[H-Diplo Roundtable XXIII-32 on Nationalism and After: With a New Introduction from Michael Cox](#)

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H-Diplo ROUNDTABLE XXIII-32

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Introduction by Anne Deighton, University of Oxford

E.H. Carr (1892-1982), British diplomat and policymaker, historian, biographer, and journalist, was a very lucky man. The first reason for his luck is that he lived his long life even as exceptionally dramatic, profound, and often tragic changes in international politics were taking place around him. His publications about the events he was living through spanned the greater part of the twentieth century, through two world wars and their global consequences, and the profound changes in Russia/the Soviet Union. His early but decisive practical experiences in the British Foreign Office, especially as an advisor to the British Government at the Versailles Treaty negotiations were to shape his thinking and inform his extensive output on the nature of history as a discipline, on the big questions relating to international relations, and then on Russian and Soviet history. Although Carr

was trained as a classicist, the small world of British intellectual elites and commentators allowed him pretty much free rein as a historian and political analyst.

The second reason for Carr's luck – posthumous luck in this case however - is that Professor Michael Cox has devoted part of his own professional life to explaining and disseminating the ideas about international relations that Carr developed. This devotion has focused particularly on Carr's work on the most critical two decades of the twentieth century, the 1930s and 1940s, and has included a book-length assessment of his contribution to the field as well as an introduction to one of Carr's most well-known books, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (1939).[1] The book under consideration here, *Nationalism and After,* was first published in 1945, and is in reality little more than a 50 page pamphlet. Cox has written an outstanding introduction to *Nationalism and After*. The introduction alone demands careful reading by all those who wish to begin to understand the history and nature of the challenges that the world faced from the First World War, and must be one of the most compelling 50-page refresher courses in twentieth-century international history. If this is not enough, Cox's response to the four distinguished reviewers brought together for this symposium is effectively also the best introduction to Carr's pamphlet the reader could hope for, setting the pamphlet in its historical context and elaborating constructively on the four reviewers' own contributions.

Craig Calhoun, himself a distinguished scholar and author on nationalism and capitalism, notes that Carr's predictions were flawed as he did not anticipate the tenacity of nationalism in the second half of the twentieth century.[2] This is in part a harsh judgement on a pamphlet written in 1945, but nevertheless the point is well made – the impact of the fall of earlier empires, and of the Cold War do in part reveal that we are certainly not yet in a post-nationalist world. Neither was the role of the giant international capitalist corporations in a globalised world fully addressed by Carr. Yet, as Calhoun cleverly remarks, "Paradoxically, had Carr been right to think we were entering on an era after nationalism, his book would be of less interest today. His insights are therefore not into an imaginary future so much as into today's realities." Carr's pamphlet was therefore aspirational – and worthy of continued study as it throws light on how the future was foreseen in the dying months of the Second World War, but also on the *grandes lignes* of international relations which were not so evident in 1945.

Tomoko Akami's review deals with these shortcomings in a long and suggestive essay that ponders on the ways in which Carr's analysis is and is not helpful to scholars of International Relations today.[3] Three themes are picked out: Europe and missing empire; Carr's "liberalism" and the functionalist idea of international organizations promoting welfare for individuals; and the problem of emphasizing economic and social rights, while negating political and civil rights. This is a serious piece of scholarship which uses Carr's work as a springboard for insights into the discipline of International Relations (a discipline which, ironically, Carr disliked). It shows that Carr's pamphlet, which was essentially focused upon Europe, has relevance globally – for example she points out that this text has been translated into Japanese. Akami is particularly exercised about the importance of political and civil rights, alongside social and economic rights. This was indeed a point of contention in the creation of the United Declaration of Human Rights, and of the European Convention on Human Rights, both in the 1940s. Her review reveals the inherent tensions between the rights of states

(nations), and individual rights. The problems that conflict between the two still presents today are dealt with in a passionate and forthright way.

Randall Germain, who has written elsewhere on Carr himself, also widens the brief of the reviewer and takes the reader through a succinct but careful analysis of where *Nationalism* fits into Carr's own intellectual development.[4] The pamphlet has also captured one important and aspirational strand of how power and organisation could be altered in the world after 1945. Germain rightly puts emphasis upon functional integration, which was seen by many at the time as a way of combining functional technologies and technocracy with the desire for states to keep their statehood (aka sovereignty). Germain also emphasises the value of Cox's own work. International Relations scholarship has always had to grapple with the vastness of the canvas – the organisation of the world and its wars no less, alongside the specialised character of economics, legal practice, individuals' rights as citizens and workers, issues of sovereignty, before the various schools of emerging thought and generalisations– Realism, Liberalisms, structural issues, constructivist and more - are considered. The clarity that Cox brings in his introduction merits the positive observations of Germain.

Mary Kaldor's review likewise reflects her own preoccupations as a leading scholar of security studies understood in its broadest sense, and more particularly the security studies of the post-cold war world.[5] She wonders whether we are not experiencing a fourth wave of nationalism in our more thickly textured world of institutions, and a world in which individual and collective rights – as Akami also says – have become one of the most contentious areas of serious international (and national) politics. This is interesting as it takes the work of Carr forward on what well might have been his own terms, while also appreciating the ways in which the world has changed, especially with new preoccupations with global health and disease.

Together the reviewers show the difficulties in defining and operationalising the concept of nationalism over time and place, and the seemingly unsolvable problems of managing our internationalised world. Further, they all touch upon the relationship between international relations and economics, and specifically the global capitalist system. What is striking, and which is pointed out by the reviewers, is that this pamphlet which was written, remember, in 1945, still retains its relevance for today. It can of course be read as one of many such books produced as the Second World War ended, when victorious politicians were confronted with the problems of understanding what the Second World War had been about. Yet, in 1945, world leaders had once again to recast the New World Order, even as ideology, global markets, technologies, borders, citizens and nations all required and demanded problem-solving of the highest order. Yet *Nationalism* does also speak to our own days – the potential and the difficulties of international organisations, whether on a global or regional level, political or technocratic, and the inherent tensions between individual human rights and the demands of states (nation-states) for equal treatment in a hierarchical, rapidly changing, and dangerous world.

Participants:

Michael Cox is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics (LSE) and Founding Director of LSE IDEAS. He joined the LSE in 2002 having previously held a Chair in the Department of International Politics in the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. His most recent

books include *The Post-Cold War World* (Routledge, 2018), a centennial edition of John Maynard Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) and in 2022 *Agonies of Empire: American Power from Clinton to Biden* (Bristol University Press).

Anne Deighton is Professor Emeritus of European International Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations in the University of Oxford, UK. She is also a member of the History Faculty in the University of Oxford. She currently holds a Leverhulme fellowship to work on Ernest Bevin, Labour Minister in the Second World War. She has written extensively on Cold War history, British foreign policy, and on the development of European integration. A list of her publications is available at https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/academic-faculty/anne-deighton.html

Tomoko Akami is Associate Professor (Reader) at the Australian National University. She is the author of *Internationalizing the Pacific* (Routledge, 2002), *Japan's News Propaganda and Reuters' News Empire in Northeast Asia* (Republic of Letters, 2012), *Soft Power of Japan's Total War State* (Republic of Letters, 2014), and her recent works on the League of Nations have been published in various books and journals, including *The International History Review*, *The Journal of Global History*, and *The Journal of History of International Law*. She is currently working on the project, "Towards a Globalized History of International Relations," funded by the Australian Research Council (2020-2023).

Craig Calhoun, is University Professor of Social Sciences at Arizona State University. Previously, he was Director of the LSE, President of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and a professor at NYU, Columbia, and UNC-Chapel Hill. Calhoun has published widely in social theory, comparative historical sociology, cultural and institutional analysis, and political economy. His books include *Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China* (University of California Press, 1994); *Nations Matter: Citizenship, Solidarity, and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (Routledge, 2007); *Roots of Radicalism: Tradition, the Public Sphere, and Early 19th Century Social Movements* (University of Chicago Press, 2012); *Does Capitalism Have a Future*? (with Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Georgi Derluguian, and Michael Mann, Oxford University Press, 2013); and *Degenerations of Democracy* (with Dilip Gaonkar and Charles Taylor, Harvard University Press, 2022).

Randall Germain is Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Canada. His teaching and research focus on the political economy of global finance, issues and themes associated with economic and financial governance, and theoretical debates within the field of international political economy. His work has been published in journals such as *International Studies Quarterly*, *Review of International Political Economy*, *Review of International Studies*, *Global Governance*, and *European Journal of International Relations*. He is the author of *The International Organization of Credit* (Cambridge University Press, 1997) and *Global Politics and Financial Governance* (Palgrave, 2010). Most recently he edited *Susan Strange and the Future of Global Political Economy* (Routledge 2016). His current research projects explore the use of the idea of history in IPE and the future of world money.

Mary Kaldor is a Professor of Global Governance and Director of the Conflict Research Programme in LSE IDEAS. She has pioneered the concepts of new wars and global civil society. Her elaboration of the real-world implementation of human security has directly influenced European and national

governments. She is the author of many books and articles including *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Wiley, 3rd edition, P2012), *International Law and New Wars* (with Christine Chinkin, Cambridge University Press, 2017), and *Global Security Cultures* (Wiley, 2018).

Review by Tomoko Akami, the Australian National University

Compared to *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (originally published in 1939),[6] which caused controversies, inspired debates, created a myth that became constitutive of pedagogical knowledge of the discipline of International Relations (IR), and established itself as a classic in the field, *Nationalism and After* is less known. In the limited space below, with the help of the new introduction of Michael Cox,[7] I ponder the broader meanings of *Nationalism and After* for modern international relations. Here, I focus on three key points: Europe and missing empire; Carr's "liberalism" and the functionalist idea of international organizations promoting welfare for individuals; and the problem of emphasizing economic and social rights, while negating political and civil rights.

