Emotions and European Union Foreign Policy

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Abstract: This article assesses the role that emotions play in European Union foreign policy-making. EU decision-making has often been depicted as technocratic and ‘de-dramatised’, yet there are still situations in which emotions can affect the process and outcomes of foreign policy decision-making. Using examples of the EU’s responses to crises in Ukraine and Myanmar, the article illustrates that emotions can motivate the taking of particular decisions at particular times, and that the EU expresses emotions in its foreign policy communications, although its use of emotional diplomacy may not be accompanied by substantive action appropriate to the emotions expressed. The ‘emotional turn’ in Foreign Policy Analysis can open up new directions for research in EU foreign policy, and the conclusion considers other promising avenues for researching emotions and EU foreign policy.

Introduction¹

A growing body of recent literature examines the role that emotions play in foreign policy-making,² building on the significant strand of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) that has focused on psychology in decision-making. In keeping with the theme of this Special Issue, the article explores this new direction in FPA by applying it to European Union (EU) foreign policy-making. Research on EU foreign policy has imported many concepts and theories from other fields (mostly from International

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Relations and European integration studies, less so from Foreign Policy Analysis)³, and this article argues that importing the ‘emotional turn’ in Foreign Policy Analysis can enrich our understanding and explanations of EU foreign policy-making. While there has been some work done on emotions and EU decision-making, there is still little work specifically focused on emotions and EU foreign policy.⁴ The EU is often perceived as a highly technocratic organisation, one deliberately designed to take the emotion out of interstate politics in Europe to avoid the risk that passions escalate into violent conflict. This article argues that FPA insights into the role of emotions in group decision-making, and emotional diplomacy, could nonetheless be of use in understanding and explaining the decision-making and implementation phases of EU foreign policy-making. To illustrate the value added by taking emotions into consideration in EU FPA, the article draws on the examples of EU foreign policy-making with respect to the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the case of Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya minority in 2017.

The first section of this article introduces the ‘emotional turn’ in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The second section argues that a focus on the role of emotions in the process of decision-making – particularly by using intergroup emotions theory - can bolster constructivist arguments about EU foreign policy-making. It does so by examining the role that emotions played in the EU’s decision-making in response to the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in 2017. The third section examines the EU’s ‘emotional diplomacy’ in the context of the Ukraine and Myanmar cases, and argues that there is an ‘emotions-action’ gap, with the emotions expressed by the EU in its communications about these cases not matched by corresponding appropriate action. The conclusion assesses the implications of these arguments for our understanding of EU foreign policy-making, and suggests a number of additional questions that could be explored in further studies.

⁴ See, for example, Kennet Lynggaard, Discourse Analysis and European Union Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Pace and Bilgic, ‘Trauma, Emotions and Memory’.
The ‘emotional turn’ in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis

The ‘emotional turn’ in International Relations (IR) refers to the growing body of literature examining the role that emotions play in world politics. This represents a shift because:

Scholars have either taken emotions for granted – viewing them as external factors that decision makers consider in their rational deliberations – or assumed that they are simply too elusive for rigorous theoretical and empirical investigations.

Although emotions may have been neglected in IR, Foreign Policy Analysis has long looked at the role of psychology in foreign policy decision-making. A significant strand of FPA focused on how emotions alter cognitive function and reasoning, for example in ‘misperception’ of the context or the other side, or in situations of crisis. The traditional view was that ‘cognitive biases and emotion cause only mistakes’, but this has been challenged: emotion can contribute ‘to rational behavior rather than only undermining it’.

Scholars investigating emotions in IR and FPA have to grapple with particular definitional and methodological challenges. Emotions are complex, and there is considerable debate in the wider literature about what emotions are. Eduardo Bericat’s distinction between primary and secondary emotions suffices for the purposes of this article. Primary emotions are universal, physiological biologically and neurologically innate, and comprise fear, anger, depression and satisfaction and

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surprise. Secondary emotions are socially and culturally conditioned: guilt, shame, love, resentment, disappointment and nostalgia.\textsuperscript{12}

A key challenge facing IR and FPA scholars of emotions is that of ‘theorising the processes through which individual emotions become collective and political’.\textsuperscript{13} Hutchison and Bleiker argue that feelings are formed and structured within particular social and cultural environments;\textsuperscript{14} for Koschut, they are intersubjective and socially constructed.\textsuperscript{15} Further, emotions are connected to norms and values: ‘Emotional power works discursively, diffused through norms, moral values and other assumptions that stipulate – often inaudibly – how individuals and communities ought to feel and what kind of ensuing behaviour is appropriate and legitimate in certain situations’.\textsuperscript{16} Smith, Seger and Mackie also argue that group-level emotions are distinct from individual-level emotions: they are shared within the group, and they motivate and regulate intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behaviour.\textsuperscript{17} This does not mean, however, that states have feelings, although it is common to see the language of emotions in government statements (‘we are concerned’, ‘we are disappointed’, and so on).\textsuperscript{18}

