How to be a democrat in an authoritarian world?

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Abstract: This article is based on a lecture given at the Fifteenth Global Studies Conference on the 21st July 2022. It analyses the causes and implications of the global process of authoritarianisation and considers the question of how and whether we can be democrats in an increasingly illiberal world. The article offers an explanation for the offensive against democratic institutions and the rule of law which locates it within the trend towards heightened systemic risk or 'cascading crises'. Drawing on the arguments of my 2021 book, "Authoritarian Contagion; the Global Threat to Democracy", I introduce the concept of authoritarian protectionism, as a framework highly attuned to the 'demand for protection' from populations in a situation of systemic risk and breakdown. The closing section of the article consider the implications of this analysis for the future of multilateralism and collective security in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Keywords: *Authoritarianism, Far Right, Neoliberalism, Democracy, Globalization*

Pre-print (accepted version) in The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies.

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In the 21st century, democrats are increasingly encountering a shared problem that might be summarised as: *"how to be a democrat in an authoritarian world?"* Are 'we' – as in supporters of democratic institutions and the rule of law – learning to live with authoritarian regression? And how is this interplay between democracy and despotism shaping the unfolding politics and economics of this century? In this article, I question the externalist fallacy: the belief that authoritarian transformation is simply an external threat democratic societies need to be protected from. This reading occupies a strange position in contemporary political discussion. For while it cannot bear a moments intellectual interrogation, given the empirically evident and widely accepted *fact* of the rise of authoritarian forces internally to democratic states, it nonetheless still tends to be central to the assumptions of geopolitical thinking in the West.

To challenge this fallacy, I will offer here an alternative diagnosis of democratic decay which argues that authoritarianisation is a systemic problem, one that reflects shared challenges but emerges unevenly (and to different levels of intensity) in the international order. Moreover, while we may find comfort in the idea that we can simply shield our societies from these allegedly 'external' pressures, this would actually leave democracies more, not less, exposed.

The corruptibility of democracy in theory and history

Jacques Derrida called it 'the autoimmune pervertibility of democracy', by which he referred to the basic historical reality, one which was at once, discursive, sociological, institutional and, of course, political, that '[w]hen assured of a numerical majority, the worst enemies of democratic freedom can, by a plausible rhetorical simulacrum… present themselves as staunch democrats' (Derrida 2005, 34). Such a *problématique* of the signifier and signified was for Derrida encapsulated by the republican and liberty embracing pretences that had framed the creation of *French* Algeria (Derrida 2005, 35). This potential for majorities in society to support actions that are antithetical to democratic governance, perhaps having become convinced by 'demagogic' rhetoric, is, naturally, as old as the very ideal of democracy itself. What's more, it can be argued that he inconsistent application of liberal values is not simply a commonly found derogation from a stated norm, but a systemic part of the governing practices of many democratic states. Consider, by way of example, how the de facto rejection of the *universal* element of *universal* human rights was evident in the Western response to the Sept 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. Rather than treating the attack as an appalling criminal action, requiring a response based on international law, it was instead framed as an act of war. This, in turn, served to justify acts which violated the rule of law system, such as illegal wars of aggression, torture, kidnap

(sometimes discussed under the euphemism of 'extraordinary rendition') and state assassination policies became part of the structure of US foreign policy.

The latter is a consummate example of what the postcolonial scholar, Partha Chatterjee, has described as the 'power to declare the exception' (P. Chatterjee 2014; 2017; 2005). Imperialism in the contemporary world has often tended to not take the form of classical imperialist conquests for territory. Instead, states pursue imperialist logics of power through informal means of 'hard power' projection, compelling other states to change their behaviour. This can often involve exempting themselves, i.e., 'declaring the exception', from the principles of human rights and the rules-based order that these self-same states tend to declare their public support for. This does not make *the power to declare the exception* the only form of imperial logic present in the contemporary world; a striking feature of 2022 has been the return of colonial practices with alternative justifications, rooted in openly ethnonationalist and territorially expansionist arguments. This can be observed not only in relation to the Russian war against Ukraine (as we will come onto discuss), but also the entry into government of pro-expulsion fascist forces in Israel, for whom the territorial expansion of the state through a programme of ethnic exclusion and apartheid is an unashamedly stated goal. In this emerging 'post-shame era' (Wodak 2019) once unacceptable discourses are undergoing a new resurgence.