Europe, Missing Empire, and Extra-Europe

E. H. Carr's *Nationalism and After* (originally published in 1945)[8] is about Europe. This does not deny the possibility of the universal application of his insights, arguments, frameworks, and analyses across the regions and across time. But exactly because we are here to think about the book's broader implications, the point needs to be stated at the beginning.

The context of the book is also crucial. As Cox explains, its gestation began in a study group on nationalism, which Carr chaired in 1936-1939, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) (xli-xlii). The study group was one of those for the League of Nations' International Studies Conference (ISC, 1928-1954), which was set up to establish the "scientific study on international relations." Recent works regard the ISC as an important part of the genealogy of the discipline of IR.[9] The RIIA played a role of the national coordinating committee for ISC-related research projects in Britain, and Carr attended the ISC conference on "Peaceful Change" in Paris in 1937 while he was chairing this study group. According to Katharina Rietzler, Carr learned about the work of German scholar Fritz Berber through this conference, which influenced his writing of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.[10] Furthermore, the RIIA was a "national" unit for international research programs for another international organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925-1961). While the IPR had held regular international conferences on "Pacific problems" since 1925, during World War II its conferences and research projects, and also its expert networks, functioned as think tank for Allied forces, examining the war situations, and discussing the post-war order and reconstruction of Asia and the Pacific region.[11] By 1940, Carr appears to have become a marginal figure in these RIIA-coordinated research projects after his *The Twenty Years' Crisis* had severed his relationship with the central figures at the RIIA, such as Alfred Zimmern. As a result, although John Hope Simpson

suggested to the RIIA that Carr should study self-determination for its research project as early as in May 1940, the RIIA responded negatively, noting that he was not a "safe author."[12] Instead, the RIIA gave the job to Alfred Cobban, who published its result as *National Self-Determination* in 1944. In the preface of this book, however, Cobban thanked Carr, who "read and re-read" the whole manuscript, noting: "I am deeply grateful [to Mr. E.H. Carr] for a thorough and constructive criticism which helped me to eliminate many faults."[13] Carr, therefore, remained on the fringe of these RIIA's policy-relevant study groups and their milieu in the early 1940s, when he was writing *Nationalism and After,*[14] while his *Nationalism and After* and Cobban's *National Self-Determination* were written with mutual awareness.[15]

Developing "scientific" (universal) theories in the social sciences based on the experiences and sources of Europe was not new, and this fact does not necessarily diminish their validity. This process nonetheless created a few problematics in the nature of the disciplinary knowledge of IR, especially in the crucial formative period of 1919-1960. While its Euro-centric and/or racist nature has so far been problematized,[16] there has been little attention on the inherent structural problem which resulted from this knowledge-making process. Here I am referring to the national-international binary framework, which assumed nation-state as *the* basic unit of "inter-national" relations, and which neglected or dismissed the roles of empires (and other imperial polities) in "inter-national" relations, the "inter-national" system, and "Inter-national" Society.[17]

The national-international binary framework made sense for Europe after 1919. The principle of self-determination was applied to the territories in Europe which had been occupied by the continental (and lost) empires (Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman), and new nation-states were created. As a result, post-1919 Europe became a space where the national-international framework would work perfectly.

Carr recognized as problematic this nation-state-based international order in Europe, largely based on his observation of its brutal effects on the minorities in post-1919 Europe. Carr first faced this problem as the acting 'British Secretary of the New State Committee' for the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. As Cox details, for Carr and the Committee, the fair treatment of the minorities in the newly created nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe was the key for peace and stability in post-war Europe. The political leaders of these new states, however, did not intend to treat their minorities fairly, and resented "instructions" to do so from the great powers (xxv-xxx). Carr further developed profound scepticism of the inter-war dealings with the minorities in Europe, including the League's, that were based on the framework of the nation-state, and which assumed a homogeneous nation. He noted: "Perhaps the apex of nationalism [was] reached when it [came] to be regarded as an enlightened policy to remove men, women and children forcibly from their homes and transfer them from place to place in order to create homogeneous national units." In his view, this ended in "the mass sacrifice of human beings to the idol of nationalism" (26, 27). This criticism shines through the experience of the twentieth century and even now.

Nationalism and After was his solution to this problem. Carr presented an alternative unit to nation-state that was driven by the principle of self-determination for the post-war international order in

Europe. This was needed because first, "[a] peace settlement which transferred tens of millions of people to foreign allegiance—or, worse still, deported them from their homes—in the illusory quest for strategic frontiers" after 1919 would in fact cause a condition of eternal insecurity in Europe (46). Second, the principle of self-determination and "too much" assertion of political rights would lead to ever-dividing smaller political units that had to compete for their survival, but that would be militarily and economically unsustainable (30, 44-45). Rather, a stable new Europe should be based on larger units than nation-states. Peoples then needed to be united by their allegiance, not to a specific "nation," but to higher ideals, such as those to "improve the condition of life of ordinary men and women in all countries" (49). This was to an extent an insightful prediction for Europe: we have witnessed the development of the EU (but also the recent challenges to it), and yet this has strengthened even smaller units' self-determination: in Scotland, for example, the government in Edinburgh has stated its intention to break away from the established state entity, the UK, and to "re-join" the EU.

Despites Carr's advocacy for this alternative to the international order, however, his almost exclusive focus in Europe in *Nationalism and After* ironically reinforced the dominant national-international binary and the neglect of empire in three key aspects. First, his historical description of the second period of nationalism was largely devoid of reference to imperialism in the regions beyond Europe. He saw the nineteenth century as a "pacific" era under Pax Britannica in which British financial and navy supremacy contributed not only to its "national" interests, but also to the "international" peace, security, and prosperity (6-14). Although Carr referred to "colonization of the empty spaces" (11), his narrative of this period stressed the harmony of national and international spheres, with little reference to the fierce imperial wars and increasing anti-imperial movements in extra-Europe. Second, *Nationalism and After* did not anticipate the meaning of nationalism for de-colonization, one of the crucial factors in post-WWII global politics. To be sure, the book was about Europe, and *Nationalism and After* referred to Asia only a few times, and only in passing. What is striking, however, is how Carr characterized nationalism in Asia. He noted: "the demand for self-determination may *still* be heard" in Asia, "though perhaps more faintly and less confidently than of late" (emphasis added: 29-30).

This "negation" or "misjudgement" seems to indicate a limit to his understanding of the subject,[18] and this is even more puzzling as he had read at least twice the whole manuscript of Cobban's *National Self-Determination*, which included a chapter on extra-Europe.[19] Indeed nationalism in Asia would become one of the most significant topics among scholars in the emerging fields of IR and Asian Studies in post-WWII, and the central theme for the IPR's conference in Lucknow (1950).[20]

The job to problematize and theorize another aspect of nationalism, namely the connection between nationalism and imperialism, was, therefore, beyond the scope of *Nationalism and After*, and was left to other scholars. Maruyama Masao, for example, regarded "ultra-nationalism"/"extreme nationalism" as a driving force of imperialism of Japan. Among many works, this theme resulted in his two volume classic, *Gendai seiji no shisō to kōdō* in 1956-1957, which was translated into English as *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, and published by Oxford University Press in 1963.[21] While the first volume focused on Japan, the second volume examined the "politics of

ideology" and "being political and its limits" broadly, and here the influence of *Nationalism and After* was evident in its discussion of the development of nationalism in Europe.[22] Born almost two decades after Carr, Maruyama nonetheless shared some of his intellectual backbones, including Marx and Mannheim, had read Carr's other works, and appreciated his insights.[23] Yet, on the issue of nationalism after 1945, Maruyama disagreed with Carr's prediction on the decline of "old nationalism,"[24] and argued for the significance of nationalism in extra-Europe (or extra-Western Europe), especially in Asia.[25]

Third, there was little consideration of empires in Carr's account of the great powers, which were central in his alternative vision of the international order. He thought this new order would consist of political units that were bigger than nation-states and which would be led by the great powers. There, smaller states would be aligned with their respective leading great powers, which would cooperatively achieve the peace and security of Europe (and beyond) (44, 45, 48). He identified the USSR, the US, and the UK as such great powers. He was aware of the possibility of the abuse of power on the part of the great powers, and cautioned them not to fall into a "new imperialism" (43, 52). Yet, he stressed — and remained optimistic about — morality, and the sense of duty and responsibility of these powers, as well as the possibility of their sharing higher common principles and purposes (47-48). He developed these ideas based on his observation of wartime cooperation among the great powers, which soon proved to be a false guide. He underestimated the ideological, strategic, and economic conflicts between the two super powers, which divided the world, caused both fierce civil wars and hot wars, and threatened a nuclear global war. Moreover, Carr neglected a negative aspect of these "great powers" as "empires" or "neo-colonial powers" in extra-Europe. Rather, he regarded them as positive political units functioning to manage a multi-national community. Can Carr's post-nationalism global order best be characterized as an inter-imperial order? In Africa, where Carr assumed European empires would maintain their colonies, he seemed to suggest that such inter-imperial organizations would be good for the economic development and military security of their colonies (59).

Carr's Liberalism and Functional International Organizations for the Welfare of Individual

Although Carr understood that conceiving of an international order without considering power was not pragmatic, he also argued that principles, purposes, and ideals were equally important. Accordingly, he advocated functional international organizations not for the benefit of nations, but for improving the welfare of individuals across political borders (38). Here, he acknowledged the modest successes of the "technical" organizations of the League, such as the International Labour Organization, which were concerned with the welfare of individuals, rather than the security of nations, as well as wartime organizations, such as the Middle East Supply Centre, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, which had been set up for specific problems, with specific objectives, and in specific regions (35, 38-40). They were run by experts, they initiated and planned schemes, and coordinated implementations across political units. This argument was similar to that of functionalist international organization elaborated by David Mitrany, Carr's contemporary and a member of the League's ISC study projects.[26]

Here, the notion of welfare liberalism or reformism may help us to resolve the conundrum of Carr's ideological position in 1919-1945. Needless to say, Carr had long been regarded as the first IR scholar to define the artificial and rhetorical divide between liberalism/utopianism/idealism and realism, which became constitutive of the pedagogical disciplinary knowledge of IR. In recent years, this divide has been questioned as a myth, and Carr's ideological position, compounded by his support for appeasement in the late 1930s and for the USSR during the Cold War, has been debated extensively.[27] Cox also takes time to unravel Carr's ideological stance: Carr was "no liberal" or at least not of the *laissez-faire* kind; rather, he was "Marxist-influenced," "collectivist," and "progressive" (xv, xx, 1). In view of these recent works, two points seem to be clear. First, whether Carr was a liberal or realist is a futile, or at least not useful, question. It is impossible, unreasonable, and ahistorical to squeeze thinkers of diverse and complex ideas into two, static, and neat boxes. Moreover, being "liberal" could mean a wide range of stances between revolutionary and a conservatism that held on to the status quo. Second, Carr maintained a critical position that constant reforms were needed for correcting injustice in international politics, and for "an equality between human beings" (49-51).

