

1 New damage curves and multi-model 2 analysis suggest lower optimal 3 temperature

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17

18 Abstract


19 Economic analyses of global climate change have been criticised for their poor representation of
20 climate change damages. Here, we develop and apply aggregate damage functions in three economic
21 Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) with different degrees of complexity. The damage functions
22 encompass a wide, but still incomplete, set of climate change impacts based on physical impact
23 models. We show that with medium estimates for damage functions, global damages are in the range
24 of 10% to 12% of GDP by 2100 in a baseline scenario with 3 °C temperature change, and about 2% in
25 a well-below 2 °C scenario. These damages are much higher than previous estimates in benefit-cost
26 studies, resulting in optimal temperatures below 2 °C with central estimates of damages and discount
27 rates. Moreover, we find a Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.5 to 3.9, even without considering damages that
28 could not be accounted for, such as biodiversity losses, health, and tipping points.

29 Introduction

30 Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of climate change provides insight into the economic consequences of
 31 different climate policy strategies. The results of CBAs critically depend on the quality of the underlying
 32 information on mitigation costs, avoided damages, the processes represented in the models and the
 33 coverage of relevant uncertainties. While there is a rich literature on mitigation costs¹⁻⁷, it has been
 34 notoriously difficult to get reliable information on the damages. Similarly, much less is known about
 35 the role of the type of integrated assessment model used to analyse the costs and benefits. While
 36 model intercomparison studies are common for other climate change research areas⁸⁻¹², very few
 37 have been performed on cost-benefit analyses.

38 In CBA models, the benefits of climate change mitigation can be obtained from reduced-form damage
 39 functions, which relate global average temperature increase to aggregate economic losses. In recent
 40 years, empirical, top-down estimates have been developed which relate observed temperature with
 41 economic growth¹³⁻¹⁵. The disadvantage of this method is that the underlying drivers of climate
 42 damages are unknown, and it is very uncertain whether historical empirical correlations between
 43 temperature and economic growth can be extrapolated to the (far) future. In earlier CBA studies, on
 44 the other hand, most estimates of damage functions relied on semi-qualitative assessment by experts,
 45 which are currently considered mostly outdated^{16, 17-2021-23}.

46 To overcome these drawbacks, a new set of regional climate change damage functions¹⁷ were recently
 47 built in a bottom-up process as part of the European Horizon 2020 project *COACCH* (www.coacch.eu).
 48 They are based on physical impacts derived from last-generation impact models covering a wide range
 49 of sectors (agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy demand, energy supply, labour supply, riverine floods,
 50 transportation, and sea-level rise)¹⁷. The impact of these physical damages on economic losses were
 51 estimated by an economic model: the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model¹⁸⁻²⁰ ICES²¹ with
 52 improved representation of driving forces and transmission mechanisms of economic impacts (Fig. 1
 53 and Table Si. 3.1).




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55 **Fig. 1 | Overview of the creation and use of the damage functions.** Results from nine sectoral impact models (a) are included
 56 in a CGE model to calculate GDP losses for various scenarios and points in time (b). Using quantile regression, a curve is fitted
 57 through the points at the 5th (low estimate), 50th (medium) and 95th (high) percentiles for each region. These reduced-form
 58 damage functions are used in the IAMs (c) for the macro-economic analysis of this paper (d). The example damages shown
 59 in the bottom panel are the combined damages (including sea-level rise, no adaptation) aggregated for the world, and are
 60 compared to several literature damage estimates. Burke et al. (LR, SSP2) refers to the SSP2 Long Run damage function.

61 Compared with similar exercises^{19,20,22}, the damage functions developed here use a higher level of
 62 regional detail and provide internally consistent uncertainty ranges. This high spatial granularity
 63 applies particularly to the EU, where the macroeconomic impact assessments are determined at the
 64 NUTS2 level. The consistency in uncertainty representation derives from accounting for i) different
 65 climate scenarios, ii) different socio-economic scenarios, iii) different impact ranges within each
 66 climate scenario originated by impact model uncertainty, and, finally, iv) how the economy reacts to
 67 these impacts. The new damage functions have been separately estimated for impacts related to
 68 temperature increase and sea-level rise (with a much longer time delay). The damage curves also
 69 include versions for the case of sea-level rise with and without optimal adaptation (see Methods).