These new dangers mark a dramatic intensification of imperialist practices. They move well beyond the liberal tendency 'to declare the exception' and openly reject the principle of sovereign equality and territorial integrity. Nonetheless, they emerge against a historical backdrop marked by a failure of mainstream liberalism and its most powerful geopolitical champions to adhere to the norms they have promoted as the basis of the modern global order.

The concept of democracy itself may be compromised by the often very difficult relationship between *formal commitment* and *substantive practice.* If democracy is understood simply as the right of a people to self-government and sovereignty, then translating this into meaningful practices involves a series of assumptions about *the* people, their representation and the territorial limitations of their claim to sovereign rulership. In a world of many societies and many peoples a notion of 'pure sovereignty', could easily lead in the direction of supporting the untrammelled power of one particular people. In such a world – i.e., of many societies and many peoples – this can therefore only be a dangerous assumption as it must logically involve an aggressive challenging of the sovereignty of others. Notions of a pure people cast in ethnic terms are perhaps even more dangerous, involving the alienation, persecution and potential genocidal elimination of minorities that are not seen as holding a legitimate 'historical' identity.

It follows from these dangers that it must be part of the functioning of democracy that it recognises sovereignty is shared and overlapping – that there are many peoples, many societies and therefore a plurality of democracies (on this see Cheneval and Nicolaidis 2017; Nicolaïdis 2013; Nicolaidis, Gartzou-Katsouyanni, and Sternberg 2018; and see also Sen 2021; D. Chatterjee 2022). This – as we'll come onto later – is not the end of the matter, because a further logic corollary of this lies in the fact that there can be mutually antagonistic but still democratic demands, which can both claim a legitimate, 'sovereign' mandate. The international nature of the social world (Kurki and Rosenberg 2020; Rosenberg 2006) thus conditions how we imagine (and institutionalize) the concepts of democracy, representation and political empowerment.

This question of how to define democracy assumes a particular importance in the context of the widely recognised global democratic crisis. In my analysis of the international process of authoritarianisation, I have made a case for a simple working definition of democracy based on the co-existence of formalised systems of representation and substantive empowerment. The former refers to the rules-based procedures and institutions that underpin genuinely free elections. The latter denotes the conditions – which may be more sociological or, indeed, economic – necessary for citizens to determine their life choices and have a say over institutions that are responsive to their demands (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002, 162). The advantage of this normative conception, which depicts democracy as we would like it to be, not as it is necessarily practised, lies in how it may open up space to critique the status quo. In this sense, it may be held to have a quiet radical

potential as it challenges the existence of practices and conditions that disempower citizens. Whereas the latter diminish the ability of individuals to exercise meaningful control over their everyday lives, democracy *should* unleash this power.

So where does this leave the question of authoritarianism – and how we should define it? On the one hand, we might well use this conception of democracy to uncover the enduring authoritarian practices and structures that exist in the nature of the economic structures that predominates in the world today, and the, often problematic, relationship they have to the formal institutions of democracy. On the other hand, while this is no doubt helpful, I prefer to focus on political authoritarianism and define it as a relational category i.e., one that should be understood as in opposition to the normative definition of democracy. I argue that authoritarianism should be seen as a *conscious attack* on the formal and substantive dimensions of democracy. Authoritarians seeks to create, or have created, systems based on the monopolization of power by an oligarchic elite or individual, which usually combines political and economic interests. This simple relational definition means that where authoritarianism advances, democracy must decline – and vice versa. This definition of authoritarianisation also goes beyond the failings of democracy as it requires deliberate attempts to undermine democratic functioning by manipulating, or overthrowing, institutions based on the rule of law.

Breakdown and disruption: on the long crisis of the 21st century

We can observe that the 21st century and its many unfolding traumas and crises present a profound challenge to the basic principle of self-governing societies. It has become, in this context, commonplace and perhaps even glib to observe democracy's fragility. Crises proliferate, overlap and interpenetrate, bringing with them greater political instability, convulsion and breakdown. From the COVID-19 pandemic, to rising inequality, falling economic growth, and the intensification of violent conflict – including the return of conventional warfare to Europe – as well as the multiplicity of threats facing our environment, we appear to be living in an epoch of sustained and multifaceted socio-ecological crises.

