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Abstract

We study the effect of superstar firms on an important human capital decision – college students’ choice of major. Past salient, extreme events in an industry, as proxied by cross-sectional skewness in stock returns (or in favorable news coverage), are associated with a disproportionately larger number of college students choosing to major in related fields, even after controlling for the average industry return. This tendency to follow the superstars, however, results in a temporary over-supply of human capital. Specifically, we provide evidence that the additional labor supply due to salient, extreme events *lowers* the average wage earned by entry-level employees when students enter the job market. At the same time, employment size and employee turnover stay roughly constant in related industries, consistent with the view that labor demand is relatively inelastic in the short run. In the longer term, firms cope with the supply increase by gradually expanding the number of positions that require prior experience.

JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14, G20

Keywords: College Major Choice, Human Capital, Superstars, Return Skewness

1. Introduction

It has long been of interest to economists the effect of salient, extreme events on human decision making. For example, there is a recent, fast-growing literature that examines the role of salient, extreme events in driving agents' financial decisions (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2008; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2012). There is, however, much less work on the impact of such events on other, potentially more important, aspects of human decision making. In this paper, we shed new light on this issue by focusing on one of the most irreversible investment decisions an individual ever has to make – her education and human capital investment.

Our paper studies the effect of superstar firms on college students' major choice. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that links extreme success (or failure) episodes in an industry to variations in the number of graduates in related fields. For example, as reported by Stanford Daily, the number of graduates with a Computer Science major in 2013 was nearly four times that in 2006, potentially attributable to the extreme successes of a handful of mobile app and social media companies (a prominent example of which is Facebook). A *New York Times* article on June 15, 2011 indeed argues that “students are flocking to computer science because they dream of being the next Mark Zuckerberg.”

The objective of our paper is to bring to the data the casual claim that college students' attention is drawn to – and their expectations and decisions shaped by – the occurrences of superstar (and similarly super-loser) firms in related industries. Intuitively, superstar firms can affect college students' major choice through two related channels. First, the occurrences of superstar firms often involve extreme payoffs – Mark Zuckerberg has been consistently named one of the world's richest people since

Facebook went public. A long-standing literature in labor economics, dating back to at least Rosen (1997), argues that individuals have a preference for skewed payoffs, possibly due to the complementarity between taste and income (i.e., state-dependent utility). Second, extreme success stories garner disproportionate media coverage and social attention: the story of Mark Zuckerberg, who dropped out of college to work full-time on his Facebook project, has been a constant talking point on college campus. Consequently, salient extreme events play a disproportionate large role in shaping student's expectations and decisions, especially in the presence of substantial search costs faced by college students.

To operationalize our empirical analyses, we take the following steps. First, we focus solely on the set of science and engineering majors (e.g., computer science vs. chemical engineering) that can be mapped relatively cleanly to one or more industry sectors (e.g., information technology vs. pharmaceutical). Second, to quantify salient, extreme events in every industry in each period, we resort to stock returns as a capture-it-all measure of value-relevant events. Specifically, we measure the occurrence of superstars (or super-losers) in each industry by the *cross-sectional* return skewness in that industry (a similar measure is also employed by Zhang, 2006 and Green and Hwang, 2012). Positive cross-sectional skewness indicates that, holding the industry's average return and return volatility constant, a small number of firms in the industry perform exceptionally well; these salient, extreme examples then draw college students to the related majors. Negative cross-sectional skewness, on the other hand, indicates that a small number of firms in the industry have done exceptionally poorly, which is likely to drive students away from the related majors. Third, since college students usually declare their majors by the end of their sophomore year (that is, two years prior

to graduation), we focus on industry return skewness measured in years $t-7$ to $t-3$ prior to the graduation year (i.e., from their junior year in high school to the end of sophomore year in college) to explain major enrollment in year t .¹

Our empirical results strongly support the view that salient, extreme events affect college major choice and, in turn, labor supply in related industries. Using college enrollment data compiled by the National Science Foundation (NSF), we show that a one-standard-deviation increase in within-industry (cross-sectional) return skewness in years $t-7$ to $t-3$ is associated with a statistically significant 10.6% increase in the number of students graduating in related majors in year t . This result is robust to controlling for the average industry return and return volatility measured over the same period, as well as time and major fixed effects.

A potential concern with our supply-side interpretation is that the increase in major enrollment associated with industry skewness may also be consistent with a demand-side explanation. That is, college students rationally anticipate that some industries will prosper in the near future and choose to invest their human capital in these industries by studying related subjects. First, it is unclear why cross-sectional return skewness should forecast future industry prospects after controlling for the average industry return and return volatility. Indeed, in simple linear regressions, we show that industry return skewness is uncorrelated with future industry operating performance, as measured by the return on equity (ROE), profit margin, and earnings/sales growth.

¹ Our results are also robust to other return windows, e.g., $t-8$ to $t-3$ and $t-6$ to $t-3$.

Nonetheless, to tease out the labor-demand channel from our supply-side explanation (i.e., labor supply being driven by salient, extreme events in the industry), we examine the wage and number of employees in these related industries in subsequent years. By examining both the price and quantity in the labor market, we can then distinguish *relative* shifts in the supply curve vs. demand curve.² Moreover, the granularity of the industry employment data from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) allows us to separately examine the wage and number of employees with college degrees for entry-level positions vs. advanced positions that require prior experience.

Our results are most consistent with a relatively larger shift in labor supply that is induced by extreme, salient industry events. A one-standard-deviation increase in industry return skewness in years $t-7$ to $t-3$ is associated with a 1.9% (t -statistic = -3.39) drop in the average wage earned by entry-level employees in related industries in year t . To put this number in perspective, a one-standard-deviation increase in the industry average return is associated with a much lower 0.47% increase in wages. Moreover, the effect of industry return skewness on the average entry-level wage decreases with the extent to which an industry overlaps with other industries in terms of absorbing students from a particular major. This is because for industries with close substitutes, an increase in student supply is shared among all similar industries and thus leads to a smaller wage decline.

Meanwhile, the effect of industry return skewness in years $t-7$ to $t-3$ on the number of entry-level employees (as well as employee turnover) in year t is indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent with the view that labor demand is

² While both the demand and supply curves may shift, the price-quantity pair can inform us which curve has shifted more.

relatively inelastic in the short run; a sudden increase in labor supply thus lowers the average wage earned by entry-level employees without changing the size of employment. (This is not to say that the additional student supply is not absorbed by the labor market; e.g., the additional graduates may compete with job-seekers without a college degree, whom we do not have data on.)

To understand the *long-term* impact of labor supply shocks on subsequent industry wage and employment, we extend our analysis to year $t+5$. But rather than looking at entry-level positions, we now focus on advanced positions that require 5+ years of experience. Our results indicate that a one-standard-deviation in industry return skewness in years $t-7$ to $t-3$ is associated with a 0.6% (t -statistic = -2.75) drop in the average wage earned by these advanced positions; it is also associated with a 1.2% (t -statistic = 2.33) increase in the number of employees in these advanced positions in year $t+5$. These results thus suggest that in the longer term, firms in these affected industries gradually adjust their operations and absorb the labor supply increase induced by salient, extreme events that take place nearly a decade earlier.

An important premise in our empirical design is that the cross-sectional return skewness of an industry reflects/captures salient, extreme events (i.e., the occurrences of superstars and super-losers) in that industry. We verify this assumption by correlating industry return skewness with a more direct, quantifiable measures of extreme events – the skewness in media coverage. To this end, we obtain news sentiment data from Ravenpack and calculate a *News-tone* score for each firm in every year. News salience of an industry is then defined as the cross-sectional skewness of *News-tone* across all firms in the industry.

Intuitively, a positive (negative) news skewness measure indicates that, all else equal, a few firms in the industry receive a disproportionate amount of positive (negative) media coverage. Not surprisingly, the news skewness measure is strongly and positively correlated with contemporaneous within-industry return skewness. Moreover, when we repeat our analysis to forecast future major enrollment, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in news salience in years $t-7$ to $t-3$ is associated with a 13.47% (t -statistic = 5.18) increase in the number of students graduating in related majors in year t . This news-based skewness measure also negatively forecasts future industry wages; yet, it has no significant predictive power for the number of entry-level employees in related industries.³

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background and literature review. Section 3 describes the data we use. Section 4 reports the main results of our empirical analyses. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2. Background and Literature Review

Our results contribute to the vast literature on student's education choice and career outcomes.⁴ At the college level, differences by field of study have received much less attention than the average return to an extra year of post-secondary education, despite the substantial variation in returns to different college majors. Most prior studies (in a relatively small literature) on college major choice uses a rational expectations

³ In robustness checks, we also show that the number of IPOs or firm defaults in an industry (both of which are direct measures of extreme, salient events) strongly forecasts the number of graduates in related fields.

⁴ Among others, see Altonji (1993), Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2014), Arcidiacono (2005), Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2015), Bhattacharya (2005), Blom (2012), Bordon and Fu (2015), Dickson (2010), Fricke, Grogger, and Steinmayr (2015), Goldin (2014), James, Alsalam, Conaty, and To (1989), Sacerdote (2001), Stinebrickner, and Stinebrickner (2014), Wiswall and Zafar (2015), Zafar (2014).

framework in which students' form their expectations of future earnings using statically modelling and Bayesian updating. Berger (1988) is an early example of this. Subsequent research complements this approach (e.g., Altonji, 1993; Arcidiacono, 2004) by incorporating uncertainties (e.g., uncertainties about ability, preference and academic progress) to the baseline model. Our paper contributes to and deviates from this literature by examining the role of salient extreme events in determining college student's earnings expectations and major choice. More broadly, our results speak to the literature on human capital investment. Given the near irreversibility of human capital investment at the college level, our results suggest that salient extreme events have a large, permanent impact on student's lifetime income.

