

**Commentary on Kogler:****Analysing the Ukraine War through a 'New Wars' Perspective****Abstract**

This essay provides supplementary evidence for Kogler's thesis. It argues that Putin will have 'won' if he succeeds in reducing Ukrainian society to a chaotic, fragmented, violent, long-term social condition that can be characterised as a 'new war'. The essay describes the combination of the 'political marketplace' and exclusivist identity politics typical of new wars and how they apply to Putin's Russia. It concludes with a proposal for negotiations based on principles, especially justice, instead of or as well as borders.

**Keywords:** Ukraine, Putin, new wars, the political marketplace, exclusivist identity politics, negotiations

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## **Introduction**

Hans-Herbert Kogler makes a powerful, original, and thought-provoking moral case for supporting Ukraine. Particularly salient is his critique of Russian cultural essentialism and his argument that those who reject support for Ukraine on the grounds of saving lives are failing to take into account what it means to be human; they are referring merely to 'bare life'. They deny the Ukrainian people 'the right to assert their full human potential. It would rather amount to an abstract valuation of the sheer survival of more individual lives whose status as human beings has been reduced to its biological core'.

In this short essay, I propose, as it were, to make a lateral commentary on his analysis along three lines of enquiry. First of all, I want to suggest that 'winning' for Putin is not necessarily taking control of Ukraine or parts of Ukraine; rather it would merely involve keeping the war going and thereby weakening Ukrainian democracy and perhaps even a contributing to the kind of long-term fragmented social condition that characterises what I call 'new wars'.

Second, I will try to draw attention to the socio-economic underpinning of Putin's ethno-nationalist ideology, which cannot be disassociated from the oligarchic, kleptocratic, extractivist, and mysoginist nature of the Russian regime, typical of the regimes associated with 'new wars'. And third, based on the previous arguments, I will argue that the type of negotiations envisaged by those who claim to be for peace are actually a way of keeping the war going, of letting Putin 'win'. I will propose an alternative way of thinking about negotiations that takes into account the social and contextual nature of human beings, including the need for justice.

### ***Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear war***

What we are learning from Russia's invasion of Ukraine is something we should have learned from Korea, Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan, namely that conventional military invasions are very difficult nowadays. Because all forms of military technology have become so accurate and lethal, it is extremely hard to establish military superiority, to use military force as an instrument of control, to do what Thomas Schelling called 'compellence' (Schelling 1960). Military force is hugely destructive but that is not the same as controlling territory. War between similarly armed opponents, what is known as symmetric war, either risks escalation to the point of human extinction, or grinding stalemate as happened in

World War I or in the Iran-Iraq war. Advanced military technology used against insurgents, asymmetric war, is vulnerable to what might be called 'vernacular' technology – home-made weapons making use of information technology. Examples are Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that make use of ingredients such as detergents or fertilisers and are often triggered by mobile phones, or the relatively simple drones that are used by all sides in the Ukraine war.

This was a point made by Engels already in the late nineteenth century. He argued that, in the case of naval warfare, ever more advanced battleships were becoming expensive, elaborate and increasingly vulnerable and that, with the development of the self-propelling torpedo, 'the smallest torpedo would be superior to the most powerful armoured battleship' (Engels 2006, p.43). A good contemporary example is the sinking of the Russian flagship cruiser Moskva by Ukrainian missiles after the invasion of Ukraine. Modern aircraft and tanks are similarly expensive and vulnerable.

This does not mean that military force has no utility. Military force can be used along with other tools to provoke fear and hate as part of a process of constructing and mobilising extremist ideologies; indeed, as we observe on the Russian side in Ukraine. And military force can be used for criminal purposes -for looting, setting up checkpoints and demanding money to cross, taking hostages, smuggling, 'taxing' humanitarian aid, and so on. What I call 'new wars' are wars in which the aim is not winning or losing but rather creating a situation in which numerous armed groups both (state and non-state) can establish local fiefdoms often associated with ethnic or religious identities and financed through revenues generated from violence. Elsewhere I have argued that rather than tending to extreme, as Clausewitz suggested was the inner tendency of war, new wars tend to persistence and spread (Kaldor 2010). They are better described as a sort of long-term social condition, a kind of militarised neo-liberalism, in which the various warlords/armed groups/oligarchs reproduce themselves through sporadic violence.

