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Lottocracy and class-specific political institutions: A plebeian constitutionalist defense

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1 | INTRODUCTION

Skepticism about the democratic nature of elections-based institutional systems is a growing sentiment among political theorists. There are many reasons explaining such skepticism, but one prominent concern is that these systems make representatives susceptible to capture by economic elites, in other words, *oligarchic capture*. Champions of electoral democracy commonly claim that oligarchic capture can be fought through legally-based, formal mechanisms of regulation, such as campaign finance and anti-money-in-politics legislation. But others think that elections, *as such*, are an important factor contributing to this problem. Authors have thus claimed that we should either fully replace (e.g., Guerrero, 2014; Van Reybrouck, 2016) or complement (e.g., Abizadeh, 2020; Arlen, 2019; Arlen & Rossi, 2020; Gastil & Wright, 2019; Landmore, 2020; McCormick, 2011) election-based political systems with *empowered "lottocratic" political institutions* (henceforth LPIs), wherein representatives are selected randomly from a relevant demographic and then frequently rotated.¹ This, some argue, would help solving the oligarchical tendencies of electoral democracy and better realize its normative aspirations.

This article has two distinct aims: First, to suggest that we should reconsider our optimism regarding the anti-oligarchic strength of LPIs. Second, to show how we can amend the design of LPIs to resist oligarchic capture, particularly by making them *class-specific* so that they are more

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explicitly oriented to the satisfaction of the interests of nonwealthy citizens. The reason for my moderate pessimism is that LPIs might suffer from similar oligarchic ills as those plaguing electoral systems. Under nonideal conditions, where there is significant wealth inequality and a power imbalance between, on the one hand, influential organized elites and, on the other, widely economically self-interested and politically unorganized citizens, many representatives in LPIs would still have strong incentives to neglect the pursuit of responsive and democratic outcomes—despite the presence of legal mechanisms of regulation. Call this the *problem of incentives-based capture* (henceforth PIC). Thus, my argument is that we must think beyond formal, legally based measures of regulation, and focus on *informal* mechanisms, particularly on how the prevalence of *class-based solidarity* among lottocratic representatives could counteract PIC. Drawing on recent “plebeian” approaches in democratic constitutional theory, I shall defend the claim that introducing class-specific criteria in institutional design can help to buttress a reluctance among representatives to follow wealth-generated incentives. Plebeian constitutionalists usually argue that selecting members only with that class-specific profile makes it more likely for them to develop bonds of solidarity. However, the role of class solidarity and the prioritization of plebeian interests in making a compelling case for anti-oligarchic LPIs has not been adequately explored in the current literature. Additionally, the normative implications of this perspective have not been sufficiently addressed. I expand on these points by discussing, on the one hand, the conceptual characteristics of class specificity and solidarity and how the former would reasonably maximize the latter. On the other hand, I argue that such an explanation entails a *partisan* vision of LPIs, in contrast to the centrality of *impartial deliberation* typically championed by lottocrats. The result is a stronger case for the anti-oligarchic potential and democratic justification of LPIs.

This article is structured as follows: Section 1 situates the argument in the context of the oligarchic tendencies of electoral-representative government, explaining the main benefits of sortition, and why LPIs may still be vulnerable to PIC. Section 2 defends and expands on plebeian constitutionalist approaches, emphasizing the significance of class-specificity in constructing anti-oligarchic LPIs. I then address the normative conflict between their explicitly partisan nature and the democratic value of impartial deliberation. Section 3 concludes by summarizing the argument and discussing several important limitations and challenges.

2 | OLIGARCHIC CAPTURE, ELECTIONS, AND THE (FRAGILE) PROMISES OF SELECTION BY LOT

2.1 | Electoral representation and Oligarchization

The growing literature criticizing electoral-representative government is motivated by a shared diagnosis of the strong tendencies of such systems to degenerate into plutocratic oligarchies, that is, political systems whose decision-making outcomes mirror the interests of economically advantaged groups while neglecting those of the rest of the polity.ⁱⁱ Authors largely conceptualize this issue in terms of a “... rising wealth concentration and discretionary forms of elite influence that allow super-rich actors to elude popular scrutiny while pursuing their own political objectives” (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 10), and so in an *instrumental* manner related to the *concerted political agency* of the wealthy. But here I will also take it to be a *structural* issue, related

to how political decision-making usually drifts toward their interests without them having to act (Leipold et al., 2020, p. 12). This is partly because liberal democracies under capitalist conditions have an institutional interest in “...promoting those conditions most conducive to accumulation” (Offe & Ronge, 1982, p. 250). Furthermore, economic elites can stop policies to the benefit of the public if they believe their interests are being negatively impacted. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that these elites can also exert influence over the democratic process simply by the positions that they hold within the class structure (e.g., Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1986). Accordingly, I define that *oligarchic capture* obtains whenever the interests of economic elites are overly represented and/or dominate the procedures and outcomes of political institutions. Many authors have recently claimed that this issue is partly generated and/or sustained because liberal democracies rely too heavily on electoral forms of representation. But why?

Arguments against systems based on popular elections of representatives are numerous.ⁱⁱⁱ However, egalitarian democrats concerned with the problem of oligarchic capture often emphasize its excessively *elitist* characteristics. For one, elections often result in a small portion of the citizenry, typically wealthy, holding office (Abizadeh, 2020, p. 7; Guerrero, 2014; Manin, 1997; McCormick, 2011, p. 92). These individuals are more likely to prioritize the interests of the wealthy, which often happen to be themselves. Further, the combination of the ex-ante identifiability of elected representatives, their independence during interim elections, their significant political power, as well as their expected re-election aspirations, create great incentives and opportunities for the wealthy to exert influence over them at a fairly low cost—for example, through campaign finance, lobbying, or bribery. This elitism plausibly intensifies structural forms of oligarchization, as compliance with market imperatives is also expected to align with the interests of wealthy incumbents or their funders. Elected representatives thus seem to be “... little more than agents of the powerful” (Guerrero, 2014, p. 143).

