Performing identity: The case of the (Greek) Cypriot National Guard

Evangelina Moisi¹ | Alexandros Zachariades²

¹Independent Scholar
²Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Correspondence
Alexandros Zachariades, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science. Email: a.zachariades@lse.ac.uk

Abstract
Students of International Relations are taught that the modern nation-state has a monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence. However, in the case of the Republic of Cyprus this does not seem to be the case, since its armed forces, the Cypriot National Guard (CNG), are intimately embedded within Greece’s military structure, and half the island remains under Turkish occupation. The colonization of Cyprus (1571–1960) and subsequent decolonization has led to the gradual construction of two rigid identities, Greek and Turkish, that have been institutionalized legally and imposed constitutionally. This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, how does the CNG perform and therefore constitute a ‘Greek identity’? Second, is this performance epistemically violent, hindering the formation of hybrid identities? We use autoethnography, interviews, and insights from Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus and Judith Butler’s performativity theory to explore these two questions. We argue that the CNG performs a Greek identity in three key configurations: 1) the operational link between the Greek Army and the CNG; 2) the explicit connection to both ancient and modern Greece through various CNG insignia and practices, including parades and marching songs; and 3) the entrenchment of the Greek Orthodox Church within its practices.
INTRODUCTION

One of the first premises scholars of International Relations (IR) and Political Science are taught is that the modern nation-state has a monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence. The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) is certainly an exceptional case, considering that its armed forces – the Cypriot National Guard (CNG) – are intimately tied to Greece’s military structure, half of the island is de facto under Turkish occupation, and contradictory sovereign regimes (buffer zones and British sovereign bases) exist across the ROC’s territory.¹ As Constantinou (2008: 145) has highlighted: ‘The ROC was intended to function as a state of exception from its very inception; an exception to the principle of self-determination […] and unfettered exercise of sovereignty’. The inception of the ROC in 1960 – following centuries of colonization – legally institutionalized and constitutionally imposed two rigid identities: Greek and Turkish. As these two identities have continuously been framed within a conflicting Self/Other dichotomy, the ROC’s ability to form a modern nation-state based on an overarching ‘Cypriot’ identity has not been realized because this requires that the Greek and Turkish Selves accept the Other within them (Zarakol, 2011). Thus, Cypriot sovereignty operates in limbo: not quite whole, not quite separate. The communal conflicts in 1963/4 (which led to the dissolution of the bicomunal Cypriot Army) and the 1974 Turkish invasion, in particular, have led to the reification of a solely Greek-Cypriot CNG.

Our article situates itself in this discussion and seeks to answer the following two questions. First, how does the CNG perform and therefore constitute a ‘Greek’ identity? Second, to what extent does this Greek performance by the CNG hinder the creation or existence of hybrid ‘Cypriot’ identities? The article is split into four sections. The first section outlines a short literature on militaries and nationalism, tracing Cyprus’s military historiography and the (de)colonial conditions that led to the creation of the CNG. The second section lays out the characteristics of the modern Greek identity and alternative Cypro-centric identities. The third section explores the theoretical frameworks employed within our article: Judith Butler’s performativity theory (1990) and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus (1977). The fourth section presents a critical analysis of the CNG and its performance of a Greek identity, bringing these different strands together into one argument. Here, we apply Butler’s and Bourdieu’s theories to the CNG, partly using interviews and autoethnography, to demonstrate that a Greek identity is (re)performed and (re)constituted in the CNG. This is followed by our conclusion.

Ultimately, we argue that the CNG performs a Greek identity mainly through three internalized structures (habitus), namely: 1) the CNG’s operational link to the Greek Army; 2) the explicit connection to both ancient and modern Greece through its various insignia, parades, and marching songs; and 3) the entrenchment of the Greek Orthodox Church within CNG practices. The enactment of a Greek identity by the CNG is inherently juxtaposed vis-à-vis the Turkish Other on the island. As the CNG is an institution that relies on mass compulsory conscription, its latent social structures impede and hinder the performance of hybrid identities with distinct Cypriot characteristics. This article asserts that a Greek identity is re-performed and re-constituted in the CNG, which is another layer on top of many previous ones (e.g. school education) that further solidify and cement the Greek-Cypriot identity. The article hopes to break new ground and provide an opening for dialogue that focuses on more critical perspectives in exploring the CNG and the role of the military in the Republic of Cyprus.

NATIONALISM, THE MILITARY, AND THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CNG

The interconnection between nationalism and the military can be seen through the work of realist scholar Barry Posen (1993), who contends that nationalism increases the intensity of warfare
and the state’s ability to mobilize resources for war-making. While many scholars (Anderson 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) have argued that nationalism evolves from internal socio-economic conditions linked to modernity, Posen argues that it evolves from external international threats against the state’s survival, which in turn leads it to build up military power and thus a mass army. He further argues that the creation of educational structures is also necessary for building an army through which soldiers become versed in the ‘national histories’ and ‘ideology’ of the nation. Literacy facilitates ‘command, training and political motivation’ (indoctrination) that cultivate unity among soldiers and a pool of recruits that easily replenishes battlefield losses (Posen, 1993: 83–6).

However, Fred Halliday (2005: 37–40) highlights that the modern nation-state was in some cases endogenously created (e.g. Western European nations), whilst in others, it was the outcome of external forces such as imperialism (e.g. the countries of sub-Saharan Africa). Posen’s account misses this latter point; in these cases, the mass army came about as a colonial institution. Most colonial forces were made up of indigenous conscripts interacting with the imperial metropolis and its representatives, which allowed for interactions between the colonizer and the colonized as well as among the colonized. These interactions spilled into society, which acted as a feeder of soldiers to the military (Barkawi, 2006, 2017; Millar, 2020). The two are co-constitutive entities. Hence, the military is a transformative social phenomenon that has the capacity to reconfigure society (ibid.).

Halliday’s argument has allowed postcolonial critiques to flourish that counteract mainstream IR arguments on civil-military relations (see Dunlap, 1992; Feaver, 1996; Finer, 1962; Holsti, 2001; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Tarak Barkawi (2006, 2017) has illustrated how military requirements for manpower during the two world wars led to greater conscription in the Imperial Indian Army. This development enabled common identities to form and these identities to spill over into society, which subsequently fuelled Pakistani and Indian nationalist movements. The co-constitutiveness of society and the military has led to new interconnected fields of academic enquiry: critical military studies and critical war studies. Feminist scholars have also contributed to this field, focusing on the role of gender in recruitment practices (Enloe, 2015) and the ways masculinity constitutes combat through ‘the heroic soldier myth’ (Millar and Tidy, 2017). Pertaining to Cyprus, the work of Anna Agathangelou utilizes her mother’s storytelling of the island’s turbulent history as a ‘living archive’, critiquing IR methodological practices that ‘collude with toxic regimes of representation, expecting certain subjects and institutions to reiterate colonial and violent racialized masculine practices’ (2017: 206).