To analyse how emotions ‘operate at the state level’, Brent Sasley has argued that we should conceive of emotions as motivators for political behaviour.\textsuperscript{19} He proposes that there are three ways to discuss emotions as informing state behaviour: viewing the state as a single actor (a person); focussing on individual state leaders as representing the state; and understanding the state as a group and following the internal process by which group members’ cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine how the state

\textsuperscript{13} Hutchison and Bleiker, ‘Theorizing emotions’, p. 492.
\textsuperscript{14} Hutchison and Bleiker, ‘Theorizing emotions’, p. 508.
\textsuperscript{16} Hutchison and Bleiker, ‘Theorizing emotions’, p. 508.
\textsuperscript{18} Hutchison and Bleiker, ‘Theorizing emotions’, p. 500.
will act. He uses intergroup emotions theory to demonstrate how an in-group identity can be activated, and individuals within the group can feel emotions as in-group members.

These insights are picked up in FPA too. Tom Dolan distinguishes three areas of current research integrating emotions into the study of foreign policy: how emotions shape decision-making processes (the cognitive and motivational effects of emotion); how emotions shape key social interactions between leaders (sending signals about an individual’s preferences or beliefs); and how mass emotional responses affect the context in which foreign policy decisions are made. Todd Hall’s theory of emotional diplomacy views emotions as the outcome of decision-making within states, the implementation phase of foreign policy-making. Emotional diplomacy is the strategic use of particular emotions by foreign policy actors to shape perceptions and behaviours of other actors and achieve desired ends. State actors use emotional diplomacy when they want to frame issues, maintain or alter their states’ image or transform the character of specific relationships. State officials and diplomats must display the mandated emotions as part of their professional roles. He investigates three types of emotional diplomacy: the diplomacy of anger, the diplomacy of sympathy, and the diplomacy of guilt.

Methodologically, the study of emotions is challenging. ‘Although social science offers a wider range of methods, the most prevalent among them are limited in their ability to understand the nature, role and impact of phenomena as ephemeral as emotions. Emotions cannot be quantified, nor can they easily be measured, even in qualitative terms’. For Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchinson, one way out of this dilemma is to study emotions as the ‘manner in which they are represented and communicated’. A recent edited collection by Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar

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22 Dolan, ‘Emotions and Foreign Policy’.
23 Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, p. 3.
24 Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, p. 3.
27 Bleiker and Hutchinson, ‘Fear no more’, p. 126.
includes a number of methods that can be used to study emotions in IR and FPA, several of which focus on analysing discourse, narratives and images.  

The next two sections extend this FPA research on the emotional turn to the analysis of EEU foreign policy. The article focuses on two of the avenues for research suggested by Sasley, Dolan and Hall: firstly, the role that emotions could play in EU decision-making processes is examined, and then the extent to which the EU practices emotional diplomacy is considered. The article thus hones in on the decision-making and implementation phases of foreign policy-making at the EU level. Further research could focus on the individual level, building on Pace and Bilgic’s work on the emotions conveyed by individuals representing the EU, and on the broader societal level, considering the extent to which mass emotional responses affect EU foreign policy-making.

**Emotions and European Union foreign policy decision-making**

The process of foreign policy decision-making in the EU is often portrayed as a rational one, meaning that decision-makers reach decisions having weighed costs and benefits, and, as argued by Saltines, having considered which norms should be followed in any given situation. The literature has generally not looked at the explicit role that emotions may play in this process.

Indeed, emotions are widely seen as having been deliberately removed from intra-EU relations. The EU is possibly the foremost example of what Andrew Linklater described as the process of ‘emotion-management’. He argued that for the past 500 years, European peoples have tried to control emotions that were deemed to clash with their ‘civilised’ self-images, including the open display of anger, which could heighten risk-taking behaviour that could lead to violence and

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29 Pace and Bilgic, ‘Trauma, Emotions and Memory’.

ultimately to war.\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, ‘economic interdependence in pacified regions creates conditions in which the collective management of global issues requires “meeting regimes”’, where emotion management is required for effectiveness.\textsuperscript{32}

The EU is just such a ‘meeting regime’. Its origins lie in the 1950 Schuman Declaration, which envisages the European Coal and Steel Community as a peace project in which organised economic unification would eliminate the ‘age-old opposition of France and Germany’.\textsuperscript{33} Although neo-functionalist theory, and others, theorised that such integration schemes would attract the loyalty of the officials involved in them, this loyalty was not imbued with emotion and is linked to the fact that integration schemes would increase welfare.\textsuperscript{34} Luuk van Middelaar refers to this as ‘depoliticization through law’ and ‘dedramatization’, a ‘response to a surfeit of drama during and immediately after the Second World War’.\textsuperscript{35}

