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Comrades in the family? Soviet communism and demand for family insurance

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Abstract

We study how exposure to (Soviet) communism (EC), a political-economic regime based on collectivist state planning, affected the preferences for family support, which we refer to as informal family insurance. Against the backdrop that 'communism gave rise to the abolition of the family', we document that it actually strengthened the preference (the demand) for informal family insurance without depressing individuals' preferences for social insurance. We exploit cross-country and cohort variation in EC on more than 314,000 individuals living in 33 Central and Eastern European countries, among which 14 had been subject to communist regimes. We estimate that EC gave rise to 9.6 percentage point (pp) increase in the preference for family care for older parent and 4.3 pp increase in the support (both financial and nonfinancial) for children. These effects are explained by the strengthening of social and family networks that resulted from the erosion of generalized, interpersonal and institutional trust, rather than by 'indoctrination effects' during Soviet communism times.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Soviet communism made a profound impact on the formal and informal institutions of many European countries during its half-century of constitutional adoption (Basu et al., 2005; Di Tommaso et al., 2007; Shleifer &

Treisman, 2005). Although throughout history the family has served as a source of informal insurance, one of the central aims of Soviet communism[1] was to abolish the traditional family, as it was perceived to be perpetuating capitalism (Marx & Engels, 2013). Hence, it is an empirical question whether entry to and exit from Soviet communism influenced the demand (or preference) for family insurance. So far, previous studies document that exposure to (Soviet) communism (EC) leads to a preference for social insurance drawing on evidence from Eastern Germany (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). However, we know very little about the effects of EC on the organization of the family and specifically on the preferences for the family as a source of informal financial and nonfinancial support. The main purpose of this paper is to fill this gap.

Although family structures are argued to reflect the ideologies that have shaped the history of the 20th century (Todd, 1985) and to reinforce inequality (Marx & Engels, 2013), we contend that preferences for family support (or informal family insurance) are endogenous to political regimes. By abolishing formal wealth accumulation, communism might have created parallel informal incentives to develop family networks further, being a source of informal insurance, which we define as the 'informality hypothesis'.

Other studies suggest that conversely, informal family support can be crowded out after the extension of market insurance (Becker, 1981). However, we contend that such effects depend on wider institutional incentives specific of a political-economic regime (Bowles & Gintis, 1975). In this paper, we show that in the absence of free markets, and in a setting where privilege does not reflect in wealth accumulation, 'internal family networks become a salient way to have access to privilege, including education and elite positions' (Filtzer, 2014).

Nonetheless, the effect of EC on the family is far from trivial given the strong presence of the state in Soviet regimes, which included extensive public benefits potentially crowding family support out. Furthermore, Soviet regimes would be followed by propaganda instilling Marxism–Leninism, which openly aspired to the abolition of the traditional family. This latter effect is referred in the literature as the *indoctrination* hypothesis. This paper will test the latter hypothesis, which was the core of the seminal analysis by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007).

This paper is the first to document that along with limited precautionary saving opportunities, exposure to Soviet communism brought two additional effects. First, we document that it shifted the demand for all types of formal and informal insurance (Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2002), thereby strengthening the networks of family and informal support, while at the same time demanding more publicly funded social programmes (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Second, we show that the effect of communism exposure was heterogeneous across countries, which has not been analysed before.

The current paper extends the analysis of the EC effects to a larger set of countries under the Soviet influence besides Germany, which, to the best of our knowledge, has been the sole focus of previous literature. Furthermore, we conduct a battery of robustness checks referring to various definitions of regime exposure, and different samples of countries, including the effect of historical legacies (Simpser et al., 2018; Wittenberg, 2015). We document robust evidence of a significant increase in the preference for family support (informal family insurance) resulting from EC. The mechanisms driving the effect include the erosion of both generalized trust as well as of the trust in the regime-specific institutions, driving the reliance on family networks which in turn helps to understand the increase of the demand for either insurance type.

The next section describes how the paper adds to the wider and specific literature. Section 3 describes the data. Next, Section 4 contains the empirical strategy and Section 5 reports the main results and heterogeneity analysis, followed by mechanisms, threads to the identification, and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.

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[1]A political-economic regime based on the collectivist planning of human needs was introduced to the Russian empire with the 1917 Revolution and imposed on the number of neighbouring countries after World Word II.

2 | RELATED LITERATURE

Soviet communism was characterized by the absence of free markets, a strong state level control, and the provision of extensive public benefits and services. These features coexisted with prevalent corruption in public institutions (Karklins, 2002) and a culture of fear, persecution, and repression (Bohacek & Myck, 2011; Rozenas & Zhukov, 2019). However, as we argue in this paper, by abolishing wealth accumulation, communism created parallel incentives to develop informal family networks. Although under certain circumstances, market economies can potentially erode family ties (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010), when wealth accumulation is not an option, or an economy is 'weakly monetized', privileged groups turn to the family to cultivate their groups connections that provide access to elite positions and other forms of priviledge (Filtzer, 2014). That said, such strategies differ across gender and urban–rural areas.

Some studies find that strong reliance on the family can erode generalized trust and inhibit support for social insurance (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010), or in its extreme form, give rise to phenomenon known as 'amoral familism' (Banfield, 1967). Consistently, Fukuyama (1996) argued that low-trust societies are characterized by large families and strong internal ties. Given the well-documented detrimental effects of Soviet communism on trust (Letki, 2018; Traps, 2009), one might hence hypothesize that Soviet communism might encompass strong family ties. However, in both communist and noncommunist countries, similar changes were brought by modernization when conservative gender norms (and in turn family values) were replaced by values oriented towards gender equality (Naumann, 2005). According to Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2011), such a phenomenon was possible, because in modern growth regimes, the importance of family weakens. Hence, one might expect that the advancement of gender equality was enhanced by state-controlled employment in Soviet communism. In contrast, free labour markets are more prone to gender discrimination. Hence, the effects of Soviet communism on the preferences for family insurance are far from obvious.

Previous studies on the impact of EC have placed the focus on social rather than family preferences. Corneo and Grüner (2002) documented significant differences in social preferences between Eastern and Western European countries, resulting from 'indoctrination effects', namely, that exposure to Soviet communism increased people's egalitarian preferences (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) in line with the socialist thought. Consistently, EC brought a reduced individual self-reliance (Bauernschuster & Rainer, 2012). More recent evidence suggests that after 20 years of communism, Eastern Germans exhibit weaker prosocial behaviour (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011), an effect driven by changes in the cohorts socialized prior to the demise of Soviet communism (Huber & Mikula, 2019).

Previous evidence is, on first sight, inconsistent with other studies (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011; Ockenfels & Weimann, 1999; Shiller et al., 1990, 1992). Indeed, some literature has attempted to reconcile the lack of empirical consensus by examining the differences in social values between East and West Germany. Van Hoorn and Maseland (2010) identify differences between Eastern and Western Germans using happiness data and conclude that, contrary to expectations, Easterners appeared to entertain values more conducive to economic growth, which questions the myth of pro-entrepreneurial values in the West. Campa and Serafinelli (2019) compare attitudes towards work in East versus West Germany. They show that women were more likely to work in Eastern Europe as state-socialist governments promoted women's economic independence. Similarly, they show that US migrants educated under the state-socialist regimes become less traditionalistic compared with Western European countries. This paper attempts to contribute to this literature by examining the effect of EC on the preferences for family support, which helps to reconcile some of the apparent inconsistencies of the previous literature.

3 | DATA AND MEASUREMENT

3.1 | Data sources

Our analysis draws on three primary data sources: the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS). We supplement the main data sources with the 2006 wave of the

Life in Transition Survey (LITS) sampling all countries exposed to Soviet communism. We use a quasi-experimental design to examine the exposure to EC by using postcommunist countries varying with respect to EC at different stages of political regime maturity, along with other European countries as controls, and different cohorts of individuals that exhibit a differential exposure over time. Migrants are excluded, because their spatial mobility is likely to alter the EC effects.[2]

The surveys provide data on social attitudes and behaviours of adults observed from 1981 to 2017. We employ post-1989 observations on Europeans living in 33 countries, including citizens born in 14 postcommunist countries, yielding a total of about 221,000; 67,000; and 314,000 observations in GGS, WVS, and ESS, respectively.[3]

3.2 | Measures

3.2.1 | Preference for family insurance

We operationalize the preference for family insurance with questions on the preferred role of one's own family in the provision of informal support. In this paper, we focus on measures of preferences for family support concerning intergenerational (flowing upward or downward) transfers of care and money exchanged between family members. Respondents in GGS answered 'to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements': 'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so'; 'children ought to provide financial help for their parents when their parents are having financial difficulties'; 'parents ought to provide financial help for their adult children when the children are having financial difficulties'; and 'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need' using the following scale: 1—*strongly agree*, 2—*agree*, 3—*neither agree nor disagree*, 4—*disagree*, 5—*strongly disagree*. Figure A1 in Appendix A shows distributions of responses to these questions in Eastern and Western European countries. Descriptive statistics indicate that familiaristic attitudes are more common in the East than in the West, with the case of care for the elderly being the most pronounced example.

3.2.2 | Preference for social insurance

Another group of measures capturing beliefs related to social insurance refers to the role of the state to ensure social equality. In order to operationalize the preference for social insurance, we refer to the measures for the following preferences: income equality, income redistribution, and equality of opportunities. Using 6-point scale ESS respondents answered to what extent they agree with a statement that 'government should reduce differences in income levels' and on 7-point scale how much they resemble individuals believing that it is 'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. WVS respondents were asked 'Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion? A. Incomes should be made more equal. B. We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort'. Figure A2 illustrates distributions of these measures. The descriptive statistics are suggestive of stronger support for income redistribution as observed in ESS (though not in the WVS) in the East than in the West of Europe.

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[2]We loosen this assumption in the robustness analysis. After the promulgation of the Soviet Constitution in 1936 migration was very rare if not existent with the exception of family reunification and some forced deportations (Dowty, 1989; Marshall, 2000). However, forced migrations between Soviet republics were frequent in the 1940s (Stola, 1992). Polian (2003) estimates that six million Soviets were resettled before Stalin's death. It is estimated that after the Second World War, twelve million ethnic Germans were deported out of Germany to other Eastern European countries, though until the early 1950s, the lines between the East and the West in some of Eastern European borders were easily crossed. Furthermore, Boenisch and Schneider (2013) document related evidence suggesting that exposure to communism affects the probability of spatial mobility.

[3]See Table A1 in Appendix A for descriptive statistics of the research samples. Tables with detailed information on the research samples' structure by country and wave as well as the composition of the research samples by country of residence and birth cohorts are available upon request.

TABLE 1 The dates of the beginning and the end of the exposure to Soviet communism (EC) in analysed postcommunist counties.

Beginning							
End	1936	1939	1940	1947	1948	1949	1952
1989					Romania		Poland
1990	Georgia	Lithuania		Bulgaria	Czech Republic, Slovakia	Germany, Hungary	
1991	Belarus, Ukraine		Latvia				
1992		Estonia					
1995	Russia						

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on dates of the socialist constitution and first free democratic elections.

3.2.3 | Exposure to communism

Our study concerns post-war Soviet communism. Living in an Eastern or Western European country provides a crude measure of external margin of EC, but it fails to inform precisely on the extent of the exposure. Thus, we measure the number of years an individual lived under a communist regime to capture EC. Because more accurate measures of actual instalment of communist regimes are unavailable, we use the year when the socialist constitution of the state was announced as an indication of the maturity of communist institutions, which ranges from 1936 to 1952 (see Table 1 for details).[4] The end of communism is also country-specific ranging from 1989 to 1995 and operationalized as the year of the first democratic parliamentary elections, with the exception of Romania and Russia where dates of the death sentence for the Romanian Communist Party general secretary and legislative election were used, respectively. In some countries (e.g., Romania) the dates of nationalization of private property and the introduction of communist constitution coincide.

Most of previous studies measure the EC as the total number of years of exposure, ignoring possible differences between exposures across various stages of life. However, one can identify different periods of Soviet communism (Stalinism, Post-Stalinism, Reformism) and its propaganda that would result in heterogeneity of EC in different stages of life between cohorts.

3.2.4 | Other measures

To examine parallel effects of EC shedding more light on the results obtained in the main analysis, we supplement our measures of the preferences with generalized trust, as in Butler et al. (2016), as well as measures of trust in selected public institutions available in our data sources.[5] We identify deep differences with respect to institutional trust in Europe, in line with the empirical studies discussed before (cf. Table A2).

Furthermore, we refer to a number of relevant measures, including political and civic participation, certain dimensions of religiosity as well as traditionalism in gender roles. Table A2 provides more details on these

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[4]For the robustness checks, we employ alternative EC measures described in Appendix D. We exclude earlier periods from the main analysis because first, communist revolution of 1917 in Russia cannot be treated as an externally imposed change of regime for its entire population, and second, political environment at that times was very unstable. These circumstances changed after WWII with Stalin in power.

[5]In particular, respondents in all three main data sources were asked about the generalized trust in the following question: 'generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' with the answer 'most people can be trusted' opposed to 'need to be very careful'. Additionally, we use answers to question on a belief that people in general are helpful ('people mostly try to be helpful' or 'people mostly look out for themselves'). Respondents reported how much confidence they have in press, political parties, police, labour unions, and justice

measures, pointing to significantly more pronounced civic participation associated with stronger secularization and gender equality in the West than in the East of Europe. These patterns are observed in all three data sources.

4 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Shocks in the institutional environment, such as political-economic regime changes, are extremely uncommon (Schelling, 2006). Though, there are a few exceptions (Nee & Swedberg, 2005). The institution of Soviet communism after Second World War was imposed on a number of countries, some of which gained political independence only in 1918. The collapse of communism, even if anticipated, occurred gradually over time beginning in 1989 in Poland and Romania, and extending through Soviet Union dissolution and the first free parliamentary election in Russia in 1991 and 1995, respectively. Thus, the exposure to Soviet communism can be treated as a natural experiment allowing for an examination of the effects of political-economic regime. Our main estimates exploit cross-section and longitudinal data as well as cohort specific variation in the exposure to communism. More specifically, we estimate Equation (1):

$$Y_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 EC_i + \gamma_2 g_i + \gamma_3 c_i + \gamma_4 t_i + \gamma_5 X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \tag{1}$$

We examine the effect of the extensive margin of the exposure to communism (EC_{it}—ever exposed to communism) to explain preferences for social and family insurance Y_{it}, where i refers to individuals, t to survey year, g to the country, and c to the birth cohort group.

We conduct pooled OLS regressions of social preferences and behaviours that were influenced by the exposure to communism controlling for demographic, socio-economic, and other individual characteristics. That is, with the set of such control variables X_{it}, we adjust the estimates for age (in a quadratic form) and gender. However, in some specifications, in order to proxy variation in socio-economic status that occurred only after communism collapse, we control for current income and education, even though such variables might potentially be 'bad controls'.

