

# **The Multidimensionality of National Belonging: Patterns and Implications for Immigrants' Naturalisation Intentions**

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## **Abstract**

Drawing on the Trajectories and Origins Survey, we investigate how national sense of belonging is associated with immigrants' intention to naturalise in France. We exploit rich information about subjective national identity, recognition by others, and perceived discrimination to build a multidimensional construct of belonging using a latent class model. We show that immigrants' sense of belonging articulates in five different ways, ranging from full belonging to exclusion. We then explore how different belonging types are related to naturalisation intentions. Naturalisation intentions are highest among those who feel they fully belong, and lowest among those who feel fully excluded. Yet, migrants whose strong sense of national belonging is undermined by the absence of recognition by others and by the experience of racism and discrimination are also highly motivated to naturalise. In light of these findings we reflect on the different ways in which national sense of belonging may contribute to immigrants' intention to naturalise.

## Introduction

Citizenship is a legal status that defines formal belonging to a nation state and the rights and obligations of individual members. Extant empirical literature investigating why some immigrants naturalise has examined how socio-demographic characteristics, resource availability and country of origin may influence how much immigrants stand to gain from citizenship status (Mazzolari, 2009; Fougère and Safi, 2008). However, citizenship also involves a sense of belonging to the national community, which is likely to contribute to immigrants' decision to naturalise (Joppke, 2010; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994). While a few empirical quantitative studies have investigated the association between national sense of belonging and citizenship status (Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019; Berry and Hou, 2016), their measurement of the concept of sense of belonging does not match its theoretical complexity and multifaceted nature (Antonsich, 2010). This has limited their insight into how different ways of belonging matter for the decision to naturalise.

In this article, we use rich survey data on the immigrant population in France, the Trajectories and Origins Survey (TeO), to investigate how different types of national belonging are related to the intention to naturalise. This paper makes two contributions to the literature on citizenship and national identity. First, we operationalise belonging as a multidimensional construct. Employing a latent class measurement model, we exploit multiple measures in the TeO data to build a more complete operationalisation of belonging, involving both *place-belonging*, that is national identification and feelings of attachment to the country; and *relational belonging*, that is perceived recognition by the community and institutions (Antonsich, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Our data also allow us to illustrate how these two aspects may align or contradict each other. We show, for instance, that some migrants experience national belonging as 'conflictual', namely they identify and feel at

home in the receiving country, yet do not believe they are perceived as such. Others experience a strong sense of place-belonging, but do not identify as a member of the nation or believe others see them as belonging. Existing studies of citizenship do not capture these potentially orthogonal dimensions of subjective belonging but instead use singular proxies (such as linguistic ability, length of stay, intermarriage or an explicit question on feelings of belonging) to capture national belonging (Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019; Carrillo, 2015).

Second, we contribute to our understanding of the relationship between belonging and naturalisation. We investigate whether and how the types of belonging we identify are associated with intentions to naturalise. In doing so, rather than relying on the commonly used three-step approach to operationalise latent classes as predictors (e.g. Luthra and Platt, 2016), we implement an innovative approach that is not sensitive to measurement error (Bakk and Kuha, 2018). Further, we consider intentions to naturalise rather than citizenship status itself. This approach allows us to separate out individual plans and desires to naturalise from the state's decision to grant citizenship. Our findings show that naturalisation intentions are highest among migrants who feel both strong place and relational belonging. Yet, the desire to naturalise is equally high among those experiencing 'conflictual' belonging. By showing that citizenship acquisition is not simply the pinnacle of the integration process for those who fully belong, as suggested by classic assimilation and acculturation theories (Gordon, 1964), we are able to further develop the theoretical mechanisms that explain how belonging is associated with naturalisation.

France provides an interesting case study to investigate the relationship between belonging and the intention to naturalise. The share of foreign residents who acquire citizenship is low relative to other countries (Eurostat, 2019). This is despite France's long history as a receiving country for migrants, the relatively accessible eligibility requirements

for becoming a citizen, and the small financial cost of applying (Ministère de l'intérieur, 2021; Noiriél, 2001). Indeed, naturalisation is open to any foreigners aged over 18 who have been residing legally and continuously in France for at least five years.<sup>1</sup> Citizenship has been historically construed as the primary means by which foreigners can melt into the French majority. However, citizenship in France is culturally and ethno-racially marked (Weil, 2002). Public debate tends to represent many potential citizens, particularly Muslims and ethno-racial minorities, to be incompatible with the Republican notion of Frenchness (Onasch, 2017; Fassin and Mazouz, 2009). The perceived exclusion of these groups from national membership is likely to have implications for non-citizens' feelings of belonging and consequently their desire to naturalise.

While prior work has examined perceptions of exclusion and belonging among visible minorities in France (Simon and Tiberj, 2015), ours is the first study to disentangle whether and how sense of belonging is associated with naturalisation intentions. Investigating the role of belonging provides new insights into citizenship and the boundaries separating citizens and foreigners. We show that, net of socio-demographic and economic characteristics, motivations to naturalise are also rooted in symbolic processes related to identity and perceived acceptance by others. Finally, more broadly, the findings shed light on how feelings of belonging and recognition relate to the stratification of migrants based on their citizenship status, creating motivations for some and disincentivising others to pursue the naturalisation process.

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<sup>1</sup> While the initial application relies on residency and age criteria only, during the application process, candidates must meet further conditions such as no criminal record, professional integration, that they have sufficient French language skills, and that they adhere to French values by signing a charter during the naturalisation ceremony. There are a number of exceptions to these rules however, as migrants who are spouses of French citizens or certain legal statuses, such as asylum-seekers, may have accelerated tracks to citizenship.

## **Background**

### *Why do immigrants naturalise?*

Much of the prior research on naturalisation focuses on the determinants of citizenship status, rather than on intentions to apply. These studies may therefore conflate individual intentions with barriers to attaining citizenship that are outside of the individual's control, including the state's ultimate decision on the application. Nevertheless, this research sheds light on the factors that shape why immigrants choose to become citizens. Generally, immigrants from low-income countries are more likely to become citizens, while at the individual level, higher socio-economic status and strong ties to the country of residence also increase the likelihood of naturalising (Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers, 2013; Mazzolari, 2009; Chiswick and Miller, 2008). In European countries, immigrants from non-European countries may be more motivated to naturalise than European-origin immigrants because citizenship status offers them a greater degree of rights and protection, such as freedom of movement in Europe, protection from deportation and greater passport power (Shachar, 2009). Research further highlights the role of citizenship laws in naturalization decisions, with migrants from countries allowing dual citizenship being more likely to acquire citizenship in the host country (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Carrillo 2015).

Variation in naturalisation across national origin groups evidenced in France echoes these general findings, with higher probabilities of citizenship among North Africans (Carrillo, 2015), Asians and sub-Saharan Africans compared to Portuguese and Western Europeans (Fougère and Safi, 2008). Immigrants who have a higher as opposed to lower level of education, are employed rather than unemployed and who earn a higher as opposed to lower income probably find navigating the citizenship application process less challenging and/or they may be viewed more favourably by the state (Chiswick and Miller, 2008; Fougère and Safi, 2008). The right to vote may also be more attractive to those who are more

highly educated and therefore more politically engaged (Insee, 2018). Prior studies of France show that higher socioeconomic status correlates with the likelihood of naturalisation (Carrillo, 2015; Fougère and Safi, 2008). Finally, factors relating to social ties and stability in the country of residence, such as length of stay, the presence of family members, and marital status, matter for naturalisation. In particular, marriage to a citizen may anchor immigrants to the country, therefore incentivising naturalisation more strongly, while also making naturalisation more accessible due to shorter residency requirements for the spouses of citizens in many contexts.

