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<ct>Warfare, Nationalism, and Globalisation

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<h1>Introduction

<p>Warfare has been regarded as one of the major institutions of nation state formation and reproduction. Classic accounts have focused first on the role of warfare in early modern state construction and the subsequent rise of a common territorial consciousness, and second on its consequences for the crystallization of sacrificial myths and "memories" that form populations into national communities.   In the contemporary period it is claimed global processes, including twentieth and twenty-first century warfare, are eroding the dual bases of nation states: the sovereignty of states and the positive mythology of the war dead. In this chapter, I shall reject such claims, but first it is necessary to set out the standard accounts of the relationship between warfare and the state- and nation-formation I then outline positions that suggest recent trends in warfare and the state system appear to be undermining this relationship, before arguing that nationalism is being transformed but not superseded by contemporary developments.

<h1>War and the formation of modern states and nations

<p>Charles Tilly (1992) and Michael Mann (1986, 1993) in their classic studies argued the modern nation state is a by-product of rulers' efforts to acquire the means of war and war is an organizational phenomenon from which the state derived its administrative machinery (Centeno

2002: 101). The two are mutually re-enforcing, as summarized in Tilly's dictum "war made states and states made war". Both scholars drew on the substantial historiography on the European "military revolution" of the early modern era, which resulted in new technologies, tactics, and strategies, and a rapid increase in the size of armies relative to the population.

Tilly argued this favored centralized political administrations able to levy taxes and raise large permanent armies and draw on revenues derived from trade and commercialized agriculture. Kingdoms such as England and France rose in strength in relation to city–states and (over time) agrarian empires, and their rulers could use standing armies to quell internal challenges to their rule. Such units became the prototypes of the nation state. The nation was a construct of such developments. State centralizing pressures and recurrent wars encouraged an increasing identification with the territory of the state rather than just one's locality, creating a growing national consciousness. When populations revolted against state exactions, they staged national rather than local revolts. A decisive moment was the French revolution, which in transforming a dynastic into a people's state created the nation state model. In Andreas Wimmer's terms, the nation state was based on a blood contract between militaristic state elites and people: in return for the former granting citizenship and public goods, the latter agreed to fight for and pay taxes to the state (Wimmer 2013: 4, 17). Mann's argument is more nuanced. He acknowledges the existence of proto-national loyalties in the early modern period, but asserts that ideological nationalism forms from the increasing pressures of militarized states on social classes emerging with industrial capitalism (Mann 1993: 215–8; 1995: 45–8). These triggered movements demanding for representation in the state, first from middle and later working classes, with the consequence that in the struggle for ownership competing classes increasingly identified their fate with the state. The military effect was much the same: the power of the

nation state model lay in being able to draw on the energies of its whole population through its conscripted citizen armies. This ensured its universal diffusion.

A cultural or ethno-symbolic approach, operating in tension with the above statist accounts has examined how warfare may give rise to *national* communities that shape state formation (Smith 1981; Hutchinson 2009, 2017). First, wars may generate myths around climactic events whose narratives endow populations with a sense of meaning and unique destiny. John Armstrong (1982) has examined how polities and /or populations in the struggles between Christians and Muslims led to particular polities and their populations defining themselves as border guards of their civilizations. Second, Anthony Smith (1981) discussed how recurring dyadic wars with neighbors may produce and harden "we–they" ethnic stereotypes in state propaganda that result in collective self-differentiation. Third, the intense emotions generated in war have given rise to public rituals that in turn produce a sense of in-group commonality. George Mosse (1990) and Reinhart Kosselleck (2002), pioneered the study of great national commemorative festivals, including those devoted to the myth of the fallen soldier, as a form of surrogate religion. In Durkheimian terms, such commemorations created a cult around the remembrance of the dead, which functioned to renew social cohesion, committing survivors in honor of the dead to the (national) values for which they sacrificed. Fourth, the outcomes of war, both of victory and defeat, shape nation formation (see Hutchinson 2017: ch.2). Victory especially in liberation wars may be said to canonize a revolutionary generation, but arguably defeat has more radicalizing potential since in the era of nationalism it can be seen to represent a failure of the people itself (Horne 2008:16-7). This can lead to demands for a thorough moral and socio-political transformation of existing institutions, including a search for scapegoats that may include "corrupt" governing classes or the scapegoating of minorities

(Schivelbusch 2003). All four of these factors can result in the embedding of myths and narratives of war in the everyday culture of the society.

However, in the contemporary age, it is claimed that several factors challenge both state sovereignty and national identities. First, the destructive impact of the two World Wars demonstrated the dangers and impotence of nation states and resulted in the establishment of global and regional institutions to govern relations between states. Second, transnational military revolutions have produced a shift from mass conscription to professional militaries and a civilian style of society in the developed West. Third, there is a shift in the West to risk-transfer wars in foreign conflict zones that are justified by universal rather than national mandates. Fourth is the proliferation of intra-state "new wars" in post-colonial countries, originating in global processes, that subvert nation-building and require cosmopolitan solutions. Finally, in a post-imperial world the growing suspicion of the military narratives of Western nation states and an awareness of the victims of war erodes the heroic myths that valorize national identities.