70 Literature shows that the results of cost-benefit studies depend not only on the damage function but
 71 also on the macroeconomic parameters and assumptions like discounting or savings, as well as the
 72 representation of mitigation costs and dynamics²³. Several studies have been published in recent years
 73 looking into uncertainty in cost-benefit analysis. These studies typically only consider a single model^{23–}
 74 ²⁶ and use the older top-down or empirical damage functions. Here, we perform the first multi-model
 75 CBA study using the newly developed COACCH damage functions, allowing to explore the impacts of
 76 a consistent set of damage curves (including an explicit uncertainty estimate) in different models.
 77 Three IAMs are used: the reduced form model MIMOSA²³, and the process-based models WITCH²⁷ and
 78 REMIND²⁸. First, we investigate how the damage functions translate to (regional) GDP losses given
 79 different temperature pathways and how the results from each model relate to each other (so
 80 covering the uncertainty as result of model representation). Next, we determine the combined effect
 81 of mitigation costs and damages on optimal emission pathways using cost-benefit analysis and
 82 compare them with the goals of the Paris Agreement (Fig. 1). We also calculate Benefit-Cost Ratios
 83 (BCRs) for these optimal emission pathways, which indicates the relationship between the relative
 84 costs and benefits of climate mitigation. For medium estimates of damage function and discount rate,
 85 we find a BCR of 1.5 to 3.9. This presents an important case to improve societal acceptance of climate
 86 policy, as the purely economic benefits of reduced climate damages significantly outweigh the costs
 87 of climate policy.




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89 **Fig. 2 | End-of-century damages for the five macro-regions for two scenarios.** The damages are split into three types (direct
 90 temperature-related damages, direct sea-level-rise damages and indirect damages from GDP loss accumulation). The
 91 damages are shown for the year 2100 in the RCP6.0 scenario (a) and the RCP2.6 scenario (b). Both scenarios assume optimal
 92 sea-level-rise adaptation. This figure does not show intra-regional differences; only the population-weighted average per
 93 macro-region is shown.

94 Multi-model comparison of economic damages

95 We first compare the sensitivity of final economic damages to different model dynamics. To do this,
 96 we calculate the macro-economic effect of the damage functions in the three IAMs under two fixed
 97 temperature pathways: the Representative Concentration Pathway²⁹ (RCP) 6.0 leading to a global
 98 average temperature change of about 3°C by 2100 (also coinciding with the no-policy scenario in one
 99 of the models, REMIND), and RCP 2.6, which is a trajectory in line with the well below 2 °C target of
 100 the Paris Agreement, i.e. RCP 2.6. We fixed the temperature pathways to reveal whether the model
 101 parameterisations shaping the economic growth differ substantively.

102 The COACCH functions allow decomposing the total GDP losses into (i) direct impacts from sea level
 103 rise, (ii) direct temperature-related impacts and (iii) indirect impacts from cumulated dynamic effects,
 104 e.g. through investment^{30,31}. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that optimal adaptation has taken
 105 place against sea-level rise (SLR) damages. Therefore, reported SLR damages are the sum of SLR
 106 adaptation costs and residual damages.



107

108 **Fig. 3 | Sensitivity analysis of the global damage costs.** Damage cost decomposition of the global GDP losses with optimal
 109 sea-level-rise adaptation for RCP6.0 (top row) and RCP2.6 (bottom row) for three levels of damages (low: 5th quantile,
 110 medium: 50th quantile, high: 95th quantile), in 2030, 2050 and 2100.

111

112 On a global level, the GDP loss in the baseline RCP 6.0 scenario ranges from 10 to 12% at the end of
 113 the century when using medium damage (50th damage quantile) estimates. The damages are
 114 significantly reduced in the mitigation scenario RCP 2.6 to 3.1-3.6% GDP loss in 2100. The economic
 115 damages are not very sensitive to the model used.

116 In Fig. 2, higher spatial resolution results from the original COACCH damage functions and the IAM
 117 used have been aggregated for the five macro-regions of the SSP database³² to facilitate comparison
 118 (see Methods).