Our study aims to go beyond prior research on naturalisation determinants by integrating an additional mechanism: non-citizens' feelings of national belonging. Although citizenship is an important legal institution, it is also a social identity, one that delineates the boundaries of the national community (Anderson, 1991). Citizens typically identify as members of a national political community and are attached to a territory and its people (Smith and Jarkko, 1998). Citizenship may therefore come at the end of a process of integration, that includes participation in and acceptance by the culture of the host country (Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019). The evidence that social and economic integration in the country of residence, such as having a family, friends and a job, are associated with naturalisation suggests that attachment to the surrounding community plays an important role in the decision to acquire citizenship (Buonfino and Thomson, 2007). We thus expect the subjective feelings of national belonging, which takes on several dimensions, to shape non-citizens' decisions to naturalise.

*The multidimensionality of national belonging: place belonging and relational belonging*

Although often used in migration research, the notion of a national sense of belonging is typically defined vaguely or simply equated to national identity and/or citizenship (Antonsich, 2016). The lack of conceptual clarity in defining belonging has translated into a

variety of approaches to measuring it in empirical studies. This has been particularly the case for quantitative studies that are less equipped to study multi-dimensional concepts because they have to rely on the limited measurements available in their data. Although a couple of studies have been able to ask respondents to rate their feelings of belonging, most studies have used proxies (Hou, Schellenberg, and Berry, 2018; Berry and Hou, 2016). A few studies measure belonging with behavioural indicators, such as speaking the language and contact frequency with the majority population (Klok et al., 2017). Others equate belonging to ‘feeling at home’ (Wu, Schimmele, and Hou, 2012) or to national identification (Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019; Bond, 2006). Still others measure group belonging using separate indicators, such as ethno-racial group, religious affiliation, location of residence and perception of recognition by others (Carrillo, 2015). Finally, some studies equate belonging directly with citizenship (Clark, 2009).

We measure national belonging to reflect its conceptual complexity and multi-dimensionality. We argue that a sense of national belonging emerges from the intersection of two dimensions: one level of belonging is personal and intimate, the other social and relational (Antonsich, 2010). Antonsich (2010) refers to the former as place-belonging, which involves two aspects: identification with and attachment to a place or a group. Place-belonging includes national identification and represents feeling at home, where home is a space of familiarity and emotional attachment (Hooks, 2009). The absence of place belonging is a sense of loneliness, isolation and disengagement.

Yet, belonging is also a relational and social construct that creates inclusion and exclusion (Fenster, 2007; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). Relational belonging refers to the boundaries set by the group that determine who belongs and who does not. Informally, boundaries are set in everyday practices and interactions in which inclusion or exclusion is created (Hopkins, 2011). For example, intense forms of lack of recognition are

manifest in episodes of racism and discrimination. The perception of exclusion also arises when official and formal boundaries, such as criteria for citizenship acquisition, signal that not everyone is welcome or acceptable as a member of the national community.

Place-belonging and relational belonging are interconnected (Erdal, Doeland, and Tellander, 2018), but do not necessarily overlap. People are able to develop a feeling of belonging when other people, institutions and systems recognise them as part of the same community, acknowledge their value and identity, and protect their rights (Barreto et al., 2010; Mulgan, 2009; Loader, 2006). Recognition also enhances a sense of security and acceptance which are vital conditions for the development of a personal sense of belonging (Erdal, Doeland, and Tellander, 2018). However, even in contexts where relational belonging is strongly exclusionary, non-citizens may still experience place-belonging, resulting in more conflictual forms of identity. For others, lack of recognition is not necessarily a source of exclusion or reduced opportunity, and aligns with one's own low sense of belonging. This could be the case for some migrant elites, who do not suffer from the consequences of not being fully recognised because they are socio-economically better-off and have a more cosmopolitan or transnational identity (Luthra and Platt, 2016; Beaverstock, 2005).

Different articulations of place- and relational belonging can also be understood within theories of immigrant integration. The classical assimilation model predicts that immigrants will increasingly resemble the mainstream of the host society over time in terms of their economic position, social embeddedness, values, practices and national identity (Alba and Nee, 2003). However, Portes and Zhou (1993) note that in unequal societies immigrants can assimilate into different segments of that society. Cross-cultural psychology suggests that immigrants adopt one of four acculturation strategies, ways of negotiating between the culture of their origin group and that of their country of residence (Berry, 1997). Integration refers to the participation in both cultures; assimilation occurs when immigrants mostly adopt



the culture of the host country; separation refers to immigrants mainly maintaining the culture of their origin group; marginalisation occurs when immigrants do not participate in either. Alongside socio-cultural and economic factors, psychological aspects, such as a feeling of belonging, shape these acculturation strategies (Hou, Schellenberg, and Berry, 2018; Berry, 1997). These dimensions of integration are distinct, but they interact and may not necessarily be concordant (Fougère and Safi, 2008; Bourhis et al., 1997). Strong cultural or social integration, i.e. language skills, engaging with mainstream values and cultural practices, having native friends and families, may foster a sense of feeling at home, while a lack of socioeconomic integration could reinforce feelings of societal or political exclusion. Low cultural integration matched with high socioeconomic integration could be at the roots of why some immigrants feel at home in the country of residence, without necessarily feeling like they belong there.

State procedures, policies and narratives in the host country influence immigrants' acculturation strategies (Bourhis et al., 1997). In France, place- and relational belonging are strongly shaped by ethno-racial boundaries, racism and discrimination. A recent meta-analysis shows that France has the highest rates of labour market discrimination against non-whites compared to eight other North American and European countries (Quillian et al., 2019). Prior studies based on TeO data also document high levels of perceived discrimination, racism (Safi and Simon, 2014), and ethnoracial segregation (McAvay and Safi, 2018), in particular among African-origin immigrants and Muslims. Onash's (2017) ethnographic study on the French civic integration programme reveals that ethno-racial boundaries further penetrate the institution of citizenship itself, delineating who is entitled to sign up for national membership. Although, in the French Republican model of integration, citizenship is officially unrelated to race/ethnicity, religion or any other individual characteristics, research has highlighted the racialised underpinnings of French citizenship.

Frenchness and whiteness tend to be conflated in the national narrative (Beaman, 2015; Fassin and Mazouz, 2009) and certain religious markers signal a lack of cultural assimilation that is seen as incompatible with French national identity (Mazouz, 2019; Bussat, 2012). For instance, in 2008, the French Conseil d'Etat denied citizenship to a Moroccan woman because she wore the niqab. Her application was rejected on the grounds that a radical practice of Islam is incompatible with the French basic value of gender equality. Reforms banning the use of headscarves in schools in 2004 and the burqa in public spaces in 2008 similarly contribute to forging ethno-racial boundaries around national belonging, likely further alienating immigrants and their descendants of African or non-European origin and/or Muslim backgrounds (Safi and Simon, 2014; Hage, 1998).

