

4. The Attlee settlement's failures: stagflation, slums in the sky and educational geography

The gap between the incomes of the richest and those of the poorest in Britain reached its narrowest point in 1979 ... But the unfortunate effect of narrowing inequality in the 1970s was to make everyone feel as though they'd never had it so bad. British people saw no reason to celebrate their egalitarianism, when the apparent cost over the course of the decade had been endless industrial action, government spending cuts, high inflation, rising unemployment, scary punk rockers and National Front Rallies. In some small way a socialist society had been achieved in Britain; it's just that people seemed to find it a dreadful place in which to live.

Lynsey Hanley (2017)¹

The Attlee government's eclectic mix of pragmatic policies built on proposals for the wartime coalition government by individuals from across the political spectrum. It was designed to tackle the problems of the 1930s – Beveridge's five giant evils. After Labour's 1951 defeat, the succession of Conservative governments to 1964 and from 1970 to 1974 governed within the Attlee settlement. They aimed to maintain the 'welfare state' but favoured limits on public spending and shifting the balance of the economy more to the private sector. This chapter looks at where the post-war settlement ran into three problems for which the neoliberalism of the later Thatcher settlement seemed to promise solutions. First, the linchpin of the Attlee settlement was that the state could steer the economy to deliver a high and stable level of employment. In the mid-1970s that linchpin fractured. Second, significant problems emerged with some post-war public housing. And, third, weaknesses in the post-war systems of public education and its attempted reform also became apparent.

How to cite this book chapter:

Bevan, Gwyn (2023) *How Did Britain Come to This? A century of systemic failures of governance*, London: LSE Press, pp. 91–108.
<https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.hdb.d> License: CC BY-NC

4.1 Stagflation and the failure to control public expenditure

In the UK the three post-war decades of high and stable levels of employment were still marked in economic policy terms by recurrent crises from deficits on the balance of payments. There were currency crises in 1956, because of the Suez crisis debacle, and in 1967, when a major devaluation was forced on the Labour government by money market pressure. In 1976, in the system of floating exchange rates, high government borrowing again resulted in a run on the value of sterling. Britain's Labour Chancellor Dennis Healey was forced to make a humbling submission to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for external financial support. For some commentators the episode:

discredited the whole postwar economic consensus of demand management, and fiscal and monetary policy fine-tuning. It powerfully reinforced the case Margaret Thatcher's radical Conservatives had been making about the failure of the Keynesian consensus, laid the groundwork for her election victory in 1979 and the dominance for a decade or more of the ideas she and her American ally Ronald Reagan espoused of free markets and fiscal restraint.²

Nearly half a century later, in September 2022, the 'minibudget' put forward by the Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng in the short-lived (49 days) Liz Truss premiership triggered a similar sharply adverse bond market reaction, a 'biting attack' by the IMF on government budgeting, which was compared to the Healey crisis.³

However, a former permanent secretary to the Treasury, Nicholas McPherson, reads history differently. He recalls that when he joined the Treasury in 1985 senior officials still shuddered, not at the humiliating outcome of the 1976 IMF loan but at mention of Anthony Barber. As the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer in the early 1970s, Barber had sought to unleash Britain's growth potential through unfunded tax cuts and easy credit (like Kwarteng in 2022). There was a brief soar in output,


before hitting a wall of high inflation, industrial unrest and an oil crisis ... His boom was seen as triggering the series of policy errors that led inexorably to Britain's emergency loan from the IMF in 1976.⁴

The economist Milton Friedman, who laid key foundations of the neoliberal revolution in economics (see Chapter 5), diagnosed two systemic problems with 'Keynesian economics'.⁵ The first was its incapability to control inflation from feedback between workers demanding increases in pay to cover costs of increases in prices, as was strongly triggered by the Barber boom.⁶ The annual rate of inflation increased from 7 per cent in 1973 to 23 per cent in 1975 (see Figure 4.1) and in combination with unemployment produced

'stagflation.' The second problem was that of 'long and variable lags' between the government decision to intervene and its impact on the economy.⁷ By the time a government's decision to reduce demand in a boom had taken effect it could exacerbate a recession. This was compounded in the UK by the Treasury's system of 'volume control' of public expenditure, which was based on historic constant prices.⁸ So, government expenditure in March 1973 was supposed to be controlled against a budget set at prices prevailing in November 1970! In January 1974, members of the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons were perplexed by how the Treasury could 'fine-tune' the economy with cuts of £300 million in 1972-73 (Anthony Barber's attempt to reduce the demand he had stimulated) when the Treasury only knew, nine months after that financial year had ended, that expenditure turned out to be £900 million less than the budget.⁹