Putin has been engaged in this type of war since he came to power. The ideology described by Kogler, and associated with Aleksandr Dugin, is supposed to be about expanding the Russian Empire, and extending Russian control over Eurasia. But what the wars have spread is not control but fragmentation and banditry. The Russian Chief of General of Staff, Valery Gerasimov, now in charge of the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine, made a speech in

2013 about what he called 'non-linear war'. 'In the 21st century' he said 'we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.' (Gerasimov 2013) He talked about the way in which 'a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.' And he argued that this is achieved through a combination of internal opposition, special forces, concealed or deniable military force such as mercenaries, and informational campaigns or what the Russians call political technology. The argument has become known in the West as the Gerasimov doctrine though it is debated whether Gerasimov, in the typical tradition of Kremlin conspiratorial thinking, was analysing how he believed the West behaves in promoting colour revolutions and thereby fomenting new wars, or whether this was a new Russian doctrine. Certainly, the invasion of Crimea and Russian actions in the Donbass the following year resembled the Gerasimov template.

Putin is a product of the KGB; he surrounds himself with intelligence agencies and so, it can be argued, sees the world through a keyhole. The KGB methodology was always about creating chaos and criminality as a way of dealing with perceived enemies. Even before Putin came to power, Russian direct and indirect interventions in Chechnya, Transdniestr, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh established closed ethnic statelets that thwarted the development of democracy in the newly independent post-Soviet states including Russia itself.

What might be called the Putin way of war can be traced through the second Chechen war, the war in Georgia in 2008 and the intervention in Syria (see Galleotti 2022). In Chechnya, he pioneered the tactic of aerial or artillery barrages that reduced cities to rubble; later, in Syria, this included the deliberate bombing of hospitals and schools so that life for civilians would become unendurable. He also began using deniable mercenaries and gangsters; hence the term 'ambiguous'. The Wagner Group is the most well-known mercenary group but there are many others: the Slavonic corps that appeared in Syria or groups like Schit (Sheild) or Patriot. The war in the Donbass after 2014 involved 'volunteer' groups like the Sparta battalion, the Russian Orthodox Army, or the Hooligan and the Somali battalions. In Crimea, for example, deals were made with criminal groups as 'shaping operations' to

influence the internal situation in preparation for the invasion. The murder of Litvinov in London using polonium or the Novichok attacks in Salisbury were similarly 'ambiguous'. Other elements of the Putin way of war include disinformation campaigns, the use of Russian trolls, cyber attacks, what the West dubs hybrid war, and the use of Spetznaz (special forces) to direct aerial and artillery fire. Where there are forces on the ground the use of force is associated with widespread looting and sexual violence, whether this is a deliberate tactic to create demoralisation among civilians or the consequence of inadequate pay and conditions is not clear.

The outcome of this type of war is not control. Chechnya is 'bandit kingdom' totally dependent on financial support from Russia. Georgia's efforts to unify and establish an effective state were greatly weakened by the continued presence of Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Syria is fragmented into different parts (nominally under the control of the Assad regime, the opposition, Turkey and the Kurdish parties) and even the part nominally under the control of Assad is characterised by local militias and criminal groups in different areas. In Crimea, a coalition government of Crimean Tartars and pro-Maidan democrats was replaced by Russian mafia gangs and widespread theft of property and discrimination against Ukrainian speakers and Tartars. And the occupied parts of the Donbass after 2014 involved long-term sniping, shelling, and trench warfare, the occasional ceasefires, and the active role of criminal groups.

But can it be argued that Putin was trying to do something different in Ukraine in 2022? Surely this was an old-fashioned conventional invasion aimed at control of Ukraine; the battles that are currently taking place are more reminiscent of European wars of the twentieth century than the new types of war I have described. It may be that the Russian regime was confident that the military reforms undertaken over the last two decades had strengthened the Russian military. It appears that Putin believed a direct take-over was possible and that the Russian army could walk into Ukraine the way the Americans walked into Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps the experience of Crimea, where the international reaction was muted, or in Syria, where no efforts were made to counter Russian military activities, even when Western forces were present, gave him a sense of impunity. And perhaps he believed his own propaganda that the Ukrainian government was neo-Nazi and

that Ukrainians would welcome Russia. If any of this was the case, he clearly miscalculated and greatly underestimated the Ukrainian capacity to resist.