The French national narrative around colour blindness may further be considered an exclusionary mechanism shaping relational belonging. The colour-blind ideology of the French state refuses any categorical distinctions between individuals on the basis of race/ethnicity or religion. However, given the existence of racism and discrimination on these grounds, it has been argued that the state's unwillingness to recognise ethno-racial distinctions amounts to a denial of racial inequality and discrimination (Eseverri Mayer, 2019; Fassin, É. and Fassin, 2006; Jennings, 2000). This absence of recognition and protection of minority rights could further reinforce a sense of illegitimacy and exclusion among certain groups with regards to national membership.

#### *How belonging matters for naturalisation intentions*

By utilising the distinction between place- and relational belonging, we can separate out different combinations of belonging and ascertain the extent to which these combinations are or are not associated with intentions to naturalise. Because citizenship is the highest formal embodiment of belonging, the decision to acquire citizenship may be a logical conclusion for immigrants who have a full sense of belonging, namely a strong sense of place-belonging *and*

recognition as part of the community. Research about the UK and Germany has shown that national identification with the host country predicts subsequent citizenship acquisition, suggesting that it may contribute to the choice of naturalising (Donnalaja, 2020; Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019). Jayet (2016) finds that immigrants who have naturalised in France are more likely to feel French and to feel accepted by others.

In contrast, we expect those who do not feel part of the nation and who are not seen by others as belonging to have a low incentive to acquire citizenship. Although naturalisation may improve their life opportunities, being at the margins of society may stifle their intention to naturalise, especially if they experience racism and discrimination. Migrant elites, who are comfortable in the country of residence without identifying as members, should have a similarly low incentive to naturalise. The identity aspect of citizenship, the right to vote, and the opportunities that arise from acquiring citizenship should be less consequential to them.

In cases where tension exists between place and relational belonging, the implications for naturalisation intentions may not be as straightforward. For immigrants whose personal sense of belonging is challenged and questioned by others, even in the form of racism and discrimination, naturalisation can be a means to recognition and inclusion. Such individuals may feel they are entitled to the benefits associated with citizenship and may also seek naturalisation as a form of security against a threatening environment. The right to vote may also be particularly appealing to people who feel unjustly excluded and misrecognised. However, if they feel that the institution of citizenship is yet another means of exclusion and negation of recognition, they may be put off from seeking to naturalise. Fassin and Mazouz (2009) find that immigrants in France decide against naturalising if they feel they are not recognised as deserving of a place in French society.

## **Data and Methods**

We use data from the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) Survey. Conducted in 2008-2009, with data collected from over 21,000 adult respondents living in metropolitan France, TeO aimed to study the outcomes of first and second generation immigrants (Beauchemin, Hamel, and Simon, 2008). The survey was designed using a stratified sampling method to over-represent certain origins of migrants in order to analyse statistically rare groups, making it a rich data source for studying immigration-related topics. A sample of native French respondents is also included for comparison. We apply the survey weights to account for the over-representation of first and second generation immigrants with respect to the comparison sample. The overall sample is representative of the population in metropolitan France aged 18 to 59. TeO is an ideal source for our study as it includes a wealth of information on feelings of national belonging, recognition, and experiences of discrimination and racism. In addition to citizenship status, TeO includes a question about whether non-citizens intend to apply for citizenship. The survey also provides detailed characteristics about migration background, origin, and legal status.

We restrict our sample to first generation immigrants, namely individuals who were born abroad without French citizenship at birth. As we aim to analyse naturalisation intentions, we focus only on immigrants who were not French citizens at the time of the survey. Further, we exclude immigrants who had applied for citizenship but whose application had been rejected. That is, we exclude respondents who had applied and received a decision on their citizenship application. We do so in order to avoid confounding one's national sense of belonging with the positive or negative experience of the citizenship application process. This results in a total sample of 4,541 respondents. As Table A1 in the Appendix shows, our sample differs somewhat from the citizens and rejected applicants we excluded from our analysis, particularly in terms of length of residency. However, other

compositional differences between samples are minor. Reflecting the composition of the immigrant population in France, most migrants in the sample come from North Africa, Southern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa (Beauchemin, Hamel, and Simon, 2008).

## **Method**

### *Belonging as a multidimensional measure*

We use latent class analysis (LCA) to measure the latent construct of belonging based on five observed indicators that tap into the dimensions of place- and relational belonging. A key advantage of a latent class model is that we can study categorical latent concepts as a typology, with the types offering interpretable construct categories (McCutcheon, 2011). This allows us to investigate not simply if belonging matters for naturalisation intentions, but more importantly how different belonging types matter.

The latent class model (LCM) rests on two key assumptions: first, that the observed indicators are correlated, and second, that such correlations are uniquely explained by the latent variable. Given these assumptions, the LCM is a probability model that describes the distribution of answers to the indicators. By estimating the model parameters, the method allows us to classify respondents into mutually exclusive and exhaustive latent classes or types, based on the covariation of answers to the indicators. The model parameters that describe the nature of the latent class variable are conditional probabilities. Conditional probabilities indicate the probability that for each level of the observed indicator (e.g. ‘totally agree’) a respondent in the said class has answered that option. By observing the patterns of conditional probabilities in each class, we can understand the nature of each class and label it accordingly. The second set of parameters of interest are latent class probabilities, which describe the number of classes defined by the LCM and the relative size of each class, i.e. how the population is predicted to be distributed across classes. Latent class and conditional

probabilities are Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates (Goodman, 1974). ML estimation allows for the use of observations with missing values, unless all values are missing and the observation is dropped.

In LCA, the researcher decides on the number of classes, beyond the necessary condition for identification of LCM (See Appendix for details). We decide on the number of classes for the model by comparing the goodness of fit of models, preferring the model with the lowest Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and by choosing the model that is most easily interpretable.

To describe the composition of respondents across class types, we first determine the predicted probability of class membership for each respondent and assign respondents to the class for which they have the highest probability of belonging (Vermunt and Magidson, 2007). We then run cross tabulations of respondent characteristics of interest and class membership. This approach is sensitive to measurement bias because it treats class memberships as known, rather than as a probability. We treat the results as indicative of the composition of class types.

### *Structural equation model*

In the third part of the analysis, we estimate a structural equation model to investigate the association between class membership and the probability of intending to naturalise. As belonging and naturalisation intentions are endogenous, potentially affected by the same unobservables, we do not claim to be estimating a causal effect of belonging. Rather we aim to describe how intentions vary across types of belonging, adjusting for individual characteristics.

We use the 'two-step' method of estimation recently proposed by Bakk and Kuha (2018) because it is not vulnerable to the biases of other commonly used approaches. The most widely used model is the three-step model. After the LCM estimation, respondents are

assigned to the class membership for which they have the highest probability of belonging. Class membership is then treated as an observed independent variable in a regression model. Because the latent variable is not observed, but is treated as such, the predicted probabilities assigned to each respondent are not equal to the true values of the latent classes, thereby producing measurement error. This measurement error may yield biased estimates of the parameters in the regression model or their standard errors (Croon, 2002). An alternative approach is the one-step method, where the LCM and the structural equation model are estimated simultaneously. This strategy has the limitation that the LCM responds to changes made to the structural equation model (e.g. adding a covariate). This means that decisions about the structural equation model may distort the estimation of the LCM and the resulting interpretation of the classes.