From its beginnings in economic integration, the EU expanded into cooperation on foreign, security and defence policy, which became ‘institutionalised’ and ‘legalised’, through the creation of rules, processes and institutions.\textsuperscript{36} The process of reaching agreement on foreign policy was bureaucratised and as such, depoliticised. The kind of ‘foreign policy’ that the EU normally does is not the stuff of high drama like the high-stakes decisions that foreign policy analysts tend to focus on: war, intervention, responses to aggression, and so on. The EU does not ‘do’ crises well: it moves too slowly and deliberately; it takes time for the member states and EU institutions to reach a consensus on what to do. The EU foreign policy-making process is complex and multi-layered, with decision-shaping and decision-making occurring in multiple forums and with multiple actors, from

\begin{itemize}
\item Linklater, ‘Anger and world politics’, p. 577.
\item Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, available here: \url{https://europa.eu/european-union/about.eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en}
\item Ernst Haas, \textit{The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces 1950-1957} (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958); Leon Lindberg, \textit{The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).
\item Luuk van Middelaar, \textit{Alarums and Excursions: Improvising Politics on the European Stage} (Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 2019), pp. 5-6.
\end{itemize}
low-level working groups up to the Foreign Affairs Council and ultimately the European Council (heads of state or government).\(^\text{37}\) The EU’s foreign policies – such as they are – tend to unfold over a long period of time. Typical examples include the European Neighbourhood Policy or the EU’s relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific states.

Can emotions play a role here or are they ‘smoothed out’ by all the other factors in play? If emotions are ephemeral, then they would not last during the hours, days, weeks in which policy-makers debate and decide, not to mention across the various levels at which discussions take place (working group, committee, ministerial, head of state or government). However, EU foreign policy-making may still not be completely ‘dedramatized’, with no room for emotions to have an impact.

Intergroup emotions theory may help explain how participants within EU decision-making groups (the European Council, Council or committees) could feel emotions as an ‘in-group’.\(^\text{38}\) As constructivists point out, EU member states have worked together for decades, and socialisation produces coordination reflexes,\(^\text{39}\) the perception of common interests,\(^\text{40}\) and the growth of collective identification (‘we-feeling’) among the member state representatives.\(^\text{41}\) That collective identification has arguably produced in-groups in which the individuals self-identify as members of an EU decision-making group (in addition to self-identifying as members of other groups, including their own national governments). Identification with the group can determine emotional reactions and behaviour: for example, ‘anger toward an outgroup increases the desire [by the in-group] to confront or attack or harm an outgroup’.\(^\text{42}\) An EU decision-making group such as the Foreign Affairs Council could feel emotion such as anger or fear with respect to another group, such as a third


country, which could lead to action being taken in response. Emotions, in other words, may affect EU foreign policy decision-making.

The FPA literature has traditionally made room for the role of emotions in crisis decision-making, when there are shared perceptions of a threat to core interests or values, the time to take decisions in response to the threat is perceived as finite, and there is a higher probability of military confrontation until the threat is overcome.\(^{43}\) The argument here is that this insight can apply in the context of EU decision-making as well. Although the EU has not had to confront a situation in which there is a high probability of military confrontation (not least because the EU is not a military alliance), it has had to confront a series of ‘crises’ in the past decade that involve perceived threats to core interests or values and time-restricted decision-making (the Euro crisis, the Ukraine crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit). Van Middelaar argues that the highest level of decision-making in the EU has become much more political and less technocratic as a result.\(^{44}\) Emotions could have an impact in meetings at a high level, in which the decision-makers in the room are hammering out the decision in that moment, along with a sense that decisions were expected to be made in that setting (and not postponed). To explore the possibility that emotions could affect EU decision-making, this article considers its response to a particularly difficult crisis in EU-Russian relations, the downing of MH17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014.

The Ukraine crisis – understood here to mean principally the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and Crimea in early 2014 and the downing of the MH17 airliner – was one of the most serious foreign policy crises that the EU has ever faced, as it posed significant threats to European security and stability and to core EU values of interstate cooperation, peace and respect for international law. From early 2014, discussions and decisions on the Ukraine crisis took place at the highest levels, in the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, with little scope for influence


\(^{44}\) Van Middelaar, *Alarums and Excursions*. On the increasing role of the European Council in crisis decision-making, see, for example, Derek Beach and Sandrino Smeets, ‘New Institutionalist Leadership – how the new European Council-dominated crisis governance paradoxically strengthened the role of EU institutions’, *Journal of European Integration*, online first 3 January 2020.
from other institutions and actors (such as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). In other words, the EU’s response to the crisis was decided on in contexts in which intergroup emotions theory could apply: there was an in-group (the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council) and then an event (the downing of MH17) which could trigger an emotional reaction towards an out-group (Russia).

