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Emotions and narratives of the spirit of Gallipoli: Turkey's collective identity and status in international relations

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ABSTRACT

This article examines Turkish narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign fought during the First World War, based on newspaper archival research covering the last 50 years. It argues that the memorialization of the Gallipoli Campaign reflects collective emotions underpinning Turkish national identity and self-perceptions of ambivalence in international relations. Compared with the Sèvres Treaty, which is the most frequently cited episode of the First World War in the context of Turkish history, the Dardanelles Victory provides a more nuanced understanding of Turkish collective identity and international status. Fought primarily against the British and resulting in victory, the narratives reveal emotions related to humiliation and betrayal, as well as desires for validation vis-à-vis Europe. However, the spirit of Gallipoli also signifies the birth of collective consciousness, restoration of honour after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and compassion for the victimized soldiers of the opposing side. Thus, the different memorialization of the First World War, especially in contrast to Europe, sets Turkey's status above the colonized nations while manifesting aspirations to place Turkey on an equal footing with the West. This duality in the narratives reproduces Turkey's own understanding of its ambivalence and liminal status between the West and the East.

Introduction

What are the emotions that underpin Turkish collective identity and self-perceptions of its status in international relations (IR)? This article answers this question by focusing on the Turkish memorialization of the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. The impact of the memory of the First World War and the Sèvres Treaty on Turkish collective identity is well-documented in the literature.¹ This traumatic past and the accompanying Sèvres syndrome has resulted in fears and insecurity regarding the intentions of European powers in partitioning Turkey. The Gallipoli Battle that preceded the Sèvres Treaty is a lesser studied aspect of the same period although it has the potential to reveal a more

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¹On the Sèvres syndrome see, for examples, Michelangelo Guida, 'The Sèvres Syndrome and "Komplo" Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press', *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 1 (2008): 37–52; Hakan Yılmaz, 'Euro-scepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion', *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 1 (2011): 185–208; Brent E. Sasley, 'Remembering and Forgetting in Turkish Identity and Policymaking', in *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates*, ed. Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 138–152.

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balanced approach to Turkish collective identity. As opposed to the memory of the Sèvres Treaty, which only highlights inferiority towards the West, the dominant narrations of the Gallipoli Campaign also demonstrate desires of restoring self-worth on an equal footing with the West and self-perceptions of status above the Rest. This duality vis-à-vis the West and the East in Turkish collective identity has been previously labelled as ‘ambivalence’ or ‘liminality’.² Once strong and never colonized, Turkey was, nevertheless, stigmatized and marginalized, leading to an international status in between the East and the West, with a desire to transform its place in the international hierarchy.³ This identity has had significant consequences for domestic and foreign policy. Turkish leaders and governments from various ideological backgrounds⁴ have adopted contradictory attitudes of hostility and admiration towards the West,⁵ while attempting to transform Turkey’s international status through domestic reforms,⁶ various policies of ‘Europeanisation’,⁷ or the assumption of regional leadership roles.⁸

Emotions permeating Turkish narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign reveal these connections between Turkey’s ambivalent status and collective identity. This battle was fought between the Allied (primarily British) and Ottoman forces during the First World War, between 1915–1916. Although the Ottomans won the battle also known as the Dardanelles Victory, they lost the Great War itself and faced occupation for five years, as well as the Sèvres Treaty which carved up Anatolia among the Europeans and Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire. Despite surrendering territory, Turkey was not colonized, and the new Republic was recognized through the following War of Independence, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923.⁹ The Dardanelles Victory is remembered in Turkish history as the successful beginning of this long period of traumatic conflict and both victory and loss.¹⁰ The Gallipoli Campaign is the memory of trauma and glory, and hence the memory of in-betweenness.

²Pınar Bilgin, ‘Securing Turkey through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy’, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 103–23; Lerna K. Yanık, ‘Constructing Turkish “Exceptionalism”: Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy’, *Political Geography*, 30, no. 2 (2011): 80–9; Bahar Rumelili, ‘Liminal Identities and Processes of Domestication and Subversion in International Relations’, *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 495–508; Bahar Rumelili and Rahime Süleymanoğlu-Kurum, ‘Brand Turkey: Liminal Identity and Its Limits’, *Geopolitics* 22, no. 3 (2017): 549–70.

³Ayşe Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁴Zeynep Gülşah Çapan and Ayşe Zarakol, ‘Turkey’s Ambivalent Self: Ontological Insecurity in “Kemalism” versus “Erdoğanism”’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 32, no. 3 (2019): 263–82.

⁵Turkey’s recent relations with NATO and the US are just one example of these ups and downs. See, Sabri Sayarı, ‘New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations’, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (2013): 129–42; Oya Dursun-Özkanca, *Turkey-West Relations: The Politics of Intra-alliance Opposition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

⁶Zarakol, *After Defeat*.

⁷Alper Kaliber, ‘Contextual and Contested: Reassessing Europeanization in the Case of Turkey’, *International Relations*, 27, no. 1 (2012): 52–73.

⁸Emel Parlar Dal, ‘Conceptualising and Testing the “Emerging Regional Power” of Turkey in the Shifting International Order’, *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 8 (2016): 1425–53; Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay, ‘The Dynamics of Emerging Middle-Power Influence in Regional and Global Governance: The Paradoxical Case of Turkey’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (2017): 164–83.

⁹For an overview of the Turkish historiography on the Gallipoli Battle, see Robert Johnson and Metin Gürcan, ‘Introduction’, in *The Gallipoli Campaign: The Turkish Perspective*, ed. Metin Gürcan and Robert Johnson (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016), 1–16.

¹⁰For memories of trauma and their links with emotions and identity, see, for examples, Neta C. Crawford, ‘The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships’, *International Security*, 24, no. 4 (2000): 140–3; Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); K. M. Fierke, ‘Whereof We Can Speak, Thereof We Must Not Be Silent: Trauma, Political Solipsism and War’, *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004): 471–91; Emma Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

The narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign express emotions related to humiliation and betrayal, as well as restoration of honour and recognition. The battles are remembered with references to 'the spirit of Gallipoli' or *Çanakkale ruhu*. The concept of 'spirit' is about standing, prestige and self-esteem.¹¹ Its Turkish use, similarly, denotes heroism, the birth of collective national consciousness and resisting imperial powers together with the victimized enemy soldiers. The spirit of Gallipoli is about reversing humiliation, restoring honour and showing compassion, and thereby, re-establishing international honour and standing.

Emotions related to humiliation and betrayal are prevalent in Eastern perceptions of the West, and they are not unique to Turkey.¹² However, the Gallipoli Campaign, as the first moment of successful collective 'resurrection'¹³ against a colonizer, sets apart Turkish identity and self-assessments of status from the rest of the East. While marginalized groups in world politics may attempt empowerment against established groups,¹⁴ Turkey successfully did so early in the 20th century. It evaded the fate that befell the colonized and constructed its own identity in a way that has continued the 'Orientalisation of the Ottoman periphery'¹⁵ and setting itself above the Rest.

Despite ultimate victory, however, 'identity transformation' still needs verification through 'support from powerful outsiders'.¹⁶ This is because status is not only about deference to authority, but it is also about prestige and esteem.¹⁷ In other words, victory against the West is not on its own sufficient to erase memories of humiliation, loss of territory and the collapse of the once almighty Ottoman Empire. International standing must be redeemed also through prestige. The narratives of the Dardanelles Victory reveal attempts to demonstrate this type of prestige by showing friendship to and compassion for the victim and the belligerent. Furthermore, they seek endorsement by making frequent references to British sources acknowledging Turkish greatness. The UK, as the established group and the main enemy in the Gallipoli Campaign, is utilized to confirm identity transformation. Yet, by seeking to get such reaffirmation from the British, as well as by juxtaposing honour with humiliation, the narratives of the Dardanelles Victory only reassert Turkey's self-perception of inferior status in the international hierarchy and uncertain place between the East and the West.

