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# The Proper and Orthodox Way of War: Henry Stimson, the War Department, and the Politics of U.S. Military Policy During World War II

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## ABSTRACT

Traditional accounts of the Allied grand strategic debates during World War II stress the divergence between the American and British approaches to waging war against the Axis. In these interpretations, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and their military chiefs were the primary shapers of grand strategy and policy. However, these studies have focused too much on certain figures and have relatively marginalized others who played crucial roles in shaping these debates. One of those comparatively overlooked figures was U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who was a vital player on the American side in influencing the politics of U.S. strategy and pushing it toward launching a second front in Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were often internally divided over how to win the war and struggled to influence policy accordingly. The lack of focused political coordination between the War Department and the JCS made it difficult to convince Roosevelt to adopt a cross-Channel attack, which opened the door to following the British Mediterranean strategy for defeating Germany, starting with the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa.



## KEYWORDS

Henry Stimson; Second World War; Roosevelt; Churchill; grand strategy

I

As news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor trickled into Washington on 7 December 1941, Secretary of War Henry Stimson did not feel anger or sorrow, but instead a sense of relief. Despite the disastrous reports of American losses, Stimson was not alarmed. 'For I feel,' Stimson wrote, 'that this country united has practically nothing to fear.' From that day forward, the United States was again able to 'take unified action for the peace and security of herself and the world.'<sup>1</sup> After a week of frantic efforts to bolster U.S. defenses of its War Department-run possessions in the Philippines and the initial chaos and shock of the attack on Pearl Harbor subsided, Stimson began to focus on 'the step which I have looked forward to and prophesied for so long – that of an open declared war against the Axis minions of evil.'<sup>2</sup>

On a broader level, the Japanese assault and America's subsequent entrance into World War II allowed Stimson and the War Department, the executive branch agency he led responsible for

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managing the U.S. Army, to focus on formulating an American grand strategy for defeating the Axis powers.<sup>3</sup> However, the War Department's role as a bureaucratic and political actor in this process has largely been obscured by historians' more narrow focus on top elected leaders and senior military officials. In many major studies of the Anglo-American war effort, it is often portrayed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and their British counterparts on the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) (Roosevelt's and Churchill's senior uniformed military advisers, respectively) were the primary designers of their nations' joint military strategy. More specifically, it is argued that General George Marshall, the U.S. Army chief of staff, and the JCS, established in early 1942, were the chief advocates of a direct assault on German military power through an invasion of northwestern Europe and the main opponents of British strategic concepts, which envisioned a series of peripheral engagements in the Mediterranean basin designed to weaken the Germans in a war of attrition.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the image one predominantly gains from these interpretations features a bifurcated policy process largely driven by each countries' military chiefs and their political masters while both sides were at loggerheads as they inflexibly pushed their preferred approaches.

But this representation is an incorrect oversimplification. In critiquing this standard depiction, this article makes two overlapping and mutually reinforcing arguments. The first argument this article makes is that these accounts obscure other influential voices in the Allied grand strategic debates and marginalize those who played crucial roles in shaping American strategy. Stimson is one of those comparatively overlooked figures, yet he was one of the main shapers of U.S. grand strategy during the early phase of American wartime involvement. As secretary of war, Stimson was setting the agenda on the U.S. side and driving much of the politics of the strategic debate. While Stimson was steadily advocating for a direct European invasion, his JCS colleagues oscillated between which strategies to pursue and were often internally divided over how to win the war. In fact, after official U.S. entry, the JCS alternated between pushing their own ideas and accepting British ones.<sup>5</sup> At one point, they decided to abandon the Europe-first approach and formed a broad consensus around a Pacific-first strategy. Their military advice usually shifted based on strategic developments in the European and Pacific theaters. This dysfunction and inconsistency ultimately made it difficult for the JCS to influence military policy.

This leads to the second argument, which is that these divisions between the War Department and the JCS made it difficult to present a united front to Roosevelt and coherently press for certain policies, such as the cross-Channel invasion, to be adopted. As these debates were unfolding, Roosevelt was wavering on how to get U.S. troops into battle. For political reasons, Roosevelt was overwhelmingly concerned with having U.S. forces engage the Axis in 1942 *somewhere* in the European theater; he was flexible about the location itself, so long as Americans saw their troops fighting the Germans. When the British were able to provide this to a growingly impatient Roosevelt in the summer of 1942 in the form of a North Africa invasion, he seized it, thus temporarily ending the debate.

Yet by examining these strategic disputes in this manner, this new perspective reinterprets mostly U.S. archival documents and sources to shed light on the underappreciated level of improvisation that underpinned U.S. grand strategy in this period. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to a burgeoning historical literature on grand strategy by reexamining who is primarily responsible for crafting strategy, especially during wartime.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it also responds to historians Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall's recent (and noteworthy) appeal to re-center the U.S. state in the historiography of American foreign relations by largely focusing on domestic institutions and their influence over military strategy and foreign policy.<sup>7</sup> The stakes of this strategy debate could not have been higher. Its outcome would have far-reaching repercussions for how ordinary Americans understood the war and the way the Allies would strive to conquer the Axis. This meant it was essential to get the policy right so support for the war could be won. With all

that in mind, the often chaotic and divided American approach to winning the war is better understood.

## II

Before the United States entered the war, American strategists were already considering how it could defeat the Axis. In November 1940, days after Roosevelt won an unprecedented third term, Admiral Harold Stark, the chief of naval operations, forwarded a memorandum to Navy Secretary Frank Knox in which he argued American security was linked to the survival of the British Empire, which was needed to preserve the European balance of power and prevent the rise of a dominant Continental hegemon. If Britain collapsed, he warned, it was likely the Axis powers would seek to expand their control and attempt penetration into the Western Hemisphere. He also pointed out Britain lacked sufficient manpower and war material to defeat Germany, necessitating assistance from allies who could launch expansive land offensives, namely, the United States. In Stark's view, America had four major strategic choices, but he argued the final one, Plan D or 'Dog,' was superior: maintain the defensive against Japan in the Pacific while focusing on launching massive offensive operations in the Atlantic and Europe against Germany. Ultimately, Stark believed 'the continued existence of the British Empire, combined with building up a strong protection in our home areas, will do most to ensure the status quo in the Western Hemisphere, and to promote our principal national interests.'<sup>8</sup> Knox sent the memorandum to the White House, but Roosevelt avoided endorsing it. However, the president did approve secret military staff talks with the British, one of Stark's recommendations.

Those conversations, which took place between January-March 1941 in Washington, yielded the ABC-1 agreement. In it, both sides agreed to a 'Germany-first' framework for vanquishing the Axis and a set of peripheral action policies to accomplish that: economic pressure and blockade, strategic bombing, early elimination of Italy from the war, minor raids and offensives; support for resistance movements, and offensive operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean to establish bases for the final campaign against Germany.<sup>9</sup> Crucially, the British had proposed those policies during the talks, and the Americans agreed to support the British 'indirect' approach to Nazi defeat.<sup>10</sup> Although the agreement was not binding since the U.S. was not an active belligerent, U.S. military planners used it to revise their primary war plan – RAINBOW 5, solidifying a future blueprint for Anglo-American coalition warfare. Several months later, they upheld those policies in a set of documents known as the 'Joint Board Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements,' which attempted to formulate a clear American grand strategy for potential involvement in the war.<sup>11</sup> Before Pearl Harbor then, the American and British military establishments largely agreed on grand strategy: they would concentrate on defeating Germany first and pursue the British indirect method to do it.<sup>12</sup>

Seen as the culmination of a year's worth of transatlantic exchanges on grand strategy, the Anglo-American military conclusions reached in Washington between December 1941-January 1942 make more sense. Codenamed ARCADIA, the First Washington Conference led to a series of pivotal determinations that shaped the war effort in 1942-43. As the British traveled to Washington, Churchill summarized his strategic views for Roosevelt. In keeping with the peripheral or 'Mediterranean strategy,' Churchill proposed an Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa – Operation GYMNAST – as their first major 1942 offensive operation. If it was successful, the West could establish control over the entire North African shore and use it as a base for further offensives on the European continent in 1943.<sup>13</sup>

In response, the Joint Army-Navy Board suggested a series of defensive moves to shore up Allied positions in the face of worldwide Axis advances. One project deviated though – supporting British armies in North Africa with material, air units, and eventually ground troops, if necessary. Moreover, aiding the establishment of additional bases needed to maintain sea and air

communications across the Atlantic was a priority, including along the African coasts.<sup>14</sup> It was likely American forces would be needed for that. The Joint Board did not mention any potential European offensive operations, undercutting the narrative that that had been U.S. strategy from the beginning. Churchill's memorandum and the Joint Board reply basically amounted to the opening American and British positions at ARCADIA. There was little daylight between them.

