

## **A Community That is Not One: Nietzsche and the True Voice of Justice**

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### **I**

Using the term, he says, without praise or blame, Nietzsche takes his bearings on thinking about the trajectory of European societies in his time from what he calls “the democratic movement in Europe”, a movement which was beginning to dominate Europe in his “today”, and which was blowing apart the Europe of “the good old days”.<sup>1</sup> As we shall see, without wanting to go back at all, he finds very little to cheer in that development. Nevertheless, he sees in its unfolding the potential for the creation of a new European configuration beyond its present configuration in national communities that marks its “today”, and threatens its “tomorrow”.

Beyond this dis-integration of the old Europe into petty nationalisms, Nietzsche reads inside its present excessively national form a movement towards the democratisation of Europe itself, the creation of a European political unity beyond petty nationalism. This remains to come, but it is (he thinks) beginning: a feeling and desire is already underway among some cultured Europeans. And it expresses one general ambition: an emerging European spirit that “*wants to become one*”.<sup>2</sup>

Like Kant a little over one-hundred years earlier, Nietzsche himself has a feeling that a new political order will emerge in the modern Europe of nations: a new and unprecedented European political union. Unlike Kant, however, Nietzsche does not see this development as an unambiguous good. This movement towards the political integration of Europe will not, he thinks, produce modern citizens living together in a peaceful federation, but rather, and for

the most part, the most repellent “levelling and mediocritizing” of European people, making Europeans into little more than “weak willed highly employable workers”. The general trend of European democratization is simply a movement towards the production of a type that is, as he puts it, “prepared for *slavery* in the subtlest sense”.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, this movement is not simply a linear story of ever greater decline of the peoples of Europe. The same democratizing conditions may also, although “involuntarily”, bring about something Nietzsche thinks really is worth hoping for, a newly promising condition. They are also the conditions for producing “a new supra-national and nomadic type of man”; people “detached from any definite milieu” who will have as their distinction “a maximum of the art of and power of adaptation”.<sup>4</sup> And these Europeans will form “a new caste” that can eventually “dominate[] all Europe” so that Europe can “*acquire a single will*”.<sup>5</sup> So, even though democratization is predominantly a movement of weakening and levelling, it is also a process in which “strong individuals” can emerge in Europe once more, “stronger and richer than has perhaps ever happened before” he says; democratization thus involuntarily promoting “the breeding of *tyrants*”.<sup>6</sup> It is a new single will – to forge and form, as we shall see, not a new authoritarian dictatorship but a new pluralist democracy to come.

In virtue of their “unprejudiced schooling” (having liberated themselves from the deformations of a narrowly national outlook and formation), and as a consequence of the “tremendous multiplicity of practice, art and mask” made available to them in the new synthesis of European peoples, Nietzsche anticipates the future (spiritual) rule of those he names – and includes himself among – “we good Europeans”.<sup>7</sup> These are the “Europeans of the day after tomorrow” – and one such is Nietzsche himself, arriving way ahead of time.<sup>8</sup>

Nietzsche is in some sense predicting these events. However, he is sharply aware that he wants his text on this development to be future producing not just future describing: “the day after tomorrow belongs to me”, says Nietzsche.<sup>9</sup> Nietzsche, here and now, elects to speak to the friends, the good Europeans of the day after tomorrow, who he says, he “as yet knows none”.<sup>10</sup> But, as Derrida notes, he sends himself off to speak to those friends *so that there may be such friends*, to “form and forge”, to “conjure” them at a distance of time of who knows how long, in writings that “produce an event” “here and now” out of the possibility of its own “will have been” a speech to these friends. Not a new teleology but “a *teleiopoetic propulsion*...[which] produces an event, sinking into the darkness of a friendship which is not yet”.<sup>11</sup>

Europe’s self-understanding had been framed by a profoundly teleo-messianic discourse of universal history: a movement of the history of “Man” from primitive and savage animality to rational and civilised humanity, with European humanity at the head. In Nietzsche’s writing on Europe another geophilosophical discourse of European humanity makes its way. And it makes its way through a new hidden hand, a new cunning of reason that belongs within the tidal wave of “the democratic movement in Europe”. It is into this wave that Nietzsche sends an untimely message-in-a-bottle of his own future arrival. In this essay I will explore Nietzsche’s call to the future – the future of a certain friendship of “we good Europeans”, the inheritors of the Europe fundamentally marked by Platonism and Christianity, the inheritors of the Europe of the Bible and the Greeks.