Our article is situated within the field of critical military studies, which ‘engages in skeptical curiosity about how [military power] works – often through domestic social and political agendas that may bear no relation to protecting the nation from foreign threats’ (Basham et al., 2015: 1). The article breaks new ground, as the CNG forms a unique and paradoxical case study. First, the Republic of Cyprus is both a de-colonial state and part of the (colonial) West. Second, the CNG was not an imposed remnant of the colonial period as was the case with post-colonial military forces in Africa, the Middle East or Asia. Nor was it created organically in response to an existential threat. Rather, the CNG was a paramilitary force that gradually became a mass army in response to internal strife. Our article also contributes to the literature on the Cyprus Problem, given that most scholars tend to approach it through the lens of securitization (Adamides, 2020), Realpolitik (Coufoudakis, 1976; Tziarras, 2019), or the role of the European Union (EU) (Economides, 2005; Richmond, 2001). While some scholars (Constantinou, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Mavratsas, 1999) have sought to contest claims about the ideational rigidity of the two communities (Greek and Turkish), none has enquired into the CNG’s capacity to act as an ideational and sociological force.

In the rest of the article we lay bare the (de)colonial conditions that led to the CNG’s creation and its subsequent ideational character that is stamped on all of its conscripts and officers.
To do this, we begin with an historical account of how the CNG was created. The CNG has been the de facto military force of the Republic of Cyprus since 1964. Hence, the history of the Cypriot state and the CNG are symbiotically intertwined. The ROC was established in August 1960 after a four-year struggle (1955–1959) by the Greek-Cypriot guerrilla organization EOKA, whose demand for Enosis (‘unification’) with Greece shifted to the creation of an independent state. The demand for Enosis first began to take shape in the 1930s among Greek-Cypriots and reached its climax in the 1950s. A counter-reaction was the development of a Kemalist secular Turkish identity in the 1930s, when Turkish-Cypriot leaders rejected any Cypriot aspect to their identity. Instead, they viewed themselves as Turks in Cyprus, being part of the greater Turkish national family. The Greek-Cypriots acted as the dialectical Other in this process (Kizilyürek, 2003: 198–9). By the 1950s, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership had constructed links with the ‘Turkish motherland’ with the aim of partitioning the island in two and uniting the Turkish part with Turkey. Taksim (‘partition’) was the Turkish-Cypriot response to Enosis. This mobilization mainly occurred through education, but the onset of operations by EOKA led to the creation of a paramilitary force (the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, TMT) supported by Ankara.

Seeing the opportunity for a tactic of divide-and-rule, in 1948 the British colonial administration allowed the government of Turkey to provide books and educational material for Turks on the island (Kizilyürek, 2003: 200). According to Harold Macmillan, the then British Foreign Secretary, stirring up the Turks against the Greeks ‘neutralized the Greek agitation’ (Hitchens, 1984: 43). The ROC’s independence was formalized with the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements between Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK) and the two Cypriot community leaders, Archbishop Makarios III and Dr Fazıl Küçük (Dodd, 2010: 42–4). The constitution of the new Republic of Cyprus set out that a Greek-Cypriot would serve as President and head of state, while a Turkish-Cypriot would serve as Vice-President (ibid.), through which both had unilateral veto powers that enabled them to reject any legislation approved by the new parliament. Two treaties accompanied the constitution: The Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. Under the former, Greece, Turkey and the UK ‘guaranteed’ the territorial sovereignty of the ROC, while the latter granted them rights of intervention and to base military contingents on the island (Mallinson, 2005). The guarantor powers drafted and presented these documents to the Cypriot community leaders, who had limited capacity to negotiate the terms of their decolonized state.

The new constitution created a bicomunal and consociational state that required its citizens to identify as either Greek/Orthodox Christian or Turkish/Muslim. The three religious minorities on the island (Armenians, Latin Catholics, and Maronites) were required to choose between these two identities and eventually chose to be part of the Greek/Orthodox Christian community. Before independence, Cypriots did not necessarily subscribe to the rigid notions and categories of identity laid out by the constitution (Constantinou, 2007a). Instead, hybrid identities existed during the Ottoman occupation of the island (1571–1878), through which many Cypriots switched between Christian and Muslim for various social purposes (ibid.). However, British rule on the island (1878–1960) resulted in the praxis of modern Western sovereignty; an imperial apparatus that set out fixed pre-described categories and classifications between citizens. In time, this evolved into the gradual segregation of Cypriots into Greeks and Turks, which became firmly embedded during the 1950s as a result of the Greek-Cypriot uprising for Enosis (Anthias and Ayres, 1983: 69–70, Demetriou, 2019: 404–8). With a constitution drafted by its former colonizers and two ‘motherlands’, the ROC’s inception solidified the legislative segregation of the two communities (Constantinou, 2007a: 247).

Although 78% of the overall population was Greek-Cypriot and 18% was Turkish-Cypriot (with the remaining 4% composed of minorities, including Maronites, Latins, and Armenians), the newly established Cypriot Army (comprising 2,000 men) was 60% Greek-Cypriot and 40% Turkish-Cypriot. However, this status quo was short-lived, as bicomunal conflict erupted in
December 1963 shortly after the Greek-Cypriot leader Makarios suggested constitutional reform. This was rejected by both Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriots (Mallinson, 2005: 35). An incident between Greek-Cypriot police officers and Turkish-Cypriots in the capital Nicosia on 20 December 1963 left two Turkish-Cypriots dead, sparking hostilities between the two communities (Dodd, 2010: 51–2; Ker-Lindsay, 2004). As very few militias had demobilized following the ROC’s creation in 1960, intercommunal fighting escalated quickly, with a Turkish invasion narrowly averted by US President Lyndon B. Johnson (Chrysostomou, 2013: 28–9; Johnson and Inonu, 1966). Turkish-Cypriots withdrew from the government and public service, fortifying themselves into eight enclaves outside the authority of the official government, now controlled exclusively by Greek-Cypriots.