This picture is, on one level, too simplistic. Champions of electoral democracy argue that the challenges posed by oligarchy are not solely a result of elections and can be mitigated through various interventions, particularly through the implementation of formal, legally-based mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation (such as legislation to protect representatives from the influence of the wealthy). Elections are also reasonably valuable on democratic grounds. They serve an important practice through which citizens can exercise their partisan political agency, hold representatives accountable, and even punish them if necessary. However, in light of the actual failure of these formal regulations to be successful, there are compelling reasons to believe that “...[n]either electoral sanctions nor criminal prosecutions are fully effective against legal forms of sheltering [and oligarchization]” (Arlen, 2022, p. 9), and that something else is necessary to effectively achieve democratic orders that can avoid oligarchic capture (Akbar, 2020; Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, 2016). As I have already indicated, one option is to *complement* our political systems with authoritative institutions based on a different form of appointing democratic representatives: sortition.^{iv} But why would this be considered remedial, and what are the main democratic values embodied by LPIs?

2.2 | Lottocratic representation and oligarchization

Specific designs for LPIs are various, but their general appeal is well-captured in what Landa and Pevnick (2020) call the “standard case”—that is, the idea that sortition better satisfies a substantively democratic understanding of political equality and that it likely leads to less oligarchic outcomes than elections. A good way to understand the common view held by lottocrats is

thus to describe this standard case more extensively. After doing so we will be in a better position to assess whether the democratic promises of LPIs are plausible.

The first, political equality-based part of the standard case states that, because sortition gives all candidates an “... equal prospect of being selected to office, it treats all candidates as equals” (Abizadeh, 2020, p. 2; see also Gastil & Wright, 2019, p. 9). Put differently, in contrast to the elitist biases of electoral systems,lottocrats argue that sortition “...better reflects egalitarian ideals, since anyone might wield political power, and everyone has an equal chance of doing so” (Guerrero, 2014, pp. 168–169). This reason is closely linked to the fact that sortition-based mechanisms promise to fulfill a form of *descriptive representation*, whereby “...representative bodies [...] come very close to mirroring the broader society” (Landa & Pevnick, 2020, p. 3). This, authors argue, would also help to realize the value of *impartial deliberation* among representatives—which would henceforth bring about outcomes more responsive to the general interests of the polity (Abizadeh, 2020; Bagg & Schulson, 2019; Gastil & Wright, 2019).^v One reason explaining this is that randomly selected representatives would likely be ordinary citizens. These citizens not only have first-hand knowledge about popular grievances, but also have much more diverse profiles compared to elite representatives. Furthermore, descriptive representation involves including voices in democratic deliberation that were previously excluded and increasing internal diversity, which can provide valuable input for the quality of political outcomes and help avoid oligarchic bias (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 79; Pek, 2021, p. 199).

The second part of the standard case consists of the claim that LPIs possess several anti-oligarchic benefits when compared to elections. Simply put, the reason is that sortition eliminates several avenues for capture that elections are susceptible to. Given that ex-ante identifiability is ruled out, the problem of campaign funding is also canceled. This means thatlottocratic representatives would not be indebted to wealthy supporters to hold office (Guerrero, 2014, p. 164; Gastil & Wright, 2019, p. 9). Also, since there is no need to raise funds for re-election (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 79; Manin, 1997), representatives would have significantly reduced incentives to engage with wealthy lobbyists or make decisions aimed at pleasing them. Moreover, because members rotate regularly, buying off particular representatives would become costly and less durable (Guerrero, 2014, p. 164). Accordingly, intending to materialize both aspects of the standard case, authors like Gastil and Wright (2019) have proposed to constitutionalize, alongside a parliament, a sortitioned Second Chamber, and Abizadeh (2020) has built on this model to more concretely imagine a sortitioned Senate in the context of contemporary Canada. Similarly, outside the context and language of bicameralism, H el ene Landemore defends the democratic credentials of what she calls the “open mini-public”, namely, “... a large, all-purpose, randomly selected assembly of between 150 and a thousand people or so, gathered for an extended period of time (from at least a few days to a few years) for the purpose of agenda-setting and law-making of some kind, and connected via crowdsourcing platforms and deliberative forums (including other mini-publics) to the larger population” (Landemore, 2020, p. 13). These are just a few examples of alottocratic imaginary that seeks to enable ordinary citizens to hold the reigns of political power, achieve more responsive outcomes, and combat the oligarchization of representative government.

While the picture presented by the standard case may seem naively optimistic about the potential of LPIs, their champions do tend to recognize that these are not the *panacea* for fighting oligarchic power. This is not only because of the obvious importance of *other* actors and

institutions in pursuing that end but also because LPIs themselves could be susceptible to capture. Along these lines, authors usually propose to complement these institutions with legal mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation, such as “...laws regulating the role of money in politics” (Landemore, 2020, 196) or ‘firewalls’ protecting members “...from lobbyists [whereby] contact would be legally restricted to official and publicly transparent channels” (Abizadeh, 2020, p. 12). Hence, while authors do not imagine LPIs to possess inherent resistance against oligarchization, I take it they are optimistic that such measures would significantly reduce the likelihood of infection. Otherwise, the allure of the standard case would be severely diminished, and it would lose its comparative attractiveness relative to nonlottocratic institutions of representation.

I find this optimism insufficiently justified. I object that the lottocratic critique of elections does not sufficiently grapple with the implications of constitutionalizing LPIs under imperfect current conditions, in which citizens remain responsive to incentives generated by great socioeconomic inequalities. Under such conditions, it is reasonable to believe that wealthy groups will still be able and willing to exercise a great degree of influence over lottocratic representatives, just as they do over elected ones (Landa & Pevnick, 2020, p. 6). For example, the wealthy could engage in forms of instrumental capture (such as bribery) even though, as already discussed, there are good reasons to hold that LPIs are significantly less vulnerable to them than electoral institutions (Umbers, 2018, pp. 16–17; Shapiro, 2016, pp. 258–259, no. 11).