In practice, many of the tactics used by Russia are reminiscent of previous wars- the bombing of schools and hospitals, forced displacement, what appears to be systematic looting, sexual violence, and terrible atrocities in the occupied areas. By contrast, the Ukrainians are resisting through classic conventional warfighting; unlike the situation in 'new wars', most of the casualties are military. For Ukraine to win, it would mean the conventional defeat of Russian forces and the liberation of all areas occupied by Russia including Crimea. The Ukrainians believe that this is possible, given sufficient military equipment – the supply of tanks, aircraft and all that is required for a combined arms offensive.

Nevertheless, given the vulnerability of all types of equipment, offensives are very difficult, if not impossible nowadays. If the war drags on for a long time, or even if there is some kind of negotiated agreement that freezes territorial status quo, Putin will have created the conditions for a new war. At present, Ukraine exhibits extraordinary cohesion. The role of civil society is exceptional; most of the social support for the war effort is provided by volunteers (Jacoby 2023).

But Putin may count on the idea that this cannot be sustained. Will he succeed in fomenting ethnic tension between Ukrainians and Russians? Already, there is an understandable but concerning emphasis on the use of the Ukrainian language. Might individual Ukrainians start to engage in various ways of making money out of weapons and war? There are reports of looting of empty houses in the abandoned areas in the East. After all wages have fallen, unemployment has risen and has everyone has received weapons. When we argue that Russia must not win, the argument is that this scenario must be prevented. Winning for Putin does not have mean to the take-over of Ukraine; rather it means keeping the war going, or a situation of no war/no peace on a long-term basis. This is what needs to be prevented if Ukrainian democracy is to survive.

### ***The Socio-economic Underpinning of Ethno-nationalism***

Contemporary authoritarianism, and indeed associated new wars, tend to be characterised by a combination of what Alex de Waal calls the political marketplace and exclusivist identity politics (Kaldor and de Waal 2021). The political marketplace refers to a situation where politics is literally about bargaining for money. De Waal describes it as an extreme form of neo-liberalism where politics itself has become commodified. (de Waal 2015) Political entrepreneurs compete for access to sources of revenue (corruption or stealing) that emanate from the state: contracts, licences, bribes and so on. At the same time, their ability to compete depends on money. This is why it is a form of systemic corruption; even a politician with principled political aims, for example, anti-corruption or economic redistribution needs money to access power. The political marketplace is similar to other terms that are used to describe this phenomenon: oligarchy, crony capitalism, state capture, and so on. This type of politics tends to be observed in rentier states, particularly those dependent on rents from oil and gas, under the impact of neo-liberalism or 'shock therapy', particularly the emphasis on privatisation and contracting out of state functions.

By exclusivist identity politics, I refer to identity that is singular, binary, and fixed. *Singular* is the term used by Amartya Sen, by which he means an identity that becomes overriding at the expense of other possibilities for permissible identification; he sees this as intrinsically linked to identity-based violence. (Sen 2006) In practise, singular identities are necessarily *binary*, that is to say, defined in opposition to others, asserting an impermeable boundary between 'us' and 'them'. Large-scale violence, in the form of pogroms or expulsions is almost always associated with binary identities. *Fixed* identity is identity framed in a way intended to prohibit debate, let alone change; it aspires to permanence. Exclusivist identity is a political project; it is about exclusive access to political authority, usually a state.

Social scientists widely agree that exclusivist identity politics are constructed despite the way that the primordialist idea that groups based on an exclusive identity are somehow essential and unchanging tends to pervade the political vernacular. Exclusivist identity politics are constructed through, the media, education, and, above all, through violence. Identity becomes singular when your life depends on it; it is the anti-semitic that makes the Jew said Sartre. Hashemi and Postel have coined the phrase 'sectarianization' to describe the way that exclusivist identity politics are produced (Hashemi and Postel 2017). In Syria,

for example, Sunni-Shi'a sectarianization was a deliberate process fostered both by the regime and by Islamist militias funded by different Gulf donors through the selective use of violence combined with public messaging in the first few years of the war (Hadaya 2021). In other words, exclusivist identity politics is the outcome of violence as much as the cause.