The two-step model addresses both these issues. It eliminates the issue of measurement error, despite employing a step-wise approach. The first step consists in estimating the LCM only (as in the three-step model). In the second step, the LCM and the structural equation model are estimated simultaneously (as in the one-step model), but the model parameters of the LCM are constrained to be fixed to the values estimated in the first step. This approach avoids the issues arising from estimating the two models simultaneously and means that the nature of the belonging types identified does not change as we add covariates. Measurement error is also not an issue because the latent construct is not treated as an observed variable. The model is estimated using ML to fit a logistic regression where intention to naturalise is the dependent variable and the belonging types are the independent variable of interest, controlling for other covariates. We then convert the coefficients to odd ratios for technical reasons. Details of the Stata code for the model is in the Appendix.

Finally, we calculate the average predicted probabilities of intending to naturalise for each belonging type (marginal means), all other covariates being at their average level.

## Measures

### *Outcome variable*

Intention to naturalise is measured using the following question asked of respondents without citizenship at the time of the survey: “Have you already applied for French citizenship?” with response categories 1) Yes, my application is underway; 2) Yes, but my application was refused; 3) No, but I intend to apply; and 4) No, and I don’t intend to apply. As per our sample selection, we dropped category 2, and coded 1 and 3 as “Intention to naturalise” (1) and 4 as “No intention to naturalise” (0). 58% of respondents plan to apply or have recently applied for citizenship, but have not heard back on it yet (see Table A1 in the Appendix).

### *Measures of belonging*

We measure place-belonging with two indicators. Respondents are asked the extent to which they agree that they feel at home in France and that they identify as French. Both indicators are measured on a four-point scale that ranges from ‘totally agree’ to ‘totally disagree’, and capture the key aspects of place attachment, namely the perceived connection to France and identification.

We measure relational belonging using three indicators. Respondents are asked the extent to which they agree that they feel others see them as French. The indicator is measured on a four-point scale that ranges from ‘totally agree’ to ‘totally disagree’. Respondents are also asked if they have experienced discrimination in France during the last five years due to their origins or nationality, and whether they have ever been the victims of insults, racist terms or racist attitudes in France during their lifetime. These three indicators measure the extent to which respondents feel recognised by others and whether they have felt excluded to the point of discrimination and/or racism.



Refusals/don't know amounts to between 0.40% (N=18) and 6.90% (N=313) respondents. Our method enables us to include individuals with some missing data. Table 1 illustrates the unweighted distribution of respondents on the indicators of belonging. The descriptive statistics reveal relatively high levels of place-belonging. Responses to relational belonging are more fragmented. More than a third of respondents totally disagree that others see them as French, and about a quarter have experienced racism.

Table 1: Indicators of belonging

| Variable         | Place belonging   |                              | Relational belonging        |                              |   |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|---|
|                  | I feel French (%) | I feel at home in France (%) | Others see me as French (%) | Victim of racism in life (%) | Experience of discrimination due to origins (%) |
| Totally agree    | 22.9              | 52.8                         | 14.7                        | -                            | -   |
| Agree            | 25.9              | 31.1                         | 19.8                        | -                            | -   |
| Disagree         | 19.3              | 8.4                          | 21.1                        | -                            | -   |
| Totally disagree | 28.2              | 5.2                          | 37.5                        | -                            | -   |
| Yes              | -                 | -                            | -                           | 24                           | 15.9  |
| No               | -                 | -                            | -                           | 75.5                         | 84.1  |
| Missing          | 3.8               | 2.5                          | 6.9                         | 0.4                          | -   |
| Total %          | 100               | 100                          | 100                         | 100                          | 100   |
| Total N          | 4,541             | 4,541                        | 4,541                       | 4,541                        | 4,541   |

#### *Covariates in the structural equation model*

In our estimates of naturalisation intentions, we use a number of covariates to capture the degree of social and economic integration of immigrants and other factors that may influence naturalisation intentions. These include:

Immigrant generation: Based on age at which the migrant arrived, the variable equals 1 if the respondent arrived before the age of 16 (generation 1.5), 0 otherwise (generation 1).

Length of residence: Based on year of arrival, we created a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent has been living for at least five years in France or not. Time spent in France influences both feelings of belonging and eligibility for naturalisation, as in France, immigrants must have five years of continuous legal residence to make the initial citizenship application.

Legal status: Respondents are asked about the type of residence permit issued upon arrival in France. We include this in the model as mode of entry indicates motivation for entry, which could affect the intention to naturalise. We recoded the original variable into eight categories: asylum, student, worker, spouse, family, other, exempt and no response. The non-response category includes those who did not respond either because they did not know their initial legal status or refused to answer.

Education: Respondents are asked their highest level of education attained in France or elsewhere. We recoded this into seven categories: no qualification, primary, professional certificate, Bac, current student, university, and no response. The non-response category may include individuals who have been educated abroad and do not know how to translate their level of qualification.

Employment: Respondents are asked if they are in paid work, are unemployed but have worked in the past, or if they have never worked.

Household income: We recoded reported values into a seven-category variable comprising the lowest decile group (1), each of the three middle terciles (2-5), the top decile group (6) within the sample, and missing values (7).

Home ownership: This variable indicates whether the respondent is the owner or renter of the house they live in, or if they are housed for free.

Language: To capture linguistic skills, this variable is an indicator of whether the interview was conducted in French or in another language. Most candidates for naturalisation must justify an adequate level of French during the application process. Language skills may thus influence migrants' naturalisation intentions as well as their sense of belonging.

Marital status: We use a question about marital status and the follow-up question about whether they are married to a French national to construct a measure with the following categories: single, married to a French spouse, married to a foreign spouse/married to 'missing', and divorced/widowed.

Number of children: Respondents are asked how many children they have in total, including children who no longer live with the respondent or who are deceased. We recoded the variable into no children, one child, two children, three or more children.

Regions of origin: We recoded respondents' country of birth into nine countries/regions: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Turkey, Southern Europe, Other European countries, and other countries in the world.

Citizenship loss: As intentions to naturalise are also dependent on whether migrants are at risk of losing their original citizenship, we control for dual citizenship policies measured at the level of the country of origin. To do so, we match TeO with the MACMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset (Vink, De Groot, and Luk, 2015), which records, since 1960, whether countries allow dual citizenship. As the data vary by country and over time, we match TeO respondents according to the policy in place in their country of birth at the time of migration to France. The variable is a dummy indicating whether the TeO respondent is at risk of losing their original citizenship upon naturalising.

Age: A continuous variable indicating the respondent's age in years.

Sex: A dummy indicating whether the respondent is a man (0) or a woman (1).

## Results

### *Types of national belonging*

Table 2 shows the results from the latent class model of types of belonging, which allocated respondents to a latent class variable with five classes. We choose a five-class model as its AIC and BIC are lower than the four-class model and the interpretation of the classes is clearer than in a six-class model. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the goodness of fit of a four-, five- and six-class model.

Table 2 presents the conditional probabilities for each indicator and marginal probabilities for each class. We named each class based on the combinations of the conditional probabilities of each observed indicator in each class: ‘Full belonging’, ‘Approaching full belonging’, ‘Conflictual belonging’, ‘At home but apart’, ‘Excluded’.