Elaborating on these points, the article is divided into two main sections. The first section summarizes the theoretical framework of emotions, collective identity and status in IR, as well as methodological considerations. The second section analyses the four emotion dynamics of the spirit of Gallipoli: (i) humiliation and betrayal; (ii) restoration of honour (iii) compassion for the enemy and the victim; and (iv) validation through the eyes

¹¹Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

¹²Khaled Fattah and K. M. Fierke, 'A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East', *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 1 (2009): 67–93.

¹³The Turkish word for resurrection, *diriliş*, is the name of a bestselling novel on the Dardanelles Victory by Turgut Özakman. Turgut Özakman, *Diriliş: Çanakkale 1915* (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2016). The term is used frequently in reference to the Gallipoli Battle.

¹⁴Simon Koschut, 'The Power of (Emotion) Words: On the Importance of Emotions for Social Constructivist Discourse Analysis in IR', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 21 (2018): 495–522.

¹⁵Einar Wigen, 'Go West! Turkey's Entry into International Society', *International Relations* 28, no. 4 (2014): 468–78.

¹⁶Koschut, 'The Power of (Emotion) Words', 505.

¹⁷Reinhard Wolf, 'Taking Interaction Seriously: Asymmetrical Roles and the Behavioural Foundations of Status', *European Journal of International Relations* 25, no. 4 (2019): 1186–211.

of the UK. These dynamics show the complexity of emotions around the Gallipoli Campaign, explain the affectual underpinnings of Turkish national identity and demonstrate the significance and desires to alter status hierarchies.

Emotions, collective identities, and international status

In the past two decades, through an ever-expanding body of work mostly within the theoretical framework of social constructivism, scholars have established the significance of emotions for international relations.¹⁸ For the purposes of this article, these debates are reviewed below by asking three interrelated questions: (i) how do emotions constitute collective identities through the memory of past traumas? (ii) how do emotions shape status hierarchies? (iii) what are the methodological considerations in the study of emotions?

Emotions, memory and collective identity

Shaped by history, culture and politics, emotions are experienced not only by individuals but also by collectives ranging from small groups to entire nations.¹⁹ Emotions are key to understanding political identities, including the identities of nation-states, their interests and their perceptions of the international system.²⁰ The collective self can only be conceived through feelings of belonging, joined together by positive emotions towards the in-group, such as love, pride and self-esteem.²¹

Traumatic events in the history of a nation can be particularly significant in the constitution of collective identities. Defined as an instance of unprecedented disaster that shatters previous feelings of belonging, traumatic events experienced by collectives create an opening to reconstitute group identities through shared emotional experiences.²² Common feelings of trauma connect people of the in-group and shape 'affective communities' while distinguishing members of the collective from the out-group, who do not share the same meaning associated with the experience.²³ The trauma of 'formative' events, such as a war of independence, constitute new communal identities in their immediate wake.²⁴ The memories of formative events can also be passed down to future generations. This is what Volkan calls 'chosen trauma', which means 'the collective

¹⁸For reviews of the earlier literature, see G. E. Marcus, 'Emotions in IR', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3 (2000): 221–50; Jonathan Mercer, 'Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9 (2006): 288–303. For practical reasons, feelings, emotions and affect are used interchangeably in this article although they are not the same thing. Affect, in particular, is a wider conceptualization and includes mood, personality or disposition. For the close connection between emotions and feelings, see the definition provided by Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics', 125. For the differences between affect, feelings and emotions, see Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', *International Organization* 69 (2015): 848–9.

¹⁹Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 491–514; Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', 849–62.

²⁰Mercer, 'Human Nature and the First Image', 297–8; Jonathan Mercer, 'Feeling Like A State: Social Emotion and Identity', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 515–35.

²¹Sarah Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 2nd edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), Kindle e-book.

²²Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*.

²³Hutchison, *Affective Communities*, 3.

²⁴Alexandria J. Innes and Brent J. Steele, 'Memory, Trauma and Ontological Security', in *Memory and Trauma in International Relations*, 15–29.

memory of a calamity that once befell a group's ancestors'. A chosen trauma is remembered and commemorated as 'a shared mental representation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasised expectations, [and] intense feelings ...'²⁵

The First World War is Turkey's chosen trauma as it led to the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire and crushed communal feelings of belonging attached to it. The sense of security that comes from belonging to a group was betrayed by the actions of the Ottoman ruling elite, who sent more than 600,000 soldiers to their death, caused millions of civilians to lose their lives in the ensuing conflict,²⁶ lost vast amounts of territory (in a trend that had already started in the 19th century), and signed the Treaty of Sèvres.²⁷ Similar to other collective traumatic instances elsewhere, these series of developments between 1914 and 1920 revealed that the protection that was sought within the pre-existing community was 'misplaced'. This made it essential to 'fight for political change ... [and for] a reformulation of community'.²⁸ The new Turkish nation-state and communal bonds were born out of this opening that was made possible by the trauma of the First World War.

In addition to trauma and because of the re-formulation of communal identities it entails, the Great War is also Turkey's 'chosen glory'—what Volkan defines as 'the mental representation of a historical event that induces feelings of success and triumph'.²⁹ Focusing on the Sèvres Treaty captures the nadir of the First World War and overlooks victorious restoration, which is equally important for Turkish collective identity. Examining the memorialization of the Gallipoli Campaign, therefore, reveals a more nuanced picture of how the First World War is remembered. Narratives demonstrate Turkish collective identity and complex emotions associated with chosen traumas, such 'loss ... humiliation, vengeance, and hatred' co-existing side-by-side with feelings associated with chosen glories, such as 'enhanced ... attachment' to the group and pride.³⁰

The memorialization of the First World War in this manner contrasts with how the Great War is remembered in the West and the Middle East. For example, popular culture in Britain remembers the War as 'a bloody, senseless affair perpetrated by reckless leaders at the expense of the millions of ordinary men and women who gave their lives'.³¹ Surveys suggest that the Great War was overshadowed by the memory of the Second World War and most people in Britain do not know why the War was fought.³² Although there are differences among local and national memories of the War, there is a general understanding across Western Europe that those who lost their lives in the War were victims of senseless violence and crimes, rather than martyrs dying for a sacred cause.³³ These

²⁵Vamik Volkan, *Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), 48.

²⁶Lance Janda, 'Casualties, Combatant and Noncombatant', in *The Encyclopaedia of World War I: A Political, Social, and Military History*, ed. Spencer Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts, Volume I: A-D (Santa Barbara: ABC Clío), 272–3.

²⁷This is the dominant narrative of the First World War in Turkish historiography. For a detailed historical account of why the Ottomans entered the war, including collective emotional sentiments of the time, the existential threats faced by the Ottoman Empire and its place in the international system, see Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

²⁸Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, 9.

²⁹Volkan, *Blood Lines*, 82.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹Emma de Angelis, 'Foreword', *The RUSI Journal* 159, no. 4 (2014): 3. For a view that contradicts this general understanding of the War as 'pointless and futile', see Gary Sheffield, 'The Centenary of the First World War: An Unpopular View', *The Historian* 122 (2014): 22–6.