During the following summer, the Greek-Cypriot government passed Law 20 of 1964, bringing the Cypriot National Guard into being (ROC, 1964). The law’s foreword contended that, due to ‘recent events’, the creation of a fighting force separate to the ROC’s military was necessary to assist in the defence of the Cypriot state. The creation of the CNG was the result of preparations in Greece between the Makarios administration, Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, and Greek-Cypriot General (and former EOKA leader) Georgios Grivas (Chrysostomou, 2013: 368). Grivas argued for a unilateral Greek professional army on the island, as the fighting was being conducted primarily by disparate militia groups with divergent agendas and loyalties (ibid.). During this period, the Papandreou administration secretly deployed a Greek division of 8,000 men on the island. The CNG saw its first operation in August 1964 during the retaking of the enclave of Kokkina, when it came head-to-head with the Turkish Air Force (Mallinson, 2005: 41–2). The establishment of a military junta in Greece in April 1967 and the subsequent attack on the Turkish enclave of Kofinou–Ayios Theodoros brought Greece and Turkey close to war over Cyprus, causing the Greek division to withdraw from the island (Mallinson, 2005: 51). This also set Makarios and the military junta at odds with each other, creating an internal division amongst Greek-Cypriots.

This intra-Greek rivalry led to a Greek-led coup d’état against Makarios on 15 July 1974, where the CNG took part in Makarios’ overthrow. Turkey invaded the island on 20 July under its right of intervention (launching a second assault in August), and this resulted in the division of Cyprus which persists to the present day, with Turkish forces occupying approximately 38% of Cypriot soil behind the Green Line cutting through Nicosia. Following the invasion, the Greek-Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus succeeded in establishing itself as the only internationally recognized actor on the island, while the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, proclaimed in 1983, is only recognized by Turkey. The demographic composition of the two de facto states became homogenized following a population exchange agreed in the aftermath of the invasion. This has resulted in a purely Greek-Cypriot ROC, whereby the incorporation of anti-Makarios paramilitaries into the CNG cemented national unity within the political system and political stability within the ROC. While the Greek far-right understood that unification with Greece was now impossible (Kovras, 2014: 56), the ROC was united behind its perception of the Turkish ‘Other’. This, along with demographic homogeneity, allowed for the establishment of a Greek-Cypriot identity as the state’s official identity. The CNG, which was ideationally a Greek force before the Turkish invasion, became firmly constituted in this state-wide performativity of a rigid Greek identity in the ROC.

THE MODERN GREEK IDENTITY ANND CYPRO-CENTRIC IDENTITIES

In this section we enquire into the characteristics of the modern Greek identity, as well as alternative Cypro-centric identities. Specifically, we argue that this identity has been formed upon three major pillars: the existence of Turkey as the significant Other; a fixation on the country’s
ancient past; and the interrelationship with the Greek Orthodox Church. The last two create a grand historical narrative that links modern Greece with the Byzantine Empire and Greek antiquity (Kitromilides, 1998; Paparrigopoulos, 1999; Zarakol, 2011: 97). These three distinctive and intertwined elements form the CNG’s official identity and aid the perpetuation of Greekness in the ROC.

First, the modern Greek ‘Self’ cannot be conceived without understanding that Turkey is the perennial enemy (Heraclides, 2011; Millas 2004, 2005; Mouzelis, 1994: 24–6; Zarakol, 2011). The 400-year imperial rule under the ‘Ottoman yoke’ ended with the Greek ‘Revolution’ and gave rise to the Greek nation-state in 1830 (Heraclides, 2011: 8). Given that Greece was the result of a Greco-Turkish confrontation, Turkey has become the significant Other for its identity formation (Heraclides, 2011; Millas, 2004: 53, Tzimitras and Hatay, 2016: 1). Current Greco-Turkish hostilities are perpetuated by disputes over the Aegean Sea and the ROC (Gursoy, 2018: 161–5; Karagiannis, 2016). After all, the last time they saw action against each other was during the 1974 Turkish invasion of the ROC.

Second, modern Greeks view themselves as the descendants of Ancient Greece (Heraclides, 2011; Kitromilides, 2013: 71–81). The classical past in the conception of the Greek Self is an aporia of two interconnected developments. The first is the importance of Ancient Greek philosophy in Western Europe for the Age of Enlightenment, where Western European elites received an education based on classical antiquity (Brewer, 2001: 153; Clarke, 1959, Hagerman, 2013; Stivachtis, 2017; Woodhouse, 1969). The second development was known as the Greek Enlightenment: an intellectual movement between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries influenced by the European Enlightenment (Kitromilides, 2013). Here, various figures sought to inspire a secular awareness and incite Greeks to rise against their Eastern despots as their classical forefathers had done (Chaconas, 1942; Kitromilides, 2013; Korais, 1958). Such figures appealed to ‘Enlightened Europe’ to aid the Greeks in their struggle, through which classical antiquity positioned Greece within Western civilization (Kalospyros, 2007; Stivachtis, 1998, 2017). Greece’s embryonic statehood also saw the rise of the irredentist Great Idea (Μεγάλη Ιδέα; ‘Megali Idea’), which sought to ‘liberate’ all areas inhabited by Greeks but not yet under its territorial control. Remnants of the Great Idea continued to surface thereafter, particularly in the form of Enosis on Cyprus (Kitromilides, 1998: 26).

Third, the importance of Byzantium elevated Christian Orthodoxy in the modern Greek identity (Heraclides, 2011; Kitromilides, 1998: 26, 2013: 325–30). Historiographer Constantine Paparrigopoulos played a key role in constructing this narrative through his History of the Hellenic Nation, in which he argued that the Greek nation went through five successive phases: Ancient, Macedonian, Christian, Medieval, and Modern (Dimaras, 1986; Karasarinis, 2001: 51–61; Kitromilides, 1998: 29–30). In his words, ‘to the Byzantine state, we owe the conservation of our language, our religion and our nationality’ (Dimaras, 1986: 171). This established Byzantium’s place as a transhistorical continuum for the Great Idea by linking modern Greece with its ancient past and providing a setting for the battle with the Turkish Other, making identity formation possible.

In contradistinction to the Greek and Turkish identities that developed within the two communities on the island, a third Cypro-centric identity emerged following the declaration of independence: Cypriotism. Cypriot nationalism focuses on the common heritage between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, whose roots can be traced back politically to the participation of both communities in the Communist Party of Cyprus, which transformed into AKEL (Ανωρθωτικό κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού (Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú/Progressive Party of Working People) in 1943. Up until the 1960s, Turkish-Cypriots were members of the party and even held important positions in its various bodies and affiliated organizations. More recently, AKEL has largely been associated with promoting a federal solution to the Cyprus Problem, although a minority advocate a unitary state. Supporters of this current movement for a federal solution seek an end to any interference in Cypriot affairs by foreign powers,
especially the three guarantors of the 1960 Constitution (Greece, Turkey, and the UK). Although this movement enjoys a great deal of support within the political left (on both sides of the Green Line), it also enjoys some support within the liberal right. In many ways, the imposition of a Greek identity by the education system and subsequent conscription into the CNG seeks to nullify the effects of this push for a federal solution.