But optimistic proponents of LPIs also seem to ignore or downplay, in a more problematic way, the entrenched problem that the wealthy can create and/or rely on *incentive structures* that nudge representatives towards satisfying their interests—what I have already called the *problem of incentives-based capture* (PIC). On the one hand, PIC can be generated by the capacity of wealthy actors to actively mobilize their resources to directly incentivize representatives, for example by making it known that those who defend their interests while in office will be duly rewarded (e.g., through future, well-paid jobs; Landa & Pevnick, 2020, pp. 8–13). On the other hand, the wealthy can exercise indirect influence by sustaining a social environment that fosters capitalist and/or pro-market ideology. They can do this by affecting representatives’ assessment of the economy through several mechanisms, such as manipulating the informational context available to them to conduct such assessments. For example, owning media outlets (e.g., newspapers, TV stations, or digital companies; Aytac, 2022)^{vi} or investing in advertisement (Wojdyski & Evans, 2020) allows them to promote narratives suggesting that political decisions going against their interests would inevitably result in steep costs that individuals cannot afford to bear—and which representatives would, therefore, tend to avoid taking. This phenomenon is likely to be more impactful to political decisions in contexts like neoliberal societies (which are those most vulnerable to oligarchization), where citizens are widely disorganized, politically disinformed, self-interested, and vulnerable to manipulation (Grossman et al., 2022; Morgan & Pulignano, 2020).^{vii} Thus, the wealthy could continue to impress the powerful idea that retaining a climate of “business confidence” (Block, 1977, p. 15)—and avoiding capital’s flight by fulfilling its wishes—is imperative for sustaining a healthy political community. Put differently, insofar as representatives can be expected to yield to such structural incentives, they will have a “...strong *personal interest* in catering to the needs of wealthy and powerful groups” (Landa & Pevnick, 2020, p. 9; see also Roberts, 2022, p. 49—my emphasis). This means that the anti-oligarchic force of LPIs is severely weakened and that the appeal of the standard case is also diminished.^{viii} Is there an alternative way to vindicate it?^{ix}

3 | PLEBEIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RANDOM SELECTION: CLASS-SPECIFICITY, SOLIDARITY, AND IMPARTIALITY

My view is that we must reply to the aforementioned question in the affirmative, and that it is worthy to explore how. Essentially, I believe that not only it is the case that the anti-oligarchic benefits of LPIs *are* significant (e.g., in eliminating many relevant sources of instrumental capture) but, importantly also that formal mechanisms of regulation are not the only means to counteract or reduce the influence of pro-wealth incentives. This section explores one such alternative, namely, the implementation of *informal* mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation within LPIs. Such mechanisms do not rely on legally enforceable measures, but rather on how representatives' behavior may be "internally" regulated, such as by adherence to organically developed anti-oligarchic norms or ethical codes. Expanding on "plebeian constitutionalist" contributions (e.g., Arlen, 2019; Arlen & Rossi, 2020; Hamilton, 2014; McCormick, 2011; Mulvad & Stahl, 2019), I argue more concretely that modeling LPIs along *class-specific* criteria can help create and strengthen such mechanisms, particularly through fostering forms of *class solidarity* among representatives. Let me start by briefly explaining the plebeian constitutionalist rationale for class-specific LPIs.

3.1 | The "plebeian" case for class-specific Lottocratic institutions

Plebeian conceptions of constitutional democracy are typically defined by the belief that a proper understanding of our social landscape must acknowledge the significant impact of wealth disparities on the political sphere. They also put the problem of the great influence of economic elites over policymaking at the centre of their analysis and propose that addressing this issue requires the establishment of class-specific political institutions. Put differently, plebeian constitutionalists seek to make "... democratic theory class-conscious again" (Mulvad & Stahl, 2019, p. 593) and provide "... ordinary citizens [with] formal spaces for enacting their class-based disadvantage" (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 14) via the creation of *class-specific political institutions*. As expected, this reasoning affects their theorization of LPIs. For example, McCormick (2011) has proposed to constitutionalize the "People's Tribune" in the US: a LPI excluding the wealthiest 10% of the population from eligibility, wherein members would rotate every year, and which would hold strong constitutional powers such as vetoing law and the ability to call referenda. Arlen and Rossi (2020) have recently *expanded* McCormick's model to what they call a "Tribunate System", that is, a set of multiple and interconnected class-specific LPIs, wherein members would rotate every 2 years, each focused on overseeing a particular policy area perceived to be especially vulnerable to oligarchic capture—such as elected representatives' performance, cases of direct and indirect lobbying, the media's influence in politics, and the doings of elite philanthropists.^x All in all, the main idea is that introducing class-specificity to LPIs would enhance their ability to counteract oligarchy.

While this story may have initial plausibility, we need to explain *why* class-specificity reduces the power of PIC and *how* it would contribute to a more effective fulfillment of the standard case. In this context, it is of fundamental importance to note that, for these authors, such is the case because this institutional feature would foster *class solidarity* among representatives and the popular masses (Mulvad & Stahl, 2019, p. 589). Thus, the idea is that emphasizing the existence of class divisions could *catalyze and amplify the socioeconomic identity* of randomly

selected members, which would henceforth strengthen their solidaristic bonds and create effective informal mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 18; Klein, 2022, p. 10).^{xi} Representatives would then be less likely to accept perverse wealth-generated incentives, and thus more likely to generate responsive and positive outcomes. Put differently, the hypothesis is that class specificity maximizes class solidarity, and that, by doing so, helps to counteract PIC.

3.2 | Class solidarity, plebeian interests, and partisan Lottocracy

Although one might find this story appealing, plebeian constitutionalists' specifications of the meaning of class solidarity, the reasons why it could be produced by class-specificity, and how it would reduce PIC, are rather scattered and unsystematic. A compelling explanation of the advantages of class-specificity in the context of effectively implementing anti-oligarchic LPIs must be more thorough. That is what this section aims to deliver. By elaborating on the conceptual content of the theory of class solidarity in action, I will also provide some empirical reasons that suggest how class-specificity would plausibly enhance it.

Let me begin by exploring the fundamental characteristics of the concept of solidarity, in a broad sense. While its meaning and practical possibilities are contested in contemporary literature (Gould & Scholz, 2007; Reh, 2007; Sangiovanni & Viehoff, 2023), one common way to interpret it is as a unique form of cohesive bond. This bond generates *obligations* and *commitments* among agents to achieve a specific *common good* or set of *interests* that they acknowledge as valuable. However, it is important to note that pursuing these interests may come at a significant cost to some individuals (Mason, 1998, np). According to Taylor (2015, p. 133), members of solidary groups are not expected to have identical interests, of course. Rather, the point is that they must have a certain significant level of convergence to coordinate their actions and align their preferences toward achieving a common interest. Accordingly, it is often noted that robust solidaristic bonds tend to arise when members share certain identities, experiences, and/or political commitments (Blum, 2007). This often leads to a disposition to empathize with and mutually trust each other (*Idem*; Taylor, 2015; Gould, 2020). Bonds of solidarity, then, are rarely spontaneous, but created in the context of participating in the functioning of the group (Reh, 2007, p. 15). Furthermore, the strength of solidary groups is often considered to be stronger when members are acquainted with each other (Blum, 2007, p. 57). It also increases when they understand their interests to be in opposition to those of other groups,^{xii} or when they perceive themselves as being in a situation where they need to unite in the face of adversity (Ibid., p. 53; Sangiovanni, forthcoming) and/or fight against their oppression (Gould, 2020; Scholz, 2008). Of course, authors disagree on how to interpret the content and significance of these elements to achieve a correct understanding of solidarity. But they are usually considered to be its fundamental constituent features. I will therefore use them as a template to further theorize the issues that concern me here.