The UK had a third problem. In principle, the Treasury's forecasts of economic growth were intended to constrain the growth in public expenditure. But, in practice, the Treasury was required to make forecasts of economic growth to finance what the cabinet had collectively agreed would be total levels of public expenditure. The Treasury's forecast for economic growth published in 1976 required 'almost an economic miracle'.¹⁰ That is why George Osborne's initiative, when Chancellor of the Exchequer in 2010, to require the government's budget to be assessed by the independent, authoritative Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) was a vital strengthening of the UK's

Figure 4.1: Annual percentage (%) increases in the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI), 1970 to 2000




Source: Bank of England.¹¹

institutional arrangements.¹² (This requirement was notoriously ignored by Prime Minister Liz Truss and Chancellor Kwarteng when announcing their catastrophic ‘minibudget’ of September 2022.¹³) From 1972–73 to 1974–75, although there were ‘shortfalls’ of ‘actual’ spending in each year against budget plans, the percentage financed by borrowing increased to a peak of 14 per cent in 1975 (see Figure 4.2) from overoptimistic projections of economic growth.¹⁴ The Treasury’s forecasts of the borrowing requirement were £2 billion too low for 1974–75 and £2 billion too high for 1976–77. The then Chancellor, Dennis Healey, later observed that, if the 1976 forecast had been correct, the government would have avoided the humiliation of asking the IMF for a loan, but ‘none of the independent forecasters had a better record.’¹⁵ J.K. Galbraith famously observed that, as a general rule, ‘the only purpose of economic forecasting is to give astrology a good name.’¹⁶

4.2 Public housing and ‘slums in the sky’

If you ask estate agents what the three most important determinants are of the price of a house or flat, they will tell you that they are location, location

Figure 4.2: The percentage share (%) of UK public expenditure financed by borrowing, 1970 to 1990




Source: Bank of England.¹⁷

and location. It determines access to work, education, shops, services and recreation. In responding to the acute shortage of housing in 1945, Aneurin Bevan prioritised building council houses of lasting quality (see Chapter 3).¹⁸ This approach had also been tried just after the First World War, when 50,000 council houses had been built to the exacting Tudor Walters standards; they were more spacious than many privately owned suburban homes and in attractive cottage estates.¹⁹ But, as Lynsey Hanley points out, they were poorly located: 'far from their extended network of friends and relatives and lacking good public transport, churches, pubs and community halls.'²⁰ The problematic implication of developing a good social mix of housing is that this requires those who can afford to buy their own houses to subsidise the building of council houses for others in more desirable locations.

Even though more than a million new houses were built by the time of the 1951 general election, there was still an acute post-war housing shortage.²¹ The Conservative Party was elected in 1951 with a manifesto promise to double the total number built in a year to 300,000. Figure 4.3 shows that Harold Macmillan, the minister of the newly created Ministry of Housing, delivered that promise in 1954. He did so by reducing their size.²² By boosting home ownership he aimed to develop a 'property-owning (Conservative voting) democracy.'²³ Figure 4.4 shows that he halved the percentage of new houses built by local authorities and trebled that by private builders. (Under the Conservative government, from 1993, local authorities accounted for at most 1 per cent of completions.)


The Labour Party next won a general election in 1964. The prime minister, Harold Wilson, appointed Richard Crossman as the minister of housing and local government. He was a fellow of an Oxford college, an 'unashamed intellectual' who could not 'understand the motivations and thoughts of those

Figure 4.3: Total new housing completions in England, 1946 to 2020



Source: Office for National Statistics.²⁴

Figure 4.4: The percentage mix of public, social and private housing in new completions, 1946 to 2020



Source: Office for National Statistics.²⁵

who were not like him.²⁶ He explained how his 1965 White Paper trashed Bevan's housing policy:

It is a new thing for a Labour Government to admit that owner-occupation is a normal and natural way for people who live and that living in a council house is an exception to that rule.²⁷

He had introduced tax relief on mortgage repayments in 1964.²⁸ The White Paper continued the tax relief policy and introduced exemption from the new capital gains tax for higher-rate taxpayers, access to low interest loans and 100 per cent mortgages.²⁹ Wilson chaired its discussion by the cabinet, which took eight minutes.³⁰

In his 1978 doctoral thesis Patrick Dunleavy explained that there were three sets of reasons why local authorities developed council estates of high-rise blocks at scale.³¹ First, to avoid urban sprawl, preserve rural areas close to the cities (particularly green belts), and provide more open space. Second, to make space for other uses of land: farming, schools, decongested industrial zones and improved transport systems. Third, architects favoured high-density residential development because of advances in construction technology as exemplified by Le Corbusier's *Unite d'Habitation* in Marseilles, which was built in the 1950s. Alexi Marmot describes how *Unite* followed Corbusier's design principles. Its structure was supported by reinforced concrete stilts (the *pilotis*), which enabled its lively facades and ground plan to be freely designed. All had a sculptural grand quality. Its windows were long strips of ribbon that

flooded the interiors with light. There were garden terraces on the roof and six types of attractive sound-proof dwellings (330 in total) with private facades and patios. Its community of 1,600 was a city in microcosm. It was expensive to build and keep running smoothly 'to landscape and maintain the grounds, to operate lifts, to run the clubs, kindergartens and sports facilities'.³²