Our parameter of interest testing the *informality* and *indoctrination* hypotheses is γ_1, as its positive value in the estimations explaining preferences for informal family insurance supports the *informality* hypothesis. The *indoctrination* hypothesis implies negative relation between EC and the preference for family insurance. As for the preferences for social insurance, positive effects of EC are in line with the indoctrination to Soviet values.

In the next step, we examine in detail the effects of the total length of exposure to communism according to Equation (2):

$$Y_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_{1j} EC_i^k + \gamma_2 g_i + \gamma_3 c_i + \gamma_4 t_i + \gamma_5 X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{2}$$

where EC_{it}^k stands for k years of total exposure to communism experienced by an individual i, $k = 0, ..., K_g$, and K_g stands for the maximum length of the exposure to communism in country g. In order to avoid mutlicolinearity between EC and age, rather than as a continuous variable, we treat EC as a categorical one, estimating the effect for each integral of total years of EC separately.

The identification of EC relies on the assumption that selection into communism was random, leading to potential threats that we address in the empirical analysis below. First, we examine alternative operationalizations of the EC (see Tables A28–A31 in Appendix D.3) and cohort measures. Second, we pay particular attention to the choice of the control group. Third, we conduct robustness checks by controlling for other relevant factors, including those related to the effects of transformation from communism (such as occupation type, age at communism collapse, and

exposure to recession).[6] In addition to linear estimates using multiple-wave data with time trends (linear, cf. Table A26, quadratic, and country-specific), we confirm that estimates obtained on a single wave in each sample remain stable over time after communism collapsed. Moreover, we estimate random and fixed effects specifications for the panel subsample of GGS (cf. Tables A32 and A33) along with models for binary variables, namely, logit and probit for dichotomized measures of the preferences related to family and social insurance (cf. Tables A34 and A35).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the decision to exploit the EC in a number of Central-European countries (rather than relying on the East-West Germany division) is motivated mainly by the fact that EC in Eastern Germany might have been different than in other postcommunist countries, due to its stronger economic, religious, and cultural ties to Western Europe. East and West of Germany were far from being randomly selected into specific treatment and control groups (Becker et al., 2020).[7] Furthermore, migration flows from East to West Germany were more pronounced throughout the duration of communism, a mass arrival to East Germany of individuals expelled from the German lands that become part of Poland took place after 1945 (Gatz, 1989) and forced migrations between Soviet republics were frequent in the 1940s (Stola, 1992).

5 | RESULTS

5.1 | Main results

We find that individuals exposed to communism more often report that members of own family should support each other, especially when personal care to older parents and financial support to own adult children is needed (by 9.6 percentage points (pp) and 4.3 pp in the total sample, respectively; cf. Table 2), than individuals unexposed to communism. Our results are consistent with the *informality* hypothesis. The effects of EC are positive for intergenerational transfers of care both to older and younger generation. In the case of the preference for family financial transfers towards older individuals, we find insignificant yet a negative EC effect, which might be explained by the extensive and generous retirement schemes in formerly communist countries.

These results shown in Table 2 help reconciling previous estimates from Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), who find that exposure to communism did increase preferences for redistribution. We document a significant increase in the preferences for income equality and income redistribution due to EC in all estimation specifications. In the left panel we use all countries (i.e., the control group consists of individuals living in the countries never exposed to communism and individuals in formerly communist countries from the cohorts that were never exposed to communism), whereas in the right panel the sub-sample of countries ever exposed to communism. The main specification yields results robust to alternative control groups.

The effects discussed above are likely to be even larger due to intergenerational transmission of preferences (Bisin & Verdier, 2000). That is, the effect sizes using total sample are predominantly larger than those retrived using the sub-sample of formerly communist countries alone. Indeed, in the total sample we assume that individuals born after the communism in formerly communist countries do not differ from their European counterparts with respect to the preference for family and social insurance. However, it is likely that the preferences shaped under communism in older generations are adapted too by younger individuals never exposed directly to communist institutions.

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[6]In particular, we control for household size, individual religiosity, experience of war, especially during one's impressionable years, country democratic index, and others, in addition to the three main model specifications. See Appendix D.3 Tables A19–A25 and A27 for results of these robustenss checks. Moreover, we exclude groups of countries to check if the results remain intact (cf. Tables A14–A17).

[7]A selective fifth of the population fled from East to West Germany before the building of the Wall in 1961, which influences differences in working-class, employment in manufacturing, and self-employment prevalence. Reichstag election in 1924 already showed twice as large a communist vote share. Moreover, share of Protestants was higher in the East and exhibited lower church attendance. Finally, in 1925, female labour-force participation was higher by 6 percentage points in Eastern than in Western Germany.

TABLE 2 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on the preference for family and social insurance (extensive margin).

	Total sample						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0861***	(0.0188)	0.0973***	(0.0189)	0.0960***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	(0.0200)	0.0420**	(0.0199)	0.0460**	(0.0199)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0221	(0.0225)	−0.0039	(0.0224)	−0.0062	(0.0221)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	(0.0216)	0.0396*	(0.0218)	0.0435**	(0.0219)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6279***	(0.0680)	0.5121***	(0.0683)	0.5422***	(0.0698)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	(0.0285)	0.2734***	(0.0285)	0.2760***	(0.0286)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	(0.0278)	0.0954***	(0.0277)	0.0975***	(0.0278)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Time FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: FE—fixed effects. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance, dichotomous: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance, dichotomous: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Subsample of formerly communist countries						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0427***	(0.0102)	0.0469***	(0.0104)	0.0463***	(0.0104)	142618
Downwards care	0.0325***	(0.0101)	0.0321***	(0.0101)	0.0347***	(0.0102)	139625
Upwards money	−0.0266**	(0.0113)	−0.0172	(0.0114)	−0.0185	(0.0113)	142416
Downwards money	0.0488***	(0.0122)	0.0538***	(0.0123)	0.0557***	(0.0124)	139637

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Subsample of formerly communist countries						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0959	(0.0133)	0.0792***	(0.0134)	0.0874***	(0.0135)	47227
Income redistribution	0.1759***	(0.0167)	0.1610***	(0.0164)	0.1564***	(0.0166)	26299
Equality of opportunities	0.0150	(0.0096)	0.0127	(0.0095)	0.0127	(0.0095)	25990
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Time FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: FE—fixed effects. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance, dichotomous: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance, dichotomous: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

5.2 | Mechanisms

5.2.1 | Detrimental effects on trust

Drawing on evidence from four data sources composed of different sets of European countries, we confirm evidence of the detrimental effects of communism on various measures of trust, as reported in Table 3. We examine generalized trust measured on a 10-point scale in ESS, as well as its dichotomous version from GGS and WVS and we identify major differences between individuals exposed to communism and those unexposed. The EC coefficient equal to −0.07 (and −0.10) in GGS (and in WVS) suggests that the probability of agreeing with the statement that most 'people can be trusted' would be reduced by 11 (19) per cent due to EC for an average individual living in the West of Europe.

Similarly, we document that individuals exposed to communism declare substantially lower levels of trust in family than those unexposed. That might be partially explained by differences in the perceptions of the family, because in the Eastern European countries the term family is more likely to refer to extended family, while in Western Europe it may only refer to nuclear family. Nevertheless, taking into account this effect as well as the reduced interpersonal trust along with the negative EC effects on confidence in several public institutions, including the legal system, police, and political parties (cf. Figure 1), we are inclined to interpret the overall results on trust as an indication of a strong and long-lasting sense of uncertainty and insecurity being a result of living under communism.

TABLE 3 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on trust.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Generalized trust (GGS)	−0.0817***	(0.0150)	−0.0645***	(0.0150)	−0.0668***	(0.0148)	137209
Generalized trust (WVS)	−0.1026***	(0.0142)	−0.0928***	(0.0143)	−0.0961***	(0.0144)	64447
Generalized trust (ESS)	−0.5949***	(0.0561)	−0.5343***	(0.0559)	−0.5338***	(0.0559)	75633
People being helpful (ESS)	−0.4098***	(0.0523)	−0.3797***	(0.0515)	−0.3619***	(0.0503)	75516
Trust in family (WVS)	−0.1220***	(0.0351)	−0.1651***	(0.0427)	−0.1651***	(0.0427)	5144
Trust in legal system (ESS)	−0.5984***	(0.0635)	−0.5369***	(0.0640)	−0.5216***	(0.0649)	74168
Trust in political parties (ESS)	−0.2393***	(0.0531)	−0.1951***	(0.0542)	−0.1757***	(0.0554)	74243
Trust in politicians (ESS)	−0.2695***	(0.0536)	−0.2193***	(0.0544)	−0.2034***	(0.0556)	74653
Trust in police (ESS)	−0.5187***	(0.0562)	−0.4628***	(0.0568)	−0.4325***	(0.0578)	75070
Trust in president (LITS 06)	0.1009	(0.1060)	0.0627	(0.0971)	0.0691	(0.0975)	20321
Trust in parliament (LITS 06)	0.0685	(0.0984)	0.0333	(0.0905)	0.0481	(0.0910)	21099
Trust in government (LITS 06)	0.1083	(0.0979)	0.0749	(0.0929)	0.0890	(0.0928)	21138
Trust in political parties (LITS 06)	0.0929	(0.0811)	0.0588	(0.0784)	0.0695	(0.0786)	20518
Trust in armed forces (LITS 06)	0.0640	(0.1171)	0.0443	(0.1147)	0.0556	(0.1141)	20879
Confidence in press (WVS)	−0.1694***	(0.0207)	−0.1659***	(0.0206)	−0.1607***	(0.0206)	65665
Confidence in political parties (WVS)	−0.1309***	(0.0160)	−0.1199***	(0.0162)	−0.1208***	(0.0163)	62632
Confidence in police (WVS)	−0.1903***	(0.0201)	−0.1830***	(0.0202)	−0.1732***	(0.0204)	65817
Confidence in the army (WVS)	−0.1139***	(0.0195)	−0.1115***	(0.0195)	−0.1045***	(0.0192)	64757
Confidence in labour unions (WVS)	−0.0182	(0.0173)	−0.0189	(0.0173)	−0.0161	(0.0174)	60187
Confidence in justice system (WVS)	−0.2339***	(0.0206)	−0.2251***	(0.0207)	−0.2205***	(0.0208)	63533
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Time FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: FE—fixed effects. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Generalized trust—'generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' with the answer 'most people can be trusted' opposed to 'need to be very careful'. People being helpful—'people mostly try to be helpful' or 'people mostly look out for themselves'. Trust in family—how much respondents trust their own family measured on five point scale ('trust them completely' … 'do not trust them at all'). Trust (ESS)—how much respondents trust in legal system, political parties, politicians, and police measured on 11-point scale ('no trust at all' … 'complete trust'). Trust (LITS)—how much respondents trust in president, parliament, government, political parties, and armed forces measured on five point scale ('complete distrust' … 'complete trust'). Confidence (WVS)—how much confidence respondents have in the press, political parties, police, army, labour unions, and justice system measured on five point scale. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), ESS waves 1–8, and LITS wave 1.

Pre-existing lack of trust in rural lands of Russian empire might contribute to the explanation of why the effects in Russia and the former USSR are relatively weaker (Shlapentokh & Woods, 2007), as general trust has not deteriorated substantially there, unlike in other republics on which communism was imposed, in line with the mechanisms discussed above.

5.2.2 | Civic capital and gender norms

Consistently with evidence documenting a negative correlation between government regulation and trust (Aghion et al., 2010), we find that communism reduced not only trust (cf. Figure A5) but also civic participation and the importance of democratic values (cf. Table A11). If public institutions are perceived as corrupted and people withdraw from expressing their voice in public due to little reliance on democratic institutions, then the preference for placing the responsibility for individuals in need of support on family networks rather than the state becomes a rational strategy.

Furthermore, we find that tradition (cf. Table A12) rather than family is more important to individuals exposed to EC, and older cohorts exposed to communism used to have more children as compared with all those unexposed. One explanation of this result is that societies exposed to communism were predominantly peasant before entry to communism, and this was even more so after the wartime. Therefore, we find no suggestive evidence to credit the more pronounced preference for family insurance in postcommunist countries to the demise of family importance in Old Europe. Instead, this might result from a stronger adherence to tradition in postcommunist countries.

Against the backdrop that motherhood is less often reported as relevant for female fulfilment and the diminished role of religion during communism, we find strong evidence of a substantial increase in the support for traditional gender roles with EC (cf. Figure A6). This finding reflects the heterogeneity in child-care policy under Soviet communism (Szelewa & Polakowski, 2008). Perhaps more importantly, attitudes towards gender equality in Central and Eastern Europe seem to be taken for granted, which is not surprising taking into account rights to vote and paid maternity leave dating back to 1910s (Wikander et al., 1995), co-education of girls and boys in schools and forced female employment under communism. In such circumstances, pro-choice behaviour might entail freedom from non-traditionalistic commodification of economic activity.

5.3 | Effects of the length of EC exposure

We estimate the effects of the length of the EC exposure to examine possible nonlinearity in the effects. Figure 2 shows that EC has ambiguous impact on the preference for family insurance depending on the extent of the communism exposure.

FIGURE 1 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on the generalized trust and confidence in public institutions. _Source_: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), ESS waves 1–8. _Note_: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, controlling for ability to make ends meet or scale of incomes, age (quadratic), gender, education, country, as well as time and cohort fixed effects. Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Trust—'generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' Confidence—how much confidence respondents have in the justice system press, police measured on five point scale. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$. *$p < .1$. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

FIGURE 2 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on the preference for family insurance by the length of the exposure. *Source*: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). *Note*: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, controlling for ability to make ends meet or scale of incomes, age (quadratic), gender, education, country, as well as time and cohort fixed effects. Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Preference for family insurance, dichotomous: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$. *$p < .1$. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

The positive effects of EC on the preference for social insurance are stronger for longer periods of exposure, particularly with respect to equality of opportunities (cf. Figure 3).

The difference in the EC effects on the role of informal family insurance with respect to children and elderly parents is striking and presumably related to the security provided by formal social insurance. The public pension support was relatively generous under communism, which might explain why shorter periods of EC are in line with the *indoctrination* hypothesis. However, we find that the EC for longer periods increased the preference for family support towards older family members, in line with the *informality* hypothesis. Exposure to communism for short periods, and more specifically less than 33 years, significantly strengthened the preference for family insurance with respect to the support to younger generations, in line with the *informality* hypothesis. Consistent with our main results, EC effects on family support towards older adults differ from support to the younger counterparts, and so do the nonlinearities in the EC effects when we focus on its length.

The effects of EC length on other outcomes (cf. Figure A6) suggest thatthe EC effects are nonlinear. A deep change in EC effects depends on its length in the case for support for inequality in gender roles within the labour market and in care-giving. The same is true, for the preference for income taxation, and for the actual number of children. Thus, it seems that the changes in formal and informal institutions occurred in parallel, creating a dynamic environment affecting the preferences for social and family insurance.