Instead, welfare liberalism or reformism could be useful for making sense of Carr's ideological stance, including that in *Nationalism and After*. Although Carr had criticized President Woodrow Wilson and League supporters as "*laissez-faire*" liberals, by 1919 many "liberals," including League supporters, had shifted or were shifting to welfare liberalism[28] in the sense that they had accepted that the state had to plan and provide welfare policies for the expanding working class male voters in most industrialized countries, whose support was vital for government survival. More social problems had been identified, and the more one was conscious about social injustice, the more one would move closer to welfare liberalism, reformism, and social democracy, if not socialism. Those who supported welfare liberalism also inevitably saw the state positively as a provider of welfare schemes, rather than as an oppressor of political and civil rights. There was, therefore, a danger of welfare liberalism that argued for greater economic and social rights of citizens (social democracy) shifting to statist reformism with a greater state power, and even to National Socialism.[29] These inclinations make sense of Carr's positions: conceptually, his sympathy for "have-not" nations, and his consistently critical view of the international status quo of the powerful being unjust, and his argument for the need for the structural reforms to correct injustice in the international system.[30] Empirically, it explains his criticism of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, his susceptibility to the writing on international law and international politics of German scholars in the late 1930s,[31] and even his notorious support for appeasement. Reading his *Conditions of Peace* towards the end of the war in 1945, Maruyama was also surprised to read Carr's critical view that "political, economic, and moral contradictions were inherent in the classic liberalism" of Europe, which led to the rise of Nazism.[32] By then Carr had admitted that his soft stance towards the Nazis was wrong.[33] Yet, Carr continued to advocate reforms to the system in order to address existing injustice and grievance, and such belief was reflected in his vision for post-WWII functionalist international organizations in *Nationalism and After*.

The Problem of Emphasizing Economic and Social Rights, While Negating Political Rights.

There is merit in such functionalist international organizations, which are driven by welfare liberalism, run by experts who would act according to scientific knowledge in order to serve the global public good and improve social and economic rights of the individuals, provided that a mechanism of accountability is implemented in these institutions. Take a few examples of current global problems. We face the biggest global pandemic crisis in human history, and if the World Health Organization had a greater power to globally coordinate scientifically informed, expert-driven, uniform policy directions, vaccination production, and distribution programs across political borders, it might have saved millions of lives. Another global problem is climate change, which is already causing devastating impacts on the lives of peoples across political borders. While politicians speak and act mainly with the goal of winning domestic polls, an expert-led international organization could propose policy directions, and coordinate implementations through its regional offices for this dire threat to the globe.

There is, however, a significant pitfall for Carr's emphasis on the economic and social rights of individuals while negating the significance of political rights (49, 51). We have the privilege of hindsight, which Carr did not have in 1945. While most former colonies had attained self-determination and achieved independence after World War II, quite a few of these post-colonial states became dictatorial, justifying their regimes by their achievement of economic development, and, at the same time, severely suppressing the political and civil rights of dissidents. Such suppression also occurred in Communist regimes.[34] Now we live in the post-colonial, and post-Communist era, where the counterforce against a liberal democratic regime is no longer a Communist one on the left, but autocracy, which similarly emphasizes economic and social rights, while ruthlessly suppressing the political and civil rights of dissidents. We see the most recent cases in Russia, Belarus, and Hong Kong. We also witness the People's Republic of China's recent move to modify the norm of "human rights" at the UN Human Rights Council, shifting the emphasis from political and civil rights to economic and social rights.[35] Moreover, even in liberal democratic regimes, minority and indigenous peoples have yet to attain full political and civil rights.

In 1945, Carr thought the great powers held the key to maintain peace. He understood that these powers could share common principles and purposes as well as a sense of duty and responsibility for the broader public good. Despite their ideological differences, he thought, cooperation among the great powers was possible. Now in 2021, we have two autocratic great powers, which show little interest in the broader public good, while the morality and leadership of the liberal democratic great powers has been diminished substantially. A third World War would not be an option unless the leaders of these states are mad enough to destroy the globe. What can we then take home from *Nationalism and After*?

First, while attention to the economic and social rights of individuals remains important, this policy should not be pursued by international organizations at the expense of political and civil rights. Stronger international institutions, mechanisms, and conventions would be needed to protect the latter. Second, Carr's point about cultivating and fostering ethics and a sense of duty and responsibility for the global public seems to be more important than ever in the face of dire threats on a global scale. This, however, should be an issue not exactly for the great powers, but for

individuals across political borders who choose those who lead their governments, at least in liberal democracies. We have seen the horror of a demagogue who had no such ethics or sense of duty and responsibility taking the highest office of the leading democratic great power, who was endorsed and backed by the established political party machine and powerful media, and who was voted in by millions of its citizens. While the supporters of this force criticized their opponents as "radicals," "left," "socialist," and "Communist,"[36] the threat to their regime of freedom and rights is no longer Communism, but autocracy. For the coalition of liberal democratic regimes to be a strong counterforce to autocracy, ethics and a sense of duty and responsibility to the global public and the globe itself need to be grounded in each individual, and there is a lot that we, academics, should do in this space. Third, I hope scholars and commentators will not *cage* these fundamental values of liberal democracy as being "Western." In Russia, Belarus, Hong Kong, Myanmar and beyond, peoples are fighting with their lives at the frontline for their own "liberty" and "rights," and it is these values that bind, not divide, peoples across all political borders.

Review by Craig Calhoun, Arizona State University and LSE

The Elusive End of Nationalism

Nationalism did not go away when E.H. Carr thought it would, and it has not gone away since. A central role in the devastation wrought by two world wars was not enough to discredit it. Nor has increasing global integration made it obsolete. Like many others, Carr underestimated the extent to which nations and nationalism are integral to globalization, not antithetical to it. National belligerence and pursuit of narrow interests can indeed disrupt global order and more local structures of peaceful relations among neighbors. But organization into national rather than imperial states is not an optional add-on to the modern world-system. It is basic.

Modern capitalism may produce the common interests that Karl Marx hoped would lead the workers of the world to unite and that Carr hoped would lead to growing internationalism after WWII. But interests do not dictate solidarities. And capitalism also produces and reinforces the organization of economic globalization through a system of more localized states. This doesn't mean that the international cooperation for which Carr called is impossible. On the contrary, there are many successful examples. Some, like the Universal Postal Union, predate the upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century that gave Carr his primary context. Many more have been achieved since World War II, both in connection with building the European Union and other regional bodies and on a more global scale.

But these are structures of cooperation among states – and mostly nation-states. Moreover, they developed in relation to the structures of political and economic power in the modern world-system.[37] They reflect the domination of Euro-American power and capital, the partial but dominated inclusion of many other countries, and the peripheralization of most of the rest.[38] There was for a time competition from the Soviet-dominated attempt to build a counter-system, and an attempt to opt out on the part of non-aligned states, but both collapsed.[39] Now, however, the whole

system of cooperation is coming unglued as the modern world-system experiences growing disorder and potential transformation. This is linked to the decline of U.S. hegemony, the rise of China, a shift of the global center of economic gravity from Atlantic to Pacific, incomplete adjustment to a series of crises since the 1970s, and in Eurasia the challenge of effectively incorporating the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.[40]

Nationalism is back on the agenda, as it has been recurrently.[41] Paradoxically, had Carr been right to think we were entering on an era after nationalism, his book would be of less interest today. His insights are not into an imaginary future so much as into realities we still inhabit.

Rightly insisting that nations, nationalism, and relations among nations all change, Carr divides the modern history of nations and nationalism into three periods. The first runs from the "gradual dissolution of the mediaeval unity of empire and church" through the establishment of national states and churches (3). The period captured little of Carr's attention and perhaps barely qualified for inclusion in his account. There was an 'international of monarchs," all speaking the same language, and respectful of international law (because each claimed law as the basis of their own authority). Mercantilism flourished because it was "the economic policy of a period which identified the interest of the nation with the interest of its rulers" (5). Revolutions, which many would take as important to nationalism, are never mentioned (perhaps on the grounds that they are domestic rather than international events).

The second period runs from the end of the Napoleonic Wars through the beginning of First World War. It brought the democratization of nationalism – with extension of roughly equal participation to a political elite - accompanied by delicate balance between politics and economics, and between nationalism and internationalism. Napoleon Bonaparte used nationalism to make himself "the first 'popular' dictator. ... The 'democratization' of nationalism imparted to it a new and disturbing emotional fervour" (7). The nation was personified, an individual writ large, appropriate for an era of individualism. As a result, "a generation reared in the doctrine of a natural harmony of interest between individuals was readily persuaded of a harmony of interest between personified nations" (8). Nationalism was kept 'pacific' by its marriage to liberal rather than mass democracy. This was rooted in solidarity of the middle class with government, and therefore grounded in respect for private property. At the same time, economic expansion underwrote overseas empires and fluid migration, offering those not provided adequate opportunity in European countries with the chance to seek their fortunes and extend European influence abroad.