PERFORMATIVITY, HABITUS AND STATE IDENTITY

The theoretical framework of our article combines Judith Butler’s (1990) performativity theory with Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of the habitus, which we apply to the meso-level of the CNG. Butler’s theory (1991: 417) claims that ‘the gendered body has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality’. She argues that genders are ‘reproduced through patterns of learned behaviour’; it is the act of continuously (re)performing gender – what is ‘considered’ masculine or feminine – that constitutes the gender identity of a subject and stabilizes that identity as a natural belief (Welti, 2004: 21). Several IR scholars (Campbell, 1992, 1997; Weber, 1996, 1998, 2010) have extrapolated Butler’s performative construction from the individual (gender identity) to the collective level (national identity), emphasizing that statehood is performed and constituted through patterns of learned behaviour at the collective level. For example, Campbell (1992, 1997) explores how state identity is constructed around demarcating foreign enemies (Self/Other), focusing on the ways in which US foreign policy re-articulates itself around new threatening enemies. Rather than threats, these enemies serve as the very condition for the United States’ statehood (ibid.).

This theoretical groundwork allows us to conceptualize both the military (the CNG) and foreign policy as a vehicle through which (state) identity is performed and constituted. While the ROC does not seek out new foreign enemies (in the way the United States does), it does have a perennial enemy in the form of Turkey. For example, the ROC’s recent trilateral partnership with Greece and Israel over a natural gas pipeline in the Eastern Mediterranean is built around balancing itself against the Turkish Other (Arinç and Özgül, 2015; Stratakis and Pelagidis, 2019). Similarly, the ROC’s foreign policy re-articulates itself around Turkey, and the two together constitute the conditions for the ROC’s existence as a Greek-Cypriot state.

Importantly, Butler’s performative identity construction depends on the interplay between performative acts and their discursive norms, which establish what acts are ‘accepted’ for that distinct (gender) identity. Extrapolating this to the international system, Campbell (1992: 10) contends that the interplay of performative and discursive ‘gives rise to an [international] society of normalization’ that imposes character deviation at the state-level. This in turn ‘legitimizes certain outlooks and orientations while delegitimizing others’ (ibid.). Accordingly, we assert that Greek-Cypriot is considered the default and accepted identity of the ROC through discursive (re)productions of Greek-normativity within state apparatuses (the CNG). This means that Turkish-Cypriot and hybrid Cypriot identities are seen as character deviations to the ROC’s state identity. The CNG’s (re)performative acts constitute the identity of the ROC not only as a state, but as a distinctly Greek-Cypriot state within the international system, stabilizing this identity as the ‘natural’ Self. In particular, CNG’s mandatory conscription makes it structurally difficult to perform alternative identities, given that the Turkish Other and Cypriot hybridity are ultimately excluded.

Elisa Welti (2004) takes performativity theory further by explaining that modern nation-states are imagined communities (Anderson, 2006). Individuals come to imagine a deep commonality through the repetition of performative acts, which create a ‘shared narrative that connects individuals to a “nation” on a temporal plane’ (Berenskoetter, 2016: 7). The more these acts are performed, the more individuals come to believe and reify that nation-state (Welti, 2004: 27). Other IR scholars have concurred that statehood and state identity are
illusions created retroactively by repeated performances (Jackson, 2006: 11). As Welti (2004: 36) explains, ‘performativity is those acts we perceive as something the state already possesses but are, in fact, something the state anticipates and produces by repetition’. The ROC’s professing to hold a Greek-Cypriot identity is an illusion contrived and maintained through the performative acts of the CNG (Butler, 1990, 2004), where prior discursive ‘statements’ of the ROC’s Greekness (i.e. links to Ancient Greece) legitimize and naturalize the very acts that are its results (Weber, 2010; Welti, 2004). Thus, through the CNG, Greekness becomes constituted as the ‘natural’ characteristic of the ROC and achieves ontological status, which productively legitimizes the continuation of the CNG’s ritual-like performativity.

Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus has received some attention within the international political sociology arm of IR (Cohen, 2018; Leander, 2006), particularly in the works of Didier Bigo (2011). Bigo has explored how Bourdieu’s relational approach in the habitus theory destabilizes the dichotomy between structure/agency or collective/individual and can therefore help avoid some of the traps commonly found in IR theories. Habitus refers to the ways in which certain collective institutions, such as the CNG in our case, (re)produce ‘internalized structures’ and ‘schemes of perception’ through which dominant socio-cultural epistemes are constituted and established (Bourdieu, 1977: 86). According to Bourdieu (ibid.), the (re)production of such epistemes affects the individuals of that habitus, by structuring the very condition and possibility of their ‘apperception’ of the world (being-in-the-world) (Heidegger, 2002). A habitus continually (re)structures how individuals relate to the world as they internalize the dominant socio-cultural epistemes made available therein (Gillespie, 2019).

A habitus also confers ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1977) upon certain attributes, ideas, and identities that become accepted or normalized, while others are stigmatized. This creates a connection to Butler’s theory, since habitus provides the latent social structures through which the interplay between performative acts and their discursive norms can occur. Hence, as a concept, habitus provides us with the language to explain how the Greek-Cypriot identity becomes laden with desirability and normality and is then internalized and instinctively performed by individuals within the CNG. Through internalization, individuals ‘become particular kinds of subjects’, such as Greek-Cypriots, who ‘in turn reproduce the habitus itself by subscribing to and perpetuating its dominant socio-cultural’ ‘being-in-the-world’ (Gillespie, 2019; Heidegger, 2002).

Bourdieu (1977) also asserts that the habitus produces relationships of power and domination as its institutions, in our case the CNG, distribute ‘cultural capital’ unequally by assigning value to and reifying certain ideas and identities (Greek identity) while obfuscating and excluding others (hybrid identities). In order to change the dominant socio-cultural epistemes within the habitus, ‘those who are dominated must cause a rupture to the status quo from within the habitus itself’ (Gillespie, 2019). As Gillespie (ibid.) beautifully puts it, ‘the dominant’ within the CNG – often the professionals who ascribe to the modern Greek identity – ‘can just “be”, while the dominated’ – often the conscripts who are formulating their own individuality – ‘must first “clear the way” before they can “be”’. This thus makes it very difficult for alternative or hybrid Cypriot identities to form or be performed within the CNG.