Once ARCADIA began, vital decisions were placed in a grand strategy memorandum produced by the U.S. and British chiefs of staff. Known as ABC-4/CS-1 or WW-1, the military chiefs reaffirmed the Germany-first approach. On *how* to defeat Germany, they adopted the indirect British strategy first developed in ABC-1 and later supported in the Joint Board Estimate, which they called 'closing the ring.' This required securing the Russian front, supporting Turkey's resistance to the Axis, strengthening Allied forces in the Middle East, and seizing control of North Africa. From there, European land offensives could be planned and initiated. Critically, the chiefs noted 'it does not seem likely that in 1942 any large-scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible' but added a 'return to the Continent' could occur in 1943.<sup>15</sup> This was entirely in line with the U.S. strategy outlined in the Joint Board Estimate, which clearly stated offensive operations on the German periphery were required to mount a successful invasion of mainland Europe.<sup>16</sup>

Additionally, the U.S. chiefs, who are often identified as the leading opponents of the peripheral strategy, voiced little to no opposition to British strategic concepts or to offensive operations in North Africa, specifically GYMNAST.<sup>17</sup> At one point, Marshall explicitly argued in GYMNAST's favor, reasoning that if the Allies did not take the initiative, the Germans would capture North Africa; after that, ejecting them would become exceedingly difficult.<sup>18</sup> One historian contends Marshall presented his objections to GYMNAST in a 9 January memorandum to Roosevelt.<sup>19</sup> Nowhere in the memorandum, however, does he oppose the operation in principle; instead, his reservations were logistical and tactical as opposed to strategic.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, in multiple reports written during ARCADIA, U.S.-U.K. military planners maintained joint Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa was integral to the war effort. Although they shared some of Marshall's logistical concerns, they argued an Anglo-American occupation was of 'first strategic importance in the Atlantic Area' and that 'our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible' to 'form a base from which Allied control of all North Africa could be extended.'<sup>21</sup> Therefore, alternative explanations for why the U.S. military chiefs acceded to a strategy they were allegedly hostile toward do not pass muster.<sup>22</sup> At this stage, in contrast to the claims of other historians, they did not have serious issues with British military strategy because it largely reflected their own.

Meanwhile, Stimson had more explicit reservations about the peripheral strategy and military operations in Africa. As an artillery commander in France during World War I, Stimson had witnessed firsthand the massive wartime mobilization of American resources, believing they helped the Allies overwhelm Germany and deliver the decisive blow on the Western Front. This experience shaped his strategic thinking and convinced him that both concentration of force and direct attacks on an enemy's industrial base were the soundest way to quickly defeat adversaries.<sup>23</sup> Similarly to many other contemporary U.S. military strategists, Stimson pointed to American history for additional evidence of this approach's superiority. This group believed the Union ultimately won the American Civil War through Ulysses S. Grant's Overland Campaign, which repeatedly entailed Grant's forces directly attacking Confederate armies in their industrial heartland, eventually threatening their supply bases and the Confederate capital. The U.S. experience during World War I only seemed to reinforce this perspective. Moreover, as a savvy New York corporate attorney, Stimson personified the idea of direct action. Overwhelming your opponent was how Stimson practiced law: in the courtroom, he preferred to overcome his foes with mountains of evidence and liked to attack problems with lengthy, forceful memoranda.<sup>24</sup> Accordingly, guided by experience and temperament, he believed any diversion of scarce U.S. resources away

from conclusively confronting Germany, America's chief enemy, was a detriment to the national interest and could prejudice ultimate U.S. victory in the war.

Starting in October 1941, during meetings with senior American and British officials, Stimson emphasized that if the United States entered the war, the first task must be to secure the British Isles from a potential German invasion. For example, he told Secretary of State Cordell Hull U.S. forces could not get 'bogged down in any of the side issues,' such as Africa or the Middle East, before the invasion threat to Britain was removed.<sup>25</sup> Stimson derided a potential U.S. plan to send American troops to Northwest Africa to distract the Germans from invading Britain as foolish because it could leave Britain virtually defenseless. An American invasion of Northwest Africa would also prevent mobilization for more vital theaters of war, such as Britain and the North Atlantic.<sup>26</sup> Stimson, with Marshall by his side, advised Roosevelt against plans that would spread American forces into disparate regions and that U.S. troops were needed to defend Britain, especially if the Germans defeated the Soviets on the Eastern Front.<sup>27</sup> But unlike Marshall or the other military chiefs, who expressed at least an openness to African operations, Stimson plainly resisted a vast majority of the proposed ones even before the U.S. had entered the war.<sup>28</sup>

Before the British arrived in Washington for ARCADIA, Stimson sent Roosevelt a memorandum outlining the issues the United States now faced as a full-scale belligerent after consulting with Marshall, Lieutenant General Henry Arnold, the chief of the Army Air Forces, and top Army planners. He argued the North Atlantic should be America's principal operational theater and that U.S. troops should immediately be sent to the British Isles to fortify their defenses. Stimson also contended that if the southwestern Pacific fell entirely into Japanese hands, it would demoralize America's European allies and would threaten the entire U.S. position in the overall Pacific theater; consequently, it should receive the most attention after the North Atlantic.<sup>29</sup> An Allied expeditionary force in West Africa would be helpful for protecting trans-Atlantic communication lines, but for the remaining theaters, Stimson believed the U.S. should only supply British efforts and should not dispatch military units. This basic outline would guide Stimson's thinking during ARCADIA and throughout 1942. The president concurred with Stimson's suggestions on the North Atlantic and the Pacific while ordering the other theaters be studied for potential action.<sup>30</sup>

Throughout ARCADIA, Stimson pushed for concentrating U.S. forces in the British Isles and consistently against peripheral operations in Africa. Both sides agreed with Stimson that the primary objective should be to protect Anglo-American communication lines across the North Atlantic and that American troops should begin arriving in the British Isles immediately.<sup>31</sup> At the first meeting, Churchill repeated his earlier proposal of American landings in French Morocco, provided a Vichy French 'invitation,' as the beginning of offensive operations to secure North Africa. But Stimson was the only American to counter, suggesting U.S. troops moving into Ireland would convince the Vichy French of American resolve and would facilitate British and French resistance arrangements for securing the region.<sup>32</sup> Roosevelt said it was important to get U.S. forces 'somewhere in active fighting across the Atlantic' in 1942, but the conversation ended without resolution. At the beginning of ARCADIA then, it was immediately clear there were divisions within the American camp over military policy. While the military chiefs supported the British approach and Roosevelt obsessed over the political dimensions of the issue, Stimson was skeptical of invading North Africa. In Stimson's mind, operations there would do little to move the Allies closer to their ultimate goal: defeating Germany. These gaps persisted throughout the remainder of the conference.

Stimson continued to advise against North African operations. After meeting with Marshall, Arnold, and senior Army officers on 3 January, he told Roosevelt about some of their unease with GYMNAST. Stimson told the president it would be harder to achieve success in North Africa than Churchill believed and that America's first large operation should be a 'resounding success.'<sup>33</sup> He added Hitler would put special effort into denying them a victory for precisely this reason and because it would shift world opinion toward the Allies if 'the great republic of the

West moved in strongly.' Therefore, the implication was that undertaking an operation such as GYMNAST was a risky proposition at best.

At another White House meeting, Stimson strongly voiced his concerns about GYMNAST. He implied the conferees were spending 'considerable' amounts of time on GYMNAST, which the secretary found imprudent given North Africa's relative insignificance in his eyes.<sup>34</sup> Stimson then raised his political and military concerns with the operation. He worried about the unstable political situation in French North Africa and whether the Spanish would be able to deter a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, which Germany would need as a base to launch a successful counterattack to GYMNAST. Stimson said GYMNAST would only be successful if the Allies could establish air superiority until the landings were complete, something he was not optimistic about, and that an operation such as this would require considerable amounts of U.S. naval assets, a critical diversion from the Pacific.<sup>35</sup> He fretted over the possibility of the Germans establishing themselves on the Iberian Peninsula, claimed the Axis had better knowledge of North Africa than the Allies, and said they required a 'fifth column' in the region to feed them reliable intelligence, something Stimson believed the Allies currently lacked. Roosevelt shared Stimson's anxieties about the French and Spanish, but challenged Stimson's other conclusions, saying he thought the Axis would have similar problems.<sup>36</sup> Throughout the rest of the meeting, Stimson continued to voice his concerns while the other military advisers refrained from questioning the operation, but the meeting adjourned without a decision.