## II

Europe is the name of a privileged site for Nietzsche, a site of “great things”.<sup>12</sup> But it is now, in a time that is doubtless still our time, a site of degeneration and decay. Those with a nose

to smell it, those who have some reverence for its history, are aware that the existence of European humanity has become something “indecent, dishonest, deceitful”, marked now, says Nietzsche, by “feminism, weakness, cowardice”.<sup>13</sup>

Most today are likely to see Nietzsche’s hopes for a new ruling tyranny in Europe as a mark of political failure, and are equally likely to think that the advance of feminism within the democratization of Europe is a distinctive mark of its political success. I know I do. And Nietzsche is aware that his own words are “bound to make a harsh sound and not easy for ears to hear”.<sup>14</sup> It is a massive provocation against the prevailing political tide. The idea that the most important, leading and governing principles of society should be based on *what we have in common*, and hence governed by appeals to what is in the best interest of the *community*, revolts Nietzsche who sees in it a new non-theistic religious bond forged through its hostility to all authority beyond “faith in the community as the *saviour*”.<sup>15</sup> He recoils against everything that crowds out anyone who aspires to be “set free from the crowd”,<sup>16</sup> recoils then, especially, from what he perceives as the obscene self-righteousness of “progressives”, whether “liberals” or “socialists”, who are so fundamentally convinced that their egalitarian values are on the side of the angels.

These “men of ‘modern ideas’ seem so sure that they “manifestly *know*...what is good and evil”.<sup>17</sup> We (and I suppose I have to say that) strive in our politics for equality of rights and the alleviation of suffering. So a counter-recoil against Nietzsche’s recoil is not only an understandable reaction: it can seem an overwhelmingly just reaction. I will come back to this, but for now I will for my part tolerate Nietzsche’s hostility towards the mainstream of European politics (again including in that “the lands where Europe’s influence predominates”<sup>18</sup>). And I will tolerate this because I also accept Nietzsche’s assessment that

the general direction of Europe's *current* "democratic era" is increasingly hostile to the pluralism that democracy promises. Moreover, in the various monistic ideals (left and right) of a community that really *is* one because it finally is *one*, I too see a main current in Europe that seems hell-bent on making it, as Heidegger put in in 1941-2, "a single office [*Büro*]" in which "the 'co-workers' [become] the staff of their own bureaucracy [*Bürokratie*"]<sup>19</sup>

Nietzsche's hopes lie in the thought that the movement towards this pathetic condition is not terminal for Europe or for European democracy. On the contrary, he still finds something "reserved for Europe" as its *other* future "the day after tomorrow" which is irreducible to "modern" Europe's own projected democratic future "tomorrow": a process of self-overcoming which may last as long as the two-thousand year long movement of the becoming-European of European humanity that went before it. The old Greco-Christian world, the old European world, "must now be destroyed" says Nietzsche. Indeed, he thinks "we are standing on the threshold of this very event"<sup>20</sup> But this, for Nietzsche, holds out a still-European promise. What is happening? Specifically this: we are, in our time, coming to realize that the world-understanding that belongs to Europe's dominant heritage, the idea that there is an underlying moral world-order and an irreducibly divine or providential significance to the whole of history and of human life – this "logos" which was believed to be objective reality, believed to be there to be known by a rationally adjusted mind – this cognitivist idea has been exposed as a dogma that we can no longer believe. Or better: it has exposed itself as such, devalued itself. God is dead, and we have killed Him.