How can this depiction help us flesh out plebeian constitutionalists' under-theorized concept of class solidarity, and why would class-specific LPIs enhance it and diminish their vulnerability to PIC? One preliminary comment concerns the nature of the class-based solidaristic bonds that nonwealthy, randomly selected representatives would hypothetically develop within class-specific LPIs. In general terms, we can say that these would constitute a mutual commitment and inclination to advocate for a specific set of shared class interests, even though that might sometimes involve a setback for their individual interests. This leads us to the first

element that requires clarification, which is to define the content of such a set of *class interests* more accurately—that is, interests that refer to a set of things that would help the lives of those sharing similar class positions go collectively better and in the long run (Wright, 2000, p. 962). Probably due to the tendency of *some* (and, importantly, *not* all) Marxists to use the language of class interests, readers might get the impression that my account treats class interests in an overly substantive and moralized sense. For example, it may understand its ultimate goal as producing the conditions to “... free mankind from alienation” (Hochfeld, 1967, p. 13), including capitalist relations in general, and so on. Yet that is not required in the context of a plebeian constitutionalist account of class interests. First, it is important to acknowledge that the plebeian subject is highly diverse. It is reasonable to assume that their shared interests, including their class position, will also vary and sometimes be in conflict under socio-political conjunctures (McCarthy & Desan, 2023; Roberts, 2023). Therefore, assigning them a narrowly defined set of interests runs the risk of misrepresenting what can be expected of their collaboration. Second, it is important to emphasize that democratic forms of solidarity should involve individuals who possess a certain level of competence or authority in identifying and interpreting common goods (Rehg, 2007, p. 7). Therefore, the content of their shared interests should not be overly pre-determined as a matter of theory or abstracted from the social context in which they act (Fantasia, 1988, p. 11). That said, my view is that, if one accepts the diagnostic I have provided above, nonwealthy citizens should be conceived to be *de facto* politically disempowered, as well as systematically impoverished, as a result of oligarchic capture (Deveaux, 2021, p. 202)—a phenomenon that is uncontroversially against their interests and material wellbeing, collectively, and in the long run. Thus, I suggest that a satisfactory parameter to define the some content of plebeian class interests is that of advancing policies aimed at diminishing the causes and factors of reproduction of oligarchization—such as great inequalities of wealth and undemocratic institutional conditions—or, at least, not sacrificing their demands because they are said to be incompatible with the interests of wealthy groups. This means that, if class solidarity obtains among representatives, they should be reluctant to follow the interests of the wealthy to acquire future rewards, as well as to uncritically accept PIC-like mechanisms such as unqualified threats of significant capital flight whenever redistribution, or other pro-plebeian policies, are pursued. In other words, although they could fail to do so,lottocratic representatives engaging in class solidarity should more likely aim to erode the social conditions that lead to political oligarchization and decide to the benefit of the plebeian class.

Let me now address the empirical claim that making LPIs decidedly class-specific would enhance class solidarity amonglottocratic representatives. One first reason to give credence to the idea draws on evidence showing that non-wealthy citizens, especially those who *identify* themselves as such, are more likely to be motivated to oppose the dynamics that impoverish them (when compared to those who benefit from such dynamics) as well as tend to prefer more egalitarian economic policies (DiMaggio, 2015; Elsässer & Schäfer, 2022; Franko & Witko, 2023; Macdonald, 2019; Western, 1999). This means that they are more likely to pursue the set of class interests already stipulated by virtue of their class position *simpliciter*—meaning that one expects that institutions composed by members of this profile *only* would be increasingly anti-oligarchic too. Yet a second, more interesting hypothesis is to question why *membership in explicitly class-specific institutions* would plausibly enhance the awareness of non-wealthy citizens regarding their subordinated status and strengthen their solidary bonds. Even though most people *are* objectively disadvantaged within these systems, they often do not subjectively identify as such. As a result, this is, plausibly, one of the reasons why they do not engage in class solidarity or support egalitarian outcomes. Now, because contemporary democracies do not

include empowered class-specific political institutions within their constitutional frameworks, this hypothesis cannot be tested in its original form. However, one way to illustrate the claim's plausibility is to draw analogies with other institutional platforms that involve class-specific criteria. This can help us understand whether these platforms enhance class solidarity bonds and how they do so. Let me elaborate on this by drawing an analogy to the case of workers' unions.

As several recent studies show, societies with low levels of unionization are characterized by lower demands for redistribution, suggesting that higher unionization is *causally linked* to producing more egalitarian outcomes (Evans & Tilley, 2017; Farber et al., 2021; Frymer & Grumbach, 2021). Now, one reason why this might be the case is that when unionization proliferates, class divisions become more visible. This leads to higher degrees of working-class identification with their class position and, consequently, a disposition to oppose policies that harm their class-based interests (Condon & Wichowsky, 2020; Pek, 2021). Importantly, this suggests that membership in organizations pursuing collective economic goals significantly shapes class identification, leading to increased solidarity and preferences for progressive policies. Workers participating in unions characterized by democratic practices get access to deliberative opportunities, share experiences, come closer and increase their mutual empathy, and thus intensify their solidaristic bonds as well as giving content to their class interests (Cornforth, 1995; Gould, 2020, p. 132; Pek, 2021, p. 195; Rogers & Streeck, 1994, p. 141). Furthermore, as Franko and Witko (2023) highlight, unions utilize excellent methods to enhance class solidarity, such as the tendency of leaders to share information regarding pay gaps between workers and management. They also create a "...social environment where economic cleavages are more likely to be discussed and reinforced among members" (p. 554), which leads to an environment where members abide by the demands of the union—either voluntarily or through coercive anti-scab social norms. All of these observations suggest that union membership is an important *cause* of class solidarity, precisely because of its class-specific features.