**THE CNG AND THE PERFORMANCE OF A GREEK IDENTITY**

The CNG is a conscription force. All able males finishing high school are legally obliged to present themselves for service for (currently) 14 months. Once a conscript finishes service, he is registered as a reserve and expected to present himself for service twice a year. By law, every member of the reserve – Greek-Cypriot males aged between 20 and 50 with permanent residency – must have all the necessary equipment at home for immediate call-up. Being a conscription force, the male population of the island spends a considerable amount of time being
socialized in the practices and rituals of the CNG, which, as we will argue, is the vehicle through which a Greek identity is performed and constituted. We illustrate our argument through an analysis of CNG’s 1) organizational structure, training and equipment; 2) symbols, insignia, marching songs, and parades; and 3) relationship to the Orthodox Church.

For part of the analysis in this section, we conducted open-ended interviews and utilized the co-author’s own conscription experience to question critically whether the CNG is able to impose a Greek identity on its personnel. The interviewees belonged to the co-author’s close social circle, where the rapport enabled them to open up and talk freely. On the other hand, there is a selection bias, since interviewees were not randomly selected. We acknowledge that this, alongside the small sample size, cannot fully answer our article’s questions. Nonetheless, the interviewees belonged to different age groups and political affiliations, and have served at different times in different posts and branches of the military, which does provide a rich sample. Finally, these interviews (and autoethnography) indicate important avenues for further research, and is the prism through which the article should be viewed in terms of its overall contribution.6

Organizational Structure, Training, and Equipment

The most profound link between Greece and the CNG can be found at the pinnacle of the CNG’s organizational structure. The CNG maintains strong links with the Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF) by having active or former Greek officers in important positions in its hierarchy, alongside its own Greek-Cypriot officers who undergo years of training in Greek military schools. The head of the organization is not a Cypriot citizen but a retired general from Greece (CNG, 2020a, 2020b), who was trained by and served in the HAF. Since the 1990s, more and more Cypriot officers have attained positions formerly held by their Greek counterparts. Nonetheless, some Greek officers still serve in the CNG while nominally remaining members of the HAF. Professional Greek-Cypriot officers in the CNG receive their military training in Greek military schools alongside fellow Greek officers.

The training curriculum includes classes on Greek history, which according to the 2015/16 manual of the Hellenic Military Academy (2015: 74) aim at ‘cultivating the historical consciousness of future officers’ by tracing the history of modern Greece and its link to ancient periods such as the Peloponnesian Wars (431–404 BC). Other classes focus on ‘The Enlightenment and the Modern Greek Identity’, with its connections to Byzantium and classical antiquity (ibid.: 76–9). The military schools in Greece seek to mould the historical perception and understanding of Greek-Cypriot officers in the same way as their Greek counterparts, conditioning and constituting them as if they were officers of the HAF. In this way, the CNG sets the terms of what identity the CNG’s professional force can ‘be’, which insidiously constricts the ability of officers to develop their own individual identity. This is enforced top-down by the professional officers onto conscripts, and it is these ‘internalized structures’ and ‘schemes of perception’ (Bourdieu 1977) that constitute the (re)performance of a dominant Greek identity and hinder alternative (hybrid) identities from forming organically.

Once Greek-Cypriot officers graduate from military school, they spend a year in a unit of the HAF. Career progression within the CNG requires that Greek-Cypriot officers attend several other military schools in Greece as well. Alongside the various compulsory joint training programmes and a common perception of the Turkish Other, the fact that Greek-Cypriot officers spend four years in Greek military schools propagates the integral link between the Greek and Cypriot armed forces. This enables Greek and Greek-Cypriot officers to forge meaningful bonds through shared experiences of the Greek identity. Such socialization fashions CNG officers’ worldview or ‘apperception’ of the world by forming a common stock of norms with Greece, which in turn stabilizes the Greek identity as natural and hybrid Cypriot identities as
abnormal. The more these acts of socialization are performed, the more individuals come to believe and reify the identity thus inculcated.

Our interviews and autoethnography highlighted to us, in particular, two points regarding the enforcement of identity within the organizational structure of the CNG. The first is that at certain historical conjunctures when Greco-Turkish relations are at a point of crisis, latent internalized structures and dominant socio-cultural epistemes become more prevalent in the CNG (Bourdieu, 1977). However, during times of détente, such structures are not so obvious and military personnel have more possibility and freedom within their ‘appereception’ of the world. The second concerns the relevance of each institutional circumstance in terms of the specific unit, who the commanding officer was, and which branch of the armed forces it was in. The first historical facet is best illustrated by interviewee 4, who served between 1972 and 1974. During this time, the junta government in Greece controlled the CNG through its officer appointments, where a staunchly anti-Makarios habitus was fostered by those dominant within the institution. Here, the vast majority of the conscripts were on the far-right, presumably supporting EOKA B and the junta, and thus were subscribing to and perpetuating the dominant socio-cultural worldview of that habitus.

For example, interviewee 4 was beaten up during training as he was openly a leftist Makarios supporter. A division was cultivated between the far-right, advocating for Enosis, and forces around Makarios, who supported the protection of the ROC’s independence. Interviewee 4 told us that all known Makarios supporters within his unit were granted two days’ leave on the eve of the coup by the command, as his unit was on the frontline against Makarios during the coup d’état on 15 July 1974. According to interviewee 3, although the internal division still existed within the special forces in the first years post-1974, it was suppressed due to the presence of Turkish armed forces on the island. For interviewee 3, there was no need for anyone to remind them of the enemy (the Turkish Other), as the events were fresh and scarred many people of his generation. In fact, interviewee 3 heard ‘stories that, in some far-flung posts, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots exchanged cigarettes. This seemed weird, because in my camp […] if a Turkish-Cypriot neared us, we would shoot without hesitation’.

In more recent years, as interviewee 2 and the co-author note, the CNG’s rhetoric has been toned down and there is little mention of the enemy (the Turkish Other) anymore. However, there were increased tensions due to the discovery of hydrocarbons within the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone in December 2011, and so the rhetoric within units became much harsher. The co-author’s commander claimed to his battalion that ‘we should be ready to put a bullet in the head of every Turkish soldier’. Even interviewee 2 agrees that he ‘could feel the confrontation more’. This reflects that, in times of crisis, it is very difficult to perform hybrid or alternative identities (a rupture to the dominant Greek identity within), as latent and internalized social structures within the CNG reinforce and (self)perpetuate the juxtaposition of the Turkish Other.