The issue became moot though when, on the last day of ARCADIA, Roosevelt and Churchill settled on a timeline for GYMNAST. At the final high-level meeting of the conference, it was agreed that if the North African political situation remained stable, the operation could begin in May.<sup>37</sup> Marshall added one U.S. infantry division would be immediately ready and another could arrive four weeks after GYMNAST began.<sup>38</sup> However, if Germany invaded French North Africa before that, Roosevelt felt the Allies should counterattack with whatever forces they then had available. To allay Stimson's concerns, Roosevelt assured everyone other steps were being taken to ensure Vichy French cooperation and to organize opposition to a potential German North Africa occupation.

Stimson did not object to these decisions at the meeting, perhaps because he felt they were unlikely to be definitive considering how delicate the Pacific situation was at the time.<sup>39</sup> Notwithstanding, Stimson remained opposed to GYMNAST, which he made clear to General Joseph Stilwell, the officer originally chosen to lead any North African invasion. Stimson told Stilwell he thought GYMNAST was too risky due to probable inability of establishing air protection for the invading ground forces, but that a West African operation could be feasible if necessary.<sup>40</sup> Despite his lack of protests at the final meeting, Stimson had established himself as the primary high-level antagonist to GYMNAST, North African operations, and the broader Mediterranean strategy. While Marshall and the other U.S. military chiefs had some tactical reservations about GYMNAST, they agreed to the British peripheral strategy summarized in WW-1 and supported North African operations in principle. This was in line with the strategic views outlined in the Joint Board Estimate, which had called for initial offensive action on the German perimeter. At the same time, Stimson made it clear he favored amassing U.S. forces in the British Isles to protect them from German invasion and to prepare for an eventual European invasion. Yet the apparent gaps between Stimson, Roosevelt, and the chiefs on military policy were not confined to ARCADIA. In fact, it was merely a preview of what was to come, an opening chapter in the discordant and disorderly American approach to military strategy.

### III

By early 1942, the emerging 'Grand Alliance' between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union was on uneven ground. After roughly eighteen months of burgeoning Anglo-American

cooperation before Pearl Harbor, thorny diplomatic, military, and political questions began to create serious areas of contention between the two countries. Yet managing relations with their uneasy Soviet allies is arguably where many of these hurdles converged.

After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 killed the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, Churchill and Roosevelt welcomed Soviet leader Joseph Stalin as an ally and pledged assistance to his beleaguered nation. Although American and British diplomatic and military intelligence sources initially believed Germany would quickly defeat the Soviets, by the late summer it was clear Russian resistance was stronger than anticipated and German forces would not cruise to victory.<sup>41</sup> In response, London and Moscow signed an agreement to supply each other with all possible aid and to not conclude a separate peace with Germany while Roosevelt worked to accelerate U.S. material support to Russia.<sup>42</sup>

However, Stalin was suspicious of Western motives and demanded further action. He wanted postwar recognition of recent Soviet territorial acquisitions granted under the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the immediate establishment of a second front in Western Europe to relieve pressure on his armies. Both demands horrified many in London, but eventually, Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden reluctantly calculated accepting the Soviet annexations was critical for building trust with Moscow.<sup>43</sup> Yet, the Americans opposed such territorial settlements as a violation of the Atlantic Charter and believed it would reward prior Soviet aggression and create diplomatic and political problems such as those stemming from the secret treaties during World War I.<sup>44</sup> With the legacy of Woodrow Wilson in mind, Roosevelt informed Churchill he strongly opposed clandestine deals and that such agreements should not be decided until a postwar peace conference.<sup>45</sup>

It was within these convoluted circumstances that larger debates over military strategy began to erupt. By February 1942, the U.S. military chiefs, now organized as the JCS, and their planners shifted strategic course in response to political and military developments. In late January, the British offensive in Libya, a key prerequisite for GYMNAST, failed when the Germans launched a successful counterattack from El Aghelia and drove British forces back to the Gazala line, just west of Tobruk. At the same time, the Vichy French declined to cooperate with an Anglo-American invasion of their North African territory, dashing another GYMNAST necessity. In the Pacific, Army planners originally agreed to send reinforcements to stem the Japanese advance, but with Allied naval fleets decimated and the Japanese capture of Singapore in February, these efforts backfired. Japan's full conquest of the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines now appeared inevitable, making additional reinforcements pointless.<sup>46</sup> Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the chief U.S. Army planner, summed up the emerging Army opinion on military strategy at the time in a personal memorandum: "We've got to go to Europe and fight – and we've got to quit wasting resources all over the world – and still worse – wasting time."<sup>47</sup>

Following Allied reversals and major shipping losses, Churchill and Roosevelt decided in early March to postpone GYMNAST indefinitely. In response to these events, Army planners developed proposals in late February for an immediate buildup of Allied forces in Britain for a direct continental attack across the English Channel on northwestern Europe. They thought this concept would address the two basic military issues they saw facing the Allies in 1942: the global diffusion of military forces and the need to relieve pressure on the Soviets fighting on the Eastern Front.<sup>48</sup>

The Army proposals seemed logical enough, but not everyone viewed the strategic situation similarly. While Army planners were devising these blueprints, the U.S. Joint Staff Planners (JPS), consisting of officials from across the military, examined the global picture and came to opposite conclusions. As the JCS's main strategic planning organization, the JPS and their analyses carried significant influence with their bosses. Since the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces were all equally represented, the JPS was seen as reflecting the broad opinion of all three service branches on a variety of key issues.



Due to the deterioration of the Allied position in North Africa and the Southwest Pacific, the JPS argued the U.S. should adopt the strategic defensive across the world and focus on expanding munitions production. Once additional forces became available, the U.S. should stabilize the situation in the Mediterranean basin and Southwest Pacific through offensive action in North Africa and Southeast Asia. At the same time, it should continue to undermine the Axis through blockade, aerial bombing, and subversive activities.<sup>49</sup> In other words, the U.S. should mostly adhere to the grand strategy affirmed at ARCADIA. Although these differences were at lower levels of the defense bureaucracy, they were indicative of the increasing levels of improvisation that characterized American military strategy at the time. Different groups of U.S. officials would evaluate new developments but make startlingly different judgements over how to proceed. This continuously hampered the U.S. ability to coherently craft their own approach to fighting the war.

Around the same time Eisenhower was drafting his plan to amass U.S. forces in the British Isles, Stimson was independently coming to the same conclusions. He felt it had been a mistake not to agree to any strategic plans during ARCADIA to use Great Britain as a base for offensive operations on the European continent. Stimson was concerned the absence of such a plan was allowing diversionary shipments of soldiers and supplies to secondary theaters.<sup>50</sup> Days before Eisenhower sent Army cross-Channel proposals to Marshall, Stimson told Eisenhower and John McCloy, one of Stimson's deputies, it was time to end the worldwide dispersal of U.S. forces and set limits on how many Army personnel were being sent to the southwestern Pacific.<sup>51</sup> Stimson's comments likely reinforced Eisenhower's emerging beliefs and showed him he had political support at the highest level of the War Department for his team's cross-Channel proposals. Stimson repeated his judgement to Arnold, and during another conversation with McCloy, he said the top thing they could do to keep the Germans off balance was to 'press hard' on building up forces in Britain and not allow further diversions.<sup>52</sup>

His conversation with Stimson and Eisenhower's memorandum seemed to have an impact on Arnold, for on 3 March, he pushed Marshall to concentrate air and ground forces in Britain to end their dispersal and to support a European invasion 'at the earliest possible moment.'<sup>53</sup> At the highest Army levels, Stimson had clear support for building up U.S. strength in Britain, which he had strongly advocated for during ARCADIA while the JCS supported the indirect approach to defeating Germany. The War Department was becoming unified on strategy as Stimson continued his political efforts to push the Allies toward preparing for a European invasion. As a result, Stimson and the Army became more effective in pushing their strategy with Roosevelt and the British.

In early March, Stimson made the Army case for a cross-Channel invasion to Roosevelt. In a recent cable, Churchill suggested increased American commitments in non-European areas of the world to counter the Axis threat emerging in Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Pacific.<sup>54</sup> He was asking for a further dispersion of U.S. forces to every world front, the opposite of what Stimson and senior Army officials were advocating. During a White House meeting with Roosevelt, Marshall, Arnold, Stark, Admiral Ernest J. King, the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, and Harry Hopkins, the president's chief foreign policy adviser, Stimson took the lead for the War Department in attacking Churchill's letter and making the case for a cross-Channel invasion. For Stimson, there were three possibilities for American action: a Pacific offensive, sending forces through the Persian Gulf to aid the Soviets and divide the German attack on the Caucasus region, or a military buildup in the British Isles to prepare for a direct Continental invasion. However Stimson, reflecting Army thinking, concluded the only acceptable plan was for a massive military buildup in the British Isles for an attack on the Germans in France.