Two 'salutary illusions' were crucial: "that the world economic system was truly international, and second, that the economic and political systems were entirely separate and operated independently of each other" (10-11). In fact, Carr suggests, economic and political power were fused. London finance dominated domestically and Britain dominated globally. Indeed, "it was precisely because economic authority was silently wielded by a single highly centralized autocracy that political authority could safely be parcelled out in national units, large and small, increasingly subject to democratic control" (13). What we might now call 'hegemony' was thus the basis for peace, stability, prosperity (and European global domination, though Carr did not put it quite that way).

Britain's dominance (and capacity to secure global order) was brief; by 1870 decline was setting in.

This brought "the catastrophic growth of nationalism and bankruptcy of internationalism" that came to a climax in the first decades of the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, liberal democracy and liberal nationalism were based on the political participation only of narrow elites. From the late nineteenth century, nationalism was 'socialized'. Support from the masses became vital to national politics. This enabled the Left to assert itself, particularly in times of crisis like 1871, 1917, and 1940, though the right also claimed to serve popular interest in jobs. It also underpinned closing borders to labor migration. In Carr's view, "no single measure did more to render a renewal of the clash of nations inevitable" (18).

This brought what Carr calls the "climax of nationalism": world war (22). This meant not only conflict, death, and enduring enmities. It meant that every belligerent government claimed the right to control its own money, displacing the previous hegemony of sterling. The private property of enemy nationals was confiscated, striking a blow at both the foundations of laissez-faire capitalism and bourgeois civilization more generally. This hardening of external relations was matched by new levels of civilian mobilization for the new kind of 'total war': "any valid or useful distinction between armed forces and civilian populations disappears almost from the outset" (22). The need for soldiers meant that civilians were pressed involuntarily into military service in unprecedented numbers; both the workers and the facilities of civilian industry were drafted for military production. In short, governments – even ostensibly democratic governments - exerted new levels of control over their citizens and countries. This 'socialized nationalism' was a feature not just of war, but of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's first steps toward what would eventually become the modern welfare state.

The war itself was also shaped, of course, by the death throes of the Hapsburg, Tsarist, and Ottoman empires. So was the unstable peace that ended it. This was an enduring influence on Carr. As Cox details in his helpful and detailed introduction, Carr's formative years in the Foreign Office focused largely on Central and Eastern Europe. He observed the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Versailles from a central position as British Secretary to the "New States Committee" (xxv-xxix). Though he argued for recognition of the newly independent Baltic states, he was concerned by what he saw as the immaturity of most others. Whatever its limits, nationalism in Western Europe was tempered by individualism (including Protestantism) and ideas of natural law. Carr thought these weak in Central and Eastern Europe and lacking in the countries of Orthodox Christianity.

"The nineteenth century," Carr writes, "was passionately devoted to individualism and to democracy as it was then understood; and nationalism seemed a natural corollary of both" (8). The ideologies of individualism and nationalism suggest categories of equivalents.[42] Nations are accorded equal dignity in formal diplomatic relations and UN membership, however much they vary in coherence, identity, and capacity; individuals are differently shaped and empowered in their dependence on culture, language, and social relations. Egalitarianism despite difference is core to the liberal legal tradition. It extends awkwardly into relations among nation-states.

Naturalizing the notions of individual and nation meant foreclosing inquiry into the variable history and character of each. Carr devoted his longest chapter to the problematic analogies between individual and nation. He was clear that the 'nation is not a "natural" or "biological" group' but rather a "historical group" (32). He apparently accepted the naturalness of individuals and families, and so did not argue that the issue is to see the historicity and variation in all sorts of possibly rights-bearing

identities. "Like the right of freedom," he argued, "the right of equality, however interpreted and conditioned, is one that can be attributed only to individuals, not to nations" (35). He presumably meant this categorical declaration as a correction to reality, for it was manifestly not a description.

In the wake of the First World War, more and more states asserted independence and gained recognition on the basis that they represented the legitimate governments of rightfully autonomous nations. But the claim to nationhood was asserted on behalf of historically formed majorities – not absolute unities, whatever the ideology - and typically at the expense of cultural minorities. The great powers showed little concern. There were efforts to relocate populations to secure a better match between nation and state. As in the catastrophic partition of India just a few years later, these brought hardship but failed to achieve homogeneity. The pursuit of ethnic purity continued by petty persecution when it lacked the capacity to try grander 'solutions.'

Against these realities, Carr could only regard U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination as dangerously naïve. Self-determination presumed a self, which in Carr's view, nations did not have. But Carr was arguably also naïve in arguing that "the disruption of the Hapsburg, Romanov and Turkish empires under the banner of national self-determination ... may well turn out to have been the last triumph of the old fissiparous nationalism, of the ideology of the small nation as the ultimate political and economic unit; for it was one of those victories which prove self-destructive to the victor" (29). This presumes a learning process for which evidence is scant. It also fails to anticipate reproduction of the material bases for very similar post-imperial nationalisms elsewhere.

Over the last hundred years, the idea of self-determination has often seemed an almost obvious correlate of thinking in terms of nations.[43] It was not quite so at the time. Cox quotes Wilson's Secretary of State and Paris Peace Conference colleague, Robert Lansing, who asked "When the President talks of 'self-determination' what unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability. ... The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives" (xxxii). As Cox summarizes, "...the question on his [Carr's] mind was not whether small backward nations with few democratic traditions could survive and prosper by themselves—in his view they could not—but whether there could be any global order at all so long as the nation-state whatever its size, material capabilities or history remained in being?" (xxxviii-xxxxix).

Carr says little about World War II in *Nationalism and After*. He seems to think the key to a better peace after 1945 was to get right what the Versailles process bungled in 1919. But given the depressing story he tells of nationalism and its consequences, Carr is impressively optimistic about the postwar order. "The main unifying purpose in the contemporary world ... is the common ideal of social justice" (51). He remains a liberal, convinced that individuals do have rights and emphatic that nations do not. He doesn't use the expression "human rights" but seems to have such a regime in mind. "The driving force behind any future international order must be a belief, however expressed, in the value of individual human beings irrespective of national affinities or allegiance and in a common and mutual obligation to promote their well-being" (35).

This is not wrong, but it is, shall we say, very aspirational. Carr anticipates and for the most part endorses not only the ideals that went into founding the United Nations but those that shaped progression from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Union. Indeed, he evokes not just ideals but international organizational structure. "[T]he world will have to accommodate itself to the emergence of a few great multinational units in which power will mainly be concentrated" (42). Carr saw two such 'great multinational units': the U.S. and the USSR. The case for the U.S. was ambiguous, since it was multinational in an altogether different sense, incorporating many immigrants but not whole nations. Of course, the USSR has collapsed, though Carr suggests reasons we might wish it to have flourished more enduringly. Arguably had he written his list a few years later, he would have included the EU as such a great multinational unit – and regretted its current difficulties.

Still, Carr radically overestimates the centrality of Europe. Indeed, Europe was his only focus of attention. He notes that in World War I "the kind of policy hitherto reserved for colonial wars against backward peoples was for the first time being turned by European powers against one another" (23). Enraged about what this meant for Europe, he was blithe about what it long meant for those subjected to European conquest and colonization. He ignores the significance of decolonization, fails to anticipate the Cold War (let alone the crisis of communism), and underestimates the extent to which capitalism would henceforth drive globalization. This contributes to his failure to anticipate the continued importance of nationalism to anti-colonialism after World War II, to the struggles of countries dominated in the modern world-system against capitalist hegemony (or simply for better, more stable terms of incorporation), and to the politics of 'newly independent states' after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Nationalism – and the ideologically distorted politics of self-determination – have come to the fore at every inflection point in globalization.[44] There is no understanding the Chinese Revolution of 1949 without nationalism, nor indeed China today. Nor the anticolonial rebellions in Algeria and Vietnam. Nor the recurrently destabilizing struggles of Israel and Arabs in the Middle East. Nor the 'populisms' and dictatorships of Latin America. Nor African liberation struggles and the difficulties of pan-Africanism. Nor the conflicts of contemporary Eurasia.

This does not mean that nationalism by itself is an adequate explanation of any of these. The world is not ordered simply by the conflict or cooperation of states that claim legitimacy on the basis of representing nations. Carr presses the advantages of "a political unit based not on exclusiveness of nation or language but on shared ideals and aspirations of universal application." He mentions liberty, rights, and social justice (52-3). In this, he anticipates what would come to be articulated by as the ideal of 'constitutional patriotism.'[45] He anticipates the European Union by calling for "great multi-national units" and implicitly celebrates the United Kingdom by praising multinational states (including also the Soviet Union and the U.S. as exemplars). He even quotes Harold Acton's assertion that "the British and Austrian Empires, include[d] various distinct nationalities without oppressing them" (52). We need not agree that empires were organized without oppression to recognize that the nationalist alternative has produced problems of its own. And we need not look *back* to see examples in the era of world wars. We can simply look around us.

Though the era of nationalism made 'empire' a dirty word, empires were sometimes better able to

accept diversity than their successor nationalist states.[46] Current Chinese repression of ethno-national and religious minorities intensifies a feature of the conversion of imperial China into a nation-state.[47] But there are versions of this story around the world.

Oddly, Carr worries that "multi-national agglomerations of power … may eventually develop a new imperialism which would be only the old nationalism writ large" (52). It seems as sensible to think of the new imperialism not as nationalism *redux* but as, well, imperialism. Nationalism co-existed with empire in British history, obviously, but also in that of the Soviet Union and the United States. Wilsonian pronouncements about self-determination did not guide dealings with the Philippines in his day, nor with Mexico before and Puerto Rico since.[48] The constituent nations of the United Kingdom recurrently chafe at the terms of their inclusion.[49] And observers were astonished after 1992 when nationalist projects emerged almost fully formed from what many had presumed to be a more unified Soviet Union.[50]

The former Soviet States came with challenges of ethnic minorities and disputed borders all too reminiscent of the early twentieth Century. The break-up of Yugoslavia presented extreme versions, but all the newly autonomous Eastern European countries distinguished themselves by embracing ethnonationalism, oppressing their own cultural minorities and/or splitting apart.[51] Neither nationalism nor empire offered stable solutions to 'international relations.'