James Stirling described Alton West, in the Roehampton estate in Wimbledon, as the first built example of Le Corbusier's 'City in the Park'. Alexi Marmot highlights what got lost in translation to Alton West, which had five identical blocks, each of 75 identical two-bedroom dwellings. They lacked privacy, light and sound proofing, shops, kindergarten and easy access to recreation. With 300 residents only, they were on too small a scale to create a community.³³

In early December 1964, Crossman wrote in his diary that he had 'decided to give Birmingham a huge area of housing in the green belt at Water Orton'. Although the Chelmsley Wood council estate was nine miles from the city,³⁴ the view of the *Birmingham Post* was that, for those who lived there, the city would feel 'a million life years away'.³⁵ The journalist Lynsey Hanley lived on the Chelmsley Wood council estate and saw Alton West as one of the best of England's council tower blocks.³⁶ Her experience of the phrase 'council estate' is 'a sort of psycho-social bruise: everyone winces when they hear it'.³⁷ Crosland described 'the whiff of welfare, subsidisation, of huge uniform estates and generally of second-class citizenship' where the council 'decides what repairs will be done, what pets may be kept, what colour the door may be painted'.³⁸ The Former Labour MP Frank Field had, in 1975, when Director of the Child Poverty Action Group, passionately denounced the feudal attitude of councils to their tenants who were treated as 'council serfs'.³⁹ In 2018, he summarised his argument for radical reform:

the best council housing almost never became available for reallocation, as tenants stayed put and children inherited tenancy rights. ... My plan was to sell dear, with the whole of a working-class family clubbing together to acquire an asset and, crucially, for councils to use all those monies to rebuild and repair stock. The Wilson and Callaghan governments undertook reviews of this idea but civil servants thought the plan unworkable.... After Labour refused to act, Mrs Thatcher came along and turned the idea on its head: sold cheaply, cut taxes, and the rest is history.⁴⁰

In many urban areas, as the council estates were built for those who were in extreme housing need, the tower blocks became 'slums in the sky'.⁴¹ Professor Anne Power found that, in many of the poorest outer areas in the UK, surrounding cities such as Birmingham, Liverpool, Glasgow and Strathclyde, and in Europe and most American cities:

governments subsidised mass housing in large, monolithic, poorly designed blocks that tore apart social networks and often failed, through brutalist design, to foster new links ... without adequate

funding for the transport connections that would make them work
... a sense of isolation, poverty and powerlessness dominates.⁴²

In Britain, the overriding principle in the design and construction of council blocks has been to cut costs to the bone. And, if really necessary, into the bone even if that put lives at risk: a gas explosion led to the destruction of the Ronan Point tower block in 1968 (Figure 4.5).⁴³ Some lessons drawn then were later 'unlearned'. In 2017, 72 people were killed, and many more injured, in an uncontrollable fire at Grenfell Tower, which had been clad in the cheapest, non-fire-proof materials.⁴⁴ That tower block was owned by Kensington Council, by far the richest area of the UK (see Chapter 2).

Figure 4.5: Effects of the explosion at Ronan Point tower block on 16 May 1968



Source: Derek Voller. Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike Licence (CC BY-SA 2.0).⁴⁵

In 1978, Dunleavy considered that the ideological effects of the high-rise/mass housing era of council housing 'may prove to have been some of the most important and enduring legacies'.⁴⁶ In 1980, Margaret Thatcher's government introduced the right to buy scheme for tenants of council houses. This allowed council tenants discounts for purchasing the home they had rented.⁴⁷ Sales occurred differentially within the most attractive council house stocks, especially of family houses in more desirable estates, and less so in flats. The new law also stripped local authorities of the power to invest in replacing the stock they lost. The percentages of new housing completions built by councils fell from nearly 40 per cent in 1980 to 1 per cent by 1993 (see Chapter 5).