MH17 was downed on 17 July, just months after Russia intervened in eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea in March 2014. The plane was shot down over eastern Ukraine, territory at that point controlled by pro-Russian militia. On board were 298 people, 193 of them Dutch citizens (another 18 were citizens of Belgium, Germany and the UK). For two days afterwards, pro-Russian rebels refused to allow free access to the site for monitors from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and there were reports that the site had been tampered with and bodies had been mishandled. Furthermore, Russian media pumped out ‘more than a dozen complex and ludicrous explanations [for the crash], including the theory that the Dutch had filled the plane with dead bodies and downed it themselves.’ Given the deaths of so many EU citizens, in the midst of a crisis in which the EU was already heavily involved, the EU became a diplomatic site in which a response was discussed. The day before the tragedy, the European Council had agreed to extend sanctions against Russia over its intervention in Ukraine; on 22 July, the Foreign Affairs Council agreed to accelerate the imposition of those sanctions and to strengthen them significantly, adding sanctions on Russian banks, oil and defence industries. On 29 July, the EU agreed the additional sanctions.


The united EU response to Russian intervention in Ukraine and downing of MH17 stands in contrast to EU reactions to other instances of Russian military action including in Georgia in 2008. The unity of EU member states in condemning Russia and imposing sanctions surprised some observers, because the member states had (and still have) conflicting interests and preferences vis-à-vis Russia, with some favouring more cooperation and others more distance. Sjursen and Rosén point to the importance of norms in triggering the initial consensus on sanctions, and particularly the concern over the fundamental breach of international law, namely the Ukrainians’ right to self-determination.\(^{49}\) Natorski and Pomorska highlight the importance of trust: the level of trust between member states increased, while trust in Russia decreased, which therefore united the member states.\(^{50}\) Trust has an ‘emotional base’, Natorski and Pomorska note,\(^{51}\) and their arguments about the increase in trust within the group, and the distrust of an outsider, fit in well with intergroup emotions theory though they do not use it explicitly.

As Sjursen and Rosén note, socialisation alone cannot explain why member states will reach a consensus on a specific issue; there needs to be an account of what triggers agreement. They posit that the argument that convinced member states to respond with sanctions to the Russian intervention was the need to respond to the violation of an important principle of international law.\(^{52}\) A focus on emotions, though, could take us even further in explaining why the member states felt the need to respond to the particular trigger of the downing of MH17. Emotions arguably strengthened the perception of the EU as constituting the in-group, with Russia the clear out-group. Orenstein and Kelemen note that the downing of MH17 in particular caused the trust of EU leaders with Russia to break down completely.\(^{53}\) The emotions in response to the loss of life and the anger


\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 56.


\(^{53}\) Orenstein and Kelemen, ‘Trojan Horses’, p. 94.
at Russia set the ‘boundaries of what is ... acceptable or not’: taking coercive action, stronger and quicker than before, became acceptable.

A review of official statements by EU foreign policy-makers reveals the key aspects of intergroup theory: stronger identification with the in-group, shared emotions in response to an event, and emotions directed at an out-group, backed up by action. They expressed shock, anger and sadness in response to the MH17 crash and show a strengthening of the in-group feeling against Russia. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed ‘incredible anger’ and fears that pro-Russian separatists ‘in the face of this horrific catastrophe, do not follow basic rules of our civilisation.’ The Dutch Foreign Minister, Frans Timmermans, said that the Netherlands was ‘angry, furious, at the news that bodies at the crash site were not being treated properly, and he and UK Prime Minister David Cameron agreed that the EU would have to reconsider its approach to Russia.

Emotions were reportedly obvious during the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 22 July:

‘British officials said the tone of the EU statement had toughened considerably in the course of the day, in part because of harrowing accounts from the scene of the crash presented to the ministers, as well as accounts of tampering with the site’. The statement from that meeting uses emotional language, of shock and sadness: ‘The EU and its Member States are shocked and deeply saddened by the downing of the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in Donetsk, Ukraine and the tragic loss of so many innocent lives. Citizens from many nationalities including many from the European Union have been killed.’ In announcing the package of additional restrictive measures on Russia on 29 July, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and the European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso stated: ‘We have witnessed with anger and frustration the delays in providing...

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international access to the site of the air crash, the tampering with the remains of the plane, and the disrespectful handling of the deceased.\textsuperscript{59}

The Ukraine crisis illustrates there could be value added by looking at the role of emotions in the internal EU process of foreign policy-making. The emotions expressed shared by EU member states’ foreign ministers and heads of state or government appear to have hardened stances against Russia after the downing of MH17. While the EU had already agreed to extend the sanctions, after 17 July 2014, the sanctions were accelerated and strengthened. Shared emotional responses among the ‘in-group’ shaped an EU foreign policy outcome.

