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Abstract: Who do urban residents turn to in everyday security incidents? Why do some go to the police in certain locations, others to armed nonstate actors or kinship networks? We explore the ways in which residents and security actors – state and nonstate – negotiate everyday (in)security in contested urban spaces with multiple security actors. We consider how hybrid security assemblages are shaped by physical and social space and how everyday security practices shape space. We use Beirut's Southern Suburbs (Dahiyeh) as a site of theorisation, bringing local vernacular experiences into dialogue with Bourdieu's concepts of capital, *habitus*, *doxa* and field to develop a spatially dynamic analytical framework. Using this framework, we map security actors' different types and sizes of capital and how this capital is affected by residents' *habitus* and *doxa* within the everyday security field. We introduce the notion of 'translocal habitus' to capture the impact of families' origins outside Dahiyeh on everyday security dynamics. The framework we develop contributes to the spatialisation, vernacularisation and pluralisation of everyday security studies, furthers the spatialisation of Bourdieu and adds to the literature on hybrid forms of governance. Our analysis is based on extensive fieldwork, including over 150 interviews and 'street chats' with residents and security actors in and around Dahiyeh.

Keywords: Everyday security, Contested urban space, Hybrid governance, Hybrid security assemblages, Policing, Translocal habitus, Bourdieu, Beirut, Lebanon, Hizbullah, Dahiyeh

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* Although the 1984 film *Ghostbusters* made this saying (in)famous, we use it to capture the everydayness of responses to our field-work questions on who people turn to in everyday (in)security matters.

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'If… my motorcycle is stolen, I go to the Hizb [Hizbullah], not the police […] In some areas, such as Mokdad Street, people would go to the clan who will know the people involved […] People from the Biqa [East Lebanon] have their clan and Hizbullah; people from the South only have the Hizb so they will rely more on the party.' (Dahiyeh students, 05/2018)

In urban spaces with multiple security actors, who do residents turn to when their motorbike is stolen? Why do some turn to the police in some locations, others to armed nonstate actors or kinship networks? How do security actors negotiate hierarchy across space? In what ways do social and political structures influence these practices and how do practices in turn shape space? Whether in gated communities employing private guards or poor neighbourhoods with armed gangs or political parties operating alongside police or army, residents and security actors negotiate everyday (in)security, forcefully or consensually, forming hybrid security assemblages that vary across space and time. Location, the physical, political and social structures that make up place at a given time, and the quotidian practices of residents and security actors all affect everyday security dynamics.

How are we to make sense of this intricate interplay between space, structures and practices? In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework to explore how everyday (in)security is negotiated across urban spaces with multiple security actors. We develop this through the lens of the Southern Suburbs of Beirut known as Dahiyeh. Dahiyeh is a densely populated urban space with strong local and translocal social networks, a product of war and structural inequality, where a historically marginalised national minority (Shi'a) have become the majority. Dahiyeh is also a space with multiple security actors, dominated by an armed nonstate actor, Hizbullah, which is embedded in global power relations through a long-standing conflict with Israel, Iranian and Syrian support, and a boycott by international actors.

While Dahiyeh may be particular in its precise combination of characteristics, it provides a good 'vantage point' (Hazbun, 2017) from which to develop broader theoretical insights, as it combines characteristics that can be found elsewhere in an especially 'visible' way (see Pettigrew, 1990, p. 275). Hybrid security assemblages have burgeoned – for different reasons – in both postcolonial and neoliberal states (Sidaway, 2003; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011). Translocal influences feature in many newly-urbanised spaces (Brickell & Datta, 2011) while war has fundamentally shaped cities (Graham, 2004), affecting everyday security dynamics.

Following everyday security studies (Bigo, 2016; Huysmans, 2009), we use the term 'everyday security' to delineate the type of incidents, actors, practices and sites we focus on: mundane, routine, unexceptional incidents involving residents negotiating (in)security with both formal and informal security actors. We broaden our analysis beyond traditional (and even some critical) security studies' usual focus on elites, elite sites and the politics of exception to include vernacular experiences. An 'everyday' perspective 'foregrounds a horizontal conception of relations', where elites and the extraordinary are entangled with non-elites, the banal and the ephemeral (Guillaume & Huysmans, 2019; Crawford &

Hutchinson, 2016).[1] We do not cover war or terrorist attacks, the (in)securities of Palestinian refugee camps in Dahiyeh, or (in)security in the field of political contestation, focusing instead on threats considered locally as quotidian: theft, drugs dealing, celebratory shootings, illegal constructions, business, family or neighbourhood disputes, including those that turn lethal, due to the ubiquity of guns in Lebanon. Following the practice turn in critical security studies, we concentrate on security *practices*, seeing everyday (in)security as routine-driven, though also agential, relational and embedded in and shaping social and political structures across space (Pouliot, 2008; Hopf, 2010; Bigo, 2011; Berling, 2012).

Models rooted in the Weberian ideal of a state monopoly on the legitimate means of violence are inadequate for explaining hybrid security practices, as a growing literature highlights. In Lebanon, as in many other postcolonial states, nonstate actors perform state-like practices while state actors often lack local legitimacy and must negotiate access with nonstate actors. State and nonstate actors often rely on each other in hybrid security assemblages (Fregonese, 2012; Hazbun, 2016) and key nonstate actors are both 'inside' and 'outside' the state, blurring private/public and formal/informal boundaries (Bou Akar, 2018, pp. 28–31; Marei, 2020; Mouawad, 2017). While Dahiyeh residents typically regard the state as absent, they have what Obeid (2010) calls an 'ideal face of the state' and both this 'language of stateness' (Mouawad & Baumann, 2017) and scepticism about the state (Hermez, 2015) shape everyday security practices.

To escape this misleading state/nonstate dichotomy and capture the relational and structurally entangled dynamics of everyday (in)security practices, we propose a Bourdieusian framework in which dominance and legitimacy in the everyday security field are the outcomes of contestation between actors with different combinations of capital, dispositions (habitus) and beliefs (*doxa*). In such a framework being part of 'the state' augments one's capital but is no guarantee for being recognised as legitimate or dominant by residents, while 'nonstate' actors can acquire sufficient capital to be recognised as such by residents in specific places.

This framework allows us to map the myriad ways in which actors gain or lose capital, how this capital is valued by residents and security actors across space and how agency – but also routine practices – shape everyday security. In contrast, rationalist and constructivist theories, with their focus on 'conscious deliberation… instrumental, rule-based, communicative', typically overlook the role of unreflexive routines in producing everyday security practices. Postmodernist approaches overemphasise discourse, downplaying structures and 'the materiality of practices' (Pouliot, 2008, pp. 260–265, 274–275). Bourdieu's relational approach and focus on practice enables us to overcome the structure-agency and empirical-idealist dichotomies common in security studies while avoiding both essentialising and ahistoricising (Bigo, 2011).

Bourdieu developed his framework in a context very different from Dahiyeh's. Lebanon differs on multiple fronts from France's highly centralised late capitalist state, which was Bourdieu's primary reference point (Burawoy & Von Holdt, 2012, pp. 214–216; Hilgers &

[1] Vernacular security studies similarly refers to conceptions, narratives and practices of non-elites (cf. Vaughan-Williams & Stevens, 2016). Our focus is on *both* elites and non-elites and on the *everyday*.

