'Extremely valuable work': British intelligence and the interrogation of refugees in London, 1941-45

This article focuses on the compulsory questioning of over 30,000 refugees who escaped to Britain during the Second World War and who were detained in London's Royal (Victoria) Patriotic School. It answers three questions: how did intelligence come to see non-British civilians as sources; what characteristics did refugees possess and how did these influence the information they shared; and who was interested in their accounts? It argues that, while this site was set up as an MI5 vetting camp for the identification of Axis agents, it quickly evolved into an intelligence-gathering centre, serving the interests of multiple departments and organisations.

It was March 1941 when Henry Taymans and Joseph Abts, two young students and cousins, escaped Nazi-occupied Brussels. The ensuing journey to Britain, where they planned to volunteer for the Free Belgian forces, was to last 77 days and saw them drive to Paris, take a train to Bordeaux, cross to Spain on foot, then to Portugal, and sail from Lisbon to Gibraltar. From there they boarded *HMS Argus*, which took them to England.[1] Upon arrival in mid-June, and before they could join the Allied forces, they had to be interrogated by War Office and Security Service officers, and possibly by Secret Intelligence Service ones as well. Although the report the War Office produced on their interrogation was a page long, it was enough to help photographic intelligence identify an ammunitions dump in Forêt de Soignes.[2]

Locating an ammunitions dump in a Belgian forest was no major intelligence coup. But consider that Taymans and Abts – whose escape story has been selected at random and was not uncommon – were two of over 30,000 people interrogated in the same way, and the value of such interrogations changes. Indeed, while many of these civilians were eager to share information, doing so was not optional: they were kept for days in London for the purpose, and their formal status was of persons under detention. The place of their detention was the Royal (Victoria) Patriotic School, often called Royal Patriotic School (RPS) or the London Reception Centre.[3] This is nevertheless a place about which we know very little. Any mentions made to it in historical work have been brief and descriptive,[4] and emphasised its counter-espionage functions

– that it was a Security Service (MI5) 'screening centre for aliens arriving from enemy territory', and a place where the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) could identify potential recruits.[5] At the same time, and while in his official account of wartime intelligence Sir Harry Hinsley too emphasised the camp's counter-espionage dimension,[6] he also acknowledged that refugees provided 'a steady flow of information about conditions in occupied Europe',[7] mentioning that a 'full and reliable account of the damage' caused during the St Nazaire raid was obtained this way.[8] Simona Tobia has also looked at the linguistic aspects of some of RPS's activities and through that angle argued that the camp was generally effective in collecting intelligence.[9]

Despite the thousands of lives it affected, the limited attention that RPS has attracted is unsurprising. This camp combines interrogation, which has only sporadically been studied as a stand-alone intelligence-gathering method for Britain in 1939-45,[10] and refugees, whose experiences tend to go under the historical radar,[11] despite their acknowledged value to intelligence.[12] Although not all those who passed through RPS would fall under subsequent legal definitions of 'refugee' – some were from neutral countries, others fled preventatively – the vast majority had indeed escaped occupied territory and reached the UK as civilians; the term refugee was therefore the umbrella term used to describe them and it is in this broader sense that it will be used here. A further reason why RPS remains unexamined is that it was not involved in any allegations of ill-treatment, and it is often such practices that trigger an interest in interrogation.[13]

Focusing on RPS from an intelligence perspective, this article has three aims. The first is to understand how intelligence came to be interested in the systematic interrogation of non-British civilians. This is important because there was no British precedent of large-scale, compulsory interrogations of refugees, even though some French and Belgian refugees were interrogated during the First World War, primarily in order to identify any agents among them than to obtain intelligence.[14] The second aim is to look at who those civilians were, expanding this way the focus from what was happening at the top, between the intelligence services, and

looking at the characteristics of the people involved. This is achieved through a survey analysis

of around 2,450 interrogation reports that the War Office produced in RPS, such as the one for

Taymans and Abts. The third and final aim is to look at who was interested in such accounts.

That RPS was maintained until May 1945 is not, in itself, evidence of it having produced good

intelligence, even though it does point to that direction: RPS involved the detention of mostly

Allied nationals and its continued existence must have been justified by proof of its value.

Moreover, RPS was kept secret from the public and Parliament, in an attempt to prevent any

scrutiny or criticism disrupting what can only be assumed to have been important work.[15] The

research answers this question of use by surveying 800 comments that RPS received from

various departments and organisations on the value of its work.