Table 2: Class distribution and marginal predicted means

|                                  | Full belonging | Approaching full belonging | Conflictual belonging | At home but apart | Excluded |
|----------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|----------|
| Pr(class)                        | 0.32           | 0.31                       | 0.08                  | 0.22              | 0.07     |
| Probability of:                  |                |                            |                       |                   |          |
| <i>I feel at home in France:</i> |                |                            |                       |                   |          |
| Totally agree                    | 0.89           | 0.39                       | 0.55                  | 0.37              | 0.07     |
| Agree                            | 0.10           | 0.53                       | 0.36                  | 0.35              | 0.28     |
| Disagree                         | 0.01           | 0.07                       | 0.08                  | 0.15              | 0.34     |
| Totally disagree                 | 0              | 0.01                       | 0.01                  | 0.13              | 0.31     |
| <i>I feel French:</i>            |                |                            |                       |                   |          |
| Totally agree                    | 0.64           | 0                          | 0.30                  | 0.02              | 0.02     |
| Agree                            | 0.26           | 0.48                       | 0.43                  | 0                 | 0.03     |
| Disagree                         | 0.09           | 0.45                       | 0.21                  | 0.02              | 0.16     |
| Totally disagree                 | 0.01           | 0.07                       | 0.06                  | 0.96              | 0.79     |

*Others see me as French:*

|                  |      |      |      |      |      |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Totally agree    | 0.45 | 0    | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Agree            | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.19 | 0.07 | 0    |
| Disagree         | 0.12 | 0.42 | 0.29 | 0.12 | 0.07 |
| Totally disagree | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0.44 | 0.78 | 0.92 |

*Discrimination*

|     |      |      |      |      |      |
|-----|------|------|------|------|------|
| Yes | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.62 | 0.06 | 0.63 |
| No  | 0.94 | 0.89 | 0.38 | 0.94 | 0.37 |

*Racism*

|     |      |      |   |      |      |
|-----|------|------|---|------|------|
| Yes | 0.18 | 0.11 | 1 | 0.10 | 0.69 |
| No  | 0.82 | 0.89 | 0 | 0.90 | 0.31 |

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Note: class probabilities add up to 1. Conditional probabilities for each indicator level add up to 1 within each indicator. Survey weights are applied.

About one-third of the sample falls into the ‘Full belonging’ class. This type represents someone who feels at home, identifies as French, has not experienced racism or discrimination and feels that others see them as French. These immigrants both feel like they belong and that others recognise their sense of belonging.

Immigrants in the ‘Approaching full belonging’ type represent 31% of the sample. These respondents are likely to feel at home in France, tend to have not experienced racism or discrimination, but only half of them feel French and they are unlikely to feel that others see them as French. These immigrants appear to be comfortable in France, but they do not belong fully.

Immigrants of the ‘Conflictual belonging’ type are those who are likely to feel at home in France and to feel French, but very few feel like others see them as such and they are likely to have experienced racism and discrimination. For this group, there is a contrast between place belonging and relational belonging. Only 8% of respondents belong to this class.

The ‘At home but apart’ type includes immigrants who are likely to feel at home, but not likely to feel French or think that others see them as French. Very few have experienced discrimination or racism. Feeling at home indicates that they are comfortable living in France, but they appear to be far from feeling like they belong. 22% of respondents fall into this type.

The ‘Excluded’ type is the immigrant who is unlikely to feel at home, identify as French, feel like others see them as French, and who is likely to have experienced racism and discrimination. These respondents score low on all dimensions of belonging, both place-belonging and relational belonging. Moreover, not only do they not belong, but they also experience exclusion in its most intense form, through discrimination and racism. Only 7% of respondents belong to this class.

Table A3 in the Appendix shows the composition of the five belonging types according to key socio-demographic characteristics: origin, income, educational attainment, length of residence and marriage. The patterns that emerge are consistent with expectations. Low-income and non-European origin groups who may be perceived as non-white are more likely to belong to marginal belonging types, namely ‘conflictual’ and ‘excluded’ belonging. Those in the top 10 income percentile are over-represented in the ‘At home but apart’ belonging type, suggesting that some migrant elites have a low sense of belonging, but without the conflict that is experienced by more disadvantaged migrants. However, university students are also under-represented in the ‘full belonging’ type and over-represented in the ‘Conflictual belonging’ type. This may be due to more educated people being more sensitised to recognising discrimination (Gee, Pavalko, and Long, 2007).

### *Belonging and naturalisation intentions*


We now turn to explore how these categories of belonging relate to naturalisation. Figure 1 shows the odd ratios of the likelihood of intending to naturalise for each typology of

belonging compared to the reference category, 'Approaching full belonging', holding everything else constant. We choose this as the reference category because it represents over a third of respondents.

Unsurprisingly, migrants who experience 'Full belonging' have a stronger intention to naturalise than those 'Approaching full belonging', net of other factors. The odds of intending to naturalise are 1.88 those of the reference category. Yet, among those with the highest propensity to naturalise we also find migrants who fall into the 'Conflictual belonging' class. Their odds of intending to naturalise are 2.26 as high as the 'Approaching full belonging' type. For this category, strong identification as French is combined with low relational belonging (i.e. a lack of recognition and the experience of racism and discrimination). Hence, lack of political inclusion does not appear to push these migrants away from the naturalisation process. On the contrary, it may even further motivate them to naturalise.

In contrast, the lowest odds are for those 'At home but apart' and who are 'Excluded'. They have 0.54 and 0.40 respectively the odds of the reference category to intend to acquire citizenship. These two groups have similarly low intentions to naturalise, but for different reasons. The former do not need to likely because of their privileged position, whereas the latter are marginalised.

Figure 1: Odds ratios of belonging types on the probability of intending to naturalise



Note: The figure depicts the structural equation model of the relationship between belonging types and naturalisation included in Table A5 in the Appendix.

Table 3 shows the average probability of intending to naturalise by belonging type predicted from the structural equation model. Those in the ‘Conflictual belonging’ and in the ‘Full Belonging’ type are those who are most likely to want to naturalise. People in the ‘At home but apart’ and in the ‘Excluded’ category are the ones least likely to intend to naturalise.

Table 3: Average predicted probability of intention to naturalise by belonging type

| Belonging type        | Intention to naturalise (%) | Total (%) | Total (n) |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Approaching belonging | 58                          | 100       | 1,421.7   |
| Full Belonging        | 69                          | 100       | 1,453.1   |
| Conflictual Belonging | 71                          | 100       | 321.4     |
| At home but apart     | 47                          | 100       | 1,102.5   |
| Excluded              | 42                          | 100       | 242.3     |



Other covariates influence naturalisation intentions. Table A4 in the Appendix shows the effects of the full list of covariates. Non-Europeans and those who are married (especially to a French national) have a higher propensity to naturalise than Europeans and single respondents respectively. Those whose country of origin does not allow for dual citizenship are also less likely to naturalise compared to those who do.<sup>2</sup> The likelihood of naturalising also decreases with age. In line with prior research, socioeconomic status also positively correlates with intentions: being in work as opposed to never having worked and having a high school diploma as opposed to not having one also increase the probability of intending to acquire citizenship. Yet, the largest effects in the model are that of membership of the ‘Full belonging’ and the ‘Conflictual belonging’ type as opposed to the ‘Approaching belonging’ type. The next highest factor is marriage to a French citizen as opposed to being single, which greatly simplifies citizenship acquisition.

As a sensitivity check we rerun the whole analysis only for the 3,563 respondents who are likely eligible to naturalise based on the length of residency and linguistic requirements for citizenship. While the data do not provide a measure of eligibility, we assume that migrants are eligible if they have lived in France for at least five years and have completed the Teo interview in French without need of translation. The findings align with those for the full sample. Results are illustrated in Table A6 and Figure A1 in the Appendix.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

Two aims guided the analysis of this study. The first was to empirically identify the multidimensionality of belonging, involving both place-belonging and relational belonging.