FIGURE 3 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on preference for social insurance by the length of the exposure. *Source*: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18) and ESS waves 1–8. *Note*: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, controlling for scale of incomes, age (quadratic), gender, education, country, as well as time and cohort fixed effects. Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities', equality—more important that 'nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$. *$p < .1$. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

5.4 | Heterogeneity

Next, we conduct an analysis of the heterogeneous impacts of EC at the intensive margins depending on demographic (gender, birth cohort), regional (rural versus urban and various country groups), and cultural (historical and religious heritage) characteristics.[8]

Consistent with previous literature, we find a different effect of EC on social preferences for men and women (cf. Figure A3). That is, our results for the strengthening of the preference for social insurance are driven by men primarily. In contrast, our results suggest strong evidence showing that EC strengthened the preference for family insurance among women, while it reduced the preference for family insurance among men. Taking into account the fact that traditionally women bore responsibility for taking care over the dependent family members (both among older and younger generations), our evidence supports the *informality* hypothesis. Women's preferences are indeed suggestive of a stronger demand for family insurance, while men's preferences appear to be more in line with the Marxism–Leninist ideology, consistent with the *indoctrination* hypothesis.

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[8]Detailed results are presented in Appendix A.2, Figures A3 and A4 and Tables A3–A8.
[9]Additional results for alternative country groupings are available upon request.

We observe significant heterogeneity with respect to cohort-specific deviations from general patterns (cf. Tables A5, A6 and A13). The results show that EC exerted the strongest effect on the preference for social insurance in cohorts born before 1950. In contrast, cohorts of individuals born after 1960 reveal only weak evidence of EC strengthening a preference for income equality, and even negative effects on the preference for income redistribution. As for the preference for family insurance, we find that the effect is driven by changes among cohorts born between 1950 and 1969, entering young adulthood in the last (Reformist) stage of communism. These individuals were disillusioned with the performance of communist institutions and thus were more critical with the state propaganda aimed at Soviet indoctrination. Therefore, we observe the more pronounced effects in line with the *informality* hypothesis for these cohorts.

We find that our estimates on EC effects on the preference for social insurance are driven by urban areas, while the increase in the preference for family insurance is mainly explained by the variation rural areas (cf. Table A4). The latter reflects that the quality and presence of public services and institutions were less resourced in countryside than in more urbanized areas in Central and Eastern Europe, which in turn might explain the regional differences in the effect of EC on family support. Indeed, access to courts and willingness to voice complaints and rights protection was hampered by the individual skills needed for successful completion of such actions (Jegorow, 2003). These differences alongside the higher accessibility of key social services (e.g., nurseries and schools) in urban areas explain the regional diversity of positive EC effects on preferences for examined types of insurance.

Next, the analysis of EC effects in various country groups (cf. Tables A9 and A10) reveals substantial heterogeneity between countries exposed to Soviet communism,[9] which is not surprising taking into account various levels of support for income redistribution across all European countries (Olivera, 2015). Indeed, the general patterns observed for the whole sample of countries are similar to the results for Eastern compared with Western Germany, but the effect sizes differ depending on the choice of country sets. This indicates that infering the effects of Soviet communism only from one country might provide results with limited external validity.

Our analysis suggests that the institutional environment pre-existing on the Habsburg and Prussian lands before regime change to Soviet communism was important when evaluating the preference for social insurance, while EC made hardly any impact in areas already under Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th century. Our analysis (see Table A7) reveals that strengthening of the preference for social insurance due to EC is driven almost entirely by individuals living in the lands of former Prussia, that is, current Germany, Western Poland (Western Prussia), Western Lithuania, and lands formerly belonging to Eastern Prussia (North-Eastern Poland). Moreover, the positive effects of EC on the preference for social insurance are driven mainly by the predominantly protestant countries. Hence, the *indoctrination* effects of communism are predominantly present in protestant societies living on the lands of former Prussian empire.

In contrast to previous results, when we examine the effect of EC on the preference for family insurance, we find that the *informality* hypothesis is less evident in the former countries of the Habsburg empire. Indeed, EC effects are stronger in the former Russian empire, and often operate in the opposite direction than those in the former Prussian empire. That is, we find an increase in the preference for family insurance due to EC in predominantly orthodox or Greek Catholic countries, while we observe a decrease in Roman Catholic countries.

In sum, the significant differences between countries exposed to communism and the vast heterogeneity in historic and religious heritage allows us to place the results obtained previously for Eastern and Western Germany in a wider context.

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[9]Additional results for alternative country groupings are available upon request.

6 | THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

6.1 | Threats to identification

The dates of the beginning and the end of the communism period are critical for the identification of EC effects.[10] Therefore, we examined alternative operationalizations[11] of communism timelines and we document that the results remain intact, also after setting the end of the communism to a fixed year (either 1989 or 1991). We observe almost the same results for both preference for family and for social insurance regardless of the EC measure, which is reassuring with respect to the credibility of our main results.

Another pivotal source of heterogeneity allowing the identification of EC effects lies in the differential exposure to communism by cohort. Therefore, we examine cohort groups alternative to the year of birth. Specifically, we employ as a robustness check a 10- and 5-year cohort group—reflecting the 5-year span of economic central planning—and find negligible changes in EC effects between alternative cohort groupings. Moreover, we test alternative approaches to clustering over only the year of birth or only the country of birth, and we find negligible differences from the main approach relying on the variation over birth year and country.

In the main analysis, we removed migrants from the research sample in order to mitigate selective migration. However, the inclusion of migrants in the sample does not alter overall EC effects on the preference for family insurance and the preference for income redistribution.

Next, we examine whether the selection of countries unexposed to communism affects our estimates excluding the West of Germany. The effects including all other postcommunist countries juxtaposed with Western Germany are similar to the main results with entire sample of Western Europe, despite minor differences in their magnitude.

However, removing Western Germany from the sample significantly alters the results (cf. Table 4). Individuals exposed to communism do not differ fromindividuals unexposed to communism living in non-German postcommunist European countries with respect to the preference for income equality and income redistribution, but they are significantly more inclined to report a preference for family insurance with respect to care. This result strongly supports our findings on positive EC effects on the preference for family insurance with respect to care, in line with the *informality* hypothesis.

An additional analysis presented in Table A8 suggests that the reason for the crucial role of Western Germany in control group might be partially credited to the protestant confession, work ethics and attitudes towards wealth and money (Weber & Kalberg, 2013). Communism changed individuals in orthodox and catholic societies to a greater extent with respect to financial family support and income redistribution, presumably because the welfare state institutions of financial public benefits had been developed in the industrialized areas of Germany, unlike in the rest of Europe (Hennock, 2007; Mommsen, 2018). In Germany, both Christian and social democrats have traditionally supported welfare state, whereas in Russia prior to Soviet revolution, both monarchy and church were against it.[12] These might explain why Western Germany is crucial for our control group including noncommunist countries to find EC effects on the preference for income equality (redistribution) and for financial informal (family) insurance.

It is worth pointing out that communism collapse resulted in deep economic change, which brought about structural unemployment and recession. We conduct estimations controlling for the experience of recession, especially in formative years, as well as the occupation at the time of communism collapse (and, in addition, occupation interacted

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[10]Detailed results of the analyses discussed in this section can be found in Appendix A.4.

[11]Baseline EC measure uses the dates of the socialist constitution and first free democratic elections as the dates of entry to and exit from Soviet communism, respectively. Other EC measures use either fixed dates of entry (1945) or of exit (1990), or both the dates fixed. Another EC measure refers to the dates of the erection (1961) and the fall (1989) of the Berlin Wall as the entry and exit dates, respectively.

[12]The Orthodox Church in 19th century Russia supported monarchy and was under the authority of state officials (Jowitt, 1992).

TABLE 4 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) on the preference for family and social insurance (intensive margin) excluding *Western Germany* from the research sample.

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | |
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.1952***	(0.0333)	0.1988***	(0.0335)	0.1953***	(0.0331)	173389
Downwards care	0.1039***	(0.0339)	0.1039***	(0.0338)	0.1030***	(0.0338)	163430
Upwards money	0.0712	(0.0459)	0.0775*	(0.0465)	0.0762*	(0.0457)	160679
Downwards money	−0.0618	(0.0382)	−0.0581	(0.0376)	−0.0581	(0.0377)	170468
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	−0.1581	(0.1783)	−0.2391	(0.1835)	−0.2656	(0.1882)	62361
Income redistribution	0.1018***	(0.0364)	0.0542	(0.0357)	0.0560	(0.0360)	71349
Equality of opportunities	0.1386***	(0.0367)	0.1232***	(0.0364)	0.1204***	(0.0369)	69533
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Time FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: FE—fixed effects. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

with graduation year), as well as the age at communism collapse, to proxy both the risk of unemployment during the transitional period as well as the chances of having relatively high socio-economic status under communism. Controlling for these factors yields results consistent with the main analysis. Moreover, the significance of the extensive margin of the exposure to Soviet communism in our results points to the key role of the communism rather than transition to free market economies.

The fact that we document substantial EC effects using various start and end dates is reassuring for the communism impact rather than the impact of transition to market economics after communism collapsed.

Finally, in an attempt to examine whether the exposure to Soviet communism can be reduced to the exposure of any type of authoritarian regime that had been present in Europe, we use as the control group the countries with highest score in the current democracy index and the set of countries with authoritarian past. We find that exposure to nondemocratic regimes cannot explain our main results found for EC, that is, the exposure to Soviet communism.

6.2 | Robustness checks

The data on which we base our empirical analysis come from years preceded by the collapse of communism; therefore, the effects observed using numerous waves should also be present for a single wave, if EC poses a long-lasting impact. Thus, we use the first wave of GGS (composed of larger country set than the second) to find EC effects on the preference for family insurance similar to the main results. Most recent waves of WVS and ESS reveal still present positive EC effects on the preference for social insurance, especially on their intensive margins, indicating that the EC effects are indeed long lasting.

We examine the robustness of our results to alternative estimation techniques. In particular, probit and logit models with dichotomized dependent variables on the preference for family and for social insurance, which continue to support our main results. Furthermore, we employ random effects models in the estimations of the preference for family insurance for the panel subsample of GGS and find that all significant effects remain, and their magnitudes remain at a similar level.

Another relevant consideration is that omitted variables may bias main estimates; thus, we examine the bias resulting from the selection on unobservables referring to Oster (2019) coefficient stability test. We find that relative degree of bias resulting from the unobservables' impact on preference for family insurance in all specifications is negligible, with values of delta below 0.001 (c.f. Table A18). Although the values of delta parameters are larger in the case of estimations for the preference for social insurance, they are close to zero and not greater than 0.06.

In order to use more detailed data on household socio-economic status instead of crude measures of the ability to make ends meet or scale of incomes, we draw on multiple imputation techniques. We use household average monthly income per capita with imputations (in logs) for the GGS sample. The sign and significance of EC effects in this specification remain similar to main results. In additional checks, we control for the experience of war. Our results are robust to specifications controlling for these experiences, particularly during impressionable years, which are found to be relevant for the preferences in later life. In addition, we control for rural area, country democracy index, European marriage patterns, individual religiosity, and household size when such information is available, to find results reassuring our main findings.

Finally, it can be argued that if there have been ongoing changes in individual preferences for family insurance, the inclusion of a time trend might help to remove the bias in main estimations insensitive to such changes. We allow for separate time trends in the East and West of Europe in additional analyses. The EC effects, remain significant and positive regardless of the analysed time trends, which is not the case for other examined preferences. By allowing for separate time trends (either linear or quadratic) in postcommunist and other countries, we identify negligible EC effects on the preference for income equality and income redistribution. As expected, time trends specific to country of birth show that the main results for particular familiarism remain robust.

7 | CONCLUSION

Against the backdrop of communism weakening the family, we document robust evidence that EC increased the demand for informal family insurance. Although political regimes are argued to result from family structures (Todd, 1985), in this paper we document that exposure to a political regime: Soviet communism increased the strength of family supports (insurance), alongside other forms of insurance. More specifically we show evidence of an average increase in the preference for family support to care for older parents by 10 percentag ponts (pp) and by 4 pp with regards to care and support for pre-school and adult children. Such effects are robust to a series of identification threats, sample compositions and other robustness checks.

The results presented in this paper provide a new perspective to the previous evidence (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) of EC effects on the demand for insurance and the role of *indoctrination* to Marxist–Leninist values in formerly communist countries. Against the view of the previous litertaure, we find that the '*indoctrination*

hypothesis' explanation suggesting an increase in the demand for social insurance is weaker than the '*informality hypothesis*', predicting the increase in the preference for different forms of informal family insurance. Our findings document that EC increased *informality* or network effects within the family, and consistently with other studies, we find evidence that it eroded social, institutional and interpersonal trust (Aghion et al., 2010; Booth et al., 2018; Rainer & Siedler, 2009).

Taken together, this study shows that in an environment that outlaws significant wealth accumulation, informal family networks become an additional form of insurance to protect against care needs and financial adversity, consistent with seminal economic theory (Becker, 1981). We find that during Soviet communism times, family networks became instrumentally valuable as a source of connection and status, despite the state propaganda aimed at the abolition of the traditional family in line with Marxist–Leninist ideology. Absence of free markets, the rampant deterioration of generalized trust and trust in state institutions, and the subsequent progressive deterioration of the public services quality, all increased individuals preference for different forms of family supports consistently with the *informality* hypothesis.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The GGS, WVS, and ESS data can be found in https://www.ggp-i.org/data/online-codebook, https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp, and https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, respectively. The replication files with the code used to obtain the findings of this study are available in the supplementary materials of this article.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

TABLE A1 Descriptive statistics of the East and the West subsamples.