Our paper also relates to the literature on the effect of superstars on other market participants. Rosen (1981) popularized the idea, and many other papers have documented various types of attraction and allocation effects of superstars (e.g., Hausman and Leonard (1997), Brown (2011), among others). Superstar effects on education choice of the type we examine here, however, have not received any attention.

Our result that high industry skewness – which attracts students to major in related fields – is consequently followed by worse job opportunities in the labor market for fresh graduates can be consistent with both preference- and belief-based explanations. On the preference side, this is consistent with a preference for skewness. Such a preference can arise in models of standard or non-standard utility. Rosen (1997) presents a model of preference for skewness, where rational risk-averse individuals with state-dependent utility can choose monetary gambles. In our context, the idea can be loosely translated as follows. A college student can choose, rationally, to major in a field where, say, one firm is doing great and is expected to provide very few, but significantly

better, job opportunities than the average firm (*skewness* in job opportunity). Once he graduates, the student tries to get hired by the target firm. If he does manage to, he stays in the field. If he fails, he might think that he can switch fields later (get an MBA after a computer science degree).

A preference for skewness is also a central theme in the non-standard utility, e.g., prospect theory, literature. Barberis and Huang (2008) study asset prices in a setting where investors derive prospect theory utility from the change in their wealth, and show that a security's expected future idiosyncratic skewness will be priced in this setting. Several papers have presented evidence in support of this prediction using various measures of expected skewness (Kumar, 2009; Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink, 2010; Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw, 2011; Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels, 2013)⁵. Moreover, the probability weighting component of prospect theory (which drives a preference for skewness), in particular, has also been directly shown to have predictive power in the cross-section of equity returns (Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang, 2016).

A different explanation for worse job prospect results associated with skewness-driven labor supply increases is that it reflects students' mistaken beliefs. Seeing a few firms do really well, students might erroneously believe that *average* job opportunities in related fields would be great. This error can arise out of a simplification: students who do not have time or resources to go through detailed industry wage records might estimate how an industry is performing using data on firms in that industry prominently featured in the media or other discussions. Since the type of firms that feature in such discussions are likely to be those that have witnessed surprising, extreme

⁵ See also Mitton and Vorkink, 2007; Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink, 2010; Boyer and Vorkink, 2013; and Eraker and Ready, 2014

events, such an estimate will overweight the tails of the distribution. Theory and evidence on such mistaken beliefs leading to oversupply can be found as far back as in Kaldor (1934), or more recently, in Greenwood and Hanson (2015), although in contexts very different from our paper.

Finally, our paper provides evidence for a growing theoretical literature on the impact of salience on human decision making. A series of recent papers have emphasized the idea that people do not fully take into account all available information, and instead over-emphasize information that their minds focus on (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010; and Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2012). The core idea of salience has been used to explain decisions in the context of consumer choice (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013a), asset prices (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013b), judicial decisions (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013c), and tax effects (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2009). On the neuroeconomics side, Fehr and Rangel (2011) show that subjects evaluate goods by aggregating information about different attributes, with decision weights influenced by attention. While none of these papers have examined the role played by salience on educational choice decisions, like we do here, it is perhaps a natural application; given the complexity of the search process for information on future job prospects (Stigler (1961,1962)).

3. Data

Our data on college enrollment are obtained from the National Science Foundation (NSF). NSF uses the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Completions Survey conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and reports the annual number of bachelor's and master's degrees in science and

engineering fields. A list of the fields is presented in Table A1. These degrees were conferred between 1966 and 2014 by accredited institutions of higher education in the U.S., which includes the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories and outlying areas.

We map a subset of the science and engineering degrees to 3-digit NAICS industry codes, as shown in Table A2. Each industry code can be mapped to several degree fields. For example, Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing (NAICS = 324) is associated with degrees in Chemical Engineering, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Materials Science, and Mechanical Engineering. Each degree field can also correspond to different industries: e.g., A degree in Health is linked to Ambulatory Health Care Services (NAICS = 621), Hospitals (NAICS = 622), Nursing and Residential Care Facilities (NAICS = 623), and Social Assistance (NAICS = 624). Wage and employment data at the industry level are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) through the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program. Wage is defined as straight-time, gross pay, exclusive of premium pay. In each industry, wage and employment data are also reported at the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code level. BLS provides projections of the job requirement (degrees and approximate number of years of experience required) of many SOC codes.

News sentiment data are obtained from RavenPack News Analytics, which quantifies positive and negative perceptions of news reports. We focus on the Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) constructed by RavenPack. CSS is calculated based on the number of positive and negative words in news articles, earnings evaluations, short commentary and editorials, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate action

announcements. It ranges between 0 and 100 and typically hovers between 40 and 60, where 50 represents neutral sentiment).

We obtain the data on IPOs and their first day returns from Green and Hwang (2012). Other data on stock returns, firm characteristics, and bond ratings are available from CRSP and Compustat. We identify a default event as one in which the firm’s long-term issuer credit rating, for the first time, drops to “D,” “SD,” “N.M.” A firm is delisted when the delisting code in CRSP is between 400 and 490, or equal to 572 or 574.

We present summary statistics for our variables of interest in Table 1. Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation, and percentiles for our variables, while Panel B shows their pair-wise (Pearson) correlations. The median number of bachelors in each major is 6112 students per year, with males contributing approximately 70% of that number. We define industries at the 3-digit NAICS level. On average, our industry returns are positively skewed in the cross-section, with a mean annual skewness of 1.2. Approximately 2.2 firms do an IPO in an industry, while 0.1% of firms with a credit rating go into default or are delisted. The employee-weighted industry average wage for workers with a bachelor degree in science and engineering and less than 5 years of experience is \$50,000 (in 1997 dollars). This figure goes up to \$81,000 for people with a bachelor’s in science and engineering and more than 5 years of experience. From Panel B, we can see that our proxies for salient, extreme events are positively correlated with one another. These correlations are mostly significant at the 1% level.

4. Main Results

In this section, we test our main hypotheses. We start by examining the relationship between superstar firms and major choice decisions.

4.1 Number of graduates in different major categories

In order to estimate the effect of our skewness measures on major choice decisions, we estimate the following regression equation:

$$\text{Log_bachelor}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta^* \text{Skew}_{i,t-3 \text{ to } t-7} + \gamma^* \mathbf{X}_{i,t-3} + \mu_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where $\text{Log_bachelor}_{i,t}$ is the number of graduates in major category i in year t , $\text{Skew}_{i,t-3 \text{ to } t-7}$ is our measure of salient, attention-grabbing events affecting firms in industries associated with that major category, $\mathbf{X}_{i,t-3}$ is a vector of controls, and μ_i and τ_t are major and time (year) fixed effects, respectively. Our vector of controls includes the average performance of firms in related industries between $t-7$ and $t-3$, a measure of volatility of firm performance again computed between $t-7$ and $t-3$, the average firm age and size in that industry, and the average industry valuation ratio (Book-to-market, B/M). The inclusion of major fixed effects ensures that our identification of the coefficient of interest, β , comes from annual changes in the number of graduates, not its level. Inclusion of time fixed effects purges out any market-wide events from our estimate.

Two aspects of our test design are noteworthy. First, our skewness measures are always lagged sufficiently such that we are measuring them at least 3 years before graduation. This is to reflect that salient events can only affect major choice if they occurred *before the time the major was most likely decided*, which for most people is, at the latest, their sophomore year in college. Second, as mentioned before, many of our majors can be stepping stones to careers in multiple industries, and choosing to

matriculate in a particular major does not necessarily limit the student to work in the industry most closely related to it. We do not claim that Computer Science graduates can never work as librarians. All we assume for our analysis is that *at the time* the student chose to major in Computer Science, he was much more interested in a career in the Computing or Tech industry than he was interested in librarianship.

Our main hypothesis is that while deciding upon a major, students get disproportionately attracted to those fields that are related to industries where salient events have occurred. For example, when Google is ‘hot’ in the headlines, maybe due to its decision to acquire youtube.com, or due to a move to a state-of-the-art new headquarter building, there is a general increase in excitement on the prospect of working for the company, drawing more and more students toward a Computer Science major. In order to proxy for such attention-grabbing salient events about companies, we rely on various different measures of skewness. The idea is that when a few firms in the industry do exceptionally well, these firms usually prominently feature in the media and capture people’s attention. Given the difficulty in gathering and analyzing data on the actual distribution of work opportunities in different industries, people’s expectations about these opportunities – and hence, major choices – are disproportionately influenced by these salient, easy to recall events.

If this hypothesis is indeed true in the data, we expect to see various measures of industry skewness positively predict number of graduates in related major fields in the future. That is, the coefficient on the *Skew* measure in the major choice regression, β , should be positive.

