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**Market Leadership Through Technology – Backward  
Compatibility in the U.S. Handheld Video Game Industry**

**Jörg Claussen, Tobias Kretschmer and Thomas Spengler**

## **Abstract**

The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward compatibility moderates this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces supply of new software. We examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain market leadership.

Keywords: backward compatibility, market leadership, network effects, video games, two-sided markets

JEL Classifications: L15, L82, O33

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Jörg Claussen is a Postdoc at the Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich. Tobias Kretschmer is an Associate in the Productivity and Innovation Programme at the Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. He is also a Professor of Management at the University of Munich and Department Head at the Ifo Institute. Thomas Spengler is a Management Consultant.

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## 1. Introduction

Firms frequently achieve a position of (temporary) market leadership in high-technology industries (Lee et al. 2010, Wade 1995). Especially in the early stages of a technology's life cycle, this can lead to a dominant design for a technology (Suarez and Utterback 1995). In industries with significant network effects, the tendency for an industry (or a technological generation) to be dominated by a single firm or standard is especially strong (Arthur 1989). This pattern of market leadership in technology-intensive industries creates incentives for firms to invest in continuous learning (Schilling 2002), build a technological community (Wade 1995), exploit complementarities across products (Lee et al. 2010), or engage in aggressive pricing (De Figueiredo and Silverman 2007), among others. Securing an early lead can therefore translate into a competitive advantage throughout a technological generation (Arthur 1989, Mascarenhas 1992, Lieberman 1989).

Interestingly, in network industries, market leadership often persists across generations, which suggests that providers of successful technologies can carry over some of their dominance to future generations. The strategy literature identifies a number of mechanisms by which this intergenerational transfer of market leadership can take place. One stream of literature proposes that incumbent firms possess dynamic capabilities developed from prior generations that are useful in the new generation (De Figueiredo and Silverman 2007, Chen et al. 2012, Danneels 2002, Kotha et al. 2010, Eggers 2012). The core logic here is that firms are better at managing a new technology because they have learned how to do so in a prior one. Another line of research suggests that firms utilize complementary assets acquired in a previous product generation (Rothaermel and Boeker 2008, Hill and Rothaermel 2003, Jones 2003, Tripsas 1997). A specific form of leveraging complementary assets from a previous technological generation is to maintain backward compatibility with the old generation (Shapiro and Varian 1999).

Our paper studies if backward compatibility by the market leader can be a strategy to sustain market leadership across generations. We pose three questions about the nature and implications of backward compatibility in markets with network effects:

1. How does backward compatibility influence demand for a new product generation?
2. How does backward compatibility affect the supply of new complementary products?
3. Are the effects of backward compatibility moderated by technological progress?

We analyze the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, which is well-suited for our questions because i) backward compatibility is possible, but not necessary and ii) generation changes can be identified clearly. Handheld consoles are especially interesting as they exhibit different degrees of technological change across generations, so we can analyze the tradeoff between backward compatibility and technological progress across generations. Existing work in the market for home video game consoles studies asymmetric network effects (Shankar and Bayus 2003), changes of indirect network effects over the product life cycle (Clements and Ohashi 2005), software exclusivity (Corts and Lederman 2009) and blockbuster software (Stremersch and Bincken 2009). While these papers handle multiple generations they do not explore how backward compatibility affects generational change and market leadership, except for Clements and Ohashi (2005), who address backward compatibility by adding available games for the *Playstation 1* to those of the *Playstation 2*.

The theoretical literature on cross-generational or ‘vertical’ compatibility (Katz and Shapiro 1994) studies firm incentives for backward compatibility. Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994) find that price discrimination increases compatibility incentives, while Kende (1994) argues that backward compatibility is more likely as valuations for old and new technologies are similar and building an installed base of complementary products is expensive. These results are confirmed in a simulation model by Lee *et al.* (2003), who find that low valuation for backward compatibility and a small installed base advantage of the old generation render backward compatibility less likely. Nahm (2008) finds that profits for the incumbent are higher with backward compatibility, which may increase its incentives to upgrade beyond the social optimum (Ellison and Fudenberg 2000). From a demand perspective, Shy (1996) finds that backward compatibility increases the rate of new technology adoption.

The empirical literature on cross-generational compatibility finds that backward compatibility helps carry over some installed base advantage to future generations. Liikanen *et al.* (2004) and Koski and Kretschmer (2005) study intergenerational effects between the first and second generations of mobile telephony and confirm the positive impact of backward compatibility. Greenstein (1993) finds that buyers are more likely to select a new mainframe computer system if they own a compatible predecessor system. Gandal *et al.* (2000) study audio technologies and run a counterfactual by assuming backward compatibility of CD and vinyl. Compatibility would have accelerated diffusion by 1.5 years.

We estimate demand for handheld video consoles as well as supply of game titles. Our estimation strategy builds on Clements and Ohashi (2005), extending their approach to account for backward compatibility, console age and the level of technological progress from

one generation to the next. Further, we identify console characteristics to allow for a meaningful comparison between the effects of backward compatibility and increased console performance. In line with prior work, we find that backward compatibility positively affects demand for a new generation. In addition, we find that: i) backward compatibility works through the installed base of software of the compatible parent generation, ii) it increases demand for hardware, but decreases supply of software, and iii) backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations.

We capture a (demand-enhancing) direct and a (demand-reducing) indirect effect of backward compatibility. The former directly influences the adoption decision through the installed base of software for the compatible parent generations. This effect weakens for higher technological leaps between generations. The latter works indirectly as old software partly substitutes for new software and thus lowers new software demand, reducing software supply, which in turn decreases hardware demand. The demand-enhancing effect outweighs the demand-reducing effect so that backward compatibility helps transfer network effects across generations. Indeed, we find that the market leader, Nintendo, was able to maintain its market leadership across multiple generations through a strategy of backward compatibility.

This paper is structured as follows. We first give an overview of the U.S. market for handheld game consoles. We then develop our hypotheses and test them using a model of hardware demand and software supply. A discussion of our results follows. Further, we analyze the role of backward compatibility in maintaining market leadership by performing a counterfactual experiment and considering alternative explanations. Finally, we conclude.