	East				West			
	Mean	Std dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std dev.	Min	Max
GGS survey sample								
Age	47.02	(16.65)	17	85	46.00	(15.39)	17	89
Household size	3.30	(2.18)	1	16	2.71	(1.31)	1	14
Number of children	1.75	(1.80)	0	19	1.44	(1.36)	0	12
Female	0.56	(0.50)	0	1	0.55	(0.50)	0	1
Education								
ISCED 0	0.01	(0.09)	0	1	0.01	(0.08)	0	1
ISCED 1	0.07	(0.26)	0	1	0.06	(0.24)	0	1
ISCED 2	0.14	(0.35)	0	1	0.16	(0.36)	0	1
ISCED 3	0.42	(0.49)	0	1	0.34	(0.47)	0	1
ISCED 4	0.13	(0.33)	0	1	0.03	(0.18)	0	1
ISCED 5	0.21	(0.40)	0	1	0.17	(0.38)	0	1
ISCED 6	0.02	(0.15)	0	1	0.01	(0.10)	0	1
Unknown	0.01	(0.08)	0	1	0.22	(0.42)	0	1
N	145,602				75,724			
WVS survey sample								
Age	45.12	(17.12)	16	99	46.98	(17.42)	15	94
Household size	3.08	(1.14)	1	5				
Number of children	1.53	(1.26)	0	8	1.51	(1.33)	0	8
Female	53.62	(0.50)	0	1	0.52	(0.50)	0	1
Education								
Incomplete primary	0.04	(0.20)	0	1	0.03	(0.18)	0	1
Primary	0.11	(0.31)	0	1	0.18	(0.38)	0	1
Incomplete secondary: technical	0.05	(0.23)	0	1	0.09	(0.29)	0	1
Complete secondary: technical	0.22	(0.42)	0	1	0.16	(0.37)	0	1
Incomplete secondary: general	0.05	(0.22)	0	1	0.09	(0.28)	0	1
Complete secondary: general	0.15	(0.036)	0	1	0.13	(0.33)	0	1
Incomplete higher	0.04	(0.20)	0	1	0.11	(0.032)	0	1
Complete higher	0.15	(0.36)	0	1	0.20	(0.40)	0	1
Unknown	0.17	(0.38)	0	1	0.01	(0.11)	0	1
N	57,071				12,872			
EES survey sample								
Age	47.74	(18.34)	16	100	48.58	(18.52)	16	100
Household size	2.78	(1.44)	1	15	2.62	(1.35)	1	22
Female	0.56	(0.50)	0	1	0.52	(0.50)	0	1
Education								
ISCED 0-1	0.04	(0.19)	0	1	0.11	(0.31)	0	1

TABLE A1 (Continued)

	East				West			
	Mean	Std dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std dev.	Min	Max
ISCED 2	0.17	(0.38)	0	1	0.13	(0.34)	0	1
ISCED 3a	0.16	(0.36)	0	1	0.15	(0.35)	0	1
ISCED 3b	0.27	(0.44)	0	1	0.11	(0.32)	0	1
ISCED 4	0.11	(0.32)	0	1	0.08	(0.28)	0	1
ISCED 5a	0.05	(0.23)	0	1	0.08	(0.27)	0	1
ISCED 5b	0.12	(0.32)	0	1	0.08	(0.26)	0	1
Unknown	0.07	(0.27)	0	1	0.25	(0.44)	0	1
N		97,886				215,753		

Note: Household size unobserved in WVS for the West. Number of children observed up to eighth child in WVS, only coresiding children are observed in ESS. All variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the *t* test significant at 1% level.
Source: Authors' own tabulation on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

FIGURE A1 Distribution of responses to questions on the preference for family insurance in the East and the West. *Source*: Authors' own calculations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). *Note*: Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties' [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

FIGURE A2 Distribution of responses to questions on preference for social insurance in the East and the West. *Source:* Authors' own calculations based on WVS waves 2– 5 (release 2015_04_18) and ESS waves 1–8. All variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the *t* test significant at 1% level. *Note:* Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities' [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

TABLE A2 Trust, civic participation, religiosity, and traditional gender roles in the East and the West.

	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
Trust								
Generalized trust (GGS)	0.38	(0.48)	0	1	0.63	(0.48)	0	1
Generalized trust (WVS)	0.27	(0.45)	0	1	0.53	(0.50)	0	1
Generalized trust (EES)	4.35	(2.51)	0	10	5.34	(2.36)	0	10
People being helpful (ESS)	4.19	(2.42)	0	10	5.17	(2.34)	0	10
Confidence in press (WVS)	2.32	(0.78)	1	4	2.23	(0.68)	1	4
Confidence in political parties (WVS)	1.94	(0.78)	1	4	2.09	(0.66)	1	4
Confidence in police (WVS)	2.37	(0.87)	1	4	2.88	(0.68)	1	4
Confidence in labour unions (WVS)	2.20	(0.84)	1	4	2.39	(0.74)	1	4
Confidence in justice system (WVS)	2.38	(0.86)	1	4	2.68	(0.76)	1	4
Trust in parliament (ESS)	3.37	(2.52)	0	10	4.77	(2.48)	0	10
Trust in politicians (ESS)	2.80	(2.31)	0	10	3.82	(2.35)	0	10
Trust in police (ESS)	4.68	(2.26)	0	10	6.46	(2.33)	0	10
Trust in legal system (ESS)	3.93	(2.65)	0	10	5.52	(2.53)	0	10
Civic participation								
Interest in politics (ESS)	2.22	(0.85)	1	4	2.45	(0.91)	1	4
Discussing politics (WVS)	2.07	(0.65)	1	3	1.93	(0.59)	1	3
Political actions (WVS)	0.06	(0.24)	0	1	0.18	(0.39)	0	1
Active organization membership (WVS)	0.15	(0.36)	0	1	0.50	(0.50)	0	1
Passive organization membership (WVS)	0.30	(0.46)	0	1	0.61	(0.49)	0	1
Ever trade union membership (ESS)	0.45	(0.50)	0	1	0.42	(0.49)	0	1
Current trade union membership (ESS)	0.08	(0.27)	0	1	0.23	(0.42)		
Religiosity								
Church answers social problems (WVS)	0.37	(0.48)	0	1	0.27	(0.45)	0	1
Church answers family problems (WVS)	0.51	(0.50)	0	1	0.32	(0.46)	0	1
Frequency of praying (WVS)	4.10	(2.61)	1	8	2.97	(2.47)	1	8
Frequency of praying (ESS)	3.29	(2.36)	1	7	3.32	(2.44)	1	7
Importance of religion (WVS)	2.57	(1.08)	1	4	2.21	(1.00)	1	4
Importance of God (WVS)	6.18	(3.27)	1	10	4.81	(3.21)	1	10
Religiosity (ESS)	2.72	(1.51)	1	7	2.50	(1.51)	1	7
Religiosity (GGS)	1.69	(1.49)	0	4	1.41	(1.47)	0	4
Traditional gender roles								
Financial independence (GGS)	2.63	(1.09)	1	5	2.17	(1.20)	1	5
Working women (GGS)	3.08	(1.23)	1	5	3.85	(1.22)	1	5
Working mothers (GGS)	2.39	(1.06)	1	5	3.05	(1.27)	1	5
Marriage (GGS)	2.35	(0.92)	1	5	-	-	-	-
Motherhood (GGS)	2.04	(1.00)	1	5	3.17	(1.34)	1	5
Parenting after divorce (GGS)	2.36	(0.96)	1	5	3.14	(1.06)	1	5
Importance of tradition (ESS)	4.49	(1.26)	1	6	4.19	(1.38)	1	6

(Continues)

TABLE A2 (Continued)

	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
Importance of family (WVS)	3.85	(0.43)	1	4	3.83	(0.46)	1	4
Family trust (WVS)	4.18	(1.40)	1	5	-	-	-	-

Note: Trust: generalized trust—'generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' with the answer 'most people can be trusted' opposed to 'need to be very careful'; people being helpful—'people mostly try to be helpful' or 'people mostly look out for themselves'; confidence—how much confidence respondents have in press, political parties, police, labour unions, and justice system measured on five point scale; trust—how much respondents trust in parliament, politicians, police, and legal system, measured on 11-point scale ('no trust at all' ... 'complete trust'). Civic participation: interest in politics—'how interested in politics'; discussing politics—'discussing political matters with friends'; political actions—dummy generated using responses to questions on undertaking various political actions; active (passive) organization membership—dummy using data on membership in up to ten civil society organizations, excluding religious ones; current (ever) trade union membership—'membership of trade union or similar organization' currently (currently or previously). Religiosity: church answers social (family) problems—whether 'your church is giving, in your country, adequate answers' to the 'social problems facing our country today' ('the problems of family life'); frequency of praying—praying 'outside of religious services' in ESS ranging from 'never' to 'every day' and in WVS from 'never or practically never' to 'several times a day'; importance of religion (God; family)—'how important in life is religion (God; family)' on four point scale ('not at all important ... 'very important'); religiosity—'attending religious services apart from special occasions' in GGS recoded to the scale 0 = *never*, 1 = *less than once every 3 months*, 2 = *one to three times every 3 months*, 3 = *one to three times every month*, 4 = *at least once a week*, and in ESS ranging from *every day* to *never* at a 7-point scale. We use questions to what extent individuals disagree with statements presenting traditional gender roles: financial independence—women should be financially independent from their husbands; working women—men have more right to job than women, if jobs are scarce; working mother—pre-school children suffer when their mothers work; marriage—women should try to marry and have a child; motherhood—a women without children is fulfilled; parenting after divorce—children should stay with mother rather than father after divorce; importance of tradition—'important to follow traditions and customs'. Family trust based on question 'how much do you trust your family' ('do not trust them at all' ... 'trust them completely'). All comparable variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the *t* test significant at 1% level.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

APPENDIX B: HETEROGENEITY

FIGURE A3   Effects of EC for men and women on preference for family insurance concerning *money Source:* Authors' own estimations Figures A3 A5 based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). *Note:* Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, controlling for scale of incomes, age (quadratic), gender, education, country, as well as time and cohort fixed effects. Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Preference for family insurance: upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (adult children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. *** *p* < .01, ** *p* < .05. * *p* < .1. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

TABLE A3 Effects of EC for men and women.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
Men	−0.1532***	(0.0120)	−0.1518***	(0.0121)	−0.1505***	(0.0121)	182330
Women	0.1694***	(0.0113)	0.1703***	(0.0113)	0.1688***	(0.0113)	182330
Downwards care							
Men	−0.0950***	(0.0122)	−0.0955***	(0.0122)	−0.0986***	(0.0121)	172337
Women	0.1039***	(0.0157)	0.1039***	(0.0120)	0.1078***	(0.0119)	172337
Upwards money							
Men	−0.1296***	(0.0135)	−0.1254***	(0.0135)	−0.1219***	(0.0135)	169582
Women	0.1213***	(0.0135)	0.1218***	(0.0134)	0.1178***	(0.0135)	169582
Downwards money							
Men	−0.1177***	(0.0110)	−0.1160***	(0.0110)	−0.1185***	(0.0110)	179393
Women	0.1220***	(0.0109)	0.1226***	(0.0108)	0.1259***	(0.0108)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
Men	0.1965***	(0.0489)	0.1607***	(0.0476)	0.1632***	(0.0483)	56017
Women	0.1685***	(0.0484)	0.1393***	(0.0471)	0.1579***	(0.0483)	56017
Income redistribution							
Men	0.0714***	(0.0174)	0.0606***	(0.0172)	0.0434**	(0.0171)	74421
Women	−0.0335**	(0.0170)	−0.0352**	(0.0168)	−0.0158	(0.0167)	74421
Equality of opportunities							
Men	0.0393**	(0.0182)	0.0352*	(0.0182)	0.0406**	(0.0182)	72642
Women	0.0007	(0.0178)	0.0005	(0.0178)	−0.0050	(0.0179)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A4 Effects of EC in urban and rural areas.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
Rural	−0.0073	(0.0146)	−0.0097	(0.0148)	−0.0091	(0.0148)	120977
Urban	0.0500***	(0.0172)	0.0572***	(0.0172)	0.0568***	(0.0172)	120977
Downwards care							
Rural	−0.0041	(0.0166)	−0.0042	(0.0166)	0.0063	(0.0164)	124376
Urban	0.0269	(0.0207)	0.0265	(0.0218)	0.0132	(0.0217)	124376
Upwards money							
Rural	−0.0352**	(0.0157)	−0.0384**	(0.0157)	−0.0445***	(0.0157)	113784
Urban	0.0447**	(0.0207)	0.0579***	(0.0205)	0.0665***	(0.0205)	113784
Downwards money							
Rural	−0.0152	(0.0125)	−0.0172	(0.0127)	−0.0110	(0.0127)	131414
Urban	0.0436***	(0.0140)	0.0494***	(0.0141)	0.0426***	(0.0141)	131414
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
Rural	0.2410***	(0.0557)	0.2090***	(0.0543)	0.2484***	(0.0550)	46019
Urban	0.3740***	(0.0767)	0.2885***	(0.0753)	0.2799***	(0.0751)	46019
Income redistribution							
Rural	−0.0533***	(0.0175)	−0.0661***	(0.0173)	−0.0497***	(0.0171)	74326
Urban	0.1015***	(0.0179)	0.1012***	(0.0177)	0.0857***	(0.0176)	74326
Equality of opportunities							
Rural	−0.0117	(0.0186)	−0.0161	(0.0186)	−0.0190	(0.0187)	72557
Urban	0.0575***	(0.0195)	0.0573***	(0.0194)	0.0605***	(0.0194)	72557
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***p < .01, **p < .05, and *p < .1.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

**FIGURE A4** Effects of EC in rural and urban areas on the preference for family insurance concerning money *Source:* Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). *Note:* Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, controlling for scale of incomes, age (quadratic), gender, education, country, as well as time and cohort fixed effects. Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Preference for family insurance: upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, *$p < .1$. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

TABLE A5 Effects of EC in different cohorts on preference for family insurance.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Upwards care							
1990–99	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	182330
1980–89	−0.1134***	(0.0146)	−0.1182***	(0.0147)	−0.1164***	(0.0146)	182330
1970–79	−0.0299***	(0.0084)	−0.0322***	(0.0085)	−0.0334***	(0.0084)	182330
1960–69	0.0244***	(0.0072)	0.0250***	(0.0072)	0.0244***	(0.0072)	182330
1950–59	0.0317***	(0.0083)	0.0329***	(0.0083)	0.0334***	(0.0083)	182330
1940–49	0.0481***	(0.0075)	0.0489***	(0.0076)	0.0497***	(0.0075)	182330
1930–39	0.0037	(0.0109)	0.0083	(0.0108)	0.0074	(0.0108)	182330
1920–29	−0.0479**	(0.0214)	−0.0452**	(0.0212)	−0.0473**	(0.0209)	182330
1910–19	0.6886***	(0.0161)	0.7007***	(0.0164)	0.7053***	(0.0171)	182330
Downwards care							
1990–99	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	172337
1980–89	0.0802***	(0.0174)	0.0807***	(0.0173)	0.0800***	(0.0167)	172337
1970–79	−0.0003	(0.0098)	−0.0001	(0.0098)	0.0048	(0.0097)	172337
1960–69	−0.0287***	(0.0107)	−0.0288***	(0.0107)	−0.0285***	(0.0107)	172337
1950–59	0.0236**	(0.0101)	0.0236**	(0.0101)	0.0227**	(0.0100)	172337
1940–49	0.0685***	(0.0125)	0.0684***	(0.0125)	0.0673***	(0.0125)	172337
1930–39	−0.0843***	(0.0201)	−0.0849***	(0.0202)	−0.0879***	(0.0203)	172337
1920–29	−0.2525***	(0.0266)	−0.2529***	(0.0267)	−0.2506***	(0.0268)	172337
1910–19	0.6505***	(0.0252)	0.6468***	(0.0253)	0.6923***	(0.0258)	172337
Upwards money							
1990–99	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	169582
1980–89	−0.0891***	(0.0172)	−0.0964***	(0.0174)	−0.0926***	(0.0168)	169582
1970–79	−0.0329***	(0.0091)	−0.0363***	(0.0093)	−0.0407***	(0.0090)	169582
1960–69	0.0200***	(0.0072)	0.0211***	(0.0072)	0.0204***	(0.0072)	169582
1950–59	0.0329***	(0.0082)	0.0348***	(0.0082)	0.0361***	(0.0082)	169582
1940–49	0.0261***	(0.0078)	0.0273***	(0.0079)	0.0295***	(0.0078)	169582
1930–39	−0.0024	(0.0105)	0.0047	(0.0105)	0.0037	(0.0103)	169582
1920–29	−0.0348*	(0.0178)	−0.0306*	(0.0178)	−0.0347**	(0.0174)	169582
1910–19	−0.0615***	(0.0160)	−0.0501***	(0.0163)	−0.0570***	(0.0171)	169582
Downwards money							
1999–99	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	0.0000	(0.0000)	179393
1989–89	0.0966***	(0.0191)	0.0923***	(0.0190)	0.0923	(0.0183)	179393
1979–79	−0.0380***	(0.0109)	−0.0398***	(0.0108)	−0.0361	(0.0107)	179393
1969–69	−0.0000	(0.0096)	0.0004	(0.0096)	0.0006	(0.0096)	179393
1959–59	0.0460***	(0.0095)	0.0470***	(0.0095)	0.0461	(0.0094)	179393
1949–49	0.0359***	(0.0115)	0.0371***	(0.0114)	0.0361	(0.0113)	179393
1939–39	−0.0918***	(0.0178)	−0.0878***	(0.0177)	−0.0897	(0.0177)	179393
1929–29	−0.1985***	(0.0262)	−0.1962***	(0.0260)	−0.1944	(0.0259)	179393

(Continues)

TABLE A5 (Continued)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Dependent variable							
1919–19	0.8628***	(0.0258)	0.8632***	(0.0255)	0.8991	(0.0255)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

TABLE A6 Effects of EC in different cohorts on preference for social insurance.