There is much scope to look at the role of emotions in the making of EU foreign policies, including in other crisis situations. What prompts shared emotions and action? But the role that emotions play – or don’t – in ‘normal’ EU foreign policy-making also merits investigation: is intergroup emotions theory of interest outside the context of a crisis? Socialisation occurs among lower-level member state representatives to the EU, in working groups and committees such as the Political and Security Committee,\textsuperscript{60} so intergroup emotions theory might apply here in the course of ‘normal’ foreign policy-making.

In addition, attention should be given to how and why the emotions of a single member government (or representative) could affect foreign policy-making at the EU level. Given that EU foreign policy is usually decided by unanimity, a member state with strongly-held views can sway outcomes (through the veto, forcing a lowest-common-denominator outcome, or persuading other member states to change their positions). For example, Ainius Lašas explores the case of the Netherlands and its stance on EU-Serbian relations, stemming from the failure of a Dutch battalion, part of the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to prevent Bosnian Serb forces from

\textsuperscript{59} European Council, ‘Statement by the President of the European Council Harman Van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission I the name of the European Union on the agreed additional restrictive measures against Russia’, Statement EUCO 158/14, 29 July 2014.

\textsuperscript{60} Juncos and Pomorska, ‘Invisible and Unaccountable?’. 
taking over Srebrenica and massacring approximately 8,000 men in July 1995. Lašas argues that ‘Dutch feelings of guilt and shame over Srebrenica caused the Dutch government to take the most resolute and strict or in other words outlier position on Serbia cooperation with the ICTY, which was then reflected in the common EU stance.’ The example of Dutch guilt and shame illustrates how state-level emotions can have an impact on internal EU decision-making processes. More research is needed into the circumstances in which different kinds of primary and secondary emotions may have effects on decision-making outcomes.

**The representation of emotions in EU foreign policy communication**

A second promising avenue for investigating the role that emotions could play in EU foreign policy is to look at the implementation of EU foreign policy decisions, which are announced through written and oral statements. Representation of emotions is one of the least methodologically challenging areas of study into emotions and foreign policy because it entails looking at the external, public representation of emotion through discourse. In the case of the EU, there is much to explore: every year it issues dozens and dozens of declarations, conclusions and common positions on foreign policy issues, and the EU High Representative, EEAS officials, spokespeople, and others make numerous statements to the press, to the European Parliament, in international settings such as the UN and beyond. This extensive trove of foreign policy communication serves to present ‘the EU as an actor in the international community’, speaking with one voice. Does the EU explicitly display emotions or use emotional language in its declarations? Is the emotion expressed then matched by the ‘kind of ensuing behaviour [that] is appropriate and legitimate in certain situations’?

This section looks at the representation of emotions in EU foreign policy communications through the lens of two of Hall’s types of emotional diplomacy – anger and sympathy. The diplomacy

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64 Hutchison and Bleiker, ‘Theorizing emotions’, p. 508.
of sympathy happens in response to other states having suffered a perceived tragedy. State actors should display sympathy through expressions of consolation and offers of support, along with actions to provide aid to the victim(s). It can be used to reframe relations with other actors (strategically) but it can also be seen as the natural, appropriate response in particular distressing situations. The diplomacy of anger signals ‘that a violation has occurred concerning a normative, emotionally salient issue about which they care….To not show anger would be a sign of acquiescence.’ It is the rhetoric of anger and accompanying gestures of displeasure that differentiate the diplomacy of anger from coercive diplomacy, as well as the constitution of an issue as ‘emotional’ and ‘explosive’. The diplomacy of anger is evident in three behavioural indicators: discursive (statements explicitly referring to anger, outrage, indignation, and so on); expressive (officials visibly displaying anger); and substantive (punitive action).

The diplomacy of anger should be evident when international norms are broken. Mercer argues that that emotion partly explains why people adhere to norms: we should feel embarrassment, shame or guilt if we violate a norm, and observers should feel anger or indignation. This insight could help to assess the presence of norms in international relations: ‘if norms play an important role in relations between states, then analysts should be able to see emotion when norms are violated’. The EU has been characterised – by itself and others – as a normative or ethical foreign policy actor, an identity laden with positive emotional undertones.

Given the extent to which the EU considers itself to be a norm-driven actor, then we would expect

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65 Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, p. 81.
66 Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, p. 91.
68 Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, p. 48.
69 Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, pp. 50-52.
70 Hall, Emotional Diplomacy, pp. 49-50.
71 Mercer, ‘Human nature and the first image’, p. 298.
72 Mercer, Human nature and the first image’, p. 299.
that the violation of norms by other states and international actors would be met with anger. On the other side of the coin, we should also expect the EU to display sympathy to victims of norm violators, in line with its characterisation as a normative or ethical power.