Contemporary warfare, globalization and the erosion of nation–states

<p>Underpinning such arguments are assumptions that there is a shift from a world of nation states into a post-national era, one of global interdependence, in which interstate war between advanced states is curbed by the UN Charter and inhibited by the spread of weapons of mass destruction, whereas there is a proliferation of "new" intrastate wars in postcolonial states. This calls into question the nexus between warfare and nation- and state-formation. I will first elaborate on these claims before arguing they are overdrawn and articulate a West Eurocentric perspective that even in its own terms has to be qualified.

First, there is a scholarly consensus since 1945 that nationalism has been associated with destructive world war and genocide which has led to global and regional initiatives (including the establishment of the UN and the European Union) to replace the realpolitik of nation states. John Mueller (2004) is an outlier in arguing that the World Wars merely advanced a sentiment developing before 1914 that viewed the institution of war as a barbaric relic of the past. But many scholars maintain that the World Wars reversed the positive relationship between war and nation and state. These were total wars that so far from revitalizing nations threatened to destroy their populations. George Mosse (1990) maintained that in 1914 war became a mass mechanized phenomenon that created death on an unprecedented scale and elicited not a sense of heroism but anonymous victimhood. The Second World War completed the destruction of the romantic myth, by blurring the distinction between fighters and civilians, notably in the aerial devastation of cities and the introduction of (nuclear) armaments that indicated that future wars might entail the annihilation of nations (Mosse 1990: 201, 223–4). These wars witnessed large scale ethnic cleansing, culminating in the attempted genocide of the Armenians by Young Turkish nationalists (1915), and in the Holocaust. Martin Shaw has argued that the wars of industrial states tend to degenerate to kill populations indiscriminately, since civilians are participants in the vast chain of economic production and distribution now integral to the war effort (Shaw 2003: 23–6). Indeed, as the century has progressed, there has been a remarkable rise in the proportions of non-combatant deaths in war.

W. H. McNeill contended that the World Wars represent the end of the European nation state as a sovereign actor. The economic and partial military command integration of the Allied Powers (Britain, France, and the USA) in the later stages of the First World War was a precursor of the transnational forms of military co-ordination achieved in its successor (McNeill 1984:

343–4). The wars threw up, as hegemons, global superpowers of continental scale, the USA and the USSR, proponents of rival universalist ideologies that entailed the irrelevance of nationalism. In short, since 1945 there has been a profound revulsion in much of Europe against nationalism, now blamed for the origins and excesses of these wars, accompanied by a scepticism about the viability of nation states.

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 seemed to introduce a new global template when its Charter outlawed war between states, except under special circumstances. Following the Nuremberg Trials, the UN established conventions in 1948 that obliged its members to advance principles of human rights and prevent crimes against humanity. The "memory" of the Holocaust has increasingly provided moral foundations for the transition from a world of national sovereignty toward a more global civil society of which the recent proliferation of human rights regimes is the manifestation (Levy and Sznaider 2004: 147–50, 155). There has also been a new attention paid to the victims of war. After the Rwanda massacres the UN formulated in 2005 the Responsibility to Protect principles. Although not legally binding, these asserted that sovereignty is not a right, but a responsibility, one which should be enforced by the international community through sanctions and in the last resort military intervention in cases of genocide.

A further outcome was the formation of the European Union as a supranational project to resolve the rivalries of the great European nation *states,* now perceived as threatening the very existence of national *peoples* and convert the continent into a zone of peace and democratic progress. Memories of the World Wars, viewed as fratricidal civil wars, have been "the European other" which proponents of the European project have invoked when the drive for integration has been challenged by defenders of nation state sovereignty (Wellings and Power

2016). Its advocates view the EU as a realization of a new international politics of reconciliation, begun by the agreement of two historic rivals, France and (West) Germany, to co-operate in building a new Europe. An essential factor was West Germany's willingness to acknowledge the sins of the Nazi period (notably in its educational system), and make material and symbolic reparations to the victims of the war. A key moment was the public contrition of Willy Brandt in 1970, expressed in his kneeling before the Warsaw Memorial to the Jewish heroes of the ghetto uprising in 1943 (Rauer 2006). Levy and Sznaider (2002: 100–3) have claimed after the Stockholm conference of 2000 the prevention of another Holocaust became the civilizational foundation of a new European project.

This has led Bernard Giesen to argue that trauma has become the basis of a new European identity and that Europe's means of mastering its violent past by rituals of apology and restitution provides a model for overcoming historic conflicts world-wide. To its supporters, the EU offers a more humble and pacific alternative to the militaristic and messianic USA in the global advancement of human rights and democracy (Giesen 2003). The politics of reconciliation seems to have taken off, in the form of transitional justice mechanisms in which groups in bitterly divided societies acknowledge and seek forgiveness for historical mutual atrocities are regarded as keys to future peace and stability within states. In a study entitled, *The Guilt of Nations*, Elazar Barkan maintains that such restitutive politics marks a replacement of martial *realpolitik* by morality in the conduct of international relations (Barkan 2000: xvi).