In a Clausewitzian sense, Stimson told the group this 'proper and orthodox' attack would allow the Allies to strike at the heart of German military and industrial power.<sup>55</sup> An attack on France would fulfill the Germany-first strategy, shore up 'sagging' British morale, and keep the Soviets engaged by forcing Hitler to fight on two fronts. Arnold and Marshall strongly supported

Stimson's arguments, demonstrating a coordinated War Department approach on the issue. The Navy was not enthusiastic, with King writing to FDR the same day that the U.S. could not allow Japan to overrun Australia and New Zealand; therefore, he recommended focusing on Pacific offensive operations.<sup>56</sup> But Roosevelt was impressed with Stimson's ideas, as was Hopkins.<sup>57</sup>

Stimson and the War Department's cross-Channel proposal was the latest manifestation of Stimson's original strategic concept for the chief American focus: building up forces in the British Isles. The Army's senior chiefs were now openly backing him having moved away from their support for the British indirect approach, but the Navy favored Pacific offensive operations. While Stimson remained consistent enough to not only drive the U.S. strategic debate and build political consensus around the cross-Channel attack inside the War Department, he was also starting to sway Roosevelt, who did not have the clearest idea of where to send American soldiers into battle. Stimson was offering FDR a realistic opportunity to fulfill his twin political goals of satiating Stalin's demands for a second European front and having the American public see their troops fighting Germans, which was his top ambition so he could sustain support for the war against Germany.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, Roosevelt could use Stimson's plan to solve his alliance problems by offering it as substitute for Stalin's desired frontiers treaty and potentially convincing the Soviet leader to drop the issue entirely. In that way, Stimson was one of the main U.S. figures shaping the politics of strategy; he was providing solutions to the problems perceived by most senior American officials and working tirelessly to secure backing for them. While his Army colleagues on the JCS could share Stimson's optimism, fissures were beginning to develop within the JCS as King and top naval planners pushed for reinforcements not only to block Japanese advances but also to mount counterattacks and offensives.<sup>59</sup> These emerging cracks within the JCS meant it was going to have a difficult time crafting and influencing national policy.

After additional meetings, Stimson was optimistic that Roosevelt would pursue the cross-Channel concept. He reported, 'The matter is working along in the direction I had hoped. The President seems to have accepted it into making it his own.'<sup>60</sup> In response to Churchill's cable, Roosevelt agreed to his requests for shipping dispersions to the Pacific in exchange for postponing GYMNAST. The president also said he was eyeing 'definite plans for establishment of a new front on the European Continent.' Roosevelt emphasized this final point by writing, 'I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of this new front this summer.'<sup>61</sup> FDR's reply delighted Stimson, who noted the president 'had accomplished what I have been hoping and working for, namely he took the initiative out of the hands of Churchill where I am sure it would have degenerated into a simple defensive operation to stop up urgent rat holes, most of which I fear are hopeless.'<sup>62</sup>

Over the next several weeks, the cross-Channel proposal gained steam. On 15 March, during a private meeting with Roosevelt, Stimson urged the president to build public support for a European offensive, explaining they were likely to be 'hammered' for not allowing further dispersions to Australia and the Middle East.<sup>63</sup> Stimson also recruited supporters inside and outside the administration for a cross-Channel attack. After Stimson met with John G. Winant, the U.S. ambassador to Britain, the ambassador heartily endorsed the plan. Stimson then worked on Knox, who had strongly supported GYMNAST during ARCADIA, showing him how many men would be available for a European offensive after allocating enough forces to the Pacific.<sup>64</sup> After that, Stimson lunched with Justice Felix Frankfurter, his old protégé and a close adviser to Roosevelt, and shared the cross-Channel proposal with him to gain Frankfurter's assistance in convincing Roosevelt to firmly adopt the plan.<sup>65</sup>

Yet, Stimson was concerned Roosevelt had avoided taking a definitive position on U.S. force dispersion and a European offensive. At Stimson's urging, Roosevelt finally agreed to review the proposals on 25 March.<sup>66</sup> In the meantime, Stimson was pursuing every avenue to ensure broad-based establishment support for a cross-Channel attack so Roosevelt could not find a justification to follow a different strategy; Stimson even tried to persuade Sir John Dill, the chief of the British Joint Staff Mission and Churchill's personal representative in Washington, of the merits of

a European offensive. Dill was cool to the idea, and Stimson's entreaties led to a shouting match between the two men.<sup>67</sup> Although this was not a successful appeal, it is worth highlighting that Stimson was trying to obtain allies wherever he could find them, even in the most unlikely corners, for promoting cross-Channel operations. He was expending all his effort to create a friendlier political environment for the War Department's strategic plans and to shape Roosevelt's choices. By working to build a sizable political coalition in favor of a European invasion inside the War Department, within the wider executive branch, and even outside the administration, Stimson encouraged Roosevelt to adopt a second front. If enough advisers were repeating the Army's ideas, it would become more difficult for Roosevelt to say no. This is exactly what he wanted, but in other corners of the defense establishment, Stimson's efforts were potentially becoming undermined by continued friction.

As Stimson was assembling endorsements for a Western front, U.S. military planners were unable to find consensus. While the Army Air Forces was willing to accept the loss of the Southwest Pacific if it meant freeing up units for a 1942 cross-Channel strike, the Navy pushed for Pacific offensives. Trying to find some middle ground, Army planners recommended maintaining the strategic defensive in the Southwest Pacific while initiating a rapid buildup in the British Isles for 1942 offensive operations.<sup>68</sup> Unable to reconcile the divergent approaches, the JPS forwarded the studies to the JCS and recommended they choose a course of action. At this point, Stark had been relieved of his duties as CNO and was replaced by King, who refused to accept the loss of the Southwest Pacific. Arnold and Marshall were equally against a Pacific-first strategy, leaving the Army proposal as the only option. At a 16 March meeting, the JCS agreed to a buildup in the United Kingdom while maintaining force levels in the Southwest Pacific 'in accordance with current commitments.'<sup>69</sup>

However, this apparent resolution did nothing to alleviate the JCS strategic rift and created a de-facto Pacific-first strategy. Since Japan was still pressing, massive numbers of U.S. troops and material were needed in the theater just to hold present American positions. Combined with shipping shortages, this meant there were few soldiers available to be sent to Britain for a 1942 assault.<sup>70</sup> The JPS later admitted that due to shipping allocations, there might be no U.S. ground forces available for a European offensive. To overcome this difficulty, they said Britain would need to provide most of the troops for any 1942 attack; if it refused, the U.S. should contemplate rethinking its grand strategy and the 'possibility of concentrating U.S. offensive effort in the Pacific Area considered.'<sup>71</sup> In their own memorandum, Army planners agreed.<sup>72</sup> Put another way, if London was not willing to mount a risky attack, Washington should reorient its entire war machine toward Japan. Clearly, the commitment to Europe first had its limits. This fundamentally left the military's efforts to influence U.S. grand strategy listless and groping for solutions to stem major Axis advances. Instead, Stimson stepped into the breach and drove U.S. decision-making toward opening a second front in Western Europe.

Toward the end of March, Stimson neared the War Department's objective of persuading Roosevelt to approve a European invasion. The president flirted with sending troops to the Middle East or the Mediterranean, but Marshall presented Roosevelt and his other senior military advisers with a convincing memorandum which concluded an attack on northwestern Europe would best accomplish America's chief objectives: protecting Britain and the Middle East along with retaining the Soviet Union in the war.<sup>73</sup> After consulting with Hopkins and Marshall, Stimson followed up with a personal letter to Roosevelt to persuade him to approve the Army plan. He continued to serve as the primary administration spokesperson for a European invasion and was pulling every lever he could to sway Roosevelt. Stimson wrote, 'The only way to get the initiative in this war is to take it ... so long as we remain without our own plan or offensive, our forces will be inevitably be dispersed and wasted.'<sup>74</sup> He also advised Roosevelt to send his 'most trusted messenger' to present Churchill and the COS with the cross-Channel proposal when it was completed.

At the same time, Army planners finalized a European invasion plan. The proposal called for the expeditious concentration of forces in Britain (Operation BOLERO) for a full-scale invasion of France during the spring of 1943 (Operation ROUNDUP). If Germany was 'critically weakened' before that or the Eastern Front was in danger of collapsing, the plan made provisions for a smaller 'emergency' attack in the fall of 1942 to open up a second front and relieve pressure on the Soviets (Operation SLEDGEHAMMER).<sup>75</sup> While the Army recognized the dangers in launching SLEDGEHAMMER and realized it could fail, Stimson and senior War Department officials thought it was worth the risks because continued Soviet participation in the war was indispensable for defeating Germany.<sup>76</sup> Without the Eastern Front, the European war would likely become unwinnable. Stimson and his advisers sought to secure a Western European invasion from Britain at the earliest possible moment; he did not prefer when this occurred, only that strategic developments dictate it.