4.3 Schools, universities and educational geography

In 1956, Crosland described the school system in Britain, which was developed by the Attlee government, as 'the most divisive, unjust and wasteful of all aspects of social inequality'.⁴⁸ A 1953 report of a House of Commons Select Committee found that secondary modern schools lacked teachers and adequate buildings – some were 'no better than slums'.⁴⁹ Grammar schools disproportionately benefited children from the middle class. In 1965, Wilson appointed Crosland as secretary of state for education and science. He had four missions. First, 'to destroy every f***ing grammar school in England ... And Wales. And Northern Ireland'.⁵⁰ Second, to ensure no fall in standards from the move to comprehensive schools.⁵¹ Third, to ensure that removing grammar schools did not 'increase the *disparity* of esteem within the system as a whole' by 'leaving the public schools still holding their present commanding position' (emphasis in original).⁵² Fourth, to develop a substantial sector of higher education by developing colleges under local authorities 'away from our snobbish, caste-ridden hierarchical obsession with university status'.⁵³

Crosland had specified demanding requirements for the new comprehensive schools: 'an exceptional calibre of headmaster ... high-quality staff for sixth form teaching ... buildings of an adequate scale or scope' and catchment areas with populations 'drawn to straddle of neighbourhoods of different social standing'. And that these requirements had to be satisfied before closing down grammar schools to avoid 'a decline in educational standards and discredit the whole *experiment*' (emphasis added).⁵⁴

In 1970, a new comprehensive school, designed for an intake of 1,000 pupils, opened on the Chelmsley Wood estate. When Lynsey Hanley went there, in 1987, it looked as if it were 50 years old. Its buildings were 'like half-abandoned husks'. It struggled to operate on just over half its original budget. The 600 students who went there felt they had no alternative, and 'had been condemned to a dump' that was 'a secondary modern in all but name'.⁵⁵ Its teachers made clear that they believed that their pupils 'just don't want to learn'.⁵⁶ Hanley explains that to become well-educated meant becoming middle class, which meant rejecting the working-class values of their parents and community.⁵⁷ George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton, who developed the concept of the

economics of identity, show how that explains why for so many young people the economic returns from education are a weak incentive because they undermine their sense of identity.⁵⁸

Hanley contrasted her peers' low expectations with those of middle-class children, who are expected, and under pressure, to do well.⁵⁹ If the 11-plus exam had continued, she would probably have gone to a grammar school (if her parents could have afforded to buy the uniform) and there would have been no 'wall in her head' that made it so difficult for her to realise her potential.⁶⁰ She recognises that, if she had gone to one of Birmingham's great King Edward VI grammar schools, that 'might have made a difference to my education, but only *mine*' (emphasis in original).⁶¹ Farquharson, McNally and Tahir cite evidence showing that 'countries that have weakened selectivity have found higher levels of average achievement'.⁶² An OECD report found that:

Students' performance is influenced by their personal characteristics, but also by those of their schoolmates ... The concentration of low achievers usually has negative consequences on student performance, and this is especially the case for students who are themselves low achievers. By contrast, high-ability students are usually less sensitive than their low-achieving peers to the composition of their classes.⁶³

The Attlee settlement was based on the belief that the way to run the public services was to trust professionals as 'knights' (see Chapter 1).⁶⁴ An occasional visit by the collegial Her Majesty's Inspectors (HMIs) of schools also preserved the 'secret garden' of the teaching profession. Governance by the Inner London Education Authority in the 1970s was based on the principle that 'you appoint a good headteacher, and then he [sic] runs the show'.⁶⁵ And what a show that turned out to be at one of its junior schools, William Tyndale. In the autumn term of 1974, the school day was divided into sets of one-hour periods that alternated between the basic skills of language and mathematics and open sessions. These offered children a free choice from (for example) swimming, cookery, woodwork, watching television and playing games.⁶⁶ Annie Walker, a part-time remedial reading teacher at the school, objected to these changes because they neglected educational basics and denied pupils the opportunity for academic progress. She organised a protest with a manifesto and involved parents, who criticised the radical teachers at public meetings in the summer of 1974.⁶⁷ The Auld Inquiry into William Tyndale was told that its education consisted of playing in the classroom or the playground and that 'lessons hardly existed'. As one of its unfortunate pupils so eloquently put it 'You don't get learned nothing at this school'.⁶⁸ In 1976, in response to a perceived 'crisis' in schools, in a famous speech at Ruskin College in Oxford, the Labour prime minister James Callaghan called for a 'great debate' on education.⁶⁹ One explanation for that 'crisis' is the revolt by middle-class parents

over their loss of access of their children to the privileged education provided by grammar schools. Over time, however, the system of comprehensive schools has largely replaced the selection of pupils by exams with a selection by class and house price.⁷⁰