Mangez, 2015, pp. 260–265). Yet, capital, habitus*/doxa* and fields can capture practices in places where states are permeable, with no monopoly on the legitimate use of physical or symbolic violence, and society is differentiated along a variety of axes with no unified 'cultural market'. We treat Bourdieu's concepts not as 'grand theory' but as 'thinking tools' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 160–167): 'theory-laden' rather than 'theory-determined' 'mid-range concepts', developed through dialogue between theory and close empirical observation (Mielke & Wilde, 2017, pp. 164–166).

Our choice of framework was motivated by the dynamics we encountered – the relational aspect of everyday (in)security in Dahiyeh, the embeddedness of residents and security actors in social and political structures, the interrelated roles of trust and hegemony. Following the Beirut School of Critical Security Studies' call to start with insights from the region, we began with the experiences our interlocutors recounted (Abboud et al., 2018, p. 279; Hazbun, 2017). Then, we brought them into dialogue with Bourdieu's concepts to abductively develop new 'mid-range' theoretical insights that can be applicable more broadly, thus furthering the pluralisation of the study of global politics beyond its traditional Western focus (Acharya, 2014, p. 650).

This article makes three theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to the spatialisation, vernacularisation and pluralisation of everyday security studies by developing a spatialised framework for understanding the entangled everyday security practices of *both* residents *and* security actors, formal *or* informal. Although Bourdieu has been used to understand security, this literature generally focuses on security professionals at state or intergovernmental level (cf. Pouliot, 2008; Bigo, 2014) – though some include private security and community actors (Dupont, 2004; Bowden, 2021). The literature using Bourdieu to analyse everyday security is far smaller, with space not a key focus.

Second, we weave capital, habitus and field together in a novel, spatially dynamic way. While Bourdieu has been increasingly used to analyse space and place (Wacquant, 2018, p. 91), application of Bourdieu's concepts remains selective, with field and social capital underutilised against a growing literature on habitus and cultural capital (Holt, 2008; Savage, 2011). They are further often applied to specific places (cf. Butler & Robson, 2003; Ley, 2003) rather than dynamically across space (exceptions include Guarnizo, 1997; Kelly & Lusis, 2006).

Finally, the article contributes to debates on hybrid forms of governance and reconceptualisations of 'the state' – whether in its Lebanese context or more broadly – by offering a framework that goes beyond the state/nonstate dichotomy and makes agents and their everyday practices the central focus, while recognising their entanglement in broader social and political structures.

Empirically, the article provides new insights into everyday security practices in Dahiyeh. Although there is a rich literature on religious and political space-making in Dahiyeh (cf. Deeb & Harb, 2013; Harb, 2001, 2010; Fawaz, 2014), everyday security practices have remained largely unexplored. Security is considered when discussing Hizbullah's modes of control, but usually in the context of the conflict with Israel or political dissent. Apart from a couple of short pieces on Hizbullah's everyday security practices (Fawaz et al., 2009, 07e;

Stel et al., 2015), everyday security and how it intersects with space across Dahiyeh have not been studied in detail.

We start with contextualising Dahiyeh and our methods, before sketching the 'thinking tools' adapted from Bourdieu to study everyday security dynamics spatially. We then explore how the three central concepts – capital, habitus and field—operate across and shape Dahiyeh, concluding by tying together the key dynamics shaping everyday (in)security and our contribution to broader debates.

DAHIYEH AND DOING RESEARCH

Dahiyeh is nestled between the southern boundary of Beirut and Beirut International Airport. Although interpretations of Dahiyeh's boundaries vary, we use it to describe the municipalities of Ghobeiry, Chiyah, Haret Hreik, Burj al-Barajneh and Mreijeh/Tahwitat al-Ghadir/Laylaki (fig. 1), covering an estimated population of 800,000 to a million (ISF Officer-I and II, 06/2019; Mayor and son, 05/2018; Nazzal 2012).

Fig. 1 Map of municipalities and urban quarters in Dahiyeh (Google Maps, 18/01/2019)

The area became known as part of Beirut's 'misery belt' (Harb, 2010, pp. 60–67) when tens of thousands of (predominantly) impoverished Shi'a from the South and the Biqa Valley in the East migrated to Beirut in search of work in the 1960s and 70s (Nasr, 1978). Lacking both capital and access to Beirut's dominant patron-client networks (which were mostly dominated by Sunnis and Christians), they settled in and around the villages south and east of Beirut alongside the Palestinian refugees already housed there and foreign migrant labourers (Khuri, 1975; Fawaz & Peillen, 2003). During Lebanon's 1975-1990 war thousands more settled in Dahiyeh, particularly those displaced by Israel's invasions in 1978 and 1982, while most of the area's Christians were displaced by the war (Faour, 1991, p. 636; Harb, 2010, p. 64).

During the 1975-1990 war, Dahiyeh came under the control of first Amal, then Hizbullah, both Shi'a armed groups that emerged in the context of the war and Israel's 1982 occupation respectively and continue to be the dominant Shi'a parties in Lebanon. In 1988, Hizbullah forced Amal out of most of Dahiyeh (Harb, 2010, p. 79). When war ended in 1990, Hizbullah was the only group to remain mobilised, with support from Syria and Iran, to maintain a resistance force against Israel's occupation of the South. Hizbullah is still the hegemonic security actor in Dahiyeh, with Amal and clans playing important roles in specific areas and state actors expanding their traditionally limited role in recent years.

Though often depicted as homogeneous, Dahiyeh displays stark differentiations. Some areas, particularly in the north, have considerably improved socio-economically over the past two decades (Deeb & Harb, 2013). Other areas, especially (semi)-'informal' or unregulated neighbourhoods such as Laylaki, Hayy el-Selloum and Ouzai, predominantly located in southern and south-eastern Dahiyeh, remain deeply disadvantaged with overcrowded, choked traffic arteries and severely limited access to water, electricity and sewerage.

Dahiyeh is socially differentiated between local families and those who migrated from the South and the Biqa (Harb, 2010, p. 82). Municipal politics is dominated by local families. Families who migrated over the past half century vote in their places of origin as per Lebanese law. Though Dahiyeh is overwhelmingly Shi'a, the area is also home to Sunnis and Christians, multiple Palestinian refugee camps, Syrian refugees and foreign migrant workers.

The authority and resources security actors operating in Dahiyeh possess have been shaped by broader political and security dynamics. The way the state has been practised and constituted in Lebanon, both historically and as part of local and global (neo)liberal policies, has meant that nonstate actors maintain considerable power in shaping the public realm, limiting state power and encouraging state-nonstate partnerships. Power is 'diffused throughout the social body' (Mouawad & Baumann, 2017, p. 77), the state but 'one of several contingent sites of power' (Marei, 2020, p. 29), with nonstate actors operating alongside (quasi)-state actors producing 'state effects' (Mitchell, 1999; Mouawad & Baumann, 2017). Crucially, as Marei (2020, p. 29) notes, this occurs 'not in spite of the State but precisely because of it' as 'the State provides the legislative scaffolding, the politico-economic environment… that allows for mediated stateness to crystallise'.