## **2. Industry Background**

The market for handheld game consoles first took off with the appearance of Nintendo's *Game Boy* in 1989, the first device to sell to the mass market (Forster 2005). Handheld game consoles are – just as their (immobile) home video game counterparts – part of a system comprising both hard- and software. Hardware manufacturers supply consoles and often also software titles,<sup>1</sup> while software providers concentrate on the development and distribution of games. Given indirect network effects (Clements and Ohashi 2005), hardware suppliers have an interest to encourage development of complementary products, namely game titles. Since the 'Atari shock' in the early 1980s (when the game console market collapsed due to a sharp increase in poor game titles), hardware suppliers actively manage quality of the market's

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<sup>1</sup> On average, hardware manufacturers produced 12.8% of game titles for their consoles.

software side: developers need to sign detailed licensing contracts which are then enforced by legal and technological means such as security chips (Genakos 2001). This also prevents any hardware manufacturer from developing consoles that are compatible with games for other platforms.


Our sample ranges from 1995 to 2007.<sup>2</sup> Industry observers typically separate consoles into generations. In industry terminology, we study generations IV to VII (Forster 2005).

Table 1 provides an overview of the consoles in the generations we study. It is striking that Nintendo – from IV up to VII – was continuously present in the market while its competitors changed continuously. Figure 1 illustrates Nintendo’s market share dominance over the whole period. We now describe the competitive landscape over the four technology generations we cover.

**Table 1: Mobile handheld consoles sold between 1995 and 2007**

Console	Platform	Backward Compatibility	U.S. launch	Manufacturer	Hardware CPU [MHz]	Weight [g]
<b>Generation IV</b>						
Game Boy	Game Boy	No	8/1989	Nintendo	4.2	300
Game Boy Pocket			9/1996			148
Game Gear	Game Gear	No	1/1991	Sega	3.6	500
<b>Generation V</b>						
Game Boy Color	GB Color	Yes	11/1998	Nintendo	8.4	188
Virtual Boy	Virtual Boy	No	8/1995	Nintendo	20	760
game.com	game.com	No	9/1997	Tiger	10	380
game.com Pocket Pro			12/1999			n/a
<b>Generation VI</b>						
Game Boy Advance	Game Boy Advance	Yes	6/2001	Nintendo	16.7	180
Game Boy Advance SP			3/2003			142
Neo Geo Pocket Color	NGP Color	No	8/1999	SNK	6.14	145
N-Gage	N-Gage	No	10/2003	Nokia	104	137
N-Gage QD			8/2004			143
<b>Generation VII</b>						
DS	DS	Yes	11/2004	Nintendo	67	275
DS Lite			6/2006			218
Playstation Portable	Playstation Portable	No	3/2005	Sony	333	280
Playstation Portable			9/2007			189
Slim						

<sup>2</sup> Extending the study period beyond 2007 would be problematic as smartphones (with Apple’s iPhone as the most prominent representative) have since then developed to be close substitutes to dedicated handheld game consoles.



**Figure 1: Monthly market shares from 1995 to 2007**

Generation IV comprised Nintendo's *Game Boy* and *Game Boy Pocket*, and Sega's *Game Gear*. At the start of our sample in 1995, these consoles had already been on the market for some time. The devices basically shared the market, with Nintendo's share ranging between 60% and 80% and Sega's moving between 20% and 40% accordingly.

The generation V console *Game Boy Pocket* reached market shares exceeding 80% from 1998 on. This is remarkable considering that: i) the device was basically a remake with a smaller body but the same hardware capabilities as its predecessor, the *Game Boy*, and ii) Tiger Electronic's *Game.com*, which had superior hardware capabilities, had also been launched in the meantime. Nintendo's *Virtual Boy* – in contrast to the company's other products – was comparably unsuccessful due to its bulkiness, problems during use<sup>3</sup> and little software available. It only reached substantial market share through a harsh price cut aimed at reducing stockpiles.<sup>4</sup> The *Game.com Pocket Pro*, a lighter and less bulky remake of the *Game.com*, did not even reach 1% market share.

The next dominant device was Nintendo's *Game Boy Color*, which again was not the technically most advanced console of its time. Its main differentiating feature was the enormous installed base of backward compatible software titles from its predecessors. While its competitors did not have an installed base of existing games, the *Game Boy Color* could build on millions of software copies sold in the almost ten years the *Game Boy* platform had

<sup>3</sup> Nintendo *Virtual Boy*'s image generation was based on a combination of a LED unit and oscillating mirrors. Users had to focus on these mirrors while playing which caused many players headaches. Hence, the *Virtual Boy* bore a warning statement that it may cause headaches from the start of retail availability in the United States (Kent 2002, pp. 513-515).

<sup>4</sup> The maximum market share reached by the *Virtual Boy* was 44%, reached after cutting the initial price of more than \$160 to less than \$30 in April 1997.

been on the market. *Game Boy Color* users did not have to wait for availability of new games and could buy or swap used games straight away.

The next generation (VI) started with the *Game Boy Advance*. The device, which featured improved hardware power on the one hand and backward compatibility to *Game Boy Color* games on the other reached market shares close to 100% at the top of its cycle. While there was no device on the market at that time matching the *Game Boy Advance* in terms of hardware power, attributing its dominance merely to weak competition would be simplistic. Backward compatibility allowed users to draw on a game library comprising more than 46 million *Game Boy Color* titles from the outset, which clearly contributed to its success.

In early 2003 Nintendo launched the *Game Boy Advance SP*, a facelifted *Game Boy Advance* with identical technology but a new body design and minor screen improvements. It matched its predecessor's success, completely dominating the market at the top of its cycle. It prevailed not only over dated devices like the *Neo Geo Pocket Color* but also over Nokia's *N-Gage*, which had a processor more than 6 times faster than the *Game Boy Advance SP*.

At the end of 2004 Nintendo launched generation VII of handheld game consoles. Compared to the previous generation, the Nintendo *DS* was a significant improvement in terms of hardware performance. The device was again backward compatible and could play Nintendo's generation VI games. However, in this generation Nintendo shared the market with Sony. Sony's *Playstation Portable (PSP)* started with a market share exceeding 50% and then ranging between 20% and 40%. This is remarkable given that Sony had to start from scratch in the business while Nintendo again had a strong installed base of games. The *PSP* was the most powerful handheld console ever and outperformed the *DS* by far – for example, it was nearly five times as fast as Nintendo's *DS*. At the end of our study period both players Nintendo and Sony launched remakes of their consoles: the *DS Lite* and the *Playstation Portable Slim*. Both are lighter and possess a smaller body than their predecessors.

Throughout the generations we study, Nintendo was successful, except with the *Virtual Boy*. At least part of its success may be due to the enormous installed bases of games leveraged by the company through backward compatibility. Sony's success suggests that such dominance may be overcome by significant technological progress. While many companies failed in challenging Nintendo with consoles roughly on par, Sony's *Playstation Portable*, which outperformed Nintendo's *DS* by far, gained substantial market share quickly.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Note that in this industry, success is typically measured in terms of market share.