Christian truthfulness...finally draws its *strongest conclusion*, its conclusion *against* itself; this will occur when it asks the question: "*What is the meaning of all will to truth?*"...There is no doubt that from now on morality will be *destroyed* through the

coming to consciousness of the will to truth: this is the great drama in a hundred acts which is reserved for Europe over the next two thousand years, the most fearful, most questionable and perhaps also most hopeful of all dramas...<sup>21</sup>

The defeat of the cognitivist idea, the defeat of the Europe of this idea, would indeed be massive. The Greco-Christian conception of Man as theomorphic rational animality supplied us with a sense of ourselves as the centre of cosmic significance, with European Man as the centre of that centre, the advance-guard of human self-development. Europe called itself to appear as a site of “great things” as a result – but its own “modern” spirit, what Nietzsche calls the “democratic enlightenment” that breaks with dogmatic authority, serves only to decapitate Man, leaving us with no way of giving content to the idea that what gives life a meaning or purpose is something real and objective – no way of making sense of the idea that living a good life is a matter of adjusting one’s beliefs to how things are, a matter of attaining an anterior truth or meaning about the world and ourselves in the world. Hence the madman seeing us increasingly “straying through an infinite nothing”,<sup>22</sup> in a world that is no longer a world, leaving Europe with an experience of its own history that now appears, more and more, only as a series of disasters and crimes – with the hope of the formation of a democratic community of equals – a community that is one because it is one – as the only saviour.

### III

In the Preface to *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche once again identifies our time as a threshold – a time in which what he calls this moral-cognitivist “foundation-stone” for Europe will be revealed as “a grotesque”, “a nightmare” from which Europe must recover and so learn to “breathe again”, a recovery from “the most dangerous of all errors”.<sup>23</sup> And the

grotesque monster here is, once again, not one European idea among others but “Plato’s invention of pure spirit and the good in itself”.<sup>24</sup> But, lest the Europe we encounter today be thought as through and through Greek he immediately continues:

But the struggle against Plato, or to express it more plainly and for “the people”, the struggle against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia – for Christianity is Platonism for “the people” – has created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit as has never existed on earth before... European man feels this tension...<sup>25</sup>

“European man” must overcome himself, send himself in a new direction and can do so: for “with so tense a bow one can now shoot for the most distant targets” and the “good Europeans”, have “the arrow, the task and, who knows? The *target*...”.<sup>26</sup>

Who knows... But wasn’t “modern man”, the “Man” of European modernity, meant to be the one who broke from the past and forged a new way of democratic self-legislation? Why do we need to look forward to “we Europeans of the day after tomorrow”<sup>27</sup> when we already have democratic modern (I mean rational, scientific, egalitarian) Europeans of today? For Nietzsche, those for whom the day after tomorrow belongs are those among us who experience democratic modernity not as “progress” towards a glorious future of equality and a new “brotherhood”,<sup>28</sup> but those (those brothers? those friends?) who, when they encounter this democratic taste, feel (Nietzsche says) “one more kind of disgust than other men do”.<sup>29</sup> “Modern ideas”, “democratic taste”, the whole “democratic movement” is the movement that understands itself in terms of its disgust with Europe’s old Christian order, the divine right of Kings, and so on. Nietzsche shares that disgust. He too thinks that the time in which Christian Europe could achieve anything “worthwhile” is decisively past, exhausted.<sup>30</sup> But Nietzsche

insists that these moderns are really not *so* different to their predecessors after at all. On the contrary, living in the shadow of the dead God “the democratic movement inherits the Christian”, he says.<sup>31</sup> Hence Nietzsche’s extra feeling of disgust is directed towards the taste of those who approve and promote democratic taste, and “faith in the community as the *saviour*”.

Nietzsche’s thinking is thus directed most aggressively against that movement in our time – a movement marked for him most prominently by “the brotherhood fanatics who call themselves socialists”<sup>32</sup> – which is the faded hang-over of European Christianity, its ethics of good and evil, and its cult of equality before God. Nietzsche’s extra disgust is disgust for modern man himself and the “herd-animal morality” that has “broken through and come to predominate” in modern Europe,<sup>33</sup> religiously bound together by its mistrust of authority.

So liberal egalitarians and socialists of the democratic enlightenment, the inheritors of Christian morality, are in reality “*levellers*”;<sup>34</sup> tamers of the European promise, not its great liberators from dogmatic tradition and superstition. On the other hand, Nietzsche retains a hope: “the greatest possibilities of man are still *unexhausted*”.<sup>35</sup> Just as “the Bible and the Greeks” was the source of a certain European greatness, so also it will be out of that legacy that Europe can forge a vital future, and remain something to come: a Europe beyond modernity. And it will involve nothing short of a new conception of Man. For Nietzsche, that is to say, the primary “target” (*qua* goal) is not a new political construction, but, rather, as we shall see, a new philosophical conception. The task is a task not for “politicians of the future” but for what he calls “philosophers of the future”:<sup>36</sup> those concerned, above all, with the meaning of Man, and with creating (*being*) a new meaning of Man.