The second was to determine how the intention to naturalise among non-citizens varied by

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<sup>2</sup> We investigated whether belonging types matter differently for those whose country of origin allows for dual citizenship and for those whose country of origin does not, but we did not find evidence of different patterns.

types of belonging, net of other socio-economic indicators of immigrant integration that influence citizenship acquisition.

Our findings show that national belonging is not a unidimensional indicator. Our data reveal five types of national belonging. We find that, for the most part, people's personal feeling of place-belonging or lack thereof is matched by a corresponding feeling of recognition by others, as predicted by theory (Erdal, Doeland, and Tellander, 2018; Barreto et al., 2010). However, there are also cases when there is a clear contrast between how immigrants see themselves and how they perceive others to see them.

Our typology further reflects the complexity of the concept by allowing the sub-dimensions of place-belonging and relational belonging to also move in different directions. For example, feeling at home can exist without identifying as French. Similarly, not feeling recognised by others can occur without the experience of racism and discrimination. This evidence supports theoretical understandings of national belonging as a multi-dimensional process, rather than as a static continuum (Antonsich, 2010).

Our data show that most immigrants, 63% hold some level of national sense of belonging that is not denied by the majority. Although exclusion, disconnect and conflictual belonging occur, they do not afflict the majority of immigrants living in France. Yet, this is not to say that we should not pay attention to these smaller groups. In fact, our five-level national belonging typology appears to be highly associated with respondents' intention to naturalise. This study is not able to causally identify whether national belonging provides people with a motivation to naturalise or not, but it does show that there is a relationship between how people belong to the nation and whether they intend to acquire citizenship or not.

The two types of immigrants with the highest propensity to intend to naturalise are those who 'Fully belong' and who hold 'Conflictual belonging'. These are two very different

groups of people, one that shows full integration and the other that experiences rejection by the majority. However, what they do have in common is that they score highly on both indicators of place-belonging, feeling at home and identifying as French.

At the opposite end of the scale we find two other groups who have the lowest propensity to naturalise, those who we define as the ‘Excluded’ and the ‘At home but apart’. Again, these two types are quite different from each other. The former are situated at the very margins of society. Lacking a sense of national identification and recognition by others, as well as having a strong experience of racism and discrimination, they are also the only group who does not feel at home. The latter, instead, do not identify as French and do not think they are seen as French, but still feel at home and are not victims of direct exclusion. What these two types of people seem to have in common is that they do not identify as French.

National identification is thus fundamental in setting apart those who intend to naturalise and those who do not. This finding fits within the acculturation framework, according to which citizenship may be a pinnacle of integration (Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers, 2013; Hochman, 2011). The types of belonging identified here echo the diverging categories of acculturation strategies shown in past research: migrants who “fully belong” could reflect those who are fully integrated in the host country’s cultural practices, while those who feel “excluded” align with those who experience cultural marginalisation (Bourhis et al., 1997). Yet, our findings go further by highlighting the potential disconnect between subjective perceptions of belonging and naturalisation, which is overlooked in classical theories of assimilation and acculturation. As our findings demonstrate, it is the combination of place belonging and the attitudes, behaviours and policies of the country of residence that matters for the intention to naturalise (Bourhis et al., 1997). More broadly, our findings echo the notion that different dimensions of immigrant integration potentially diverge, as by Safi (2008) who shows that African origin

migrants in France are rooted in terms of their social networks and cultural practices, but face barriers to socioeconomic integration. Such disjunctive integration patterns align with the ‘conflictual belonging’ type and their desire to naturalise.

Belonging types are associated differently with the motivation for naturalising and therefore with the ways migrants view the function of citizenship. For example, although the ‘Full belonging’ and the ‘Conflictual belonging’ type have the same propensity to naturalise, their motivations for doing so may be very different. For the former group, citizenship is an acknowledgement of full integration and belonging. In contrast, the latter group may be moved by the frustration of being the subject to various forms of exclusion, despite feeling French. They may also need citizenship to assert their identity and to overcome the obstacles associated with lack of recognition, such as discrimination in the work-place. Citizenship may therefore matter mainly as an identity or as a means to full integration. Similarly, the low intention to naturalise of the ‘Excluded’ and the ‘At home but apart’ types may follow from different mechanisms. The ‘Excluded’ type may need citizenship more than anyone, but is far from it, both as a personal feeling and in the eyes of society. In contrast, people in the ‘At home but apart’ type do not want citizenship likely because they do not need it.

Further, our findings underscore a paradox of naturalisation in France: although the naturalisation rate is not particularly high in France (in line with the European average) (Eurostat, 2019), the majority of migrants in the TeO survey have a sense of national belonging and intend to naturalise. This suggests that there are obstacles to naturalisation for migrants, despite their intention to naturalise. Unequal treatment linked to origin or legal status, perceived cultural integration, socioeconomic status, etc. undoubtedly enter into the application process, as illustrated by prior qualitative research (Mazouz, 2017). It is also possible that migrants who experience belonging as conflictual self-select out of the citizenship process, even if they do state a desire to naturalise, due to prior experiences of

racism and discrimination and a sense of social exclusion. Alternative explanations may be found in the bureaucratic procedure itself, which is long, painstaking, and at times discouraging. Despite relatively open eligibility rules, documentary requirements for naturalising are stringent and lack transparency, and the objective criteria used to determine successful applicants is often mixed with a large degree of discretion on the part of administrators (Mazouz, 2017). Thus, even migrants with strong aspirations to become citizens may drop out or opt out of the process entirely. Future research should further investigate why this desire to naturalise is not acted upon or made possible.

Overall, the different articulations of belonging that emerge from our findings mark a development over prior studies, which typically use single variables or imprecise proxies to measure migrants' attachment to the receiving society. Our findings highlight that immigrants are not a homogenous group in how they relate to the country of residence and that this relationship is complex. In doing so, this paper also illustrates how such modes of national belonging matter for immigrants' intention to naturalise. Previous research has tried to identify what motivates immigrants to naturalise by identifying what socio-demographic and economic characteristics are associated with citizenship status. This evidence suggests that those who have the available resources to do so are the most likely to naturalise. In this study we go a step further by showing that, for the same objective characteristics, immigrants' personal sense of belonging is associated with naturalisation intentions and this appears to matter more than other typically influential determinants, such as marriage to a citizen. Immigrants of similar socio-economic status, country of origin and length of residence may have different intentions to naturalise if they view themselves differently and have different experiences of acceptance by others. Our findings underscore the multiple roles citizenship can have in the eyes of immigrants, not just as a legal status, but also as a means to more integration and acceptance, and as a national identity.