### 3. Hypotheses

We now derive hypotheses on the effect of backward compatibility on hardware demand and software supply. We first discuss how backward compatibility works directly and indirectly. We then argue why we expect the effect of backward compatibility to be less strong for larger technological leaps. To our knowledge, we are the first to empirically test both the positive and negative effects of backward compatibility and the effect of technological progress.

#### 3.1 Direct influence of backward compatibility on hardware demand

When an incumbent launches a technologically improved product generation, it usually faces competition from two directions: from the incumbent's parent generation and from products offered by competing firms. The larger the incumbent's installed base and the more fragmented the new generation, the more difficult it is to overcome this startup problem, causing excess inertia (Farrell and Saloner 1985, Kretschmer 2008) or technological lockout (Schilling 2002). In markets with indirect network effects, firms face a chicken-and-egg problem: it is not enough to offer a new video console; consumers also expect to choose from a wide variety of games for it (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009, Gupta et al. 1999, Gandal et al. 2000).

Gandal *et al.* (2000) identify three strategies for markets with indirect network effects to overcome startup problems. Firms can (1) subsidize hardware, (2) increase software availability by forward integration, and (3) make the product backward compatible with the parent generation. All three strategies are used in the videogame market. Especially shortly after product launch, consoles are often sold at or below marginal costs. Most console manufacturers also develop and publish games on their own to increase availability of software for their own consoles (Corts and Lederman 2009). The strategy we focus on in this paper is the use of backward compatibility to transfer network effects across generations, also widely used in the video games industry.

In the market for handheld game consoles, backward compatibility implies that game cartridges of the parent generation can still be used with the new console generation. If the physical format of the game cartridges changes, this may even require a second cartridge slot.<sup>6</sup> Backward compatibility is costly for the console manufacturer: the enclosure has to be bigger, additional parts are needed, and the processor must be able to process the old games.

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<sup>6</sup> This was the case for the *Game Boy Advance*, which had one slot for old *Game Boy Color* cartridges and one for new *Game Boy Advance* ones.

How will backward compatibility work exactly? Indirect network effects in the videogame industry have so far been measured through the demand-increasing effect by the number of games currently offered on the market (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009). One way to assess the effect of backward compatibility could be to analyze if and how much the number of games still available for the compatible parent generation affect demand for the new generation. Alternatively, the stock (or installed base) of games sold for the parent generation would proxy all games that could potentially be used with the new console. This measure, which we feel is more plausible since buying old games for a new console generation may be somewhat unattractive, implies that a larger installed base of compatible games increases the likelihood that a potential adopter has access to some of these games and thus benefit from backward compatibility. A person has access to old games if she owns the parent console or gets old games from friends or through second-hand trading.<sup>7</sup>

The results by Greenstein's (1993) support our intuition in another setting: he finds the likelihood of adopting a new-generation mainframe to be higher if a firm owns a previous-generation mainframe of the same brand. Given the switch of mainframes is a binary (hardware) decision, while the software used on the previous mainframe can be used with the new mainframe, the availability of existing software, and not sales or software development post-hardware purchase, is what affects demand for hardware. This is summarized in our first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1: Backward compatibility increases hardware demand more the higher the prior generation's installed base of software.*

### **3.2 The dark side of backward compatibility**

In addition to the direct effect of complementary goods on the baseline product, backward compatibility can also have a negative impact on the new generation. This negative impact stems from the fact that complementary goods from both generations are substitutes for each other. In the console market this implies that a new console can be used to run games from the current generation as well as compatible games from the previous one. Given that most games are provided by independent developers,<sup>8</sup> this implies that developers of new games will face more competition – not only from competitors in the same generation, but also from their predecessors (Kretschmer 2008). Given the fixed-cost nature of game development,

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
<sup>7</sup>There is a sizable second-hand market for console games. E.g., on eBay.com, as of 24 January 2012, a total of 108,466 used games for mobile devices were offered.

<sup>8</sup> In our sample, only 12% of games were published by one of the hardware manufacturers.

developers will expect less revenues to cover their (sunk) fixed costs, so that their incentive to develop and release new games – basically, to enter the new generation – decreases (Sutton 1998). Therefore, what may be beneficial for the hardware market because there is a stock of complementary goods available may be harmful for the software market because it decreases the incentives to develop software for the new generation. This is summarized in our second hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2: Backward compatibility decreases supply of software titles for the new generation more the higher the prior generation's installed base of software.*

This hypothesized effect represents the ‘dark side of compatibility’. Therefore, the net effect of backward compatibility is determined by two countervailing effects: First, the direct effect of backward compatibility suggests that availability of games for the compatible parent generation serves as a (part-)substitute for variety of new games, increasing hardware demand. Second, the indirect effect of backward compatibility implies that the substitution of new games by old games reduces new software demand, which in turn lowers software supply, which eventually reduces hardware demand. The effects are summarized in Figure 2.



**Figure 2: Dual effect of backward compatibility**

### 3.3 Backward compatibility and technological progress

Our final set of hypotheses addresses the potential tradeoff between backward compatibility and technological progress. Shapiro and Varian (1999) identify this as the tradeoff between

‘evolution’ (ensuring backward compatibility but offering limited technological improvement) and ‘revolution’ (sacrificing backward compatibility, but offering drastically increased performance) strategies. However, Shapiro and Varian (1999) conceptualize these as decisions based on technological restrictions. The argument is that significant performance increases can only be secured by using the latest technology, which in turn makes it more difficult or costly to maintain backward compatibility. In our empirical setting, backward compatibility is achieved without any performance losses (i.e. an old game runs just as well on a new console as on an old one), so that one might assume that backward compatibility is perfect and that technological improvements affect demand in general, but not the effect of backward compatibility. In other words, for perfect compatibility the degree of substitutability between old and new-generation games is independent of the technological gap between the old and the new generation console.

However, the degree of substitutability rests on the extent to which games exploit the technical capabilities of a particular console. As games for the old generation were designed with a different set of technological restrictions, new games will differ significantly in their performance especially if the set of restrictions imposed by the current generation console has changed considerably (Shy 1996). Our empirical setting lets us identify the relative importance of technological improvement and backward compatibility if both are present.