Like in the case of unions, class-specific LPIs would make class divisions more visible to members and the public at large. They would provide opportunities for meaningful deliberation on questions of economic and political power for the former and, plausibly, enhance their class solidarity. Furthermore, in the absence of formal leaders within LPIs, one could imagine instituting programs of activist-led political education (Shelley, 2021), whereby organizations would provide randomly selected representatives with formal education on the politics of wealth maldistribution, oligarchic capture, and other relevant issues which they might deem necessary to explore to achieve their ends more successfully. Consequently, attitudes like a voluntary disposition to reject pro-wealth incentives, and/or social norms punishing those who do not—similar to anti-scab cultural norms and practices in working-class organizations—could be expected to prevail among lottocratic representatives. Of course, the specifics of how these mechanisms would work in particular LPIs should be decided based on context and careful institutional design—for example, which constitutional powers they should carry, or whether the criteria for class membership should be different (e.g., based on certain occupations, or excluding more people than the wealthiest 10%, etc.). But here, the point is to explain the more general claim that class-specificity could provide a solid foundation for crucial informal mechanisms helping to avoid oligarchy, and therefore more effectively resist PIC and achieve the standard case for LPIs.^{xiii}

Yet much of this analysis is, of course, hypothetical, and a more convincing case for class-specificity within LPIs would require concrete institutional experimentation and testing (Elsässer & Schäfer, 2022, p. 1375; Pek, 2021, p. 199). But, absent this experimentation, it is

worth considering how some *disanalogies* between these institutions and unions might affect the ability of the former to create class solidarity, and ways in which such disanalogies can be ameliorated. While the following discussion does not aim to be exhaustive, I shall address four of these disanalogies and venture ways in which they can be downplayed. I shall discuss two disanalogies which, I think, are easier to address, and then two others that, while not defeating, are more complex and present a stronger challenge to my account. The first disanalogy (1) is that unions organize workers against more *tangible* opponents (bosses, management, etc.) than in the case of LPIs. Given the importance of a visible and direct conflict in producing class solidarity, the idea is that, without such conflict, class-specific LPIs may not produce the same kind of class solidarity. However, I believe that, because LPIs as I construe them *are* explicitly aimed at conflicting with oligarchic agents and their interests, an oppositional element is not missing—it is just presented in a different form. Therefore, we should not be too concerned with this objection. A second disanalogy (2) is that unionized workers plausibly share more substantive experiences and know each other better than randomly selected representatives, not only because they share in their workplaces, but because they plausibly spend more time together than in the case of LPIs—where members rotate frequently. That said, it is important to note that LPIs fare better than unions allowing for instances of meaningful solidarity-building. One example is the central place of face-to-face deliberation in LPIs, which, as partially discussed above, has proven to be a significant factor in producing shared identities and increasing solidarity (Prinz & Westphal, 2023, p. 20). Accordingly, while the way in which shared experiences help to produce class solidarity differs from the ways unions work, class-specific LPIs have their own resources to achieve that end. Disanalogies (1) and (2) should therefore be downplayed.

But there are (at least) two further, more serious disanalogies. Third one (3) is based on the claim that there are good reasons to believe that effective unions are successful in creating class solidarity because they are platforms of mass mobilization. Since they can only achieve their demands if members stand in collective action, that creates an incentive for leaders to push members to stand in solidarity—and, for that reason, facilitate such bonds. Yet LPIs are not platforms of mass mobilization, and they lack leaders with strong incentives to push them to create solidarity. Thus, if such an incentive structure *is* fundamental, it means that we should be skeptical of the argument presented here. Relatedly, the fourth disanalogy (4) claims that healthy unions are such because they are *staffed* with personnel who have been successful in building solidarity. But, again, since LPIs are rather composed of representatives that are randomly selected and *frequently rotated*, it would be defeating to staff them, for example, with *permanent* members that would have been previously successful in creating class solidarity. This means that we should doubt the capacity of these institutions to produce the same degrees of class solidarity as unions.

Although not decisive, I think that the following measures could help ameliorate disanalogies (3) and (4). Starting with (3), the incentives union leaders have in producing class solidarity are just *one* factor in explaining why these institutional forms produce these bonds—and thus one should not deduce that there are *no* relevant analogies between them and class-specific LPIs. Even if, for the sake of argument, we imagine that class-specific LPIs cannot fully replicate this incentive structure since they are not platforms of mass mobilization, it does not follow that a similar structure *cannot* be created through other measures. For instance, one way to maximize the chance of producing class solidarity would be to make sure that representatives have a clear understanding of the expected results of this kind of institution—which is a widely acknowledged factor for producing successful citizens' assemblies (e.g., OECD, 2022). Thus, one

could stipulate that, because class-specific LPs *should* be anti-oligarchic to be successful, members could be formally *asked* to behave along the lines of the requirements theorized above, perhaps in the form of constitutional directive principles (e.g., Khaitan, 2019a, 2019b). This could also be maximized through programs of activist-led political education, as briefly suggested already. Such methods, in turn, could foster positive feedback loops whereby members not only receive formal *requests* to be in solidarity with each other but produce outcomes in which they come to have a *genuine interest* in engaging in such mutual dispositions—and thus incentives to behave in that manner.^{xiv} Similarly, regarding (4), while it would be counterintuitive to have permanent staff in anti-oligarchic institutions whose very nature is to frequently rotate members, one can imagine institutional designs in which representatives could benefit from contact with staff, or experts, that have shown to align with the purpose of these institutions. Deviating from traditional lottocratic arguments (e.g., Guerrero, 2014), which place experts and agencies in contact with randomly selected representatives to provide “impartial” expertise, my view is that not only could it be productive to foster interactions with experts that *do* share the *aims* of these institutions—for example, economists of an egalitarian bent, or even union leaders that have been successful in producing class solidarity in their organizations, and so on—but to give randomly selected members the capacity to democratically select the agencies from which they want to receive advice.^{xv} To reiterate, although I believe that all these routes for institutional experimentation are appealing in their capacity to reduce the force of (3) and (4), we cannot establish with *certainty* that they would produce their expected empirical effects. They do, however, provide us with potential solutions to diminish the extent to which these two institutional forms are disanalogous and thus contribute to the attractiveness of a class-specific argument for the design of LPs.