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## Appendix-The Multidimensionality of National Belonging: Patterns and Implications for Immigrants' Naturalisation Intentions

### Sample characteristics

Table A1: Unweighted descriptive statistics of sample selection

| Variable                       | Non-sample (%) | Sample (%) |
|--------------------------------|----------------|------------|
| <i>Intention to naturalise</i> |                |            |
| Intend to                      | -              | 57.8       |
| Do not intend to               | -              | 42.2       |
| <i>Length of residence</i>     |                |            |
| < five years                   | 1.24           | 14.73      |
| ≥ five years                   | 98.74          | 85.16      |
| Missing                        | 0.03           | 0.11       |
| <i>Education</i>               |                |            |
| No qualification               | 20.87          | 25.99      |
| Primary                        | 14.28          | 16.76      |
| Professional certificate       | 15.79          | 11.96      |
| Bac                            | 14.82          | 13.12      |
| University                     | 28.67          | 21.05      |
| Current student                | 2.96           | 5.40       |
| No response                    | 2.61           | 5.73       |
| <i>Income</i>                  |                |            |
| Bottom decile                  | 10.73          | 16.74      |

|                             |       |       |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|
| 10-25 <sup>th</sup> centile | 7.21  | 10.39 |
| 25-50 <sup>th</sup> centile | 28.89 | 30.76 |
| 50-75 <sup>th</sup> centile | 29.64 | 23.50 |
| 75-90 <sup>th</sup> centile | 9.90  | 6.34  |
| >90 <sup>th</sup>           | 5.22  | 3.46  |
| NR                          | 8.42  | 8.81  |
| <i>Origin</i>               |       |       |
| Algeria (ref)               | 9.68  | 10.17 |
| Morocco                     | 12.16 | 9.67  |
| Tunisia                     | 3.52  | 3.44  |
| Sub-Saharan Africa          | 17.81 | 20.30 |
| Southeast Asia              | 16.51 | 2.77  |
| Turkey                      | 7.91  | 11.78 |
| Southern Europe             | 13.58 | 18.01 |
| Other Europe                | 9.12  | 15.13 |
| Other World                 | 9.71  | 8.72  |
| Total (n)                   | 3718  | 4541  |

## Latent Class Model (LCM) specification

Necessary and sufficient condition for identification of LCM

The number of latent variable classes that fit the data must satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition for identification that the degrees of freedom (df) are bigger than zero:

$df = a + b$  where

$a = (K_1 \times K_2 \times \dots \times K_n)$  where  $K_i$  is the number of levels of the observed indicator  $i$

$b = (C - 1) + C \times [(K_1 - 1) + \dots + (K_n - 1)]$  where  $C$  is the number of latent classes

Table A2: goodness of fit statistics

| Number of classes | Observations | df | AIC                | BIC                |
|-------------------|--------------|----|--------------------|--------------------|
| Three class       | 4,541        | 35 | $1.72 \times 10^5$ | $1.72 \times 10^5$ |
| Four class        | 4,541        | 47 | $1.70 \times 10^5$ | $1.70 \times 10^5$ |
| Five class        | 4,541        | 57 | $1.69 \times 10^5$ | $1.69 \times 10^5$ |
| Six class         | 4,541        | 66 | $1.69 \times 10^5$ | $1.69 \times 10^5$ |

Table A3: Composition of belonging types-Weighted belonging types by key socio-demographic variable (row percentages)

|                    | Approaching belonging (%) | Full belonging (%) | Conflictual belonging (%) | At home but apart (%) | Excluded (%) | Total | Total (n) |
|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|-------|-----------|
| <i>Origin:</i>     |                           |                    |                           |                       |              |       |           |
| Algeria            | 30.37                     | 36.55              | 8.47                      | 18.59                 | 6.02         | 100   | 462       |
| Morocco            | 32.72                     | 31.94              | 12.65                     | 17.27                 | 5.43         | 100   | 439       |
| Tunisia            | 27.4                      | 35.59              | 11.98                     | 19.49                 | 5.54         | 100   | 156       |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 31.67                     | 27.89              | 12.22                     | 17.6                  | 10.62        | 100   | 922       |
| Southeast Asia     | 40.37                     | 23.81              | 3.25                      | 25.99                 | 6.57         | 100   | 126       |
| Turkey             | 32.45                     | 24.3               | 7.28                      | 30.62                 | 5.35         | 100   | 535       |
| Southern Europe    | 26.1                      | 44.25              | 3.03                      | 24.8                  | 1.82         | 100   | 818       |
| Other Europe       | 35.1                      | 27.55              | 3                         | 30.9                  | 3.44         | 100   | 687       |
| Other World        | 33.55                     | 22.4               | 4.48                      | 33.12                 | 6.45         | 100   | 396       |
| <i>Income:</i>     |                           |                    |                           |                       |              |       |           |
| Bottom decile      | 32.75                     | 29.15              | 7.48                      | 25.83                 | 4.79         | 100   | 496       |
| 10-25th centile    | 31.75                     | 30.79              | 9.58                      | 21.25                 | 6.63         | 100   | 736       |

|                            |       |       |       |       |      |     |         |
|----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-----|---------|
| 25-50th centile            | 29.61 | 32.34 | 7.11  | 25.03 | 5.91 | 100 | 1,397   |
| 50-75th centile            | 33.93 | 32.87 | 6.27  | 22.15 | 4.78 | 100 | 503     |
| 75th-90 centile            | 30.12 | 35.49 | 5.87  | 24.86 | 3.66 | 100 | 852     |
| Top decile                 | 35.2  | 20.97 | 4.33  | 33.96 | 5.53 | 100 | 157     |
| No response                | 31.96 | 32.99 | 6.37  | 22.83 | 5.84 | 100 | 400     |
| <i>Education</i>           |       |       |       |       |      |     |         |
| No qualification           | 31.61 | 31.82 | 6.23  | 24.55 | 5.79 | 100 | 1,171.1 |
| Primary                    | 31.31 | 36.5  | 4.74  | 22.84 | 4.61 | 100 | 743.9   |
| Professional certificate   | 23.04 | 45.95 | 10.73 | 15.71 | 4.57 | 100 | 528.3   |
| Bac                        | 33.73 | 29.93 | 6.55  | 25.88 | 3.91 | 100 | 606.7   |
| University                 | 32.75 | 25.88 | 8.52  | 26.49 | 6.36 | 100 | 966.4   |
| Current student            | 32.33 | 28.48 | 8.15  | 24.44 | 6.6  | 100 | 306.9   |
| No response                | 35.15 | 21.63 | 4.35  | 33.99 | 4.89 | 100 | 217.6   |
| <i>Length of residence</i> |       |       |       |       |      |     |         |
| < five years               | 37.35 | 17.01 | 3.58  | 35.79 | 6.28 | 100 | 729.4   |
| ≥ five years               | 30.19 | 34.93 | 7.76  | 21.96 | 5.16 | 100 | 3,806.6 |
| <i>Relationship status</i> |       |       |       |       |      |     |         |
| Single                     | 31.08 | 32.14 | 8.91  | 21.65 | 6.22 | 100 | 1,379.6 |
| Married                    | 31.17 | 31.43 | 7.64  | 24.3  | 5.47 | 100 | 923.8   |
| French spouse              |       |       |       |       |      |     |         |
| Married                    | 32.64 | 30.27 | 5.27  | 27.18 | 4.65 | 100 | 1,878.2 |
| foreign spouse             |       |       |       |       |      |     |         |
| Widowed/<br>Divorced       | 25.6  | 41.98 | 8.04  | 19.17 | 5.21 | 100 | 359.3   |
| Total                      | 31.31 | 32    | 7.08  | 24.28 | 5.34 | 100 | 4,541   |



## Structural Equation Model

### Details of estimation of the structural equation model

The Stata command *gsem* is used to estimate the structural equation model. Stata does not allow for a latent construct to be used as independent variable in a structural equation model. We therefore estimate the model for the five latent class and add equality constraints for all other explanatory variables in the model to be the same across classes. That is, the coefficients of other covariates do not depend on the latent construct (e.g. the coefficient for age is the same for class 1, class 2 etc.). To then estimate each class coefficient and its standard error we calculate the difference in intercepts between each class and the class used as reference category (class 1, i.e. ‘Approaching belonging’). We use the command *lincom*. Table A4 includes the logistic coefficients converted to odds ratios for each independent variable and for the intercepts for each class. Table A5 illustrates the calculated difference in class intercepts also converted in odds ratios.