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Dependent variable							
Income equality							
1990–99	0.2245**	(0.1088)	0.1970*	(0.1197)	0.1583	(0.1251)	65163
1980–89	0.0223	(0.0648)	0.0392	(0.0644)	0.0427	(0.0642)	65163
1970–79	−0.0458	(0.0440)	−0.0159	(0.0427)	−0.0167	(0.0425)	65163
1960–69	−0.0340	(0.0397)	−0.0424	(0.0380)	−0.0433	(0.0378)	65163
1950–59	−0.0446	(0.0366)	−0.0623*	(0.0362)	−0.0539	(0.0368)	65163
1940–49	0.1230***	(0.0426)	0.1220***	(0.0421)	0.1318***	(0.0421)	65163
1930–39	0.1246***	(0.0478)	0.0954**	(0.0467)	0.0974**	(0.0463)	65163
1920–29	0.2054***	(0.0629)	0.1549**	(0.0625)	0.1430**	(0.0613)	65163
1910–19	0.1591	(0.1431)	0.1397	(0.1388)	0.1748	(0.1372)	65163
1900–09	0.6465	(0.5290)	0.7615	(0.5360)	0.7978	(0.5402)	65163
Income redistribution							
1990–99	−0.2018**	(0.0892)	−0.2049**	(0.0888)	−0.2052**	(0.0900)	71730
1980–89	−0.0817***	(0.0249)	−0.0650***	(0.0247)	−0.0768***	(0.0245)	71730
1970–79	−0.0727***	(0.0243)	−0.0740***	(0.0242)	−0.0800***	(0.0239)	71730
1960–69	0.0299	(0.0270)	0.0158	(0.0266)	0.0196	(0.0259)	71730
1950–59	0.0515*	(0.0286)	0.0381	(0.0279)	0.0456*	(0.0276)	71730
1940–49	0.1544***	(0.0263)	0.1401***	(0.0260)	0.1444***	(0.0263)	71730
1930–39	0.2261***	(0.0312)	0.2321***	(0.0302)	0.2292***	(0.0308)	71730
1920–29	0.2394***	(0.0507)	0.2413***	(0.0485)	0.2354***	(0.0479)	71730
1910–19	0.2494**	(0.1272)	0.2731**	(0.1281)	0.2588**	(0.1275)	71730

TABLE A6 (Continued)

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Equality of opportunities							
1990–99	−0.1091	(0.0849)	−0.1113	(0.0847)	−0.1165	(0.0845)	69904
1980–89	−0.0356	(0.0225)	−0.0309	(0.0226)	−0.0286	(0.0227)	69904
1970–79	−0.0285	(0.0248)	−0.0302	(0.0248)	−0.0269	(0.0249)	69904
1960–69	−0.0193	(0.0243)	−0.0239	(0.0243)	−0.0227	(0.0245)	69904
1950–59	−0.0224	(0.0232)	−0.0258	(0.0231)	−0.0262	(0.0231)	69904
1940–49	0.0776***	(0.0246)	0.0727***	(0.0246)	0.0702***	(0.0247)	69904
1930–39	0.1229***	(0.0334)	0.1250***	(0.0334)	0.1235***	(0.0336)	69904
1920–29	0.1426***	(0.0522)	0.1465***	(0.0521)	0.1474***	(0.0522)	69904
1910–19	0.3170**	(0.1438)	0.3343**	(0.1451)	0.3334**	(0.1463)	69904
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A7 Effects of EC in the lands of former Russian, Prussian, and Habsburg empires.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
Russian empire	0.0449***	(0.0139)	0.0422***	(0.0140)	0.0407***	(0.0140)	181377
Prussian empire	0.0058	(0.0090)	0.0083	(0.0092)	0.0080	(0.0091)	181377
Habsburg empire	−0.0361***	(0.0112)	−0.0341***	(0.0112)	−0.0336***	(0.0112)	181377
Downwards care							
Russian empire	0.0630***	(0.0160)	0.0635***	(0.0159)	0.0684***	(0.0158)	171385
Prussian empire	−0.0468***	(0.0119)	−0.0471***	(0.0119)	−0.0454***	(0.0119)	171385
Habsburg empire	−0.0124	(0.0160)	−0.0126	(0.0160)	−0.0152	(0.0159)	171385

TABLE A7 (Continued)

| Dependent variable | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | |
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Upwards money							
Russian empire	0.1218***	(0.0153)	0.1175***	(0.0153)	0.1120***	(0.0154)	168629
Prussian empire	−0.0363***	(0.0100)	−0.0322***	(0.0099)	−0.0324***	(0.0099)	168629
Habsburg empire	−0.0784***	(0.0132)	−0.0752***	(0.0133)	−0.0728***	(0.0131)	168629
Downwards money							
Russian empire	0.0686***	(0.0158)	0.0667***	(0.0158)	0.0698***	(0.0156)	178440
Prussian empire	−0.0228*	(0.0130)	−0.0204	(0.0132)	−0.0185***	(0.0131)	178440
Habsburg empire	−0.0331**	(0.0153)	−0.0319**	(0.0153)	−0.0335***	(0.0152)	178440
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
Russian empire	0.1470	(0.1063)	0.1194	(0.1138)	0.1465	(0.1139)	65114
Prussian empire	0.6414***	(0.0611)	0.5710***	(0.0601)	0.5987***	(0.0603)	65114
Habsburg empire	0.1133	(0.1758)	0.1383	(0.1805)	0.1613	(0.1901)	65163
Income redistribution							
Russian empire	0.0438	(0.0368)	−0.0065	(0.0370)	0.0480	(0.0382)	72405
Prussian empire	0.3601***	(0.0293)	0.3085***	(0.0303)	0.3094***	(0.0301)	72405
Habsburg empire	0.1316**	(0.0644)	0.0739	(0.0644)	0.0987	(0.0711)	72405
Equality of opportunities							
Russian empire	−0.0656*	(0.0372)	−0.0832**	(0.0372)	−0.0903**	(0.0374)	70652
Prussian empire	0.0589**	(0.0275)	0.0396	(0.0277)	0.0457	(0.0278)	70652
Habsburg empire	0.1441***	(0.0545)	0.1233**	(0.0548)	0.1241**	(0.0555)	70652
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Russian empire: Russia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, mazowieckie, podlaskie, świetokrzyskie vojevodships in Poland (lubelskie, warszawskie, białostockie, bielskie, chełmskie, częstochowskie, kieleckie, konińskie, łomżyłskie, ostrołeckie, piotrkowskie, płockie, radomskie, siedleckie, sieradzkie, skierniewickie, suwalskie, włocławskie, zamojskie). Prussian empire: Germany and dolnoślaskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, opolskie, pomorskie, ślaskie, wielkopolskie, zachodnipopomorskie and lubuskie voievodships in Poland (bydgoskie, elblaskie, gdańskie, gorzowskie, jeleniogórskie, koszalińskie, legnickie, leszczyńskie, olsztyńskie, pilskie, poznańskie, słupskie, toruńskie, wrocławskie, zieleniogórskie). Habsburg empire: Czech Republic, Hungary, Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramureş in Romania (Bihor, Bistriţa-Năsăud, Caraş-Severin, Cluj, Covasna, Harghita, Hunedoara, Iaşi, Maramureş, Mureş, Neamţ, Sălaj, Vrancea), małopolskie and podkarpackie voievodships in Poland (bialskopodlaskie, krakowskie, krośniełskie, nowosadeckie, przemyskie, rzeszowskie, tarnowskie, NUTS-2 regions). Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of

opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A8 Effects of EC by predominant confession.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
Orthodox and Greek Catholic	0.2607***	(0.0247)	0.2814***	(0.0246)	0.2764***	(0.0248)	182330
Roman Catholic	0.0055	(0.0254)	0.0054	(0.0262)	−0.0063	(0.0266)	182330
Protestant	0.0492***	(0.0173)	0.0611***	(0.0176)	0.0610***	(0.0175)	182330
Downwards care							
Orthodox and Greek Catholic	0.4631***	(0.0258)	0.4604***	(0.0259)	0.4735***	(0.0257)	172337
Roman Catholic	−0.1106***	(0.0329)	−0.1105***	(0.0329)	−0.0868***	(0.0319)	172337
Protestant	0.0311	(0.0217)	0.0298	(0.0217)	0.0352	(0.0217)	172337
Upwards money							
Orthodox and Greek Catholic	0.4551***	(0.0235)	0.4875***	(0.0236)	0.4747***	(0.0238)	169582
Roman Catholic	−0.0197	(0.0291)	−0.0202	(0.0291)	−0.0452*	(0.0274)	169582
Protestant	−0.0671***	(0.0194)	−0.0478**	(0.0196)	−0.0492**	(0.0195)	169582
Downwards money							
Orthodox and Greek Catholic	0.3739***	(0.0248)	0.3911***	(0.0248)	0.3973***	(0.0247)	179393
Roman Catholic	−0.2011***	(0.0318)	−0.2004***	(0.0318)	−0.1834***	(0.0340)	179393
Protestant	0.0621***	(0.0210)	0.0742***	(0.0212)	0.0793***	(0.0213)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
Orthodox and Greek Catholic	−0.0884	(0.1408)	−0.1784	(0.1542)	−0.1382	(0.1518)	65163
Roman Catholic	−0.0766	(0.2578)	−0.0980	(0.2842)	0.0385	(0.2890)	65163
Protestant	0.7544***	(0.0668)	0.6397***	(0.0666)	0.6835***	(0.0664)	65163
Income redistribution							
Orthodox and Greek Catholic	0.0014	(0.0624)	0.0108	(0.0627)	0.0957	(0.0653)	74421
Roman Catholic	0.1151***	(0.0397)	0.0660*	(0.0386)	0.0890**	(0.0414)	74421
Protestant	0.4339***	(0.0363)	0.4093***	(0.0356)	0.4036***	(0.0352)	74421

(Continues)

TABLE A8 (Continued)

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Equality of opportunities							
Orthodox and Greek Catholic	−0.1300**	(0.0642)	−0.1238*	(0.0647)	−0.1393**	(0.0649)	72642
Roman Catholic	0.1325***	(0.0357)	0.1156***	(0.0357)	0.1154***	(0.0362)	72642
Protestant	0.0509	(0.0397)	0.0421	(0.0395)	0.0466	(0.0393)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A9 Effects of EC in selected country groups on preference for family insurance.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Upwards care							
Russia	0.1799***	(0.0093)	0.1777***	(0.0094)	0.1743***	(0.0097)	182330
Germany	0.0492***	(0.0173)	0.0611***	(0.0176)	0.0610***	(0.0175)	182330
Poland	0.0055	(0.0254)	0.0054	(0.0262)	−0.0063	(0.0266)	182330
Baltics	−0.2114***	(0.0296)	−0.2292***	(0.0296)	−0.2260***	(0.0296)	182330
Uprisings	0.0492***	(0.0173)	0.0611***	(0.0176)	0.0610***	(0.0175)	182330
Downwards care							
Russia	−0.0253**	(0.0125)	−0.0258**	(0.0124)	−0.0018	(0.0133)	172337
Germany	0.0311	(0.0217)	0.0298	(0.0217)	0.0352	(0.0217)	172337
Poland	−0.1106***	(0.0329)	−0.1105***	(0.0329)	−0.0868***	(0.0319)	172337
Baltics	−0.4331***	(0.0281)	−0.4309***	(0.0281)	−0.4361***	(0.0282)	172337
Uprisings	0.0311	(0.0217)	0.0298	(0.0217)	0.0352	(0.0217)	172337

TABLE A9 (Continued)

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Upwards money							
Russia	0.0770***	(0.0092)	0.0734***	(0.0093)	0.0520***	(0.0095)	169582
Germany	−0.0671***	(0.0194)	−0.0478**	(0.0196)	−0.0492**	(0.0195)	169582
Poland	−0.0197	(0.0291)	−0.0202	(0.0291)	−0.0452*	(0.0274)	169582
Baltics	−0.3817***	(0.0385)	−0.4085***	(0.0385)	−0.4121***	(0.0387)	169582
Uprisings	−0.0671***	(0.0194)	−0.0478**	(0.0196)	−0.0492**	(0.0195)	169582
Downwards money							
Russia	−0.0221	(0.0137)	−0.0246*	(0.0136)	−0.0113	(0.0140)	179393
Germany	0.0621***	(0.0210)	0.0742***	(0.0212)	0.0793	(0.0213)	179393
Poland	−0.2011***	(0.0318)	−0.2004***	(0.0318)	−0.1834	(0.0340)	179393
Baltics	−0.3919***	(0.0256)	−0.4066***	(0.0255)	−0.4149	(0.0254)	179393
Uprisings	0.0621***	(0.0210)	0.0742***	(0.0212)	0.0793	(0.0213)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Baltics: Estonia and Lithuania. Uprisings in: Czech Republic (1968), Germany (1953), and Hungary (1956). Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