We present these results in Table 2. In column (1), we measure salient events driving excitement about an industry based on the annual skewness of stock returns for

firms in that industry, averaged over the years $t-7$ to $t-3$ ($Skew_{i,t-3 \text{ to } t-7}$, referred to as *Skew* in the following), where t is the cohort graduation year. As we can see from the table, *Skew* predicts major choice strongly, even after controlling for the average return in the industry and its cross-sectional dispersion. A one standard deviation increase in *Skew* of a particular industry increases the number of students majoring in related fields by 10.6% (all explanatory variables in (1) are standardized for ease of comparison). This coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in the mean return to firms in that industry is associated with an increase in major popularity by 11.5%; while a one standard deviation increase in cross-sectional dispersion (measured by the coefficient of variation of returns) reduces related major popularity by 7.7%; and a one standard deviation change in industry growth valuation (measured as log of the industry-average B/M ratio) is associated with an increase major popularity by 7.2%. So, at the very least, our measure of salient events at related industries seems to have similar, if not stronger, predictive power for major choice decisions than other well-known determinants.

In column (2) of the same table, we measure return skewness using mean minus median return to firms in that industry. Results are similar, with a one standard deviation increase in skewness corresponding to a 7.6% increase in the number of graduating students in related majors. In columns (3) and (4), we change our measure of return skewness to the average of daily and monthly cross-sectional return skewness within industry in years $t-7$ to $t-3$, and continue to find similar, if not stronger, results.

Finally, we examine whether the relationship we document is stronger for less ‘versatile’ majors, that is, majors that usually lead to a few industries where graduates are employed. For example, Aeronautical and astronautical engineering majors, or Earth

and ocean sciences majors, have less leeway in terms of the industries they join post graduation, as compared to, for example, economics majors. As a result, the presence of a superstar employer in the aeronautical industry might have a more pronounced effect on a student choosing to major in Aeronautics, than would the presence of a superstar investment bank on Economics majors. This is because, for the latter major, it is harder for the econometrician to figure out whether a student is drawn by a superstar investment bank, or a superstar hedge fund, or a superstar consulting company – all of which are feasible career options after Economics – making our skewness measure potentially noisier.

We define industry ‘versatility’ as follows. For each year for each major, we calculate the number of people employed in related industries, scaled by the total number of employees. This gives us a measure of how ‘broad’ are employment opportunities for each of these majors. Versatility is 1 when this ratio is in the top quartile during that year. Our results in column (5) of the table are consistent with this hypothesis.

4.2 Effects on related-industry wages and employment

Is cross-sectional return skewness actually a reasonable proxy for work opportunities? In order to understand this, we first look at the labor market for fresh graduates directly. We estimate the effect of our skewness measures on future wages and employment.

Wages and employment are measured at the within-industry-job-category level granularity. A job category within an industry is defined jointly by the typical education and experience levels required to perform that particular function. For

example, one of our job categories is “bachelor degree required, with no prior experience” within each of the industries we examine.

4.2.1 Short-term effects

We first examine what happens to work opportunities at the time of graduation of our year t cohort in industries where a few firms have performed saliently well in years $t-7$ to $t-3$, resulting in a significantly larger number of college graduates in related fields. Here, we estimate the following regression equation:

$$\text{Log_annual_wage}_{j,c,t} = \alpha + \beta^* \text{Skew}_{j,t-3 \text{ to } t-7} + \gamma^* \mathbf{X}_{j,t-1} + \phi_j + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{j,c,t} \quad (2)$$

where $\text{Log_annual_wage}_{j,c,t}$ is the average annual wage in industry j for job category c in year t , $\text{Skew}_{j,t-3 \text{ to } t-7}$ is our measure of salient, attention-grabbing events affecting firms in industry j , $\mathbf{X}_{j,t-1}$ is a vector of controls, and ϕ_j and τ_t are industry and time (year) fixed effects respectively. We use the same vector of controls as in Table 2, but in some specifications, we add to this list (the log of) the average number of bachelors graduating in related majors in years $t-1$ to $t-2$. This inclusion of the number of bachelors is to account for the effect of delayed absorption of the previous years’ graduates in that industry. The inclusion of industry fixed effects ensures that our identification of the coefficient of interest, β , comes from annual changes in industry wages, not its level. Inclusion of time fixed effects purges out the effect of any market-wide event from our estimate.

Table 3 reports these results. In panel A, column (1), we examine wages in job categories requiring no experience but a bachelor’s degree, the most likely entry-level job category for fresh college graduates in related majors. In column (2) of the same panel,

we examine the change in (log) number of employees (year-on-year change in number of employees in industry j for job category c in year t), and in column (3), we look at labor market turnover. Turnover is defined as net separations (total separations - total hires) scaled by total employment.

First, notice from column (2) that there is evidence of some rationality in major choices. Higher wages at graduation indeed seem to be associated with more students to choosing to major in related fields, as seen by the positive coefficient on the *Log_Number_of_Bachelors* variable. Moreover, industries that have done well in years $t-7$ to $t-3$ have higher wages at time t , as evidenced from the coefficient on *Mean_Return*, so it does seem worthwhile to decide major choice based on industry average returns, as we saw students doing in Table 2. But controlling for these two covariates, *Skew* is *negatively* associated with future graduate-entry-level wages in both column (1), where we do not control for delayed absorption of the previous years' graduates, and column (2), where we do. In terms of economic magnitude, an industry which has a skewness one standard deviation above average pays a 1.9% lower wage for entry-level jobs requiring a bachelor's degree.

Wages by themselves do not paint a complete picture of job opportunities at the industry level, much like changes in equilibrium prices do not pin down supply/demand curve shifts. But examining price and quantities together will; so here, in addition to wages, we also measure changes in the number of people employed in these industries in columns (3) and (4).

Note that we use the *change* in the number of employees, rather than its level, to make it consistent with our major choice regressions in table 2, where we also use the

“flow” of new graduates as the dependent variable (rather than the “stock” of every working age individual who ever graduated in that field).

Like in columns (1) and (2), we examine employment in job categories requiring no experience but a bachelor’s degree, the most likely entry-level job category for fresh college graduates. Here, we find no significant association with anything other than *Mean Return* (which is again consistent with students’ decision to take average industry return into account while choosing majors being a reasonable one). This suggests that even though salient events drive more people to major in fields related to certain industries, entry-level graduate job positions do not immediately expand to absorb these extra graduates.

Finally, it is possible that while the number of jobs or pay does not show any support for the influence of skewness on major choice, another possibility is that *job security* changes. That is, once there is a match, there are less job separations. We examine this hypothesis in columns (5) and (6) of the same Table. Our results paint a similar picture – while higher industry mean return and lower volatility in the past predict lower separations, skewness has no meaningful relation.

So, overall, salient events at the industry level do not forecast any additional graduate-entry-level jobs or changes in job separation, and forecast lower wages in the future. At least at the entry level, then, students’ decision to choose majors based on attention-grabbing events in related industries does not seem to benefit them; if anything, it costs them in terms of getting a lower entry-level salary.

In Table 3 Panel B, we carefully examine the notion that the fungibility of employment opportunities varies across majors. The idea is that if an industry has a close substitute in terms of employment opportunities for fresh graduates, then part of

the excess labor supply due to the presence of superstars can get absorbed in that substitute industry, reducing supply pressure. As a result, the effect of having a superstar firm will be more muted for industries with close substitute employment opportunities. For example, many NAICS industries in the healthcare sector lack close substitute industries where graduates can find employment, but many industries in the manufacturing sector (employing, for example, Mechanical engineering, or Industrial engineering and manufacturing majors) have such substitute opportunities.

To calculate ‘closeness’, we look at the overlap in majors (i.e., overlap = 1 when two industries have one or more common majors) for each pair of industries. Then for each industry, we calculate the average overlap across all other industries. Closeness is 1 when this number is in the top quartile of the distribution.

In Column (1) of Table 3 Panel B, we find consistent evidence: skewness affects wages negatively mostly in sectors that lack close substitutes to absorb the excess labor supply. We do not find statistically significant differences in employment numbers or turnover in columns (2) and (3), although the signs of the coefficients on *Skew*Closeness* are also consistent with this hypothesis.

4.2.2 Medium- and longer-term effects

One possible concern is that although results from immediate work opportunities do not seem to indicate the response to superstars is demand-driven, industry prospects may rise in the longer term. In order to understand whether this is the case, we examine what happens to the same industry 5 years after our cohort graduates from a related major.

Here we use regressions similar to those in Equations (2) and (3), but lag the explanatory variables of interest by 5 more years. So *Skew*, for example, is measured

using data from years $t-12$ to $t-8$ (i.e., we use $Skew_{j,t-8 \text{ to } t-12}$ in this section, compared to $Skew_{j,t-3 \text{ to } t-7}$ elsewhere; we still refer to this variable as $Skew$ for short), with the intention of capturing major choice decisions of people graduating in $t-5$, and then measuring their employment opportunities at year t , which is 5 years after graduation.

Table 4 reports these results. It is most helpful to think of Panel A of this table as a version of Table 3 where the dependent variables are moved 5 more years out in the future. In Panel B, we conduct a placebo test by examining wages in job categories requiring no experience but a bachelor's degree, which is unlikely to be the relevant job category for college graduates who have 5 years of experience by now.

In Panel A, columns (1) and (2), we examine wages in job categories requiring 5 years of relevant experience and a bachelor's degree, the most likely job category for people who graduated from related fields 5 years ago. Our results show that $Skew$ is still negatively associated with wages, which suggests that even 5 years later, people who chose majors attracted by salient positive events in certain industries earn lower wages. The economic magnitude, reassuringly, is lower. An industry with skewness one-standard-deviation above average pays approximately a 0.55% lower annual wage. To put the economic magnitude of this result in perspective, note that the data here are aggregated at the level of *all* workers in that industry with 5 years or more experience, i.e., also including those with 15 or 20 years of experience. So, if indeed the wage depression is a result of labor over-supply 5 years back, the magnitude should be more muted here than when we examine entry-level jobs.