The sectarian powersharing arrangements adopted since the mid-19th century and reinforced by the 1943 National Pact at independence and the 1989 Taif Agreement have meant that both state and nonstate actors are primarily sect-based and embedded in sectarian clientelistic networks (Salloukh et al., 2015). Besides major posts being allocated to specific sects – the President being Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni and the Speaker Shi'a – other state institutions are affiliated with one or another sectarian powerbroker. For example, the leadership of the Internal Security Forces has been close to the Sunni-dominated Future Movement; the leadership of General Security to Hizbullah; and the leadership of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the President (Macaron, 2017). Meanwhile, political parties derive much of their clientelistic power from access to state resources which they use to pursue their own interests. Management of everyday (in)security has historically been part of clientelistic arrangements (Johnson, 1986) and political parties are

still routinely involved in everyday (in)security (Fawaz et al., 2012; Saleh & Zakar, 2018). The space available to nonstate security actors is also linked to global dynamics. The international community's concern with 'maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge' has capped international support for Lebanon's state security forces. However, since the 2006 July War and increasingly since Syria descended into war, international interest in strengthening the capabilities of the Lebanese state has revived funding for state security actors, in particular to secure Lebanon's borders and to balance out Hizbullah's capabilities (Tholens, 2017, p. 871).

For exploring everyday security dynamics in Dahiyeh, our analysis draws from fieldwork carried out between 2016-2019.[2] For security reasons, photographs, GPS tracking and mapping within Dahiyeh are prohibited. We were not granted interviews with Hizbullah officials[3] but were given permission to conduct 'street chats' during the 2016 municipal and 2018 national elections and we conducted walking tours (Evans & Jones, 2011) of geographically and socio-economically diverse parts of Dahiyeh in 2018 and 2019. We talked to shop owners, residents and pedestrians; conducted individual and group interviews with university students and professionals; and met with municipal, security and judicial actors. In total, we talked with over 150 people.

Our questions being about routine behaviour reassured our interlocutors; they were open and frank in describing their everyday security practices, also taking the opportunity to vent criticisms about the different security actors. Talking about everyday (in)security is nevertheless political – in Bourdieusian terms, a struggle over a field's stakes, boundaries and capital – and the following must be seen in that light.

We used the Civil Society Knowledge Center's geo-mapped conflict database of Lebanon (CSKC, n.d.), downloading reported interventions by state security forces across Dahiyeh between June 2014 and December 2018. However, as many interventions go unreported, the database is incomprehensive, and we only used it when a pattern was supported by other sources.

UNPACKING EVERYDAY SECURITY WITH BOURDIEU

Bourdieu's concepts of capital, field and habitus enable us to capture the complexity of everyday security practices by mapping the relative capital and habitus of any actor in the everyday security field. Capital describes the 'chips' security actors bring to the field: economic (money, investments), social (networks, social standing) or cultural (tastes, rank, knowledge). Other relevant types of capital Bourdieu later added include informational and coercive capital (Bourdieu, 1986b, 2014; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 98–99, 119).[4] Capital can be embodied (taste, comportment), objectified (artefacts, buildings) or institutionalised (rank, bureaucracy). Symbolic capital is created when capital is no longer

[2] Our research was done prior to the '17 October revolution' of 2019 and the 2020 port explosion, both of which challenged Lebanon's political elite, including Hizbullah and Amal. Further research is needed to assess these events' impact on the balance of capital and habitus in the everyday security field across Dahiyeh.
[3] Over the last decade, Hizbullah has severely limited academic interviews.
[4] Bourdieu later recast cultural capital as a form of informational capital.

recognised as capital but comes to be seen as giving the bearer legitimate authority or trustworthiness. Capital is linked to habitus*/doxa* which shapes what people see as 'natural' and thus how capital is valued.

Habitus denotes the dispositions that shape the practices of security actors and residents. It is closely related to *doxa*: taken-for-granted beliefs. Habitus/*doxa* are the internalisation of social order, reinforced through everyday practices so that actors' instinctive practices and beliefs reproduce it. However, this does not preclude agency. Actors can improvise, make strategic choices, resist or transform their habitus or *doxa*, for instance by adopting heterodox habitus*/doxa* when experiencing dissonance between their mental and external structures (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 52–65; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 120–140; Bigo, 2011; Hopf, 2010; Berling, 2012).

Capital and habitus come into play within fields: networks of relations between social positions linked to a specific sphere of social activity with its own stakes and 'rules of the game' – e.g., security, politics, family. Capital determines people's position in a field relative to others while fields (including adjacent fields) influence what capital is available and how it is valued. Habitus and field co-constitute each other, as agents bring their existing habitus to the field while adapting to or challenging the field's dominant habitus. Both habitus and field are products of historical social relations, one embodied, the other external (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 16, 127; Bigo, 2011).

Like individuals, political parties – and organisations more broadly – have capital and a dominant habitus (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 194–2002). Organisational capital can be objectified and institutionalised (buildings, bureaucracies, personnel), embodied (shared dispositions, culture, world views) and symbolic (loyalty). Party officials can draw both on their personal and on the party's capital.

Actors and organisations can improve their position through the concentration of multiple species of capital across multiple fields. This is how Bourdieu (1994, pp. 4–5; italics in original) conceptualised the emergence of the modern state, namely as

> the *culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital*: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital. It is this concentration… which constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital…

Competing with this conceptualisation of the state as a unitary meta-field, Bourdieu also paints the state as a conflicting 'ensemble of fields that are the site of struggles… [over] the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence', in which both public (state) and private (nonstate) agents participate, creating varying hierarchies (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 112; Bourdieu, 2014; Berling, 2012). Bourdieu's state is thus both structural (in a material but also ideational sense) and agent-driven (Arnholtz & Hammerslev, 2013), enabling us to analyse the interplay between structure and agency in security practices.

Bourdieu's state ideal is Weberian with a monopoly of *both* legitimate physical *and* symbolic violence. However, in the absence of a monopoly, state and nonstate actors alike can claim

varying levels of legitimacy and dominance across space, depending on how much (meta)-capital they have acquired in a location. The ability to make successful claims varies spatially. Statist meta-capital can lose value, for instance, where a heterodox habitus or other forms of concentrated capital are dominant (e.g., clan-related or religious).

It is these claims, and the practices underpinning them, that produce what Mitchell calls 'state effects' (Mitchell, 1999). A focus on processes whereby actors negotiate capital and fields embedded in social relations rather than a focus on 'the state' allows us to see Lebanon not as an anomaly in terms of its particular state form, as it has been typically conceptualised (Marei, 2020, pp. 14–20), but as a site where 'state effects' can be made visible.

Contra treating fields, capital and habitus as 'static, isotropic' across space, we conceptualise Bourdieu's concepts as spatially and temporally dynamic (Holt, 2008).[5] Following Ripoll (2012, p. 121; translation ours), capital, habitus and field '[do] not have… equivalent value in all places' but are (re)-inscribed unevenly across 'physical space', 'social [or institutional] space' and 'mental space'. The everyday security field in Dahiyeh is both uneven and fluid – with habitus, capital and its valuation differing from place to place and time to time due to actors' choices and movement. With Low (2014), we conceptualise residents and security actors as 'mobile spatial fields', carrying capital and habitus that are enmeshed in broader social and political structures and interact with the local capital and habitus of other actors.