Table A4: odds ratios of the intention to naturalise

| Variable  | Odds ratio<br>(intent) |
|---|------------------------|
| <i>Generation: G1.5 (ref)</i>                         | 1                      |
| G1  | 0.918<br>(0.127)       |
| <i>Length of residence: &lt; five years<br/>(ref)</i> | 1                      |
| ≥ five years  | 1.148<br>(0.160)       |
| <i>Origin: Algeria (ref)</i>                          | 1                      |
| Morocco   | 0.725<br>(0.132)       |
| Tunisia   | 0.928<br>(0.249)       |

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|  |         |
|--|---------|
| Sub-Saharan Africa                         | 1.559*  |
|  | (0.340) |
| Southeast Asia                             | 0.483*  |
|  | (0.178) |
| Turkey                                     | 0.395** |
|  | (0.074) |
| Southern Europe                            | 0.098** |
|  | (0.019) |
| Other Europe                               | 0.201** |
|  | (0.038) |
| Other World                                | 0.644*  |
|  | (0.125) |
| <i>Age</i>                                 | 0.945** |
|  | (0.005) |
| <i>Gender: Male (ref)</i>                  | 1       |
| Female                                     | 1.117   |
|  | (0.11)  |
| <i>Legal status at entry: Asylum (ref)</i> | 1       |
| Student                                    | 0.205** |
|  | (0.049) |
| Worker                                     | 0.275** |
|  | (0.058) |
| Spouse                                     | 0.242** |
|  | (0.06)  |
| Family                                     | 0.295** |
|  | (0.063) |
| Other                                      | 0.361** |
|  | (0.087) |
| Exempt                                     | 0.177** |
|  | (0.043) |

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|  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| No response                              | 0.263**<br>(0.069) |
| <i>Education: No qualification (ref)</i> | 1                  |
| Primary                                  | 1.021<br>(0.145)   |
| Professional certificate                 | 1.228<br>(0.201)   |
| Bac                                      | 1.424*<br>(0.224)  |
| University                               | 1.03<br>(0.162)    |
| Current student                          | 0.708<br>(0.175)   |
| No response                              | 0.687<br>(0.138)   |
| <i>Employment status: In work (ref)</i>  | 1                  |
| Unemployed (previously worked)           | 0.868<br>(0.098)   |
| Never worked                             | 0.624**<br>(0.097) |
| <i>Income: bottom decile (ref)</i>       | 1                  |
| 10-25 <sup>th</sup> centile              | 1.281<br>(0.228)   |
| 25-50 <sup>th</sup> centile              | 1.126<br>(0.161)   |
| 50-75 <sup>th</sup> centile              | 1.271<br>(0.202)   |
| 75-90 <sup>th</sup> centile              | 0.882<br>(0.185)   |
| Top decile                               | 0.705<br>(0.196)   |

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|   |                    |
|---|--------------------|
| No response   | 0.98<br>(0.183)    |
| <i>Home ownership: Owner (ref)</i>                                      | 1                  |
| Renter  | 1.127<br>(0.115)   |
| Free housing  | 0.923<br>(0.217)   |
| <i>Language of interview: not French(ref)</i>                           | 1                  |
| French  | 0.813<br>(0.199)   |
| <i>Relationship status: Single (ref)</i>                                | 1                  |
| Married French spouse   | 1.836**<br>(0.293) |
| Married foreign spouse/NR   | 1.442**<br>(0.207) |
| Widowed/Divorced  | 1.761**<br>(0.35)  |
| <i>Number of children: One child (ref)</i>                              | 1                  |
| Two children  | 0.939<br>(0.135)   |
| 3 or more children  | 0.839<br>(0.121)   |
| No children   | 0.896<br>(0.139)   |
| <i>Citizen policy country of origin: Dual citizenship allowed (ref)</i> | 1                  |
| Dual citizenship not allowed  | 0.682**<br>(0.092) |

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|                          |                       |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Intercept Class 1</i> | 92.068**<br>(41.814)  |
| <i>Intercept Class 2</i> | 180.963**<br>(82.174) |
| <i>Intercept Class 3</i> | 210.489**<br>(107.71) |
| <i>Intercept Class 4</i> | 50.028**<br>(22.529)  |
| <i>Intercept Class 5</i> | 37.727**<br>(17.74)   |
| Observations             | 4,541                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*p<.01 \*p<.05

Non-linear quadratic effects of age were excluded as non-significant.

Table A5: Difference between class intercepts

| Class                 | Odds Ratio        |
|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Approaching Belonging | 1                 |
| Full Belonging        | 1.965**<br>(.277) |
| Conflictual Belonging | 2.286**<br>(.633) |
| At Home but Apart     | .543**<br>(.077)  |
| Excluded              | .409**<br>(.10)   |

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*p<.01 \*p<.05

## Sensitivity check

Table A6: Class distribution and marginal predicted means on respondents eligible for naturalisation

|                                  | Full<br>belonging | Approaching<br>full belonging | Conflictual<br>belonging | At home but<br>apart | Excluded |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Pr(class)                        | 35%               | 29%                           | 10%                      | 18%                  | 8%       |
| Probability of:                  |                   |                               |                          |                      |          |
| <i>I feel at home in France:</i> |                   |                               |                          |                      |          |
| Totally agree                    | 0.90              | 0.39                          | 0.57                     | 0.41                 | 0.10     |
| Agree                            | 0.08              | 0.54                          | 0.35                     | 0.33                 | 0.32     |
| Disagree                         | 0                 | 0.06                          | 0.07                     | 0.15                 | 0.33     |
| Totally disagree                 | 0                 | 0                             | 0.01                     | 0.11                 | 0.25     |
| <i>I feel French:</i>            |                   |                               |                          |                      |          |
| Totally agree                    | 0.67              | 0                             | 0.31                     | 0.02                 | 0.03     |
| Agree                            | 0.24              | 0.51                          | 0.47                     | 0                    | 0.05     |
| Disagree                         | 0.09              | 0.45                          | 0.16                     | 0.03                 | 0.21     |
| Totally disagree                 | 0                 | 0.03                          | 0.06                     | 0.95                 | 0.72     |
| <i>Others see me as French:</i>  |                   |                               |                          |                      |          |
| Totally agree                    | 0.47              | 0                             | 0.09                     | 0.04                 | 0.01     |
| Agree                            | 0.30              | 0.28                          | 0.22                     | 0.09                 | 0        |
| Disagree                         | 0.12              | 0.44                          | 0.28                     | 0.15                 | 0.12     |

|                       |      |      |      |      |      |
|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Totally disagree      | 0.11 | 0.28 | 0.42 | 0.72 | 0.87 |
| <i>Discrimination</i> | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.57 | 0.03 | 0.57 |
| <i>Racism</i>         | 0.18 | 0.11 | 1    | 0.1  | 0.67 |

Note: Total sample is of 3,563

Figure A1: Odds ratios of belonging types on the probability of intending to naturalise for respondents who are eligible for citizenship