So how do we explain the co-occurrence of the political marketplace and exclusivist identity politics? Identity politics constructs a political narrative, a way of framing money-based politics that, on the one hand, works well for patronage networks that can be defined in terms of identity, and, on the other hand, trumps other value-based commitments such as peace, social justice or human rights. Political entrepreneurs, the actors of the political marketplace, make use of identity politics in order to reframe social discord, to dub political opponents as dangerous enemies or 'terrorists', or because it provides a mechanism for organising a cohesive armed unit, inspiring selfless actions among followers or enticing support from foreign sponsors. At the same time, dedicated believers in exclusivist identity politics may find it necessary to turn to the political marketplace for funding. Whether motivated by belief, ambition, opportunism or desperation, a politician can draw on identity narratives as well as money. But identity politics may follow a logic of its own; once people have experienced killing or the loss of loved ones in the name of identity its singularity and exclusivity becomes increasingly entrenched and it may be much more difficult to reverse.

Both the political marketplace and exclusivist identity politics are highly gendered. They are both associated with extreme forms of patriarchy. Political marketplace entrepreneurs are almost always men. Exclusivist identity politics are almost always linked to misogyny and homophobia explicitly exhibited in the deliberate sexual violence to be observed in 'new wars'.

The Soviet system was transformed into a political marketplace in the wild years of the 1990s. At that time, loans for shares schemes in which commercial bankers allocated shares in return for a loan to the government (that was never intended to be repaid) established the first generation of oligarchs drawn from the former nomenklatura, former managers of enterprises or government officials responsible for enterprises who became owners. They were joined by a new generation of oligarchs who had built up their own wealth through arbitrage during the period when quasi-market prices co-existed with state prices (Guriev



and Rachinsky 2005). When Putin came to power 2001, he brought the oligarchs under control. He offered them a deal according to which he would not interfere in their business activities provided they did not engage in politics. Those who failed to accept these terms, like Berezovsky or Khodorkovsky, were imprisoned and/or exiled. Effectively the oligarchs were integrated into what could be called a 'stealing' network that shields Putin from the potential consequences of disloyalty (since all the oligarchs are implicated in stealing) and contributes to the kind of chaotic criminality that fits with KGB thinking (for accounts of the nature of the Russian oligarchy, see Glenny 2009, Browder 2015 and 2022, Mezrich 2015). Effectively, the oligarchs could continue to cream off money from state contracts as long as they did not challenge Putin's monopoly position. Indeed, under Putin, public contracts increased again as did the stealing. A case in point is the sorry state of the Russian armed forces revealed in the Ukraine war, despite the billions of roubles that were poured into military reform.

The system could be described as a monopolistic political marketplace. It has some similarities to what is known as prebendal feudalism that is said to have characterised tsarist Russia. Unlike the West, Russian noblemen did not independently own their land; they received title to their lands from the Tsar (Perry Anderson 1996). Under Putin, Russia has become heavily dependent on revenues from oil and gas. The political marketplace is a mechanism for controlling expenditure and ensuring that politics is animated by money.

Putin's use of Dugin's ideology as a narrative is typical of the behaviour of political marketplace entrepreneurs. Actually, he only adopted the illiberal and conservative ideology after 2012, when he began his third term in office following an election marred by allegations of fraud and protest. By this time, public spending was outpacing the increase in state revenues even though living standards were stagnating, presumably because so much of the increase in public spending was stolen, and Putin's political standing was much more precarious than during his previous terms. While the idea of conflict or discord against an external other (even if the other was internal) was always present to justify Putin's rule, it was only after 2012 and particularly after the Ukraine crisis of 2014, that the emphasis began to focus on Russian ethno-nationalism, the role of the orthodox church, the idea of the Russian empire (which paradoxically combined both Russian ethnic nationalism and an

idea of multi-culturalism drawn from the Soviet era) and the importance of ‘family values’ (code for homophobia and the idea of the ‘traditional ‘ nuclear family).