SPATIALISED CAPITAL

Although outsiders cast Dahiyeh as dangerous, most of our interlocutors – bar those from/near informal areas – reported feeling safe in Dahiyeh, crediting this to its strong sense of community, Hizbullah's (or Amal's) presence and increased coordination between political parties and state agencies. Two-thirds of respondents to a 2013 Dahiyeh poll similarly indicated feeling secure, even while being dissatisfied with crime (Hayya Bina, 2013). A young woman summarised this position, saying that 'if I walk at night in Dahiyeh I am not scared if I am alone, but I would not walk alone elsewhere at night' (Tahwitat Tour-I, June 2019). This narrative is partly a counter to the stigmatisation of Dahiyeh, Hizbullah and Shi'a more broadly. Yet, a Judge (06/2019) based in Baabda, Mount Lebanon Governorate's capital, under which jurisdiction Dahiyeh falls, noted: 'crimes take place in Dahiyeh like any place'; while ISF Officers stressed that 'you see [crime] more' because 'Dahiyeh is much more overcrowded' and because of socio-economic deprivation in certain locations and historical state neglect (ISF Officer-I and II, 06/2019). In some areas, high incidences of shootings are reported (CSKC, n.d.). However, respondents also highlighted established mechanisms for dealing with insecurity: 'Things work… they are controlled', said a former Ouzai Resident (8/2018). Everyday security has a 'taken-for-granted quality'. It might be 'invisible in official politics' but it is 'performed, acted out and recreated' (Crawford &

[5] When Bourdieu discusses space, he typically means 'social space'. Physical space, when discussed, is treated as derivative of social space, not as co-producing each other (cf. Bourdieu, 1970, 1999, 2008; Wacquant, 2018).

Hutchinson, 2016, p. 1192). How then is everyday (in)security negotiated in this urban space?

Which security actor acts or is asked to act depends on their capital and its valuation relative to the incident, location and others in the security field. This is influenced by the area's dominant habitus at a given time, the level of homology between residents' and security actors' habitus and the field's localised rules of engagement. Although capital cannot be separated from field and habitus, we start by mapping the capital the main security actors possessed at the time of our research across Dahiyeh.

State actors

'Where do you see the state security agencies? You see them on the entry/exit points of Dahiyeh…'
(Baabda Judge, 06/2019)

State security actors range from the Municipal Police and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) – encompassing local stations and the externally based Mount Lebanon Police Division, Information Bureau, Judicial Police and Office for Combatting Drugs – to General Security, State Security, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Military Intelligence. The Municipal Police are the most ubiquitous; but their remit is primarily traffic and municipal violations (Baabda Judge, 06/2019; Saliba, 2013).

Fig. 2 Map of police stations in Dahiyeh (Google Maps, 18/01/2019)

The state actors most active in Dahiyeh at the time of our research were the ISF and the LAF. The ISF's objectified capital consists of five police stations, historically built in the villages of Bir Hassan (Ghobeiry), Haret Hreik, Burj al-Barajneh, and in Mreijeh and Ouzai (fig. 2). These are positioned along Dahiyeh's rim and due to population density and poor infrastructure are thus distant to residents in both physical and mental space. The majority of our respondents indeed reported not going to the police, except for insurance or liability purposes.

The ISF's community policing ideal (piloted in Beirut) is 7 officers per 1,000 residents – requiring 5,600-7,000 to cover Dahiyeh's estimated population. Estimates for actual

numbers were 70-125 officers for *all* of Dahiyeh (Former Deputy Mayor, 05/2018; Mayor and son, 05/2018; ISF Officer-II, 06/2019; Nazzal, 2012). With minimal local police, the ISF, as an organisation, thus is short on local social capital, reducing its capacity to generate informational capital.

The ISF were also regarded as distant in institutional space, affecting its symbolic capital. This partly goes back to the historical division between the police handling main roads, municipalities the inner roads (ISF Officer-I, 06/2019). Further, most of the ISF's reported interventions came from departments outside Dahiyeh (CSKC, n.d.). As one respondent illustrated:

> you need to go submit [a] report in Baabda at the Public Prosecution's Office… so that they get convinced that they need to commit… (Tahwitat resident, 07/2019)

The ISF was seen as ineffective, accentuating this sense of institutional distance. As two respondents on the Mreijeh-Laylaki border (06/2019) put it:

> Where is the station? It's very close, it's next block… One time, a problem broke out here on the street… We call and we call […] but no one shows up…

This dynamic was exacerbated by police viewing (semi-)informal areas of Dahiyeh as dangerous due to past clashes with clan factions (ISF Officer-II, 06/2019). The ISF's symbolic capital was further weakened by the perception that its leaders have been historically close to the anti-Hizbullah pro-US/Saudi bloc around the Future Movement (Macaron, 2017; also Tahwitat and Laylaki Shopkeepers, 05/2018; Laylaki and Mreijeh Tour, 06/2019). The combined deficit in local symbolic capital weakened the ISF's ability to draw on statist capital, leading residents to associate the ISF with the idea of the negligent state (Tahwitat Tour-I, 07/2019; ISF Officer-I and -II, 06/2019).

The Lebanese Armed Forces were rated higher and more trusted in Dahiyeh than the ISF by both our respondents and surveys by Hayya Bina (2014, 2015). The LAF have had a semi-permanent presence at roadblocks around Dahiyeh since the 2013 bombings by militant *jihadi* groups and have dealt with shoot-outs, drug-related crime and armed suspects within Dahiyeh (CSKC, n.d.) – described approvingly by interviewees as 'cleaning' out the area.

Better organisational efficacy, high-level networks and superior arms gave the LAF higher social and coercive capital. It had better informational capital through Military Intelligence. Better training and more soldier martyrs elevated its cultural capital. High societal trust through a reputation for neutrality and professionalism and good relations with Hizbullah (Free Patriotic Movement insider, 03/2016) increased its symbolic capital, enabling the LAF to draw more effectively on statist capital as it was popularly associated with the ideal of a protective state (cf. Obeid, 2010).

Political Parties

'If there are individuals that are not controllable, you go to the neighbourhood office of the Hizb or Harakeh [Amal]… they would… hand them to the state'
(Former Ouzai resident, 08/2018)

At the time of our research, the dominant nonstate security actors in Dahiyeh were Amal and Hizbullah. It is to them that most respondents said they would turn. Hizbullah's objectified and institutionalised capital was more extensive and denser than any actors' in Dahiyeh. As the Baabda Judge (06/2019) said, Dahiyeh 'is the base of Hizbullah'. Hizbullah has divided Dahiyeh into six 'sections', roughly corresponding to municipalities, sub-divided into 'factions' consisting of 4-5 'groups' representing neighbourhoods. Within each faction, Hizbullah has objectified and institutionalised capital – a local representative, around 120-150 members, offices, centres, security personnel and sometimes roadblocks (Daher, 2019, p. 128; Harb, 2010, p. 79; Burj resident-I, 05/2018; Former Ouzai resident, 08/2018). At 120-150 members, each faction is larger than the total of local police for the whole of Dahiyeh. Only a proportion of members are designated everyday security personnel (e.g., *Indibat,* for keeping order) but Hizbullah can draw on this broad membership for surveillance, mediation and maintaining order. It can also draw on its capital in the military field, even though it seldom deploys its military capital in everyday security matters.