A second destabilizing development arises from post 1945 transnational military revolutions that have produced a shift from mass conscription to professional militaries and a civilianization of society in the developed West (See King 2013: 208–10). Michael Howard (1976) has argued that the rise of high precision technologies and nuclear weaponry has made

obsolete conscription armies with the result that state elites are no longer required to invoke

nationalism as a mobilizing ideology. During the Cold War the nuclear stand-off between the

USA and the USSR resulted in a long peace on the European continent.   With professional

volunteers now responsible for national defense, the close relationship between the military and

the national collective has been loosened as one of the pillars of the mass nation state, universal

conscription, has gone (Posen 1993).

In Europe the rights to citizenship became detached from the obligation to bear arms in

national defense. There has been a general demilitarization of mature European democracies,

after the end of the Cold War, where spending on national defense has rapidly declined in favor

of the welfare system, which now provides the social cement of the democratic nation state.

Modern middle-class democracies, it is argued, are now casualty averse and suspicious of

military campaigns of choice that degenerate into brutality, exemplified in the Vietnam War

(Merom 2003: ch.3; Carruthers 2014). Many explain this by demography: as fertility now

declines to bare replacement rates, so parents are less willing to sacrifice their children to war

(Lachmann 2013). This will be exacerbated by the rapid ageing of the populations of the great

powers, including China, which is already producing a redistribution of resources from the

military to welfare and pensions, as well as threatening the economic growth necessary to sustain

the military (Haas 2012).

In the West, war is now perceived as a moral anomaly rather than a constituent feature of

the state system, and many observers fear that the reduction of the military threatens to make it a

marginal actor in the larger society, with which it appears now at odds. The post war period has

seen many large-scale pacifist demonstrations, directed at nuclear armaments and successive

military campaigns from Suez to the Second Gulf War.   Howard (1976: 142–3) has warned that

the dominant culture of consumerism and individualism is likely to undermine in the long run the morale of a military, committed to hierarchy, discipline, and self-sacrifice, as part of a distinctive mission to the nation state. The old stoical response to fatality, reinforced by religion, is in decline, replaced by a concern for the security and well-being of individuals. Senior officers in Western democracies fear the loss of respect for the distinctive military vocation, and the impact on military morale of the pressures of a global civil society expressed in a declining tolerance for state violence and a concern for human rights and for war violations (Forster 2006: 1048–9).

A third development is that although Western powers continue to engage in military interventions in conflict zones, they now justify them as "peace-keeping" expeditions under United Nations rather than national mandates. These are wars of international coalitions that, it is claimed, require a new "post-heroic" ethos, unlike the previous existential conflicts that inspired mass nationalist passions (Luttwak 1995). After 1945 the disintegration of their empires appeared to entail the gradual disengagement of European states, with the approval of the USA, from the rest of the world. However, many of the new *soi-disant* nation states that emerged were extremely fragile. Because of intensified global interconnectedness of the contemporary world they have become sources of security problems, and subject to calls for external intervention to restore peace and create stable civic institutions (ie state-building). Although the collapse of Communism inspired hopes of a harmonious new world order, it also triggered state disintegration and ethnic cleansings in the Balkans and elsewhere, that produced waves of refugees that destabilized neighboring states as well as offering centres for international terrorism.

In the past European imperial powers engaged in many "small wars" when establishing and enforcing colonial rule, but foreign military missions are now much more problematic.

Before, empires drew many of their troops from the colonies themselves: the Indian army was termed the "fire-brigade" of the British Empire (Barkawi 2006: 61). This colonial manpower, however, is no longer available, imperialism is now discredited, and the global diffusion of nationalist ideologies and repertoires of popular resistance, including appeals to world public opinion, make armed interventions much more costly, and the finding of collaborators (on which empires depended) more difficult (Moran 2006: 31–5).

Moreover, to justify military intrusions into distant regions and override state sovereignty, the great powers must increasingly obtain a mandate from a world community invoking UN charter provisions, and their tasks are no longer the acquisition of territory and glory, but conflict-resolution and state-building via developmental programs, to support which they employ "hearts and minds" strategies. In reality, they tend to get drawn into asymmetrical conflict with one of the warring sides that alienates the local populations. The costs for intervening states have encouraged a shift towards what Martin Shaw (2005) calls risk-transfer wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that seek to minimize the military and civilian losses that could undermine the legitimacy of the interventions. This includes a targeting of enemy combatants with high precision weapons, a shift of risks of ground combat to local allies where possible, the avoidance of direct and open civilian killings, through indirect and less visible forms of long-distance weaponry, such as drones.

This leads us to consider the increase outside the West in intra-state wars and question the continued salience of nationalism. Kjell Holsti (2000: 146) noted that since the Second World War that the number of intra-state wars to inter-state wars (excluding anti-colonial wars) is in a ratio of 7:1 and these stretch from the Balkans to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Dubbed "new wars", these, Mary Kaldor (2006) claims, are enabled by global processes such as the arms

trade and the fragmention of states into ethnic units. In such contexts, nationalism is increasingly irrelevant and she looks to a cosmopolitan politics as an alternative.

The term "new wars" contrasts with Clausewitz's wars between states which were more or less discrete, fought by the official military units for political ends and for control of territory and ended by decisive battles and peace agreements, regulated by international law. Such wars resulted in a stabilization of territorial borders and a centralization of political authority out of which the concept of nationality and citizenship emerged. What is novel is that violence (genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape) is directed at civilians not as a side effect but as a strategy. They are characterized by "de-statization": funded not through taxation but through criminality and plunder, by an "autonomization" of the forms of violence in which state forces have lost control over the conduct of war, and where a focus is on the domination of populations and resources rather than territories (Kaldor 2006: ch. 4) Here, war has become a way of life and a form of a predatory political economy that is destructive to collective identities.