We expect technological progress and backward compatibility to be substitutes – however, unlike Shapiro and Varian (1999) we assume substitutability to be consumer-driven rather technologically determined. The degree of substitutability of old and new games depends on the relative performance of the two game generations and backward compatibility. As a large technological improvement on the hardware side permits the design of better (i.e. more elaborately programmed) games, an old game will be a worse substitute as the technological frontier is pushed out. We thus expect technological progress to have a moderating effect on both the demand- and supply side effects of backward compatibility, which is summarized in Hypotheses 3a and 3b:

*Hypothesis 3a: The positive effect of backward compatibility on hardware demand is negatively moderated by the degree of technological progress between generations.*

*Hypothesis 3b: The negative effect of backward compatibility on software supply is negatively moderated by the degree of technological progress between generations.*

## 4. Data and Estimation Model

### 4.1 Data

#### *Data sources*

The core data set for our analysis comes from the market research firm NPD Group and consists of monthly unit sales and revenues in the market for handheld game consoles in the U.S. for the period from 1/1995 to 11/2007.<sup>9</sup> While, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the data about handheld game consoles, NPD data on video consoles has already been used for several other studies (Shankar and Bayus 2003, Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009, Stremersch and Bincken 2009, Mollick 2012).

Data on games for the different platforms is also supplied by NPD Group. The software data consists of monthly unit sales and revenue data for all available game titles. For each game title, the associated platform is reported. Note that game data is assigned on a platform (not console) level. We define a platform by a common game format. A platform can therefore consist of a single console (as for the Game Boy Color) or a family of consoles (as for the Game Boy and Game Boy Pocket) that use the same game format but are distinct regarding their hardware sales.<sup>10</sup>

Data on technical characteristics of the different consoles are also matched to our data. We use two variables representing the key dimensions that influence user perception: CPU speed as a proxy for processing power of the console and weight as a proxy for the console's mobility. The major data source for these technical characteristics is Forster (2005, pp. 212-214). This is completed with specifications from suppliers' websites, console databases and console information websites.

All prices are deflated to enable comparison of console and game prices over the entire period. We use the U.S. deflator provided by the International Monetary Fund.<sup>11</sup> We use monthly population estimates from the U.S. census bureau to proxy for market potential.

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<sup>9</sup> We include hardware-only sales, i.e. just the console, and packages comprising a console and a game. Both are treated equally in the analysis as (i) package prices do not differ significantly from that of single consoles and (ii) a clear separation is not possible with our data. Moreover, many consoles are rarely sold on their own.

<sup>10</sup> The other platforms consisting of two consoles are *Game Boy Advance* and *Game Boy Advance SP*, *Nintendo DS* and *Nintendo DS Lite*, *game.com* and *game.com Pocket Pro*, *N-Gage* and *N-Gage QD*, as well as *Playstation Portable* and *Playstation Portable Slim*. There are no platforms with three or more consoles in our data set.

<sup>11</sup> We used the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database for this.

Finally, we use USD-JPY exchange rates from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service<sup>12</sup> for a price instrument discussed later.

### **Variables**

The variables are described in Table 2 and Table 3 reports summary statistics. In line with Corts and Lederman (2009), we eliminate the influence from outdated consoles selling remainders or products that never reached a wider audience by considering only devices that sold more than 500 units in a given month.<sup>13</sup>

**Table 2: Variable definitions**

Variable	Definition
$s_{jt}$	Market share of console $j$ at time $t$ (relative to market potential)
$s_{0t}$	Market share of the outside good (no console purchase)
$s_{jt B(t)=1}$	Within-group market share (share within the handheld market)
$N_{jt}$	Available software titles for current format
$p_{jt}$	Deflated console price (1995 prices)
$x_{jt}^{weight}$	Normalized weight of the console
$x_{jt}^{CPU}$	Normalized CPU speed of the console
$IB_{gt}^{HW}$	Installed base of consoles for the current platform format (millions)
$IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$	Installed base of games for the compatible parent platform (millions)
$a_{jt}$	Age of the console (months)
$IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$	Percentage improvement of CPU to compatible parent platform

**Table 3: Summary statistics**

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
$\log(s_{jt}/s_{0t})$	502	-8.69	2.09	-13.07	-4.69
$\log(s_{jt B(t)=1})$	502	-2.33	1.97	-7.71	0.00
$N_{jt}$	502	259.04	233.27	3.00	844.00
$p_{jt}$	502	95.94	54.69	20.39	298.23
$x_{jt}^{weight}$	502	0.00	0.99	-1.57	3.52
$x_{jt}^{CPU}$	502	-0.01	0.98	-1.44	3.25
$IB_{gt}^{HW}$	502	11.68	10.35	0.00	34.18
$IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$	502	22.78	31.56	0.00	106.83
$a_{jt}$	502	35.18	30.67	0.00	131.00
$IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$	502	0.65	0.89	0.00	3.02

<sup>12</sup> Available at <http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/>.

<sup>13</sup> The mean monthly total number of units sold is 627,068.

Market shares in the market for handheld game consoles  $s_{jt|B(t)=1}$  are directly calculated by dividing the monthly unit sales of console  $j$  by the total units sold in a given month. To derive  $s_{jt}$  and  $s_{0t}$ , we have to define potential market size first. Unlike Clements and Ohashi (2005), who use the TV households to determine the number of potential buyers, we use the U.S. population numbers as several people in a household can own handheld consoles and handheld use is independent of TV ownership. From this, we derive  $s_{jt}$ , which is a console's market share of the market potential<sup>14</sup> and  $s_{0t}$ , the market share of the outside good, i.e. the share of potential consumers that do not have a console and do not buy one in the given time period. By cumulating the unit sales data of hardware sales, we also derive each platform's hardware installed base  $IB_{gt}^{HW}$ <sup>15, 16</sup>. Finally, we divide revenue by units to calculate each console's average monthly price  $p_{jt}$ . All prices are reported in 1995 USD.

Software variety  $N_{gt}$  is taken from the NPD data. For every platform we count the number of game titles with positive sales to obtain  $N_{gt}$ . Therefore,  $N_{gt}$  can decline over time if game titles are no longer sold. We also create the software installed base of the compatible preceding generation  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ <sup>17</sup>.

The last set of variables concerns the hardware characteristics of the handheld consoles. The dataset covers a twelve-year period in which technological progress for handheld game consoles was remarkable. For example, the mean CPU speed of active consoles grew from 3.93 MHz in 01/1995 to 187.43 MHz in 12/2007. As the data covers the entire period this causes problems in comparing devices' capabilities. Comparing a 2007 console that is technically below average to the best device from 1995 would make the first one look far too good. We therefore normalize all variables containing technical data by the characteristics of contemporaneously active consoles. This is done by calculating yearly mean values and standard deviations for CPU speed and console weight. The yearly mean values and standard deviations obtained were then used to construct a z-score for each

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<sup>14</sup> The market potential is defined as the size of the population minus the number of people who already bought a handheld console.

<sup>15</sup> We do not depreciate the installed base as (absolute) console performance does not deteriorate over time.