This *sense* of growing turmoil posits a need to conceptualise what exactly we mean by a 'crisis'. One starting point for this rethinking might be found in Jürgen Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis* (Habermas 1988). For Habermas crises constitute moments of breakdown in which individuals feel a breach in the 'normal' pattern of life by some kind of external force, denying them their 'normal sovereignty' (Habermas 1988, 1). While individuals may experience a generalised lack of control over the forces that shape their lives (as per the discussion of substantive democracy above), a crisis is marked by a sudden change, a rupture with a previously constructed norm. Individuals will seek to escape the crisis in one way or another in order to restore a sense of sovereignty. Habermas argued, correctly in my view, that a crisis therefore necessarily involves making moral and normative claims about the concept of the good society, and accordant expectations of how societies can and should tackle the problems they face, 'the resolution of the crisis effects a liberation of the subject caught up in it' (ibid), as he put it. Yet, while the question is normatively-laden with notions of beliefs and norms, it is also the case that a society does not enter into a crisis simply because individuals subjectively believe this to be the case.

In short, key to the conception of a crisis is a combination of subject and objective ('structural' and 'systemic') elements. The sense that something has suddenly, i.e., in very short order, gone wrong is combined with evidence-based reasons for believing that this sense is justified.

Those of us that approach things from a historical perspective might also be inclined to observe the parallels that exist with other extended periods of crisis in world history. For example, those deep and long crises that beset fourteenth century in western Christendom, a period marked in particular by the terrible toll of the Black Death, or the global crisis of the seventeenth century, as a weather induced depression in agricultural output led to famine the world over and sparked a series of wars and revolutions (Parker and Smith 1997). Despite the deadly toll of these sustained crises on society, it can be observed that they also

stimulated change as individuals and groups innovated in the face of the systemic structural crisis that they were caught up in.

Like these earlier periods of disruption and transformation we are also living in a period marked by a dramatic heightening of systemic risk; that is, the proliferation of risks that are highly complex, involve considerable uncertainty, and see cascading effects develop, as a crisis within one system, like our economy, leads to further crises in other systems, such as political governance or environment ecosystems.

In this sense, we do not for the most part have a problem in delineating the growing cascading crises of our era. We also have what should be a unique advantage in the assessment of these dynamics: we *know* that these crises will only intensify and accelerate in their speed and ferocity. Due to the scientific breakthroughs of the modern era, we are alert to the *Earthly* drivers of these changes. Science has forewarned us of the great dangers ahead. With this knowledge that the relationship between the human species and planet Earth is under great stress, we can model some of the likely contours and outcomes of the events that lie ahead.

As the concept of the Anthropocene (Keys et al. 2019) teaches us, if the human species were to become extinct tomorrow, we would have already left a permanent, enduring mark on Earth, one quite unlike that of any earlier, now extinct, species. So, we are both uniquely cognisant of the dangers that we face and have the capacity, in principle, to utilise technology and transform social systems, in order to adapt and perhaps avert the worst of the dangers ahead.

While many civilisations in the era of sedentary agriculture have experienced long crises, usually due to changing weather patterns and declining agricultural output, producing an intensification of class and interstate conflict over resources, in the industrial and post-industrial era in which we are in, the long crisis changes its nature: it is driven by the ecological costs of production for abundance, the need to produce with the goal of limitless growth.

Nonetheless, we can still use a similar metric of analysis to think about how the human world is being profoundly disrupted, and how it might be brought back into equilibrium. Other long crises in world history have been defined through three metrics: first, as I've suggested, environmental conditions and their social effects; second, the productive capacity of the economic system, its ability to generate surpluses and the extent of the inequality entailed by how they are distributed; and, third, the governance arrangements within and between societies, including their propensity for war and the ideas they use to garner legitimacy from populations.

Applied to the current conjuncture in world politics each of these dimensions points to a human order facing severe, overlapping crises and challenges: (a) we are only at the beginning of the changes set to be unleashed by man-made climate change; (b) economic inequality globally is going through a huge acceleration – with a very small elite at the top enjoying lifestyles and wealth unimaginable to the great majority; and (c) our politics, governance and security arrangements have been breaking, dramatically so this year with the Russian war on Ukraine.