The problem with the Attlee settlement was that its systems of governance of public services had no remedy to failures like that of the William Tyndale school (and the scandal at the Bristol Royal Infirmary – see Chapter 1). In 1992, the old HMI inspections were replaced in the ‘reign of terror’ of the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED). Christopher Hood et al found that 67 of the 3,600 secondary school OFSTED inspected from 1993 to 1997 were deemed to be ‘failing.’⁷¹ One was Hackney Downs, despite it having ‘expenditure per pupil higher than some of the most exclusive public schools in this country.’⁷² Michael Barber was a member of the committee (the ‘hit squad’) who decided that Hackney Downs ought to be closed as soon as possible. Its best results for GCSEs were in Turkish, which the school did not teach. In a maths class for 16-year-olds, several were ‘unable to say how many pence there were in £1.86’. Barber attributed its failings to ‘a culture of excuses and low expectations’ blamed on ‘the high poverty of many of the students’ families.’⁷³ The lack of corrective action by local governments that allowed the failings between William Tyndale and Hackney Downs to continue unchecked in the glare of their media notoriety may have explained why the model of the Thatcher settlement of a ‘quasi-market’ in which parents chose schools and ‘money followed the pupil’ was so appealing (see Chapter 7).

On his second area of action, in 1965 Crosland established a Public Schools Commission to recommend the best way of integrating Britain’s elite independent schools with the state-financed school system.⁷⁴ But, Nicholas Hillman explains, this was wanted by neither his ministerial colleagues nor his officials, nor the public schools, nor local authorities.⁷⁵ Hillman’s verdict, in 2010, was that:

Labour’s attempt in the 1960s to make public schools less dependent on parental income, less academically selective, more integrated with the maintained sector, more responsive to boarding need and less socially divisive all failed: school fees continued to rise; the public school sector became more selective as the state sector became less selective; there was no big increase in the links between the maintained and independent sectors; it became no easier for people from lower incomes to board at public schools; and former public school pupils, though small in number, continued to dominate access to the leading universities and continued to be disproportionately represented at the top of key professions.⁷⁶

There is, however, a substantial body of evidence that what we inherit largely determines our educational achievement and the impact of our schools is relatively minor. This is the principal finding of the 2018 study by Kaili Rimfeld et al of the 6,000 twin pairs in the UK-representative Twins Early Development Study sample.⁷⁷ Freddie be Boer put it more bluntly based on studies in the US: ‘in thousands of years of education humanity has discovered no replicable and reliable means of taking kids from one educational percentile and raising them up into another.’⁷⁸ He argued that what matters is ‘relative learning – performance in a spectrum or hierarchy of ability that shows skills in comparison to those of other people’ (emphasis in original).

On his last priority Crosland followed a previous government initiative to raise the status of technical education by creating a new sector in higher education. That is easier to change than the much larger school system, but changing schools is a precondition for increasing the number of students qualified by ability and attainment to benefit from higher technical education. In 1965, Crosland established 30 ‘polytechnics,’ governed by local authorities.⁷⁹ In 1966, the 10 colleges of advanced technology (CATs), which had been established in 1956, became universities.⁸⁰ In 1992, the polytechnics became autonomous universities.⁸¹

In his 1976 book *Social Limits to Growth* Fred Hirsch argued that there are two types of goods.⁸² Non-positional goods are those where what matters is just your own consumption. For instance, if a government were to implement a policy so the majority of people rather than just a rich minority can afford to buy the food they need to live on a healthy diet, then the value of food for the best-off minority would not be impaired. But a good education is a ‘positional good,’ one whose intrinsic value depends on its scarcity. The expansion of university education, as recommended by the 1963 Robbins Report on Higher Education, was implemented under subsequent governments.⁸³ Hirsch, who was then at the University of Warwick, argued that this changed the hurdle set by employers for having access to ‘glossy’ top jobs from simply having a degree to having an Oxbridge degree and access to their elite network.⁸⁴

Education has been one reason why geography remained destiny in Britain into the 2020s. At the macro scale, Britain’s best universities were, and still are, concentrated in the golden triangle of Oxford, Cambridge and London. At the micro scale, access to good state schools depends on where you live and so whether you can take advantage of the changes in Oxbridge admissions policies. The *Sunday Times* reported on 30 October 2022 that, between 2017 and 2022, the state school intake at Cambridge increased from 63 to 73 per cent, and at Oxford from 58 to 68 per cent.⁸⁵ The education system illustrates what Julian Le Grand found about the welfare state, which was that, even though this obviously benefited the poor as compared with what had gone before, across healthcare, social services, education and transport ‘almost all public expenditure benefits the better off to a greater extent than the poor.’⁸⁶ A report by the Institute for Fiscal Studies found that:

Young people from better-off families – and especially those who attended private school – enjoy much higher financial rewards from completing a degree than their peers from disadvantaged backgrounds, even holding constant attainment during school and at university as well as subject and institution.⁸⁷