Do the EU’s foreign policy communications show that the EU is engaged in emotional diplomacy? Do they display the rhetoric of indignation or consolation? Do its foreign policy communications show that there are deeply-held norms whose violations can provoke anger and the drawing of red lines? Two examples are used to explore the representation of emotions in EU foreign policy: the initial response of the EU to the Ukraine crisis in February and March 2014; and the EU’s initial response to the ‘textbook case of ethnic cleansing’ of the Rohingya from Rakhine, Myanmar, between August 2017 and February 2018. These are both cases of violations of fundamental international norms (on self-determination on limiting use of force in the first case, and preventing genocide and mass atrocities in the second), and, following Mercer, we would expect to see anger and indignation in response. In addition, the plight of the victims of violence in Ukraine and of the Rohingya refugees could prompt the diplomacy of sympathy.

Statements, tweets, and other communications issued on behalf of the EU or by EU officials have been examined, using what Korschut calls ‘emotion discourse analysis’. EU communications between February and March 2014 (in the case of Ukraine) and August 2017 and February 2018 (the case of Myanmar) were searched for the use of nouns or verbs that directly refer to emotions (eg ‘dismay’ or ‘fear’), the use of words or phrases that have emotional connotations (eg ‘aggression’ or ‘horror’), and the use of adverbs or adjectives that magnify the emotional intensity (eg ‘strongly’ or ‘immediately’). Words of this type are highlighted in bold in the excerpts cited below. This article


75 Simon Koschut, ‘Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations’, in Maëva Clément and Eric Sanger, eds, Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). The focus here is on the EU as a collectivity, not on individual representatives of the EU, who may express emotions when representing the EU, but not as ‘official policy’. See Pace and Bilgic, ‘Trauma, Emotions and Memory’, who focus on individual representatives

76 Koschut, ‘Speaking from the Heart’, pp. 283-5.
looks only for evidence of the diplomacy of anger and of sympathy: further research, including interviews with policy-makers, is required to uncover whether there were concerted attempts behind the scenes to ensure that the appropriate emotional response was manifested in the communications of the EU and its officials.

The Ukraine crisis

Did the EU show anger in response to the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea? The immediate origins of the crisis lie in the protests that broke out in Ukraine in late 2013, after the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych declined to sign an association agreement with the EU and signalled that closer trade relations with Russia would be pursued instead. In February 2014, violence broke out between protesters in Maidan Square in Kiev and riot police and other armed attackers. This prompted a ‘revolution’ which led to Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine, and the installation of a new interim government. In the east of the country, protests against the new government broke out, and Russia intervened militarily, largely with special forces backing pro-Russian militia. Russian forces then took over Crimea and organised a referendum which backed independence on 16 March. On 18 March, Russia annexed Crimea.

The EU’s responses to the violence in February, the Russian intervention, and the annexation of Crimea do demonstrate both anger, mostly at Russia, and sympathy with victims of violence. This can be seen in the consistent use of strong adjectives or adverbs, and repetitive use of terms such as ‘grave’, ‘crisis’, or ‘urgency’. On 20 February, the Foreign Affairs Council used strong language to condemn the violence in Maidan Square but also to express sympathy with victims of violence:

The European Union is **appalled** and **deeply dismayed** by the deteriorating situation in Ukraine. No circumstances can justify the **repression** we are currently witnessing.
We condemn in the strongest terms all use of violence... Our thoughts are with the families of those who have lost their lives and with the injured.\textsuperscript{77}

On 25 February, on a visit to Ukraine, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton told reporters that ‘for me it was very important that the first thing I did when I arrived here was to lay flowers to honour those who have died and to understand the sense of loss of the people of Ukraine.'\textsuperscript{78} This is a clear example of an EU official engaging in the diplomacy of sympathy, through a gesture to express consolation and support.

Two weeks later, the Foreign Affairs Council condemned Russian intervention, while also signalling sympathy with the new government of Ukraine:

The European Union strongly condemns the clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the Russian armed forces....These actions are a clear breach of the UN Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act.... The EU calls on Russia to immediately withdraw its armed forces to the areas of their permanent stationing....The European Union commends the measured response demonstrated so far by Ukraine.\textsuperscript{79}

After the annexation of Crimea, the Foreign Affairs Council again met, and the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, reported that:

We strongly condemn the holding of this referendum, which is illegal and in clear breach of the Ukrainian Constitution... We also deplore the further negative developments we have seen on the ground, which are in clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{77} Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 20 February 2014.
\textsuperscript{78} European Union External Action, ‘Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to Ukraine’ document 140225/01, Kyiv, 25 February 2014.
The diplomacy of anger and of sympathy was accompanied by the use of sanctions against Russia, and the offer of aid and a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with Ukraine. The EU did thus signal anger at the breach of various international norms, and that there was a ‘red line’ that if crossed, elicited a strong response. However, the sanctions imposed in March 2014 were not as strong as they could be – they were enhanced only a few months later, after the downing of MH17 – because of some intra-EU reluctance to take measures that could hurt some member states more than others. The sanctions were limited to asset freezes and travel bans against some officials, diplomatic sanctions (the cancelling of summits), the suspension of some aid programmes, and the prohibition of trade with and investment in Crimea. The EU did not impose more far-reaching ‘sectoral’ sanctions targeting the Russian economy until July, after the downing of MH17. Thus the EU’s use of the diplomacy of anger in March 2014 contained a discursive element but not as clear a substantive element. Emotions were represented externally, but their effect on internal decision-making was limited given diverging material interests. It took the even more shocking event of the downing of MH17 to prompt a harder stance.

The Rohingya

In 2017, after several decades of authoritarian, military rule, Myanmar appeared to be in transition to democracy; a ceasefire agreement between the government and a number of ethnic groups was agreed in 2015 and seemed to promise an end to cycles of violence and atrocity. However, the human rights situation in Rakhine State was precarious, as the Rohingya minority there were not considered to be Myanmar citizens, and there was frequent inter-communal violence. In August 2017, an armed Rohingya group attacked police posts. The Myanmar armed forces launched a disproportionate response, which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,  

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81 Mercer, ‘Human nature and the first image’.
83 Orenstein and Kelemen, pp. 94-5.
84 See also Youngs, Europe’s Eastern Crisis, pp. 134-5.
Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, labelled ‘a textbook case of ethnic cleansing’. In a few months from August 2017, almost 700,000 Rohingyas fled Myanmar, mostly across the border in Bangladesh.

The EU had been supportive of Myanmar’s apparent transition to democracy, lifting sanctions that had been imposed back in the 1990s, and offering support for democratic reform. The reluctance to undermine the new government by ‘naming and shaming’ it helps to explain the EU’s response to the Rohingya situation. The EU’s response was predominantly the diplomacy of sympathy, backed by the provision of humanitarian aid for the refugees. Some anger was shown, but backed by hardly any substantive measures: in February 2018 the Council considered imposing restrictive measures but only in May 2018 did it impose targeted sanctions on individuals in the Myanmar security forces, ban cooperation with the Myanmar military and expand an arms embargo. As Jürgen Haacke has noted, international actors including the EU have not focused on implementing the ‘responsibility to protect’ because of the view that the government ‘would be a necessary partner to bring about a successful political transition in Myanmar’.

Several communications by EU officials and the EU itself signalled anger at the human rights violations taking place; usually these were directed at the Myanmar military and local militia, sometimes also the Myanmar government, and sometimes no actor was identified as responsible. On 16 October 2017, the Foreign Affairs Council stated:

There are deeply worrying reports of continuing arson and violence against people and serious human rights violations, including indiscriminate firing of weapons, the presence of landmines, and sexual and gender based violence. This is not acceptable and must end immediately.

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In February 2018 it reiterated the point: ‘The Council condemn ongoing widespread, systematic, grave human rights violations committed by Myanmar/Burma military and security forces, including rape and killings. It also reiterates its condemnation of attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and other militant groups.’

The EU’s diplomacy of anger was thus somewhat vague in its targets, and not accompanied by significant substantive measures, so its signal that red lines had been crossed was not clear. The EU also clearly engaged in the diplomacy of sympathy. In a speech to the European Parliament on 12 December 2017, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini opened with an emotive description of her recent visit to refugee camps in Bangladesh:

The thing that struck me the most was the number of young children – children of my little daughter’s age, 6, 7, years old – taking care of even younger children – 2 or 3 years old.... It is hard to imagine what that must feel like. These kids are forced to grow up, they’re stripped of their right to childhood, and this is going to stay for the rest of their lives.’

The persistent references to children (and elsewhere in the speech, women too) are emotive, and should generate sympathy for specific groups that are considered to be more vulnerable – and innocent.

In October the EU’s Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, Christos Stylianides, visited Bangladesh, and declared, ‘Here in Bangladesh the scale of this emergency is painfully clear to see; this is the fastest-growing refugee crisis in the world.’

These expressions of sympathy were accompanied by promises of additional humanitarian aid, and the pledge to ensure that the refugees returned home soon, though this did not address the root causes of the refugee exodus. The EU’s engaging in the diplomacy of sympathy seems clear, but

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it did not do so in order to reset relations with another actor (EU-Bangladesh relations were not in the state in which a reset was required). Instead, it appears to have done so because it was considered to be the appropriate response - appropriate because the situation demanded it. It was also in lieu of taking stronger action vis-à-vis Myanmar.