Carr seems to have thought that the issue was mainly a matter of pre-existing heterogeneity made salient by material conditions. Population growth presses on subsistence economies. Failure to achieve full employment frustrates workers in 'advanced' societies. Nationalism follows. An "underlying lack of homogeneity … blocks the way to realization of the ideal of world unity and imposes division and diversity of policy in the pursuit even of aims recognized as common to mankind" (54).

What this leaves out is capitalism. The global structure that emerged in the wake of imperial crises from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries was not simply one of nation-states. It was one in which these were increasingly organized into a capitalist world-system. This achieved organization and growth by producing a hegemonic core, an engaged and aspirational but not fully empowered semi-periphery, and a periphery. The world wars stemmed among other things from contestation over hegemony. Nationalist conflict and reorganized alliances today derive in part from the decay of first European and then American hegemony.[52] The U.S. cannot afford to be the world's sheriff and cannot unilaterally impose order on contemporary capitalism.[53] It cannot escape growing rivalry with China on every front from technological infrastructure to finance to security to intellectual and cultural vocabularies of legitimation.

But capitalism cannot be understood in terms of national economies alone. Carr's account of "a few great multinational units" strikingly neglects the importance of business corporations. These have complex relationships to nation-states but cannot be reduced to them. Determining how to include

corporations in global governance is a major challenge today.[54] One of the reasons nation-states remain important is that they have at least some capacity to resist, limit, or shape corporate pursuit of markets – and profits.[55]

Carr placed considerable hope in postwar project that would combine 'socialized nations' with multi-national organizations to advance both material equality – social justice – and peace. His account missed much (the book is only 59 pages long), but is hardly all wrong. This project flourished to an impressive extent during what the French call *les trente glorieuses* – which was not just a 'postwar boom' but an era of vital institution-building.[56] It informed welfare states in rich countries and the European Union. And it was the basis for the vision – perhaps only fantasy – of development embraced by modernization theory.

This is not the place to describe the crises of the 1970s that took down *les trente glorieuses*.[57] But Carr's account of a late nineteenth century reality he thought decisively past in fact says much about what has in fact happened after the brief postwar boom in which something like his vision seemed dominant. He declared that "mercantilism which stood for 'wealth for the nation, but wealth from which the majority of the nation must be excluded' is dead." But in the version of globalization that took root from the 1970s, it lived. He declared that "the laissez-faire individualism which purported to interpose no effective economic unit between the individual at one end of the scale and the whole world at the other is equally gone beyond recall." But it came back in the era of neoliberalism. He noted that the 'pursuit of "free competition", of an economic principle of all against all, inevitably tends to create those extreme inequalities and forms of exploitation which offend the social conscience and drive the less privileged to measures of self-defense…" But he thought the problems were clear enough that they would not be repeated (37).

Carr was dead wrong on many points, but to read him now is still clarifying. "The protest against nationalism," he wrote, "will certainly not find expression in a return to the aristocratic cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment or to the laissez-faire individualism of the nineteenth century (36)." An individualistic, universalistic cosmopolitanism was compatible with human rights but ineffectual in confronting capitalism and indeed resurgent nationalism.[58] Neoliberalism gave new force to illusions of individualism and allowed both new concentration of wealth and the fantasy of a seamless, happy globalization.[59]

That we are not "after" nationalism, but living a reality significantly continuous with that Carr described, is one reason that this new edition of his book is welcome (and all the more so thanks to Cox's contextually sensitive introduction).

Review by Randall Germain, Carleton University

Nearly eighty years after it was first published, *Nationalism and After* can still provide scholars of

world politics with insights into contemporary problems and issues.[60] Nationalism remains a potent force, having resurfaced in Europe after the Cold War and more recently in that most global of superpowers, the United States. Carr wondered in his pamphlet whether nationalism had reached its climax in the devastation of two world wars, or if it had legs enough to enter a still somewhat indeterminate fourth stage. Now we know: it has legs, and if we fail to appreciate how they work and why they have such endurance we will fail to answer the most basic injunction of scholarship, which is to understand how our world works (and perhaps also to offer guidance for acting in it).

If Carr's work travels well, Michael Cox's helpful introduction to this wartime publication does yeoman's service to contextualize why this is so. He explains the principal determinants and benchmarks of Carr's life and career, and points to how he came to his wartime conviction that the institutional fabric of world politics had to respond to new and compelling developments. Carr was after all a product of Victorian England and its educational institutions, which instilled in him a respect for tradition and the progress it had brought to a certain segment of the world's population. But Cox also shows how Carr was drawn into the disruptions of that time (most obviously the Great War and its diplomatic *denouement*, the negotiations at Versailles), and how he came to recognize the fissures which ultimately produced two global wars within a twenty year span. Nationalism was heavily implicated in what Carr came to see as the contradictions of this period, but Cox is careful also to show how Carr's appreciation of nationalism's many currents were inextricably interwoven with two other fundamental pressures: the movement to extend economic and social security to all citizens irrespective of their status, and the growing involvement of government in society at large. The confluence of these three primary forces, which we might characterize as nationalism, welfare, and the state, produced a new world that could not be sustained by the existing institutional configuration of world politics. This was the central problem that Carr was determined to elucidate in *Nationalism and After*, and Cox does a very good job steering us through the deliberations that marked his complicated intellectual journey.

Cox is certainly correct to suggest that, while offering a penetrating and astute assessment of how far nationalism had become entangled in these other fundamental developments, Carr fails to offer a convincing answer to Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin's famous challenge, 'what is to be done?'[61] In this sense *Nationalism and After* was more of a resting point than a destination for Carr. He published prolifically throughout his academic career, but perhaps no period matched the output between 1939 and 1951, when he published no less that five single authored book length manuscripts in addition to his work at *The Times*, at Chatham House, and a near continuous steam of reviews for various London weeklies.[62] What unites these five monographs is the consistent portrayal of the most pressing big picture problem of the age, namely how to reconstruct a functioning international system that would be sustainable over the long term. He insists that our collective starting point to think about the future must be to appreciate how far the world's political landscape had been altered by the extension of democratic means to wider swathes of citizens. For Carr, recognizing this change meant understanding how far international relations had come in terms of the provision by states of economic security to their populations, precisely because governments had now become responsible for the delivery of a growing array of social benefits. Carr was not alone in recognizing this problem – David Mitrany and Karl Polanyi were two contemporaries who concurred in this assessment – but he was among the most insistent that these new directions had to be accommodated in the world as it

was coming into being at mid-century.[63]

Carr's answers to this problem changed considerably between 1939, when *The Twenty Years Crisis* was first published, and 1951, when the lectures he delivered to the BBC as *The New Society* came out. In 1939 Carr believed that the international system could only be anchored around an accommodation among Great Powers, but already by 1942, in *Conditions of Peace*, he understood that some kind of multi-tiered dispersion of authority could become an integral aspect of its operation. *Nationalism and After* saw his thinking extend the furthest in this direction, when, for example, he considers how far different forms of authority might be organized around functionally specific international organizations of one type or another. His thinking here did not depart substantially from that of Mitrany, who had set out his ideas on functional world organizations in his 1943 pamphlet *A Working Peace System*. But by the end of the decade, in his lectures on *The New Society*, Carr had returned to a modified version of the future first outlined in *The Twenty Years Crisis*, where a reduced number of Great Powers – now christened as 'superpowers' by American political scientist William T.R. Fox – would in fact be the principal authors of the international system.[64] A reduced and more tightly circumscribed role for Europe and Britain seemed inevitable, while what Carr called the 'colonial revolution' was about to redraw the operational dynamics of other parts of the system. Nationalism for Carr at this point had become subordinate to the logic of industrial progress which was then underway at full steam in America and Russia, while the nation-building programs in the rapidly expanding ex-colonial world had not yet acquired the bite that had torn the old world apart. If nationalism had not gone away, its 'afterward' had entered a subdued stage as the fault lines of the Cold War solidified.

The point I would make here is that Carr's views continue to evolve after the publication of *Nationalism and After*, due in no small part of course to his own transition from a scholar of international affairs into one of the leading historians of Soviet Russia. Quite why Carr left the new subject of international relations remains a mystery, although Cox points towards an answer when he notes that Carr remained unimpressed by efforts to make a subject out of the *mélange* of activities which many associated with relations among states (page citation to the introduction). He was much more impressed by actually existing institutions and their underlying forces (whether classes, industries, elites, or even on occasion communities of peoples that might be considered to be nations), which perhaps helps to explain why he eventually turned his full attention to a multi-volume history of the Soviet revolution sometime around the end of the Second World War. Cox might have made more of where *Nationalism and After* sits within Carr's overall intellectual evolution, especially as *Nationalism and After* points in certain respects to the coming Soviet-American confrontation as part and parcel of how the three-way confluence of nationalism, welfare and the state were about to play out at mid-century. But in any case, how could a definitive answer to the future of nationalism be provided at that juncture; there was simply to much going on to clearly parse the tea leaves. As Polanyi put it, a "great transformation" was working its way through the international order, and its course had not yet reached its *apogee*.[65]

Nationalism and After may not be one of Carr's most enduring works, but Cox is right to draw attention to it as a way point on E.H. Carr's broader intellectual journey. It is not without valuable insights which can continue to inform contemporary efforts to better understand our world, and so its

re-issue is as timely and topical as it is relevant. And given the careful attention Cox pays to the origins of Carr's ideas on nationalism and international politics more generally, one would hope that an intellectual history of Carr's ideas on world politics will follow. Carr has his biographers, and of course his work is widely engaged by scholars across the spectrum of International Relations who are intent on aligning him with different strands of contemporary IR thought.[66] But what we still do not have is the kind of careful documentation of the evolution of Carr's ideas on international affairs *tout court*, which Michael Cox is well positioned to supply. The world needs more E.H. Carr, and Michael Cox is the scholar to supply it.