³²Catriona Pennell, 'Learning Lessons from War? Inclusions and Exclusions in Teaching First World War History in English Secondary Schools', *History and Memory* 28, no. 1 (2016): 41–2.

³³Jay Winter, 'Commemorating Catastrophe: 100 Years On', *War & History* 36, no. 4 (2017): 239–55.

European recollections of the Great War are distinctive from its memory in the Middle East, which emphasizes partition, colonialization and the region's 'sacrifices . . . in vain'.³⁴ For many in the Middle East, the Great War is the memory of the British and the French secretly deciding the fate of the people in the region in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the establishment of Israel with the Balfour Declaration.³⁵ The War in the Middle East was particularly painful and is still resented because of these acts of betrayal in direct connection to the region's current problems.

Turkish memorialization of the Great War is in some ways similar to the West in its shared understanding of devastation and loss of life. It is also like the memories of the War in the Middle East in its betrayal, humiliation, resentment and trauma. However, for Turkey, the memory of the War is also one of triumph and restoration—a collective memory of both trauma and glory that is not readily shared in Europe and the Middle East. This ambivalence in the narratives of the Great War is also related to and matched with Turkey's place and status in international relations.

Emotions and international status

Status hierarchies in IR interact with collective identities and perceptions of the self and the other.³⁶ International actors shape each other's identities through productive power, which is constructed by discourses and languages.³⁷ When imbued with emotions, such discourses and languages 'set the boundaries for the possible'.³⁸ For instance, a status hierarchy may form if the weaker group accepts the negative characteristics attributed them, such as in a colonial relationship.³⁹ However, this situation can also lead to resentment, anger or 'status conflicts',⁴⁰ when the weaker group feels that its deserved position is repeatedly disregarded. Such disputes between the West and the East are highly related to (dis)respect and social (mis)recognition,⁴¹ which are then linked to different understandings of self-worth, dignity and honour.⁴²

In the case of the Middle East, security concerns and status conflicts have led to political violence through emotions of humiliation and betrayal. While humiliation is the public loss of status and respect, betrayal is the private experience of damage to trust and

³⁴Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014): 277.

³⁵Ian Black, 'Middle East Still Rocking from First World War Pacts Made 100 Years Ago', *The Guardian*, 30 December 2015, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/on-the-middle-east/2015/dec/30/middle-east-still-rocking-from-first-world-war-pacts-made-100-years-ago>> (accessed 25 January 2022).

³⁶Reinhard Wolf, 'Identifying Emotional Reactions to Status Derivations in Discourse', *International Studies Review* 19 (2017): 492; Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Emotions, Discourse and Power', 504. On the concept of 'hierarchy' in IR, see Janice Bially Mattern and Ayşe Zarakol, 'Hierarchies in World Politics', *International Organization* 70 (2016): 623–54.

³⁷Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', *International Organization* 59 (2005): 39–75.

³⁸Ty Solomon, 'Rethinking Productive Power through Emotion', *International Studies Review* 19 (2017): 498.

³⁹Koschut, 'The Power of (Emotion) Words', 504.

⁴⁰Wolf, 'Taking Interaction Seriously', 1197–201.

⁴¹Reinhard Wolf, 'Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition', *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (2011): 105–42.

⁴²Jörg Friedrichs, 'An Intercultural Theory of International Relations: How Self-Worth Underlies Politics among Nations', *International Theory* 8, no. 1 (2016): 63–96. Although in colloquial use, dignity and honour are sometimes used interchangeably, as Friedrichs argues they are quite different. While dignity is inalienable, 'honour is ambivalent [and] contestable. It is never quite clear whether honour resides in the honorable person, or if the person is honorable only because others have bestowed honor on him', 69 (emphasis in the original). Turkish narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign approximate this type of ambiguity in self-worth, and therefore, the word 'honour' was preferred in this article.

'sense of belonging'.⁴³ Both emotions usually reinforce each other in experiences of defeat and they have a long history in the Middle East, starting with colonization in the First World War and continuing on with the formation of Israel. In the faulty logic of militant Islamists, decades of such humiliation and betrayal require the restoration of honour and status through violence and revenge.⁴⁴

However, compassion can be an alternative way of restoring honour. Compassion is an emotion one feels when an awful event has happened to another, coupled with the belief that the event is not due to the victim's own doing. For compassion to manifest itself, one should feel that the victim and their wellbeing are important and must be advocated for one's own ambitions.⁴⁵ Defined as such, compassion is a non-violent way to regain dignity and combat emotions pertaining to loss.⁴⁶ One can redeem honour by showing compassion for others who are in a weaker or similar position, and thereby, advance one's own status, along with the wellbeing of others. For liminal actors in international relations, compassion can be a 'subversive strategy that seeks to convert the ambiguity of their position into an asset, and to challenge the existing social categories'.⁴⁷ Thus, compassion can be utilized and used strategically to advance one's standing and reassert power in a peaceful way.⁴⁸

In the narratives of the Dardanelles Victory, the humane feeling of compassion for the victims of the War serves also as a benign strategy to alter Turkey's international status. As it was mentioned in the introduction of this article, status hierarchies are an important aspect of Turkish national identity. From the late 19th century onward, the Ottoman Empire faced threats to its own survival experienced through consecutive losses of territory and ascending Western imperialism. These security threats were compounded by the Ottoman Empire's externally-generated stigmatization as the backward and barbaric savage in the construction of Europe's own identity as early as the Renaissance period. This type of stigmatization has continued over the centuries, with its expressions still apparent in EU's self-identification and in its relations with Turkey.⁴⁹ From Turkey's perspective, loss of international status since the 19th century and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire have led to the internalization of this externally-generated marker⁵⁰ and adoption of modern standards in an effort to catch up with the West. While this internalization had emotional aspects, it also had very real concerns related to survival.

⁴³Fattah and Fierke, 'A Clash of Emotions', 71–3, quote from 72.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 321. Also see Fierke, 'Whereof We Can Speak', 473–7.

⁴⁶Fattah and Fierke, 'A Clash of Emotions', 86. The authors argue that dignity and compassion in Islamic thought are compatible. Needless to say, this link between the two is not unique to Islam and other societies also show compassion to those who are in a weaker position. For wider discussions on compassion, also see Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Loc 568–579 and Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 142–155.

⁴⁷Rumelili, 'Liminal Identities and Processes of Domestication', 503.

⁴⁸Strategy in this context does not necessarily mean conscious decisions to advance one's goals. For the strategic use of emotions in this at times unconscious way, see Robert C. Solomon, 'The Politics of Emotion', in *Bringing the Passions Back In: The Emotions in Political Philosophy*, ed. Rebecca Kingston and Leonard Ferry (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2008), 189–208.

⁴⁹Bahar Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation', *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004): 27–47; Senem Aydın-Düzgüt, *Constructions of European Identity: Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

⁵⁰Volkan, *Blood Lines*, 97.

Although the nation-state's territorial boundaries were ultimately secured, the expected recognition by the established group never truly materialized, leading to 'a state obsessed with international stature, recognition, and acceptance'.⁵¹

However, unlike the Middle East, Turkey also has a status of in-betweenness because it was never colonized and was also victorious. Remembering the Ottoman Empire and its glorious past in the Middle East, this status as the non-colonized leads to self-perceptions of superiority vis-à-vis the East. Allowing to express this latter status in a benign way and in order to disprove the inferiority bestowed upon itself by the West, Turkish narratives of past trauma also manifest compassion to the West's other victims, mostly colonized Muslim nations and sometimes even the marginalized citizens of the West. Thereby, these narratives reveal Turkey's self-perceptions of its international status and position, as well as desires to transform them. Yet, by not giving up on seeking validation and by instrumentalising compassion in this way, the narratives continue to reinforce the very hierarchies they desire to transform. In short, ambivalence continues.