The cases of the EU’s response to both the Ukraine crisis and the Rohingya refugees show that the EU engaged in the diplomacy of sympathy and of anger, but struggled to match its emotional rhetoric of anger to action. For at least one Foreign Minister, Spain’s Josep Borrell (since November 2019, EU High Representative), the Foreign Affairs Council engages in far too much of the diplomacy of sympathy, and does not follow it up with substantive support. In May 2019, he stated:

To me, the Foreign Affairs Council is more a valley of tears than a centre of decision-making because it’s where all the open sores of humanity come. They tell us their sufferings, we express our condolence and concern... but no capacity for action comes out of it and we just move on to the next one.

And this feeling of them trooping in one after the other to set out what’s happening in the heart of Africa, what’s happening in Sahel, what’s happening in Lebanon, in Libya – what’s happening in Venezuela...in each case we settle on a bit of humanitarian aid and express our condemnation and that’s about it... It gives a sense of a Europe with very little capacity to influence world affairs.92

Further research into the EU’s use of emotional diplomacy in other cases could explore the kinds of emotional diplomacy it engages in, the extent to which the expression of emotions is matched by substantive action, and the effectiveness of its emotional diplomacy. A focus on the EU’s emotional diplomacy could build on existing critiques of the EU’s identity as a normative and ethical power.93 The EU is an institution defined by rules, and it projects an image as an international actor

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with a deep attachment to the rule of law internationally; outsiders will then consider whether its emotional and substantive response to international norm violations, including gross human rights violations, is appropriate for that identity. As March and Olsen argue, the perceived match (or mismatch) between action, rhetoric and identity can include a consideration of whether the ‘attitudes, behaviors, feelings or preferences’ match those that are essential to that identity. A focus on the EU’s emotional diplomacy can reveal the existence of an ‘emotions-action gap’: the emotions it demonstrates may fit the image of a normative actor, but the perceived lack of substance backing the emotional rhetoric calls the image into doubt.

**Conclusions and issues for further research**

This article has illustrated the utility of the new direction of FPA focusing on emotions in producing further insights into the making and implementation of EU foreign policies, despite the oft-depicted ‘de-dramatised’ nature of EU decision-making. Emotions can nonetheless affect EU foreign policy decision-making processes and outcomes, especially during crises. Intergroup emotions theory can be used in the case of the EU because, as constructivists argue, enough of a ‘we-feeling’ has developed among member state representatives that they perceive themselves to be part of a group. As such, external events such as the deaths of many EU citizens as happened in the downing of MH17 could provoke a shared strong emotional response that leads the EU decision-making group to take action. The outrage arguably prompted member states to take stronger, quicker action against Russia than they had previously been willing to take.

However, a focus on the external representation of emotions in EU foreign policy communications may reveal limits of the EU as a foreign policy actor: as seen in the cases of EU policy towards Ukraine in 2014 and Myanmar in 2017, the EU used both the diplomacy of sympathy and anger, but its expressed anger was not accompanied by matching substantive measures. In

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addition to a ‘capability-expectations gap’\textsuperscript{95} and a ‘consensus-expectations gap’,\textsuperscript{96} there could thus be an ‘emotions-action’ gap. The significance of this latter gap is that the emotion-laden identity of the EU as normative, ethical international actor is not matched by appropriate action. Reception of this gap by other international actors merits further investigation as the EU’s emotional diplomacy may backfire or be dismissed. The EU repeatedly declares its deep commitment to the rule of law and human rights: if it cannot credibly signal outrage when these are violated then it is in danger of instead showing acquiescence.\textsuperscript{97}

There are any number of additional cases in which the ‘emotional turn’ in FPA could add value to our understanding of EU foreign policy-making. Interviews with EU decision-makers could reveal how they felt about particular events or developments, how their emotions changed over time, and how emotions impacted their decisions. This article looked at the emotions of anger and sympathy, but the role that other emotions – from guilt and shame to joy – could be explored. Are (particular) member states ‘uploading’ emotions in the EU foreign policy-making process? Are member states in turn impacted by the shared emotions within the decision-making groups at the EU level? Other methodologies can be used to investigate the EU’s emotional diplomacy, including the interpretation of facial expressions by EU and member state officials during press conferences, visits to significant sites such as refugee camps, and so on. The numerous videos and other images produced by the EU about its international relations could be analysed for their emotional content – and viewers’ responses to them might provide further insights into the reception of the EU’s international identity. What is the EU’s emotional diplomacy ‘in the eyes of others’?\textsuperscript{98} Do external perceptions of an ‘emotions-action’ gap feed back into EU decision-making processes? In sum, taking

\textsuperscript{97}Hall, \textit{Emotional Diplomacy}, p. 48.
the ‘emotional turn’ could deepen and extend our understanding of EU foreign policy-making, EU diplomacy and the EU’s international identity.