This leads us to the second, institutional and structural facet. Interviewee 1, himself an officer in the Air Force, argues that most officers in his branch do not care much about the training of the conscripted soldiers, who are simply there to execute necessary services for the running of the camp. However, he asserts that, within the land army, the conscripts are ‘the bread and butter’ of the officer who needs to ‘transfer knowledge and experience to him’. Interviewee 1 noted that in the Hellenic Air Force Academy the norm was not to take ceremonials related to identity particularly seriously, but he thought if we interviewed someone who had been trained in Evelpidon, the response would likely be different. This is largely a personal issue, since the choice to become an officer is, for many, connected to money and related perks. Interviewee 2 also noted that despite the fact that soldiers in his battalion tended to be somewhat indifferent about serving in frontline units, he observed that they performed over and above their duties. In his words: ‘You could see the Turkish soldier opposite you, [so] the soldiers responded differently. The guard posts facing the Turks were manned in the most appropriate way and the
guards were executing their duties to perfection’. However, a question does arise as to whether these experiences are just pertinent to the interviewees’ units and not the full spectrum of CNG’s activities, but that is beyond the scope of our article.

With regard to equipment, the Greek weapons industry has supplied most of the CNG’s small arms and vehicles, such as the Greek-made HK G3s and the Leonidas 2 armoured personnel carrier. The CNG and the Cypriot government have also invested in various infrastructure developments to facilitate Greek forces operating in the ROC in case of confrontation with Turkey. The Andreas Papandreou air base in Pafos hosts Greek fighter jets, with war games and search-and-rescue exercises by the Greek army regularly taking place, the latest as recently as October 2019 (Mavros, 2019). As CNG officers are trained throughout their career by the HAF, and the interdependent material relationship means that this needs to continue for the sake of operational requirements, the creation of non-Greek or hybrid identities is severely restricted. To a lesser extent, conscripts are exposed to this same dynamic through their period of service, which is shaped by the institutional and practical framework set out by the (Greek) state. Accordingly, these acts hinder the formation of a hybrid Cypriot identity within the CNG, since Turkish-Cypriots are inherently excluded, as a result of which this exclusion then becomes constituted as normal and reified as natural for the ROC. Nonetheless, this is only a temporary environment for conscripts, although it is a permanent working environment for the officers.

Symbols, Insignia, Marching Songs, and Parades

The second performance of the Greek identity in the CNG is through its symbols and insignia. The naming practices of bases, equipment, and sites within the military provide a legitimization of the CNG’s mission, creating a cohesive ‘common group dynamic among soldiers serving within a particular unit by stressing the history of their unit’ (Basham, 2013; Frisk, 2019; King, 2006). This history is interlinked with the state’s ‘national myth’, perpetuating a certain identity at the expense of Others. Similarly, the choice of insignia and their interpretations serve an identical purpose: a historical account filled with glorious victories against perennial Others. The omnipresence of these insignias on the uniform of every soldier within the unit, as well as the obligation of soldiers to know and recite that history, is another performance of identity. The history provided is not open to debate or interpretation; it is rigid and static, disallowing the formation of alternative identities within the force other than the one prescribed by the ROC and the military command.

Soldiers are obliged to learn the CNG’s interpretation of symbols and insignias. In certain instances, such as weekly inspections by each company’s captain, soldiers are asked to prove their knowledge. Failure to answer adequately could result in punishment, while a correct answer could result in a reward, such as ‘honorary leave’. This relates to the co-author’s own experience while serving in one of the strictest battalions (the 613th Mechanized Infantry), as every aspect of his life was moderated by the officers and command. Within that unit, he was expected to know important historical information regarding national state celebrations and the official interpretation of the division’s insignia linked to the Greco-Persian confrontation during the fifth century BC. This punitive practice gradually conditions soldiers to the dominant socio-cultural episteme of the CNG, which structures how soldiers relate to the world as they internalize the dominant identity made available through the habitus. Nearly all the insignias in the CNG use ancient Greek inscriptions or references to the Byzantine past. Moreover, the emblem found on the berets of the CNG is the same as that of the HAF, which serves as the Greek coat of arms. Accordingly, the performativity of a Greek identity is visually evidenced in the insignias through which the norm of Greekness is produced and achieved.
One need look no further than the CNG’s emblem (Figure 1) to comprehend the reproductive relationship between the force’s symbols and the modern Greek identity. The CNG’s emblem represents a double-headed eagle with a Greek flag in the centre, and an inscription in ancient Greek meaning ‘defending the homeland’. The emblem not only utilizes the original Greek state flag, but the inscription mirrors a quote from Homer’s *Iliad* that the only good omen is defending the homeland. The Greek flag and reference to a homeland highlights that, for the CNG, there is a common Greek homeland encompassing Cyprus with Greece, and an ethos of defending the homeland against foreign invaders since the time of Ancient Greece. From its website, the CNG (2020g) contends that the emblem:

> […] symbolizes the universality of the Greek spirit. In ancient mythology, [the double-headed eagle] was a fundamentally holy and heavenly bird, helper and protector of Zeus. As a symbol of authority, it was used for the first time during the Byzantine era, symbolizing the dual dominion of the Byzantine emperors over Europe and Asia […] East and West. As a Christian symbol, it is the official emblem of the Patriarchates and the Orthodox Churches in general.

Based on the CNG’s own interpretation, the modern Greek identity evidently manifests itself within the discourse of an unbreakable unity between Ancient Greece, Byzantium, and Modern Greece, with the Orthodox Church holding a pre-eminent position. Concurrently, the reference of looking to both East and West points to the perception held by modern Greeks that, like their ancestors, they form a frontier between the barbaric East and the civilized West. Hence, within the CNG, it is impossible to form an identity that does not place Turks in the position of the Other.

The discourse of defending Western civilization against Eastern invaders is further exemplified in the insignias of the 1st and 2nd Mechanized Infantry Brigades as well as that of the 20th Armoured Brigade (Figure 2). These insignias allude to the Greco-Persian confrontation, which ended in Greek victory in 329 BC by Alexander the Great. The insignia of the 1st Brigade establishes a connection between the ROC and the military past of Greek antiquity by depicting Athenian general Cimon and two ancient pillars of Salamis-in-Cyprus. This insignia refers to the battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus (449 BC), when Cypriot city-states revolted against Persian rule (CNG, 2020c). While this again symbolizes the connection between Greece and the ROC through a shared past, it also highlights their enduring military unity against Eastern invaders: then the Persians, now the Turks.
The insignias of the 2nd and 20th Brigades allude to the battle of Thermopylae (480 BC). The former portrays a Greek hoplite (a citizen-soldier of one of the city-states in Ancient Greece) with the inscription ‘come and get them’, which was the response of Spartan King Leonidas to the Persians demanding Greek surrender (CNG, 2020d). The latter bears the inscription ‘in the shade’, the response of hoplite Dienekes when told that Persian arrows would fill the sky (CNG, 2020f). The battle is significant in the collective Greek imagination as a stand by the few against the many, transposed onto the CNG standing against the (much larger) Turkish forces. It also represents the ‘heroic psyche’ of the Greek warrior, thus linking the CNG, as part of the Greek military infrastructure, with one of the glorious battles of Ancient Greece.