RPS as an intelligence centre

People like Taymans and Abts – non-Britons escaping to Britain – were not thought of as

potential intelligence assets when the war broke out. They were instead thought of as potential

enemy spies. Interrogation was therefore the process through which the state, and specifically

MI5, would determine 'whether the alien is a sheep or a goat'.[16] While only few people arrived

during the 'phoney war' to necessitate any special vetting arrangements, these became necessary

from the spring of 1940 following the invasion of the Low Countries and France. Those events

caused thousands of people to escape to the UK, even though the number who made it that

summer – approximately 35,000 people – was a fraction of the anticipated figures, due to the

rapid collapse of France.[17] From May 1940, therefore, systematic vetting interrogations were

undertaken at the ports by the newly-established B24 section of MI5. Those who aroused

suspicion following enquiries were handed to the police, the rest to the Ministry of Health which

would distribute them to billets.[18]

Staffed by former employees of British consulates in the now-occupied territories, B24's

interrogators were not trained in the task. In many cases, vetting meant that they would skim

through lists of arrivals and pick out any names that would 'strike a chord' in their memory.[19] The process left a Dutch woman horrified, as her own encounter with B24 convinced her that 'a few lies would have enabled any German spy or…any Dutch Fifth Columnist, to enter Harwich in a boatload of refugees'.[20] A Home Office committee reviewing the process in mid-May also expressed concerns,[21] while the Dutch Consul General visited the Home Office to warn that B24 had failed to spot Dutch Nazi Party members arriving among refugees.[22] Yet no change to the process could be carried out at that point. The authorities were already overwhelmed by the mass internment of Germans and Austrians which was ordered that summer, another consequence of widespread 'spy fever'. Problems existed at an organisational level as well. After Winston Churchill sacked Vernon Kell – MI5's only Director since 1909 – MI5's organisation 'had all but broken down'.[23] But vetting had to be an MI5 affair: refugees were solely seen as a security threat at this point. It was not until November that a different policy became feasible, long after most refugees had arrived and been billeted. By that point, large-scale evacuations from Europe were being restricted, with ships only allowed to admit those with visas.

In this context of restricted arrivals, vetting at the ports was to continue; but instead of letting *non-suspects* proceed for billeting, those for whom B24 found no special grounds for suspicion were from then on being sent to London for further interrogation.[24] Those for whom there was suspicion at the port continued being handed to the police as before, or to MI5's Camp 020 for captured Axis agents. It is for this reason that RPS in Wandsworth, South London was requisitioned in late 1940: to facilitate the detailed interrogation of those for whom there was no obvious reason to suspect them of espionage. Administratively, RPS was the responsibility of the Home Office, with guards provided by the War Office.[25] The decision of who would be released from the camp and when, however, was explicitly one for MI5.[26]

Although initially some groups were exempted from the process – such as Allied seamen due to the nature of their job – within weeks of RPS's opening and by the spring of 1941, very

few non-Britons were able to proceed from the ports straight for billeting. Indeed, children were now detained too alongside their mothers (both kept in a neighbouring building, which was physically separate from RPS but which on paper was part of the same establishment). This widening remit of detention in 1941 was the result of a realisation that German espionage abilities had been overestimated and agents were not being parachuted into the UK, rendering civilians arriving openly almost the only way a spy could enter.[27] The only ones exempted from RPS were thus British subjects from the colonies and dominions; nationals of the US and USSR; Allied nationals with a diplomatic passport, unless they wanted to volunteer for the Allied forces; and neutral aliens, unless they planned to volunteer or work for the war industry.[28] Such arrivals would pass through RPS even if they held a pre-approved labour visa.[29] Although Britons arriving from abroad were not being sent to RPS, those who aroused suspicion at the port were occasionally interrogated by RPS's officers elsewhere; similarly, 'enemy aliens' were taken to internment camps instead of RPS, but RPS's interrogators were able to visit them.[30]

This wide remit resulted in approximately 34,000 individuals having been interrogated between January 1941 and May 1945.[31] What fraction of overall traffic to the country did they account for is difficult to ascertain: war-related arrivals were not considered immigrants and so there was no attempt to register them.[32] It may nevertheless be assumed that until mid-1943, individuals who fell into the above nationality categories were detained with few exceptions, since MI5 had introduced a policy of 100 per cent collection of arrivals in RPS.[33] This was altered in 1943, after the Home Office came to question the necessity of indiscriminate detention now that the tide of the war had changed. Officers at the ports were therefore instructed to continue sending prospective volunteers to RPS without exception, but use discretion when sending anyone else.[34] Yet there had always been a recognition within MI5 that most detainees were 'quite innocent and vital to the Allied War effort' – well before 1943.[35] This assumption was confirmed in post-war calculations, estimating that 95 per cent of those interrogated were clear of any links to the enemy.[36] More detailed breakdowns actually point to 99 per cent having been

innocent: around 50 people were ever identified as spies, some 200 as having had 'hostile associations', and three got through undetected.[37]