Review by Mary Kaldor, LSE

The publication of this new edition of E.H. Carr's little book on nationalism, with an illuminating introduction by Michael Cox, is very timely. The significance of the book lies in the proposals for future international relations. Carr favoured a "balanced structure of international or multinational groupings" (55) based on the spread of functional institutions, and in which freedom and equality were attributed to individuals rather than nations with a shared common project of social justice. He was against world government and against a system in which responsibility for freedom and equality resides with nations. I share these ideas. But what are the prospects of such a system in the current era? On the one hand, the world is witnessing the re-emergence of nationalism, the rise of authoritarian populism personified in former president Donald Trump, Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi, Hungarian Prime Minister or Viktor Orban. On the other hand, global functional integration is much thicker than it was when Carr was writing and, at the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic and incipient climate change represent a moment when it is all the more important to construct a system along the lines that Carr envisaged.

To apply Carr's method, it could be argued that contemporary authoritarian populism represents a fourth period of nationalism. Carr divides nationalism (or international relations) into three periods. In the first period, the eighteenth century, the nation was represented by independent sovereigns, who were often related and conversed together in French; they conducted limited mercantilist wars and recognised the rights of neutrals and non- combatants. Ernest Gellner, in a lecture devoted to the book, rightly argues that this was not really nationalism[67]. The second period in the nineteenth century was the period of nationalist irredentism, when the nation was seen as a vehicle for democracy and development and the state was personified in the nation. Nationalism in this period was a middle-class affair and wars were about the consolidation of territory. While nationalism in this period is usually regarded as progressive, it was also exclusivist and violent. Nowadays we would describe the exclusion of women, the exclusion, in the U.S., of Blacks and native Americans, or the exclusion of the poor in Britain, as a form of apartheid. Suffrage was widened in the second half of the nineteenth century though not to women but this was associated with the rise of empire. Nationalism was culturally exclusive; Gellner tells us how a vertical high culture was developed around the vernacular language so that all members of the nation could communicate in a standardise idiom. This involved forcible assimilation and the eradication of other languages and dialects[68]. Most importantly it was a militaristic form of nationalism that celebrated battles and

hero soldiers. Gellner tells us that Marxism in the Soviet Union was linked to violence, which gave the Marxist doctrines a sort of religious significance[69]. The same is true of nationalism where the idea of the nation and the passion that idea arose was the consequence as much as the cause of war.

Finally, Carr talks about what he sees as the totalitarian socialised nationalism of the twentieth century – the consequence of the involvement of the whole population. Again, I wonder if this is nationalism or the rise of empires and blocs that were associated with a utopian idea – fascism, Communism, or imperialism. The "apex of nationalism" says Carr "is reached when it comes to be regarded as an enlightened policy to remove men, women and children from their homes and transfer them from place to place in order to create homogenous national units" (26).

So does the nationalism of the twenty first century represent a fourth period? It is much more divisive and fragmented than earlier nationalisms. It has its antecedents in the nationalism that arose after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Whereas nineteenth century nationalism and indeed post-colonial nationalism were about democracy and development (and external expansion), contemporary nationalisms are about access to the state for particular groups (defined in ethnic, religious, or racial terms). It is about fragmentation rather than state-building.[70] In the UK, the Brexit movement for all its talk of global Britain, is actually about white English nationalism; it plays a hugely divisive role domestically and is likely to lead to the break-up of Britain with Scottish independence and renewed violence in Northern Ireland[71].

What accounts for this new type of nationalism? I agree with Gellner about the importance of industrialisation as an explanation for nineteenth and twentieth century nationalism. Particularly important, as Anderson tells us, was the introduction of print technology and the role of novels and newspaper in the vernacular in imagining the nation[72]. What we are seeing now is a shift away from industry to both finance and services. Whereas industry was physically linked to territory, finance and services are both more global and more localised than industry. And the rise of digital communication in place of print facilitates horizontal virtual communities including both cosmopolitan communities based on markets or human rights and identity based communities such as Islamism or right-wing transnationalism.

Nationalism tends to come in waves. And the emergence of destructive types of nationalism is usually associated with economic and social crises. Nationalism is a form of popular mobilisation that displaces democratic demands. It is a way of bringing together the dispossessed, the 'left behind,' as well as those who fear losing their privileges. Just as twentieth century nationalism can be seen as an outcome of laisserz-faire doctrines, as Karl Polyani pointed out,[73] so contemporary nationalism has to be understood in terms of four decades of neo-liberalism.

Each type of nationalism is associated with a particular type of war. Contemporary nationalism is associated with what I call 'new wars' and the Russians call 'non-linear war'.[74] They are protracted, local, and transnational, and involve cyber conflict (what the Russians call political technology), ethnic cleansing, destruction of cultural heritage, and terror. The long-distance assassination

associated with drones compounds these wars. If we cannot counter contemporary nationalism, the future is likely to consist of the long-term spread of this type of war.

So, in this context, what are the prospects for an international order of the type envisaged by E.H. Carr? It is worth noting two long-term developments since the time that Carr was writing. First there has been a massive increase in global rules and functional international organisations associated with the growth of the global economy. The European Union epitomises this development. The so-called Monnet method was designed to promote economic and social integration in the expectation that politics would follow. The thick regulatory framework is not just confined to the EU; it is a global phenomenon. This evidenced in the huge difficulty for the UK of disentangling itself from the EU. [75]

The second development is the growing importance of global consciousness and human rights despite the setbacks of recent years. Global movements like Black Lives Matter, Extinction Rebellion, or the Social Forum are a feature of contemporary life. Digital communications draw attention to violations of rights in different parts of the world.

Carr talked about the need for a common project. One common project is climate change. The other is COVID. We cannot eliminate the pandemic without a global response; moreover, dealing with the pandemic is linked to the other global problems including war and climate change. Might we be living through a transformative moment that makes it possible to establish the kind of international order that Carr envisaged?

Response by Michael Cox, LSE, Emeritus

Let me begin by thanking H-Diplo and Michael Innes for organizing this roundtable. There is no other comparable forum which I know of which allows for an exchange of views on key works in such depth. Long may it continue its important work. Thanks too to the four colleagues who spared their valuable time in reading (or rereading) E. H. Carr's wonderfully provocative book – *Nationalism and After* - and making a number of interesting and suggestive points about where they think Carr may have got it right, and where they think he got it wrong. Some time ago, when a leading U.S. scholar was asked to name the ten worst books on international affairs he had had the misfortune to read, he put Carr's 1945 polemic against nationalism and the nation-state up there amongst the worst for the simple reason that neither the ideology of nationalism or the nation-state itself disappeared in the post-war period: ergo Carr was wrong. [76] I am glad to say that each of the four contributors to this forum has rather more interesting and subtle things to say about Carr and the book he wrote.

Let me say something first about how I arrived at writing what turned into a rather long, but I hope useful introduction, which helps place *Nationalism and After* in Carr's wider *oeuvre*. As readers of H-Diplo will probably know, this is not for the first time I have engaged with the formidable twentieth-century century figure, Edward Hallett Carr. [77] Indeed, I first met him (intellectually speaking) when I was trying to become a 'Sovietologist' back in the 1970s before going on to discover that the same Carr had written several books on international relations as well. Carr, as I later discovered, never much liked IR as an academic subject, no more than he liked the term Sovietologist. However,

in those pre-1991 days when everyone had to have a view about the Soviet system, it was impossible not to engage with Carr and his *History of Soviet Russia.* [78]

Hardly read at all today, it was back then the defining work covering the years 1917 to 1929. Monumental hardly begins to describe the many volumes starting with the Bolshevik revolution – an event he clearly approved of - right through to the beginning of the Five Year Plans in 1929, another upheaval which he viewed as being both economically essential and strategically necessary. Carr was no Stalinist. Nor did he much approve of Joseph Stalin's methods. Yet if Russia was to take its place as a great power in a world full of even more powerful enemies, then it had no alternative but to modernize at break-neck speed. [79] Moreover, according to Carr, by the 1930s it had become obvious that planning rather than free-market capitalism represented the future. Nor did he later shy away from talking up what he termed the USSR's "immense" economic and social "achievements." [80]

Carr's positive attitude towards the USSR is perhaps one of the more obvious reasons why he was never considered entirely 'safe' by the British establishment, a point referred to by Tomoko Akami in her excellent contribution. Interestingly though, Carr himself grew up inside that establishment where important men (a bit like Carr himself) made big decisions about how the world would be organized. Carr was in little doubt which states within that world were significant and which were not. Yet he did not, as was often claimed by critics, worship at the altar of power. Nor was he, as has also been claimed, a 'Eurocentric' overly preoccupied with developments in Europe alone. For example, one very important non-European power called the United States, and its President, Woodrow Wilson, cast a very long shadow over his work, as of course did the Soviet Union a multi-national state which he firmly believed had found an answer to the national question.