The old Greco-Christian anthropology is decisively turned by Nietzsche but it is not abandoned in its mission. Philosophy, European philosophy, was and had always been the site of thinking not a regional Europeanness but a universal humanity. And history is then grasped in terms of the unfolding of this distinctive form of life in time towards its proper end. In the movement of its own deconstruction Nietzsche turns this towards a new variation, proposing a specifically non-metaphysical and non-theistic variation: “man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed”<sup>37</sup> and “in man, *creature* and *creator* are united”.<sup>38</sup> Man gives himself a meaning through what Nietzsche regards as artistic self-fashioning, through a movement of auto-teleiopoiesis. In reality, according to Nietzsche, Christianity attempted this too, for example with the ascetic ideal. But what did they achieve in their work on “the boldest animal”?<sup>39</sup> *Since Nietzsche* it has been hard to ignore the possibility that what they achieved was – an “abomination”, an “abortion”:<sup>40</sup> herd-animal man of the democratic enlightenment.

In the face of a nihilistic anxiety about the meaning of life that perhaps we – the type that human beings are – can never simply be free from, Christianity, as “Platonism ‘for the people’”, had been Europe’s foundation stone: its *teleo-eschatology* imbued human life and history with meaning. Nietzsche offers a distinctive interpretation of modernity: the movement of resistance to the hegemony of Christian ecclesiastical authority (resistance to the power realm of Christendom) that takes place through democratic enlightenment (political democratization and the rise of socialism) – this movement is not a new era of progress but is Greco-Christian Europe in decline. Indeed it is conceived as the leveling and the diminution of European Man into a pathetic herd animal that has lost its capacity to make something great of itself. Nevertheless, as we have seen, despite that reading of the movement of the death of God into our time, Nietzsche still conceives those developments as

potentially belonging to a step forward, and a revival of Europe's democratic promise. Let's follow him.

#### IV

A new ambition for the philosopher: from realizing (so far as that is possible) an objectively ideal social and individual condition of Man under the guidance of the philosopher King (or Party, or whatever), to creating a new meaning of being human in the wake of the chance made possible by the horizon wiped away by the inner dissolution of the Graeco-Christian world. An honest self-overcoming for the animal that is artistically self-creative.

There is a way of interpreting Nietzsche on this shift of ambition which might be especially attractive to those who have altogether lost confidence in the kind of responses to our condition that European politics has provided: one might think that the Nietzschean project of self-overcoming is now simply dissociated from a political and social project. Nietzschean overcoming, one might think, is an exclusively personal and individual affair. This is one way of taking Nietzsche's relentless criticisms of the (let's say) communism of the modern movement of democratization, and his emphasis on being a "friend of solitude".

In the "Introduction" to his book *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Richard Rorty encourages this "privatized", "individualized" construal of Nietzschean propaganda: Nietzsche's challenge to we moderns is for us to give up on political ideals of social transformation (give up on getting rid of exploitation, for example) and to become a private work of art all on your own.<sup>41</sup>

However, what this reading overlooks is that Nietzsche does not simply place his emphasis on the arrival of a new kind of individual, or a new kind of genius – though, as we have seen, he has hopes that “the *strong* man will be found” in Europe once again<sup>42</sup> – but on the fact that these individual must be philosophers. And that qualification of the individuals that Nietzsche identifies means that at issue are those willing to take on the absolute maximum of responsibility, “the most comprehensive responsibility”:<sup>43</sup> responsibility, that is to say, for the meaning of Man as such, responsibility for the meaning of our being (“they have more to do than merely know something new – namely to *be* something new, to *signify* something new”<sup>44</sup>). Hence it is a class or “caste” who – in a great Platonic tradition – “should *rule*”.<sup>45</sup> While it belongs to the overcoming of onto-theological metaphysics – where the ideas of “knowing the essence” of Man claimed by metaphysics are displaced by ideas of the inventive creating of a new subjectivity – Nietzsche’s arrow is also very political.