Now, what is *not* uncertain is that, *at a conceptual level*, my argument presents a *partisan* case for LPs, in the sense that it sides “... with an agent of change [i.e., plebeian, non-wealthy citizens] in a political struggle against agents of injustice [i.e., the wealthy]” (Laurence, 2020, p. 9, no. 23). Put differently, it is important to acknowledge that these institutions, *by design*, are intended to represent and advance the interests of *a part of the polity* as participants in a bargaining process, or struggle, against others (Hamilton, 2014, p. 18). I think this is an entirely admissible move for egalitarian democrats to make. But this is not common sense among democratic theorists interested in lottocracy. Indeed, many argue that if we are interested in materializing LPs, we should reject class-specificity because it explicitly clashes with a fundamental value that underlies the argument for the standard case: *impartial deliberation*. If this is true, the values that underpin LPs and class-specific institutional design seem to be incompatible. This implies that we should reject the class-specific solution to PIC on a strictly *normative* level. The following sub-section discusses this objection.

3.3 | The impartiality-based objection

The impartiality-based objection is grounded on the idea that, when a partisan element is introduced within class-specific LPs, they become less intrinsically justifiable from a democratic standpoint. Moreover, they are also likely to yield poorer outcomes compared to class-neutral alternatives. For example, Landemore claims that “... there [seems to be] something [intrinsically] unattractive and indeed undemocratic about a scheme that pits representatives of the wealthy against the poor, reifying class conflict and, as a result, problematically denying the fundamental political equality that should be at the heart of an authentic democracy”

(Landemore, 2020, p. 50). Indeed, the fundamental rationale for the democratic nature of lottocratic, descriptive representation is that it instantiates the value of political equality by providing everyone with an equal chance to hold public office and that doing so would make deliberation “... presumptively responsive to *people's* interests in an informed, *impartial* fashion [where the people is taken to be the public as a whole]” (Abizadeh, 2020, p. 10—my emphasis). This is connected to the claim that excluding members from the polity in the process of decision-making within LPIs would diminish the quality of deliberation because it would reduce the *cognitive diversity* within these assemblies (Landemore, 2020, p. 7, no. 13), alienate progressive elites who could be beneficial for the plebeian cause (Vergara, 2020, p. 244), and result in worse and biased outcomes. In other words, introducing a *partisan* and *partial* element into the construction of LPIs would undermine their intrinsic democratic credentials and prevent them from achieving the desired outcomes advocated by supporters of this kind of democratic innovation (Barber, 2018, p. 156ff). Class-specificity seems, therefore, incompatible with the standard case favored by lottocrats.

I find the impartiality-based objection important. But it holds less normative force than it may initially seem, for two interrelated reasons. The first casts doubt on the claim that the interpretation of democracy at the heart of lottocratic proposals must adhere to the constraints posed by the impartiality-based objection. Such a view seems committed to a “classic” ideal of deliberation, according to which laws should embody “...the reasonable consensus of publicly debating [persons, and not] a compromise between competing private interests” (Habermas, 1989 [1962], p. 81). But one must note that some deliberative democrats, who aim to address a less idealized social world, are increasingly endorsing models that include more partisan and self-interested forms of conflict and negotiation. These models include the use of coercive force, as compatible with the normative requirements of democratic deliberation (e.g., Mansbridge et al., 2010). In this context, it is worth highlighting that relaxing the constraints of what counts as justified democratic deliberation seems particularly appropriate when relevant parties are highly unequal in terms of political and economic power (Ibid., pp. 82–83), which is the case in scenarios involving deep oligarchization. If true, champions of the impartiality objection seem to represent only a *specific*, competing interpretation of the values underpinning lottocratic representation. The burden of justification is on them to show that this interpretation is the best. In the absence of such a justification, the partisan case presented here is consistent with the values embodied in lottocratic proposals and therefore aligns with the standard case. And, because of the purported anti-oligarchic benefits of my more partisan argument, I suggest that there are compelling reasons to favor it.^{xvi}

The second argument that I want to consider here targets the plausibility of certain empirical claims on which the impartiality-based objection appears to rely. Essentially, the crux of the issue is that their champions seem to aspire to anti-oligarchic outcomes while preserving full formal political equality and impartial deliberation within LPIs. Yet, there are reasons to believe that this goal, although noble, is a false alternative, one that could potentially perpetuate undemocratic relations (Young, 1990, pp. 96–121). Indeed, if the intensity of oligarchization is as high as stipulated above, it is strange to expect that having more “inclusionary” arrangements would better satisfy political equality if doing so will deprive us of the grounds for the kind of plebeian solidarity that we need to counteract PIC. Put differently, unless we are persuaded by the idea that we solve PIC through formal, legally-based mechanisms of regulation alone, non-class-specific lottocratic assemblies will remain strongly vulnerable to it. This means that they will *not* produce impartial deliberation either. Instead, they will produce *elitist*, *pro-capitalist* deliberation, similar to the kind that current class-neutral elected assemblies already

tend to favor. Furthermore, the concern with the lack of diversity within these institutions, and the negative effects that such a homogeneity could bring in, are misplaced—for, related to what I clarified in footnote 11, the plebeian subject, or “non-wealthy” class, is *already* very diverse. There is, moreover, no principled reason to believe that alienating progressive economic elites from deliberation would worsen policy outcomes. Therefore, when democrats face a dilemma between endorsing either explicitly exclusionary, but solidarity-enhancing lottocratic institutions, or inclusionary institutions that we have good reasons to think will be captured, they should decisively and unapologetically opt for the former.^{xvii} Impartial deliberation and fully equal opportunity to exercise political power in *all* institutions seem inaccessible to citizens living under plutocratic oligarchies, like us. Coming to terms with this predicament might be necessary to fight the entrenched injustice of such political orders.

4 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article argued that, if we seek to meaningfully correct the oligarchic tendencies of representative government through the employment of LPIs, we should give more attention to the question of how to ground informal mechanisms of regulation within their inner workings. In particular, I claimed that class-specific random selection is likely to represent an attractive way of producing bonds of solidarity among representatives which, in turn, would make them reluctant to follow pro-wealth incentives. Expanding on the meaning and workings of class-based solidarity, I also claimed that such an account involves a partisan vision of LPIs which, despite clashing with the value of impartial deliberation, is worth pursuing.