In the earlier wars in Chechnya and Georgia, Putin tended to emphasize international language, which continues to be used as well. Thus, Chechnya was framed as a front in the global war on terror and the Georgian war was justified in terms of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the ‘human security’ of Russians, Ossetians and Abkhazians. In Syria, Putin used the language of geo-politics and great power competition. There is also a big emphasis on what is known as the Great Patriotic War. It was in the Maidan protests of 2014 that Ukrainian protestors were dubbed as Nazis.

In addition, as Jade McGlynn shows, during the post-2012 period, there was a much greater emphasis on everyday nationalism, an attempt to inculcate the patriotism of ordinary citizens with discussions about ‘correct’ education and ‘correct’ media reporting (McGlynn 2020).

The war has consolidated Putin’s rule. Unlike the shoddy preparation for the invasion, Putin seems to have been well prepared to close the few remaining democratic spaces in Russia. Censorship, punishment for protest, and other wartime laws were introduced in quick succession following the invasion, which suggested they had been prepared beforehand.

### ***Rethinking Negotiations***

Those who make the moral case for peace based on negotiations, as critiqued by Kogler, tend to envisage top-down talks about borders and ethnicity. There have been literally hundreds of peace agreements of this type in recent decades (PA-X database). By and large such agreements involve some type of power sharing among the various warring parties, that tends to entrench or even ‘fix’ exclusivist identity politics. The Taif agreement of 1989 that ended the Lebanese civil war, the Dayton Agreement of 1995 that ended the war in Bosnia, or the Minsk Agreement of 2014 about the Donbass are all examples of this type of agreement. Such agreements do not necessarily end of violence but they often mark the beginning of an international presence that may contribute to a dampening down of violence. Nevertheless, human rights violations, stealing, and occasional flare-ups continue.

The Dayton Agreement is often held up as the big success story of international peace-making; yet despite the presence of large numbers of international troops, a civilian international presence, and more aid per head than was provided to Europe under the Marshall Plan, Bosnia remains a dysfunctional society, still ruled by fragmented ethnic warlords, with very high unemployment and emigration, where the conflict is played out day after day in the media, and where threats of political violence are ever-present (Kaldor 2016). In other words, this type of agreement perpetuates the new war social condition, even though it may be at a lower level of violence than before the agreement. Bell and Poposil use the term 'political unsettlement' to describe this type of agreement (Bell and Poposil 2017).

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia is actually about political and social systems. Ukraine has its own political marketplace, but it is competitive rather than monopolistic and less dependent on rent. Perhaps because of the competitive nature of the oligarchy in contrast to Russia, the Orange Revolution and the subsequent Maidan protests were able to build a sustained pressure for democratisation. Out of that experience came a political idea of Ukraine based on democracy and a civic notion of citizenship. Russian speakers overwhelmingly support the idea of Ukraine precisely because it represents democracy and tolerance (interviews in Southern Ukraine, see Kaldor 2015). The pro-European expression of the Maidan protestors -they called themselves Euro-Maidan- had everything to do with the idea that European values and laws, especially transparency, would enable them to replace the politics of money with the politics of principles.

Historically, wars were the main mechanism through which European states were able to deal with corruption (Neild 2002). The war in Ukraine has greatly weakened the oligarchs; some have voluntarily relinquished their assets and others have been affected by the crackdown on corruption. Nevertheless, the neo-liberal mindset still persists -state assets are still being privatised and labour rights have been removed- and this represents a real risk for undermining public cohesion. (Cooper 2022) Moreover, anger with Russia risks spilling over to everything Russian. So the new war scenario remains a possible challenge to democracy- something that Putin may be counting on.

If there are to be negotiations, then they should focus on these political and social differences, on principle and values, rather than borders and ethnicity. Negotiations about

borders are likely to endorse the identity/ political marketplace game in which human beings are reduce to bare life with an ethnic tag. As was the case with Minsk, an agreement would not end the war even though the levels of violence may be lower. Instead, the negotiations should address the lived experience of people based in the different areas, the principles and values by which their social relations are governed, and the substance of everyday life.

There are already negotiations taking place that are different from top-down classic approaches. Cindy Wittke talks about 'islands of agreement' that construct civic spaces in the midst of war (Wittke, forthcoming). Examples are the grain deal negotiated by the United Nations, that lifted the blockade on grain exports so as to contribute to global food security; the courageous presence of a team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiated by the UN at the Zaphorizhza nuclear plant currently under Russian control; and a set of localised agreements about the safe evacuation of civilians and the exchange of prisoners.