Although there are parallels with premodern conflicts, Munkler (2005: ch.1) and Kaldor maintain contemporary struggles in Africa and parts of Asia have a postmodern global character. The new context is of a proliferation of weak states that lack internal legitimacy in a world subject to global processes, particularly an absorption into a neo-liberal economy, that they are powerless to regulate. Internal struggles cannot be described as civil wars since there is little concept of state, citizenship or borders.   Moreover, external actors (competing ideological blocs, large-scale diasporas, and NGOS) intervene to keep these conflicts going indefinitely. A global arms trade supplying inexpensive Kalashnikovs, makes decentralized guerrilla struggles cheap to run. The result has been the sustaining of protracted low intensity warfare that would repeatedly

flare up. Therefore, Kaldor maintains that the ideological state-building narratives of nationalism no longer apply to such conflicts. These are rather identity wars where ethnic classifications are used by predatory leaders as a means of subverting the state or in the process of achieving (communal) ethnic cleansing. This has inspired peace-keeping operations in Bosnia where international organizations have sought to de-ethnicize the warring factions, construct neutral symbols and institutions, and prosecute war criminals.

These four developments have, it is maintained, undermined the heroic ethos of war and transformed the way it is conceived and commemorated. As nation states have lost sovereignty in a global age and their homogeneity has been eroded by large-scale immigration from former colonies, so their heroic progress stories, embodied in great public monuments to the glorious dead, have lost their validity. The horrors of the Second World War have encouraged a deconstructive skepticism about the myths of the dominant nationality that in turn has exposed the oppression of previously marginalized populations, and promoted a multicultural relativism. In the contemporary world the focus is on the victims of war, one expression of which is the institutionalization of Holocaust Days which express a universalist condemnation of genocides and mass ethnic cleansings.

Christopher Coker (2004) and Jay Winter (2017) date this turn earlier to the mechanized mass slaughter of the First World War. As a result, western societies lost faith in the civic patriotism able to invest death on the battlefield with meaning. The tombs to the Unknown Soldier and Edward Lutyens's abstract Cenotaph to the dead, indicated that with the triumph of industrial technology war had become agent-less. Soldiers are no longer warriors given individuality and meaning by a shared national *telos* but have become anonymous victims (Coker 2004: 14). Jay Winter has interpreted commemorations of the dead after the First World

War in Britain and France as sites of mourning rather than national celebration (Winter 1995: chs 4,8) and in his latest book charts a long-term decline in older notions of glory in France, Britain, and Germany (Winter 2017). He observes the persistence of traditional religious symbolism in the depiction of the dead that expresses a sense of loss. Mosse argues that this demonstrated the weakening hold of the national cult. After 1945 in Britain there was also a trend away from the public sacralization of the dead in monument-building focused on the national *collectivity* towards the utilitarian provision of recreational facilities that served the *individual* needs of the people. In the West and beyond, history has become, with the development of a heritage industry, a means of entertainment and nostalgia rather than of collective revival (Mosse 1990: 220–1; also Nora 1996).

With the absence of a sacralizing narrative, there is an increasing tendency to view the military dead as victims. The Vietnam Wall (1982) in the USA is an important emblem of this long-term shift from heroic towards traumatic remembrance and has displaced the Arlington Cemetery and the tomb to the Unknown Soldier as the most visited memorial site (Lachmann 2013: 61). The architect, Maya Lin, of Asian descent and a woman, deliberately rejected masculinist "phallic" celebratory forms and nationalist iconography, in designing low black walls that descend into the earth, on which the names of the dead were inscribed. The focus is on individual mortality and loss. Lacking therefore a didactic national context, it aimed to encourage an individualistic and constructivist stance to the past that undermines the idea of an objectified moral collective (Edkins 2003: ch. 3)

In contemporary Britain, many memorials to the dead in post war military campaigns eschew references to a national or a religious mission. The recent "homecoming" ceremonies of Wootton Bassett, a small military town in Wiltshire, where coffins draped in Union Jacks

processed through the main street, appeared to mark a shift away from didactic official monumentalism to a memorialization that is local, "non-political" and performative (Freeden 2011).   Anthony King has observed that military press releases set the dead as individuals closely knit to families and bound by professional loyalties to soldier comrades (King 2010). He argues in Durkheimian terms that what integrates the military with the wider public is not a shared sense of national purpose but rather a respect for the ethos of professionalism that pervades modern societies (King 2013: ch. 12).   This raises questions about symbolic and emotional resonance of national events such as Remembrance Day.

Jay Winter understands this as an expression of a "second memory boom" that emerged in the 1970s (Winter 2006). Whereas the first boom in the later nineteenth century sanctified the emerging mass nation states, this now focuses on the traumas and losers of history. A key event was the growing consciousness of the enormity of the Holocaust and its challenge to the triumphal telos of the European nation states. We earlier noted arguments that remembrance of the Holocaust, abstracted from its specific context, has become cosmopolitan. In a globalized modern world, characterized by the transcending of boundaries, it provides the foundations for a global politics of human rights based on earlier remembered barbarism (Levy and Sznaider 2005: 25). Holocaust guilt has created an ethos of "never again" and a justification as well as an obligation to act to prevent future mass murders (Levy and Sznaider 2002: 101).