<sup>16</sup> At the start of our dataset (1/1995), Nintendo's *Game Boy* and Sega's *Game Gear* have had already been on the market since 8/1998 and 1/1991. We therefore use data from <http://vgchartz.com> to derive the initial installed base of 12.7 respectively 2.9 million units for the *Game Boy* and the *Game Gear*. Data is derived by weighing the lifetime sales for Americas with the consoles' 1995 U.S. share from total Americas sales.

<sup>17</sup> As for the hardware installed base, the software installed base for *Game Boy* and *Game Gear* is not directly available in our dataset. We therefore assume that the number of software titles sold per console in the years prior to the beginning of our dataset equals the number of software titles sold for each console in 1995.

console. Finally,  $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$  is derived as the percentage improvement of the CPU speed compared to the CPU speed of the compatible parent generation.<sup>18</sup>

## 4.2 Model specification

We estimate both hardware demand and software supply. In line with prior work on indirect network effects, we use a structural model to estimate hardware demand and a reduced-form model to estimate software supply (Nair et al. 2004, Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009). The two estimation models are derived below.

### *Hardware demand*

We model the demand side of the market using a structural model for hardware demand. Our model extends the discrete-choice model for differentiated products used by Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Corts and Lederman (2009) with measures of backward compatibility. We assume that each potential adopter  $i$  of handheld video consoles maximizes its utility by choosing the highest  $u_{ijt}$  where  $j \neq 0$  represents the different handheld consoles and  $j = 0$  represents the outside option of not buying a console. The consumer's utility function has the following (additive) functional form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 u_{ijt} = & x_{jt}\beta + \alpha p_{jt} + \omega N_{gt} + \xi_{jt} + v_{ijt} + \\
 & + \gamma_1 IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} + \gamma_2 IMPR_{g,g-1} + \gamma_3 [IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}] \\
 & + \gamma_4 a_{jt} + \gamma_5 [a_{jt} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}]
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

The first part of the utility function represents the baseline model that does not consider backward compatibility: utility depends on observed product characteristics  $x_{jt}$ , the console price  $p_{jt}$ , software variety  $N_{gt}$ <sup>19</sup>, unobserved characteristics  $\xi_{jt}$ , and the idiosyncratic error term  $v_{ijt}$ , which can be interpreted as the difference of consumer  $i$ 's valuation and the mean utility.

This model is extended to capture the effects of backward compatibility. First, the installed base  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  of the prior generation's compatible games is added. This variable is used to test Hypothesis 1 and we expect it to have a positive influence on the buyer's selection decision. Second, we add the improvement factor over the compatible parent  $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$  and its interaction with installed base  $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ . The improvement factor expresses the relative increase in CPU speed compared to the CPU speed of the earlier

<sup>18</sup> We set this variable to zero if there is no active parent generation.

<sup>19</sup> As already noted we distinguish between consoles  $j$  and platforms  $g$  which can consist of multiple consoles using the same game format.



generation. We expect  $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$  to have a positive effect on utility as a technological leap stimulates demand for a new product generation. In line with Hypothesis 3a however, we expect the interaction term to have a negative effect on the buyer's utility. Further, we add console age  $a_{jt}$  as well as an interaction term of installed base and console age,  $a_{jt} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ . For console age, we expect a negative influence as older consoles are less attractive to the remaining non-adopters. We also expect a negative coefficient for the interaction term between console age and installed base, as we expect the effect of a backward compatible installed base to be more important in the launch phase of a new platform generation.

As in Clements and Ohashi (2005), we assume  $v_{ijt}$  to be identically and independently distributed with an extreme value distribution function to generate a nested logit model (Berry 1994). Potential adopters decide first to buy a handheld game console or not, and if they decide to buy one, they then select a specific console. In contrast to a simple logit model, substitution patterns can therefore differ between the decision of buying a console and the decision which console to buy.

Setting the utility of the outside good equal to zero (Berry 1994), we get a linear regression equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(s_{jt}) - \ln(s_{0t}) = & x_{jt}\beta + \alpha p_{jt} + \omega N_{gt} + \xi_{jt} + \sigma \ln(s_{jt|B(t)=1}) + \\ & + \gamma_1 IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} + \gamma_2 IMPR_{g,g-1} + \gamma_3 [IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}] + \\ & + \gamma_4 a_{jt} + \gamma_5 [a_{jt} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}] \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

### **Software supply**

We follow prior literature when estimating software supply (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009). Software supply is expressed by the variety of different game titles  $N_{gt}$  available for a specific platform. We estimate the following reduced-form equation:

$$\begin{aligned} N_{gt} = & \alpha_b + \gamma_1 IB_{gt}^{HW} + \gamma_2 a_{gt} + \gamma_3 [a_{gt} * IB_{gt}^{HW}] + \eta_{gt} + \\ & + \gamma_4 IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} + \gamma_5 IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU} + \gamma_6 [IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}] \\ & + \gamma_7 [a_{gt} * IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}] \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The first line of the equation is the base model with  $\alpha_b$  being brand-specific dummies,  $IB_{gt}^{HW}$  the installed base of console of the current generation,  $a_{gt}$  the age of the platform, and  $\eta_{gt}$  an error term. We allow hardware installed base to interact with platform age (Clements and Ohashi 2005). We extend the model with the same measures of backward compatibility as for the demand estimation. Following Hypothesis 2, we expect  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  to negatively affect

software supply as the installed base of backward compatible software might partly substitute for demand for new game titles. Further, from Hypotheses 3b we expect the interaction term of  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  with relative performance increase to be positive as they reduce the importance of backward compatibility on the demand side and we therefore expect less substitution. Finally, we again allow for the interaction of our measure of backward compatibility with platform age to allow for changing importance of backward compatibility over time.

### 4.3 Instruments

#### *Hardware demand*

The potential endogeneity of the three variables within-group share  $s_{jt|B(t)=1}$ , price  $p_{jt}$ , and software variety  $N_{gt}$  requires the identification of appropriate instruments. We use the set of instruments proposed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Corts and Lederman (2009). Within-group share is obviously correlated with the error term  $\xi_{jt}$  as it contains part of the dependent variable  $s_{jt}$ . As  $\xi_{jt}$  is known to firms and consumers in the market (but not to the econometrician), differences in unobserved quality might lead to different price setting and thus a correlation of the console price  $p_{jt}$  and  $\xi_{jt}$ . Finally, autocorrelation of  $\xi_{jt}$  leads to a positive correlation between  $\xi_{jt}$  and the measure of software variety  $N_{gt}$ .