Emotions, narratives and methods

Studying emotions does not result in parsimonious theories with causal relationships. There are two main reasons for this, which also lead to specific methodological choices. First, as identified in the above sub-sections, emotions 'interact with', 'underpin', or 'permeate' collective identities and status hierarchies, rather than 'causing' them. Moreover, emotions generate identities and status in IR, but they are also produced by them. This is the co-constitutive nature of emotions, which makes it practically impossible to analyse them as variables of a causal theory. Second, emotions are complex or 'mixed'.⁵² For instance, the basic emotion of fear may be considered simple, but what is feared may be quite obscure in situations of uncertainty.⁵³ Similarly, as suggested above, more complex emotions, such as compassion, contain within them varied feelings of pride, privilege, gratitude, as well as empathy and grief.⁵⁴

While the complex nature of emotions limits the use of certain positivist methodologies, memories of trauma and collective identities are expressed, disseminated, and shared through stories or narratives. In other words, 'past and current actions' of a state are made meaningful 'through the discursive articulation of a(n) (auto)biographical identity narrative ...'.⁵⁵ In these narratives, there are interactions between discourse, power relations and emotions. Just like the reproductive relationship between emotions and collective identities, emotions are 'constituted through and in part constitutive of discourse', making it possible to employ discursive approaches.⁵⁶ More specifically, because of its links to discourse, emotions can be

⁵¹Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 7.

⁵²Andrew A. G. Ross, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

⁵³Ibid., 18.

⁵⁴Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Loc 4443–52.

⁵⁵Innes and Steele, 'Memory, Trauma and Ontological Security', 17 (emphasis in the original). Also see Michelle Pace and Ali Bilgic, 'Trauma, Emotions, and Memory in World Politics: The Case of the European Union's Foreign Policy in the Middle East Conflict', *Political Psychology* 39, no. 3 (2018): 505.

⁵⁶Hutchison, *Affective Communities*, 93.

studied through a range of linguistic and paralinguistic tools.⁵⁷ While the former would focus more on representations of emotion in the texts, the latter would also try to capture how actually existing emotions are being evoked, new ones are generated and forgotten ones are reignited. As explained in further detail below, this article considers the emotions that support the memorialization of the Gallipoli Campaign through newspaper accounts. As such, it uses linguistic tools alone and looks at the textual representations of emotions. By tracing the emotion dynamics introduced in this section—namely humiliation, betrayal, honour and compassion—the analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of Turkish collective identity, self-perceptions of status and desires to transform international standing.

Narratives of the spirit of Gallipoli

In order to examine the narratives of the Dardanelles Victory for this article, online archives of two mainstream Turkish newspapers with wide circulation, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, were examined, covering the period from January 1970 to January 2020.⁵⁸ The time period and newspapers were chosen because of practical and empirical reasons. Online archives of *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* were easily accessible only after the 1970s and doing research in the physical archives was not possible.⁵⁹ Instead of focusing on the last few decades, the research went as back as possible to observe enduring elements in the common narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign. For example, focusing on the last two decades might have given the impression that the current Justice and Development Party (JDP) government gives more attention to the Gallipoli Campaign. Similarly, taking the 1980s as the starting point might have led to conclusions that the narratives are unique to the post-coup period. In order to minimize such issues and to capture common elements in the narratives, the research was started in 1970, which was also practically the most viable option.

As the first step of this research, keywords related to the Dardanelles Victory were searched in the archives, resulting in around 230 relevant news segments (125 from *Cumhuriyet* and 104 from *Milliyet*). These segments included editorial columns, commentaries and other general news. Most of the clippings were from the commemorations of the Victory, celebrated each year on 18 March. The second step was the analysis of the narratives, presented in the following sub-sections and in relation to different emotions.⁶⁰

⁵⁷For examples of various methodologies that can be employed, see Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 60–4; Pace and Bilgic, 'Trauma, Emotions, and Memory', 506; Simon Koschut, 'Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics', in *The Power of Emotions in World Politics*, ed. Simon Koschut (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2020), 3–27.

⁵⁸These two newspapers were chosen because of the quality of their internet-based archives. Until recently, both *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* were considered mainstream, nationalist and secular newspapers. Although these characteristics of the newspapers could have led to results that reflect the narratives of a certain segment of the Turkish public more, the inclusion of news segments that cite the public declarations of Islamist political leaders and other fractions mitigates this problem.

⁵⁹Archives of *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* start from 1930 and 1950 respectively. However, scanned material from the earlier years are problematic with some texts appearing almost illegible. Search engines also work better as time progresses. The decision to start the research from 1970 was based mostly on this practical consideration and personal constraints preventing field research.

⁶⁰Unless otherwise noted, the narratives are dominant themes reappearing in the newspapers over the years. They are not necessarily 'the truth' although they certainly contain elements of truth as well. References cite one or two newspaper clippings for each manifestation rather than the entire range, in order to save space. Similarly, specific words that were used in the newspapers are not cited in quotation marks to facilitate easy reading. Quotation marks are avoided also because they are translations from Turkish which may have slightly different semantics. Only quotes in the newspaper pieces and directly translated lengthy sentences are cited in quotation marks.

Humiliation and betrayal

Although the Ottoman Empire was victorious in the Gallipoli Campaign, memories of the battle in the newspapers are almost always juxtaposed against prior and contemporary humiliation and betrayal. While this is usually done in a manner to highlight the significance of the victory itself, it nevertheless serves as a reminder of Turkey's uncertain status in IR. The emotion dynamics of humiliation and betrayal can be summarized under three main themes.

First, the Gallipoli Campaign is described in the newspapers as a battle against the most powerful nations of the world that had the strongest navy of the period. The British fleet is specifically described as an invincible global power that had the most modern weapons of the contemporary period. Portrayed as imperialists that had expansionist visions, the Allies are presented as the superior power with moral inferiority.⁶¹ This depiction of the enemy is contrasted with the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire, lacking any modern weaponry, cannonballs or even bullets, but possessing moral superiority.⁶²

The story of the battle itself stresses these status differences. The events are described in two phases. In the first and naval phase of the battle, Turkish forces won against the Allies on 18 March 1915 thanks in part to the last 26 sea mines that were laid the night before. Victory was achieved despite having no significant fleet and decades of neglect by the Ottomans, who did not pay attention to maritime forces.⁶³ In the narratives, it is argued that if the Allies had insisted, they could pass the straits the next day as there were no other mines that could be used to sink the battleships.⁶⁴ Similarly, victory on land in the second phase on 9 January 1916 was attained thanks to a critical turning point months before, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ordered soldiers, who had no ammunition left and were running away from the enemy, to use their bayonets instead and get on the ground. As frequently cited in the narratives of the battle, he ordered the regiment not to attack but to die.⁶⁵ Enemy soldiers also got on the ground and lost their pace, giving time for backup forces to move to the battle zones. Thus, in both navy and land victories, it is remembered that the Ottoman forces were the weaker party, and the Allies had the technological advantage. The battle was won not because of any material superiority, but due to spiritual strength.⁶⁶

Second, the start of the campaign and entry to the First World War are seen in the narratives as results of series of humiliating defeats and betrayals. According to the dominant contextualization of events that led to the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was in decline since the 17th century, and had faced embarrassing defeat and loss of territory only a year before, in the Balkan Wars.⁶⁷ This incapacity made the British and the French think that defeating the Ottomans in the Dardanelles and capturing Istanbul would be rather easy.⁶⁸ The Ottoman government of Union and

⁶¹This is not unique to Turkey. See, Friedrichs, 'An Intercultural Theory', 73.