There has been general deconstructive scepticism on the part of Western societies to national pasts, and associated monuments and rituals. The task of peace-keeping both internationally and domestically is to achieve reconciliation by persuading participants in conflicts to acknowledge the historical grievances of the other (Barkan 2000). South Africa has been a setting for what are called Transitional Justice Mechanisms and this took the form of

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (Meskell 2006). Together these arguments suggest that global developments (economic, political, demographic, and cultural) have transformed the nature of war, making it increasingly inimical to nations, states, and the ideology of nationalism on which they rest.

While these points have some force, they require heavy qualification. They reflect a West European perspective and nationalism and military commitment remain strong in many areas of the world. Casualty aversion is related to the legitimacy of specific wars, not of war itself. Even far-distant humanitarian "wars of choice" though justified by universal mandates are ultimately sustained by coalitions of nation–states and may reinforce a sense of national allegiance.   Outside the West, many of the "new wars" are far from novel in their features and contribute to nation- and state-formation. Finally, although commemoration of the war dead is contested and is more individualistic in its expression, it relies on repertoires and practices that are embedded in everyday life and the frameworks provided by "sacred" ceremonial occasions, whose resonance remains as potent as ever. This will be explored in the next section.

<h2>Collective trauma and nationalist mobilization

<p>To what extent has mass mechanized warfare with all its destructiveness lost its capacity to create heroes and regenerating collective myths? Has there been a shift away from military retribution in favor of restitution? This perspective seems very West Eurocentric. As Winter (2017: 126, 162) acknowledges, outside Europe there have been a succession of major interstate

wars, between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Israel and Arab states, and China and Vietnam, as well as the American struggle against North Vietnam, which generated national heroes and collective sentiments.

Indeed, in Asia in contrast to Western Europe, recollections of the Second World War have inflamed national hatreds. Memories of Japanese aggression and atrocities rather than fading intensified over the period. In large part, this is because of the apparent failure of the Japanese government unlike their German counterparts, to offer sincere expressions of apology and appropriate compensation to former victims. A contributing factor is the sense of "double victimhood" in the population, imposed by the Japanese war leadership and by a ruthless USA that targeted them with nuclear weapons (Hein 2010: 153–5). For a long time authoritarian governments in Asia, anxious to obtain Japanese economic investment after the war, saw it in their interest to curb popular anti-Japanese sentiment. However, in more recent decades democratization in South Korea and the Chinese Communist party's effective abandonment of Marxism and search for alternative legitimations has led to a resurgence of popular nationalism focused on the Nanjing massacre and the exploitation of "comfort women" (Berger 2010).   In China the sufferings of war and foreign occupation, deeply felt at a popular level, have become part of an official national cult, institutionalized in "national days of humiliation" to buttress the Communist regime and its territorial claims on Japan and Taiwan (Callahan 2010: ch.3).

Even in the case of the European continent and North America, however, the idea that World Wars have fundamentally eroded an identification with the nation and heroic martial traditions needs strong qualification.

First, the popular image of the First World War, is of one dominated by immobile trench warfare, at least on the Western front, lacking obvious individual heroes and agency (except for

fighter pilots or exotic figures such as Lawrence of Arabia) and whose futility was immortalized by the British war poets. However, as Jay Winter and Antoine Prost observed (2005: vii), the First World War was seen in heroic terms by the French as an existential war on their own territory that ended with their defeat of the Germans and the recovery of their lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. A recent study of popular English historical pageants of the interwar period shows the war being integrated in celebratory style into a "Whiggish" teleology that depicted British military history as part of a struggle for liberty dating back to the Elizabethan period, if not before (Barth et al 2017).

The Second World War, in contrast to its predecessor, was one of high drama and of dynamic movement, in which star generals rose to prominence (Rommel, Montgomery, Patton, MacArthur, Zhukov) in epic conflicts, decisive naval battles were fought in the Pacific, and fighter pilots who became "aces" in the Battle of Britain.   Heroism was not necessarily linked to military individuals but was also an attribute of populations – of the peoples of Stalingrad and Leningrad, of Londoners who were unbowed by the "Blitz", and of the participants in the Warsaw Rising. The *outcome* of the war was demoralizing for much of Western Europe because the continental peoples had to be liberated by external actors (demonstrating the failure of the auto-emancipation myth of nationalism).

For the victors the Second World War had the status of the "good war" against "evil" (Schrijvers 2014).   This has framed and justified subsequent military actions in the post war era: Anthony Eden and George Bush constructed parallels between Hitler's aggression and Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. The USA and the Soviet Union used the war experience to advance their claims of moral and political leadership of the world. Both suffered military humiliations, the USA in Vietnam, and the USSR in Afghanistan.