I would like to finish by addressing certain observations regarding the practical and ethical constraints of my argument, as well as provide some insights on their relevance within an institutional framework for promoting egalitarian social change. Regarding empirical issues, there is no denying that this account is based on several controversial claims. For example, leaving aside the potential concern that the whole picture of widespread oligarchization presented is overly dramatic, some might want to contest the pessimism that I exposed regarding the ability of formal mechanisms of regulation to avoid capture, or the actual ability of class-specificity to enhance class-based solidarity. I have also bracketed important issues of institutional design, such as how to deal with the possibility that representatives selected on a random basis may be too “incompetent” to produce good policy—although there is important empirical evidence indicating the opposite (e.g., Pek, 2021, p. 202). Again, the problem is that these issues can only be addressed through experimentation (Guerrero, 2014, p. 178). My suggestion is that, given the longstanding failure of formal mechanisms of regulation to succeed in counteracting oligarchization, we have a strong presumptive case for trying alternatives such as the one presented here.

It is also true that my account is *normatively incomplete*. Among other things, some authors have leveled important *general* charges against LPIs—for example, Lafont's (2020) arguments that these institutions involve unjustified forms of *blind deference* over political decisions, because citizens who are not randomly selected would have few mechanisms to control the content of their decisions. I have also not addressed important *targeted* objections to *class-specific* LPIs—such as the idea that all defensible conceptions of democracy must secure formal political equality *always*, regardless of the outcomes that they could produce (e.g., Urbinati, 2011; Vergara, 2020).^{xviii} Such objections are important and legitimate, and a better democratic case for class-specific LPIs should address them at length. But, in this context, I will limit myself to

saying that the very option of a *complementary road* to constitutionalizing these institutions serves as a preliminary reply—since it retains, within the political system, other institutions which fare better in materializing the values that generate these objections and work as a check on LPIs. On the one hand, this is the case because, although LPIs (class-specific or not) might entail problems of blind deference, we must remember that they *can* be made compatible with formal mechanisms of regulation and accountability, such as “...recall processes, oaths of office, training, disclosure requirements, and penalties for bribery” (Pek, 2021, p. 202). Again, the point has never been that such mechanisms are useless, but rather that they have shown to be insufficient on their own. On the other hand, and more importantly, under the complementary road, LPIs would be checked by other institutions, either electoral or judicial, and so on (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 92). Furthermore, class-specific LPIs can coexist with other electoral institutions based on universal enfranchisement, which might mitigate liberal anxieties about formal political equality. Again, while incomplete, there are promising routes for a more comprehensive defense of these institutions.

Finally, there are also important questions about what we should expect from—and how to implement—this plebeian constitutionalist proposal within the framework of existing political systems. While I have already clarified that I do not think there is sufficient reason to completely replace electoral systems, and that the successful application and design of LPIs depends on several contextual and practical issues, it is also fundamental to reaffirm, as many plebeian constitutionalists do, that they are surely not sufficient to curb oligarchic influence or correct all the challenges confronting contemporary democracies (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 18). Rather, doing so would undoubtedly necessitate a “...radical redistribution of social and economic power” (Bagg, 2018, p. 902) which can only realistically arise from poor-led activism and grassroots social movements (Deveaux, 2021) in conjunction with progressive political parties gaining power (Gastil & Wright, 2019, p. 32; Wright, 2019, p. 43). Along similar lines, there are very good reasons to doubt that current political elites would implement LPIs without the pressure of other strong political agents pushing them to do so (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 87). But this seems to suggest that LPIs are functionally redundant since their materialization relies on a politically empowered plebeian, a unified political subject. Why then bother designing institutions politically empowering them if they are already empowered? My view is that, while this objection certainly applies to those who disentangle the achievement of progressive ends through institutional innovation from the struggle of the popular masses, it does not for those who unite them—and that is the perspective defended here. Popular movements supported by political parties are essential, but so are institutional channels for ordinary people to effectively resist organized oligarchic power sustainably (Mulvad & Stahl, 2019, p. 603).^{xix} Egalitarian democrats interested in realizing their aspirations should emphasize the importance of *both* elements, not only one.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

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ENDNOTES

- ⁱ Following Lafont, I suggest that a political institution is *empowered* if and only if it holds highly authoritative constitutional powers—such as law-making or binding vetoing; its opposite are institutions holding mere *advisory* or *consultative* powers (Lafont, 2020, p. 107). The distinction between “empowered” institutions and their opposite is, of course, a matter of degree. For example, Mulvad and Popp-Madsen (2021, p. 81) have recently proposed a four-stage categorization specified in terms of how much authority they hold, ranging from *legislative*, *co-legislative*, *agenda-setting*, to *consultative* institutions. That said, the distinction between authoritative and non-authoritative institutions is, to my view, sufficiently clear, and I will focus on defending examples of the former kind.
- ⁱⁱ The intensity of this phenomenon in contemporary politics is a matter of debate, but the evidence showing its significance is robust—for example, as Elkjær and Klitgaard (2021) demonstrate in a systematic review of the recent literature. For favorable evidence in the contemporary United States, see Bartels (2017), Hacker and Pierson (2010), Winters (2011), and Gilens and Page (2014). See Hopkin and Lynch (2016) for a discussion on Europe.
- ⁱⁱⁱ See, for example, Brennan (2016) well-known “epistocratic” alternative, according to which the right to participate in the political system should be circumscribed to social-scientific experts or voters who pass tests of political knowledge.
- ^{iv} As mentioned earlier, some proponents of lottocracy argue for the complete elimination of elections as a method for selecting political officials. This viewpoint is explicitly supported by authors such as Guerrero (2014) and Van Reybrouck (2016), while others like Landemore have a less clear stance, sometimes suggesting a combination of methods (Landemore, 2020) and other times not (Landemore, 2022). However, both for reasons related to the unlikelihood of getting rid of elections, but also because of their contribution to channel citizens’ partisan agency, most authors opt for what I call the *complementary road*, which makes the more modest claim that “...sortition merely constitutes one particular form that the more general principle of democracy (rule of the people) can take” (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 79), one which should “...strengthen, not replace, [electoral] democracy” (Ibid., p. 80; also Arlen, 2022). As I will discuss in the conclusion below, this approach will also be useful in addressing significant objections to the democratic justifiability of LPs.
- ^v This means that, according to many theorists, LPs should not be designed to represent specific interests in a bargaining process (Gastil & Wright, 2019, p. 33). As I will explain below, I disagree with this view.
- ^{vi} Some examples are Rupert Murdoch’s direct control over his media empire, which he has systematically deployed to exercise influence over US politics and beyond (Wolff, 2008), or Sheldon Adelson’s ownership of the newspaper *Israel Hayom* in Israel, which there are good reasons to believe has been extremely effective in promoting Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing agenda (Grossman et al., 2022).
- ^{vii} Again, some dominant narratives are those to continue to peddle dubious claims that higher economic redistribution is bound to produce unacceptable degrees of inflation, decreased growth, and unemployment, all of which are important threats to the individual welfare of ordinary citizens (Bagg, 2021, p. 9; Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 87; Umbers, 2018, pp. 16–17). To the extent that a concern with their individual welfare is widespread amongst citizens in neoliberal societies, it is reasonable to believe that randomly selected representatives unexposed to measures aimed at reducing such egoistic tendencies will tend to avoid policies that affect them individually in the short-term.