TABLE A10 Effects of EC in selected country groups on preference for social insurance.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Income equality							
Russia	−0.6032***	(0.1239)	−0.3420***	(0.1239)	−0.2755**	(0.1224)	65163
Germany	0.7544***	(0.0668)	0.6397***	(0.0666)	0.6835***	(0.0664)	65163
Poland	−0.3713*	(0.1909)	−0.4418**	(0.1938)	−0.3203*	(0.1853)	65163
Baltics	0.1732	(0.2955)	0.0628	(0.3591)	0.1800	(0.3421)	65163
USSR	−0.4788**	(0.2363)	−0.5735**	(0.2762)	−0.4898*	(0.2865)	65163
Uprisings	0.7581***	(0.0657)	0.6480***	(0.0659)	0.6949***	(0.0660)	65163

(Continues)

TABLE A10 (Continued)

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Income redistribution							
Russia	−0.0296	(0.1054)	−0.0284	(0.1058)	0.0753	(0.1026)	74421
Germany	0.4339***	(0.0363)	0.4093***	(0.0356)	0.4036***	(0.0352)	74421
Poland	0.2409***	(0.0529)	0.1626***	(0.0535)	0.1583***	(0.0529)	74421
Baltics	−0.0244	(0.0436)	−0.0149	(0.0438)	0.0407	(0.0512)	74421
USSR	−0.0504	(0.0513)	−0.0469	(0.0513)	0.0214	(0.0553)	74421
Uprisings	0.3461***	(0.0358)	0.3117***	(0.0360)	0.3156***	(0.0365)	74421
Equality of opportunities							
Russia	−0.2268**	(0.0919)	−0.2257**	(0.0920)	−0.2455***	(0.0914)	72642
Germany	0.0509	(0.0397)	0.0421	(0.0395)	0.0466	(0.0393)	72642
Poland	0.1951***	(0.0652)	0.1681**	(0.0655)	0.1699**	(0.0667)	72642
Baltics	−0.0070	(0.0464)	−0.0008	(0.0463)	−0.0080	(0.0464)	72642
USSR	−0.0734	(0.0517)	−0.0717	(0.0518)	−0.0819	(0.0522)	72642
Uprisings	0.0792**	(0.0326)	0.0668**	(0.0325)	0.0701**	(0.0325)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Baltics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Uprisings in: Czech Republic (1968), Germany (1953), Slovakia (1968) and Hungary (1956). Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18) and ESS waves 1–8.

APPENDIX C: MECHANISMS

FIGURE A5 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on the beliefs about people being helpful and fair
Source: Authors' own estimations based on ESS waves 1–8. *Note*: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, controlling for scale of incomes, age (quadratic), gender, education, country, as well as time and cohort fixed effects. Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. People are helpful—'people mostly try to be helpful' or 'people mostly look out for themselves'. People are fair—'most people would try to be fair' or 'most people would try to take advantage of me'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$. *$p < .1$. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

TABLE A11 Average effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on civic participation and democratic values.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Civic participation							
Interest in politics (ESS)	0.0470**	(0.0225)	0.0697***	(0.0227)	0.0370*	(0.0208)	75696
Discussing politics (WVS)	−0.0116	(0.0273)	−0.0226	(0.0276)	0.0097	(0.0266)	32432
Political actions (WVS)	−0.0083	(0.0090)	−0.0048	(0.0090)	−0.0070	(0.0092)	64679
Active membership (WVS)	−0.1227***	(0.0114)	−0.1112***	(0.0118)	−0.1190***	(0.0117)	59360
Passive membership (WVS)	−0.1665***	(0.0125)	−0.1563***	(0.0125)	−0.1620***	(0.0125)	59368
Current trade union membership (ESS)	−0.0511***	(0.0082)	−0.0413***	(0.0081)	−0.0433***	(0.0081)	75861
Ever trade union membership (ESS)	0.1915***	(0.0179)	0.1960***	(0.0178)	0.1830***	(0.0178)	75861
Democratic values							
Democracy (WVS)	−0.3448***	(0.0551)	−0.3062***	(0.0546)	−0.3401***	(0.0532)	33522
Taxation in democracy (WVS)	0.1344*	(0.0749)	0.0719	(0.0761)	0.0684	(0.0766)	31559
Incomes in democracy (WVS)	0.7500***	(0.1397)	0.6640***	(0.1396)	0.6549***	(0.1407)	14950
Rules in democracy (WVS)	0.5372***	(0.0994)	0.5286***	(0.0981)	0.5268***	(0.0938)	14857
Women rights in democracy (WVS)	0.1931***	(0.0586)	0.1968***	(0.0590)	0.1716***	(0.0576)	32441
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: scale of incomes. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Civic participation: interest in politics—'how interested in politics'; discussing politics—'discussing political matters with friends'; political actions—dummy generated using responses to questions on undertaking various political actions; active (passive) membership—dummy using data on membership in up to ten civil society organizations, excluding religious ones; current (ever) trade union membership—'membership of trade union or similar organization' currently (currently or previously). Democratic values: democracy—importance of democracy, taxation in democracy—taxes on the rich subsidizing the poor essential to democracy; incomes in democracy—state making incomes equal essential to democracy, rules in democracy—obeying the rules essential to democracy; women rights in democracy—women having the same rights as men essential to democracy. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

**TABLE A12** Average effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on religiosity and traditional family and gender roles.

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | |
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Dependent variable							
Religiosity							
Social problems (WVS)	−0.0413*	(0.0211)	−0.0394*	(0.0213)	−0.0355*	(0.0215)	15329
Family problems (WVS)	−0.0677***	(0.0251)	−0.0691***	(0.0252)	−0.0644**	(0.0256)	15777
Frequency of praying (WVS)	−0.8876***	(0.1083)	−0.8969***	(0.1083)	−0.8796***	(0.1078)	15456
Frequency of praying (ESS)	−0.9069***	(0.0721)	−0.9264***	(0.0713)	−0.8917***	(0.0721)	74475
Importance of religion (WVS)	−0.5349***	(0.0291)	−0.5438***	(0.0290)	−0.5365***	(0.0289)	65502
Importance of God (WVS)	−2.1951***	(0.1004)	−2.2297***	(0.1003)	−2.2075***	(0.0997)	62759
Religiosity (ESS)	−0.4157***	(0.0438)	−0.4185***	(0.0435)	−0.4057***	(0.0442)	75455
Religiosity (GGS)	−0.7819***	(0.0597)	−0.7713***	(0.0599)	−0.7782***	(0.0602)	163516
Traditionalism							
Number of children (GGS)	0.0422	(0.0334)	0.0258	(0.0337)	0.0453	(0.0341)	91822
Number of children (WVS)	0.1511***	(0.0480)	0.1416***	(0.0483)	0.1808***	(0.0484)	26564
Financial independence (GGS)	0.1934***	(0.0269)	0.1721***	(0.0264)	0.1777***	(0.0266)	172214
Working women (GGS)	0.1149***	(0.0252)	0.1390***	(0.0244)	0.1244***	(0.0243)	170077
Working mothers (GGS)	0.7318***	(0.0607)	0.7550***	(0.0614)	0.7523***	(0.0611)	173729
Motherhood (GGS)	−0.3825***	(0.0306)	−0.3633***	(0.0298)	−0.3664***	(0.0300)	186974
Parenting after divorce (GGS)	0.0144	(0.0217)	0.0265	(0.0217)	0.0214	(0.0218)	177676
Importance of tradition (ESS)	0.1046***	(0.0306)	0.1010***	(0.0307)	0.1214***	(0.0300)	72848
Importance of family (WVS)	−0.0413*	(0.0211)	−0.0394*	(0.0213)	−0.0355*	(0.0215)	15329
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Religiosity: church answers social (family) problems—dummies whether 'your church is giving, in your country, adequate answers' to the 'social problems facing our country today' ('the problems of family life'); frequency of praying—praying 'outside of religious services' in ESS on seven point scale ranging from 'never' to 'every day' and in WVS on eight point scale ranging from 'never or practically never' to 'several times a day'; importance of religion (God)—'how important in life is religion (God)' on four point scale ('not at all important ... 'very important'); religiosity—'attending religious services apart from special occasions' in GGS recoded to the scale $0 = never$, $1 = less\ than\ once\ every\ 3\ months$, $2 = one\ to\ three\ times\ every\ 3\ months$, $3 = one\ to\ three\ times\ every\ month$, $4 = at\ least\ once\ a\ week$, and in ESS ranging from *every day* to *never* at seven point scale. Traditionalism: financial independence—women should be financially independent from their husbands on five point scale; working women—men have more right to job than women, if jobs are scarce on five point scale; working mothers—pre-school children suffer when their mothers work on five point scale; marriage—women should try to marry and have a child on five point scale; motherhood— women without children is fulfilled; parenting after divorce—children should stay with mother rather than father after divorce on five point scale; importance of tradition—'important to follow traditions and customs' and importance of family—'how important in life is family' on four point scale ('not at all important ... 'very important'). Number of children in the population of individuals aged at least 50. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

FIGURE A6 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on selected beliefs concerning gender roles *Source:* Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and ESS waves 1–8. *Note:* Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, controlling for scale of incomes, age (quadratic), gender, education, country, as well as time and cohort fixed effects. Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Motherhood—women without children is fulfilled. Financial independence—women should be financially independent from their husbands. Working mothers—pre-school children suffer when their mothers work. Working women—men have more right to job than women, if jobs are scarce. Parenting after divorce—children should stay with mother rather than father after divorce. Equal earnings—it is not good for relationship of woman earns more than partner. All measured on five point scale where 1 denotes the least and 5 the most pronounced gender inequality. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. ***p < .01, **p < .05. *p < .1. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

APPENDIX D: IDENTIFICATION THREATS AND ROBUSTNESS

D.1 | ALTERNATIVE SAMPLE SELECTIONS

TABLE A13 Effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on the preference for family and social insurance comparing old and young individuals in postcommunist countries.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.9619***	(0.0171)	0.9268***	(0.0194)	0.8975***	(0.0221)	108017
Downwards care	1.4491***	(0.0219)	1.4504***	(0.0255)	1.3741***	(0.0276)	105628
Upwards money	0.9614***	(0.0142)	0.8832***	(0.0179)	0.8623***	(0.0207)	107877
Downwards money	1.3238***	(0.0210)	1.2675***	(0.0239)	1.2130***	(0.0256)	105609
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	−0.1672	(0.1886)	−0.2304	(0.2025)	−0.2284	(0.2022)	38730
Income redistribution	−0.1473	(0.0990)	−0.1635*	(0.0958)	−0.1776*	(0.0915)	18506
Equality of opportunities	−0.0506	(0.0882)	−0.0563	(0.0879)	−0.0542	(0.0875)	18171
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Young are the individuals born after 1989 in formerly communist countries. Old are the individuals exposed to communism for at least 14 years. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A13 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		**(2)**		**(3)**		
	Coef. on EC	**(Std. err.)**	**Coef. on EC**	**(Std. err.)**	**Coef. on EC**	**(Std. err.)**	**N**
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.1511***	(0.0090)	0.1387***	(0.0100)	0.1254***	(0.0111)	108017
Downwards care	0.4487***	(0.0104)	0.4537***	(0.0123)	0.4190***	(0.0134)	105628
Upwards money	0.1497***	(0.0084)	0.1104***	(0.0097)	0.1103***	(0.0115)	107877
Downwards money	0.4113***	(0.0112)	0.3760***	(0.0127)	0.3641***	(0.0135)	105609
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	−0.0316	(0.0259)	−0.0430	(0.0284)	−0.0433	(0.0285)	38730
Income redistribution	−0.0749	(0.0517)	−0.0813	(0.0503)	−0.0856*	(0.0481)	18506
Equality of opportunities	−0.0271	(0.0198)	−0.0279	(0.0199)	−0.0262	(0.0202)	18171
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Young are the individuals born after 1989 in formerly communist countries. Old are the individuals exposed to communism for at least 14 years. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A14 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *Russia*.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0864***	(0.0189)	0.0977***	(0.0189)	0.0968***	(0.0187)	165133
Downwards care	0.0434**	(0.0200)	0.0415**	(0.0199)	0.0462**	(0.0199)	155145
Upwards money	−0.0220	(0.0225)	−0.0036	(0.0225)	−0.0055	(0.0222)	152398
Downwards money	0.0284	(0.0216)	0.0394*	(0.0218)	0.0445**	(0.0219)	162202
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6463***	(0.0671)	0.5306***	(0.0675)	0.5671***	(0.0691)	57294
Income redistribution	0.3328***	(0.0281)	0.2934***	(0.0281)	0.2940***	(0.0283)	72177
Equality of opportunities	0.1269***	(0.0280)	0.1138***	(0.0279)	0.1171***	(0.0279)	70392
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care—'care for older persons in need of care at their home', downwards care—'care for pre-school children', upwards money—'financial support for older people who live below subsistence level', downwards money—'financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family'. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A14 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0606***	(0.0104)	0.0653***	(0.0105)	0.0652***	(0.0105)	165133
Downwards care	0.0356***	(0.0091)	0.0350***	(0.0091)	0.0371***	(0.0092)	155145
Upwards money	−0.0131	(0.0111)	−0.0040	(0.0111)	−0.0049	(0.0110)	152398
Downwards money	0.0295**	(0.0131)	0.0358***	(0.0132)	0.0378***	(0.0133)	162202
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0936	(0.0130)	0.0727***	(0.0132)	0.0788***	(0.0133)	57294
Income redistribution	0.1412***	(0.0122)	0.1258***	(0.0123)	0.1248***	(0.0125)	72177
Equality of opportunities	0.0268***	(0.0080)	0.0249***	(0.0080)	0.0245***	(0.0080)	70392
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care—'care for older persons in need of care at their home', downwards care—'care for pre-school children', upwards money—'financial support for older people who live below subsistence level', downwards money—'financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family'. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A15 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *Germany*.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.3271***	(0.0288)	0.3329***	(0.0292)	0.3251***	(0.0296)	170750
Downwards care	0.1558***	(0.0475)	0.1553***	(0.0469)	0.1540***	(0.0468)	160798
Upwards money	0.2740***	(0.0504)	0.2840***	(0.0517)	0.2767***	(0.0503)	158054
Downwards money	−0.1425***	(0.0521)	−0.1369***	(0.0515)	−0.1376***	(0.0504)	167834
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	−0.1733	(0.1850)	−0.2733	(0.1915)	−0.2971	(0.1953)	59390
Income redistribution	0.1245***	(0.0370)	0.0763**	(0.0364)	0.0749**	(0.0366)	69682
Equality of opportunities	0.1474***	(0.0378)	0.1312***	(0.0376)	0.1269***	(0.0380)	67859
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A15 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.1657***	(0.0193)	0.1682***	(0.0195)	0.1664***	(0.0197)	170750
Downwards care	0.0585***	(0.0210)	0.0589***	(0.0207)	0.0581***	(0.0207)	160798
Upwards money	0.0687**	(0.0272)	0.0739***	(0.0277)	0.0713**	(0.0277)	158054
Downwards money	−0.0892***	(0.0339)	−0.0854***	(0.0330)	−0.0857***	(0.0329)	167834
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	−0.0175	(0.0263)	−0.0358	(0.0271)	−0.0402	(0.0273)	59390
Income redistribution	0.0495***	(0.0167)	0.0307*	(0.0165)	0.0283*	(0.0166)	69682
Equality of opportunities	0.0247**	(0.0113)	0.0228**	(0.0113)	0.0211*	(0.0114)	67859
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***p < .01, **p < .05, and *p < .1.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A16 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *Baltic countries*.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0860***	(0.0189)	0.0975***	(0.0189)	0.0966***	(0.0187)	165755
Downwards care	0.0428**	(0.0200)	0.0409**	(0.0200)	0.0459**	(0.0199)	155759
Upwards money	−0.0224	(0.0225)	−0.0040	(0.0224)	−0.0059	(0.0221)	153032
Downwards money	0.0288	(0.0217)	0.0401*	(0.0218)	0.0443**	(0.0219)	162821
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6343***	(0.0683)	0.5199***	(0.0685)	0.5505***	(0.0697)	60732
Income redistribution	0.3527***	(0.0299)	0.3088***	(0.0301)	0.3118***	(0.0302)	69158
Equality of opportunities	0.1125***	(0.0305)	0.0967***	(0.0304)	0.1017***	(0.0305)	67387
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Baltic: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A16 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0605***	(0.0104)	0.0652***	(0.0105)	0.0652***	(0.0105)	165755
Downwards care	0.0353***	(0.0091)	0.0348***	(0.0091)	0.0370***	(0.0092)	155759
Upwards money	−0.0133	(0.0111)	−0.0043	(0.0111)	−0.0050	(0.0110)	153032
Downwards money	0.0297**	(0.0131)	0.0361***	(0.0133)	0.0380***	(0.0133)	162821
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0921	(0.0130)	0.0718***	(0.0131)	0.0771***	(0.0132)	60732
Income redistribution	0.1490***	(0.0131)	0.1316***	(0.0133)	0.1318***	(0.0135)	69158
Equality of opportunities	0.0229***	(0.0085)	0.0206**	(0.0085)	0.0203**	(0.0085)	67387
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money— 'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Baltic: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A17 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *countries with anti-communism uprisings*.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.3289***	(0.0286)	0.3339***	(0.0290)	0.3254***	(0.0294)	154127
Downwards care	0.1491***	(0.0443)	0.1468***	(0.0435)	0.1423***	(0.0441)	147087
Upwards money	0.2709***	(0.0495)	0.2782***	(0.0506)	0.2733***	(0.0494)	141473
Downwards money	−0.1482***	(0.0521)	−0.1441***	(0.0516)	−0.1440***	(0.0503)	154142
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	−0.1830	(0.1745)	−0.2747	(0.1794)	−0.3056*	(0.1798)	58511
Income redistribution	0.1205***	(0.0410)	0.0958**	(0.0396)	0.1076***	(0.0395)	63635
Equality of opportunities	0.1158***	(0.0436)	0.1100**	(0.0433)	0.1128**	(0.0438)	62224
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Uprisings in Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia and Hungary. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A17 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.1665***	(0.0191)	0.1686***	(0.0193)	0.1667***	(0.0195)	154127
Downwards care	0.0568***	(0.0202)	0.0563***	(0.0199)	0.0545***	(0.0203)	147087
Upwards money	0.0670**	(0.0273)	0.0709**	(0.0276)	0.0697**	(0.0275)	141473
Downwards money	−0.0910***	(0.0339)	−0.0882***	(0.0332)	−0.0880***	(0.0331)	154142
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	−0.0187	(0.0255)	−0.0356	(0.0262)	−0.0413	(0.0258)	58511
Income redistribution	0.0421**	(0.0186)	0.0323*	(0.0181)	0.0359**	(0.0180)	63635
Equality of opportunities	0.0167	(0.0144)	0.0167	(0.0144)	0.0169	(0.0144)	62224
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Uprisings in Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia and Hungary. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