119 There is high agreement across models also on regional damage patterns, although the ranges are
 120 larger in some regions than others. In the RCP 6.0 scenario (Fig. 2a), the damages are the highest in
 121 the Middle East and Africa region, with total losses between 13% and 18% of GDP, followed by 12% to
 122 14% for Asia. The other three regions have lower total damages (6-8% for Latin America, 5% for OECD

123 and 3-5% for Eastern Europe and Northern Asia). This figure does not show intra-regional differences;
124 only the population-weighted average per macro-region is shown.

125 Even with optimal adaptation, sea-level rise damages, including adaptation costs, make up a
126 significant part (10-13% of total direct damages) in Asia and the OECD region. This share is much lower
127 in the other regions (as low as 2% of total direct damages for Africa). Without sea-level rise adaptation
128 (Fig. SI.1.1), total damages per region become substantially higher (from global average damages of
129 11-12% with SLR adaptation to global damages of 14-17% without SLR adaptation). This is especially
130 pronounced in the OECD (5-6% total damages with SLR adaptation to 12% total damages without SLR
131 adaptation), which confirms previous literature on the benefits of SLR adaptation³³.

132 RCP 2.6 reduces the total damages to a regional maximum of 4.5%, compared to the 18% for RCP 6.0
133 (Fig. 2b). The regional distribution of damages is similar to RCP 6.0, except that Asia has now slightly
134 higher damages than Africa. Because of the slow processes of sea-level rise, the differences in sea-
135 level rise damages between RCP 2.6 and RCP 6.0 are relatively small in the first half of the century.
136 Accordingly, the relative share of damages from sea-level rise becomes larger, especially in regions
137 with relatively long coastlines, like Asia and the OECD. Without SLR adaptation, Asia and the OECD
138 have the highest damages in RCP 2.6, as, in that case, sea-level rise damages account for most of the
139 total damages (Fig. SI.1.1b).

140

141 *Impact of damage curve uncertainty*


142 The total damages are significantly higher when using the high end of the damage quantile (95th
143 damage quantile, see Methods): 18-22% global average GDP loss instead of 11-12% for the medium
144 damage quantile (Fig. 3). There is a small probability that global impacts are slightly positive up to
145 2050, indicated by negative GDP losses for the 5th damage quantile, due to significant gains in Latin
146 America from increased agricultural yield (see Fig. SI.1.4b). These gains are offset by sea-level rise
147 damages towards the end of the century.

148 Until 2050, the differences between RCP 2.6 and 6.0 are still moderate. They only strongly diverge
149 towards 2100 (up to 50% higher damages in RCP 6.0 than RCP 2.6 in 2050, whereas the damages are
150 300% higher towards the end of the century). REMIND shows lower indirect effects than the other
151 models. While in MIMOSA and WITCH all economic assets are fixed, in REMIND, assets can be
152 relocated, facilitated by more advanced trade mechanisms³⁴, and, accordingly, losses are lower.

153 Cost-benefit analysis

154 We now add mitigation costs of each model to perform a comprehensive CBA.

155 The cost-optimal (or, in a strict sense, welfare-optimal) end-of-century temperature for the medium
156 estimates of damages is similar for all three models: around 1.9°C above pre-industrial levels (Fig. 4).
157 These temperature estimates are median climate estimates; we have not assessed uncertainty in the
158 climate module. Interestingly, none of the models applies net-negative emissions to limit temperature
159 increase to these levels. This is a consequence of running the models in cost-benefit mode (minimising
160 damages and mitigation costs) instead of cost-effectiveness mode (minimising mitigation costs only).
161 Previous^{23,35,36} research has shown that cost-benefit runs lead to much higher reductions early in the
162 century and less use of net-negative emissions than cost-effectiveness runs.



163

164 **Figure 4. Emission pathways, damage costs and climate policy costs in cost-benefit (CBA) setting.** (a) Cost-optimal emission
 165 trajectory and corresponding end-of-century temperature in cost-benefit runs for the low, medium and high end of the
 166 damage function uncertainty range (damage quantiles). While only global CO₂ emissions are shown in this figure, each model
 167 takes into account non-CO₂ gases as well in their calculation of temperature outcomes. (b) GDP loss (compared to baseline
 168 GDP) decomposed in policy costs (mitigation costs), damage costs and indirect costs. Here, the indirect costs result from
 169 accumulated GDP impacts from mitigation and damage costs.