He was also a good deal more sensitive to events in what he termed the 'Far East' than many other English historians of the time. [81] That said, Akami is certainly right to point out that Carr tended to neglect empire and empires in his work. But he was not completely indifferent to their fate. Indeed, as nationalist movements began to chip away at the foundations of the European empires after 1945, Carr appeared to cheer them on from afar, even though he referred to nationalism there – "like all nationalism" - as appealing "rather to the heart than the head." [82] Even so, he later confessed to having been "impressed" by the fact "that the only considerable revolutions achieved since 1917 have been in China and in Cuba, and that revolutionary movements are alive today only in countries where the proletariat is weak or non-existent." [83]

Carr though was a strange kind of radical who, while looking forward as he did in *The Twenty Years Crisis* to a 'new international order,' always tended to look at the world from on high. As Justin Rosenberg put it so well so many years ago, Carr viewed international relations with a "state's eye view," quite often with the ultimate purpose of seeking to guide the hand of those who made policy. It all began back in 1917 when he was advising London on how to deal with the new Bolshevik regime in Russia. It went on in Paris at the peace negotiations, where he was involved in working out a common western approach to the "new nations" and their alienated minorities. And it continued

when he left the Foreign Office in 1936 so that he could make the theoretical case for appeasement.[84] As his good friend, the Marxist Isaac Deutscher once remarked, Carr was very much the product of his training as a foreign policy "mandarin," even referring to him once as "an intellectual expatriate" from the diplomatic world who, as the record shows, had little time for wild schemes like world revolution or even world government.[85]

On the other hand, he came to believe, along with many others at the time, that not only was the old economic order no longer fit for purpose, but that the Westphalian system of sovereign states had passed its sell-by date too. The solution, he insisted, did not lie in doing away with organized state power as such or even in building a classless society (both far too utopian for Carr). Rather it lay in ensuring that there would be far fewer states within the system overall: a world in other words in which great powers - empires by any other name perhaps - would run the show. This may have been decidedly tough on smaller nations, including those in Eastern Europe. It might have led to the political rights of some nations being ignored. However, if it produced "order" and economic advancement as a result then this was a price worth paying.[86]

But was Carr too optimistic when it came to the withering away of nationalism and nation-state, a point picked up by Craig Calhoun in his most stimulating essay? Calhoun himself is quite clear on the issue: nation-states, he suggests, are not just incidental features of the international system that would over time be rendered obsolete by the march of history, an argument central to the thesis Carr advanced in *Nationalism and After.* Rather they are "basic" to modern politics and culture. As he has argued elsewhere, we should never underestimate "the continued currency of nationalism."[87] Carr would have almost certainly agreed, which is one of the reasons of course why he spent the better part of three years chairing a Chatham House Study Group examining the phenomenon. Like Calhoun, he was in little doubt about the power of nationalism. His main concern was not to deny its significance but instead try and devise an order that would mitigate against its consequences.[88]

Nor was he alone in making the point. Many years before, the great Cambridge classicist and sometime LSE lecturer, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, had argued in one of the great forgotten classics of international politics, that until nationalism was tamed and the European system of states reformed, the continent (which he defined as being in a state of permanent 'anarchy') would for ever be imploding in on itself.[89] A new Europe therefore would have to be constructed, as in many ways it was after 1945. Indeed, the case could be made that this is precisely what happened after the Second World War with the emergence of a two-bloc system managed by the US and the USSR. The new order was not entirely cost free, especially for those who happened to be living on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. But compared to what had gone before, a Europe "between the superpowers" did, if nothing else, help suppress the nationalist genie that had been let out of the proverbial bottle in the first half of the twentieth century.[90]

Calhoun also goes on to argue that for all his insights, Carr "underestimated the extent to which nations and nationalism are integral to globalization." There is undoubtedly some truth in this. As the history of the global economy proves, behind every effort to make the capitalist world economy more

'open' there stood a powerful state, first in the form of Great Britain, and then later after 1945, in the shape of the United States. But the relationship between the nation-state and the world economy has never been a straightforward one. Even free-trade Britain finally abandoned the gold standard in 1931 in a desperate effort to protect its own economy. And even if the US came to preach the virtues of what later came to be called 'globalization,' before it did so, it had been an outspoken champion of protectionism. Thereafter the relationship between the US as a nation-state and 'globalization' was never an especially comfortable one, and if anything became even more uncomfortable in the first part of the twenty first century when the global economy went even more global.[91] Nor has the deep divide between those who see the nation-state as the best form of defence against the outside world and others - let us here call them followers of David Ricardo who believe in 'comparative advantage' - gone away. The nation state may be integral to globalization, as Calhoun suggests. But there is no getting away from the fact the relationship is a complex one.

But where in the end does all this take us. Indeed, why bother to read a short study on nationalism composed over three quarters of a century ago and which has been out of print for many years? The simplest answer, I suppose, is that Carr, warts and all, remains one of the true giants of twentieth century historiography and that anything he wrote is likely to be of interest to students of world politics. There is also something to be said for shifting our attention away from the volume that everybody seems to know – namely *The Twenty Years' Crisis* – to his other, lesser known, works like *Nationalism and After*. As Randall Germain wisely advises us, we should be looking at Carr's work in the round. By so doing we perhaps get a much better idea of what Carr was seeking to do, which was far more ambitious and interesting than just talking about power and power shifts; it was also a plea to public intellectuals in the midst of one of the greatest crises in history to provide some kind of answer to the problems then facing humanity.

Finally, as Mary Kaldor makes clear in her thoughtful contribution, there are a number of lessons which can be learned from Carr, one of the more important being that the threats to progress which he sought to expose in his day – rising nationalism being the most immediate – remain just as threatening in our own age. Carr may well have been a critic of 'liberal projects' that aimed to reform the world. On the other hand, he recognized that the old order based on a multiplicity of nation-states had failed and that there was a pressing need to create a new one. Understanding the deeper causes of the twenty years' crisis was only one of the tasks he set himself: the other was to provide a road map to find a way out of it. *Nationalism and After* was part of his contribution to that debate. Moreover, the debate he ignited in one very bloody century about the conditions of a just and stable order, remains just as pertinent and significant in our own.

Notes

[1] Michael Cox, *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000); E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939:An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Palgrave, 2001).

[2]
___ Craig Calhoun et al, *Does Capitalism Have a Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter* (London: Routledge, 2007).

[3]
___ See in particular, Tomoko Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

[4]
___ Randall Germain, *Global Politics and Financial Governance* (London: Palgrave, 2010).

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___ Major publications include Mary Kaldor with Christine Chinkin, *International Law and New Wars*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Kaldor, *Global Security Cultures* (Hoboken: Wiley, 2018).

[6]
___ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Papermac, 1993). In this paper, I have listed: Japanese names with surnames first and then given names in the text and as the authors of their works in Japanese in the footnotes; and Japanese and Chinese names with given names first and then family names as the authors of their works in English.

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___ And Michael Cox ed., *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000). I also thank James Cotton and Katharina Rietzler for their comments on my draft.

[8]
___ E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945).

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___ David Long, "Who Killed the International Studies Conference?," *Review of International Studies*, 32:4 (2006): 603-622; Michael Riemens, "International Academic Cooperation on International Relations in the Interwar Period: The International Studies Conference," *Review of International Studie*s 37:2 (2011): 911-928; Jo-Anne Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part One, Part Two, Part Three: Cold-Blooded Idealists* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 2019, 2020); Katharina Rietzler, "American Foundations and the 'Scientific Study' of International Relations in Europe, 1910-1940," Ph.D. Thesis (University College London, 2009); Jan Stöckmann, "Studying the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany, 1912–33," *The International History Review* 38:5 (2016): 1055-1088; Nicholas Guilhot ed., *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbian University Press, 2011); Tomoko Akami, "Missed Opportunities to be Global: Conversion and Diversion of the Scientific Field of Knowledge of International Relations of the International Studies Conference and the Institute of Pacific Relations," *Monde(s): Histoire, espaces, relations* 19:1 (2021): 183-202.

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____ Rietzler, "American Foundations," 234-235.

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_____ Tomoko Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 249-255.

[12]
_____ Chatham House Registry Files, 2/III/8b: John Hope Simpson to Cleeve, 2 May 1940; Cleeve to Simpson, 3 May 1940. I owe these documents to Katharina Rietzler, and thank for her insights on this exchange and the context.

[13]
_____ "Preface" in Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944), n.p.

[14]
_____ It is a historical irony that a marginal Carr, rather than the central Zimmern, was to be regarded as the "founding father" of IR. Cox reveals Carr's negative view to the discipline of IR in the post-WWII. Michael Cox, "Introduction," in E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After*, xix; Cox, "Introduction," in Cox ed., *E.H. Carr,* 2.

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_____ Similar conclusions on greater and regional federations, for example, were evident in both books.

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_____ John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

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_____ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, first published in 1977); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson eds, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

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_____ Cox discusses this criticism in note 171, Cox, "Introduction," liv.

[19]
_____ It spared fifteen pages of the 186 page text. Cobban, *National Self-Determination*, 123-138.

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_____ The conferences would produce some of the key works on nationalism in Asia. William Macmahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1952); Masao Maruyama, *Nationalism in Post-War Japan* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950). The theme, nationalism, also remained important for the last two IPR conferences in Kyoto (1954) and Lahore (1957).

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_____ Maruyama Masao, *Gendai seiji no shisō to kōdō*, vols. 1 and 2 (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1956, 1957). There is an extensive scholarship on Maruyama in Japanese and other languages. See, for example, Rikki Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy* (London: Routledge, 1996).

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_____ Maruyama, *Gendai seiji*, vol. 2, 295-298.

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_____ *Nationalism and After* was first translated into Japanese in 1952, and in the same year *The Twenty Years' Crisis* was also translated into Japanese. Murayama, however, had been reading Carr's works in English during wartime. He had found a pirate version (in English) of Carr's *Conditions of Peace* (published in 1942) in a second hand book shop in Hiroshima, and read it in March 1945, while he was still in military. He noted that the book was most useful for his lecture on postwar world immediately after the end of the war, "*despite the fact that it hardly referred to the Far East.*" Maruyama Masao, *Maruyama Masao shū*, vol. 12 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996), 67-74.

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_____ Maruyama, *Gendai seiji*, vol. 2, 299.

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_____ Maruyama, *Gendai seiji*, vol. 2, 299-302.

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_____ David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933); *A Working Peace System* (London: National Peace Council, 1946). On Mitrany, see Cornelia Navari, "Mitrany and International Functionalism," in David Long and Peter Wilson eds., *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

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_____ See, for example, Peter Wilson, "The Myth of the 'First Great Debate'," *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998): 1-16; Lucian M. Ashworth, "Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations," *International Relations* 16:1 (2002): 33-51; Brian Schmidt ed., *International Relations and the First Great Debate*, New York: Routledge, 2012; James Cotton, *The Australian School of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; and Long and Peter eds, *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis*.