The end of economic individualism and the return of the 'claim to protection'

One way of thinking about the political fallout from these turbulent crises we are experiencing is through what I have called the rising importance of the 'claim to protection' (Cooper 2021). Politics today sees a decline in the importance of egoistic individualism as a framework for elite legitimacy (Cooper 2022). Instead the making of collective claims to protection is back – the idea of shielding the community or society from the growing crescendo of crises has a powerful appeal, and is displacing the imaginary of self-reliance, which underpinned the 'small state' vision of classical neoliberalism. What we might call the *hardline meritocratic* discourses associated with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan had a tremendous influence internationally, notably in Central and Eastern Europe. By hardline, or what Thomas Piketty calls 'violent' (Savage and Piketty 2015) meritocracy, I mean a philosophy that sees conflict between individuals over economic resources that entails hardship and poverty as representing an efficient and 'fair' form of economic

management. As resources are imagined to flow to those that work the hardest, redistribution of any kind is assumed to disturb the efficiency and equitability of the system and may even have a corrupting impact on the political life of society.

Thatcher and Reagan both found the idea of a state that protects the socioeconomic welfare of its people to be offensive. They rejected the social welfare safety net, seeing the small state as the basis on which hard work was incentivised. 'A great country is a country of great fearless people' (Thatcher 1985), as Thatcher put it. And that 'fearlessness' would be pursued by individuals that prioritised their own interests, not those of others. Her nationalism, which was certainly very present in her thinking, was thus cast in terms that rejected notions of collective solidarity or the idea that individual members of the nation had a responsibility to support one another. Instead a great nation, in her imaginary, was built by unleashing free market forces.

In their recent book, *The Upswing*, Robert Putman and Shaylyn Romney-Garrett focus in on the American side of this story (Putnam 2020). Identifying how a nation lost its way, they present an evocative outline of a conflict between two alternative ways of thinking about the wider world: a communitarian 'we' on the one hand, and an egotistical 'I', on the other. They argue that the former – the solidaristic politics of 'we' the people – had the upper hand from the start of the twentieth century until the 1960s and 70s. It was then, perhaps surprisingly, displaced by the new hyper-individualism. Today America lives with the consequences of this long down-swing – hollowed out infrastructure, decaying industries, pollution and climate emissions, massive economic inequality and entrenched, institutionalised racial injustices.

At one point in the book they acknowledge that 'in today's Trump world what counts as Conservatism is much in turmoil, but for the half century between 1960 and 2016 Conservatism shifted starkly away form the solidarity and compassion of the 1950s Republicans' (Putnam 2020, 188). While I read this after writing my own book, I found it interesting how it both parallels some of my arguments but takes a quite different position: focusing trenchantly on the rise of the 'I', egoistic individualism, and the decline of conceptions of communitarianism. While much of the story they tell is highly persuasive, here I want to question whether Putnam and Romney-Garrett have the 'we' and 'I' dichotomy correct. Their seeming uncertainty of what to make of the post-Trump Republican party illustrates, I think, the multiple ways that the 'we' can be given a substantive content. After all, Trump often utilised collectivist discourses, but in a highly ethno-nationalistic form. In the 2016 US Presidential Election, he repeatedly condemned the trade liberalisation agenda – especially in relation to the effects of Chinese competition on American jobs – as a conspiracy of an out of touch metropolitan elite against ordinary blue- and white-collar Americans. This was combined with the utilisation of extreme racial discourses. Condemning Latin American migrants as criminals and rapists, he attacked the 'globalism' of Washington – and said his administration would stand up for America, pursuing a zero-sum economic and foreign policy agenda that prioritised the national interest. In short, this did have a strong notion of the 'we'. But one lacking progressive content.

This, I want to suggest, belies a broader transformation in elite politics that we can observe in other global iterations – as disenchantment with free markets sets in, elite politics has to reposition itself, abandoning the claim that individual hard work alone is sufficient to live a prosperous life, and instead promoting an alternative claim that the state should protect. I have referred to this alternative paradigm for elite legitimacy as 'authoritarian protectionism' (Cooper 2021). It involves a set of discursive steps: (a) an ethnically exclusionary view of the nation – something that, in most instances, will be simultaneously framed in patriarchal terms which draw on traditional social codes; (b) the articulation of this group – the ethno-nation – as having interests fundamentally distinct to those not included in the identity; and on occasion there is also added to this (c) some kind of civilisational crisis or 'reckoning' that renders the goals of the people urgent, and the risks existential if they fail to support the authoritarian agenda. As other accounts of democratic regression have argued (Svolik 2019) partisanship is key to this shift because a people who believe their interests are fundamentally at risk may support attacks on democracy, the rule of law and human rights in order to protect them against the threats allegedly ranged against them, such as 'globalists', ethnic minorities or immigrants.