170

171 As expected, the low damage function leads to higher optimal end-of-century temperature increases
 172 of 2.8-3.1°C, and the higher end of the damages leads to optimal temperature increases, which are
 173 very close to the 1.5 °C target of the Paris Agreement (1.5-1.7°C).

174

175 *Model uncertainty*

176 The optimal emission pathways in MIMOSA, WITCH and REMIND are similar. REMIND is slightly less
 177 sensitive to variability in the damage function than the other two models. It can be also noted that
 178 overall mitigation costs are lower in REMIND (Fig. 4b, see also ⁶). Nonetheless, in terms of
 179 temperature, the model shows the smallest difference (only 0.2°C) between the 50th and 95th damage
 180 quantile. The bottom-up description of mitigation options, including hard-to-abate processes, puts
 181 stringent constraints on the total mitigation potential; this means that the model already exploits the
 182 largest share of the total mitigation potential already in the 50th damage quantile run. In MIMOSA, the
 183 mitigation costs are higher (around 2% of GDP for the medium CBA scenario) than REMIND, but the
 184 model is more flexible in achieving higher mitigation levels. It has less strict inertia constraints and
 185 allows more net-negative emissions towards the end of the century than REMIND or WITCH,
 186 explaining the lower optimal end-of-century temperature in the high damage quantile scenario.
 187 WITCH shows a stronger initial mitigation effort and less towards the end of the period, even with the
 188 modest global carbon price of \$67/tCO₂ in 2030 (see Fig. Sl.2.1) for medium damages. WITCH still
 189 reaches similar end-of-century temperatures as REMIND and MIMOSA, based on different
 190 assumptions about land-use CO₂ emissions, other greenhouse gases, and the climate model used.

191

192

193 *The role of discounting*

194 Another key component in long-term cost-benefit analysis is the discount rate. By default, we use a
195 pure rate of time preference (P RTP) of 1.5%/year, combined with an elasticity of marginal utility of 1,
196 in line with recent literature^{23,24} and a recent expert elicitation³⁷. We perform a sensitivity analysis
197 with a lower and higher discounting parameter to cover the full range of current discounting
198 estimates. We use 0.1%/year as a low P RTP value, as in the Stern³⁸ review, and 3%/year as a high P RTP
199 value covering a range similar to the Inter-Agency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon³⁹, while
200 keeping the elasticity of marginal utility fixed.


201 As shown in Fig. 5, the impact of damage function uncertainty on the cost-optimal end-of-century
202 temperature is twice as large as the impact from discounting uncertainty. The spread in optimal
203 temperatures is around 1.5°C for damage cost uncertainty and 0.7°C for uncertainty in discounting.
204 Without sea-level rise adaptation, the optimal temperature is, across all discounting scenarios,
205 between 0.1°C and 0.2°C lower than with optimal sea-level rise adaptation, as the models choose to
206 reduce the other damages as much as possible. Only for end-of-century temperatures of 1.5°C or
207 lower, peak temperatures are in some cases more than 0.1°C higher than 2100 temperatures (see
208 Suppl. Fig. 2.2).

209

210 *Comparing costs to avoided damages using the Benefit-Cost Ratio*


211 Besides providing a cost-optimal target, an important and policy-relevant metric is the Benefit-Cost
212 Ratio, showing by how much the avoided damages outweigh the mitigation costs. When subtracting
213 the residual damages of a CBA scenario from the damages in a baseline scenario, we obtain the
214 avoided damages, or, in other words, the economic benefits of mitigation (expressed as % of GDP).
215 Comparing the total discounted avoided damages to the total mitigation costs gives a Benefit-Cost
216 Ratio of mitigation (Extended Figure 1). Globally, most benefits occur in the second half of the century
217 or even beyond 2100, as damages increase slowly while mitigation costs increase early, even incurring
218 the large costs at the beginning of the transformation. Therefore, we consider the 2020-2150 time
219 range. Using a medium discount rate (pure rate of time preference of 1.5%/yr), the benefits are almost
220 twice the total discounted costs (multi-model range of 1.5 to 3.9, Fig. 6). This gives strong economic
221 validation of the Paris-consistent mitigation scenario, especially when considering that the damage
222 functions are likely to be underestimates since not all damage sectors have been included (see
223 Discussion). When assuming the high damage function, the benefit-cost ratio increases to 1.8 - 5.0 for
224 medium discounting (Figure SI.2.2.). Since the low damage function yields CBA paths with very low to
225 no mitigation effort, the BCR is not calculated here. Since these scenarios are performed in a
226 cooperative setting, only the global results are calculated. A regional BCR requires assumptions on
227 equity and burden sharing, which are outside the scope of this paper (see Discussion).