⁶²Metin Erksan, '18 Mart Çanakkale Boğazı Savaşı', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1997, 2.

⁶³Zeyyat Selimoğlu, 'Gemilerde Talim Var', *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1988, 5.

⁶⁴Oktay Akbal, '18 Mart 1915 ...', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1982, 2, 9.

⁶⁵See for example, Taha Akyol, 'Çanakkale', *Milliyet*, 29 July 1994, 15.

⁶⁶'Mesajlarda Çanakkale Zaferi', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2010, 7.

⁶⁷İsmet Görgülü, 'Çanakkale Zaferi Neden Önemlidir?', *Cumhuriyet*, 27 March 1999, 2.

⁶⁸Büşra Fatma Gülcü, '18 Mart'ı Anlamak', *Milliyet*, 16 March 2018, <<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/pembenar/busra-fatma-gulcu/18-marti-anlamak-2629394>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

Progress and its War Minister Enver Paşa made the mistaken decision to ally with Germany and entered the war, leading the country into an adventure.⁶⁹ Before the Dardanelles Victory, the Ottoman forces faced dismal defeat against the Russians in the Battle of Sarıkamış as a result of Enver Paşa's poor leadership.⁷⁰ During the Gallipoli Campaign, German allies and General Liman von Sanders, who commanded the Ottoman troops, made detrimental mistakes that would have led to certain defeat. The German commander's mistakes were salvaged by Atatürk, who was only a lieutenant colonel at the time.⁷¹

Third, going back to the depiction of the enemy as the morally inferior imperialist force, in Turkish narratives, the British are portrayed as sinister plotters, who brought their colonies into the battle as soldiers. Australian and New Zealander (ANZAC) soldiers, as well as Canadians and Muslims, were dragged into distant territories to fight for their masters.⁷² Pakistanis from India, Arabs and the Senegalese were deceived by the Allies into thinking that they were fighting on the side of the Muslims to save the Caliphate.⁷³ However, in an oft cited anecdote, when these victims heard the Muslim call for prayer from the Turkish side, they laid down their arms.⁷⁴ Thus, it was not only Turkey that was betrayed by the imperialist forces, but also other innocent victims coming from all over the world, leading them to question their belonging to the British Empire.

In official public declarations commemorating the Dardanelles Victory, this general description of the British as the oppressive imperialist is usually extended to the contemporary period. Although the British is not necessarily named, it is declared that colonialism continues in other forms. Turkey is still fighting imperialism and faces domestic and foreign threats.⁷⁵ While in some of these pronouncements, it is argued that Turkey and its armed forces have the strength to defeat these dark forces as before,⁷⁶ others also imply that Turkey is still economically and politically behind the West⁷⁷ and has been crashed from within, thanks to domestic accomplices.⁷⁸ In both counts, humiliation vis-à-vis the West and the UK and betrayal by domestic leadership and imperialist allies continue. Thus, inferior international status is constantly remembered even when victory is being celebrated.

⁶⁹Dr Mahmut Gürkan, 'Çanakkale, Almanlar, İttihatçılar', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1992, 15.

⁷⁰İlhami Soysal, '18 Mart ve Atatürk', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 March 1988, 11.

⁷¹Dr Hüner Tuncer, 'Size Taaruzu Emretmiyorum, Ölmeyi Emrediyorum!' *Cumhuriyet*, 25 April 2019, 2.

⁷²Mine G. Kırıkkanat, 'Yenen Unutsa Yenilen Unutmaz!' *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2015, 20.

⁷³'Çanakkale'de Olmayan Bir Şey Vardı, O Da ...', *Milliyet*, 19 March 2018, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/gundem/canakkalede-olmayan-bir-sey-vardi-o-da-2630226>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁷⁴Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech in 'Erdoğan: Şehitler Kimlik Kartımızdır', *Milliyet*, 18 March 2013, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/erdogan-sehitler-kimlik-kartimizdir-1681862>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁷⁵President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech in 'Cumhurbaşkanı Afrin Müjdesini Çanakkale'den verdi: O Gün Galip Geldik Bugün de Zafer Bizim', *Milliyet*, 19 March 2018, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/cumhurbaşkanı-afrin-mujdesini-canakkale-den-verdi-o-gun-galip-geldik-bugun-de-zafer-bizim-2629997>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁷⁶Quote from President Fahri Korutürk in 'Çanakkale Zaferi'nin 65. Yılı Törenlerle Kutlandı', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1980, 1, 9.

⁷⁷Declaration of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz in 'Türkiye Örnek Ülke Olacak', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1998, 17.

⁷⁸Quote from Recai Kutan (leader of the religious Felicity Party) in 'Zafer Coşkusu', *Milliyet*, 19 March 2001, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/gundem/zafer-coskusu-5287784>> (accessed 30 March 2020); Erol Manisalı, 'Bıçak Sırtı', *Cumhuriyet*, 21 March 2008, 11.

Restoration of honour

Once put together with humiliation and betrayal, the emotion of honour in the Dardanelles becomes a story of restoration. It also becomes the heroic story of the victims against the colonizers,⁷⁹ faith against technology,⁸⁰ compassion against atrocity.⁸¹ The significance of defeating superpowers against all odds is narrated in a glorified and nationalistic manner, stressing Turkey's influence in global politics and international status. While humiliation and betrayal, which was analysed above, direct attention to self-perceptions regarding inferiority towards the West, restoration of honour demonstrates desires to change this status.

In the narratives, the Dardanelles Victory is directly linked to collective national consciousness. This is the battle that gave rise to Atatürk as a skilled and charismatic commander, who gained the trust of Anatolian people.⁸² Through stories of unprecedented heroism that Atatürk himself retold in later years, he is elevated as the father of the nation.⁸³ It is believed that it was his reputation in Gallipoli that allowed him to lead the War of Independence later. In this myth, Turkish people who came together from all over Anatolia and remote areas of the Ottoman Empire,⁸⁴ for the first time, in the Dardanelles, witnessed their power and experienced collective consciousness.⁸⁵ It was this experience that demonstrated to them that they could reverse the humiliation and replace their broken sense of belonging with another other form of collective identity. This is how they established the Turkish Republic based on nationalism and carried out the subsequent modernization reforms.⁸⁶

Although Islamists in Turkey may de-emphasize the role of Atatürk, their narratives still glorify the battles through religious faith.⁸⁷ In this slightly different narrative, the Dardanelles Victory is a form of restoration of honour for the nation as well as the Muslims. For example, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, in its commemorative sermon in 2005, did not mention Atatürk but referred to the Allies as 'the mindset that aimed to eradicate the existence of Muslims from the face of the earth . . . and enslave our nation'. It praised the 'love of homeland and the power of faith' in defeating this mindset.⁸⁸ Similarly, former Justice and Development Party Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım described the Gallipoli Campaign as the battle fought by 'the last army of Islam' and claimed that

⁷⁹Prof Dr Muzaffer Eryılmaz (mayor of Çankaya), 'Çanakale Geçilmez!' *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2005, 2.

⁸⁰Abbas Güçlü, 'Çanakale Destanı', *Milliyet*, 11 March 2018, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/abbas-guclu/canak-kale-destani-2625243>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁸¹Quote from the Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu 'Bakan Soylu'dan 18 Mart Mesajı', *Milliyet*, 18 March 2019, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/bakan-soyludan-18-mart-mesaji-2844199>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁸²Speech of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, 'Tarihi Değiştiren Zafer', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2013, 8.