Further blurring the lines between security actors and residents, Hizbullah has mobilised ordinary residents to keep order. As university students noted (Fawaz et al., 2009, 07e; ; Haret Hreik student, 04/2015), Hizbullah's policing

> includes an indirect level of control operated by ordinary dwellers who feel a sense of responsibility towards enforcing [Hizbullah's] restrictions… This mechanism contributes to the creation of a sense that "Hezbollah is always there even if you don't see it", which has a deterring aspect…

Amal has a comparable structure, dividing Dahiyeh into five regions with five subsections, the most extensive of which is subdivided into neighbourhoods (Harb, 2010, pp. 79–80). However, since Amal's late 1980s defeat against Hizbullah, its infrastructure has been spatially more limited and discontinuous. Its objectified and institutionalised capital is concentrated around party offices, roadblocks and particular streets and neighbourhoods, including where its leaders live. These concentrations of social capital are turned into symbolic capital by its members' active involvement in – and regular imposition of – everyday security. As one respondent in Tahwitat noted, where 'the majority [in a street] are Amal', Amal 'would solve your issue' (Tahwitat Tour-II, 07/2019). Amal's security provision echoes the historical model of the *qabaday* (strongman), mobilising local men with enough coercive and social capital to impose order (e.g., for Beirut, see Saleh & Zakar, 2018).

A reputation for operational efficacy, articulated by many of our interlocutors, increased parties' symbolic capital – 'managerial legitimacy' in Hizbullah's case (Harb, 2010, pp. 244–249), a more rough-and-ready reputation for getting things done in Amal's. Complementarity between the parties (even if sometimes strained) has enhanced the capital of both. As a shopowner in Tahwitat quipped: 'In terms of safety… we have security the most in Dahiyeh… there is Hezbollah *and* Haraket Amal' (Tahwitat Tour-I, 07/2019).

Both parties consist of people who are socially embedded in Dahiyeh; representatives typically have high social capital (Daher, 2019, p. 140), enabling the accumulation of

informational capital. As a respondent from Burj (08/2018) put it, the parties know about incidents before the security agencies because they are closer to the people.

Unlike the police, Hizbullah's and Amal's offices are not focused solely on security but provide a wide range of services across multiple fields (welfare, housing, employment), strengthening their capital in the security field and their overall presence in material, institutional and mental space. Hizbullah furthermore gains symbolic capital from the 'socio-religious legitimacy' (Harb, 2010, pp. 247–249) that comes from its role in the religious field.

Although Hizbullah's overall capital is greater than Amal's, Hizbullah's capital is not uniform across Dahiyeh. Its presence is denser where its leadership and high-security infrastructure are located (e.g., Haret Hreik). In more informal areas, such as Laylaki and Ouzai, where 'there are no security installations here, there is less… security presence from Hizbullah and more of the clans' (Laylaki and Mreijeh Tour, 06/2019).

Clans and families

The third type of security actor active in Dahiyeh were clans and families. Clans are originally from the Biqa or Jbeil. Families are either local or from the South. Clans' capital is often concentrated within the neighbourhoods in which they have historically settled. The Mokdad clan's capital, for instance, is concentrated in Hayy Mokdad in Ruwais, Shari' al-Mokdad in Ghobeiry and parts of Ouzai. The Zeaiters' is concentrated in Laylaki (Dahiyeh Driving Tour, 05/2018). Clans are currently particularly strong in (semi-)informal neighbourhoods, such as Laylaki and Ouzai, where state actors and the parties have less presence (Tahwitat Tour-I, 07/2019).

Though clans lack the bureaucracy of parties and state actors, they have the social capital of numbers (Luca, 2015; Samaha, 2012), a level of organisation and coercive capital, particularly if a clan faction is involved in drugs trafficking or smuggling. They further have two powerful sources of symbolic capital: a clan code which, among other things, requires members to protect each other, and what some residents called the 'aura' of weapons (Burj resident, 08/2018). Weapons do not just provide coercive capital, enabling extraction of protection money or control of local services (Laylaki and Mreijeh Tour, 06/2019; Harb & Deeb, 2012). They also increase a clan's authority to impose everyday security in accordance with the clan code – not unlike the intertwining of coercive and symbolic capital in state formation (Bourdieu, 2014, pp. 200–201).

Clans and families typically have a *kabir* [elder; pl. *kbar*]. A Tahwitat shopowner (07/2019) explained:

> in principle every family has a *kabir*… our *kabir* is his father [pointing to a friend]… he is known: a good person, a *qabaday*, and he has money… he is fair… he does not like injustice… if someone abused your right, he brings it back for you… and [he is] connected… in the Hizb [as a representative]… [and] in the state.

Kbar have localised informational capital, in certain areas more than parties. Following one respondent:

> If something happens, it reaches the clan guy first – they have the men on the ground – and then the parties… before it can take its course through the state. (Laylaki and Mreijeh Tour, 06/2019)

If respondents suspected clan members of being involved in an incident, they went to the clan (Dahiyeh students, 05/2018; Laylaki shopkeeper and friends, 05/2018; Tahwitat Tour-I, 07/2019).

Equally important is the cultural and social capital of *kbar*, which gives them authority to mediate, prevent escalation and play a central role in everyday security (Laylaki and Mreijeh Tour, 06/2019).

The concentration of multiple types of capital made *kbar* the go-to security actor in several neighbourhoods. *Kbar* can enhance their capital by occupying multiple positions, being simultaneously a party representative or high-ranking officer. Consider the way a resident of Tahwitat (07/2019) had his stolen motorbike returned from a clan gang. The resident, though not a clan member, contacted a clan connection who held a position in Military Intelligence:

> I called Military Intelligence that day, calling [name removed]… He called the father of the café owner… who stole my motorbike. He told him: "I am here in [location removed] and your son has this motorbike, and I am expecting it to come to me". And indeed, the motorbike came back.

A respected clan member can command authority; however, their word takes on a whole other dimension when backed by the statist and coercive capital of Military Intelligence.

In sum, everyday security actors enjoy layers of capital that are enmeshed in broader social and political structures, blurring the distinction between state and nonstate actors. The concentration of various types of capital at a given time – meta-capital in the case of Hizbullah – solidifies the role of nonstate actors as primary providers of everyday security. State actors have varying levels of capital and their ability to draw effectively on statist capital is affected by the level of symbolic capital they enjoy in the community. Capital valuation by residents thus plays an important role in negotiating everyday security practices for people to 'foster security for themselves' (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016, p. 1188).

SPATIALISED HABITUS

Habitus, homology and heterodoxy

Habitus affects how capital is valued and which security actor an individual goes to 'instinctively'. The social and political structures of Dahiyeh have privileged the formation of a habitus that sees the parties' capital as 'natural', thus turning it into symbolic capital. This is partly because the parties are products of the same social structures as Dahiyeh's population, having emerged from and evolved in the South, the Biqa and Dahiyeh. Such

homology is helped by Amal and Hizbullah providing services across multiple fields, expanding routine contact with the parties; and compared to other Lebanese parties, they operate in some of the most sectarianly homogeneous communities (Cammett, 2014, pp. 103–105). Sectarian identity does not solely determine habitus, as class, place, schooling, political-ideological affiliation, place of origin all play a role. However, sectarian identification and representation are the basis of Lebanon's political system and Lebanon's elites have 'aggressively clamped down on alternative, cross-sectarian, and heterogeneous modes of political subjectification' (Salloukh et al., 2015, p. 70).