[28]
_____ Wilson refers to this shift among liberals, who supported the League, although without using the term, welfare liberalism. Peter Wilson, "Carr and His Early Critics: Responses to *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, 1939-46," in Cox ed., *E.H. Carr*, 175-177.

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_____ On welfare liberalism and statist reformism, see also Tomoko Akami, "Nation, State, Empire and War: Problems of Liberalism in Modern Japanese History and Beyond," *Japanese Studies* 25:2 (2005): 119-140.

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_____ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Papermac, 1993), 93.

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_____ Rietzler, "American Foundations," 235.

[32]
_____ Maruyama, *Maruyama Masao shū*, vol. 12, 68. Maruyama, therefore, saw a critical insight in Carr, similar to the Frankfurt School.

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_____ Carr omitted "many of the more insensitive and apologetic passages concerning Munich and appeasement" from the second edition of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, which was published in 1945. Wilson, "Carr and His Early Critics," 184. In 1980, Carr also noted: "No doubt I was very blind" to the nature of Hitler in the 1930s. E.H. Carr, "An Autobiography," in Cox ed., *E.H. Carr*, xix.

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_____ While the notion was first expounded by James Gregor's *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), "Developmental Dictatorship (*Kaihatsu dokusai*)" became a significant concept to examine political and economic developments of post-colonial countries in Asia as well as the PRC. See Suehiro Akira, "Ajia kaihatsu dokusairon," in Nakagane Katsuji ed., *Kōza gendai Ajia 2: Kindaika to kōzō hendō* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1994); Liang Tang, *China's Authoritarian Path to Development* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Iwasaki Ikuo, *Ajia seiji o miru me: Kaihatsu dokusai kara shimin shakai e*, (Tokyo: Chūōkōron shinsha, 2001).

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_____ I thank Callum Higginson for his insight and drawing my attention to this recent move of the PRC at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). UNHRC, "Resolution HRC: Promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights," A/HRC/37/L.36 (March 19, 2018), A/HRC/RES/43/21 (July 2, 2020), A/HRC/46/L.22 (March 16, 2021).

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_____ On this, see, for example, Richard Seymour, "Why is the Nationalist Right Hallucinating a 'Communist Enemy'?," *The Guardian*, 26 September 2018.

[37]
_____ This is a central theme of Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011 [1974]).

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_____ Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010).

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_____ Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power v. 4: Globalizations, 1945-2011* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

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_____ Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing* (London: Verso, 2009), David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Mann, Georgi Derluguian, and Craig. Calhoun, *Does Capitalism Have a Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

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_____ Richard Mansbach and Yale Ferguson, *Populism and Globalization: The Return of Nationalism and the Global Liberal Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); Calhoun, *Nations Matter* (London: Routledge, 2007); Umut Özkirimli, *Debating Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (London: Red Globe Press, 2017).

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_____ See discussion in Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1997).

[43]
_____ If it has been subject to recurrent theoretical critique, it has nonetheless been basic to practical legal and political arrangements. See, e.g., John Summers, *Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

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_____ Debate over whether nations are primordial or created is misguided – as though it could somehow settle whether they were real. Equally unhelpful is the assumption that nationalism is always about to vanish because it has outlived its usefulness (which among other things begs the question of usefulness to whom and for what). See my discussion in *Nations Matter* (London: Routledge, 2007).

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_____ The term was introduced by Dolf Sternberger and made prominent by Jürgen Habermas. See Habermas, *Inclusion of the Other* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). There is important elaboration in Dieter Grimm, "Integration by Constitution," *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, v3 n2-3 (2005): 193–208; Jan-Werner Müller and Kim Lane Scheppele, "Constitutional Patriotism: An Introduction," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 6:1 (2007): 67-71; and Jan-Werner Müller, "A General Theory of Constitutional Patriotism," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 6:1 (2007): 72–95.

[46]
_____ See Karen Barkey: *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, and more broadly, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011; also Mann, *Sources of Social Power, v. 3: Global Empires and Revolutions, 1890-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2012.

[47]
_____ Hui Wang, *China from Empire to Nation-State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Yan Sun, *From Empire to Nation State: Ethnic Politics in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Maura Elizabeth Cunningham, *China in the 21st Century*, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

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_____ Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

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_____ Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1977; 2021) remains the most incisive analysis; there is a helpful introduction to the new edition by Anthony Barnett.

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_____ Ronald Gregor Suny, *Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

[51]
_____ John Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations: A History of Eastern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020). See also Tony Judt's broader, but magisterial, *Postwar: a History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2006).

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_____ Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*, revised ed. (London: Verso, 2010); also Arrighi and Beverly Silver, *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[53]
_____ This is not just a critique from the left but an affirmation from the center-right. See Richard Haass: *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order* (New York: Penguin, 2017). Indeed, recognizing this situation motivated the historic opening to China of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in 1971. See "The Kissinger Issue" of *The Wire*: https://www.thewirechina.com/2021/07/11/the-kissinger-issue/.

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_____ For a useful review, see Tim Bartley, "Transnational Corporations and Global Governance," *Annual Review of Sociology* 44 (2018): 145-165.

[55]
_____ Calhoun, *Nations Matter*, op cit. This is a very current issue, for example in the struggle to tax global tech companies fairly. See *The Economist*, "The New Geopolitics of Global Business," June 5 2021: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/06/05/the-new-geopolitics-of-global-business.

[56]
_____ For a case that the conservative and restrictive side of the postwar era has unjustly dominated later accounts, see Louis Menand, *The Free World: Art and Thought in the Cold War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021).

[57]
_____ See Calhoun, Dilip Gaonkar, and Charles Taylor, *Degenerations of Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 2022), chapter 2.

[58]
____ See Calhoun, "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101:4 (2003): 869-897 and "Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 14:3 (2008): 427-449.

[59]
____ See Calhoun, Gaonkar, and Taylor, *Degenerations of Democracy*, op cit., esp. Ch 4 and David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

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____ E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945).

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____ Vladimir Lenin, *What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement* (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1902).

[62]
____ Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1939); Carr, *The Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1942); Carr, *Nationalism and After*; Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (London: Macmillan, 1946); Carr, *The New Society* (London: Macmillan, 1951). For discussions of Carr's life during this period see Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr 1892-1982* (London: Verso, 1999) and Charles Jones, *E.H. Carr and International Relations: a duty to lie* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[63]
____ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our times* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944). For a discussion of their overlapping contributions to understanding the new post-1945 world, see Randall Germain, 'Nearly Modern IPE? Insights from IPE at mid-century,' *Review of International Studies* 47:4 (2021): 528-548.

[64]
____ William T.R. Fox, *The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union – Their Responsibility for Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944).

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____ Polanyi, *Great Transformation*.

[66]
____ On biography see Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity and* Jones, *A Duty to Lie*. On theoretical engagements with Carr's work within the context of the discipline of International relations, see Seán Molloy, *The Hidden History of Realism: a genealogy of power politics* (London: Palgrave, 2006) and Michael Cox, ed., *E.H. Carr: a Critical Appraisal* (London: Palgrave, 2000).

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_____ Ernest Gellner "Nationalism Reconsidered and E. H. Carr," *Review of International Studies* 18:4 (October 1992): 285-293.

[68]
_____ Gellner *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

[69]
_____ Gellner *The Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Penguin, 1996).

[70]
_____ Mary Kaldor, "Nationalism and Globalisation,'" *Nations and Nationalism* 10:1-2 (January 2004): 161-177.

[71]
_____ Anthony Barnet *The Lure of Greatness: England's Brexit and America's Trump* (London: Unbound, 2017).

[72]
_____ Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983)

[73]
_____ Karl Polyani *The Great Transformation:The Political and Economic origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).

[74]
_____ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd ed. (Malden: Polity Press, 2012), Speech by Valen Gerassimov, Russian Chief of general Staff, January 2013, *Military Kuria,* February 27 2013, http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/

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_____ Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, Christilla Roederer-Rynning, and Alasdair R. Young eds., *Policy-making in the European Union*, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

[76]
_____ Daniel Drezner, "The Ten Worst Books in International Relations," *Foreign Policy*, 10 April 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/10/the-ten-worst-books-in-international-relations/.

[77]
_____ See for example Michael Cox ed., *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (London: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2000), and my Introduction to E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: Palgrave, Houndmills, 2001), ix-lviii.

[78]
_____ E.H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia,* 14 Volumes, London, Macmillan Press, 1950-1978,

[79]
_____ For Carr's defence of what he admitted was a "haphazard and impulsive …final decision" to go ahead with mass collectivization and the first Five Year Plan in 1930, see his "Revolution From Above'*,*" *New Left Review* 46 (November-December 1967), 17-27.

[80]
_____ E. H. Carr, "The Russian Revolution and the West," *New Left Review* 111 (September-October 1978), 25.

[81]
_____ Interestingly, Carr pointed out in 1937 that it was not events in Germany, or any other European country in the early part of the decade, that marked a decisive turning-point, but "the Japanese conquest of Manchuria" in 1931. For Carr's fairly detailed discussion on Japanese policy within what he termed "the Far East," see his massively popular *International Relations Between The Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (London: Houndmills, Macmillan, 1989), esp. 18-22, 160-173, 179-182, 242-247.

[82]
_____ See his "New Nations for Old," *Times Literary Supplement*, 24th June 1955.

[83]
_____ See "The Left Today: An Interview" (1978) in E.H. Carr, *From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays* (New York, St Martin's Press, 1980), 274.

[84]
_____ Justin Rosenberg, *A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London, Verso, 1994), 10-15.

[85]
_____ Isaac Deutscher, "Mr. E.H. Carr As Historian of Soviet Russia," *Soviet Studies* VI:4 (April 1955), 342.

[86]
_____ For a discussion of the various reforms proposed advanced to deal with a world crisis which many writers by the end of the 1930s believed was rooted in nationalism and the nation-state, see Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United Sates, 1939-1950* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2017), esp. 51-55.

[87]
_____ Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 2, 126.

[88]
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