The Nietzsche that Rorty champions, by contrast, will insist that the revolution or upheaval that is needed is not a shift from liberal democracy or ideals of socialism to a new kind of “philosopher king” (the new “tyrants” with the most “spiritual will to power”<sup>46</sup> who take maximum responsibility for the who that we *all* are), but a shift from the public and political to the personal and private. This conception of Nietzsche fits very neatly with something else that Rorty wants to foreground in his elaboration of the outlook of what he calls the “contemporary liberal ironist”. This might be called the postmodern interpretation of the postmodern condition: we postmodernists, for Rorty, are skeptical about “the whole idea of finding a comprehensive outlook that would hold [private] self-creation and [public] justice, private perfection and human solidarity, in a single vision”.<sup>47</sup>

Nietzsche would be seen, on this understanding, as situated on one side of a divide between (on the one hand) those old modern philosophers like Kant, Hegel or Marx who see the project of self-realization and the project of achieving a just society as fundamentally the same (*teleo-eschatological* or onto-theological political) project – a metaphysical conception of politics that attempts to unite a striving for human perfection with a sense of community – and (on the other hand) those postmodernists who see that whole Greco-Christian project as one which simply sacrifices self-realization in the name of the solidaristic community.

What we need, Rorty suggests, is to “drop the demand for a theory which unifies the public and the private” and be content with the thought that “the demands of self-creation and of human solidarity are equally valid yet forever incommensurable”.<sup>48</sup> The basic incommensurability here is this: there is no way of simultaneously respecting the demands of public virtue and of private virtue. One can only choose a path of either “the general good” of the community or the path of one’s own good. It is, as Rorty puts it, a choice between “speaking the language of the tribe and finding our own words”.<sup>49</sup> It is because one cannot do both things at once that we cannot achieve the task of constructing a unified theory (or way of life) in which we square public solidarity in a community and private fulfillment for an individual. That old “modern” project should be abandoned.

The distinction between public and private goods – between communal and individual fulfillment – is not, I believe, peculiar to modern political thought. But, and rather more interestingly, it belongs to what we might call the classic European idea of the political as such, and to the concept of *res publica* – the idea of public things, or distinctively public affairs – which dominates that European idea of the political. Rorty’s postmodernist is the one who has given up an idea of justice that was central to the Platonic tradition in European

politics: that justice in one sphere can only be brought about where there is justice in the other – that realizing a just society can only be achieved where that society maximizes individual flourishing too. On that view, justice in one sphere must be essentially compatible with justice in the other. After all both aim at the same thing: justice. And the voice of justice must be at one with itself. (“Justice just is justice”, as G.A. Cohen liked to say.)

Rorty’s postmodernist retains the distinction between spheres but gives up on that old hope of achieving a conception which can unify justice in both spheres at once. In fact, Rorty does not give up on the idea of the univocal voice of justice altogether but places it on only one side of the old distinction: he distinguishes “the vocabulary of justice”, which is social and communal, from the “vocabulary of self-creation” which is isolated and individual. He supposes that as long as one stays within a single vocabulary one can get along fine; the only radically abyssal question – left to each individual – is the choice between incommensurable vocabularies: social justice in a community or self-creation for an individual. Nietzsche, for Rorty, makes propaganda to side with the latter. (This is also a good way of getting out of trouble with respect to reading Nietzsche’s recoil from contemporary “democratic taste” – it’s simply not his main business.)

It is significant, I think, that Rorty will distinguish the voice of justice and the voice of self-creation, as if justice has nothing to do with how things are at an individual level. Nietzsche, like Plato (which is really to say, like the entire European tradition), does not tolerate that idea. Justice cannot be confined to the sphere of the social. As we have seen, Nietzsche recoils in disgust from what he calls the “community as the *saviour*” idea so loved by those moderns with a democratic taste for equality. The fundamental feature of such a taste in politics is, for Nietzsche, a dogmatic, and essentially Christian, insistence on the value of

what is common to us all. It is the idea that there should be, for example, “everywhere equality before the law”.<sup>50</sup> This call for equality sounds, precisely, *just*, at least as far as the social dimension is concerned. Nietzsche is clearly hostile to that. So on Rorty’s reading he must be one of those who opts for self-creation instead. But Nietzsche refuses to accept that justice only applies to the social domain. Like Plato he does not think that the question of justice is indifferent to the outcome for individuals. However, for Nietzsche, unlike Plato, justice is *not* univocal: “Equality for equals, inequality for unequals” – that would be the true voice of justice”, says Nietzsche.<sup>51</sup>