Hizbullah has invested heavily in promoting the conditions favouring its dominant habitus, while delegitimising and silencing heterodox habitus (ibid., pp. 169–172). It has invested systematically in creating both a pious and a resistance culture in Dahiyeh, through schools, the Mahdi Scouts, welfare agencies, the 'pious' leisure industry, its media, control of Dahiyeh's municipalities and its security dominance (cf. Harb & Leenders, 2005; Deeb & Harb, 2013; Khatib et al., 2014). For many in Dahiyeh there is thus a close fit between 'objective structures' and 'internalized structures', conditioning them to recognise Hizbullah's dominance, in Bourdieu's terminology, 'not as arbitrary,… but as a… natural order which goes… unquestioned' (Bourdieu 1977, 165-166). The readiness of Hizbullah members to die for the resistance and Hizbullah's investment in a martyrdom culture through ubiquitous posters, media programmes and special cemeteries enhance Hizbullah's overall cultural and symbolic capital, enabling it to augment this homology and delegitimise heterodoxy. The veneration that its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, inspires and the belief that he will protect his supporters (Daher, 2019, pp. 154–171; Calabrese, 2016, pp. 187–207) further increases this symbolic capital. As one respondent (08/2018) summarised:

> they lived the war first hand… they will protect us… we are not worthless… in 2006 Nasrallah said that 1 building in Dahiyeh is worth 10 in Israel…

This homology/orthodoxy has been increasingly questioned in Dahiyeh. Hizbullah's accrual of meta-capital has meant that some have come to see it as complicit in the political system's corruption (Dahiyeh election chats, 05/2016; 05/2018). Since Hizbullah entered into the Syrian war, its dominance has been more openly questioned, but also more strongly defended despite misgivings over lack of development and increase in crime – 'least we can do is to show gratitude… by voting… preserving the resistance…' (Baalbek election chats, 05/2018; also Dahiyeh election chats, 05/2016; Sufair resident, 12/2018). Hizbullah's resistance narrative is less contested (Hayya Bina, 2014, 2015), even among those who voted against it (Dahiyeh election chats, 05/2016; 05/2018), bolstering its position in the everyday security field.

Although those critical of Hizbullah may value its capital less, rendering this capital uneven across the space it dominates, the overall capital and habitus Hizbullah brings to the everyday security field still make it the go-to security provider. Take the following testimony from a resident of Burj al-Barajneh (05/2018), who had grown up in Europe:

> Here in this street, there is a police station four streets away and an army checkpoint at the end… But… people don't go to the army or the police… I'll give you an example: My cousin wanted to extend his living room, so he broke down the wall dividing his building from ours and extended his room by two meters. If I want to rent out that space, it is now worth a lot

> less. But I didn't go to the police, because they'd make you pay, $200, $500 and then my cousin pays them and they prolong the process; then they tell you to go to the court, but that costs more money and takes a lot of bureaucracy… So, I asked around in the neighbourhood and they said: go to this man, he can get this sorted. He was from the Hizb. […] So even I, who want to build a state here, avoid the state and go to the Hizb.

Our interlocutor saw the state as the natural security actor; yet his experience of the state in Dahiyeh made him doubt its efficacy, leading him to Hizbullah. This was part rational calculation about Hizbullah's greater local capital and reputation for lack of corruption and for delivering. But his calculus (and agency) was influenced by those around him, for whom Hizbullah was the 'natural' choice. The repeated experience – personal but also communal – of turning to Hizbullah can through what Bourdieu (1999, p. 124) calls the 'naturalization effect' over time develop into a habitus that makes approaching Hizbullah seem natural, contributing to the construction of a Hizbullah-oriented space.

In this instance, the choice was still calculated, rather than habitual. But the more people turn to a particular security actor, even if their choice is initially calculated, the more the practice of turning to that actor becomes socially inscribed in the area. The 'logic of practice', emphasising agency, turns into the 'logic of habit', emphasising structure, through 'repeated exposure to how things are, and are not, done' (Hopf, 2010, pp. 542, 544–547). This type of habitual practice cannot be fully explained by rational choice, norm socialisation or discursive analysis, as it can be wholly unreflective 'knowing-how' based on 'bodily experience and practice' (Pouliot, 2008, pp. 260–269).

Translocal habitus

Place of origin was a key factor in everyday security dynamics in Dahiyeh. As a Southern student from Dahiyeh put it (05/2018):

> How security is dealt with and by whom differs between those who came from the South and those who came from the Biqa. Those from the Biqa are members of clans... If there is a fight between members of different clans… Hizbullah will deal with the incident through the clans… If the people in the fight are from the South, they do not have a large family to protect them, so it will go through the Hizb.

To capture these translocal 'site effects' (Bourdieu, 1999, pp. 123–129),[6] we propose the notion of a 'translocal habitus' (cf. 'transnational habitus' in Guarnizo, 1997; Kelly & Lusis, 2006; 'translocality' in Low, 2014). Habitus being 'a sense of one's place' (Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 141), it includes a sense of one's family's place of origin – its social hierarchies, capital, dispositions, everyday practices.

Limiting ourselves to translocal site effects within Lebanon, rather than also consider Lebanon's Diaspora or transnational security networks, most inhabitants of Dahiyeh continue to have strong links with their places of origin. These linkages are in part sediments

[6] Though Bourdieu emphasised the effect of historical trajectories (including ruptures through displacement) on actors' capital, habitus and field position (cf. Bourdieu, 1986a, pp. 110, 447; Bourdieu & Sayad, 1964; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 117), he did not develop translocality theoretically.

of how migration was initially inscribed into Dahiyeh by 'adult males… with families to support' for whom 'the village remained their real home' (Halawi, 1992, p. 76; Former Ouzai Resident, 08/2018; Sufair resident, 12/2018; Dahiyeh students, 05/2018). Families and inhabitants from the same village often clustered together, spatially and socially inscribing their translocal linkages (cf. Fawaz & Peillen, 2003, p. 19; Khuri, 1975, pp. 46–62). Such linkages continue to be reinforced by the persistence of family neighbourhoods, regular home visits, the continuation of consanguineous marriages (El-Kheshen & Saadat, 2013) and the requirement for the vast majority of Dahiyeh's residents – over 70% according to Harb (2010, p. 78) – to vote in their family's place of origin, cementing them in translocal electoral clientelist networks.

Translocal habitus reflected differences in social structures between Southerners and those from the Biqa, with important ramifications for the security field. The South has long come to be dominated by a handful of *zu'ama* families (e.g., As'ad, Osseiran), weakening its clan structures. When their rule was replaced by political parties in the 1970s-1980s, 'people turned to Amal and Hizbullah' (Dahiyeh students, 05/2018; also Nasr, 1985; Halawi, 1992).

By contrast, though feudal lords emerged in the northern Biqa, for historical, geographical and socio-legal reasons the clans were too strong to submerge, remaining a dominant structure (Nasr, 1985; Winter, 2010, p. 175; Samaha, 2012). In addition, the northern Biqa suffers from severe chronic socio-economic and security problems, reinforcing people's reliance on clan in the absence of a state tradition. As a clan member from Baalbek told Luca (2015), 'there is no state. We're on our own. The people… have their own laws'– clan codes, including the 'law of blood', which dictates how clan disputes are dealt with.