On 1 April, Roosevelt approved the Army plan. He also took Stimson's earlier advice, instructing Hopkins and Marshall to fly to London to secure British support.<sup>77</sup> Two weeks later, Marshall informed Stimson that the British had formally accepted the Army's cross-Channel proposals.<sup>78</sup> Stimson was thrilled. His preferred military strategy, which he first articulated in late 1941 as the best way to defeat Germany, was now official Allied policy. Up to this point, Stimson had done more than any other player inside the Roosevelt administration to build political support for a cross-Channel invasion. Now that it was approved, Stimson immediately began work on BOLERO. But just below the surface, the situation was not as sanguine as Stimson thought because the divides within the JCS over military strategy began to widen.

As the Army was preparing its proposals, the Navy was still pushing for Pacific offensive operations. Days before Roosevelt authorized the Army plan, King requested additional U.S. forces at the expense of the European theater. While King did not object to BOLERO in principle, he thought it should not occur until the Allies seized the Pacific initiative.<sup>79</sup> In other words, he favored a de-facto Pacific-first strategy. But realizing early on the odds were against him and he would not be able to fully concentrate on Japan while Germany was still fighting, King reluctantly blessed the Army memorandum.<sup>80</sup>

Yet several weeks later, Churchill was suggesting a return to GYMNAST in line with the original peripheral strategy.<sup>81</sup> King used the British vacillation as an opportunity to revive his demands for fresh Pacific reinforcements. In early May, he insisted to his JCS colleagues that BOLERO 'must not be permitted to interfere with our vital needs in the Pacific,' which are 'certainly more urgent' than BOLERO.<sup>82</sup> Although Roosevelt reiterated BOLERO was the priority, it was clear the Army and Navy were 'completely divided, the latter going all out for the South-West Pacific and the former for BOLERO.'<sup>83</sup> After Japan suffered decisive blows at the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June, respectively, King proposed a counter-offensive to seize the Pacific initiative. If such an offensive were launched and Pacific commitments were increased, BOLERO would be threatened due to manpower and shipping shortages. In essence, King was proposing a shift away from a cross-Channel attack and toward a Pacific-first strategy based on recent U.S. victories. As the summer began, the JCS remained split on how to prosecute the war as Stimson was working on BOLERO.

In the middle of all this, a reprieve came when Stalin dropped his insistence on a postwar frontiers treaty. While it's not certain what drove this shift, the declining Soviet military position on the Eastern Front was likely pivotal; this made securing a second front Stalin's top priority, even if that meant delaying postwar questions to secure additional Western military support. The Germans had launched a spring offensive and were quickly pushing toward the oilfields of the Caucasus – renewing fears in London and Washington of a Russian defeat. 'I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia or anything else than have the Russians collapse,' Roosevelt confided privately.<sup>84</sup> In June, FDR assured Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov of his desire to open a 1942 second front.<sup>85</sup> Although it was somewhat ambiguous if this would be in France, Roosevelt concurrently cabled Churchill he was anxious for a cross-Channel invasion sometime in

1942.<sup>86</sup> 'It must be constantly reiterated,' the president reminded his advisers, 'that Russian armies are killing more Germans and destroying more Axis material than all twenty-five united nations put together. To help Russia, therefore, is the primary consideration.'<sup>87</sup> To Roosevelt, the Stimson-Army plan was still the best method for achieving this politico-military objective while also maintaining public support for the Germany-first concept.

Yet while King was attempting to force a strategic adjustment, the British were trying to do the same. After Churchill suggested revisiting GYMNAST, arrangements were made for him and his military advisers to visit Washington to answer the latest strategic questions. During a White House meeting announcing Churchill's visit, Marshall and Stimson attacked GYMNAST while 'King wobbled around' in a way that made Stimson 'rather sick with him.'<sup>88</sup> Stimson was furious, writing in his diary that pursuing GYMNAST over BOLERO would be a 'very foolish thing.'<sup>89</sup> With Marshall's unequivocal support, Stimson decided to send a detailed letter to Roosevelt arguing the war could only be won through a cross-Channel invasion. It was the most forceful defense made of formal Allied strategy to date.

In his letter, Stimson argued the matter was simple. He asserted Hitler 'dreaded' a second European front and that it was the 'best hope' of keeping the Soviets in the war and defeating the Germans.<sup>90</sup> The British Isles provided the only safe base to concentrate U.S. troops and supplies, meaning BOLERO was the finest method for halting Germany's Russia offensive, defeating her armies, and winning the war. 'Geographically and historically BOLERO was the easiest road to the center of our chief enemy's heart,' he reminded Roosevelt. Amassing U.S. forces in Britain would allow the Allies to strike a decisive blow against the center of German industrial power; this was the only real method for relieving pressure on the Soviets. For the first time, Stimson explicitly attacked GYMNAST as a diversion that would only protect the British Empire and do nothing to aid the Soviets. If the Soviets were defeated while U.S. and British forces were engaged in North Africa, it was conceivable Germany would attempt to invade Britain. Since GYMNAST would weaken BOLERO, defending Britain in the event of an invasion would become 'impossible.'<sup>91</sup>

On the other hand, if the Soviets kept the Germans pinned down on the Eastern Front, an invasion of France would become easier. In either scenario, BOLERO was the solution. Following up in his own memorandum for Roosevelt, Marshall said GYMNAST was a 'poor substitute' for BOLERO and would be a pointless diversion.<sup>92</sup> But Marshall was following Stimson's lead in excoriating GYMNAST ahead of the British arrival. In fact, Marshall called Stimson's letter to Roosevelt a 'masterpiece' and it came with Marshall's handwritten endorsement, which underscored that he fully supported Stimson's views.<sup>93</sup> As at ARCADIA, Stimson continued to play the role of chief opponent to British military strategy. At the same time, the JCS's inability to coalesce around one set of policies hindered its ability to shape the direction of U.S. strategy.

In Washington, Churchill clashed with Stimson and the JCS over military policy. Nevertheless, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) crafted a compromise that was basically a restatement of Stimson's letter to Roosevelt. BOLERO would continue as the 'principal offensive effort,' but 1942 offensive operations could be launched 'in case of necessity' or 'an exceptionally favorable opportunity.' In that case, SLEDGEHAMMER or invasions of Norway and the Channel Islands were preferable to GYMNAST. The CCS reiterated GYMNAST should not happen 'under the existing situation.'<sup>94</sup>

After heated debate, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to continue with the BOLERO buildup until 1 September, at which time existing plans would be reexamined. But they rejected no offensive action in 1942, insisting a 1942 offensive was 'essential' and pushing GYMNAST as an alternative if SLEDGEHAMMER was 'improbable.'<sup>95</sup> Stimson was lukewarm to the September 1 reassessment; his main problem with this decision is that it mistakenly understood BOLERO as a 1942 operation, not a 1943 one. If BOLERO slowed down in 1942, it would reduce the chances for a 1943 French invasion. At any rate, Stimson was pleased GYMNAST was not definitively authorized, considering this a major win.<sup>96</sup>

Within a few weeks though, Churchill was renegeing on these decisions. In early July, he cabled Roosevelt that the British considered SLEDGEHAMMER's chances increasingly remote due to continued setbacks in North Africa and the Atlantic; in the North African desert, Germany had defeated the British at the Gazala line, captured Tobruk, and forced British troops to retreat into Egypt toward the Nile River Delta. Alternatively, Churchill suggested GYMNAST would be the best way to assist the Soviets.<sup>97</sup>

The JCS vehemently objected. In response, Marshall extraordinarily proposed at a JCS meeting that if the British exhorted GYMNAST over SLEDGEHAMMER, the U.S. should 'turn to the Pacific for decisive action against Japan.'<sup>98</sup> Marshall reasoned such a move would concentrate U.S. forces in a specific theater; be popular with America's Pacific allies and the public, and second only to BOLERO, would have the greatest effect on the Soviets by deterring the Japanese from taking advantage of the Russians' deteriorating military fortunes and attacking Siberia. King backed the proposal, which was forwarded to Roosevelt as a formal memorandum. In it, they warned GYMNAST would be an indecisive operation, drain limited resources, and preclude cross-Channel operations in both 1942 *and* 1943. If London demanded North African operations, Marshall and King advised abandoning Germany-first and launching all-out offensives against Japan.<sup>99</sup>

Marshall informed Stimson of these developments, who found a 'very stirred up and emphatic' Marshall calling for a 'showdown.' Stimson supported Marshall and King's decision, believing it would serve as an 'effective block' to GYMNAST, but if the British continued to back-track on their agreements, 'we will turn our backs on them and take up the war with Japan.'<sup>100</sup> As historian Mark Stoler has shown, Marshall and King were equally inclined to act on their threat if Britain remained obstinate.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, Marshall said exactly that in a second memorandum to Roosevelt. 'My object,' he wrote, 'is again to force the British into acceptance of a concentrated effort against Germany, and if that proves impossible, to turn immediately to the Pacific with strong forces for a decision against Japan.'<sup>102</sup> Put another way, Marshall was willing to shift toward a Pacific-first strategy if the British were not willing to support SLEDGEHAMMER, and by extension, BOLERO. In fact, Marshall had already agreed to divert scarce resources to the Pacific by sanctioning limited offensives there to follow up on the U.S. victory at Midway.<sup>103</sup>

This was a major shift in the debates over Allied military strategy. It demonstrated Marshall, the apparent undisputed champion of Germany first and cross-Channel operations, was more than willing to change course and embrace a Pacific-first approach if perceived circumstances required it. In Marshall's mind, British intransigence over BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER was a good reason to focus American forces on the Pacific. With Marshall's Pacific proposal, the JCS were now generally united again for the first time in months, forming a broad consensus around offensive Pacific operations if SLEDGEHAMMER was no longer an option.