- viii It is important to recognize that there is disagreement in the empirical literature regarding the extent to which the informational contexts in liberal democracies are biased to the interests of wealthy elites, and how much these elites can actually exercise influence through these means. For example, Prat and Strömberg (2013) suggest that, if media owners' motives are profit-driven, the extent to which they can shift coverage of news to their ideological bent is very much constrained by consumers' preferences (see also Prior, 2014), as these consumers might move to other media that mirror their preferences. Yet, following Martin and McCrain (2019), there are good reasons to believe that consumers tend to stick with the sources they already know—however, biased they are, and they tend to be. This means that they *do* stick with pro-wealth biased outlets and, granted that the informational context regarding economic issues greatly affects their positions on these issues, there are reasons to hold the intensity of PIC. But this is a complex issue, and the general claim is still contested. See Duch and Stevenson (2006), Garz and Martin (2021), and Jacobs et al. (2021), however, for further arguments supporting the claim that pro-wealthy media bias is real and politically impactful in rich liberal democracies.
- ix One strategy to diminish LPIs' vulnerability to capture is to bestow them with purely advisory powers, so that it would be less interesting for the wealthy to exercise influence (Umbers, 2018, p. 18; Landa & Pevnick, 2020, p. 13). This feature attaches to recent proposals such as “citizen oversight juries” (Bagg, 2021) or “citizen tax juries” (Arlen, 2022), which are anti-oligarchic institutions aimed at overseeing and triggering procedures against agents engaging in capture, but that do not take highly authoritative decisions. While these institutions may help tackle oligarchic capture at different levels of the socio-political landscape. I think their lack of authority has obvious drawbacks. Simply put, it is ultimately unclear why we should expect already oligarchized institutional systems to “hear” them at all (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 81). I think this worry gives us sufficient reason to keep pursuing more empoweredlottocratic institutions.
- x It may be necessary to clarify that, in this article, I follow the way in which plebeian constitutionalists tend to theorize “class”, that is, in terms of stratification approaches focused on the distribution of income and wealth. I am aware of the important limitations often leveled against this perspective—for example, its relative insensitivity to questions of economic power, or to the intersection between class and other forms of oppression (Cicerchia, 2021). But here I bracket them for the sake of the argument.
- xi One might object that, since in capitalist societies “plebeians” represent the majority of the population, excluding wealthy elites from their inner functioning would not really make much of a difference. In fact, the most likely scenario is that LPIs will be composed by “plebeians”, making class-specific criteria redundant. My view is that this objection misses the mark, as it ignores the positive effects of *explicitly recognizing* class divisions in the context of institutional politics, and how that awareness might enhance class solidarity—thereby increasing the anti-oligarchic nature of these institutions.
- xii Several authors agree in that oppositional or agonistic politics enhances in-group solidarity—for example, Kolers (2016), Frega (2021), and Morgan and Pulignano (2020). This does not mean, however, that they endorse such a polarization as an unqualified good.
- xiii With these elements in mind, an important issue to consider is whether other social divisions based on race, gender, occupation, geography, or even religion interfere with or undermine class solidarity amongst non-wealthy representatives within LPIs. This question seems particularly pressing given a common concern regarding the potential negative effects of making class salient in the context of solidarity-building, particularly in obscuring and/or reinforcing other forms of oppression pervasive in our societies—for example, that focusing on class identity might leave patriarchal and/or racist attitudes within these assemblies untouched, and perhaps exacerbate them. My stance on this issue is, first, that the kind of solidarity that primarily exercises me in this article is one that can foster an opposition to oligarchy and, for all the reasons given, a focus on class seems appropriate to that effect. Furthermore, while such a saliency of class *might* produce negative effects, there is also empirical evidence that it can produce the opposite—for example, Frymer and Grumbach (2021) recent analysis showing that union membership *reduces* racial resentment compared with those who are not unionized. But, again, whether that would occur in class-specific LPIs is a matter of concrete experimentation. If class-based institutional forms would indeed impede the emergence of other important forms of solidarity, and/or deepen oppressive social divisions, that would be a strong argument against their

desirability. This would weaken the force of the argument I am trying to make here, maybe to the point in which it should be rejected altogether.

- ^{xiv} See Klein (2022) for a similar argument regarding the necessity of evaluating procedures in tandem with the outcomes they produce, and whether these dynamically maximize relations of equality.
- ^{xv} See Pamuk (2021, ch. 4) for a somewhat similar proposal for democratically scrutinizing expertise in the context of scientific decisions.
- ^{xvi} That said, I agree with Mansbridge et al. (2010) in that, although allowing deliberation to include the pursuit of more factional interests, its processes and outcomes should plausibly be constrained by “...universal constraints of moral behavior and human rights and by the particularly deliberative constraints of mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, fairness, and mutual justification” (p. 76). If class-specific LPIs were to transgress these norms—especially in an intense and repeated manner—the arguments in this paper would not support them. See also Sangiovanni and Viehoff (2023) for similar comments regarding how these constraints also apply to the special obligations we acquire towards fellows in solidarity.
- ^{xvii} For a similar rationale applied to the desirability of promoting unionization through state-led reform, see O’Neill and White (2018).
- ^{xviii} I discuss this problem regarding class-specific political institutions more generally in Harting (2023).
- ^{xix} For example, Felicetti and Della Porta (2019, pp. 160–165) argue, on the basis of empirical analyses of sortition-based assemblies during the last 25 years, that experiments withlottocratic institutions tend to be materialized only when they are demanded from social movements and the broader civil society. Institutional solutions to oligarchization, whether focused on sortition or other innovations, must not overlook the significance of this element of popular agency if we are to effectively stabilize it within the political system.

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