228



229

230 **Figure 5. Optimal temperature in 2100 in CBA for different levels of discounting and SLR adaptation assumptions.** The
 231 levels of discounting are quantified by three values of the Pure Rate of Time Preference (PRTP), also called utility discounting.
 232 REMIND has not been calibrated to use the low utility discount rate.
 233



234

235 **Figure 6. Benefit-cost ratio for the CBA scenario using the medium damage function (50th percentile).** Left: policy costs
 236 (dotted lines) and avoided damages (benefits, solid lines) over time for the scenario with medium discounting. Right: Benefit-
 237 Cost Ratio (BCR): total discounted avoided damages divided by the total discounted mitigation costs. REMIND is not
 238 calibrated for the lowest discount rate.
 239

239

240 **Discussion**

241 The results in this study show that, from a purely economic perspective, the benefits of reduced
 242 climate damages significantly outweigh the costs of climate policy, even when some climate change
 243 damages, including those on biodiversity and health, are not accounted for. This presents an
 244 important case to improve societal acceptance of climate policy.

245 The results are based on i) detailed process-based biophysical impacts, ii) a consistent economic
 246 modelling approach to quantify and monetise these impacts in a multi-model context, iii) the
 247 separation of temperature and sea-level rise impacts, and iv) allowing for sea-level rise adaptation
 248 investment. We show that with medium damages (evaluated at the median of our multi-impact-model
 249 chain estimated damage function), the optimal temperature increase is below 2°C according to all
 250 three models. Assuming the high end of the damage function (estimated at the 95th percentile), the
 251 optimal temperature increase is close to 1.5°C in all three models. Since the COACCH damage
 252 functions do not include all impacts (e.g. biodiversity loss, health impacts and tipping points), the
 253 resulting temperature outcomes are likely to be conservative, meaning that this study gives strong
 254 economic validation of the Paris Agreement. Our damage functions only explicitly modelled
 255 adaptation for sea-level rise. For the other impacts, adaptation is implicitly addressed in the CGE
 256 (market-driven adaptation), but not in the impact models. Future research needs to improve our
 257 understanding of adaptation in a comprehensive global impact study.

258 Interestingly, when aggregated globally, the COACCH low, medium and high damage functions are
259 close to, respectively, the DICE⁴⁰, Howard et al.¹⁶ and Burke et al.¹³ functions (see Fig. 1.), thus also
260 leading to similar optimal temperature levels²². However, the methodology for creating the damage
261 function is completely different. While DICE, just like the new functions presented here, also relies on
262 bottom-up sectoral physical impacts, major criticisms about these damage functions (as used in
263 DICE⁴⁰, FUND⁴¹ and PAGE⁴²) are the lack of empirical foundation, the relatively simple monetisation
264 method used, and that they are based on relatively old and scarce impact data^{43,44}. A more recent
265 study²⁶ with bottom-up impacts directly included damages from a limited set of 4 sectors in their IAM
266 using a simplified damage function for each of the sectors. Contrary to the bottom-up methods like
267 DICE and Rennert et al (2022)²⁶, empirical damage functions, like Burke et al., with their “reduced-
268 form nature” constitute black boxes: the underlying impact drivers are unknown, which makes it far
269 from certain that these historical correlations between temperature and economic growth also hold
270 for the (far) future^{45,46}. With the advancement of sectoral physical impact models, the COACCH
271 damage functions rely much less on semi-qualitative expert assessment and avoid simple
272 monetisation by translating the state-of-the-art physical impacts into economic damages using a CGE.
273 This improves the transparency of how each type of physical impact is implemented in the economical
274 assessment (see Table SI. 3.1). However, more research should be performed to monetize and include
275 more climate impact sectors, like biodiversity losses, health impacts and tipping points.