## V

We have seen that for Nietzsche so-called political progressives, the egalitarians and socialists of the democratic enlightenment are, in reality, “levellers”. In terms of justice one can put it like this: *that* democratic movement is not, for Nietzsche, simply against justice, but it is entirely one-sided, and hence its sense of justice remains, as it were, unjust. We need also to acknowledge, justice would demand that we acknowledge the inequality of unequals. That too needs to be equally respected.

Nietzsche will have no hesitation in distinguishing “the best” from “the rest”. But his point about justice which subtends recognition of a social and cultural “order of rank” is not itself separated out in an aristocratic way. It is not that we have the equals here, who can be treated equally, and the special ones, the few, the unequals, there, who should be given special treatment. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s point about justice is *universal*: insofar as we are all equals, then we should be treated as such. But insofar as we are all unequals, then we should be treated as such too. This is not an incommensurability of social justice and personal fulfillment but an incommensurability within justice itself: an irreducible *aporia* within “the

true voice of justice”. How to live with that irreducible *aporia* – that is a question of politics. And it will not be lived satisfactorily in the herd-animal politics of modern democratic taste whether national, supra-national or international. For Nietzsche the last thing we should want is to strive for a community that really *is* one because it is a community that finally *is one*. What we should strive for is not the community of equals but for cultivating justice in a universalizable culture of singularities – a democracy of the singular not of the common.

Writing in the name of justice will not, on this account, be about speaking the language of the tribe. And yet, in a world of both populist market activism and radical political activism, we are increasingly inclined to think that cultivating anything that is not accessible to all is elitist and undemocratic. But for Nietzsche, and I think he is right about this, those activists also destroy what one might call the chance of attaining an attainable but as yet unattained democratic condition beyond our present one. This is the chance that is opened up by literary activism: of difficult, demanding and untimely texts that do not call for a wide readership but calls for new readers – the activism that gives our culture, and the democratic *aporia* of justice – a future. Here is Derrida on the politics of this *aporia*:

There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy with the “community of friends” (*koína ta philōn*), without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. The two laws are irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcilable and forever wounding. The wound itself opens with the necessity of having to count one’s friends, to count the others, in the economy of one’s own, there where every other is altogether other. But where every other is *equally* altogether other. More serious than a contradiction, political desire is forever borne by the disjunction of these two laws.

It also bears the chance and the future of a democracy whose ruin it constantly threatens but whose life, however, it sustains, like life itself, at the heart of its *divided virtue*, the inadequacy to itself.<sup>52</sup>

Democracy is being regarded here as the best name for what is aimed at by a political desire to cherish and to cultivate the irreducible singularity of every other (and which, for that reason, most strongly resists the “democratic taste” of a politics of the common in the community). For the friend of democratic desire there is no question of demanding the other to be just like me, to share my identity as something to have “in common” with me. This other democratic desire aims at the realization of a “community of friends” that would be an alliance of singularities who are infinitely other, each one the only one. But that is why it also aims at the realization of a “community of friends” in which each one can be recognised as, in that respect, just like the other, each one fundamentally equal to every other in their incomparable singularity. So at every step, the *aporia* endures. It is the politics of endless democratic politics, not an anti-perfectionism but of a perfectibility without end, and of a democracy which must now and in every future now remain to be thought, in a community that is not one.