⁸³See the anecdote in the above section. It is also believed that Atatürk was shot in the battle but was miraculously saved by the pocket watch he was carrying over his heart which took the hit.

⁸⁴Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım lists Istanbul, Salonica, Diyarbakır, Bagdat, Jerusalem, Kastamonu, Skopje, Tripoli, Bosnia and Damascus. '18 Mart Türk'ün neyi göze aldığına kanıtı', *Milliyet*, 18 March 2017, <<http://www.Milliyet.com.tr/gundem/18-mart-turk-un-neyi-goze-aldiginin-kaniti-2415836>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁸⁵Quote from President Kenan Evren in 'Evren: Çanakale Bağımsızlığımızın İfadesidir', *Milliyet*, 19 March 1985, 7; Quote from Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 'Ulusal Kimliğimiz Çanakale'de belirlendi', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1999, 1.

⁸⁶Like others, Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt referred to the Dardanelles Victory as the 'preface of the Republic'. 'Cumhuriyet'i Yaşatacağız', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 2007, 8.

⁸⁷For a detailed analysis of the changing meanings of the spirit of Gallipoli and similarities and differences between political fractions, see Kahraman Şakul, 'Contemporary Turkish Perceptions of the Gallipoli Campaign', in *The Gallipoli Campaign*, 181–204.

⁸⁸'Atatürk'süz Çanakale Hutbesi', *Cumhuriyet*, 17 March 2005, 5.

Turkey 'defended the honour of all Muslims'.⁸⁹ This implies that standing up against imperialism elevates the status of Turkey above other Muslim nations, placing it in a position of leadership.

There is also a general emphasis on the significance of the Dardanelles Victory for world history in a way that positions Turkey above the colonized East. The battle is almost always summarized as Turkish dignity being witnessed by the whole world.⁹⁰ One of the main goals of the British and the French, when they started the Gallipoli Campaign, was to support their ally Tsarist Russia through the straits. With defeat, they could not assist Russia, which resulted in the October Revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union.⁹¹ Thereby, Turkish forces changed the course of the First World War and global politics for decades to come.

Likewise, according to the narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign, the battle became an important example for the colonized ANZACs and Indians, as well as the Arabs and African Muslims. During the battles, they witnessed what a nation could do with limited resources. These enslaved nations were deceived into fighting, but they observed the chivalry of the Turks (see below for more on this theme). This is how their perceptions of the British changed and the fire of independence and national consciousness were ignited.⁹² The Dardanelles Victory ended colonialism and changed international history.

The significance of the Gallipoli Campaign as the beginning of the end of colonialism exhibits longings for re-establishing past grandeur, along with proof of self-worth and status above the Rest. As it will be analysed in the sub-section below, themes of exaltedness and chivalry, as well as compassion shown for the enemy, during and after the battle display similar aspirations of status elevation.

Compassion

Expressions of compassion are also quite common in the narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign. They work in tandem with restoration of honour and demonstrate a self-understanding of greatness, as well as confirmation of self-worth against the morally inferior and deceptive enemy. The victims of the battle are not only Turkish martyrs, but also the colonized people and British soldiers who were forced to fight to advance the interests of the British Empire. War is depicted as evil and something that should be avoided, with the implication that modern Turkey always seeks justice and peace in the world.⁹³ Turkey's victory against the oppressive West is the victory of all Muslim brethren coming from all over the world—or specifically, from Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Mogadishu or Tripoli.⁹⁴

⁸⁹Binalı Yıldırım "Beka Sorunu Yok" Diyenlere Seslendi: Çanakkale'ye Gidin', *Milliyet*, 19 March 2019. <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/binali-yildirim-beka-sorunu-yok-diyenlere-seslendi-canakkale-ye-gidin-2844671> (accessed 24 March 2022).

⁹⁰President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech, '18 Mart Türk'ün Neyi Göze Aldığının Kanıtı'.

⁹¹Toktamış Ateş, 'Çanakkale Geçilmez!' *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2004, 3; quote from Prof Dr Sina Akşin, 'Çarlık, Çanakkale'de Yıkıldı', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2007, 8.

⁹²Prof Dr Vahdettin Engin, 'Çanakkale Zaferi: Kurtuluş Zaferinin Öncüsü', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2018, 11.

⁹³Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech in 'Çanakkale'de Tarihi Anlar', *Milliyet*, 24 April 2015, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/canakkalede-tarihi-anlar-2049160>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁹⁴Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech in 'Erdoğan: Şehitler Kimlik Kartımızdır'.

The Gallipoli Campaign is reminisced also as a battle that friendship won. During the land battles, the warring troops, and especially the ANZACs and other colonies, got to know the Turks and realized that, instead of the barbaric, uncivilized people the British led them to believe, they were actually gentlemen and chivalrous.⁹⁵ At times of temporary truce, Turkish soldiers would share their resources with their opponents, aid them in taking care of the wounded and burying their dead.⁹⁶ Through these acts of compassion, the ANZACs and the Turks became everlasting friends, exemplified by hundreds of tourists that come every year from Australia and New Zealand to commemorate the war. Australian and New Zealander museums dedicated to the battle, streets named after Atatürk and books written on the campaign testify to these long-term bonds. The Irish soldier David Fallon wrote that ‘Turks fight like the devil but they are gentlemen, they do not attack and touch the helpless, unlike the brutal and opportunist Germans’.⁹⁷ These and other quotes exemplify and validate Turkish honour and place in international hierarchy, above the savage and barbaric status the Europeans bestowed upon them.

Turkish compassion after the First World War is symbolized in Atatürk’s clemency.⁹⁸ His moderation is echoed in his famous quote from 1931: ‘peace at home, peace in the world’.⁹⁹ With regards to the Dardanelle’s Victory, Atatürk is believed to have written a letter to the ANZACs in 1934, saying

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives ... You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore, rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehments¹⁰⁰ to us where they lie side by side now here in this country of ours ... You, the mothers, who sent their sons from faraway countries, wipe away your tears, your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.¹⁰¹

The level of affectionate understanding Atatürk shows to the enemy victims in this letter is frequently cited in narratives to show Turkish compassion and eminence.

A poem written on the Gallipoli Campaign by the centre-left former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit exemplifies the internalization of Atatürk’s quote and its wider incorporation into the narratives. After three beginning verses on a young ANZAC soldier, Ecevit’s poem continues with three verses on a 15-year-old English trumpet player in the British army. The poem then goes on:

Some were English, some Scottish
Some were French, some Senegalese
Some Indian, some Nepalese
Some from Australia, some from New Zealand, ANZAC

⁹⁵Prof Dr Mete Tuncoku, ‘Çanakkale 1915’i Anlamak, Anlatabilmek ...’, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2003, 2.

⁹⁶For an account of these exchanges that turned prejudice to mutual respect, and as evidenced by the diaries, letters and memoirs of the ANZAC veterans, see Alev Karaduman, ‘Recognizing the Other: Contested Identities at Gallipoli’, in *The Gallipoli Campaign*, 163–172.

⁹⁷İlber Ortaylı, ‘Belediyeler Son 25 Yılda Güçlendi’, *Milliyet*, 22 March 2009, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/ilber-ortayli/belediyeler-son-25-yilda-guclendi-1073919>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁹⁸Tanju Erdem, ‘Kurtuluşun Başlangıcı: Çanakkale Zaferi’, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2000, 2.