It follows that despite being set up as a vetting camp, RPS detained those who were not expected to be enemy agents, something that was realised at the time rather than in hindsight. To understand why RPS was maintained until May 1945, in spite of the shrinking infiltration threat, one must turn to its more general intelligence functions. These functions developed gradually and were largely sparked by MI5's need to systematise the interrogation process. When RPS first opened, the work it was set up to do – security vetting – was based on guesswork. Due to MI5's poor record-keeping, interrogation reports did not exceed a single page, when they existed: during this period, MI5 did not see themselves as gathering intelligence but only as identifying suspicious characters. Consequently, there was no reference library against which a person's story could be checked. The outcome of vetting was based upon interrogators' personal impressions – 'a farcical thing in the light of later experience', was how MI5 subsequently put it.[38] Yet problematic record-keeping within RPS was symptomatic of the same issue within MI5 generally. The way MI5 was storing information had not changed since the First World War,[39] with information cards often misplaced and new cards not created soon enough.[40] Having to fight a total war with a new Director following the sacking of Kell, and with a Registry that was in a lamentable state, threatened 'a complete breakdown' in MI5's work.[41] Thanks to staff who volunteered to rectify the problem, the situation was reversed by mid-1941, with over a million index cards sorted into the Central Index.[42]

Inspired by this, MI5's Dick White – deputy director of B Division for counter-espionage, under which RPS fell – ordered that a similar index be kept in RPS. After all, the Central Index concerned the UK, whereas RPS was dealing with the continent. Accordingly, the RPS Index would come to have a Name Index and a Geographical Index divided into several countries, subdivided into addresses, towns, and various subjects.[43] Importantly, and again unlike

the Central Index, RPS was storing information on everyone, not only those considered suspicious: the aim was to 'have a large background of real general knowledge about each country in addition to secret intelligence narrowly restricted to the enemy organisation'.[44] Counter-espionage had already been re-defined during the First World War in order to include general political surveillance than merely the identification of agents,[45] a purpose RPS was beginning to facilitate. With the meaning of intelligence having expanded in this way, RPS's index resulted in over 100,000 cards on occupied territories including on intelligence services, resistance movements, political parties, the police, the press, and embassies.[46]

To gain a thorough knowledge of entire regions and topics, as well as to confirm what detainees were telling them, interrogators had to utilise a range of sources from other parts of the intelligence machine. Making use of new technology, the RPS Index was connected to MI5's Central Registry and B Division's 'local registry' – hence to decrypts of *Abwehr* and *Sicherheitsdienst* messages – as well as to SIS's registry, which was valuable due to its information on individuals abroad. This meant that, upon an individual's arrival and before they even began interrogating them, RPS could trace any information already held about them.[47] Interrogators also received prisoner of war interrogation reports from the War Office; SIS's 'purple primers' on suspected agents; reports from the Special Operations Executive (SOE); digests of continental newspapers by the Political Warfare Executive; reports on confirmed agents from Camp 020; intelligence summaries by army groups; and information from the Belgian intelligence service.[48]

The process worked in the opposite direction as well. With no registry of its own, SOE came to rely on RPS for intelligence, particularly after 1943 when an interrogation there apparently revealed that SOE in Belgium was controlled by the enemy.[49] Overwhelmed by fears of further infiltration, SOE maintained its own interrogation centre in Bayswater for its returning agents, and RPS attached an officer to this;[50] interrogations of returning SOE agents would thus

also inform the RPS Index.[51] Moreover, SOE had the option of interrogating civilians of interest to them in RPS, with one such case having been future French President François Mitterrand, who passed through RPS in November 1943 and discussed Giraudist resistance.[52]

While this level of information sharing with SOE did not always exist between MI5 and SIS, the relationship appears to have been collegial. Despite sharing premises, SIS did not use nor populate the RPS Index, neither did they share most reports they produced in RPS, in part to avoid duplicating intelligence.[53] But this attitude may also have been because SIS doubted MI5's jurisdiction in collecting information about the continent. Such doubts existed not only with regard to RPS but because of MI5 having to encroach on traditional SIS territory during the war (the opposite was sometimes true as well).[54] Nevertheless, access was given to decrypts as produced in Bletchley Park,[55] which were considered vital to the successful interrogation of refugees,[56] as well as access to other SIS material, such as the 'purple primers' already mentioned.

By broadening the meaning of intelligence, RPS thus also highlighted the value of information sharing: cooperation between parts of the intelligence machine would help, rather than hamper the others – a point which confirms and illustrates the existence of a coordinated 'intelligence community' having existed during Churchill's wartime premiership, even though some tensions evidently remained.[57] The value of cooperation was taken a step further when the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) also saw it worthwhile to establish their own permanent section in RPS. Upon RPS's opening, any information unrelated to counter-espionage was being lost. Attempts had been made by MI5 and SIS to provide the DMI with useful material in early 1941, but they were inconsistent.[58] Indeed, the DMI ended up having to rely on the Allied Missions for military information coming from refugees during that period: up until May 1941, it was those missions that interrogated their nationals on military matters once they had been released from RPS. To address the situation, a suggestion was made within the War Office in April 1941 to attach an officer to RPS who would interrogate refugees on behalf of

DMI sections and distribute intelligence immediately. The suggestion was directed at MI9, a section established in 1939 and whose functions included the interrogation of prisoners of war, both enemy and British returning ones. The proposal was approved in late May and Temporary Captain AE Acton-Burnell, an MI9 interrogator, was sent to establish what he called 'squatter's rights' in RPS.[59] With him was Sub-Lieutenant Reilly of the Admiralty.[60] Even before it started work, the purpose of MI9(RPS) had been broadened: it would not only provide intelligence to the DMI, but to the Admiralty as well.