When interviewing for an undergraduate place at Cambridge University, current Conservative MP (and briefly Chancellor or the Exchequer in 2022 during the short-lived government of Liz Truss) Kwasi Kwarteng, having been to Eton, complimented the fellow interviewing him at Trinity College Cambridge, for whom this had been his first interview: ‘Oh, don’t worry, sir, you did fine.’⁸⁸ Lynsey Hanley harbours bitter memories of the humiliation to which she was subjected at her interview at Christ’s College Cambridge, which came to a premature end.⁸⁹ Hanley argues that:

The further up the social ladder you are, the more external influences are set up to favour you and your kind so that to the extent that privilege becomes invisible and so weightless that – literally – you don’t know how lucky you are. At the other end of the social scale, there is an acute sense of how little social trust or esteem is placed in you as an individual, a feeling that is absorbed in low self confidence.⁹⁰

Conclusions

The Attlee settlement aimed to tackle the problems of the 1930s: Beveridge’s five giant evils of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. Markets had delivered unacceptable levels of unemployment and failed in industries (for example, coal and the railways). Previous government policies of austerity had resulted in poverty for the unemployed, and inequalities in access to decent housing, good education and healthcare. Under the Attlee settlement, by the end of the 1970s, the UK was more equitable than before (or since). But the economy suffered from high inflation, unemployment and debt; the weakening of market arrangements resulted in nationalised industries favouring the interests of the producers, as did public services. Margaret Thatcher terminated the Attlee settlement at the 1979 general election, when her governments promised to tackle the problem of inflation, reduce government debt, and develop markets to remedy the failures of government – a saga of neoliberalism’s advance. That is the subject of the next chapter.

Endnotes

¹ Hanley, Lynsey (2017) *Estates an intimate history*, UK: Granta, pp.132–33.

- ² Baker, Gerard (2022) 'Market chaos points to a new political era', *The Times*, 29 September. <https://perma.cc/A969-KSB3>
- ³ Giles, Chris (2022) 'Is Britain now in a full-blown economic crisis?' *Financial Times*, 27 September. <https://perma.cc/2Q8F-QVLT>; Sherman, Natalie and Espiner, Tom (2022) 'IMF openly criticises UK government tax plans', *BBC News*, 28 September. <https://perma.cc/27UW-UVFK>
- ⁴ Macpherson, Nicholas (2022) 'Outlier Britain needs a credible economic plan in a hurry', *Financial Times*, 30 September. <https://perma.cc/4YLA-Y84N>
- ⁵ Krugman, Paul (1994) *Peddling prosperity: Economic sense and nonsense in the age of diminished expectations*, UK: WW Norton & Company, pp.43–47.
- ⁶ The National Archives (n.d.) *1960s and 1970s radicalisation*. <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/alevelstudies/1960-radicalisation.htm>
- ⁷ Krugman, Paul, *Peddling prosperity*, pp.43–47.
- ⁸ Bevan, Gwyn (1980) 'Cash limits', *Fiscal Studies*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp.26–43. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.1980.tb00450.x>
- ⁹ Expenditure Committee (1973–74). *Public expenditure to 1977–78* (Cmnd 5519). *Public expenditure and the balance of resources*, UK: HMSO. <https://perma.cc/2PDA-L6JK>
- ¹⁰ *Fourth Report from the Expenditure Committee* (1975–76), UK: HMSO.
- ¹¹ Bank of England (2016) *A millennium of macroeconomic data*. <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/research-datasets>
- ¹² Office for Budget Responsibility (2023) 'International Engagement'. <https://perma.cc/PBN3-P3BY>
- ¹³ Cavendish, Camilla (2022) 'This was a railroading, electioneering mini-Budget', *Financial Times*, 23 September. <https://perma.cc/Y3GV-DAAW>
- ¹⁴ *Second Report from the Expenditure Committee* (1977–78), UK: HMSO.
- ¹⁵ Healey, Denis (1989) *The time of my life*. Michael Joseph, pp.380–81, quoted in Goodman, Geoffrey (2003) *From Bevan to Blair: Fifty years' reporting from the political front line*, Pluto Press, pp.166–67.
- ¹⁶ Corder, Matthew and Weale, Martin (2012) 'Uncertain uncertainty', *British Actuarial Journal*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp.542–61.
- ¹⁷ Bank of England, *A millennium of macroeconomic data*.
- ¹⁸ Campbell, John (1997) *Nye Bevan: A biography*, UK: Richard Cohen Books, p.156.