⁹⁹Bahir M. Erüreten, ‘Kurtuluşun Öncüsü: Çanakkale Savaşları’, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1999, 2.

¹⁰⁰Mehmet is a common Turkish male name, derived from Muhammed. It is also the generic name used to refer to Turkish soldiers in sympathy and appreciation.

¹⁰¹English translation quoted in ed. Gürcan and Johnson, *The Gallipoli Campaign*, xii.

Soldiers filling up ships
 Everyone of them not knowing why they came ...
 The battle later became their grave ...

'Don't you think I do not understand you, my brothers?' said
 the Anatolian Mehmet,
 who does not even have a tomb

'I too perished in foreign lands
 not knowing for the sake of what
 I had the pleasure of dying for my own homeland
 for the first time in the Dardanelles ...
 The Dardanelles is now considered your homeland too'

...

The Dardanelles Battle was an odd war
 The more heated it became, the more it soothed anger
 With every break of fighting, it turned
 enemy to friend
 It was a cutthroat battle
 But one that produced respect

...

Fighters who fell on the ground
 United like friends

...

Like this, the battlefield of hell
 Became heaven on earth¹⁰²

In this poem, Turks show compassion to foreign soldiers, as friends and brothers, who fell victim to the battle that were not their doing. Their sacrifice was clearly important for Turkey's own ambitions of creating a collective national identity out of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks appreciated the opponent because they were also betrayed into fighting in distant wars for the sake of the Ottomans. Just like their sense of belonging that was dislocated through years of humiliating defeats, the Gallipoli Campaign upset the victims' sense of belonging to the British Empire and started independence movements.

Commemorating the Gallipoli Campaign in this manner, compassion is utilized to alter Turkey's international status. Similar to narratives of restoration of honour and replacement of lost greatness, superiority over the colonies and the morally inferior West is re-established. However, this re-positioning must also be confirmed by external sources in

¹⁰²Bülent Ecevit'ten Çanakkale'ye', *Milliyet Blog*, 10 October 2007, <<http://blog.Milliyet.com.tr/bulent-ecevit-ten-çanakkale-ye/Blog?BlogNo=68816>> (accessed 25 March 2020).

order to be valid. As it will be discussed in the sub-section below, remembering the Gallipoli Campaign through the eyes of the UK serves this purpose of endorsement, but also inadvertently calls in to question Turkey's international status.

Validation

In many accounts of the Gallipoli Campaign in the newspapers, there are also references to sources from the Allies that corroborate the dominant Turkish narrative. While in some commentaries, relatively short quotes from foreign accounts are added as supporting evidence, in others the entire segment is dedicated to translations of such work. In most, there are no proper citations of the original source, and the translated pieces seem to rely on Turkish books or second-hand knowledge that has become conventional wisdom. By trying to demonstrate that even the enemy acknowledges Turkish honour and compassion after years of humiliation, the main purpose of these types of evidence seems to be the validation of Turkish narratives as undeniable truth. By resorting to this method, however, unintentionally narratives reproduce emotions of self-doubt and give the impression that there may be other alternative narratives.

These types of confirming evidence come from a wide range of different sources, such as books on the battle written by foreigners,¹⁰³ encyclopaedic entries,¹⁰⁴ memoirs of the soldiers,¹⁰⁵ and movies.¹⁰⁶ As explained above, the continued interest in the Gallipoli Campaign by the Australians and New Zealanders is also proof of Turkish chivalry, compassion and friendship. However, in general, quotations from British political and military leaders seem to outweigh reliance on other types of sources. Again, unwittingly, this dependence on British quotations becomes a double-edged sword. While they validate Turkish narratives of the Dardanelles Victory, they also demonstrate the desire to receive reconfirmation from a superior power.

The often-used motto to summarize the Gallipoli Battle, 'the Dardanelles is impassable', is attributed to the British War Cabinet that uttered it for the first time.¹⁰⁷ The battles and the significance of Atatürk as a military leader are narrated through British official history.¹⁰⁸ The British official history itself has a significant story on its own. The British General Staff documented the Gallipoli Battle to pass on to the future generations as Britain's unsuccessful attempt.¹⁰⁹ In 1932, the volume was presented to Atatürk by the British government, referring to him as 'a great general, a noble enemy, a generous

¹⁰³For a selection of wide ranging foreign authored volumes, see Miyase İlknur, 'Zaferimizin 102. Yıldönümü', *Cumhuriyet*, Mart 18, 2017, 10–1. The following book written by an Australian war correspondent is one of the most frequently cited: Alan Moorehead, *Gallipoli* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956).

¹⁰⁴Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, 'Çanakkale'de Buve Zirhlisi', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1984, 2.

¹⁰⁵Hüsnü Göksel, 'O, Öyle Bir Sabahtı ki . . .', *Cumhuriyet*, 26 April 2000, 2.

¹⁰⁶Mustafa Balbay, 'Russell Crowe'dan Son Umut', *Cumhuriyet*, 4 January 2015, 1, 7.

¹⁰⁷Quote from renowned historian İlber Ortaylı, 'İlber Ortaylı'dan "Tarihi" Açıklama: "Çanakkale Geçilmez" Lafını Diyen Biz Değiliz', *Milliyet*, 4 March 2019, <<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/ilber-ortaylidan-tarihi-aciklama-canakkale-gecilmez-lafini-diyen-biz-degiliz-2837090>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

¹⁰⁸Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations Gallipoli (Official History of the Great War)*, 2 volumes, cited in a number of newspaper clippings. See, for example, Dr Handan Diker, 'Çanakkale Kara Savaşlarında Mustafa Kemal', *Cumhuriyet*, 26 April 2007, 2.

¹⁰⁹Hasan Pulur, 'Tarih Safsatayla Değişmez', *Milliyet*, 20 March 2008, available at <<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-pulur/tarih-safsatayla-degismez-507379>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

friend'. British Ambassador to Ankara, George R. Clark, reported Atatürk's reception of the volume to London with the comments that his recount of the Gallipoli Battle was 'plain and humble'.¹¹⁰

Beyond this incident, in Turkish narratives, Atatürk and his humility, compassion, sense of responsibility and readiness to sacrifice himself as the father of the nation are contrasted with the British commanders during the war. For example, the memoirs of General Ian Hamilton are cited to demonstrate his self-confidence, arrogance and hubris.¹¹¹ These enemy sentiments at the beginning of the battle, however, turned into frustration, shock and acceptance by the end. In such portrayals of British leaders, they underestimate the might of the Turks by just looking at numbers of weaponry and by failing to realize the Turkish spirit. For instance, the 2005 commemorative religious sermon quoted a British general, who 'confessed that the Turks defeated [the British] not with material power but with moral force'.¹¹²

Winston Churchill receives significant attention in narratives of the Dardanelles Victory as the Secretary of State for War during the Campaign. He is held both in contempt and in awe as a great statesman.¹¹³ Descriptions of Churchill's feelings mirror narratives of humiliation before the campaign and restoration of honour and self-worth after the battle. According to the dominant Turkish narrative, before the war, Churchill belittled the Turks and described them as barbarians although it was him who was blinded by hubris.¹¹⁴ He was the main architect of the Gallipoli Campaign and he had been obsessed with the Dardanelles since late 19th century. His fixation was acknowledged by another British statesman, Prime Minister Asquith.¹¹⁵ During the war, Churchill became an unprecedented villain. Because he realized that winning the battle would be impossible, he requested and received the permission to use biological/chemical weapons from the House of Lords. When one British MP opposed the idea of using such methods by saying 'our opponents are humans too, after all', Churchill replied 'Turks are not human'. He did not say this out of spite or anger but because he genuinely believed it, implying that regular weapons would not be enough to defeat the Turks.¹¹⁶

Yet, despite all this cruelty, once the battle was over, Churchill learned an important lesson. He had to resign from his ministerial position.¹¹⁷ He acknowledged that the fate of the First World War changed because of the navy's defeat on 18 March 1915. In an interview with a French magazine in 1922, Churchill said that 'The main reason for so many people to die in the First World War, for the heavy expenses . . . was not German cannons or rifles, but it was 26 mines that swung like a pendulum in the flowing waters of the Dardanelles'.¹¹⁸ Churchill summarized the consequences of the Gallipoli Campaign as follows:

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Prof Dr Turgut Turhan, 'General Hamilton'ın Yaşadığı Düş Kırıklığı', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2010, 2.