First, we use exchange rates between the U.S. and Japan as a cost side instrument for prices as many consoles come from Japan. Exchange rates seem a valid price instrument as their change would probably lead to price adjustment in the U.S. market. However, it does not allow for identifying effects at the console level.

Further, we use the average age of software titles currently available on the market to instrument for within-group share and console price. A high average age of games is a sign for missing supply of new game titles. Hence, we expect negative correlations of average software age both with within-group share as a lack of new games reduces the console's relative attractiveness and with console price as console manufacturers may try to reduce counter this adverse effect by lowering prices.

Finally, we construct several instruments that measure the extent of competition faced by a platform (Berry et al. 1995). We use the sum of competing hardware characteristics,<sup>20</sup> the total number of competing platforms, the number of competing platforms within a company, and the number of competing platforms within the same generation as instruments. Following Corts and Lederman (2009), these instruments are expected to be correlated with

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<sup>20</sup> We use the sums of the competing consoles' cumulative CPU speed and weight.

each of the three endogenous variables: with the within-group share as they affect utility of different options, with software variety as they influence incentives to provide game titles, and with price as they affect the ability to raise prices.

### *Software supply*

The installed base of hardware  $IB_{gt}^{HW}$  is possibly endogenous as unobserved shocks in the software market might lead to increased software entry but also to increased hardware adoption. We use the instruments proposed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) to account for endogeneity. The average age of software titles on the market serves as an instrument, although the direction in which the instrument works is not clear. A high average software age could either indicate profitable opportunities or tough competition. We also use squared platform age and an interaction term between platform age and average software age as supply-side instruments.

## **5. Results**

The 2SLS estimation results are reported in Table 4 (hardware demand) and Table 5 (software supply).<sup>21</sup> Columns 4-1 and 5-1 report results without the software installed base, 4-2 and 5-2 include just the linear term of the software installed base, and 4-3 and 5-3 include both the interaction terms and the hardware improvement factor. In all specifications, we use brand dummies to control for unobserved brand-specific effects as well as calendar month dummies to control for the strong seasonality in console sales. All 2SLS estimations are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation.

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<sup>21</sup> The corresponding OLS regression results are available from the authors and show the same sign and significance for the hypothesis tests.

**Table 4: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS)**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: $\ln(s_{jt}) - \ln(s_{0t})$		
	(4-1)	(4-2)	(4-3)
SW installed base $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ [millions]		0.0149*** (0.00125)	0.0141** (0.00708)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$			-0.00388*** (0.00139)
HW improvement $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$			0.897*** (0.197)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * a_{jt}$			-0.000314*** (9.56e-05)
Console age $a_{jt}$	-0.0239*** (0.00432)	-0.0109*** (0.00235)	-0.00489** (0.00233)
Number of available games $N_{gt}$	0.00458*** (0.000608)	0.000775** (0.000301)	0.00117** (0.000534)
Deflated price $p_{jt}$	-0.00885* (0.00454)	-0.00897*** (0.00256)	-0.00708** (0.00356)
$\ln(\text{within-group share } s_{jt B(t)=1})$	0.795*** (0.116)	0.737*** (0.0617)	0.655*** (0.0931)
Normalized console weight $x_{jt}^{weight}$	0.261* (0.155)	-0.254*** (0.0921)	-0.322*** (0.102)
Normalized CPU speed $x_{jt}^{CPU}$	0.174 (0.114)	0.157** (0.0682)	0.169* (0.0854)
Observations	502	502	502
R-squared	0.856	0.952	0.958
Hansen's J	8.171	34.37	34.45

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , (\*\*)  $p < 0.05$ , (\*)  $p < 0.1$ . Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported.

**Table 5: Software supply estimates (2SLS)**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: $N_{gt}$		
	(5-1)	(5-2)	(5-3)
SW installed base $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ [millions]		0.00889 (0.0862)	-1.185*** (0.303)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$			0.597*** (0.0584)
HW improvement $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$			-33.25*** (12.23)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * a_{gt}$			-0.00297 (0.00371)
Format age $a_{gt}$	-1.305*** (0.168)	-1.298*** (0.173)	-2.080*** (0.117)
HW installed base $IB_{gt}^{HW}$	35.46*** (0.646)	35.45*** (0.635)	39.00*** (1.195)
Interaction term $IB_{gt}^{HW} * a_{gt}$	-0.153*** (0.0115)	-0.152*** (0.0112)	-0.158*** (0.0126)
Observations	437	437	437
R-squared	0.975	0.975	0.982
Hansen's J	12.25	13.04	18.15

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , (\*\*)  $p < 0.05$ , (\*)  $p < 0.1$ ). Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported.

We first discuss results for the direct effect of backward compatibility (Hypothesis 1 and 2) before turning to the moderating effect of technological progress (Hypothesis 3a/3b).

The control variables in the instrumented estimation results have the expected signs over the different specifications. With increasing age, demand as well as supply goes down. The interaction term of age and the installed base of compatible parent software is only significant for the demand side, confirming the expectation that the importance of backward compatibility declines over time. Further, the industry exhibits indirect network effects as the availability of more software variety  $N_{jt}$  positively influences demand and the availability of a larger hardware installed base in turn increases software variety. We find negative price elasticity of demand and a strong positive seasonal effect (not reported) in November and December for both demand and supply.<sup>22</sup> Higher CPU speed increases demand, while higher console weight generally decreases demand. These results give us confidence in our model.

<sup>22</sup> As the right-hand side of the demand model is the mean utility of console  $j$  in month  $t$ , the magnitudes of the coefficients for the demand model cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way (Corts and Lederman, 2009). We

## 5.1 Effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply

We now discuss the first-order effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply. As discussed above, we expect backward compatibility to work through the installed base  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  of games for the parent generation.

### *Hardware demand*

We first observe that  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  has a significantly positive coefficient for both specifications (4-2) and (4-3), which supports Hypothesis 1. For specification (4-3), we compare the effect of backward compatibility with indirect network effects from software variety  $N_{gt}$ : one extra game title for the current generation has the same impact on demand as 82,979 game titles sold for the parent generation.<sup>23</sup> Applying this to the case of the *Game Boy Advance*, at the launch in June 2001 an installed base of 45.6 million compatible *Game Boy Color* games corresponded to the availability of 550 game titles for the new generation. In fact, at launch only 21 game titles were available for the *Game Boy Advance* and it took until August 2004 for 550 game titles to be available on the market.