- ¹⁹ Powell, Christopher (1974) 'Fifty years of progress', *Built Environment*, vol. 3, no. 10, pp.532–35. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44398033>
- ²⁰ Hanley, Lynsey, *Estates*, p.66.
- ²¹ Timmins, Nicholas (2017) *The five giants: A biography of the welfare state*. (3rd paperback edition), UK: HarperCollins, p.148.
- ²² Timmins, Nicholas, *The five giants*, p.182.
- ²³ Hanley, Lynsey, *Estates*, pp.89–91.
- ²⁴ Office for National Statistics (2022) *House building, UK: permanent dwellings started and completed* <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/housing/datasets/ukhousebuildingpermanentdwellingsstartedandcompleted>
- ²⁵ Office for National Statistics (2022) *House building, UK*.
- ²⁶ Burchell, Andrew and Purton, Marie-Astrid (2012) 'About Richard Crossman – a short biography', Warwick University Library: Modern Records Centre. https://warwick.ac.uk/services/library/mrc/archives_online/digital/crossman/urss/bio/
- ²⁷ Crossman, Richard (1975) *The diaries of a cabinet minister, vol. 1, minister of housing 1964–66*, UK: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, p.383.
- ²⁸ Timmins, Nicholas, *The five giants*, p.232.
- ²⁹ Timmins, Nicholas, *The five giants*, p.233.
- ³⁰ Crossman, Richard, *The diaries of a cabinet minister*, pp.382–83.
- ³¹ Dunleavy, Patrick (1978) *The politics of high rise housing in Britain: Local communities tackle mass housing*, D-Phil thesis, UK: University of Oxford, p.87. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/82066> (note: Dunleavy is editor in chief of LSE Press).
- ³² Marmot, Alexi (1981) 'The legacy of Le Corbusier and high-rise housing', *Built Environment*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp.82–95, 93. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23288674>
- ³³ Marmot, Alexi, 'The legacy of Le Corbusier and high-rise housing', pp.88–91.
- ³⁴ Crossman, Richard, *The diaries of a cabinet minister, vol. 1*, p.87.
- ³⁵ Hanley, Lynsey, *Estates*, p.16.
- ³⁶ Hanley, Lynsey, *Estates*, p.102.
- ³⁷ Hanley, Lynsey, *Estates*, p.ix.
- ³⁸ Timmins, Nicholas, *The five giants*, p.364.

- ³⁹ Field, Frank (1975) *Do we need council houses?*, UK: Catholic Housing Aid Society.
- ⁴⁰ Field, Frank (2018) 'Council Housing', *The Times*, 3 September. <https://frankfield.co.uk/news/Council-Housing>
- ⁴¹ *Economist* (2005) 'Slums in the sky', 29 September. <https://www.economist.com/britain/2005/09/29/slums-in-the-sky>; Hanley, Lynsey, 'Slums in the Sky', in *Estates*, Chapter 3, pp.97–147.
- ⁴² Power, Anne (2012) 'Social inequality, disadvantaged neighbourhoods and transport deprivation: An assessment of the historical influence of housing policies', *Journal of Transport Geography*, vol. 21, p.42. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2012.01.016>
- ⁴³ Cook, Chris (2018) 'Ronan Point: a fifty-year building safety problem', *BBC News*, 15 June. <https://perma.cc/8B37-QRAH>
- ⁴⁴ *BBC News* 'Grenfell Tower: What happened' (2019), 29 October. <https://perma.cc/MM3C-WJV8>
- ⁴⁵ Voller, Derek (1968) 'Tower block collapse. Canning Town'. <https://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/2540469>
- ⁴⁶ Dunleavy, Patrick, *The politics of high rise housing in Britain*, p.451.
- ⁴⁷ Davies, Aled (2013) "'Right to buy": The development of a Conservative housing policy, 1945–1980', *Contemporary British History*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp.421–44. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2013.824660>
- ⁴⁸ Crosland, Anthony (1967) *The future of socialism*, US: Schocken, p.188.
- ⁴⁹ *Eighth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates* (Session 1952–53), UK: HMSO, pp.vii, ix. Cited in Crosland, Anthony, *The future of socialism*, p.190.
- ⁵⁰ Kogan, Maurice (2006) 'Anthony Crosland: intellectual and politician', *Oxford Review of Education*, vol. 32, no. 1, p.78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03054980500496452>
- ⁵¹ Crosland, Anthony 'Comprehensive schools in practice', in Crosland, Anthony, *The future of socialism*, pp.201–04.
- ⁵² Crosland, Anthony, *The future of socialism*, p.205.
- ⁵³ Timmins, Nicholas, *The five giants*, p.244.
- ⁵⁴ Crosland, Anthony, *The future of socialism*, p.205.
- ⁵⁵ Hanley, Lynsey (2016) *Respectable: The experience of class*, UK: Penguin. p. 88.
- ⁵⁶ Hanley, Lynsey, *Respectable*, p.49.
- ⁵⁷ Hanley, Lynsey, *Respectable* p.100.