¹¹²Atatürk'süz Çanakkale Hutbesi'.

¹¹³Müşerref Hekimoğlu, 'Bir Büyükelçi ile Söyleşi', *Cumhuriyet*, 13 March 1980, 10. This depiction of Churchill is different than other Middle Eastern portrayals of him as a colonizer, held only in contempt. See the testimonial of an Iraqi in Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Kindle e-book, Loc 781–839.

¹¹⁴Ali Sirmen, 'Zor Günler', *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1980, 3 and 'Ulusallık', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 April 1983, 3.

¹¹⁵Prof Dr Mete Tuncoku, 'Churchill'in Çanakkale Saplantısı', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2000, 2.

¹¹⁶Quote from Dr Emin Ertan, 'Çanakkale Savaşının Yıldönümünde İlginç İddia' *Milliyet*, 18 March 2011, <<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/canakkale-zaferinin-yildonumunde-iliginc-iddia-13659571365957>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

¹¹⁷Burhan Felek, 'Çanakkale Zaferi', *Milliyet*, 19 March 1982, 2.

¹¹⁸There are various versions of the same quote, see Afif Büyüktuğrul, '18 Mart Dünya Tarihini Değiştirmiştir', *Milliyet*, 19 March 1973, 2; Engin Konuksever, 'Çanakkale Savaşının "Nusret" Mayın Gemisi Şimdi Kömür Taşıyor', *Milliyet*, 18 March 1976, 1, 10; İsmail Hergünşen, 'Nusret ve Kahraman Komutan Hakkı Bey', *Milliyet*, 18 March 2014, <<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/dusunenlerin-dusuncesi/nusret-ve-kahraman-komutan-hakki-bey-1853215>> (accessed 30 March 2020).

One third of our invincible armada went down. One third became unusable. Our failure prolonged the war for 2.5 years. It caused 8.5 million Europeans to die. In Russia, the communists took over. When we could not pass the straits, Muslims, other Asians started to question the magnificence of Europe. While we lost our power in India and Pakistan, other Europeans lost theirs in their colonies.¹¹⁹

Having experienced Turkish national faith in battle, Churchill vehemently opposed the Greek army's assault, in Izmir in 1919, at the start of Turkish War of Independence.¹²⁰ He showed magnanimity by acknowledging Atatürk's role in the battle.¹²¹ He changed his impression of the Turks as barbarians and instead described them as fortresses that stood up against 'the most advanced technologies of the era'.¹²²

As these quotations show, instead of strategic mistakes that might have led to Allied defeat, Turkish narratives selectively make references to British accounts that validate stories of honour.¹²³ Churchill and other British leaders are respected for their acknowledgements of Turkish spirit after defeat. However, Britain (as well as personifications of the UK through Churchill, General Hamilton and others) is also remembered as an arrogant Western imperialist that had the upper hand at the beginning of the war. It is the ambivalence of emotions of humiliation and honour, as well as the need to confirm narratives through the eyes of a Western power, that perpetuate Turkey's status of in-betweenness.

Conclusion

This article examined the narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign and the emotions underpinning Turkish collective identity and international status. It drew attention to the memorialization of this particular event as a more comprehensive reflection of Turkish identity, as opposed to other episodes during the First World War, such as the Sèvres Treaty. A sole focus on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of European powers highlight humiliation and betrayal, as well as the desire to be recognized by the West. In this sense, the literature on Turkish collective identity draws attention to emotions that permeate Turkey's international status inferior to the West. Yet, this self-perception is only half of the picture. As this article has shown through narratives of the spirit of Gallipoli, Turkey also views itself above the colonized nations and aspires to alter its international status. The memory of the Gallipoli Campaign restores self-worth and evokes feelings of compassion towards the Rest. The narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign capture a more nuanced understanding of self-worth, going beyond insecurities and inferiority while reflecting and reproducing Turkey's own understanding of its liminality between the West and the East.

¹¹⁹Melih Aşık, 'Zaferi Yazanlar', *Milliyet*, 18 March 2015, <<https://www.Milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/melih-ask/zafere-yazanlar-2029952>> (accessed 30 March 2020). There is no original source cited in the column for this quote.

¹²⁰İlhan Selçuk, 'Çanakkale Zaferi!..', *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1987, 2.

¹²¹Prof Dr Metin Osmangazi, 'Anafartalar Kahramanı Mustafa Kemal', *Cumhuriyet*, 10 August 2007, 2.

¹²²Ismail Hergünşen, 'Bir Destandır Çanakkale', *Milliyet*, 17 March 2015, <<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/dusunen-lerin-dusuncesi/bir-destandir-canakkale-2029339>> (30 March 2020); Dr Hüner Tuncer, 'Çanakkale Geçilmez!', *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 2019, 2.

¹²³For a balanced account of Allied historiography on the battle with various different approaches explaining defeat, see Robert Johnson, 'Contested Historiography: Allies Perspectives on the Gallipoli Campaign', in *The Gallipoli Campaign*, 17–40.

Turkish narratives of the Gallipoli Campaign highlight a different understanding of the Great War, especially in contrast to Europe. Turkey remembers the First World War and the Dardanelles Victory as a constitutive element of its collective identity. Narratives reveal desires to change status hierarchies although unintentionally they reinforce Turkey's liminality. This finding draws attention to the fact that the Great War means different things to various nations, and the literature should continue to strive for a more diverse approach to its memorialization.

Further research into the memorialization of the Gallipoli Campaign in Turkey can provide illuminating insights at the intersection of emotions, collective identities and status in IR. First, this article only covered dominant narratives from the 1970s onward. Analysing the memorialization of Gallipoli Battle in the early Republican era was not possible. However, a more comprehensive analysis starting from the 1920s would be able to show how and if Turkey's self-perceptions changed throughout its modern history. Second, this article used linguistic tools and the textual representations, which omitted the question of how narratives are felt by the readers or the general Turkish public. Further research can look into the recollection of the Dardanelles Victory among the public, for instance, by analysing commemorative events on the war site. This type of scrutiny would also provide interesting insights into the extent to which Turkish collective identity is performed, internalized and contested. Finally, future projects can examine how the emotions identified in this article are reflected in the past and current Turkish foreign policy behaviour. As it was argued in the second section, establishing causal relationships involving emotions is difficult. Yet, tracing emotions in state actions would highlight how Turkey interprets its own role in world politics and provide a more detailed and meaningful account of its behaviour. Through the analysis of Turkish narrations of the Gallipoli Battle, this article suggested a move in the direction of incorporating emotions in the study of Turkish collective identity and status in international relations.

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