At the same time, Stimson tried to assist Marshall by helping him build political support for his proposal. After Roosevelt demanded an outline for a Pacific-first strategy, the JCS hastily compiled one, but admitted 'there is no completed detailed plan for major offensive operations in the Pacific.'<sup>104</sup> Following a 'vigorous discussion,' Stimson endorsed the memorandum 'as the only thing to do in such a crisis.' Stimson hoped the plan would succeed, but if the British persisted 'in their fatuous defeatist position as to it [BOLERO]' then the Pacific operation was the next best option.<sup>105</sup> However, a skeptical Roosevelt told Stimson he disliked the Pacific alternative and that 'it was a little like taking up your dishes and going away.' Stimson appreciated the president's view, but warned it was essential to use the Pacific threat 'if we expected to get through the hides of the British.'<sup>106</sup> Despite Stimson's attempts to persuade him, Roosevelt separately told Marshall he thought the proposal was 'something of a red herring, the purpose for which he thoroughly understood.'<sup>107</sup> After months of the War Department trying to persuade Roosevelt to back a cross-Channel attack, it is not surprising he was unconvinced shifting toward a Pacific-first strategy was sound.

While FDR had been swayed by previous War Department arguments for a second European front, British resistance had upended the calculus. Roosevelt was now searching for a plan that would get American troops fighting the Germans; the JCS proposal did not offer that. Whether they realized it or not, the JCS had undercut Stimson and the Army's previously careful campaign to launch a cross-Channel invasion. While the British were also an impediment, in Stimson's mind they had been overcome before, and they could be again. However due to inelegant JCS maneuvering, Stimson and the War Department's efforts had been diminished, especially when the secretary of war decided to support Marshall's Pacific alternative.

Roosevelt rejected the Pacific proposal and ordered Hopkins, Marshall, and King to London to decide on some 1942 action against German forces.<sup>108</sup> In Washington, Stimson was attempting to support them by convincing Roosevelt to continue with BOLERO. He argued London's abandonment of SLEDGEHAMMER was the result of their 'fatigued and defeatist mental outlook' and said they should now concentrate on ensuring a 1943 invasion of France while 'enlarging' their air attacks on Germany in 1942.<sup>109</sup> Stimson also warned GYMNAST would permit the Axis to maintain the initiative and would do nothing to either aid the USSR or destroy Hitler's armies. Looking to shore up political support, Stimson even enlisted Hull and Knox to convince Roosevelt to stay the course.<sup>110</sup>

But it was too late. Realizing SLEDGEHAMMER would be impossible without the British and bowing to FDR's pressure, King and Marshall proposed a compromise. SLEDGEHAMMER was off the table, but preparations would continue for both ROUNDUP and a North African invasion, renamed TORCH, until 15 September, at which time a final decision would be made depending on the Eastern Front. Pursuing TORCH would make ROUNDUP impossible in 1943 and would be tantamount to accepting a defensive European strategy that would allow the U.S. to pursue Pacific offensive operations. After initially objecting, the British relented, and the proposal was formalized as CCS 94.<sup>111</sup> Importantly, the JCS interpreted CCS 94 as opening the doors to a Japan-first strategy, hardening a broad consensus around focusing on the Pacific that began emerging earlier that month.<sup>112</sup> However, Roosevelt did not approve CCS 94, refusing to accept that TORCH would cancel ROUNDUP. The president also subverted the rest of the document by ordering that TORCH should be launched by 30 October.<sup>113</sup>

When Stimson learned of these decisions, he was stunned. He told FDR he wanted it on the record he uniformly opposed U.S. landings in North Africa.<sup>114</sup> Confiding in his diary, Stimson worried that turning on BOLERO, the 'sound and correct strategy,' would lead to a 'dangerous diversion and a possible disaster.' Stimson, having spent months fighting North African operations and championing a cross-Channel invasion, felt defeated. He had single-mindedly pushed the Allies to invade France and solitarily fought the British strategic approach every step of the way. As the JCS fluctuated on military strategy, Stimson unambiguously pushed Roosevelt to open a second front throughout this period. Now he felt Germany would keep the initiative and could win the war. Having lost the strategic debate for now, Stimson looked ahead to future opportunities.

Over the next few months, the Allied notched important victories. TORCH was a success, allowing Anglo-American forces to occupy French North Africa. Across the desert, the British had won a major victory at El Alamein in Egypt, forcing the Germans to retreat into Libya. On the Eastern Front, the Soviets halted a German advance on the critical city of Stalingrad and in mid-November, launched a massive counterattack that eventually forced the German Sixth Army to surrender in January 1943. In the Pacific, the Allies launched several counteroffensives in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea that began to turn the tide against the Japanese.

As a result, Churchill and Roosevelt decided to have another conference to plot their war strategy for 1943, which was planned for January in Casablanca, Morocco. Stimson wanted a firm commitment to a cross-Channel attack, but during late 1942, the JCS and their planners were divided again on strategic policy.<sup>115</sup> Army planners were split over whether to continue further Mediterranean operations by invading Sicily or Sardinia, or instead to focus on a maximum

buildup in Britain for a cross-Channel invasion.<sup>116</sup> Arnold and AAF planners pushed their colleagues to focus on the air offensive against Germany followed by an invasion of France.<sup>117</sup> The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the JCS's top strategic advisers, forcefully opposed any plans to attack Sicily and Sardinia, arguing those prospective operations would not accord with U.S. grand strategy.<sup>118</sup> The military was so split that at a pre-Casablanca meeting with Roosevelt, Marshall was forced to admit there was no 'united front' on cross-Channel operations. While the JCS favored a cross-Channel invasion over additional Mediterranean operations, 'the question was still an open one.'<sup>119</sup> The British favored exploiting TORCH's success by planning an amphibious invasion of Sicily to help knock Italy out of the war, which Marshall admitted was likely a 'desirable objective.'<sup>120</sup> Due to U.S. fissures prior to Casablanca, the JCS basically acquiesced to new Mediterranean operations since they did not possess a credible alternative and it made strategic sense to exploit TORCH's success by opening up the Mediterranean and attempting to precipitate Italy's collapse.<sup>121</sup> However, now it was likely that a second front would have to wait until 1944.

#### IV

The Casablanca Conference represented a milestone in Allied military planning. Due to lack of consensus over U.S. strategic priorities before the conference, the JCS and their planners were unable to present viable substitutes to Britain's Mediterranean strategy. Partly as a result, the JCS bowed to strategic reality and accepted additional Mediterranean operations would occur in 1943 even before meeting with their British counterparts.<sup>122</sup>

But seen from a different angle, the pre-Casablanca strategic conversations in the fall of 1942 weren't all that different from what American strategists had largely been experiencing during the entire year. Their disagreements, inconsistencies, and infighting critically obstructed their ability to mold and shape U.S. strategy. Since they were largely unable to offer a unified set of policies, their influence over their nation's approach to warfighting was unsurprisingly limited.

The War Department was usually spared from this reality because its civilian and professional leaders, Stimson and Marshall, were so often working closely together that the organization's performance as a bureaucratic and political actor in these debates was noticeably successful. Their warm personal relations and routinely close working partnership helped aid their efforts to create a military strategy that matched their strategic preferences. Yet there were also occasions where they were not as closely aligned as they thought: while Stimson consistently pushed for a cross-Channel assault, Marshall sometimes shifted between supporting a direct European invasion and favoring the British Mediterranean strategy. Although Stimson enjoyed some success as the one of the primary political influencers of American military policy for a time, the divisions between the War Department and other senior U.S. defense officials left that success ephemeral.