D.2 | OMITTED VARIABLES BIAS

TABLE A18 Results of the coefficient stability test for the omission bias in the effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on the preference for family and social insurance (extensive margin).

Dependent variable	Total sample						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Cond. on Beta	Delta	Cond. on Beta	Delta	Cond. on Beta	Delta	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.07	−0.00037	0.10	−0.00138	0.10	−0.00140	182330
Downwards care	0.04	−0.00046	0.04	−0.00051	0.05	−0.00151	172337
Upwards money	−0.02	0.00035	0.00	−0.00023	−0.01	0.00025	169582
Downwards money	0.03	−0.00004	0.04	−0.000042	0.04	−0.00026	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.63	0.05507	0.51	0.04295	0.54	0.04678	65163
Income redistribution	0.31	0.01292	0.27	0.01182	0.28	0.01330	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.11	0.00583	0.09	0.00444	0.10	0.00521	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Parameters delta were obtained conditional on the assumption that beta coefficient is equal to its estimate obtained in the examined model. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A18 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Subsample of formerly communist countries						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Cond. on Beta	Delta	Cond. on Beta	Delta	Cond. on Beta	Delta	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.04	0.00080	0.05	0.00059	0.05	0.00058	142618
Downwards care	0.03	0.00053	0.03	0.00048	0.03	0.00066	139625
Upwards money	−0.03	0.00086	−0.02	0.00083	−0.02	0.00077	142416
Downwards money	0.05	−0.00217	0.05	−0.00153	0.06	−0.00274	139637
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.10	0.05289	0.08	0.06056	0.09	0.06397	47227
Income redistribution	0.18	0.003911	0.16	0.05125	0.16	0.06148	26299
Equality of opportunities	0.01	−0.01194	0.01	−0.01244	0.01	−0.01233	25990
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Parameters delta were obtained conditional on the assumption that beta coefficient is equal to its estimate obtained in the examined model. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2–6 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A19 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the experience of war.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0861***	(0.0188)	0.0973***	(0.0189)	0.0960***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	(0.0200)	0.0420**	(0.0199)	0.0460**	(0.0199)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0221	(0.0225)	−0.0039	(0.0224)	−0.0062	(0.0221)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	(0.0216)	0.0396*	(0.0218)	0.0435**	(0.0219)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6279***	(0.0680)	0.5121***	(0.0683)	0.5422***	(0.0698)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	(0.0285)	0.2734***	(0.0285)	0.2760***	(0.0286)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	(0.0278)	0.0954***	(0.0277)	0.0975***	(0.0278)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A19 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0604***	(0.0104)	0.0650***	(0.0105)	0.0647***	(0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0356***	(0.0091)	0.0351***	(0.0091)	0.0369***	(0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0132	(0.0111)	−0.0043	(0.0111)	−0.0054	(0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0295**	(0.0131)	0.0357***	(0.0132)	0.0374***	(0.0133)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0910	(0.0129)	0.0707***	(0.0130)	0.0759***	(0.0131)	65163
Income redistribution	0.1306***	(0.0126)	0.1159***	(0.0126)	0.1158***	(0.0128)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.0215***	(0.0079)	0.0196**	(0.0079)	0.0191**	(0.0079)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A20 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the experience of economic recession during impressionable years.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0861***	(0.0188)	0.0973***	(0.0189)	0.0960***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	(0.0200)	0.0419**	(0.0199)	0.0459**	(0.0199)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0222	(0.0225)	−0.0040	(0.0224)	−0.0064	(0.0221)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	(0.0217)	0.0396*	(0.0218)	0.0435**	(0.0220)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6250***	(0.0684)	0.5099***	(0.0687)	0.5399***	(0.0702)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3105***	(0.0285)	0.2723***	(0.0285)	0.2748***	(0.0287)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1100***	(0.0279)	0.0972***	(0.0278)	0.0993***	(0.0279)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Economic recession based on the World Bank data on unemployment rate. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A20 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0604***	(0.0104)	0.0650***	(0.0105)	0.0647***	(0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0355***	(0.0091)	0.0350***	(0.0091)	0.0369***	(0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0132	(0.0110)	−0.0043	(0.0111)	−0.0054	(0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0296**	(0.0132)	0.0357***	(0.0133)	0.0374***	(0.0133)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0907	(0.0130)	0.0705***	(0.0131)	0.0757***	(0.0133)	65163
Income redistribution	0.1306***	(0.0125)	0.1157***	(0.0126)	0.1156***	(0.0128)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.0219***	(0.0079)	0.0200**	(0.0079)	0.0194**	(0.0079)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Economic recession based on the World Bank data on unemployment rate. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A21 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the occupation.

| Dependent variable | Intensive margin | | | | | | |
| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | |
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0870***	(0.0189)	0.0973***	(0.0189)	0.0958***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0414**	(0.0202)	0.0424**	(0.0202)	0.0455**	(0.0201)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0184	(0.0227)	−0.0030	(0.0226)	−0.0053	(0.0222)	169582
Downwards money	0.0293	(0.0213)	0.0409*	(0.0215)	0.0444**	(0.0216)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6081***	(0.0669)	0.5116***	(0.0672)	0.5322***	(0.0682)	65163
Income redistribution	0.2895***	(0.0289)	0.2648***	(0.0288)	0.2675***	(0.0289)	70207
Equality of opportunities	0.1005***	(0.0280)	0.0858***	(0.0278)	0.0900***	(0.0279)	68507
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A21 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0606***	(0.0104)	0.0648***	(0.0105)	0.0644***	(0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0344***	(0.0091)	0.0350***	(0.0092)	0.0366***	(0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0116	(0.0111)	−0.0041	(0.0111)	−0.0052	(0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0299**	(0.0130)	0.0362***	(0.0131)	0.0377***	(0.0131)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0874	(0.0127)	0.0704***	(0.0128)	0.0739***	(0.0129)	65163
Income redistribution	0.1200***	(0.0127)	0.1105***	(0.0127)	0.1106***	(0.0128)	70207
Equality of opportunities	0.0200**	(0.0081)	0.0178**	(0.0080)	0.0178**	(0.0081)	68507
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A22 Coefficients on the exposure to communism controlling for democracy index.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0861***	(0.0188)	0.0974***	(0.0189)	0.0960***	(0.0187)	182316
Downwards care	0.0437**	(0.0200)	0.0421**	(0.0199)	0.0461**	(0.0199)	172323
Upwards money	−0.0221	(0.0225)	−0.0039	(0.0224)	−0.0062	(0.0221)	169568
Downwards money	0.0290	(0.0216)	0.0397*	(0.0218)	0.0438**	(0.0219)	179379
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.5795***	(0.0770)	0.4295***	(0.0767)	0.4561***	(0.0774)	31553
Income redistribution	0.5652***	(0.0452)	0.5106***	(0.0449)	0.5029***	(0.0446)	38678
Equality of opportunities	0.0269	(0.0504)	0.0096	(0.0504)	0.0102	(0.0503)	36945
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A22 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0604***	(0.0104)	0.0650***	(0.0105)	0.0647***	(0.0104)	182316
Downwards care	0.0356***	(0.0091)	0.0351***	(0.0091)	0.0369***	(0.0092)	172323
Upwards money	−0.0132	(0.0111)	−0.0043	(0.0111)	−0.0054	(0.0110)	169568
Downwards money	0.0296**	(0.0131)	0.0357***	(0.0132)	0.0375***	(0.0133)	179379
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0879	(0.0140)	0.0615***	(0.0141)	0.0666***	(0.0143)	31553
Income redistribution	0.2677***	(0.0210)	0.2459***	(0.0211)	0.2434***	(0.0213)	38678
Equality of opportunities	0.0002	(0.0150)	−0.0029	(0.0150)	−0.0034	(0.0150)	36945
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A23 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the Hajnal line of marriage patterns in Europe.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0861***	(0.0188)	0.0973***	(0.0189)	0.0960***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	(0.0200)	0.0420**	(0.0199)	0.0460**	(0.0199)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0221	(0.0225)	−0.0039	(0.0224)	−0.0062	(0.0221)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	(0.0216)	0.0396*	(0.0218)	0.0435**	(0.0219)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6279***	(0.0680)	0.5121***	(0.0683)	0.5422***	(0.0698)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	(0.0285)	0.2734***	(0.0285)	0.2760***	(0.0286)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	(0.0278)	0.0954***	(0.0277)	0.0975***	(0.0278)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A23 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0604***	(0.0104)	0.0650***	(0.0105)	0.0647***	(0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0356***	(0.0091)	0.0351***	(0.0091)	0.0369***	(0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0132	(0.0111)	−0.0043	(0.0111)	−0.0054	(0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0295**	(0.0131)	0.0357***	(0.0132)	0.0374***	(0.0133)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0910	(0.0129)	0.0707***	(0.0130)	0.0759***	(0.0131)	65163
Income redistribution	0.1306***	(0.0126)	0.1159***	(0.0126)	0.1158***	(0.0128)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.0215***	(0.0079)	0.0196**	(0.0079)	0.0191**	(0.0079)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A24 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for individual religiosity.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0943***	(0.0192)	0.1057***	(0.0196)	0.1036***	(0.0193)	140414
Downwards care	0.0666***	(0.0214)	0.0666***	(0.0214)	0.0709***	(0.0214)	140414
Upwards money	−0.0135	(0.0251)	0.0030	(0.0251)	0.0020	(0.0247)	140306
Downwards money	0.0501**	(0.0240)	0.0609**	(0.0241)	0.0646***	(0.0243)	140361
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6244***	(0.0677)	0.5016***	(0.0680)	0.5287***	(0.0693)	63388
Income redistribution	0.3069***	(0.0285)	0.2689***	(0.0284)	0.2723***	(0.0286)	74064
Equality of opportunities	0.1118***	(0.0279)	0.0991***	(0.0277)	0.1009***	(0.0277)	72287
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A24 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0636***	(0.0106)	0.0680***	(0.0107)	0.0677***	(0.0107)	140414
Downwards care	0.0461***	(0.0097)	0.0463***	(0.0097)	0.0488***	(0.0098)	140414
Upwards money	−0.0125	(0.0118)	−0.0043	(0.0118)	−0.0050	(0.0117)	140306
Downwards money	0.0428***	(0.0146)	0.0487***	(0.0147)	0.0507***	(0.0147)	140361
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0916	(0.0129)	0.0701***	(0.0130)	0.0746***	(0.0132)	63388
Income redistribution	0.1297***	(0.0126)	0.1149***	(0.0126)	0.1151***	(0.0128)	74064
Equality of opportunities	0.0225***	(0.0079)	0.0207***	(0.0079)	0.0200**	(0.0079)	72287
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money— 'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A25 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for household size.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0865***	(0.0189)	0.0982***	(0.0190)	0.0968***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0474**	(0.0203)	0.0457**	(0.0203)	0.0490**	(0.0203)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0241	(0.0223)	−0.0054	(0.0222)	−0.0075	(0.0219)	169582
Downwards money	0.0339	(0.0217)	0.0444**	(0.0219)	0.0480**	(0.0220)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income redistribution	0.3119***	(0.0284)	0.2741***	(0.0284)	0.2766***	(0.0286)	74337
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained.Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money— 'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