Having originally started with just two officers, and despite not having any clerical staff to assist them, Acton-Burnell and Reilly were able to circulate 250 reports in the summer of 1941 based on the interrogations of 390 individuals. Yet 1,699 people had been detained in that period, meaning that many more could have been interrogated.[61] At the same time, the two interrogators were producing satisfactory intelligence: 'during the last three months the results obtained have exceeded all expectations', declared their parent section, who now wanted to attach more permanent interrogators there.[62] Consequently, by Christmas 1941, there were four additional interrogators working alongside Acton-Burnell and Reilly.[63] In 1942, an interrogator from the Ministry of Economic Warfare also joined them, now that interrogations had come to include topics like production, workforce numbers, and rationing;[64] There were eleven interrogators by January 1945.[65] (In 1942 MI9(RPS) was renamed MI19(RPS) due to changes within its parent section.)

The Air Ministry also followed suit by attaching two permanent officers in RPS in September 1941, when the 'full potential of this source was realised'.[66] These were reporting directly to the Air Ministry – they were not part of MI9/MI19(RPS) – on matters relevant to them: they needed civilians to pinpoint industrial targets on aerial photographs, explain the internal layout of buildings, and corroborate known information.[67]

The characteristics of refugee intelligence

The interrogation of refugees was clearly considered important by different parts of the intelligence machine. A big question nevertheless remains: what rendered non-British civilians worthwhile British sources? This question can be answered more fully through MI9/MI19(RPS)'s records, which was more systematic at recording its interrogations than RPS's other main stakeholders. Much of the relevant DMI material has also been declassified – of the 2,641 reports they produced, all but 205 have been found.[68] This is not the case for the records of MI5 and SIS (even though the stories of some individuals can be pieced together in those cases[69]). Indeed, not everyone had something new or useful to share – of the 30,000 people MI9/MI19(RPS) interrogated, the reports identified drew on just over 3,900 individuals (i.e. 13 per cent of all).

A further reason for looking at MI9/MI19(RPS) is that it ended up distributing its reports to a number of departments. Although the initial intention was for Acton-Burnell and Reilly to interrogate on behalf of a handful of specialised military and naval intelligence sections, their reports ended up being circulated to a diverse list of recipients. The first ones in June 1941 were MI9; naval intelligence on Belgium, Holland, and France (NID1); the Admiralty's photographic library, contact register, and library research section (NID6); the Central Interpretation Unit; sub-sections of MI14 on Germany; and General Headquarters Home Forces (GHQ, HF), interested in intelligence on occupied coasts in North-West Europe.[70] Over the next three months, the distribution list tripled to include SOE, more sections of the DMI, the Chief of Combined Operations, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, and more. By the end of 1941, SIS, MI5, the Coastal Command, and the Controller of the BBC's European Services were also added. Reflecting the course of the war, the US Navy were included in spring 1942; the Headquarters of the European Theatre of Operations USA

from late 1942; and the US War Department from 1943. Originally restricted to certain specialist sections, the list quickly spanned across security, political, and military domains.

To ensure that they could satisfy the multiple interests involved, MI9/MI19(RPS) sought to maintain a dialogue with user departments, and did so through a Comments Card system. This was established in 1942, when interrogation reports started being sent alongside a feedback card, asking recipients how useful a report was and for any criticism or further information required. Although it does not seem that these cards were being returned to RPS every time, the material that was generated is sufficient to allow us to gain a sense of why these civilians were considered worth interrogating. In fact, in the absence of the Comments Cards, and going only by the interrogation reports, the conclusion may have been that refugees were less useful to intelligence than some actually were. This is because interrogators had to grade individuals in reports for perceived reliability using the below scheme, and most were graded low:

> A= Completely reliable source...;
> B= Competent observers, responsible people;
> C= Enthusiastic but inexperienced witnesses...;
> D= Ignorant fellows who may have noticed things but cannot be certain of them...[71]

According to calculations for this research, the majority (71 per cent) were graded as C by interrogators – 'enthusiastic but inexperienced' – followed by Bs (20 per cent), then Ds (8 per cent), with only a fraction (1.5 per cent) graded A.[72] Recipients, however, graded reports too, based on the information useful to them only.[73] It follows that RPS's grading alone cannot be used to grasp the value of reports or whether user departments ended up trusting them, which is why the Comments Cards system is particularly useful.