This approach is implicit in the Ten Point peace plan put forward by Zelenskyy. It includes radiological security and food security along the lines of the agreements already reached. It includes energy security, an end to attacks on critical infrastructure, and protection of the environment. It also includes an emphasis on the situation of prisoners and those who have been forcibly deported to Russia, especially children, and a demand for transitional justice, the establishment of a special tribunal to deal with war crimes. At the same time, it covers the traditional negotiating issues, which would, of course, need to be included in any set of talks; the end of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops. And finally it also talks about the need for a new euro-atlantic security architecture.

The emphasis on justice is particularly important. The role of law in this war is unprecedented. Numerous international and local groups are collecting evidence of war crimes and violations of human rights, more than in any other war. There are already war crimes trials taking place inside Ukraine. The issuance of an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin by the International Criminal Court (ICC) represents an historic decision. There are also well advanced proposals to establish a special tribunal to try the crime of aggression, since this is not included in the remit of the ICC.

Negotiations thus need to address principles or values rather than only the traditional concerns with borders and the deployment of troops and they need to include or to be supplemented by justice mechanisms. Borders are the key issue when politics are framed in terms of binary identity politics, in which there is a clear division between 'us' and 'them' on each side of the border. If social and political arrangements were similar on both sides of the border, then borders would be less relevant as is the case, for example, within the European Union.

Negotiations based on principles and values rather than just borders could be viewed as a process, in which 'islands of agreement' could establish localised or sectoral alternatives to the new war social condition. It would involve the construction of a different kind of peace through a bottom-up and top-down set of talks rather than the overarching type of top-down type of agreement envisaged by those who frame the conflict in primordialist terms. Any agreement on borders would thus depend on a set of agreements about principles and values.

### **Conclusions**

In this essay, I have argued that Putin will have 'won' if he succeeds in reducing Ukrainian society, through a combination of war and negotiations, to a fragmented sectarian violent condition, in which a small group of oligarchs/ethnic warlords/ criminal gangsters continue to amass riches while everyone else is prey to criminality, ethnic violence, poverty and predation. I would rephrase Kogler's point about negotiations reducing human beings to their biological core. I would argue that the kind of negotiations proposed by the proponents of peace at any price is 'bare life with an ethnic tag'. Exclusivist identity politics, underpinned by the political marketplace, override all other social, economic, gendered or cultural aspects of identity – that is the meaning of singularity.

Can this dire scenario be prevented? First of all, it is important to provide military aid and do whatever can be done to facilitate a Ukrainian victory. All offensives, as I have argued, are very difficult but the demoralisation of the Russian forces and those living in the occupied zones do open up the possibility of retaking the occupied territories. There should be no attacks on Russia itself, not only to prevent escalation, but primarily to preserve the defensive nature of the war for both legal and moral reasons. The question of whether this

might lead to the use of nuclear weapons by Putin is unanswerable; but to refuse to support Ukraine for fear of a nuclear outcome means succumbing to nuclear blackmail and thereby providing an incentive for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by authoritarian leaders in other places. And it removes the argument for nuclear disarmament because it implicitly endorses the notion of deterrence.

Second, Ukraine needs substantial economic aid along with a big increase in publicly provided social support so that cohesion can be sustained even if volunteer efforts begin to wane as they must eventually do. Third, the civic idea of Ukraine must be promoted to counter exclusivist identity; any form of domestic tension between Ukrainian and Russian speakers plays into Putin's strategy. And fourth, while there will come a time when negotiations about borders take place, there will also need to be negotiations about principles (food, energy, the environment, justice) as well and even before and they need to include civil society and women.

The arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin represents a moment of global significance for the role of international law. In the end there can only be peace with justice. The debate about peace versus justice presupposes that peace agreements among the warring parties can be sustained. But where the warring parties are identity based political marketplace entrepreneurs, the consequence is a long new war social condition, perhaps at a lower level of violence. A functioning rule of law and an effective and honest justice system at all levels is the most important safeguard against that kind of outcome.

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