But the military in the USA have been central symbols of national prestige and regularly waged large scale conventional wars from Korea to Desert Storm. In Russia itself, after the collapse of communism, the core Soviet myth of the great patriotic war was initially repudiated as legitimizing a failed socialist experiment. After the decline of Yeltsin, however, Putin revived Russian Soviet symbols such as the national anthem, commemorations of military veterans, and a willingness to conduct costly wars in the Caucasus and Georgia and currently the Ukraine and Syria (Krylova 2004).

In Eastern Europe the memories of World Wars intensified national consciousness and had the effect of provoking West–East tensions. The First World War could be celebrated as marking their liberation from imperial yokes.   In contrast, the Second World War marked their "betrayal" by the Western powers who, in the Munich agreement of 1938 and at the Yalta conference in 1945, had condoned their imperial oppression at the hands of both the Germans and the (Soviet) Russians. After the Soviet collapse, there was a revival of ethnicized national pasts to find an alternative value system for the new states and to make sense of their recent experience. Previously suppressed memories against German and Russian occupation were expressed in the establishment of museums of occupation (e.g. in Estonia) and celebrations of popular resistance (e.g. of the Warsaw Rising).   Key moments of Second World War commemoration have triggered Polish and Baltic demands for Russia to repudiate Stalin's legacy of conquest and for the West to acknowledge the equal status of victims of Communism and Nazism (Mälksoo 2009).   Suspicions of French and German willingness to accommodate first the USSR and later Russia have led to support for US defense bases in Eastern Europe and for the USA's invasion of Iraq in contradiction to the West European mainstream.

A second point of tension is over the recognition of the Holocaust. Over five and half million of the six million Jews murdered suffered their fate in countries that became communist after the war, the memory of which was suppressed. As we observed, a Holocaust consciousness has become central to the European project. In the East, a sense of competitive national victimhood occurred, in which there was an unwillingness to acknowledge the victim status of others, notably the Jews and Roma (Assmann 2007: 16–17; Harris 2012: 350–3). The revalidation of interwar nation states and their elites, following the "long night" of Communism, also led to the heroization of nationalists imbued with extreme anti-semitism. Those seeking to uncover the dark past of anti-Jewish pogroms and collaboration with the Germans have encountered public hostility because of its "insult" to a fragile sense of national pride (Himka and Michlic 2014, introduction).

Western Europe then is arguably peculiar – both in historical terms and as a region in the contemporary world in enjoying an unusually long period of extended peace. In many parts of the world nationalism and a cult of martial virtues remain strong. Nation state leaders in Europe have presented themselves as having a continued civilizing role in the world, via a European Union that employs soft power as opposed to the USA to advance human rights and democracy. The European peculiarity, however, may not last as we move into a more unstable multi-polar world, indicated by the crisis in the Ukraine and doubts about President Trump's commitment to NATO, which has led to demands by some European leaders for re-militarization.

<h1>The nation–state and its military

<p>What of the trend in Western states towards civilianization arising from the reduction of military budgets? Can we view the decline of conscription armies either as a cause or consequence of an alleged loss of saliency of nationalism? A historical perspective suggests that there has been a recurring debate in many countries about the status of the military as defender or opponent of national values. Moreover, although many countries introduced conscription as a means of national integration there is no clear relationship between the two.

War is not the only or necessarily the most significant source of national identification, which can rest on multiple foundations, for example, democratic constitutions, distinctive religious beliefs, and cultural achievements. There is a long history of national debates about the balance between military requirements and citizen satisfactions (guns versus butter arguments). In Britain and the USA mass conscription, except in wartime, was seen as portending a statist threat to national liberties. During the nineteenth century smaller countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands, relied on the idea of a popular mobilization rather than a standing army to deter invasion. (Horne 2003: 112–6)

The classic study by Eugene Weber (1976) seemed to support arguments that link the introduction of conscription and mass education to the successful nationalist indoctrination of the masses in late nineteenth century France. Nevertheless, these innovations were themselves triggered by humiliating national defeat and the loss of Alsace–Lorraine. In other words, nationalist sentiment was a cause as much as a consequence of a moral and organizational rearmament of society. In contrast, conscription in Italy and Spain failed to produce a strong sense of national cohesion (Centeno 2002: 242). Conscription in peacetime has often been resisted by populations unless there is a sense of pervasive threat (Enloe 1980: 82–3).

This last point is crucial. The supposed unwillingness of the democracies to endure sacrifices has little to do with whether armies are conscripts or professional volunteers. The key question is whether the nation appears to be under threat. Politicians when they need to arouse large-scale popular support almost invariably justify the resort to war as essential for the defense of the nation   The legitimacy of wars is rarely questioned if the military campaign is attended with rapid success. However, wars on foreign soil without a clear defensive rationale generally become unpopular once they run into difficulties when the death of individual soldiers tends to be portrayed in tragic terms. The unpopularity of wars provokes casualty aversion, not vice versa (Scheipers 2014: 11). Particularly problematic in the postwar period are those perceived as imperialistic wars and as divisive of the nation, e.g. Suez for Britain and Vietnam for the USA. Where a war lacks legitimacy or is contentious, particularly among the political elites, conflicts over the draft have further weakened support for the war (Carruthers 2014). During the Vietnam War the draft heightened tensions as it was perceived to be racially and socially skewed, suggesting that African–Americans and the white working class were bearing the burdens of an unpopular war compared to white middle class university-educated youth who avoided enlistment.   As a result, after Vietnam the US moved to a professional volunteer army. Nonetheless, when the homeland itself was attacked, in 9/11 there was a powerful and sustained support for external intervention, and the US population have mobilized strongly around the military as representative of the nation.