Looking at the reports that did receive a comment, geography emerges as a key reason why this new source was useful. For example, while Norwegians were the largest nationality on which reports overall drew (29 per cent), only 50 such reports received a comment; at the same time, while Channel Islanders made up a small proportion of those in reports (around 2 per cent)

a third of all such reports received comments by user departments expressing gratitude for the information. This is because intelligence on the Channel Islands was overall more limited compared to that on Norway, rendering escapers an invaluable source of information.[74] The Political Warfare Executive – the clandestine propaganda organisation – confided that all its 'good information' on the islands was coming from RPS.[75] The Ministry of Home Security appreciated local newspaper issues brought to RPS by escapers and which contained air raid orders and currency regulations.[76] Another report on the region was one of RPS's 'chefs d'oeuvres', according to GHQ, HF.[77] This was by two Guernsey escapers and spanned 12 pages, covering topics regularly mentioned in interrogations, such as rations, the building of defences, and civilian morale.[78] But it also included new information on military buildings, the names of Nazi officers, the names and tonnage capacity of ships going into Guernsey, and information on German patrol routes and times. Even information on how agriculture and horticulture were being exploited by the Germans was included, with one of the men having been on Guernsey's Growers' Advisory Board.

It follows that together with geography, the second characteristic that emerges was that civilians were often experts in their individual fields, even if they were not always trained observers in a military sense. As a prime example, few civilians were better placed to aid the plans for Normandy than a French engineer who had helped to build the pumping station in Dunkirk. Although the man arrived in the UK before RPS was established, he was located in 1944 (possibly through RPS's liaison work with refugee communities) and explained how the depth of the water could be controlled to hamper enemy troop movements.[79] The Theatre Intelligence Section of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) found the information 'extremely valuable'.[80]

Engineers and mechanics such as this man were one of the largest occupational groups that reports drew upon, yet were only the fifth biggest (Figure 1). Most reports drew on

information by fishermen and seamen – which is unsurprising since most escapes were clandestine, with refugees often arriving on fishing boats – followed by those who had military training. In the latter group there was a mixture of defectors from the German military (not Germans, bar a few exceptions), escaped prisoners of war (not British), retired personnel, as well as personnel of armies now under Nazi control. A proportion of these civilians were therefore indeed trained observers in a more military sense, despite arriving as refugees.

[Figure 1]

Many enemy prisoners of war who were also being interrogated elsewhere had civilian jobs and could have offered similar insights, meaning that occupational expertise was not unique to refugees. But not only did refugees have more up-to-date experience on such matters than prisoners, they were often more willing to share it: RPS's detainees were, after all, on the side of the Allies. Cooperation was thus a third strength of this source and served to amplify all other characteristics. To the best of their memory and ability, these people would not only provide a piece of information, but would elaborate upon and clarify it, with reports often spanning a number of pages, sometimes with sketches and, in a handful of cases, smuggled photographs. Of course, the living conditions in RPS must also be examined before coming to any conclusions about the reasons behind this apparent cooperation. While life in RPS has not been covered here, no complaints of ill-treatment exist in declassified material or literature. There were, in fact, active attempts by the Home and Foreign Offices to avoid complaints by making RPS look more like a reception camp than a detention one. Moreover, it is now well known that in the contemporaneous interrogations of prisoners of war and some spies, British intelligence made extensive use of concealed microphones to eavesdrop on relevant conversations; there is no indication that such equipment was being used in RPS, further confirming that most of these civilians did not have to be tricked into answering questions.

In a war of technical innovation, cooperation made RPS interrogations a valuable asset for understanding enemy plans and equipment. In one instance, the DMI's section responsible for technical analysis (MI10) was able to obtain new information on blockhouses through RPS, as well as previously unknown information on the reinforcement of fortifications in Canteleu as provided by an Organisation Todt labourer.[81] Another forced labourer, this time from Poland, provided the 'first workable explanation of how submarines [were] parked in their repair pens at Lorient'; 60 extra copies of his report were needed for circulation to the Naval Staff, and it was later incorporated in a specialist Directorate of Naval Intelligence (NID) publication on the area.[82] Also useful to NID's section on Belgium, Holland, and France (NID1) were five reports by Joachim Tomaszewski in May and June 1943. A German deserter, Tomaszewski provided information on controlled minefields in Cherbourg, which could be detonated remotely from the shore. His descriptions helped produce a sketch on how these worked, and helped 'complete [NID1's] knowledge of this important form of defence'.[83] It is not hard to see why interrogation was so useful in these cases: those topics could not have been understood unless someone willing to do so explained them and answered questions on them, complete with sketches.