Sediments of clan-based Biqa habitus can be seen in Dahiyeh's clans, varying across clan factions and communities. Asked if family plays a part in life in Dahiyeh, a respondent from the Biqa said: 'We take traditions of the village to the city… we are not shy about this. […] There are blood ties, existential ties' (Sufair resident, 12/2018; also, Former Deputy Mayor, 05/2018).

Clan habitus concerns all aspects of life, not just the security field. However, this translocal habitus affects the security field's calculus:

> If I know that they are from the Biqa, I will take more precautions and take more force with me… Whereas if it were someone from the South, there is no need…' (ISF Officer-II, 06/2019).

Parties must also reckon with the (trans)local habitus of clan loyalty and cannot take for granted their own members' obedience when confronting their clan.

The historical absence of state actors from parts of the South and the Biqa contributes to a translocal habitus that is disposed towards the clans or the parties over the state in the security field. If state actors are similarly experienced as absent in Dahiyeh, this translocal habitus is reinforced.

However, habitus is affected by lived structures and practices and can be transformed. In a street on the border between Mreijeh and Tahwitat, five shopkeepers – all but one from the South or the Biqa – conveyed that they would go to the police to report a theft (Tahwitat Shopkeepers, 05/2018). Their mental security map no longer matched their translocal habitus. Various factors may be behind this. The local Mreijeh police station was reportedly more active than other Dahiyeh stations (CSKC, n.d.), which may have had a naturalisation effect on our interlocutors' habitus. By contrast, shopkeepers in neighbouring Laylaki (05/2018), where ISF interventions were limited (CSKC, n.d.), regarded the police as absent, despite being equidistant to the same Mreijeh station. *Doxa* also seemed to play a role. The Mreijeh-Tahwitat shopkeepers praised state expansion in Dahiyeh, crediting this to rapprochement between Hizbullah and the state after Hizbullah became part of government. What had changed was not their 'state ideal' but their scepticism towards the state and their willingness to resort to it (cf. Obeid, 2010; Hermez, 2015), encouraging a shift in habitus in the everyday security field.

Habitus is thus not static. Agency can open up new possibilities (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016, p. 1192; Huysmans, 2009, p. 202) and create new habits. Sedimented habitus*/doxa* – including translocal – can be overlaid by habitus*/doxa* inculcated by new structures and practices, continuously (re)shaping how everyday security is practised.

SPATIALISED FIELD

It is in fields that capital and habitus play out, but fields are not homogeneous across space. They form a 'more complex spatiality' than Bourdieu acknowledged, with 'multiple and overlapping spaces' characterised by 'discontinuity, fragmentation and contradiction' (Painter, 2000, p. 257).

The relative value of capital and which rules and habitus dominate varies across the field's space; for instance, the capital of parties and state actors had less value in Dahiyeh's clan-dominated areas, where a clan habitus was more likely to overlay party or state habitus. Shopowners in Laylaki who turned to clan connections might approach Hizbullah if they lived in Haret Hreik or Amal in Bir Hassan (Laylaki and Mreijeh Tour, 06/2019). Conversely, how people value capital and how they act reshapes space. The more people turn to the police in Tahwitat or Hizbullah in Burj, the more those areas become ISF- or Hizbullah-centric.

The everyday security field varies not just across physical space but also depending on the type of incident and the mobile fields of those involved. Among state actors, low-level theft was usually handled by local ISF stations; drugs trafficking and larger thefts by regional ISF divisions (e.g., Information Bureau, Judicial Police) or Military Intelligence; clan or gang shoot-outs typically by the LAF. This is partly a product of the different types of capitals security actors possess; Military Intelligence and the Information Bureau typically have more informational capital regarding drugs trafficking, the LAF has more coercive and symbolic capital and can draw more effectively on statist capital, making them better-suited to high-intensity violence and absorbing the targeted community's anger. Habitus also affects which actors are expected to deal with specific types of incidents, whether through

the naturalisation effect of repeated practices or homology between the habitus of security actors and those seeking security. For instance, clan or family disputes were typically solved by *kbar*, especially if the *kabir* was also a party representative or state actor (as with the motorbike from Tahwitat). Place-based habitus also influences how security actors act: ISF officers activate different registers of their habitus in clan-dominated zones than in party-dominated zones.

The security field should thus be conceptualised as multiple potential spaces – which one is activated depends on incident, location, the assemblage of potential actors and the valuation of their capital at the time. Although political and social structures make certain outcomes more likely, the actualisation of a particular field configuration has an ephemeral quality, creating space for innovation – 'a continuously emergent enacting of what [everyday security] can be' (Guillaume & Huysmans, 2019, pp. 289–292).

Which actor dominates depends on the volume, makeup and valuation of their capital relative to others. The combination and concentration of capitals in Dahiyeh, reinforced by its cumulated capital nationally, currently gives Hizbullah a localised meta-capital that allows it to shape the value of the different forms of capital in the security field and the rules governing it, placing Hizbullah at the top of Dahiyeh's security hierarchy overall. The Baabda Judge (06/2019) confirmed this, saying that

> it is *al-lajneh al-'amniyeh* [Hizbullah's Security Committee] that handles security within Dahiyeh… [There are] no raids [by state actors] if there is no green light… (cf. also ISF director Ashraf Rifi, US Embassy Beirut, 2008)

However, this hierarchy fluctuates with space, actor and type of incident. In Laylaki, Hizbullah's capital was lower, the clan's higher. In Mreijeh, it was less dominant vis-à-vis the ISF than in Haret Hreik.

Hierarchy also does not prevent interdependence and complementarity. For example, parties are dependent on the state for judicial process and incarceration. They may be the first involved in incidents, but when it comes to arresting, they lift 'political cover' for the state to act (Baabda Judge, 06/2019). Hizbullah has neither the infrastructure nor the symbolic capital to undertake judicial process and manage incarceration (Former Deputy Mayor, 05/2018), underlining how the state's 'scaffolding' underpins Hizbullah's capital in the everyday security field.

Hizbullah similarly recognises that despite its accumulated capital it lacks the statist and symbolic capital of the LAF. Because it relies on the clans for votes and foot soldiers locally and translocally in the Biqa – bringing translocal habitus, capital and field into play in Dahiyeh – it cannot afford to lose capital by antagonising the clans, so it mediates through *kbar* or asks the LAF to step in, creating shifting hybrid security assemblages. Following a student from Dahiyeh (05/2018):

> Zeaiter is 55,000 strong, the biggest clan in Lebanon… In Dahiyeh, Hizbullah leaves such big clans alone, lets them sort out their internal business… when two clans clash, they step in to impose order… [but not] with guns blazing; more often it is diplomatic, involving tribal

shaykhs… (also Dahiyeh Driving Tour, 05/2018; Tahwitat Tour-I, 07/2019; US Embassy Beirut, 2008).

In recent years, the overall balance of capital has begun to alter, creating openings for others to '[mobilize] different types of capital in a field in which fundamental assumptions (doxa) have been… called into question' (Berling, 2012, p. 471). Hizbullah's ability to deploy its capital in the everyday security field has diminished following its increased role in government after Syria's 2005 withdrawal, its focus on reconstruction post-2006 war, its involvement in Syria and fluctuations in Iran's ability to provide support (Harb & Deeb, 2012; Former Mreijeh resident, 04/2016; Tahwitet Shopkeepers, 05/2018). This retreat has enabled criminality, drug trafficking and prostitution, increasing the capital of some clan factions while weakening Hizbullah's symbolic capital and forcing it to spend cultural capital on religious campaigns like 'Order comes from belief' (Nazzal, 2012; ISF Officer-II, 06/2019).