### *Software supply*

Adding  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  to the baseline specification as in estimation (5-2), we do not see any significant effect from backward compatibility. However, in the full specification (5-3), we obtain a significant negative effect of  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  on software variety<sup>24</sup>. For each million games in the installed base, 1.2 game titles less would be offered on the market. Again looking at the example of the *Game Boy Advance*, the installed base of 45.6 million compatible *Game Boy Color* games would reduce software supply by 54 titles at its launch date. This implies that absent an installed base, 75 games would have been available immediately from the launch of the *Game Boy Advance*.

## 5.2 Backward compatibility and technological progress

After discussing the direct effect of backward compatibility, we now turn to the interaction between backward compatibility and technological progress.

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therefore compare the strengths of different effects or discuss marginal effects from exogenous changes of a console's backward compatibility.

<sup>23</sup> The average unit sales of games in our sample are 118,619.

<sup>24</sup> This is intuitive as we find a time-varying effect in (5-3), suggesting that a simple linear term is misspecified. Indeed, we find strong serial correlation in the error term in specification (5-1).

### ***Hardware demand***

Our results support Hypothesis 3a, as the interaction term has a significantly negative coefficient. Combining the counteracting effects of the installed base and the interaction term for specification (4-3), we see that backward compatibility has a positive effect if the percentage increase in CPU speed compared to the compatible parent generation is smaller than 363%. The largest technological leap between two succeeding generations in our data set is the switch from the *Game Boy Advance SP* to the Nintendo *DS*. For this generation change, CPU speed increased from 16.7 MHz to 67 MHz, an increase of 301%. Here, backward compatibility played a much weaker (although still positive) role. This coincides with the observation that the *Playstation Portable*, which entered the market four months later, was the only console to successfully challenge Nintendo's dominance in handheld consoles market – with a much improved technology and up against a less influential installed base.

### ***Software supply***

The results from specification (5-3) strongly support Hypothesis 3b that higher technological progress between generations reduces the supply-decreasing effect of backward compatibility. We see a substitutive effect from backward compatibility as long as the technological leap is smaller than 198%. Therefore, the Nintendo *DS* with an increase in CPU speed of 301% more than outweighs the substitutive effect.

## **6. Backward Compatibility to Sustain Dominance**

Our results suggest a strong effect of backward compatibility on the demand of new hardware generations. Since Nintendo was the only firm to launch successive console generations and therefore the only firm to report a positive installed base of backward compatible games, we ask if backward compatibility was a useful means of sustaining a dominant market position over multiple product generations. To isolate this effect however, we need to rule out that backward compatibility simply proxies for other unobserved factors – the Nintendo effect. We address this in two ways: First, we discuss the brand dummies in our regressions that aim to capture unobserved, brand-specific factors. Second, we run a counterfactual experiment by assigning one of the unsuccessful consoles, the Game.com console, the installed base of the then dominant console, the Game Boy.

## 6.1 The Nintendo effect

Table 6 reports the brand dummies for all players in the handheld game console market, with Nintendo the base category.

**Table 6: Omitted brand dummies from estimation (4-3)**

BRAND	
Sega	0.576** (0.248)
Tiger	-0.739*** (0.230)
SNK	0.192 (0.395)
Nokia	0.319 (0.759)
Sony	2.967*** (0.374)

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

While Sony's brand dummy has a positive and significant sign – suggesting that both brand equity and technological advance played a role in successfully challenging Nintendo, the other dummies show no clear pattern. This implies that Nintendo's reputation does not significantly explain its success in repeatedly holding off competition. One explanation for Sony's success (and the others' failure) would be that Nintendo's reputation suffered significantly just prior to the introduction of the *PSP*, which would lead to a significant and positive brand dummy for Sony as it measures the reputation relative to Nintendo. However, there is no anecdotal evidence for this in the relevant time period.

Another consideration is that Nintendo's reputation may have grown over time and that the backward compatible installed base (which grew more or less constantly throughout our sample) simply proxies for this reputation increase rather than a 'real' effect of backward compatibility. However, as the Sony *PSP* entered at the very end of the sample, this would make its success all the more improbable as it would have to be based on an implausibly high brand reputation vis-à-vis Nintendo. However, to alleviate this possible bias, we run our preferred regressions (4-3 and 5-3) using the rolling software installed base  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$  of the three years before the observation month instead of the overall installed base. The results are shown in Table 7 and show a qualitatively similar picture as our baseline results, rendering this alternative explanation less likely.



**Table 7a: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: $\ln(s_{jt}) - \ln(s_{0t})$	
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(7-a)
SW installed base $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ [millions]	0.0171*** (0.00546)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$	-0.00916** (0.00360)
HW improvement $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$	1.267*** (0.295)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * a_{jt}$	-0.000370*** (0.000107)
Console age $a_{jt}$	-0.00553** (0.00236)
Number of available games $N_{gt}$	0.000238 (0.000733)
Deflated price $p_{jt}$	-0.00468 (0.00398)
$\ln(\text{within-group share } s_{jt B(t)=1})$	0.624*** (0.0933)
Normalized console weight $x_{jt}^{weight}$	-0.372*** (0.112)
Normalized CPU speed $x_{jt}^{CPU}$	0.0733 (0.0979)
Observations	502
R-squared	0.952
Hansen's J	29.45

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , (\*\*)  $p < 0.05$ , (\*)  $p < 0.1$ . Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported.

**Table 7b: Software supply estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: $N_{gt}$	
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (7-b)	
SW installed base $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ [millions]	-1.205*** (0.325)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$	0.00217 (0.00532)
HW improvement $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$	-45.50*** (16.42)
Interaction term $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW} * a_{gt}$	0.814*** (0.131)
Format age $a_{gt}$	-1.770*** (0.150)
HW installed base $IB_{gt}^{HW}$	37.94*** (1.015)
Interaction term $IB_{gt}^{HW} * a_{gt}$	-0.162*** (0.0111)
Observations	437
R-squared	0.979
Hansen's J	2.929

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. Asterisks denote significance levels (\*\*\*)  $p < 0.01$ , (\*\*)  $p < 0.05$ , (\*)  $p < 0.1$ . Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are included but not reported.