Civilians were not only able to explain difficult or unknown topics, but each was usually able to do so regarding a number of matters – the fourth characteristic of this source. This is another advantage highlighted by Tomaszewski's account. Together with controlled minefields, he explained how the telephone system of communication between the Germans and the French in Cherbourg worked,[84] leaving other departments as impressed as NID1. The report contained 'admirable stuff', according to GHQ, HF[85] and so parts were included in a Martian Report – a weekly series collating intelligence obtained from a range of sources, most often covering orders of battle and locations; at least 42 MI9/MI19(RPS) reports were included in them. Many Martian Reports have actually been lost, but one example of how a paragraph from RPS was collated with others and, stripped of its original source, was used in a Martian Report is offered below:

Information as offered in the RPS report:

> On his journey Paris-Carantec, informant saw a number of trains full of young men (18-20) (? Hitler Jugend) [sic] in khaki uniforms with red swastika armbands, proceeding to Brittany. There were A/T guns on the train – he saw four on flats – the men all had rifles.[86]

As adapted in the Martian Report:

> Reports have been received on the presence of considerable numbers of <u>Hitler Jugend</u> [sic] in this area at the beginning of March 1943. According to one account a number of trains full of <u>Hitler Jugend</u> in their usual khaki uniform and red brassard were seen on the Paris-Carantec line proceeding West... When on exercises they carry rifles... Since one witness gave the age of these youngsters as 18 to 20 their identification as members of the <u>Hitler Jugend</u> is not entirely certain...[87]

Whatever descriptions and factual information they could offer based on their experience, most civilians also had lived experience of life in occupied territory. They could thus elaborate on public administration issues, the quality of rationing, as well as the impact of propaganda. A fifth characteristic was thus that RPS was able to obtain intelligence on areas which signals, captured documents, and espionage could either not shed light on or for which doing so was not a priority. The Political Warfare Executive (PWE), tasked with damaging enemy morale and sustaining civilian morale in occupied territories, benefitted much from this characteristic. The main value of RPS to PWE included information about radio confiscations, views about Allied propaganda, reactions to Allied bombing, and information about resistance activities.[88] PWE started using information from refugees in broadcasts as early as December 1941, and Sefton Delmer, who led PWE's 'black propaganda' efforts against Germany, hoped that RPS would continue sending 'this wonderful dope'.[89] Soon after, Delmer was again 'very much struck with the really sensational' report from a Czech engineer who had escaped from the Netzweiler concentration camp in Alsace in 1942.[90] The 32-year-old – one of the few to have been graded as 'A' by the interrogators – had escaped four months earlier and informed RPS that he knew of 27 concentration camps.

The BBC was another recipient who benefitted from the fact that many detainees had recent experience of civilian life in occupied territory. Intelligence from RPS helped to inform

the sentiment, and sometimes content, of broadcasts. It was reported, for example, that the broadcast announcing that the sites of V-1 weapons in Mery-sur-Oise had been bombed relied on descriptions of the area given by a French antique dealer in RPS.[91] Intelligence from civilians also provided insights into how Europeans were responding to broadcasts, and so information from 12 reports was included in the BBC's surveys of European Audiences. While far from an ideal way to measure public opinion, very often it was only through collating individual accounts that the BBC could grasp the impact of its efforts. Consequently, by the summer of 1942, the BBC considered RPS as one of its main sources on how broadcasts were being received in occupied territory.[92] In 1943, it confirmed that RPS was its 'best source of information'.[93]

While RPS was in a position to get information on non-military matters, it also had the potential to do so through a different sample size of sources than was usually available, even though this characteristic was not especially exploited. Multiple age groups were better represented in RPS than amongst prisoners of war, with at least 100 men in the reports having been between the ages of 50-67, a group that did not really exist among prisoners. Nevertheless, the average age of those cited in reports has been calculated here as 30.5. Similarly, unlike its sister units interrogating prisoners of war, who were almost always men, RPS also interrogated women. Even so, only 40 reports involved women (fewer than two per cent of all reports) – likely due to a combination of fewer arriving compared to men, and their observations not being considered as reliable.

Finally, together with shedding light on issues and areas for which intelligence was limited, civilians' 'eyewitness' angle meant they were being used to confirm or clarify existing information. For the Central Interpretation Unit on photographic intelligence, civilians were able to explain details that were not clear in aerial photographs, one of the most objective sources. There were also cases where bombing targets were missed and thus photographs showed no damage, yet damage had been caused on materials, communication lines and so on. In some

cases, therefore, what had been written off as a failed attack was pointed out by refugees to have been anything but.[94] Thus, although it has been argued that reconnaissance was more 'valuable than patrols, prisoners, or documents', and while this may have been true in general terms, images often had to be interpreted by those who had been in the concerned areas.[95]