The American case provides an indication of how human rights and social liberal values are discarded in the name of a particular depiction of the rights and freedoms of *true Americans.* This also, I would argue, helps explain the transformations seen in conservative politics in other countries where the ethno-people have become an increasingly central object of discourse.

The conjuncture of 2022: the Russian case of authoritarian protectionism

This brings us to the question of the Russian war against Ukraine. But getting there by this route, with reference to the United States of America and the broader global crisis of humankind, was a deliberate choice. Any account of what's happening in Ukraine that starts and ends with domestic analysis of Russian politics will necessarily be of limited explanatory power. Rather than restrict ourselves to this horizon we should think in terms of 'the international', and the multiple ways that societies intersect, to make sense of the Russian attack on Ukraine. Putin's now infamous essay published in the summer of 2021, 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians', followed the logics of authoritarian protectionism closely. 'Russians and Ukrainians', he argued, are 'one people – a single whole' (Putin 2021). In frequently Orwellian terms (especially when read in the context of the subsequent invasion), the essay assimilated Ukrainian identity into a monolithic pan-Russian one. He decreed that Ukraine does not have a legitimate existence as an entity independent of, and separate from, Russia. Ukrainian statehood was held to be an invention of the Soviet Union and its 'localization' policy. He argued that this imposed a Ukrainian identity on his fellow 'Russians' and created a 'dangerous time bomb' that 'exploded' with the fall of the Soviet Union (ibid). Putin argued that the loss of the communist party meant no force was able to uphold the unity of Ukrainians and Russians. In this warped worldview, the invasion therefore corrects a historic error, restoring 'harmony' between a single but artificially divided people.

Any assertion of Ukrainian independent selfhood can only be indicative, he suggests, of a malformity – a claim that has some parallels to Xi Jinping's campaign of cultural genocide against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang. Dangerous and foreign threats are held to require 'cleansing', i.e., violent assimilation. Nonetheless, Putin's willingness to abandon any pretence of legal justification, and utilise openly imperialist arguments, goes further than most of his global co-thinkers. Nonetheless, as I noted at the outset it accords with a wider mentality and discursive strategy which Ruth Wodak calls 'the shameless normalization of previously tabooed agendas' (Wodak 2020). Putin offers an extreme version of this, in comparing his war on Ukraine to the imperial conquests of Peter the Great (Guardian News 2022) he effectively discarded the UN Charter's touchstone principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.

Kremlin-aligned outriders have made similarly openly imperialist and even genocidal statements. In one example, state media agency, RIA Novosti, called for a campaign of repression and liquidation in Ukraine under the absolute control of the Russian state, explicitly rejecting any notion of Ukrainian sovereignty. This 'denazification' would, they said, 'inevitably also be de-Ukrainization', adding that '"Ukraine" cannot be kept as a title of any fully denazified state entity on the territory liberated from the Nazi regime' (Sergeytsev 2022). This raw fascism, veiled in 'anti-Nazi' discourse, now defines the Kremlin's view of the world.

The rise of this extremist politics – a fascism of the 21st century, in all but name – has prompted much debate over the sociological, economic and political conditions that have proven amenable to this decades long shift from the liberalism of 1989 to the authoritarianism of 2022.

An outline explanation for this global transformation may consist of the following presuppositions.

First, we are seeing an intensification of conflicts over distribution which do not lead to effective redistributional solutions. Moreover, these are often not expressed in economic terms, but take the form of ethnic and racialized claims on distribution. Societies experiencing low to stagnant growth will likely see intensifying conflicts over how the gains are distributed. And as markets become more dependent on states to intervene to try to generate growth, they also create opportunities for the kind of kleptocratic political

economy associated with the new authoritarianism. The drive to protect 'us' from 'them' emerges organically in such a context.