The national bases of international missions

<p>Where a sense of existential threat is not present, what effective justifications can be found to sustain external interventions that are "wars of choice"?   Is the maintenance of international law and humanitarian ideals able to inspire popular backing for foreign missions?   In spite of appearances, I will argue that such interventions may reinforce the salience of nationalism as a legitimating force.

Levy and Sznaider (2002) argue that the memory of the Holocaust came to be salient as a justification of international interventions from the time of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Cheyney Ryan, however, makes an important distinction between reasons that justify and those that motivate action (Ryan 2014: 126–8).   The former may be couched in universalist terms (e.g. the prevention of genocide), notably to the international community. But effective interventions are made by coalitions of *nation state*s who are able to mobilize support among their population by appeals to national interests, ideal and material (e.g. security).

International coalitions, in spite of their difficulties, can strengthen national identities. Japanese and German leaders (the latter in the case of Kosovo) have been able to "normalize" their nation states by justifying military expeditions abroad, previously forbidden under their respective constitutions, as part of their international obligations. Coalitions create significant challenges for militaries: the problems of divided commands and separate forces answering to national governments. But they may also strengthen national identifications among their publics – when invidious comparisons are made with the contributions of other nations or when complaints are made that their nation is being drawn into an unnecessary conflict by a hegemonic power (the USA).

The goals themselves, when they envisage the construction of state institutions based on civic conceptions and new neutral symbols of territorial nationhood tend to reinforce

assumptions that the global political norm is nation statehood.   Where the significant

foundations of state and national institutions already exist, as in much though not all, of the

former Yugoslavia, interventions could have at least partial success. In the absence of such

foundations (e.g. in Afghanistan), establishing stable and successful states is a task of decades

and beyond patience of Western populations, while it is very doubtful that nations themselves

(on which most successful states are built) can be engineered by external agents.   Nations are, in

the eyes of their adherents, autochthonous. If nations arise from interventions it will generally be

in resistance to them.

There is little evidence of the long-term effectiveness of aerial weaponry and drones:

indeed the "collateral damage" ensuing may undermine "hearts and minds" strategies directed at

the general population (Johnson 2014: 70–2). Breakdowns in military discipline in asymmetric

struggles together with popular doubts about the rationale of international interventions remain a

problem for the military. It is instructive that generals have repeatedly insisted on the importance

of public support for the troops even if they do not agree with the reasons offered by

governments for military interventions. There is popular sympathy for the predicaments of the

armed services. Although there may be reactions against the government or even the state, the

military can be pictured simultaneously as victims of the state and heroes of the nation.

<h1>The Old Features of New Wars

<p>How novel then are the "new wars" and to what extent are they working in tandem with

global forces to undermine the possibility of nation- and state-building?   The case for the

disintegrative effects of contemporary conflicts is strongest in Africa but while a new global

context is relevant, the driving force lies in the unresolved problems of the colonial legacy. Many states were by Weberian standards judicial fictions, they had few pre-European collective traditions and their boundaries, inherited from the colonial unit, were not closely matched with ethnographic boundaries. Imperial policies of divide and rule had resulted in minority groups being allocated privileged power positions, which was challenged during the decolonization processes and resulted in inter-ethnic conflicts. This was exacerbated by the freezing of the territorial map after the Second World War and also by agreements of the Organization of the African Union to avoid a reconsideration of state boundaries. The effective banning of war between states except under limited circumstances meant in Africa conflicts with neighbors took indirect forms, with states seeking to advance their claims to resources by giving support to rebel groups.

This is one reason for the prevalence of intra-state over interstate wars. There are, indeed, some novel global contexts, but many are so only in their scale or intensity. Several have a long history: the transfer of ideas and resources from diaspora to places of conflict, the role of transnational organizations (in the past religious missions) that often sided with resistance movements, and flows of arms**.** Hew Strachan (2006) asserts that what is novel is not the phenomenon of new wars themselves, but the decision of Kaldor to widen the definition of war to include features that would in the past be viewed as brigandage or, at best, as revolution.

Claims that these are identity wars founder on the inability to easily divorce identity from ideological politics. The so-called decentralized Balkan wars of genocide in 1990s (on which Kaldor's thesis was based) were highly organized nationalist campaigns that relied on state structures (Malešević 2010: 325). They were powerful agents of nation state building, mobilizing popular movements in the homelands and the diaspora producing a legacy of

historical memories that were used to legitimize the new polities. The new global context, is of a multipolar world (rather like the long nineteenth century) in which we find a series of great states – China, Russia, India, and Iran, emerging to challenge USA hegemony, each appealing in different ways to a sense of national mission.

<h2>Postmodern fragmentation and the end of nationalist monumentalism?