276 Apart from the results of the CBA, the regional macro-economic implications of the new COACCH
277 damage functions show equally important insights. While there is a lot of attention regarding the
278 regional distribution of mitigation costs⁴⁷⁻⁵⁰, this research shows that financing loss and damages is
279 just as important, since even Paris-compliant scenarios still yield significant damages, especially in
280 developing regions. While the new damage functions provide improved estimates of economic climate
281 damages on a regional level (as shown in Fig. 2), the Benefit-Cost Ratios provided in this study are only
282 applicable on a global scale. A regional BCR would imply specific assumptions about regional equity
283 regarding the distribution of mitigation costs, like burden sharing regimes and emission trading
284 schemes^{47,51}, which are outside the scope of this study.

285 In this research, we have not taken all possible uncertainties into account. We have instead
286 concentrated on the two main sources of uncertainty in CBA: damage costs and discounting, together
287 accounting for almost 75% of total variance in cost-optimal temperature variance according to a
288 recent CBA study²³. Other relevant sources of variance are mitigation cost uncertainty, climate
289 uncertainty and socio-economic uncertainty. By systematically using three different IAMs, this study
290 considers between-model uncertainty in mitigation costs and climate model, but not within-model
291 uncertainty.

292 An extra source of uncertainty originates from the separation between sea-level rise damages and
293 purely temperature related damages. While all three models considered in this study have the ability
294 to separate the two by modelling sea-level rise explicitly, this is not the case for all IAMs. For this
295 reason, the new damage functions are also provided as *combined* damage functions depending only
296 on temperature (SI.3.2c). These functions include the aggregated effect of SLR and non-SLR damages.
297 They result in similar damages for high temperature scenarios (RCP 6.0, see Suppl. Fig. 1.2). However,
298 the combined damages are up to 50% lower than the disaggregated damage functions in an RCP 2.6
299 scenarios without SLR adaptation (Suppl. Fig. 1.2), due to the different time scales that are not being
300 captured when SLR is not modelled explicitly. This highlights the importance of separating sea-level
301 rise damages from other temperature-related damages.

302 This analysis shows the importance of including the full range of damage function uncertainty, as this
303 strongly influences possible policy recommendations. It also highlights that different models can lead

304 to different results. Using multiple models can highlight these differences and lead to more robust
305 outcomes in the case of model agreement. While the uncertainty due to three models in the cost-
306 optimal end-of-century temperature is much smaller than the damage and discounting uncertainty,
307 the model range in the Benefit Cost Ratio does show the importance of including multiple models in
308 a cost-benefit analysis.

309

310 [Data availability](#)

311 All regional damage coefficients for the reduced-form climate change damage functions are available
312 at <https://zenodo.org/record/5546264#.YlWeBehBw2w>⁵². This includes the sea-level rise, non-sea-
313 level rise and combined damage functions for all used damage quantiles. All scenario data from the
314 three models is available at <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7627679>⁵³.

315 [Code availability](#)

316 The calculations and the figures used in this paper and the scripts required to reproduce them are
317 available at <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7627679>⁵³.

318 The model code and documentation of the MIMOSA model is available at
319 <https://github.com/kvanderwijst/Project-MIMOSA/>, of the WITCH model at
320 <https://www.witchmodel.org/> and of the REMIND model at [https://rse.pik-](https://rse.pik-potsdam.de/doc/remind/2.1.0/)
321 [potsdam.de/doc/remind/2.1.0/](https://rse.pik-potsdam.de/doc/remind/2.1.0/) and <https://github.com/remindmodel/remind> for the model code.

322

323 [Acknowledgements](#)

324 The research presented in this paper and all authors benefitted from funding under the European
325 Union's Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation under grant agreement no.
326 776479 for the project CO-designing the Assessment of Climate Change costs (COACCH,
327 <https://www.coacch.eu>) and from the European Commission Horizon 2020 Programme H2020/2019-
328 2023 under Grant Agreement No. 821124 (NAVIGATE).

329

330 [Author contributions](#)

331 All authors contributed to the manuscript, the development of the idea and set up of the study. FB,
332 RP, GS, SD and KvdW developed the damage functions. FB, LD, JE, AH, ML, FP, DV and KvdW developed
333 and ran the CBA scenarios. KvdW performed the multi-model analysis.