State actors have expanded their role at Hizbullah's request. Recurring state 'security plans' (e.g., 2013, 2015 and 2017) have targeted quarters 'controlled' by fugitives in areas such as Laylaki or Hayy al-Joura in Burj al-Barajneh. During these operations, state actors led while the parties provided support and informational capital (*Daily Star*, 'Security plan in southern suburbs to be expanded', 29/04/2015; Tahwitat Tour-I, 07/2019). The parties ceded space but reclaimed dominance in the everyday security field once the raids were complete. However, as our respondents' positive reception of the expansion of state actors' roles suggests, this has started to affect both residents' *doxa* and their valuation of capital in the field.

Although overall hierarchy in Dahiyeh's everyday security field is shaped by Hizbullah's accumulation of meta-capital, localised hierarchy fluctuates according to place, time, actors and type of incidence. Shifting hybrid security assemblages form through competition and complementarity based on differences in capital, habitus and capital valuation. Rather than simply imposed, hierarchy, as the actualisation of field dynamics, involves constant negotiation between the various security actors and residents (cf. Guillaume & Huysmans, 2019, p. 284).

CONCLUSION

To explore dynamics of everyday (in)security in contested urban spaces with multiple security actors, we grounded our research in Dahiyeh and developed a conceptual framework that makes possible a spatially complex analysis of the capital and habitus that residents and security actors possess in a fluctuating security field.

Built through dialogue between vernacular experiences and our operationalisation of Bourdieu in Dahiyeh, this framework allowed us to conceptualise everyday (in)security as fluid, relational, negotiated and dynamic; agential yet often routine-based; and grounded in time, place and space (Huysmans, 2009; Pouliot, 2008; Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016). By focusing on capital, we were able to go beyond a Weberian state-nonstate dichotomy that does not match lived experiences in Dahiyeh, with both state and nonstate security actors operating across formal/informal boundaries. Habitus enabled us to consider how practices are shaped by both agency and unreflective routines while being enmeshed in social,

political and spatial structures – local *and* translocal. The notion of field enabled us to map the fluctuating hierarchies resulting from the spatially varied relations between different security actors, residents and the capital and habitus they embodied at a particular time. Taken together these conceptual tools add analytical depth to everyday security studies by helping us to explain and compare across space which particular security actors are more/less likely to be involved in everyday security incidents and how their different types and volume of capital can complement each other, creating shifting hybrid security assemblages.

In doing so, we have pushed Bourdieu's concepts in new directions. The value of an actor's capital varies not just depending on who is involved or on the type of incident, but also where it takes place, what other capital is present (or can be moved there readily) and how local residents value this capital at a given time. Both the spatial distribution of actors' capital and its specific make-up influences who acts where. During the timespan of our research, state actors' social capital was largely external to Dahiyeh, Hizbullah's capital pervasive throughout most of Dahiyeh and clan capital concentrated in certain areas but able to draw on translocal links. The ISF lacked social and symbolic capital in many areas and was consequently considered absent in material, institutional as well as mental space, hampering its ability to draw effectively on statist capital. The LAF had high social and symbolic capital and, despite having no physical base in Dahiyeh, was considered present in material, institutional and mental space in relation to higher risk incidents.

Habitus similarly fluctuates across space in terms of what habitus security actors bring to the scene, which habitus is dominant among residents there at a particular time, and how practices (re)inscribe habitus. Nonstate actors with accumulated meta-capital such as Hizbullah can shape this process, even for residents with a state-centric *doxa*, not only by delegitimising or silencing heterodoxy but by creating conditions that make them the rational go-to choice, turning over time into habitus. Homology between residents' and security actors' habitus increases the latter's capital, advantaging those with local ties.

We proposed the concept of 'translocal habitus' to capture the influence of translocal family relationships. Social and political structures – both sedimented and current – entangle residents not only in their place of residence but in their families' place of origin, often reinforcing translocal habitus (e.g., towards the state, parties or clan), affecting the calculations and practices of both residents and security actors. But habitus is not static. A habitus born of neglect by state institutions can transform into a state-oriented habitus if state actors' practices and residents' *doxa* about the state change and residents act on that change.

Fields and the hierarchies they give rise to are similarly uneven across space and time. They fluctuate with time and across physical and social space. The value of statist capital and rules of engagement in a clan-dominated informal area, for instance, differed from those typical of a middle-class Hizbullah-dominated space. Fluctuations in some clans' capital relative to Hizbullah's as a result of the Syrian war similarly affected field dynamics. Which field dynamics are activated – and thus, what hybrid security assemblages form – depends on location, type of incident, who is involved, their (trans)local capital and habitus and the

field dynamics at the time. Hierarchy is constantly (re)negotiated between security actors and residents, (re)shaping the meaning and contours of that space.

We developed this framework to explain everyday (in)security dynamics in Dahiyeh. But our broader aim was to forge a mid-range conceptual framework that can explain everyday (in)security elsewhere too – and indeed security, peace and governance dynamics more broadly. For instance, it can add analytical precision to analyses of 'state effects' by distinguishing between different fields, how they interact and what social relations underpin them.

Although the precise assemblage of capital, habitus and field characteristics differ, many of the dynamics experienced in Beirut's Southern Suburbs would resonate with residents in overcrowded urban quarters with translocal linkages and multiple security actors elsewhere. Non-Weberian hybrid security assemblages with blurred boundaries between public/private and local/translocal are common across the Global South and, for this, Beirut provides a better vantage point than security studies' usual Euro-American focus (Hazbun, 2017).

Consider the 'rurban' community in Cairo's City of the Dead, where housing patterns and cultural practices still often reflect regional origin and close links with place of origin remain common (Di Marco, 2011). A Bourdieusian analysis would enable reflection on the way sedimented rural habitus and translocal capital intersect with local urban habitus and capital, affecting who is asked to deal with everyday security problems and how. Attention to the spatial distribution of capital and habitus will shed light on why practices and assemblages differ between areas.

The model we developed can similarly help to explain everyday (in)security dynamics in urban communities in neo-liberal states in the Global North. Take armed gangs which in many cities constitute one of the most visible nonstate security actors with strong local social ties. What combination of capital, habitus and field dynamics enables gangs to act as 'protection agencies' in Los Angeles, for instance, or to perform local governance acts in London (Sobel & Osoba, 2009; Densley, 2014)? Do residents turn to a gang primarily because of its coercive capital? Or does a gang derive symbolic capital from their local social ties, a similar habitus to residents', or a reputation for getting things done? Why, conversely, do police forces lack symbolic capital in certain areas? Is it for lack of local social capital? A police habitus shaped by institutional racism? A community habitus shaped by state-sanctioned structural inequality, mass incarceration and symbolic violence, pitting community loyalty against cooperation with the police, as in the US's Stop Snitching movement (Asbury, 2011)? Meanwhile, what makes particular community members the go-to mediators in urban conflict, such as Chicago's CeaseFire programme (Skogan et al., 2009)? And what role do translocal factors play? The social and political context will differ between cases, but this can be captured by our framework's ability to account for different assemblages of capitals, *habitus* and field dynamics, grounded in their own time and place.

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