<p>The increasingly destructive character of war and its association with genocide has led to a more tragic conception of history that focuses on its victims. This has been reinforced by the fact that most nation states have formed relatively recently from the collapse of empires in three convulsive waves: first in 1914–18 in Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, after 1945 in Asia and Africa, and finally in Eurasia after 1990. Although the achievement of independence produced heroic liberation myths, many of these new states defined their identities in terms of centuries of subjugation, martyrdom, and victimhood.   Independence and its aftermath was also frequently accompanied by civil wars and ethnic cleansings as nationalists dealt with "the unfinished business of unwelcome minorities on their soil or of unrealized irredentist agendas". To what extent has this transformed the public memorialization of war and eroded a sense of national identity on which states have traditionally rested?

The notion of "trauma" tied to collective victimhood is misleading if it suggests the idea of a breach of meaning arising out of overwhelming experiences that produce broken peoples unable to come to terms with their pasts.   A claim of "victimhood" is often a strategic *choice* (is an exercise of agency) and in the past has been linked with religious eschatologies that interpret apparent disaster as being ordained by God or History to confirm one's chosenness as a people,

in the cases of the Jews and of the Serbs. "Victimhood" may be constructed to co-exist with heroic narratives, sometimes in tension with and sometimes reinforcing the latter. Constructing one's nation as a victim is often to make claims on others. It can also be a ploy of political elites to divert popular attention when their legitimacy was threatened, as with the Chinese Communist regime's use of "a century of a humiliation" motif in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. Such self-victimization tends to reinforce exclusive ethnic conceptions of nationality. Populations which perceive themselves as victims are often blind to the oppressed status of other groups. Indeed, attempts by peace-making historical revisionists to deconstruct hegemonic myths and explore their intolerant consequences may stir up a backlash in populations resentful of having founding or legitimation myths questioned.

It might be argued, however, that the changing character of war in the contemporary world together with post imperial guilt has in the dominant nation states of the West produced a scepticism about the national past that results in a rejection of monumental and official "memorialization". Jay Winter, we saw, contrasts a first memory boom in the late nineteenth century designed to integrate state, regime and nation with a second boom that focuses on the traumatic identity politics of minorities. What has been distinctive about the European present, however, after the collapse of the USSR is the absence of an obvious neighboring military threat until very recently.

The character of national memorialization has changed. As Winter and Mosse observe, the strong religious symbolism of the mass public and local commemorations after the two World Wars demonstrated a desire to make sense of overwhelming loss rather than a triumphal nationalism. But such symbolism (in France, the iconographical cult of St Joan, and in England the images of the village graveyard) often contained strong national connotations. Whatever, the

intentions of the initiators, the siting of monuments like the Cenotaph next to the British parliament and of the Vietnam Wall close to the Washington and Lincoln monuments inevitably gave them a national significance. Even the Wall, whose design initially eschewed the national, increasingly took on such meaning, as a flag and heroic statuary were added in response to pressures from veterans, and a variety of messages were left by mourners.   Indeed, by recognizing the sacrifice of soldiers in a war previously viewed with deep ambivalence, it came to be seen as a necessary instrument of national reconciliation (Edkins 2003: 73–8; Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991: 395–6, 404–8)

Although many attempts to honor the dead of recent wars are communal and demotic and there is a strong focus on the loss as personal, the language of the popular press indicates a widespread thirst for heroes. In Britain, although the spontaneous "homecoming" ceremonies of Wootton Bassett for the returning dead self-consciously eschewed ennobling nationalist grand narratives (Freeden, 2011: 4,6,7), they were rapidly absorbed into a national frame. The regular televising of these processions made them national as well as local events so that they attracted "pilgrims" from far and wide. Prince Charles visited the town to thank the people for their reverence for the dead. The renaming of the town as Royal Wootton Bassett completed the process of the local and demotic being absorbed into the public iconography of the nation state.

This is dependent on the continuing relevance of larger national commemorative rituals that hark back to foundational war experiences, which in countries like Britain, USA, France, and Australia act as master frames for subsequent wars. Indeed, what is impressive is that, in spite (or perhaps *because)* of the many secular changes within contemporary societies, they retain their power. Such public ceremonies "work" because they are underpinned by a popular awareness of the events to which they refer. In Britain there is a never-ending thirst for

documentaries, comedies, and fictional stories about the two World Wars. Images of the great events of the Second World War – of the Blitz, Dunkirk, and El-Alamein are regularly cited by politicians to justify policies and mobilize support, and journalists "playfully" evoke memories of the Huns on the eve of sporting occasions featuring the Germans. In Australia Paul Keating linked the "betrayals" of Gallipoli (vividly depicted in Peter Weir's film, *Gallipoli*, in 1981) and of Singapore to subsequent repudiations of British obligations to Australia in order to justify his republican stance. In the banal nationalism of daily life the images of war provide a store of meaning through which individuals and communities reflect on the everyday problems of their lives. This provides the soil in which public commemorations live.

Moreover, wars are recalled because of the unpredictability of the modern world, in which many states and their populations have been periodically subject to crises. Populations are forced regularly to consider *existential* (and in a sense pre-political) questions of who they are and what they stand for. Inevitably they are drawn to consider the relevance of the stock of older myth-images, where they are available, in order to reformulate programs and mobilize populations in defense of the nation. Hence, they turn to the recollection of great crises such as war that the collectivity has faced and overcome in the past which then provides hope for their future. All this suggests that while contemporary forms of war and wider global contexts may be transforming states and national identities they are not eroding their centrality in world politics.

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