334

335 [Competing Interests Statement](#)

336 The authors declare no competing interests.

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455

456 Methods

457 *Damage functions*

458 Damage functions connect global or local temperature increase to loss of income or consumption.
459 Here, we use the newly created COACCH damage functions.

460 In a first step a set of climate change damages quantified by process-based sectoral impact models
461 have been evaluated in their macroeconomic consequences applying the ICES recursive-dynamic
462 computable general equilibrium model⁵⁴ (www.icesmodel.org). The list of impacts considered and
463 their implementation in the CGE model for the evaluation are reported in **Error! Reference source**
464 **not found.** The climate change impacts do not include potential losses originated in ecosystems or
465 in the health sector. This is motivated by the difficulty to address with a “market-transaction-based”
466 model like a CGE, the non-market dimension of those impacts. Also, catastrophic events are not
467 considered, even though some “extremes” (riverine floods) are included.

468 To provide the amplest account for uncertainty, all the impacts have been specified for 9
469 combinations of climate change scenarios (RCPs), social economic development scenarios (SSPs) (see
470 Fig. SI.3.1) between 2020 and 2070, a range of low-to-high variability in the climate and impact
471 models used and two different assumptions on investment mobility determining the economic
472 consequences.

473 In a second step, these data are used to extrapolate the reduced-form climate change damage
474 functions. Two different types of damage functions have been estimated using linear and quadratic
475 quantile regression, depending on the region (see SI.3.1). One specific to sea-level rise (SLR); the
476 other to the remaining climate change damages. SLR damage functions have been estimated
477 assuming “current level adaptation” and “incremental adaptation”, when coastal protection
478 upgrades following the prescription of “optimal” adaptation from the DIVA model⁵⁵. For the
479 remaining damages, adaptation is not explicitly modelled. However, some level of adaptation occurs
480 in the CGE optimization process, where economical assets can be reallocated between sectors and
481 regions. All damage functions and underlying GDP loss estimates are provided in SI.3.1. The damage
482 functions have been estimated through different *damage quantiles*. Unless otherwise stated, the
483 medium damage estimate is the 50th quantile, with the low and high estimates respectively the 5th
484 and 95th quantile.

485

486 *Direct vs. indirect costs*

487 The COACCH damage functions are level damage functions: they directly impact economic output,
488 instead of economic growth. However, a reduced economic output also has an indirect impact on
489 GDP growth³¹ through reduced investments for the next time period. For this reason, we also report
490 indirect damages, accounting for this reduced growth effect. When fixing the temperature path to
491 RCP6.0 or RCP2.6, we calculate the indirect damages as the difference between an RCP run with and
492 one without damages, while keeping the mitigation costs constant. This yields the total damages. By
493 subtracting the direct damages as reported from the damage function, we obtain the indirect
494 damages. For the CBA runs, it is not possible to distinguish between reduced economic growth from
495 climate impacts and from mitigation costs. We therefore do not report the *indirect damages*, but the
496 *combined indirect costs* from both damages and policy costs. These are calculated as the difference
497 between in GDP between the CBA run and a baseline without damages and without mitigation costs.

498 By subtracting both the direct damages and the mitigation costs, we obtain the combined indirect
499 costs. For the Benefit-Cost Ratio calculation, the indirect costs need to be included for a fair
500 comparison of benefits and costs. We therefore scale the direct policy and residual damage costs to
501 include the indirect costs to obtain total policy and residual damage costs. The residual damages are
502 then subtracted from the total damages in a no-policy scenario (Extended Fig. 1).

503

504 *Integrated Assessment Models*

505 To assess the macro-economic implications of the new COACCH damage functions, we use three
506 different IAMs of varying levels of complexity. IAMs are models designed to capture the interplay
507 between, among others, the climate, the economy and the energy system.

508 MIMOSA²³ is a recent IAM based on FAIR⁵⁶, with 26 regions covering the whole world. It is a
509 relatively simple Cost-Benefit IAM but still covers the relevant technological and socio-economic
510 dynamics. Temperature is a linear function of cumulative CO₂ emissions⁵⁷. MIMOSA uses the DICE
511 sea-level rise module. In contrast with the previous global version, we have now regionalized the
512 mitigation costs, population, initial capital stock and baseline GDP and CO₂ emissions (see SI.4 for
513 more details). The direct regional mitigation costs are calculated as area under the Marginal
514 Abatement Cost (MAC) curve, and have been recalibrated to the IPCC AR6 WGIII database.