TABLE A25 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0609***	(0.0105)	0.0656***	(0.0105)	0.0653***	(0.0105)	182330
Downwards care	0.0377***	(0.0093)	0.0371***	(0.0093)	0.0387***	(0.0094)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0140	(0.0110)	−0.0050	(0.0110)	−0.0059	(0.0109)	169582
Downwards money	0.0322**	(0.0132)	0.0382***	(0.0133)	0.0398***	(0.0133)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income redistribution	0.1310***	(0.0125)	0.1162***	(0.0126)	0.1161***	(0.0127)	74337
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

TABLE A26 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the *linear* time trend.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0861***	(0.0188)	0.0973***	(0.0189)	0.0960***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	(0.0200)	0.0420**	(0.0199)	0.0460**	(0.0199)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0221	(0.0225)	−0.0039	(0.0224)	−0.0062	(0.0221)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	(0.0216)	0.0396*	(0.0218)	0.0435**	(0.0219)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6279***	(0.0680)	0.5121***	(0.0683)	0.5422***	(0.0698)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3065***	(0.0260)	0.2877***	(0.0256)	0.2878***	(0.0259)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0845***	(0.0156)	0.0784***	(0.0154)	0.0789***	(0.0153)	298660
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A26 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0604***	(0.0104)	0.0650***	(0.0105)	0.0647***	(0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0356***	(0.0091)	0.0351***	(0.0091)	0.0369***	(0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0132	(0.0111)	−0.0043	(0.0111)	−0.0054	(0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0295**	(0.0131)	0.0357***	(0.0132)	0.0374***	(0.0133)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0910	(0.0129)	0.0707***	(0.0130)	0.0759***	(0.0131)	65163
Income redistribution	0.1183***	(0.0107)	0.1112***	(0.0105)	0.1108***	(0.0107)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0122***	(0.0040)	0.0113***	(0.0039)	0.0112***	(0.0039)	298660
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A27 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) with imputed income.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0820***	(0.0182)	0.0809***	(0.0211)	0.0798***	(0.0208)	271254
Downwards care	0.0388*	(0.0200)	0.0515**	(0.0209)	0.0514**	(0.0209)	252572
Upwards money	−0.0276	(0.0216)	−0.0182	(0.0237)	−0.0171	(0.0234)	245854
Downwards money	0.0291	(0.0215)	0.0316	(0.0228)	0.0318	(0.0228)	266694
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6304***	(0.0673)	0.6425***	(0.0670)	0.6600***	(0.0689)	120527
Income redistribution	0.2725***	(0.0289)	0.2915***	(0.0289)	0.2937***	(0.0291)	121518
Equality of opportunities	0.1131***	(0.0273)	0.0962***	(0.0282)	0.0969***	(0.0283)	119443
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .0$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A27 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		**(2)**		**(3)**		
Dependent variable	**Coef. on EC**	**(Std. err.)**	**Coef. on EC**	**(Std. err.)**	**Coef. on EC**	**(Std. err.)**	**N**
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0589***	(0.0102)	0.0566***	(0.0117)	0.0563***	(0.0117)	271254
Downwards care	0.0337***	(0.0092)	0.0400***	(0.0092)	0.0399***	(0.0092)	252572
Upwards money	−0.0151	(0.0108)	−0.0110	(0.0117)	−0.0104	(0.0116)	245854
Downwards money	0.0298**	(0.0130)	0.0333**	(0.0141)	0.0337**	(0.0141)	266694
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0914	(0.0128)	0.0941***	(0.0128)	0.0972***	(0.0130)	120527
Income redistribution	0.1119***	(0.0125)	0.1218***	(0.0128)	0.1216***	(0.0130)	121518
Equality of opportunities	0.0235***	(0.0078)	0.0184**	(0.0081)	0.0178**	(0.0081)	119443
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .0$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

D.3 | ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF EXPOSURE TO COMMUNISM (EC)

TABLE A28 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *fixed entry and exit* dates.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0751***	(0.0186)	0.0868***	(0.0188)	0.0855***	(0.0185)	182330
Downwards care	0.0421**	(0.0208)	0.0403*	(0.0208)	0.0449**	(0.0208)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0317	(0.0230)	−0.0127	(0.0230)	−0.0150	(0.0227)	169582
Downwards money	0.0380*	(0.0219)	0.0491**	(0.0220)	0.0536**	(0.0220)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6878***	(0.0676)	0.5680***	(0.0671)	0.5971***	(0.0697)	64024
Income redistribution	0.1774***	(0.0359)	0.1325***	(0.0356)	0.1432***	(0.0362)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1744***	(0.0363)	0.1603***	(0.0361)	0.1616***	(0.0364)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A28 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0545***	(0.0103)	0.0592***	(0.0104)	0.0589***	(0.0103)	182330
Downwards care	0.0348***	(0.0094)	0.0342***	(0.0094)	0.0363***	(0.0095)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0155	(0.0115)	−0.0062	(0.0115)	−0.0074	(0.0114)	169582
Downwards money	0.0343***	(0.0132)	0.0406***	(0.0133)	0.0425***	(0.0134)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.1021	(0.0132)	0.0811***	(0.0133)	0.0863***	(0.0135)	64024
Income redistribution	0.0767***	(0.0161)	0.0595***	(0.0161)	0.0618***	(0.0163)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.0310***	(0.0104)	0.0292***	(0.0104)	0.0285***	(0.0104)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A29 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *fixed exit* date.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0751***	(0.0186)	0.0868***	(0.0188)	0.0855***	(0.0185)	182330
Downwards care	0.0421**	(0.0208)	0.0403*	(0.0208)	0.0449**	(0.0208)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0317	(0.0230)	−0.0127	(0.0230)	−0.0150	(0.0227)	169582
Downwards money	0.0380*	(0.0219)	0.0491**	(0.0220)	0.0536**	(0.0220)	179393
Preference for family insurance							
Income equality	0.6730***	(0.0678)	0.5505***	(0.0672)	0.5949***	(0.0700)	51684
Income redistribution	0.1774***	(0.0359)	0.1325***	(0.0356)	0.1432***	(0.0362)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1744***	(0.0363)	0.1603***	(0.0361)	0.1616***	(0.0364)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A29 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0545***	(0.0103)	0.0592***	(0.0104)	0.0589***	(0.0103)	182330
Downwards care	0.0348***	(0.0094)	0.0342***	(0.0094)	0.0363***	(0.0095)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0155	(0.0115)	−0.0062	(0.0115)	−0.0074	(0.0114)	169582
Downwards money	0.0343***	(0.0132)	0.0406***	(0.0133)	0.0425***	(0.0134)	179393
Preference for family insurance							
Income equality	0.1007	(0.0133)	0.0790***	(0.0133)	0.0870***	(0.0136)	51684
Income redistribution	0.0767***	(0.0161)	0.0595***	(0.0161)	0.0618***	(0.0163)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.0310***	(0.0104)	0.0292***	(0.0104)	0.0285***	(0.0104)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A30 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *fixed entry* date.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		**(2)**		**(3)**		
	Coef. on EC	**(Std. err.)**	**Coef. on EC**	**(Std. err.)**	**Coef. on EC**	**(Std. err.)**	**N**
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0490***	(0.0173)	0.0614***	(0.0177)	0.0607***	(0.0176)	150895
Downwards care	0.0255	(0.0214)	0.0223	(0.0213)	0.0264	(0.0213)	140901
Upwards money	−0.0678***	(0.0195)	−0.0487**	(0.0197)	−0.0506***	(0.0196)	138167
Downwards money	0.0552***	(0.0209)	0.0657***	(0.0210)	0.0702***	(0.0211)	147958
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6403***	(0.0668)	0.5282***	(0.0673)	0.5668***	(0.0695)	56017
Income redistribution	0.1518***	(0.0374)	0.1011***	(0.0366)	0.1125***	(0.0370)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1588***	(0.0371)	0.1426***	(0.0368)	0.1427***	(0.0373)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money— 'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A30 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0443***	(0.0102)	0.0498***	(0.0103)	0.0495***	(0.0103)	150895
Downwards care	0.0318***	(0.0100)	0.0312***	(0.0101)	0.0330***	(0.0101)	140901
Upwards money	−0.0256**	(0.0113)	−0.0167	(0.0114)	−0.0178	(0.0113)	138167
Downwards money	0.0479***	(0.0121)	0.0539***	(0.0122)	0.0557***	(0.0122)	147958
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0926	(0.0129)	0.0727***	(0.0130)	0.0796***	(0.0132)	56017
Income redistribution	0.0606***	(0.0167)	0.0410**	(0.0164)	0.0435***	(0.0165)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.0255**	(0.0112)	0.0234**	(0.0112)	0.0224**	(0.0112)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A31 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using dates of the _Berlin Wall_ erection and fall.

	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0857***	(0.0188)	0.0970***	(0.0189)	0.0956***	(0.0187)	182330
Downwards care	0.0430**	(0.0200)	0.0414**	(0.0199)	0.0454**	(0.0199)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0225	(0.0225)	−0.0043	(0.0224)	−0.0066	(0.0221)	169582
Downwards money	0.0282	(0.0216)	0.0389*	(0.0218)	0.0429*	(0.0219)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.6448***	(0.0708)	0.5233***	(0.0705)	0.5507***	(0.0731)	64024
Income redistribution	0.1616***	(0.0345)	0.1190***	(0.0341)	0.1304***	(0.0343)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1754***	(0.0337)	0.1624***	(0.0335)	0.1636***	(0.0339)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A31 (Continued)

	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
Dependent variable	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0604***	(0.0104)	0.0650***	(0.0105)	0.0647***	(0.0105)	182330
Downwards care	0.0354***	(0.0091)	0.0349***	(0.0091)	0.0367***	(0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0133	(0.0111)	−0.0043	(0.0111)	−0.0054	(0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0293**	(0.0131)	0.0355***	(0.0132)	0.0372***	(0.0133)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.0968	(0.0133)	0.0755***	(0.0134)	0.0804***	(0.0137)	64024
Income redistribution	0.0725***	(0.0154)	0.0564***	(0.0154)	0.0591***	(0.0154)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.0305***	(0.0096)	0.0288***	(0.0096)	0.0281***	(0.0097)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money— 'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1–5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

D.4 | ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION STRATEGIES

TABLE A32 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the fixed effects panel estimation.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	−0.0423*	(0.0220)	−0.0427*	(0.0220)	−0.0455**	(0.0221)	182330
Downwards care	−0.1060***	(0.0267)	−0.1027***	(0.0267)	−0.1044***	(0.0268)	172337
Upwards money	0.1079***	(0.0235)	0.1050***	(0.0235)	0.1019***	(0.0235)	169582
Downwards money	0.0089	(0.0231)	0.0076	(0.0231)	0.0067	(0.0231)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p <$ .01, **$p <$ .05, and *$p <$ .1.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

TABLE A32   (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	−0.0173	(0.0111)	−0.0173	(0.0111)	−0.0180	(0.0111)	182330
Downwards care	−0.0418***	(0.0127)	−0.0417***	(0.0127)	−0.0422***	(0.0127)	172337
Upwards money	0.0567***	(0.0127)	0.0551***	(0.0127)	0.0536***	(0.0128)	169582
Downwards money	−0.0025	(0.0123)	−0.0037	(0.0123)	−0.0045	(0.0124)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p <$ .01, **$p <$ .05, and *$p <$ .1.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

TABLE A33 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the random effects panel estimation.

Dependent variable	Intensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0941***	(0.0183)	0.1041***	(0.0183)	0.1024***	(0.0183)	182330
Downwards care	0.0441**	(0.0187)	0.0420**	(0.0187)	0.0457**	(0.0188)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0095	(0.0207)	0.0075	(0.0207)	0.0049	(0.0207)	169582
Downwards money	0.0273	(0.0192)	0.0373*	(0.0192)	0.0408**	(0.0192)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money— 'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

TABLE A33 (Continued)

Dependent variable	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.0645***	(0.0093)	0.0684***	(0.0093)	0.0681***	(0.0093)	182330
Downwards care	0.0352***	(0.0094)	0.0345***	(0.0094)	0.0362***	(0.0095)	172337
Upwards money	−0.0079	(0.0114)	0.0005	(0.0114)	−0.0007	(0.0114)	169582
Downwards money	0.0277***	(0.0108)	0.0335***	(0.0108)	0.0351***	(0.0108)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p <$ .01, **$p <$ .05, and *$p <$ .1.
Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

TABLE A34 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the probit model.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.1763***	(0.0334)	0.1937***	(0.0337)	0.1924***	(0.0336)	182325
Downwards care	0.1233***	(0.0313)	0.1218***	(0.0313)	0.1264***	(0.0314)	172330
Upwards money	−0.0290	(0.0288)	−0.0018	(0.0290)	−0.0059	(0.0288)	169568
Downwards money	0.0815**	(0.0360)	0.0992***	(0.0364)	0.1040***	(0.0366)	179390
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.2578	(0.0369)	0.2025***	(0.0376)	0.2186***	(0.0383)	65155
Income redistribution	0.3904***	(0.0364)	0.3440***	(0.0366)	0.3479***	(0.0375)	74415
Equality of opportunities	0.1226***	(0.0429)	0.1115***	(0.0428)	0.1086**	(0.0429)	72615
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, and *$p < .1$.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.

TABLE A35 Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the logit model.

Dependent variable	(1) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(2) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	(3) Coef. on EC	(Std. err.)	N
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care	0.2932***	(0.0578)	0.3242***	(0.0583)	0.3224***	(0.0582)	182325
Downwards care	0.2126***	(0.0543)	0.2102***	(0.0543)	0.2183***	(0.0548)	172330
Upwards money	−0.0461	(0.0464)	−0.0009	(0.0467)	−0.0079	(0.0464)	169568
Downwards money	0.1313**	(0.0588)	0.1600***	(0.0593)	0.1678***	(0.0597)	179390
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality	0.4268	(0.0618)	0.3365***	(0.0628)	0.3618***	(0.0640)	65155
Income redistribution	0.6481***	(0.0604)	0.5694***	(0.0607)	0.5760***	(0.0624)	74415
Equality of opportunities	0.2354***	(0.0811)	0.2155***	(0.0810)	0.2094***	(0.0812)	72615
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Note: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care—'children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need', downwards care—'grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so', upwards (downwards) money—'children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties'. Preference for social insurance: income equality—'incomes should be made more equal', income redistribution—'government should reduce differences in income levels', equality of opportunities—'important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities'. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. Statistical significance: ***p < .01, **p < .05, and *p < .1.

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015_04_18), and ESS waves 1–8.