Many recipients benefitted from this sixth characteristic of the 'eyewitness angle', including the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW). Human intelligence was vital to MEW, and thus they were not only receiving interrogation reports but had officers interrogating both refugees and prisoners of war – their interrogator started working as part of MI9/MI19(RPS) in 1942. Prisoners of war were not as useful for intelligence on industrial matters because their knowledge was often out of date; precisely because RPS's detainees were civilians, they were in a better position to feed into MEW's main interests. With many of those detained having been technicians, factory hands, and engineers (Figure 1), they became one of MEW's key sources, always alongside signals and air reconnaissance.[96] Given the topics MEW were interested in – intelligence on Germany's industrial infrastructure, the locations of plants and factories, and material shortages[97] – individual refugee accounts alone would have had little impact on efforts; but when combined with other sources, they allowed MEW to 'arrive at aggregate estimates of enemy productive capacity', especially of oil, tanks, and locomotives.[98] These estimates, which relied heavily on Central Interpretation Unit reconnaissance, itself sometimes made clear by civilians, were considered 'extraordinarily accurate' in hindsight.[99]

RPS's value in numbers

The kind of information RPS obtained evidently was of interest to multiple users for different reasons. Who of all those receiving RPS's reports benefitted the most? To be able to answer this question, research should look at the evaluation of relevant reports by user departments, each of which had its own processes for assessing information – failure to act on a report may not have been because it was flawed. Moreover, not all information called for specific action: as seen,

intelligence from RPS would often be used to confirm or fill gaps created by other sources.

Some reports would have also served a more educational function, enabling Britain to build a

better understanding of enemy capacity and methods. The educational use of some reports may

have sometimes been more literal, such as a report which the Air Ministry – at the request of Air

Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief at Technical Training Command –

asked 'if the gist of it could be made available...to be read by [other ranks]' during tactical

training.[100] This was the opinion-based account of a German engineer who believed that:

> The only salvation for Europe lies in Great Britain. The Americans will, after all,
> withdraw after a time to the U.S. but Germany must be occupied for two generations as
> this Nazi poison has bitten into the bones of the whole people. All Germans from the
> age of eight to 30, are incurable. Time must elapse for them to die out and in the
> meantime Great Britain must exercise a rigid control, exterminating the trouble-makers
> and re-educating the tractable.[101]

Whether parts of this report were indeed then made available for that purpose is unknown: the

eventual use of RPS's intelligence is beyond the scope of this article. What can be offered here is

instead an analysis of how users appear to have benefitted from RPS in numerical terms – in

terms of how many reports they found useful. This has the effect of pointing to possible

directions for future research tracing the validity and development of relevant intelligence.

Such quantitative analysis is possible again thanks to the Comments Cards, which make it

possible to quantify interest more systematically. This research has found 801 comments relating

to 480 reports – a fifth of all that MI9/MI19(RPS) produced. However, the cards were

introduced in May 1942, a year into the detachment's work;[102] taking into account only those

reports produced after May 1942 (1,955), 25 per cent attracted comments. Figure 2 shows who

made them.

[Figure 2.]

As may be expected, military and naval intelligence benefitted the most, going on the amount of

comments made. The Air Ministry would have benefitted more from RPS than Figure 2 shows,

since it had its own interrogators there from September 1941 who were reporting to their ministry independently. But the figure confirms that RPS was a case where civilian departments and organisations were made privy to intelligence and benefitted from this access, while MI5, SIS, and SOE, despite carrying their own interrogations on site, benefitted further from MI9/MI19(RPS). This was because, in the course of providing intelligence unrelated to espionage, civilians often named alleged Nazi collaborators in their hometowns – a total of 261 such reports have been identified, not all of which received a comment. In the case of MI5, such denunciations allowed it to compile lists of alleged collaborators for future prosecution.[103]

Together with comments, more reports received requests for extra copies for circulation outside the standard distribution list; if this too is treated as an expression of interest, then the number of reports that received a comment and/or a request for copies becomes 604 – 31 per cent of all. The chief reason why more reports did not receive such interest may have been due to RPS's main limitation: timing. Many of the people interrogated spent days trying to reach Britain, with the average journey having been calculated as 70 days.[104] Added to this was the delay between arrival and interrogation, the average having been calculated as 11 days – MI9/MI19(RPS) usually had to wait for MI5 to complete an individual's questioning before they could interrogate them.[105] Such delays had a potentially lethal impact on intelligence.

What Figure 2 does *not* capture must also be pointed out. The first limitation is that the Comments Cards were only one form that feedback took; more would almost certainly have been received informally. Feedback received before the cards started being used in 1942 is illustrative of this point. In the first month that military interrogations in RPS started, Alexander Cadogan – Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs – conveyed his appreciation for the reports' value in 'estimating the trend of opinion in Germany and the state of enemy morale'; he would often pass them to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary.[106] Soon after, the Director of Naval Intelligence wrote to say that MI9(RPS) was doing 'extremely valuable work'

and its reports had 'already proved extremely useful', both to NID and the Royal Air Force.[107] The Deputy Director of Military Intelligence (Operations) also wrote to say that the reports were just as valuable 'from the military point of view'.[108] As early as January 1942, MI14 on Germany had also come to consider the reports 'among the most valuable we get in matters appertaining to invasion'.[109] At around the same time, GHQ, HF estimated that more than 80 per cent of reports had so far been accurate.[110] All this before the Comments Cards were introduced. Even after this point, RPS was regularly visited by interested parties in order to discuss specific requirements with interrogators, reinforcing the point that the cards are a minimum indication of interest and not the sole form that interest towards RPS took.[111]