By reappraising these wartime strategic debates from the disorderly American perspective explored here, this article aimed to contribute to the growing historical literature on grand strategy. Specifically, it sought to answer questions around who is responsible for crafting strategy, especially during wartime. In the case of early U.S. grand strategy during World War II, those usually spotlighted and focused on were revealed to be plagued by inconsistency, indecision, and infighting. Previous historical accounts that have focused on these actors, especially the JCS and the military, have depicted them as having high levels of influence over national policy. Yet this article has shown that during the first months of America's struggle against the Axis, this was largely not the case.

Alternatively, the bureaucratic dysfunction that is often endemic to the strategy and foreign policy process allowed a figure who has been mostly overlooked by historians to step forward and drive the politics of U.S. strategic policy. Stimson had the ambition, consistency, determination, experience, and vision to drive the American strategic debate. While Army planners



provided some of the details, Stimson used his organizational and political skills to build a coalition around a second European front and push Roosevelt to adopt this approach for defeating Germany. His efforts proved remarkably successful for a time until he was undermined by the military's sharp internal disagreements, the dynamics of the fighting in North Africa and the Pacific, and eventual British reluctance to mount a cross-Channel invasion. Of course, Stimson's thinking eventually triumphed when the Allies successfully invaded northwestern Europe through Operation Overlord in June 1944, but it would take two more long years of continued bureaucratic struggle and heavy fighting to reach that point. Yet even though a second front in France was not opened in 1942 (and if it had been, it would have led to a military disaster), this experience sheds light on the frequently disparate nature of American strategy formation and how unexpected figures can play outsized roles in that process.

Ultimately, the general hesitancy and indecision of most American policymakers led them to rely on an astonishing level of improvisation in determining how it should wage global war. Some improvisation is natural in fighting wars, but how often policymakers displayed it in this period is surprising. Yet how this spontaneity underpinned U.S. strategy could not be appreciated without focusing on the role of domestic institutions and executive branch agencies in fashioning grand strategy and foreign policy. In writing the histories of American grand strategy, it is vital to examine the U.S. state and come to grips with how the bureaucracy instrumentally shapes American policy and strategy. If this early period of U.S. wartime involvement reveals anything, it is both that the prewar military establishment was wholly unprepared to fight global war, and that the subsequent chaotic, divided, and slapdash American approach to the war cannot be understood without appreciating the agendas, efforts, and motivations of the myriad national security officials who attempted to define it.

## Notes

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3. For a precise definition of grand strategy, see Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 3.
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6. For example, see David Gethin Morgan-Owen, 'History and the Perils of Grand Strategy,' *The Journal of Modern History* 92, no. 2 (June 2020): 351–85, <https://doi.org/10.1086/708500>; Elizabeth Borgwardt,

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7. Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall, 'Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations,' *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 38–55, <http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8867>.
  8. Harold Stark to Frank Knox, 'Memorandum for the Secretary,' November 12, 1940, President's Secretary's File (PSF) Safe File: Navy Department, 'Plan Dog,' Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY (hereafter FDRL). Stark's memorandum can also be found in Steven T. Ross, ed., *American War Plans, 1919–1941, 5 vols.* (New York: Garland, 1992), 3: 225–74. See also Louis Morton, 'Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II' in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1960).
  9. The ABC-1 report can be found in The National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter TNA), Records of the Cabinet Office (hereafter CAB), Commonwealth and International Conferences Minutes and Papers, CAB 99/5, 'British-United States Staff Conversations, 1941.' ABC-1 and the revised RAINBOW 5 are also reproduced in Ross, *American War Plans*, 4: 3–66 and 5: 3–43.
  10. The two sides did disagree however over British requests for U.S. aid in the defense of Singapore. After the British stressed the importance of Singapore to their interests in the Far East, the American delegation invited their counterparts to present an appreciation of their views. In their memorandum, the British indirectly requested U.S. naval assistance for Singapore, which infuriated the Americans. In an aide-mémoire of their own, the Americans explicitly declined to reinforce Singapore. When Churchill learned about all this, he was angry his directives had not been followed to avoid the Singapore question and ordered the entire matter should be abandoned for the duration of the talks. See U.S.-U.K. Conversations Minutes, February 10, 1941; 'The Far East,' Appreciation by the United Kingdom Delegation, February 11, 1941; Statement by the United States Staff Committee, 'The United States Military Position in the Far East,' February 19, 1941, all in TNA, CAB 99/5. For the U.S. Army delegates' private thoughts on Singapore, see Stanley Embick, Leonard Gerow, Sherman Miles, and Joseph McNarney memo to George C. Marshall, 'Dispatch of United States Forces to Singapore,' February 12, 1941, OPD Exec. 4, item 11, Record Group 165, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA). For Churchill's instructions to avoid the Singapore issue before the ABC-1 talks, see TNA, CAB 121/146 'Minute by the Prime Minister commenting on Washington Telegram No. 2952 dated 7 December,' December 7, 1940. For Churchill's order to drop the Singapore issue during the ABC-1 conversations, see TNA, Records of the Admiralty, ADM 116/4877, Churchill minute to First Lord and First Sea Lord, February 17, 1941.
  11. Marshall and Stark to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 'Joint Board Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements,' September 11, 1941, PSF Safe File: American-British Joint Chiefs of Staff, FDRL. It can also be found at <http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/VictoryPlan/JointBoard.htm> and is reproduced in Ross, *American War Plans*, 5: 143–298. Some historians have referred to the Joint Board Estimate and its supporting documents as the 'Victory Program,' usually crediting Major Albert C. Wedemeyer as one of its major architects or its sole author, especially the Army 'Ground Forces Requirements' study. For example, see Pogue, 140–41; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 45–50; Steele, 30–1; Mark M. Lowenthal, *Leadership and Indecision: American War Planning and Policy Process, 1937–1942*, 2 vols. (New York: Garland, 1988) 2: 624–41; Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Program of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992). However, Lacey argues it is one of the 'more enduring myths of World War II' that Wedemeyer wrote the Victory Program and that industrial planners found the Joint Board Estimate's mobilization estimates 'so wildly inaccurate as to be worthless.' See Lacey, 'Toward a strategy,' 187–88. See also James Lacey, 'World War II's Real Victory Program,' *The Journal of Military History* 75, no. 3 (July 2011): 811–34. Due to this discrepancy, this article refers to this document as the Joint Board Estimate.
  12. A meeting between Stimson, two of his civilian deputies, and top Army planners further indicates that senior Army officials felt the U.S. did not have the munitions capacity to undertake 'major offensive operations' against Germany and would not for some time. See 'Conference of the Secretary and McCloy and Bundy with General Gerow and Major Wedemeyer,' September 16, 1941, Stimson Papers, reel 127.
  13. Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill, December 16–20, 1941, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*): *The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, eds. Fredrick Aandahl, William M. Franklin, and William Slany (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), Document 23.
  14. *Ibid*, Papers by the Joint Board, December 21, 1941, Document 34. Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who at the time was Deputy Chief of the Army War Plans Division, played a large role in drafting this document. See Alfred D. Chandler, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) (hereafter *Eisenhower Papers*), I: 20.
  15. 'American-British Grand Strategy,' Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, December 31, 1941, *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Document 115.