Second, geopolitical and social crises are also themselves reflective of the ecological terrain – as we can see in how the Russian war on Ukraine has hit the global food supply, and, indeed, has its own extractive logic in relation to extractive energy industries. Climate change will act – and is already acting – to further intensify conflicts over distribution, with societies that are dependent on subsistence agriculture particularly exposed to these effects.

Third, in these situations of growing beggar-thy-neighbour dynamics, politics will only become more centred on the *claim to protection.* So, against this structural backdrop it will be hard to avoid an on-going semi-permanent quasi conflict with authoritarian protectionists – and this poses the need to construct an alternative, inclusive claim to protection based on mutual solidarity, democratic governance and fundamental human rights.

How to be a democrat in an authoritarian world?

In the final turn of this argument, how does a conceptualisation of 'the international' shape how we understand the dynamics of rising authoritarian protectionism or authoritarianisation?

As I said at the outset, we have to recognise that we live in a world of many societies – and this gives an uneven, conflictual and complex character to any process of democratization. Processes of authoritarianisation and democratisation take place within 'the international' as a sociological structure, which entails a causal efficacy and logic for the development of individual societies, as none develop in a purely endogenous manner. All are shaped by the complexity of their uneven and combined interactions with *the outside world* (Rosenberg 2016).

A complex reading of the nature of international co-existence must furthermore entail a rejection of the fallacy, which has been particularly apparent in the response to the Russian war on Ukraine, to view the danger of authoritarianism as a purely external, geopolitical threat.

According to this logic the world is divided between democratic, non-democratic societies and semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian ones. While this may be more or less true as a descriptive statement, it involves a hermeneutic assumption that individual societies are merely shaped by domestic political logics and may lead to an ossified, unchanging reading of these global political dynamics. For if it were the case that the threat to democracy was a purely geopolitical phenomena there would be little in the way of a substantive, genuine threat to democratic societies – beyond the risk of geopolitical miscalculation and war, there would not be any genuine internal danger facing these societies. But, of course, this is not the case: long-standing, stable democracies like India and the United Kingdom, or relatively young ones like Poland and Hungary are experiencing the danger of authoritarian regression. In other words, it is a global phenomenon, and the causes of this trend are *systemic* and *international* in nature.

The conclusion of this returns to our original question – how to be a democrat in an authoritarian world – which requires, I think the consistent pursuit of several key principles.

While military alliances like NATO are important in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they have to be calibrated towards a defensive posture that prioritises the protection of the rule of law system. We have to mindful of the danger that defensive alliances can be misinterpreted as offensive – and rule out wars of aggression like the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hypocrisy – declaring an exception from the rules that you insist others follow – has undermined the legitimacy of the United States and others. These lessons must now be learnt.

Key to avoiding future risks is a trenchant commitment to collective security. Whereas bloc-based security assumes states and military alliances have a primacy of obligation to their allies, collective security holds that all states have a mutual obligation to ensure one another's safety. It seeks to advance common interests that

addresses the cascading crises of our time: war and violence, economic insecurity, corruption, authoritarianism, and, above all, ecological calamity. While it might be accused of naivety, the paradigm of collective security is arguably a pragmatic doctrine. It recognises that its pursuit may involve the use of force and just wars, such as Ukraine's military resistance to the Russian invasion. But it places legal and moral limits on how force is used. It challenges the zero-sum worldview and promotes a positive-sum agenda that, I would argue, is consistent with the substantive needs we face in the 21st century. If there is any hope of equitable, sustainable development states must be willing to cooperate.

This, in turn, involves an expansive conception of 'we' that prioritises international solidarity and multilateralism between states and peoples, supporting the building of many democracies and recognising the shared character of sovereignty and the need to cooperate with one another.

Lastly, there is a need to resolutely defend formal institutions and the rule of law system from corrosion, but combine this with civic, mass popular mobilisation to 'keep the institutions honest'. And this can, furthermore, pursue the policies that are progressively redistributive, rebalancing society in favour of the economic majority and addressing run away inequality.

In other words, to return to where we started, we have to work to ensure not only formal democracy endures, but it becomes capable of delivering substantively democratic outcomes.

This is, in the end, the only way to protect and extend the great democratic experiment.

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