The insignia of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Figure 3) stresses modern Greece’s link with Byzantium and the Orthodox Church, bearing the ancient Greek inscription ‘in God we find power’, taken from a psalm in the Old Testament. The Greek and Cypriot flags are in the background alongside two images of the Archangel Michael and the Holy Mother (CNG, 2020e). According to the CNG’s official interpretation, the Holy Mother and Archangel Michael are protecting the Brigade’s troops and the whole of ‘Hellenism’. The picture of the Holy Mother is also a specific Byzantine image destroyed by the Ottomans during the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Both the actual insignia and its official interpretation once again accentuate the dominant discourse of official Greek historiography by focusing on the Greek Orthodox Church and Byzantium, which serve as a historical continuum linking modern Greece to its ancient past. Furthermore, the choice of an image that was destroyed in the fall of
Constantinople helps in presenting the Turkish Other as a savage. Yet again, the vilification of the Turk leaves no room for the creation of a hybrid Cypriot identity, since such an identity would have to include Turkish-Cypriots.

The CNG participates in two annual military parades that take place in all major cities in the Republic of Cyprus. The first occurs on 1 October, which marks the ROC’s official day of independence, and the second occurs on 25 March, which marks the beginning of the Greek Wars of Independence and the establishment of modern Greece. These parades are often attended by political and military leaders from Greece. During these parades, and in training, CNG soldiers sing various marching songs. That the CNG chooses to showcase its military prowess on the most important anniversary for Hellenism exemplifies a (re)performativity of a Greek identity that constitutes the ROC on the international stage of nation-states (including Greece and Turkey). Together, the parades produce a gesture of confrontation to the Turkish Other, thus reinforcing the ontological status of the ROC and the CNG’s Greek identity.

Another theme that was prominent in our interviews and the autoethnography was the eagerness of soldiers, despite their general indifference, to engage in shouting marching songs. This constitutes a performative act of the Greek identity within the CNG, as most of these marching songs reinforce Turkey’s position as the ROC’s significant Other. Furthermore, these marching songs also reinforce the importance of the Church, emphasizing the contradistinction between Greek Orthodox Christian and Turkish Muslim. Interviewee 2 argued that, although the captain in charge did not care much about it, the soldiers in his camp were always very eager to participate in marching songs. Some even lost their voices from excessive shouting. This corresponds to the co-author’s own experience of bootcamp, where despite his Cypro-centric left-wing background, he found himself shouting these songs without any hesitation alongside ‘comrades’ from AKEL’s youth organization. The adrenaline from the performative act of marching songs constitutes a ‘cathartic release’ and bonds soldiers closer to the ‘internalized structures’ and ‘schemes of perception’ of the CNG. This performative act, in turn, subscribes soldiers to (re)perpetuating the dominance of the Greek identity within the CNG.

The discourse and rituals of those marching songs constitute a (re)performative act that is socially and historically conditioned as a nationalist and irredentist Greek identity. For example, during the annual 25 March military parade in 2019, reserve soldiers repeated the chant that ‘Cyprus and Macedonia are Greek’ (YouTube, 2019a). This took place after the Prespes Agreement signed between the Greek and North Macedonian government in resolution of the Macedonian name dispute. However, Greek nationalists saw the deal as a ‘traitorous’ move of the then left-wing Greek government. This example of Greek-Cypriot reserves taking a stance on a matter not pertaining directly to the ROC but rather a ‘national issue’ of Greece highlights how the CNG perpetuates and constitutes a modern Greek identity through its performative acts. A second incident in 2019 saw Greek-Cypriot reserves chanting a marching song that referred to Agia Sofia, the former Greek Orthodox Patriarchal Church that has now been converted back into a mosque in Istanbul. The song contained graphic threats of violence, such as chopping off the Turkish crescent on top of Agia Sofia’s dome to re-establish a cross (YouTube, 2019b).

Both these marching songs contain lyrics concerning the Greco-Turkish confrontation and Greece’s second ‘enemy’, the North Macedonians, who have nothing to do with the ROC. Here, Greek identity achieves a status of naturalness in the ROC, as it becomes the norm for Cypriot soldiers to be preoccupied with ‘ontological’ threats to another state, Greece. Achieving this status productively legitimizes the continual repetition of such performative acts by the CNG and means it is impossible for hybrid Cypriot identities to be performed within the CNG, because the ROC’s statehood (Self) is partly fused with Greece, often against a Turkish Other. Marching songs express an internalization within the soldiers, who ‘become particular kinds of subjects’, Greek-Cypriots, and ‘in turn reproduce the habitus itself by subscribing to and perpetuating its dominant socio-cultural identity’ (Gillespie, 2019).
The Orthodox Church and the CNG

The Greek Orthodox Church has an intimate relationship with the CNG, where its Religious Directorate is jointly appointed by the CNG and the Church of Cyprus. This relationship is part of the wider network between the Church and the state, as also seen within the ROC’s educational system. The first head of state (Makarios III) was simultaneously the head of the church, highlighting the symbiosis between the two entities. Within the CNG, it is almost unthinkable to conceive oneself as not being Orthodox Christian, thus hindering the formation and performance of another religious identity, such as the Sunni Muslim identity of most Turkish-Cypriots. As a state institution, the CNG is part of the Church’s network, and the Church’s presence penetrates into all CNG departments: each has a priest on its staff catering to the ‘religious needs’ and education of CNG units. The Church also has a presence at every official CNG event, including swearing-in ceremonies of new conscripts. From the co-author’s own experience in the 613th Mechanized Infantry, every soldier also has to know the official armed forces prayer.