16. Marshall also explicitly argued this in a memorandum he sent to Roosevelt a few days before the president received the Joint Board Estimate. He wrote, 'Our broad concept of encircling Germany and closing in on her step by step is the only practical way of wearing down her war potential by military and economic pressure. In the final decisive phase we must come to grips with and annihilate the German military machine.' See Marshall to FDR, 'Ground Forces,' September 22, 1941, PSF Departmental Correspondence: War, September-December 1941, FDRL. See also Stimson to FDR, September 23, 1941, PSF Departmental Correspondence: War – Henry L. Stimson, 1940–1941, FDRL.
17. The U.S. chiefs offered slight revisions to British ideas, but no fundamental changes. See *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Documents 47–48, 52, 56, 67, 80, 83, 88, 96–97, 99, 105–107, 110, 112.
18. 'Notes on Conference at Office of the SW,' January 4, 1942, Stimson Papers, reel 127. See also Steele, *The First Offensive*, 65–68.
19. Buchanan, 36–37.
20. Marshall to FDR, 'North Africa,' January 9, 1942, PSF Safe File: North Africa, FDRL.
21. 'Project – Gymnast,' Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, December 26, 1941, *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Document 126; 'Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater – For the First Half of 1942,' Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, January 13, 1942, Document 143.
22. For example, see Stoler, *The Politics of the Second Front*, 25; Steele, *The First Offensive*, 60–68; J.R.M. Butler and J.M.A. Gwyer, *History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy*, vol. 3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), 357–358.
23. Jonathan W. Jordan, *American Warlords: How Roosevelt's High Command Led America to Victory in World War II* (New York: NAL Caliber, 2016), 158; Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 581–582, 592.
24. *Ibid.*; Stimson to FDR, August 10, 1943, HLSD; For more on Grant's influence on World War II-era American military strategists, see Weigley 312–359.
25. 'Memorandum of Conference Between Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson,' October 6, 1941, HLSD.
26. Stimson Diary, October 7, 10, 1941, HLSD.
27. Stimson Diary, October 9–10, 1941, HLSD; Lord Halifax to WSC, October 11, 1941, Correspondence with Winston Churchill, Prime Minister, Papers of Lord Halifax, Hickleton Papers, Borthwick Institute for Historical Research, University of York, Yorkshire, UK.
28. For Marshall and senior Army planners' openness to operations in North or West Africa in the fall of 1941 before Pearl Harbor, see Steele, 30–33.
29. Stimson to FDR, 'A suggested analysis of the basic topics and their attendant problems,' December 20, 1941, HLSD.
30. 'Memorandum of Decisions at White House,' December 21, 1941, HLSD.
31. Stimson Diary, December 23, 1941, HLSD.
32. 'Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army,' December 23, 1941, *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Document 47.
33. Stimson Diary, January 3, 1942, HLSD.
34. 'Notes by Lieutenant General Arnold,' January 4, 1942, *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Document 97.
35. *Ibid.*, 'Meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with their military advisers, 5:30 p.m.,' January 4, 1942, Document 96.
36. *Ibid.*
37. 'Meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with their military advisers, 5:30 p.m.,' January 14, 1942, *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Document 112.
38. *Ibid.* Also see 'Operation Super-Gymnast,' Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, January 14, 1942, *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Document 144.
39. Stimson and Bundy, 415.
40. Stimson Diary, January 14, 1942, HLSD; Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), 25.
41. Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 27–28; Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 103–104; David Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 136–139.
42. Mark A. Stoler, 'The Grand Alliance in World War II,' in *Grand Strategy and Military Alliances*, ed. Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 137.
43. Steven M. Miner, *Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Grand Alliance* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 184–213.
44. Stoler, 'The Grand Alliance in World War II,' 143.
45. Warren F. Kimball, ed., *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence: Volume 1*, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) (hereafter *Churchill and Roosevelt*), I: 221–222. Also see

- Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 14–46.
46. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 71.
  47. Chandler, *Eisenhower Papers*, I: 66.
  48. *Ibid.*, 149–155.
  49. JPS 4-A, 'Agreed Concepts of Grand Strategy: Evaluation and Revision Where Appropriate of Agreed Concepts as Affecting Deployment of United States Forces,' February 14, 1942, CCS 381 (2-2-42), RG 218, NARA.
  50. Stimson and Bundy, 415–416.
  51. Stimson Diary, February 23, 1942, HLSD.
  52. *Ibid.*, February 24, 1942.
  53. Arnold to Marshall, 'Employment of Army Air Forces,' March 3, 1942, Special Official File, Box 39, Henry H. Arnold Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
  54. Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt*, I: 381–384.
  55. Stimson Diary, March 5, 1942, HLSD.
  56. Ernest J. King to FDR, 'Areas of Responsibility,' March 5, 1942, PSF Safe File: Ernest J. King, FDRL. See also Stoler, *The Politics of the Second Front*, 32. Additionally, King had already been requesting Army troops to garrison Pacific islands, a step that would have drained crucial resources during a period when they were scarce and potentially prejudicially defensive strategy in the Pacific would fail. See Chandler, *Eisenhower Papers*, I: 112–113; Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1953), 154–155.
  57. Stimson Diary, March 5, 1942, HLSD.
  58. On this latter point, see Steven Casey, *Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War against Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
  59. King to FDR, 'Areas of Responsibility,' March 5, 1942, FDRL; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 68–69. King also argued to Knox a strategically defensive strategy in the Pacific would fail. See King to Knox, February 8, 1942, Ernest J. King Papers, Archives Branch, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC.
  60. Stimson Diary, March 7, 1942, HLSD.
  61. Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt*, I: 398–399.
  62. Stimson Diary, March 8, 1942, HLSD.
  63. *Ibid.*, March 15, 1942.
  64. *Ibid.*, March 16, 1942.
  65. *Ibid.*, March 17, 1942.
  66. *Ibid.*, March 20, 1942.
  67. *Ibid.*, March 23, 1942. In his book on Dill, Alex Danchev does not mention this episode between the two men. For more, see Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941–1944* (London: Brassey's, 1986).
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  71. Appendix II to JPS 2/6 in JCS 23, March 14, 1942, CCS 381 (1-30-42), RG 218, NARA.
  72. Chandler, *Eisenhower Papers*, I: 205–208.
  73. *Ibid.*
  74. Stimson to FDR, March 27, 1942, HLSD; Stimson and Bundy, 417–418.
  75. Marshall to FDR, 'Basis for preparation of attached outline plan for Invasion of Western Europe,' n.d. (but sometime between March 27 and April 1), PSF Safe File: George C. Marshall, 1941 - Apr. 14, 1942, FDRL. The plan is reprinted in Butler and Gwyer, *Grand Strategy*, vol. 3, 675–681. The codenames for these operations were assigned later after the British agreed to the American proposals in London in April. See Matloff and Snell, 190–191, 383.
  76. Stimson Diary, March 30, 1942, HLSD; Stimson and Bundy, 418–419.
  77. Stimson Diary, April 1, 1942, HLSD.
  78. *Ibid.*, April 20, 1942; Matloff and Snell, 187–190; Larry I. Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: 'The Right Man For The Job,' December 7, 1941 - May 31, 1943*, vol. 3 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) (hereafter *Marshall Papers*), III: 162–163.
  79. Matloff and Snell, 211.
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83. Ibid, FDR memo to Marshall, May 6, 1942; For the quotation, see Alex Danchev, *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes* (London: Brassey's, 1990), 139.
84. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Presidential Diary, March 11, 1942, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Diaries, FDRL.
85. Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 563, 575.
86. Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt*, I: 494–495, 503–504.
87. FDR memo to Stimson, Marshall, Arnold, Knox, King and Hopkins, May 6, 1942, PSF Departmental Correspondence: War: George C. Marshall, 1941–1942, FDRL.
88. Stimson Diary, June 17, 1942, HLSD.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid, Stimson to FDR, June 19, 1942.
91. Ibid.
92. Marshall to FDR, 'Memorandum for the President,' June 23, 1942, *FRUS: Washington, 1941–1942*, Document 301.
93. Marshall to FDR, June 19, 1942, PSF Safe File: Marshall, Apr. 15, 1942–1944, FDRL; Stimson Diary, June 19, 1942, HLSD.
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95. Ibid, Note by the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, June 24, 1942, Document 304.
96. Stimson Diary, June 21, 1942, HLSD.
97. Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt*, I: 520–521.
98. Minutes, JCS 24<sup>th</sup> Meeting, July 10, 1942, Meetings, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1: 1942–1945, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London, London, UK. For some of the evidence on the likelihood of a Japanese attack on Siberia, see Bland, *Marshall Papers*, III: 208–209; Joint Intelligence Committee memo, 'Japanese Capabilities and Intentions regarding Siberia,' June 17, 1942, OPD 381 Japan, Case 4, RG 165, NARA; Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 90–91; U.S. Department of Defense, *Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1955), 9–10.
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103. Ibid, 252–256; 261–266; Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 7.
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109. Stimson to FDR, July 23, 1942, HLSD.
110. Ibid, Stimson Diary, July 21, 1942.
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112. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 90.
113. Stimson Diary, July 25, 1942, HLSD; Sherwood, 611–612.
114. Stimson Diary, July 25, 1942, HLSD.
115. Ibid, January 7, 1943.
116. Thomas Handy memo to Marshall, 'American-British Strategy,' November 8, 1942, WDCSA 381, RG 165, NARA; CPS 49/2 'Planning for Operations Subsequent to "Torch"', December 5, 1942, CCS 381 (11-16-42), RG 218, NARA.
117. JCS 152, Arnold to JCS, 'Strategic Policy for 1943,' November 16, 1942, CCS 381 (11-16-42), RG 218, NARA; CPS 49/2 'Planning for Operations Subsequent to "Torch"', December 5, 1942, CCS 381 (11-16-42), RG 218, NARA.
118. Ibid, JSSC 4/1, 'Operations Subsequent to TORCH,' December 31, 1942.
119. 'Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes of a Meeting at the White House,' January 7, 1943, *FRUS: Casablanca, 1943*, Document 329.

120. Ibid; Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, 'Basic Strategic Concept for 1943 – The European Theater,' January 2, 1943, Document 400.
121. Ibid, 'Meeting of Roosevelt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 p.m.,' January 16, 1943, Document 347; 'Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m.,' January 18, 1943, Document 355; Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 'Conduct of the War in 1943,' January 19, 1943, Document 408; 'Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister,' January 23, 1943, Document 416.
122. Lacey, 'Toward a strategy,' 201–206.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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