In columns (3) and (4) of the same panel, we examine the year-on-year change in number of employees, similar to Table 3 columns (3) and (4), but 5 years further out. Here we examine job categories requiring 5 years of relevant experience and a bachelor's

degree, the most likely job category for people who graduated from related fields 5 years ago. Here, interestingly, we find a positive and significant coefficient on *Skew*. A one standard deviation increase in *Skew* is associated with a 1.2% increase in job opportunities for majors in related fields 5 years later. This suggests that even though entry-level graduate job positions do not immediately expand to absorb extra graduates in related fields attracted by salient events, there is a gradual and partial accommodation of the excess supply, which we can capture in the data 5 years later.

Finally, in Panel A columns (5) and (6), we examine job turnover rates, and find that skewness is not related to any differences in job turnover rates five years out. Note that we do not have turnover data separately for different job category/experience levels, so this is the turnover rate for the whole industry five years after graduation.

In our placebo test in Panel B, *Skew* does not forecast any difference in wages, as expected, in columns (1) or (2). This is important, because it makes it less likely that skewness is forecasting some type of industry dynamic that matters for wages, and therefore, should matter for major choice. Notice that on the other hand, high industry mean return at the time of major choice *does forecast* higher wages 5 years later even for job categories not occupied typically by graduates with experience, and is thus more likely to reflect industry dynamics. For completeness, we conduct a similar placebo test using the change in employment for job categories requiring no experience but a bachelor's degree in columns (3) and (4) of Panel B, and find no evidence of any relationship between *Skew* and future employment.

Overall, even after 5 years from graduation, we fail to uncover any economically meaningful effect of our skewness measures on job market opportunities, and certainly not enough of an effect to warrant the kind of strong response we observe in Table 2,

where we examine the impact of these salient events on major choice. In fact, our evidence here is consistent with the view that the additional graduates who choose majors attracted by superstar firms lead to a labor over-supply in related industries, and this pushes down short- to medium-term wages. Employment does seem to expand in response, but slowly, and the economic magnitude of the response is limited even 5 years out.

4.2.3 The Role of Timing in Measuring the Impact of *Skew*

One concern with our results until this point could be that *Skew* is measuring some stable characteristic of industries, and it is that characteristic which directly captures major choice and industry wage dynamics: *Skew* is just a correlate.

This is unlikely to be the case if *Skew only matters* when measured at the time students are choosing their majors, that is, before their junior years (in years (t-7) to (t-2) before graduation), rather than in the last two years of college by which time most students have already selected majors. On the other hand, if *Skew* measured between years (t-2) and (t-1) before graduation also turns out to predict major choices and/or wage dynamics at graduation just as strongly, then our main results are more likely to be capturing the effect of some stable correlate, as in the alternative explanation.

We present these results in Table 6. *Skew* measured in the last two years of college does not predict major choice, lending support to our interpretation of earlier results. It is negatively related to entry level wages, but the economic magnitude is approximately a third of our main results, also suggesting that the entry-level labor supply effect through major choice is the likely reason behind the lower entry-level wages. One reason why $Skew_{t-2 \text{ to } t-1}$ predicts entry-level wages at time t at all could be

that the labor market forecasts higher future supply in the following years as well, seeing the presence of superstar firms in a particular industry, and responds by taking this into account in setting wages.

4.3 Effect on future firm performance

While wages and employment do not seem to indicate that the major choice response to *Skew* reflects rational anticipation of better job opportunities, it may be the case that *Skew* is still related to some sort of unobserved industry-level performance dynamic, one which a career aspirant should indeed care about in choosing majors. Here we examine what happens to the average overall operating performance of firms in industries at the time of graduation of our year t cohort, and 5 years later, and relate it to cross-sectional return skewness. We use panel regressions similar to (2) above, with $Industry_avg_performance_{j,t}$, the average operating performance measure for all firms in industry j in year t , as our dependent variable.

We report these results in Table 6, Panels A, B, and C. Columns (1) and (2) look at Return on Equity (RoE) and Return on Assets (RoA) as measures of performance. RoE is measured as $\frac{Earnings}{Book\ Equity}$ while RoA is measured as $\frac{Earnings}{Assets}$. Columns (3) and (4) examine Net Profit Margin (NPM, measured as $\frac{Earnings}{Sales}$), and Sales Growth (measured as $\frac{Sales_t - Sales_{t-1}}{Sales_{t-1}}$). Panel A examines industry performance at the time of graduation (analogous to Table 3), Panel B examines industry performance 5 years after graduation (analogous to Table 4), and Panel C examines industry performance at an even longer horizon, 10 years after graduation.

As we see from the table, *Skew* does not predict any of our future industry performance measures in any specification. This makes it extremely unlikely that our skewness measure is picking up some metric that is related to future industry performance. When viewed together with our results in Tables 3 and 4, these results suggest that *Skew* is unlikely to be related to any average firm or labor-market dynamic that should be accounted for in the major choice decision.

4.4 The major choice decision: role of the media

While we show strong evidence that *Skew* predicts major choice, it seems unlikely that high school students, or for that matter first and second year college students, follow the stock market performance of all firms on a regular basis, to be able to calculate or be affected by stock return skewness. Note, however, that this is *not* what we claim anywhere in this paper. Indeed, we think of *Skew*, or any of our other return skewness measures in Table 2, as nothing other than a capture-it-all proxy for the object we are truly interested in: salient events taking place in related industries that draw students' attention, and shape their expectations and decisions.

While there could be many prominent events that affect a few firms but affect them substantially, contributing to *Skew*, one overarching outcome of any such event must be media attention. *Skew* then could be proxying for the cross-sectional skewness in media coverage received by firms in an industry. In other words, very positive and substantial media coverage on a few firms within an industry makes the industry 'hot' and attracts students to related majors ("I want to do computer science because I think it will be exciting to work for Apple"). In order to measure media skewness, we first create a net coverage positivity score using articles in RavenPack. Each article is

assigned a score -1 to 1 depending on the positivity or negativity of the article (rescaling RavenPack scores of 0 to 100) following Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang (2015)⁶. For every firm in each year, we calculate the sum of all news scores. Then we calculate the first three moments of this firm-level news tone measure for each industry for each year. The cross-sectional skewness of net coverage tone in an industry is our measure *News_Skew*.

As can be seen from Table 1, Panel B, this measure of news salience is strongly correlated with different measures of return skewness (*Skew*). The correlations are economically substantial – for example, the correlation between *Skew* and our measure of media skewness is around 0.24, significant at the 1% level.

To provide further evidence, we run regressions similar to equation (1), but replace *Skew* with the media skew measure discussed above, *controlling for the average media tone* (industry average net coverage positivity score, to be precise), *and its dispersion*, about firms in an industry. We report these results in Table 7. In Panel A, we find that media skewness also predicts major choice, with substantial economic magnitudes. A one-standard-deviation higher *News_Skew* is associated with 13.5% more students choosing a related major. This estimate is also highly statistically significant, in spite of the fact that here our sample size goes down substantially due to the lack of availability of media coverage data in the earlier part of the sample (Ravenpack starts in 2000).

In Panels B and C, we examine the relation between media skewness measured in years (t-3) to (t-7) and labor market outcomes for fresh graduates at time t. Panels B and C examine entry-level wages and employment respectively. Similar to our results in

⁶ Also following their paper, only news articles with relevance = 100 (articles which can be definitely ascertained as referring to a given firm) are counted.

Table 3, even here we find that an industry with one standard deviation higher media skew is associated with a 1.55% lower entry-level wage, while there is no significant relationship with change in employment.

Since the time series of media data is very short, we cannot examine what happens in the labor market five years later with this measure; this is one reason we do our main tests with *Skew*.

4.5 Salience: the firm visibility link

We have previously proposed that one reason why *Skew* might predict major choice is because skewed industries have very well (or very poorly) performing, *salient* firms. Here we examine the hypothesis in more detail, exploiting a crucial feature of salience: visibility. Extreme good or bad performance is much more salient if it happens with a larger firm, or a firm covered more prominently in the media. Larger firms typically employ more people, are held by more shareholders, and have larger advertising budgets and analyst following. So when a large firm performs saliently well, this news is much more likely to reach the general public. Similarly, the news of a firm doing extremely well within an industry is more likely to reach a student choosing a major if it is a large firm that enjoys significant media coverage.

In this section, we check whether this is true in our data. Specifically, we create two measures of visibility here. The first measure, which we call *Size_visibility* takes a value of one for an industry where most firms that have extremely good return performance (above the 90th percentile) and are hence responsible for *Skew* are *large*

firms, and zero otherwise.⁷ The second measure, which we call *Media_visibility*, takes a value of one for an industry where most firms that have extremely good return performance (above the 90th percentile) and are hence responsible for *Skew*, are firms covered by the media, and zero otherwise.

We estimate regression equation (1) with two additional variables in each specification: our visibility measure, and its interaction with *Skew*. The interaction effect is of interest here – it singles out those industries whose high skewness comes from large firms or firms that are highly visible in the media. Our hypothesis is that very good return performance is more salient when the underlying firm is more visible, so we expect this interaction term to affect major choice positively.

Our results, presented in Table 8, are consistent with this hypothesis. Using either measure, *Skew* is predictive of returns only in industries where more visible firms contribute to this skewness.