In addition, the CNG is present at religious ceremonies across the ROC, such as funerals and memorials of political and military leaders. During the ceremony on Good Friday, the Epitaphios – a large embroidered cloth bearing an image of the dead body of Jesus Christ – is placed on a bier in the church. In many cases, a CNG envoy ‘guards’ the bier. The presence of the CNG at important religious celebrations of the Orthodox Church, and vice versa, illustrates the unity between the Church, the military (CNG), and the state (ROC). As per the tradition of the HAF, each of the three branches of the CNG (the army, navy, and air force) have patron saints. These patron saints are represented on each of the branches’ flags and are celebrated in accordance with Greek Orthodox tradition by the officers and soldiers of that branch. The most important celebration is that in honour of the air force’s patron saint, the Archangel Michael, which runs for three days and allows the public to enter the Andreas Papandreou air base to watch various CNG air force shows. Through the Religious Directorate and participation by its soldiers in Orthodox ceremonies and rituals linked to patron saints and religious songs, the CNG (re)performs a Greek identity on a daily basis. These performative acts enable the Orthodox Church to cultivate an integral link that connects the CNG to the modern Greek Self, which in turn reifies this link as inherent to the ROC. Greek-Cypriotness thus becomes the norm, while any other hybrid or less confrontational identity becomes the deviation. Although the interviewees did not note any overall pressure by the command on the issue of religion, at the same time, it was unthinkable to be anything other than Greek Orthodox Christian. Thus, CNG’s performative acts result in epistemic violence that hinders the formation of alternative identities.

CONCLUSION

Our article sought to answer two key questions. First, how does the CNG perform and therefore constitute a ‘Greek identity’? By deploying Judith Butler’s performativity theory, supplemented by Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus theory, we were able to lay out what the Greek identity consists of (three key components) and then demonstrate how the CNG performs these components and thus constitutes Greekness. It achieves this via the operational link between the Greek Army and the CNG, the connection between ancient and modern Greece reinforced through various CNG insignia and practices, and the intimate relations between the Greek Orthodox Church and the CNG. The enactment of a Greek identity by the CNG is also inherently juxtaposed vis-à-vis the Turkish Other, which likewise constitutes Turkish-Cypriots. This leads to our second question: to what extent does CNG’s Greek performance hinder the formation of a (hybrid) Cypriot identity? We assert that the CNG’s performative acts are executed through a ‘Greek identity’ habitus that obstructs the performance of a truly organic hybrid or Cypriot
identity. The CNG’s performative acts reify a Greek-Cypriot state as the norm, while Turkish-Cypriotness and (hybrid) Cypriotness become deviant forms.

Thus, the CNG as a habitus harvests ‘internalized structures’ and ‘schemes of perception’ through which its Cypriot professional officers and conscripts subscribe to and propagate the Greek identity. As this is the dominant socio-cultural episteme, it latently structures their ‘apperception’ (Bourdieu, 1977) of the world and demarcates the conditions through which identities can form (or not). This article sought to argue that identity is re-performed and re-constituted in the CNG; the CNG represents yet another layer upon those that have preceded it (i.e. school education) that reifies the Greek-Cypriot Identity.

We propose three questions that future research could usefully investigate: 1) Is the lack of unification on the island due to inherently incompatible/non-common identities (Greek vs. Turkish) or Greek identity performance within the CNG and other state apparatus (that hinders hybridity)? 2) What impact does the CNG experience have on different sectors of Cypriot society and their identity formation? 3) In what ways do historical circumstance and variations in military institutions affect the propagation and performance of a Greek identity?

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NOTES
1 Constantinou (2008: 146) has elucidated how a politics of double exceptionality exists within Cyprus, whereby exceptions to the norm (sovereignty) within the local sovereign state and the global system of sovereign states (particularly on the part of Turkey) are constantly reproduced.

2 EOKA stands for National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών/ [Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston]).

3 Alongside the Greek and Turkish forces on the island, the British were granted the right to two sovereign military bases.

4 To illustrate, the militia groups led by the Socialist Vassos Lyssarides pledged loyalty to Makarios, whereas the ultimate goal of groups within the Cypriot Fighters’ Association was the unification of Cyprus with Greece (Chrysostomou, 2013: 291).

5 Note that we use the terms modern Greek identity and Greek identity interchangeably throughout this paper in reference to the same phenomena.

6 Three of the interviewees spoke anonymously while one wished to speak eponymously. The first interviewee is a professional officer in the Air Force who trained at the Hellenic Air Force Academy. He comes from a right-wing family and his conceptualization of Hellenism were the ideas that led to him to enlist as an officer. The second interviewee served between 2011 and 2013 as a reserve officer in three units, which had a range of postings on the Green Line and in the dead zone. He also received training in Greece for four months. The third interviewee served between 1979 and 1981 in the special forces. Politically, he was a supporter of the Socialist EDEK party and Makarios. The fourth interviewee is named Polys Patatos. He was a member of AKEL and served in the special forces between 1972 and 1974. He fought against the Turkish army on Pentadaktylos in July 1974 and was injured, almost fatally. Finally, the paper’s co-author, Alexandros Zachariades, served between 2011 and 2013 in two units. The first was the 613th Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the second was the 356th Infantry Battalion.

7 EOKA B was a far-right paramilitary organization established in 1970 by Grivas with the agenda of removing Makarios and achieving Enosis. It had close relations with the Greek junta.
Evelpidon is the common name for the Hellenic Military Academy.

The story of Dienekes can be found in the Histories of Herodotus, Book 7, Verse 226.

The only exception to this rule is the conscription of the Maronite, Armenian, and Latin Catholic minorities into the force, whose members are also Christian but not Greek Orthodox. This is a relatively recent development, since the male members of these minorities were not obliged to be conscripted before 2008. (There was also a brief period between 1990 and 1992 when they were conscripted.)

A Christian holiday commemorating the crucifixion of Jesus Christ.

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Evangelina Moisi completed her MSc in International Relations Theory at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), where she was a recipient of a 2017/2018 LSE Anniversary Scholarship, and her BA Hons in Geography (with International Relations) from University College London (UCL). She previously worked at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) as a Serious and Organized Crime Research Assistant, where her research focused on a range of transnational organized crime topics, including maritime security and the illicit trade of narcotics. Before this, Evangelina worked at a political and security risk firm in London, focusing on political developments around natural resources and maritime security in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. She has also worked as a research intern at the Constitution Unit at UCL as well as at the Ramphal Institute, based at King’s College London (KCL).

Alexandros Zachariades is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He holds a BA in History and Politics from the University of Exeter and an MSc in International Relations Theory from LSE. His research focuses on the foreign policy of Greece and Cyprus in the Middle East, with a particular interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. His work also explores the interconnection between Neoclassical Realism and small powers. He is conducting his research at the LSE with the support of an Onassis Foundation scholarship. He is also the Head of Research for the think tank 89 London, based at the LSE.