515 WITCH²⁷ is a dynamic optimisation IAM of intermediate complexity, with 17 world regions. The
516 climate module is based on the DICE and MERGE climate modules, calibrated to reproduce the
517 CMIP5 model ensemble results. The sea-level rise module is the model of Li et al. (2020)⁵⁸. Mitigation
518 costs are endogenously computed based on a fully hard-linked energy system covering all main
519 energy supply technologies and demand sectors. Moreover, land-use mitigation actions and costs
520 are computed based on the linked GLOBIOM model. The policy costs are then calculated as total
521 GDP loss compared to a baseline scenario without climate policy.

522 REMIND²⁸ is an optimal growth IAM with a high level of detail in the representation of the economy
523 and the energy sector including mitigation options in the energy system and land-use sector.

524 REMIND is soft-coupled to MAGICC⁵⁹ as its climate module. The policy costs are calculated as GDP
525 losses compared to a baseline scenario without climate policy.

526

527 *The Computable General Equilibrium model*

528 ICES²¹ is a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy
529 based on the GTAP 8 database⁶⁰. While, at the time of writing, GTAP10 is available, ICES has been
530 calibrated separately for the entire 2020-2070 period according to the macroeconomic trends of the
531 SSPs, making it less sensitive to updates of the starting point (more recent calibration years) from
532 the newer GTAP versions. It simulates in 5-year time steps from 2020 to 2070. For this exercise, a
533 model version has been developed featuring a sub-national resolution for the EU economies
534 represented by 138 territorial units. 24 different economic sectors are considered. An extended
535 description of the ICES model and of the calibration process is provided in SI.6. Using a CGE to
536 calculate the damages allows to use the highly detailed representation of the economy to account
537 for feedbacks and rebound effects triggered by climate change impacts.

538

539

540 *Harmonisation*

541 To allow a comparison of the results between the models, we harmonise key assumptions. We use
542 the SSP2⁶¹ assumptions on baseline GDP and population growth and baseline emissions. The
543 discounting is also harmonised: by default, we use a Pure Rate of Time Preference (PRTP, also called
544 utility discount factor) of 1.5%/year and an elasticity of marginal utility of 1.001, in line with a recent
545 expert elicitation³⁷ on discount rates. Since temperature is an essential factor determining the
546 climate damages, the climate models are calibrated such that the 2020 temperature is harmonised
547 and equal to 1.16°C above pre-industrial levels⁶². Moreover, all damages are reported relative to
548 2020 damage levels. While the COACCH damage functions are calibrated for the 1986-2005 period
549 and therefore report non-zero damages in 2020, we assume that the observed GDP of 2020 already
550 incorporates these damages. Specifically, if the COACCH damage function relative to 1986-2005
551 temperature is noted by $D_{1986-2005}(T_t)$ for temperature level T_t , the damages as incorporated in
552 the models are:

$$553 \quad D_{\text{rel. to 2020 level}}(T_t) = D_{1986-2005}(T_t) - D_{1986-2005}(T_{2020}),$$

554 where T_{2020} is the global mean temperature in 2020.

555 Finally, since each model uses different regional definitions, we aggregate all results to the five
556 macro regions of the SSP database³² (see
557 <https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about#regiondefs> for the detailed
558 country mapping of each region):

- 559 • ASIA: most Asian countries, except for the Middle East, Japan, the Russian Federation,
560 Central Asia and the Caucasus region
- 561 • EENA: Eastern Europe and North Asia: Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus
562 region, Central and North Asia
- 563 • LAM: Latin America
- 564 • MAF: the Middle East and Africa
- 565 • OECD: includes all OECD and EU countries except Egypt, Israel, Mexico and South Korea. Also
566 includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Guam, Macedonia, Montenegro, Puerto
567 Rico, and Serbia

568 While these key assumptions have been harmonised across the three IAMs, the models differ,
569 among others, in their representation of the economy, their internal climate and sea-level rise
570 module, and the energy sector.

571

572

573 *Methods-only references*

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