4.6 Attention-grabbing events in the equity market

In this section, we examine two salient events in equity markets, which can generate discussion and/or disproportionate news coverage: first, companies coming into public equity markets for the first time in an IPO. During this time, there is disproportionate advertising and media coverage on these companies, and some of the larger IPOs generate considerable public discourse. IPOs are especially prominently discussed in the media when they yield a high first-day return. Similarly, firm defaults also receive significant, but this time *negative*, coverage. So this is the second variable we examine.

⁷Large firms are those with above median market capitalization.

We run regressions similar to equation (1), but replacing *Skew* with these candidate underlying measures discussed in this section. We report these results in Table 8. In column (1), we look at the average return to all IPOs in related industries, in column (2) we examine the (log of) first day dollar return on all IPOs, in column (3) we look at the total number of firm defaults, and in column (4) we examine the number of delistings and defaults in each industry. While IPOs are associated with large positive returns, likely drawing more students to related majors, defaults are negative events, and should repel students instead.

We find consistent evidence with this hypothesis throughout Table 9. Note that here we do not examine wages or employment, since we do not think that IPOs or defaults are unrelated to industry fundamentals directly.

4.7 Pecuniary expectations in major choice and the role of gender

Recent research (e.g. Zafar, 2013) suggests that males and females differ in their preferences in the workplace while choosing majors, with males caring about pecuniary outcomes in the workplace much more than females. Under this view, if the industry-level stock return moments affect major choice through their effect on pecuniary expectations like we hypothesize, then we might observe a stronger effect for males than females.

In order to examine this, we run our major choice regression (1) separately for males and females. In results reported in Table 10, we find evidence consistent with the view above. Almost all of our observed effect comes from male students, with all three moments of industry stock returns having no significant effect on female major choice.

4.8 Robustness Tests

In this section we examine the robustness of our main results in Table 2. We present these results in Table 11. In Panel A columns (1) – (4), we examine the number of master’s degree graduates, instead of bachelors. Our results here are very similar to those in Table 2. In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in *Skew* is associated with a 11% increase in the number of students graduating with a master’s degree in a related field (column (1)). In columns (2) through (4), we repeat the results presented in columns (2) through (4) of table 2, but using Master’s degrees, and continue to find similar results. In unreported results, we have also verified that results remain very similar if we use data from $t-3$ to $t-6$ or from $t-3$ to $t-5$. Overall, our result is not specific to field choice for the bachelor’s degree.

In Panel B, we examine equation (1) again, but we add an additional explanatory variable, the industry returns moments measured in years (t-1) to (t-2), that is, after most people have already declared majors. Therefore, it should not have any effect on major choice. This is what we find, both for Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees. In Panel C, we continue with this analysis, but now examine entry-level wages and employment. In the wage regression, we find that higher *Skew* in years (t-1) to (t-2) is statistically associated with slightly lower wages, but the economic magnitude of the coefficient is one-third of that on $Skew_{t-3 \text{ to } t-7}$. This possibly reflects that while this skewness is too recent to elicit major choice decision changes (as shown in columns (5) and (6)), it can still attract a few graduates from other fields into the entry-level job-market, depressing wages further. There is no significant association between *Skew* and entry-level employment at either horizon.

Finally, in Panel D, we leave out the Tech boom years (1998-2004) from our analysis, and find similar results, showing that our results do not come solely from major choices in tech in these periods.

5. Conclusion

This paper examines the effect of superstar firms on an important human capital decision – college students’ major choice. Intuitively, superstars may play an important role in shaping college students’ expectations and major choice through two related channels. First, the occurrences of superstar firms often involve extreme payoffs to the founders and top executives. Most individuals, in the meanwhile, have a preference for skewed payoffs, possibly due to the complementarity between taste and income. Second, superstar firms garner a disproportionate amount of media coverage and social attention. Given the substantial search frictions faced by college students in choosing their fields of study, their effort is likely directed by superstar firms.

Using cross-sectional skewness in stock returns or favorable news coverage as proxies for salient extreme events in an industry, we find that these events are associated with a disproportionately larger number of college students choosing to major in related fields. Students’ tendency to follow superstars, however, results in a temporary over-supply of human capital. In particular, we find that upon entering the job market, the additional student supply due to salient extreme events lowers the average wage earned by entry-level employees. Coupled with the finding that the number of entry-level employees (as well as employee turnover) stays roughly constant, this result is consistent with the view that labor demand is relatively inelastic in the

short run; a sudden increase in labor supply thus lowers the average wage earned by entry-level employees without affecting the employment size.

In the longer term, firms appear to better cope with the increase in labor supply by gradually expanding their operations. For example, focusing on positions that require some prior experience, we find that five years after the extra supply reaching the job market, there is a significant increase in the number of employees in these advanced positions in related industries, however at a still depressed wage level.

In sum, our paper is the first to examine the role of salient, extreme events in determining how people make perhaps the most important and irreversible decision in their lives – the choice of investment in career skills. Our results have implications for both labor economists who study the substantial variation in individuals' education choice, as well as micro-economists who emphasize the role of salience and skewed payoffs in human decision making.

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Table 1
Summary Statistics and Correlations

Panel A provides summary statistics of our major variables. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major. Log Number of Male and Female Bachelors, as well as Masters are also reported. Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual returns in a industry. Skew_Mean_Median is the mean annual return minus the median in a industry. Skew_Daily and Skew_Monthly are similar to Skew; they are cross-sectional skewness of daily returns and monthly returns, respectively, and then averaged across the year.

News Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual net number of positive stories, based on RavenPack CSS scores. Mean IPO First Day Return and Log IPO First Day Dollar Return are the average IPO first day return and the log total dollar amount of IPO first day return. Default Rate and Default and Delisted Rate are the number of defaults (as defined by S&P issuer ratings) and the number of defaults and delisted firms, divided by the total number of rated firms in a industry.

Annual Wage is the employee-weighted average wage across all occupation codes that require bachelor s degree and do not require prior experience, inflation-adjusted (1997 level). Some occupation codes require 5+ years of experience. Number of employees is also reported. Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean), Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age.

Panel A: Summary Statistics							
	Mean	Median	Std Dev	5th Pctl	25th Pctl	75th Pctl	95th Pctl
Log Number of Bachelors	8.751	8.718	1.205	6.835	8.071	9.700	10.778
Log Number of Bachelors (Male)	8.413	8.364	1.120	6.521	7.813	9.435	9.812
Log Number of Bachelors (Female)	6.638	7.095	1.968	2.890	5.481	7.599	9.620
Log Number of Masters	7.765	7.750	0.958	6.271	7.138	8.250	9.650
Skew	1.202	0.958	1.445	-0.674	0.310	1.801	3.854
Skew_Mean_Median	0.070	0.044	0.126	-0.044	0.004	0.100	0.276
Skew_Daily	0.426	0.334	0.371	0.004	0.169	0.577	1.179
Skew_Monthly	0.703	0.587	0.644	-0.119	0.268	1.000	1.968
News Skew	2.025	1.586	2.550	-1.212	0.614	2.839	7.231
Mean IPO First Day Return	0.105	0.070	0.164	-0.017	0.027	0.141	0.298
Log Number of IPOs	0.820	0.693	1.022	0.000	0.000	1.386	3.045
Log IPO First Day Dollar Return	1.293	0.000	1.445	0.000	0.000	2.894	3.037
Default Rate (%)	0.045	0.000	0.123	0.000	0.000	0.023	0.268
Default and Delisted Rate (%)	0.095	0.000	0.237	0.000	0.000	0.099	0.442
Mean Return	0.010	0.011	0.025	-0.031	-0.003	0.024	0.046
Return Coefficient of Variation	12.077	16.357	470.310	-91.580	-6.027	35.251	143.584
Log Total Market Cap	22.464	22.611	2.779	17.689	20.648	24.501	26.908
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.585	-0.564	0.547	-1.447	-0.955	-0.216	0.304
Log Mean Firm Age	2.753	2.892	0.786	1.143	2.377	3.304	3.745
Log Annual Wage (No Experience)	10.815	10.799	0.177	10.543	10.721	10.915	11.116
Log Annual Wage (5+ Years of Experience)	11.305	11.304	0.139	11.088	11.231	11.393	11.511
Log Number of Employees (No Experience)	10.277	10.157	1.574	7.456	9.289	11.660	12.750
Log Number of Employees (5+ Years of Experience)	9.884	9.898	1.259	7.421	9.053	10.945	11.554

Table 2
Regressions of Number of Bachelors on Return Skewness

This table reports the results of regressions of Log Number of Bachelors on skewness measures (averaged across years t-3 to t-7) and other controls. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major. Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual returns in a industry. Skew_Mean_Median is the mean annual return minus the median in a industry. Skew_Daily and Skew_Monthly are similar to Skew; they are cross-sectional skewness of daily returns and monthly returns, respectively, and then averaged across the year. All skewness measures are then averaged across years t-3 to t-7, relative to the graduation year t.

Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean). Both are averaged across years t-3 to t-7. Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year t-3. Versatility is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the ratio, number of employees in related industries to the total number of employees in the graduation year, is above the 75th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables (except dummy variables) are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

	Log Number of Bachelors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Skew	0.1062** (0.0516)				0.1148** (0.0534)
Skew_Mean_Median		0.0763** (0.0392)			
Skew_Daily			0.2710*** (0.0726)		
Skew_Monthly				0.2488*** (0.0830)	
Skew * Versatility					-0.1419** (0.0609)
Mean Return	0.1155*** (0.0403)	0.1226*** (0.0372)	0.1002*** (0.0368)	0.0943*** (0.0342)	0.1072*** (0.0377)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0770*** (0.0176)	-0.0736*** (0.0152)	-0.0512*** (0.0123)	-0.0504*** (0.0122)	-0.0738*** (0.0176)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0358 (0.0783)	0.0201 (0.0564)	-0.1787** (0.0783)	-0.0423 (0.0752)	0.0279 (0.0756)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0723* (0.0432)	0.1301** (0.0523)	0.0206 (0.0413)	0.0341 (0.0433)	0.0429 (0.0415)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.1627*** (0.0304)	-0.1641*** (0.0330)	-0.1078*** (0.0287)	-0.1413*** (0.0291)	-0.1398*** (0.0308)
Versatility					0.0784 (0.0634)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Observations	517	521	520	522	517
R-Squared (%)	88.86	88.88	89.24	89.34	88.97

Table 3
Regressions of Wage, Number of Employees, and Turnover, Upon Graduation

This table reports the results of regressions of Log Annual Wage, Change in Log Number of Employees, and Industry Turnover Rate, all in graduation year t , on skewness measures (averaged across years $t-3$ to $t-7$) and other controls. Annual Wage is the employee-weighted average wage across all occupation codes that require bachelor s degree and do not require prior experience, inflation-adjusted (1997 level). Log Number of Employees is the log number of employees in these occupation codes. Industry Turnover Rate is the total number of separations minus hires in the whole industry, divided by the total number of employees. Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual returns in a industry. It is then averaged across from years $t-3$ to $t-7$. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major, averaged across years $t-1$ to $t-2$.

Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean). Both are averaged across years $t-3$ to $t-7$. Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year $t-1$. In Panel B, Closeness is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the average industry overlap rate is above the 75th percentile. For each pair of industry, we look at the overlap in majors (i.e., overlap = 1 when two industries have one or more common majors). Then for each industry, we calculate the average overlap rate across all other industries. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables (except dummy variables) are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

Panel A: Upon Graduation						
	Log Annual Wage	Log Annual Wage	Change in Log Number of Employees	Change in Log Number of Employees	Industry Turnover Rate	Industry Turnover Rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Skew	-0.0190*** (0.0056)	-0.0193*** (0.0052)	0.0030 (0.0093)	0.0023 (0.0124)	-0.0026 (0.0025)	-0.0018 (0.0024)
Mean Return	0.0047* (0.0027)	0.0037 (0.0024)	0.0200** (0.0079)	0.0200** (0.0079)	-0.0035* (0.0018)	-0.0049** (0.0019)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0051** (0.0019)	-0.0056*** (0.0018)	0.0075 (0.0056)	0.0079 (0.0051)	0.0028** (0.0011)	0.0027** (0.0010)
Log Number of Bachelors		0.0644*** (0.0163)		0.0032 (0.0194)		0.0228* (0.0120)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0147* (0.0082)	0.0179* (0.0087)	0.0089 (0.0067)	0.0088 (0.0068)	-0.0060* (0.0033)	-0.0051* (0.0028)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.0001 (0.0033)	0.0000 (0.0035)	0.0051 (0.0067)	0.0055 (0.0061)	0.0003 (0.0027)	0.0004 (0.0028)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.0042 (0.0042)	-0.0023 (0.0038)	-0.0105 (0.0142)	-0.0098 (0.0126)	0.0034 (0.0020)	0.0038 (0.0021)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
# Observations	557	557	482	482	441	441
R-Squared (%)	94.88	95.15	17.13	17.16	76.63	77.51

Table 3 (continued)

Panel B: Upon Graduation, With Industry Substitutability Measure			
	Log Annual Wage	Change in Log Number of Employees	Industry Turnover Rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Skew	-0.0334*** (0.0072)	-0.0020 (0.0293)	-0.0039 (0.0056)
Skew * Closeness	0.0283*** (0.0058)	0.0074 (0.0346)	0.0046 (0.0075)
Closeness	0.6014*** (0.0318)	-0.0276 (0.0344)	0.0968*** (0.0306)
Mean Return	0.0036 (0.0025)	0.0199** (0.0090)	-0.0043** (0.0019)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0055*** (0.0019)	0.0126* (0.0060)	0.0025* (0.0014)
Log Number of Bachelors	0.0528*** (0.0150)	-0.0016 (0.0195)	0.0201 (0.0116)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0175** (0.0080)	-0.0004 (0.0093)	-0.0047 (0.0032)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0001 (0.0035)	0.0002 (0.0051)	0.0003 (0.0029)
Log Mean Firm Age	0.0000 (0.0041)	0.0063 (0.0115)	0.0040* (0.0021)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes
# Observations	557	482	441
R-Squared (%)	95.31	17.89	77.61

Table 4
Regressions of Wage, Number of Employees, and Turnover, 5 Years After Graduation

Panel A reports the results of regressions of Log Annual Wage, Change in Log Number of Employees, and Industry Turnover Rate, all in 5 years after graduation (year t+5), on skewness measures (averaged across years t-3 to t-7) and other controls. Annual Wage is the employee-weighted average wage across all occupation codes that require bachelor s degree and 5+ years of experience, inflation-adjusted (1997 level). Log Number of Employees is the log number of employees in these occupation codes. Industry Turnover Rate is the total number of separations minus hires in the whole industry, divided by the total number of employees. Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual returns in a industry. It is then averaged across from years t-3 to t-7. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major, averaged across years t-1 to t-2.

In Panel B, Log Annual Wage and Change in Log Number of Employees of entry-level positions, both in year t+5, are regressed on skewness measures (averaged across years t-3 to t-7). These entry-level positions are occupation codes that require bachelor s degree and do not require prior experience.

Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean). Both are averaged across years t-3 to t-7. Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

Panel A: 5 Years After Graduation						
	Log Annual Wage	Log Annual Wage	Change in Log Number of Employees	Change in Log Number of Employees	Industry Turnover Rate	Industry Turnover Rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Skew	-0.0055** (0.0020)	-0.0058** (0.0020)	0.0112* (0.0053)	0.0119** (0.0051)	0.0010 (0.0024)	0.0016 (0.0025)
Mean Return	-0.0021 (0.0014)	-0.0026* (0.0015)	0.0082 (0.0051)	0.0081 (0.0052)	0.0041*** (0.0011)	0.0047*** (0.0011)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0022** (0.0010)	-0.0022** (0.0010)	0.0008 (0.0026)	0.0006 (0.0026)	-0.0046*** (0.0014)	-0.0046*** (0.0015)
Log Number of Bachelors		-0.0126 (0.0092)		-0.0028 (0.0056)		0.0193** (0.0089)
Log Total Market Cap	-0.0088** (0.0030)	-0.0095*** (0.0029)	-0.0004 (0.0045)	-0.0004 (0.0044)	-0.0022 (0.0044)	-0.0010 (0.0041)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.0054* (0.0029)	-0.0057* (0.0029)	-0.0046 (0.0039)	-0.0049 (0.0037)	0.0012 (0.0022)	0.0016 (0.0022)
Log Mean Firm Age	0.0089*** (0.0025)	0.0089*** (0.0024)	0.0014 (0.0062)	0.0010 (0.0064)	-0.0025 (0.0024)	-0.0021 (0.0024)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
# Observations	564	564	489	489	448	448
R-Squared (%)	93.83	93.85	14.66	14.72	73.61	73.93

Table 4 (continued)

Panel B: Entry-Level Positions, 5 Years After Graduation (Placebo Test)				
	Log Annual Wage	Log Annual Wage	Change in Log Number of Employees	Change in Log Number of Employees
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Skew	0.0020 (0.0047)	0.0025 (0.0046)	0.0142 (0.0181)	0.0141 (0.0151)
Mean Return	0.0033 (0.0021)	0.0040* (0.0022)	0.0188 (0.0109)	0.0188 (0.0113)
Return Coefficient of Variation	0.0015 (0.0014)	0.0014 (0.0014)	0.0059 (0.0048)	0.0059 (0.0056)
Log Number of Bachelors		0.0163 (0.0159)		0.0003 (0.0129)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0016 (0.0062)	0.0025 (0.0062)	0.0012 (0.0105)	0.0012 (0.0103)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.0026 (0.0039)	-0.0022 (0.0040)	0.0062 (0.0072)	0.0063 (0.0076)
Log Mean Firm Age	0.0024 (0.0041)	0.0023 (0.0041)	-0.0062 (0.0118)	-0.0062 (0.0116)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No
# Observations	564	564	489	489
R-Squared (%)	94.34	94.36	17.00	17.00

Table 5
Regressions with Skewness Measures of Different Horizons

Panel A of this table reruns regressions of Log Number of Bachelors in year t , while Panel B reruns regressions of Log Annual Wage (of entry-level positions) and Change in Log Number of Employees (of entry-level positions), both in year t . In addition to our return measures measured over years $t-3$ to $t-7$ in Tables 2 and 3, we include skewness, mean, and coefficient of variation that are measured over years $t-1$ to $t-2$. All other variables are the same as Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

Panel A: Log Number of Bachelors, with t-1 to t-2 Measures		
	(1)	(2)
Skew t-1 to t-2	-0.0014 (0.0414)	-0.0075 (0.0418)
Skew t-3 to t-7		0.1214** (0.0532)
Mean Return t-1 to t-2	0.0128 (0.0317)	-0.0086 (0.0304)
Mean Return t-3 to t-7		0.1310*** (0.0391)
Return Coefficient of Variation t-1 to t-2	-0.0592*** (0.0144)	-0.0779*** (0.0167)
Return Coefficient of Variation t-3 to t-7		-0.0863*** (0.0188)
Log Total Market Cap	0.1718** (0.0788)	-0.0149 (0.0785)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0145 (0.0390)	0.0779* (0.0448)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.1374*** (0.0289)	-0.1338*** (0.0293)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
# Observations	517	517
R-Squared (%)	88.47	89.17