## 6.2 A counterfactual experiment

To assess if backward compatibility could indeed have played a role in sustaining Nintendo's market leadership by intensifying the startup problem for challenging platforms, we run a counterfactual experiment in which we hypothetically assume that games for the *Game Boy* generation can be played on the *Game.com* console (and Nintendo consoles).<sup>25</sup> In reality, the *Game.com* console was not backward compatible to any other parent console and was a commercial failure. Following Corts and Lederman (2009), we derive the counterfactual as follows. First, mean utility  $\delta_{jt}$  for console  $j$  at time  $t$  is derived from the regression results of our preferred specification (4-3). With the nested logit formula discussed in Berry (1994), the implied market shares can be obtained as follows:

$$s_{jt} = \frac{\exp(\delta_{jt}/(1-\sigma))}{D^\sigma(1+D^{1-\sigma})} \quad (4)$$

<sup>25</sup> Such a move of mandating compatibility with a promising entrant could also be imposed by an antitrust authority as a pro-competitive measure (Shapiro 1996).

with  $D \equiv \sum_j \exp(\delta_{jt}/(1 - \sigma))$ . In a next step, we assume that the *Game.com* console, which was launched in 9/1997 could have played titles for the *Game Boy*. The installed base of compatible software titles for the parent generation  $IB_{g-1,t}^{SW}$ , the performance increase of the *Game.com* CPU compared to the *Game Boy* CPU  $IMPR_{g,g-1}^{CPU}$ , and the interaction terms from equation (2) are adjusted accordingly. We then use the updated values to recalculate mean utilities and implied market shares. We repeat these steps for every month in the first year since the launch of the *Game.com* console and report average changes and the actual outcome in the top half of Table 8.

**Table 8: Average monthly changes (9/1997-8/1998) assuming that the Game.com console is backward compatible with software for the Game Boy**

	Game.com	Game Boy Pocket	Virtual Boy <sup>26</sup>	Game Gear
Actual market shares	2.68%	89.03%	5.64%	4.84%
Predicted market shares base model	2.87%	74.54%	12.42%	10.60%
<i>Direct effect of backward compatibility</i>				
Unit change prediction vs. counterfactual	+ 231,707	- 83,111	- 19,193	- 12,505
Market share change prediction vs. counterfactual	+ 71.74%	- 55.29%	- 8.90%	- 7.84%
<i>Indirect effect of backward compatibility</i>				
Additional unit change	- 23,576	+ 6,086	+ 1,153	+ 892
Additional market share change	- 4.71%	+ 3.70%	+0. 51%	+0. 52%

First off, we observe that backward compatibility leads to an increase in total demand: the average additional demand of 231,707 *Game.com* units is twice as large as the aggregate decrease in demand for the competing platforms of 114,809 units. This is intuitive as overall network effects have increased. Without backward compatibility, the technologically superior *Game.com* never takes off and the outdated *Game Boy Pocket* maintains a dominant position, as can be seen from *Game.com*'s actual market share of 2.68%. Assigning the *Game Boy*'s installed base to *Game.com* changes the dynamics of the market drastically, and *Game.com*'s counterfactual market share is almost as high as Nintendo's actual one.<sup>27</sup>

In the bottom part of Table 8, we add the indirect effect of backward compatibility, which we found to decrease supply of new games. We proceed as follows. We first simulate

<sup>26</sup> Nintendo's Virtual Boy has only been on the market for the first six months since the launch of the *Game.com* console.

<sup>27</sup> Note that we maintain *Game Boy*'s backward compatibility so that *Game Boy* and *Game.com* have equal installed bases.

backward compatibility of the *Game.com* console by changing the installed bases analogous to hardware demand. We then use the coefficients from our supply estimation (5-3) to predict the number of available games  $N_{gt}$ . We finally substitute this (lower) number of available games in the utility function  $\delta_{jt}$  of the demand-side equation and can again derive implied changes in units sold and in market shares.

The indirect effect moderates the direct effect somewhat (as game providers for *Game.com* would have been deterred by the installed base of backward compatible games serving as imperfect substitutes). However, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, so that backward compatibility would still have helped the *Game.com* console capture a large chunk of the market at the time.

## 7. Conclusion

In this paper we study the effects of backward compatibility in a market with indirect network effects, the U.S. handheld game console industry. Backward compatibility helped the market leader Nintendo maintain their market leadership over multiple generations despite having an inferior technology in many instances. Backward compatibility in this market works through the installed base of games for a compatible parent generation and its strength is affected by the rate of technological improvement between successive generations.

On the demand side, our results lend support to the role of backward compatibility. If a new generation is backward compatible with the old one, the installed base of games for the prior generation increases sales for the new generation console. However, large technological improvements across generations come at the cost of consumers valuing backward compatibility less as their utility from using the old complementary products is comparatively low. Therefore, benefits from large technological improvement are partially offset by the reduced benefits from backward compatibility. On the supply side, we find that backward compatibility lowers the supply of new software, and that this effect is less pronounced for consoles with higher technological progress, which suggests that there is a (previously not identified) “dark side” to backward compatibility.

By jointly analyzing hardware demand and software supply, we identify a tradeoff between the demand-enhancing effect of backward compatibility directly affecting hardware demand and the demand-reducing effect that works indirectly through reduced software variety for a platform. We find that the demand-increasing effect clearly outweighs the demand-decreasing effect.

Could backward compatibility have stabilized market structure in the U.S. handheld console market by giving Nintendo a head start for every new generation? Sony's *PSP*, the most successful challenger, entered with a much superior technology at a time when Nintendo had just made a significant technological leap from their previous generation, which is in line with our results that backward compatibility matters less if the generations are very different technologically, so that Nintendo was comparably more vulnerable at that junction. To further substantiate the claim that backward compatibility helped Nintendo maintain a dominant position over technologically superior challengers, we run a counterfactual and assign Nintendo's *Game Boy* installed base to a technologically superior, but ultimately unsuccessful challenger, the *Game.com* console. We find that if *Game.com* had been backward compatible, market leadership would have been reversed.

Our work relates to the literature on entry deterrence, as backward compatibility can discourage firms from entering a market or at least prevent them from attaining large market shares. While there are many theoretical models of strategic entry deterrence (Dixit 1980, Klemperer 1987, Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Salop 1979, Haan 2003), empirical studies of entry deterrence are rare in industrial organization (Schmalensee 1978, Smiley 1988). Strategy and marketing scholars have focused on limit pricing (Srinivasan 1991), reputation (Clark and Montgomery 1998) and excess capacity (Harrigan 1981), while Gruca and Sudharshan (1995) integrate a wide variety of entry deterrence strategies in their conceptual framework, in part referring to product portfolio choices (brand proliferation, preannouncement, switching costs). However, technological parameters are not typically considered potential strategic instruments for entry deterrence.<sup>28</sup> This is surprising as in technology-intensive industries entry is a salient phenomenon, often replacing current leaders in the process of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942). In this light, our results have both managerial and policy implications. Managers in network industries must consider backward compatibility an important parameter that helps stabilize market shares across generations and establish persistent market leadership. Judiciously managing the tradeoff between backward compatibility and technological progress is thus a key challenge for technology strategists.

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<sup>28</sup> An exception is Church and Gandal (1996), who study compatibility as a means of entry deterrence in a theoretical model.

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