I am reading Nietzsche as a democratic thinker. But isn't that absurd? So much in his work seems to be (in his words) illiberal “to the point of *malice*” that the very idea of a democracy-cherishing Nietzsche can seem totally obscene.<sup>53</sup> But there is a complication to his malice that changes everything. The complication is both historical and conceptual. Nietzsche conceives the history of Europe's modernity – life lived increasingly in the shadow of the death of God – as inseparable from the coming-to-dominance of “democrats”, their “democratic taste” and “modern ideas”. As I have accepted, most people today would regard



this, not unreasonably, as basically a good thing. And Nietzsche does not entirely demure from that: he is anything but nostalgic for the “good old days”, the old world-order of Christian ecclesiastical power. On the other hand, what he sees in the unfolding historical reality of “the democratic movement in Europe” is the spreading out a sort of nightmare version of itself: the extraordinary transformation of Europeans (and those who live in the lands where Europe’s influence predominates) into herd-animals. This is the principal “result” of the democratic movement in Europe in our time, and he has no hesitation in voicing his disgust with it.

And yet, for Nietzsche, it is not all over for Europe or democracy. The “levelling” mediocrity of the democratic movement may be our reality, but that very historical reality has within itself (and not simply opposed to it) its *own* “beyond”: a still-democratic future which is, within all of this, already the opposite of all of this. In *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, Nietzsche articulates this conceptually by defining democracy in a way that sounds exactly like the *opposite* of herd-animal society; as a political regime that “wants”, he says, “to create and guarantee as much independence as possible: independence of opinion, of mode of life and of employment”.<sup>54</sup> This is something he unreservedly affirms; but he does so in a distinctively futural way: when he speaks of this democracy, he says, “I speak of democracy as of something to come”.<sup>55</sup> This *other* democratic ideal, this democracy to come, is as far as possible from herd-animal egalitarianism: it has unending pluralism and not final collective unity as its “end”. It is a culture that recognizes that the ends of men are many – and that *wants* to maximise the chance for individuals to live experimentally in accordance with life plans of their own. Nietzsche champions this pluralism, and sees in it a perfectionist development for democracy beyond the levelling, herd-animal cultivating democratic condition we now find ourselves in. And he champions it not because it opens a space for

“illiberal” individuals to emerge beyond the herd (which it does – and not necessarily or always or even often happily – and yet must do if the prevailing institutions of democracy are to have a future beyond their present – which is to say their *past* – forms) but because that possibility ultimately promises another democratic future, one which forges institutions that can “create and guarantee” a space fit for the flourishing of *all*.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 157.

<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 169.

<sup>3</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 154.

<sup>4</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, pp. 153-4.

<sup>5</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 119.

<sup>6</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 154.

<sup>7</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. p. 154.

<sup>8</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 128; see also Nietzsche: 1973, p. 124.

<sup>9</sup> Nietzsche: 1990, p. 114.

<sup>10</sup> Nietzsche: 2013, p. 135.

<sup>11</sup> Derrida: 2005, p. 43.

<sup>12</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 13 and Nietzsche: 2013, p. 135.

<sup>13</sup> Nietzsche: 2013, p. 135.

<sup>14</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 106.

<sup>15</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 107.

<sup>16</sup> Nietzsche: 1973, p. 39.

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- 17 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 106.
  - 18 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 106.
  - 19 Heidegger 2014, p. 100 (translation mine).
  - 20 Nietzsche 2013: p. 135.
  - 21 Nietzsche: 2013, p. 135.
  - 22 Nietzsche: 2001, §120.
  - 23 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 14
  - 24 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 14.
  - 25 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 14.
  - 26 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 14.
  - 27 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 128.
  - 28 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 107.
  - 29 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 109.
  - 30 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 93.
  - 31 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 107.
  - 32 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 107.
  - 33 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 106.
  - 34 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 53.
  - 35 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 109
  - 36 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 52
  - 37 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 69
  - 38 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 136.
  - 39 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 136.
  - 40 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 71.
  - 41 Rorty : 1989, pp. xiii-xvi.
  - 42 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 154.
  - 43 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 67.
  - 44 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 166.
  - 45 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 112.
  - 46 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 21.
  - 47 Rorty: 1989, p. xiv.
  - 48 Rorty: 1989, p. xv.
  - 49 Rorty: 1989, p. xiv.
  - 50 Nietzsche: 1973, p. 34.
  - 51 Nietzsche: 1990, p. 102.
  - 52 Derrida: 2005, p. 29.
  - 53 Nietzsche: 1990, p.105.
  - 54 Nietzsche: 1996, p. 293.
  - 55 Nietzsche: 1996, p. 293.
  - 56 Nietzsche: 1996, p. 293.