Table 5 (continued)

Panel B: Entry-Level Positions, with t-1 to t-2 Measures				
	Log Annual Wage (1)	Log Annual Wage (2)	Change in Log Number of Employees (3)	Change in Log Number of Employees (4)
Skew t-1 to t-2	-0.0045* (0.0023)	-0.0076*** (0.0025)	-0.0192 (0.0145)	-0.0110 (0.0133)
Skew t-3 to t-7		-0.0217*** (0.0054)		0.0018 (0.0123)
Mean Return t-1 to t-2	-0.0013 (0.0037)	-0.0022 (0.0043)	0.0051 (0.0169)	-0.0017 (0.0112)
Mean Return t-3 to t-7		0.0007 (0.0030)		0.0173** (0.0082)
Return Coefficient of Variation t-1 to t-2	0.0009 (0.0011)	0.0006 (0.0014)	0.0069* (0.0041)	0.0062 (0.0039)
Return Coefficient of Variation t-3 to t-7		-0.0059*** (0.0022)		0.0077 (0.0050)
Log Number of Bachelors	0.0651*** (0.0168)	0.0664*** (0.0165)	0.0104 (0.0194)	0.0053 (0.0208)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0302*** (0.0102)	0.0320*** (0.0108)	0.0298** (0.0146)	0.0164 (0.0091)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0026 (0.0049)	0.0012 (0.0048)	-0.0030 (0.0113)	0.0033 (0.0086)
Log Mean Firm Age	0.0028 (0.0040)	-0.0041 (0.0042)	-0.0229* (0.0131)	-0.0103 (0.0121)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No
# Observations	581	548	506	473
R-Squared (%)	94.80	95.22	15.23	17.41

Table 6
Regressions of Industry Average Operating Performance Measures

This table reports the results of regressions of industry average operating performance measures on skewness measures (averaged across years t-3 to t-7) and other controls. RoE is the return on equity, defined as earnings divided equity. RoA is the return on assets, defined as earnings divided by total assets. NPM is the net profit margin, that is, earnings divided by sales. Sales growth is the percentage growth in sales. In Panel A, these performance measures are measured in year t. In Panels B and C, these measures are measured in year t+5 and t+10, respectively. Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual returns in a industry. It is then averaged across from years t-3 to t-7. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major, averaged across years t-1 to t-2.

Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean). Both are averaged across years t-3 to t-7. Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

Panel A: Upon Graduation				
	RoE	RoA	NPM	Sales Growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Skew	0.0026 (0.0029)	0.0008 (0.0014)	0.0018 (0.0022)	-0.0053 (0.0069)
Mean Return	-0.0104** (0.0041)	-0.0040** (0.0016)	-0.0013 (0.0017)	-0.0176* (0.0106)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0005 (0.0011)	-0.0001 (0.0005)	-0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0036 (0.0032)
Log Number of Bachelors	-0.0164** (0.0072)	-0.0034 (0.0033)	-0.0027 (0.0046)	0.0012 (0.0186)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0075 (0.0097)	0.0071** (0.0030)	0.0123* (0.0071)	-0.0327** (0.0161)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.0339*** (0.0047)	-0.0117*** (0.0019)	-0.0108*** (0.0026)	-0.0435*** (0.0073)
Log Mean Firm Age	0.0047 (0.0037)	0.0019 (0.0015)	0.0085*** (0.0025)	-0.0214* (0.0123)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Observations	1581	1581	1581	1580
R-Squared (%)	32.82	48.52	40.40	32.82

Table 6 (continued)

Panel B: 5 Years After Graduation				
	RoE	RoA	NPM	Sales Growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Skew	-0.0031 (0.0036)	-0.0003 (0.0014)	0.0017 (0.0029)	-0.0111 (0.0065)
Mean Return	0.0018 (0.0037)	0.0012 (0.0013)	0.0034 (0.0025)	0.0141** (0.0067)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0081*** (0.0022)	-0.0026*** (0.0008)	-0.0026*** (0.0012)	-0.0056* (0.0031)
Log Number of Bachelors	-0.0179 (0.0120)	-0.0127*** (0.0038)	-0.0084 (0.0062)	-0.0642*** (0.0143)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0050 (0.0065)	-0.0023 (0.0028)	0.0006 (0.0062)	-0.0196 (0.0189)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0042 (0.0060)	0.0017 (0.0023)	-0.0005 (0.0038)	-0.0136 (0.0097)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.0126** (0.0053)	-0.0022 (0.0022)	0.0082* (0.0043)	0.0082 (0.0079)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Observations	1224	1224	1224	1223
R-Squared (%)	27.61	39.99	36.60	29.62
Panel C: 10 Years After Graduation				
	RoE	RoA	NPM	Sales Growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Skew	-0.0020 (0.0047)	-0.0005 (0.0020)	-0.0017 (0.0030)	0.0067 (0.0049)
Mean Return	0.0036 (0.0044)	0.0017 (0.0016)	0.0009 (0.0025)	0.0044 (0.0093)
Return Coefficient of Variation	0.0032 (0.0046)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0043 (0.0029)	-0.0012 (0.0068)
Log Number of Bachelors	0.0166 (0.0156)	0.0125** (0.0052)	0.0142* (0.0083)	0.0405** (0.0171)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0003 (0.0174)	-0.0004 (0.0059)	0.0159 (0.0139)	-0.0550 (0.0374)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.0064 (0.0056)	-0.0042** (0.0021)	-0.0028 (0.0040)	-0.0041 (0.0101)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.0128 (0.0084)	-0.0040 (0.0030)	-0.0022 (0.0049)	0.0100 (0.0097)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Observations	855	855	855	854
R-Squared (%)	26.74	36.17	41.56	26.86

Table 7
Regressions Using News Skewness

Panel A reports the results of regressions of Log Number of Bachelors on news skewness (averaged across years t-3 to t-7) and other controls. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major. News Skew, News Mean, and News Coefficient of Variation are, respectively, the cross-sectional skewness, mean, and coefficient of variation of annual sum of news scores, based on RavenPack CSS scores. All are then averaged across years t-3 to t-7, relative to the graduation year t.

Panels B and C report the results of regressions of Log Annual Wage and Change in Log Number of Employees, both in graduation year t, on news skewness (averaged across years t-3 to t-7) and other controls. Annual Wage is the employee-weighted average wage across all occupation codes that require bachelor s degree and do not require prior experience, inflation-adjusted (1997 level). Log Number of Employees is the log number of employees in these occupation codes. In Panels B and C, Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major, averaged across years t-1 to t-2.

Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year t-3 in Panel A, and t-1 in Panels B and C. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

Panel A: Log Number of Bachelors	
News Skew	0.1347*** (0.0260)
News Mean	0.0180 (0.0082)
News Coefficient of Variation	0.0265** (0.0087)
Log Total Market Cap	-0.0325 (0.0247)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0489** (0.0194)
Log Mean Firm Age	0.0461** (0.0176)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes
# Observations	88
R-Squared (%)	99.83

Table 7 (continued)

Panel B: Log Annual Wage	
News Skew	-0.0155*** (0.0029)
News Mean	0.0248*** (0.0031)
News Coefficient of Variation	0.0004 (0.0016)
Log Number of Bachelors	0.1992*** (0.0459)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0020 (0.0169)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0004 (0.0037)
Log Mean Firm Age	0.0059 (0.0066)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes
# Observations	274
R-Squared (%)	98.22
Panel C: Change in Log Number of Employees	
News Skew	-0.0203 (0.0159)
News Mean	0.0147 (0.0118)
News Coefficient of Variation	0.0130 (0.0098)
Log Number of Bachelors	0.0332 (0.0303)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0206** (0.0084)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.0008 (0.0061)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.0055 (0.0208)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	No
# Observations	273
R-Squared (%)	14.42

Table 8

Regressions of Number of Bachelors on Return Skewness, with Firm Visibility Measures

This table reports the results of regressions of Log Number of Bachelors on return skewness (averaged across years t-3 to t-7) and firm visibility measures. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major. Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual returns in a industry. It is then averaged across years t-3 to t-7, relative to the graduation year t. The visibility measures, Large Firms and News Coverage, are dummy variables that indicate at least 50% of the extreme winners are large firms and are covered by RavenPack, respectively.

Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean). Both are averaged across years t-3 to t-7. Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year t-3. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables (except dummy variables) are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

	Log Number of Bachelors	
	(1)	(2)
Skew	0.0973** (0.0492)	0.1407** (0.0596)
Skew * Large Firms	0.0512** (0.0207)	
Large Firms	-0.0534** (0.0220)	
Skew * News Coverage		0.0869*** (0.0303)
News Coverage		-0.0208 (0.0409)
Mean Return	0.1092*** (0.0359)	0.1137*** (0.0404)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0801*** (0.0187)	-0.0442*** (0.0164)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0364 (0.0726)	-0.0115 (0.0697)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0447 (0.0417)	0.0869** (0.0443)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.1544*** (0.0297)	-0.1424*** (0.0269)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
# Observations	516	516
R-Squared (%)	89.14	89.07

Table 9

Regressions of Number of Bachelors on Other Measures of Salient, Extreme Events

This table reports the results of regressions of Log Number of Bachelors on other measures of salient, extreme events (averaged across years t-3 to t-7). Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major. Mean IPO First Day Return and Log IPO First Day Dollar Return are the average IPO first day return and the log total dollar amount of IPO first day return. Default Rate and Default and Delisted Rate are the number of defaults (as defined by S&P issuer ratings) and the number of defaults and delisted firms, divided by the total number of rated firms in a industry. All salience measures are then then averaged across years t-3 to t-7, relative to the graduation year t.

Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean). Both are averaged across years t-3 to t-7. Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year t-3. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

	Log Number of Bachelors			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mean IPO First Day Return	0.0649*** (0.0177)			
Log IPO First Day Dollar Return		0.1744*** (0.0375)		
Default Rate			-0.0509* (0.0268)	
Default and Delisted Rate				-0.0433* (0.0246)
Log Total Market Cap	-0.0439 (0.0588)	-0.0572 (0.0670)	-0.0956*** (0.0188)	-0.0828*** (0.0256)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	-0.1044*** (0.0392)	-0.0465 (0.0520)	-0.0097 (0.0483)	-0.0023 (0.0486)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.0228 (0.0620)	-0.1610*** (0.0419)	-0.0379 (0.0257)	-0.0465* (0.0275)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Observations	232	330	253	253
R-Squared (%)	98.60	98.00	98.50	98.48

Table 10
Regressions of Number of Male and Female Bachelors on Return Skewness

This table reports the results of regressions of Log Number of Bachelors (Male and Female separately) on skewness measures (averaged across years t-3 to t-7) and other controls. Log Number of Bachelors is the log annual number of bachelor degrees awarded for a major. Skew is the cross-sectional skewness of annual returns in a industry. It is then averaged across years t-3 to t-7, relative to the graduation year t.

Our industry control variables include Mean Return (in a industry), Return Coefficient of Variation (standard deviation divided by the mean). Both are averaged across years t-3 to t-7. Other controls are Log Total Market Cap, Log Mean Book-to-Market, and Log Mean Firm Age, measured at year t-3. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. All independent variables are standardized with zero mean and unit standard deviation.

	Log Number of Bachelors (Male) (1)	Log Number of Bachelors (Female) (2)
Skew	0.1176** (0.0543)	0.0795 (0.0515)
Mean Return	0.0825** (0.0390)	0.0631 (0.0495)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0798*** (0.0190)	-0.0265 (0.0268)
Log Total Market Cap	0.0901 (0.0934)	-0.7840*** (0.1720)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0514 (0.0425)	-0.2320*** (0.0769)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.1950*** (0.0359)	-0.1084** (0.0539)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
# Observations	484	484
R-Squared (%)	82.65	95.84

Table 11
Robustness Tests

Panel A repeats Table 2 using Log Number of Masters. Panel B reruns Table 2 and drops graduation years that are between 1998 and 2004. All other variables are the same as Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the year level. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively.

Panel A: Log Number of Masters				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Skew	0.1104*** (0.0411)			
Skew_Mean_Median		0.0970*** (0.0322)		
Skew_Daily			0.2689*** (0.0490)	
Skew_Monthly				0.2189*** (0.0587)
Mean Return	0.0809** (0.0321)	0.0819*** (0.0263)	0.0604** (0.0288)	0.0473* (0.0280)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0950*** (0.0152)	-0.0908*** (0.0138)	-0.0707*** (0.0107)	-0.0711*** (0.0105)
Log Total Market Cap	-0.0824 (0.0806)	-0.0900 (0.0639)	-0.2866*** (0.0808)	-0.1079 (0.0773)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.0209 (0.0413)	0.0745* (0.0422)	-0.0323 (0.0400)	-0.0263 (0.0458)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.1653*** (0.0281)	-0.1516*** (0.0277)	-0.1044*** (0.0278)	-0.1363*** (0.0285)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Observations	517	521	520	522
R-Squared (%)	92.44	92.54	92.87	92.73
Panel B: Exclude 1998-2004				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Skew	0.1333** (0.0561)			
Skew_Mean_Median		0.1050*** (0.0381)		
Skew_Daily			0.2164*** (0.0806)	
Skew_Monthly				0.2076** (0.0856)
Mean Return	0.0925** (0.0406)	0.1020*** (0.0361)	0.0893** (0.0418)	0.0801** (0.0395)
Return Coefficient of Variation	-0.0902*** (0.0193)	-0.0862*** (0.0159)	-0.0503*** (0.0139)	-0.0560*** (0.0135)
Log Total Market Cap	-0.0757 (0.0858)	-0.0656 (0.0522)	-0.1847** (0.0782)	-0.0649 (0.0785)
Log Mean Book-to-Market	0.1070*** (0.0397)	0.1673*** (0.0488)	0.0603 (0.0464)	0.0707 (0.0455)
Log Mean Firm Age	-0.1180*** (0.0323)	-0.1214*** (0.0323)	-0.0822** (0.0341)	-0.1091*** (0.0344)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Major Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Observations	440	444	443	445
R-Squared (%)	88.20	88.25	88.21	88.40

Table A1
List of Science and Engineering Majors

This lists the science and engineering majors from the NSF data.

1	Aeronautical and astronautical engineering
2	Astronomy
3	Atmospheric sciences
4	Chemical engineering
5	Chemistry
6	Civil engineering
7	Computer sciences
8	Earth and ocean sciences
9	Economics
10	Electrical engineering
11	Engineering technology
12	Health
13	Industrial and manufacturing engineering
14	Materials science
15	Mathematics
16	Mechanical engineering
17	Physics
18	Political science
19	Psychology
20	Sociology

(Only 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 16 are used in the paper)

Table A2
Industries and Majors

This is a map between college majors and 3-digit NAICS industry codes.

3-digit NAICS	Industry	Major(s)
113	Forestry and Logging	Earth and ocean sciences
115	Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry	-
211	Oil and Gas Extraction	Chemical engineering Earth and ocean sciences
212	Mining (except Oil and Gas)	Chemical engineering Earth and ocean sciences
213	Support Activities for Mining	Chemical engineering Earth and ocean sciences
236	Construction of Buildings	Civil engineering
237	Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction	Civil engineering
238	Specialty Trade Contractors	-
311	Food Manufacturing	-
312	Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing	-
313	Textile Mills	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
314	Textile Product Mills	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
315	Apparel Manufacturing	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
316	Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
321	Wood Product Manufacturing	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
322	Paper Manufacturing	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
323	Printing and Related Support Activities	-
324	Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
325	Chemical Manufacturing	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering Materials science Mechanical engineering
326	Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing	Chemical engineering Industrial and manufacturing engineering

3-digit NAICS	Industry	Major(s)
		Materials science
		Mechanical engineering
327	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	-
331	Primary Metal Manufacturing	Chemical engineering
		Industrial and manufacturing engineering
		Materials science
		Mechanical engineering
332	Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing	Chemical engineering
		Industrial and manufacturing engineering
		Materials science
		Mechanical engineering
333	Machinery Manufacturing	Chemical engineering
		Industrial and manufacturing engineering
		Materials science
		Mechanical engineering
334	Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing	Computer sciences
		Electrical engineering
335	Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing	Computer sciences
		Electrical engineering
336	Transportation Equipment Manufacturing	Chemical engineering
		Industrial and manufacturing engineering
		Materials science
		Mechanical engineering
337	Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing	Chemical engineering
		Industrial and manufacturing engineering
		Materials science
		Mechanical engineering
339	Miscellaneous Manufacturing	-
423	Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods	-
424	Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods	-
425	Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers	-
441	Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers	-
442	Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores	-
443	Electronics and Appliance Stores	-
444	Building Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers	-
445	Food and Beverage Stores	-
446	Health and Personal Care Stores	-
447	Gasoline Stations	-
448	Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores	-
451	Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book, and Music Stores	-
452	General Merchandise Stores	-
453	Miscellaneous Store Retailers	-
454	Nonstore Retailers	-
481	Air Transportation	Aeronautical and astronautical engineering
482	Rail Transportation	-
483	Water Transportation	-
484	Truck Transportation	-
485	Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation	-
486	Pipeline Transportation	-
488	Support Activities for Transportation	-

3-digit NAICS	Industry	Major(s)
491	Postal Service	-
492	Couriers and Messengers	-
493	Warehousing and Storage	-
511	Publishing Industries (except Internet)	-
512	Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries	-
515	Broadcasting (except Internet)	-
516	Internet Publishing and Broadcasting	-
517	Telecommunications	Computer sciences Electrical engineering
518	Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals, and Data Processing Service	Computer sciences Electrical engineering
519	Other Information Services	Computer sciences Electrical engineering
521	Monetary Authorities - Central Bank	Economics
522	Credit Intermediation and Related Activities	Economics
523	Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments and Related Activities	Economics
524	Insurance Carriers and Related Activities	Economics
525	Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles	Economics
531	Real Estate	Economics
532	Rental and Leasing Services	Economics
533	Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works)	Economics
541	Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services	-
551	Management of Companies and Enterprises	-
561	Administrative and Support Services	-
562	Waste Management and Remediation Services	-
611	Educational Services	-
621	Ambulatory Health Care Services	Health
622	Hospitals	Health
623	Nursing and Residential Care Facilities	Health
624	Social Assistance	Health
711	Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries	-
712	Museums, Historical Sites, and Similar Institutions	-
713	Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries	-
721	Accommodation	-
722	Food Services and Drinking Places	-
811	Repair and Maintenance	-
812	Personal and Laundry Services	-
813	Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional, and Similar Organizations	-