- ⁵⁸ Akerlof, George and Kranton, Rachel (2010) 'Identity and the economics of education', in *Identity economics*, UK: Princeton University Press, pp.61–80. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400834181>
- ⁵⁹ Hanley, Lynsey, *Respectable*, p.49.
- ⁶⁰ Hanley, Lynsey, 'The Wall in the Head', in *Respectable*, pp.148–84.
- ⁶¹ Hanley, Lynsey, *Respectable*, p.150.
- ⁶² Farquharson, Christine; McNally, Sandra; and Tahir, Imran (2022) *Education inequalities*, UK: IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities, p.42. <https://ifs.org.uk/inequality/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Education-inequalities.pdf>
- ⁶³ OECD (2019) *Balancing school choice and equity: An international perspective based on PISA*. France: OECD, p.46. <https://www.oecd.org/publications/balancing-school-choice-and-equity-2592c974-en.htm>
- ⁶⁴ Le Grand, Julian (2003) *Motivation, agency, and public policy: Of knights and knaves, pawns and queens*, UK: Oxford University Press, p.5. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0199266999.001.0001>
- ⁶⁵ Davis, John (2002) 'The Inner London Education Authority and the William Tyndale Junior School affair', *Oxford Review of Education*, vol. 28, no. 2–3, pp.275–98. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03054980220143423>
- ⁶⁶ Davis, John, 'The Inner London Education Authority', p.284.
- ⁶⁷ Davis, John, 'The Inner London Education Authority', p.275.
- ⁶⁸ Davis, John, 'The Inner London Education Authority', p.286.
- ⁶⁹ Chitty, Clyde (2004) *Education policy in Britain*, UK: Palgrave, pp.40–45.
- ⁷⁰ Adonis, Andrew and Pollard, Stephen (1997) *A class act: the myth of Britain's classless society*, UK: Hamish Hamilton, p.55.
- ⁷¹ Hood, Christopher; James, Oliver; Jones, George; Scott, Colin; and Travers, Tony (1999) 'From secret garden to reign of terror? The regulation of state schools in England', in *Regulation inside government: Waste watchers, quality police, and sleazebusters*, UK: Oxford University Press, pp.139–61. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0198280998.001.0001>
- ⁷² Hanley, Lynsey, *Estates*, p.545.
- ⁷³ Barber, Michael (2008) *Instruction to deliver: Fighting to transform Britain's public services*, UK: Politicos, p.25.
- ⁷⁴ Hillman, Nicholas (2010) 'The Public Schools Commission: "Impractical, expensive and harmful to children"?' *Contemporary British History*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp.511–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2010.518413>

- ⁷⁵ Hillman, Nicholas, 'The Public Schools Commission', pp.514–15.
- ⁷⁶ Hillman, Nicholas, 'The Public Schools Commission', p.526.
- ⁷⁷ Rimfeld, Kaili; Malanchini, Margherita; Krapohl, Eva; Hannigan, Laurie; Dale, Philip; and Plomin, Robert (2018) 'The stability of educational achievement across school years is largely explained by genetic factors', *NPJ Science of Learning*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp.1–10. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41539-018-0030-0>
- ⁷⁸ DeBoer, Freddie (2022) 'Education doesn't work 2.05'. *Substack*. <https://freddiedeboer.substack.com/p/education-doesnt-work-20>
- ⁷⁹ Hirsch, Fred (2005) *Social limits to growth*, UK: Routledge, pp.243–45.
- ⁸⁰ Hanley, Lynsey, *Estates*, pp.200–03.
- ⁸¹ Timmins, Nicholas, *The five giants*, pp.482–83.
- ⁸² Hirsch, Fred, *Social limits to growth*.
- ⁸³ *Report of the Committee appointed by the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of Lord Robbins* (1963), UK: HMSO. <https://perma.cc/K55H-Y3V2>
- ⁸⁴ Hirsch, Fred, *Social limits to growth*, p.49.
- ⁸⁵ Griffiths, Sian (2022) 'Oxbridge leaders urge 95 per cent intake from state schools.' *Sunday Times*, 30 October. <https://perma.cc/RU22-J537>
- ⁸⁶ Timmins, Nicholas, *The five giants*, p.485.
- ⁸⁷ Farquharson, Christine et al, *Education inequalities*, p.80.
- ⁸⁸ Pochin, Courtney (2022) 'Kwasi Kwarteng's bold comment to tutor after Cambridge University interview'. *The Mirror*. <https://perma.cc/U74D-XHBU>
- ⁸⁹ Hanley, Lynsey, *Respectable*, pp.128–29.
- ⁹⁰ Hanley, Lynsey, *Respectable*, p.xi.