The second limitation is that, while Figure 2 shows the frequency with which certain departments interacted with RPS through comments, not all comments were equal. The Anti-Aircraft Command, for example, seems to have included RPS material in its intelligence surveys on around 70 occasions; it would merely inform RPS of this fact, without commenting on why or how useful the information was. At the other extreme, such was the value of certain reports that SHAEF wrote to say it was sending the interrogators Russian emblems 'in token of appreciation' for their work.[112] Even similarly-worded comments, indicating a similar level of value, often related to incomparable matters. One of the reports the Foreign Office thought was of 'considerable value', for example, contained the opinions of three middle-aged gardeners from Germany and was bereft of military information. The report was of value to the Foreign Office for its focus on a contradiction that had puzzled Britain throughout the war: anti-Nazis who refused to criticise Hitler.[113] Other reports with similarly-worded comments to the aforementioned appear to have been militarily significant: the Scottish Command, responsible for Norway's liberation, found a report 'of particular value to their planning staff';[114] Force 134 – Norway's future occupying force – found another 'very valuable from a planning point of view'.[115] There was even one occasion where a report attracted completely opposite reactions from the NID: while the section responsible for intelligence from prisoners of war thought the

report was 'a waste of paper', its sister section in charge of naval propaganda found it most useful, thinking it 'refreshing to have intelligence from Germany by a source who is not service minded'.[116] It follows that a more qualitative analysis of comments, as well as research looking into specific intelligence leads and how they developed outside of RPS, is necessary to appreciate the impact of these interrogations.

Furthermore, Comments Cards only concerned British and American recipients, even though some information was also being shared with the Allied Missions. Although MI5 remained adamant that no Mission could be granted permanent access in RPS,[117] in the case of MI9/MI19(RPS) there was particular cooperation with the Norway Mission, in line with the good collaboration that existed generally between Norwegian and British intelligence. While the former initially kept interrogating their nationals following release from RPS, they ceased doing so in October 1941 precisely because they were convinced – through discussions with MI9/MI19(RPS)'s interrogators – that their interests would be met by the latter, who were from then on sending them relevant reports.[118] The value of RPS to the Allies is therefore another aspect which affects conclusions about RPS's overall value but which remains to be examined.

Conclusion

What is clear, however, is that RPS was an intelligence-gathering centre serving a number of interests and benefitting a number of users. To continue treating it only as an MI5 vetting camp is thus to overlook its other vital functions, and the fact that refugees were usually seen as sources, not as potential spies. Of course, RPS was there to identify suspects too, but the majority were put through the process primarily for intelligence's benefit, not due to a genuine expectation that they could be a threat. Why else would such an extensive and sensitive operation continue until May 1945, long after fears of invasion had disappeared, if the sole aim was to catch spies?

From being treated wholly as a threat to security during the 1940 'spy fever', non-Britons came to be seen as intelligence sources within months of RPS's opening in 1941. This change occurred in the eyes of both security and military intelligence. For MI5, the need to update its record-keeping processes made it realise that counter-espionage relied as much on a good reference library as it did on the instincts of its interrogators. At the same time, military intelligence realised that civilians could share unique information based on what they did, what they saw, and what they heard. Many other departments and organisations benefitted from these realisations while the range of expertise within the intelligence apparatus – altogether inexistent up to September 1939 – ensured that the diverse information civilians could share could either be assessed immediately, or be indexed for future consultation.

Numerically, the reports that attracted explicit interest in the form of a comment may seem modest – between a third and a quarter of the total concerned. Yet to try and measure the value of RPS in terms of comments would be to miss the reason behind its existence, as well as behind its perceived success: it maintained a living database of information. The reason certain reports were found useful in the examples included here was because RPS built a directory of information, and because MI9/MI19(RPS) maintained contact with the users of its intelligence, enabling interrogators to ask the right questions and distribute reports which had at least some veracity. Such a service was inexistent prior to the *military* section of RPS being set up. Thus, the proportion of reports that attracted written interest is the tip of the iceberg, not the yardstick against which RPS's success should be measured.

While the clandestine means refugees had to use to reach Britain meant that time-sensitive intelligence could not have been RPS's strength, it is arguable whether civilians were expected to possess this kind of information in the first place; time-critical matters were already covered by other methods. Instead, and as it emerges from the MI9/MI19(RPS) reports, civilians were expected to report on long-term matters like the building of defences, industry conditions,

transport, rationing, bombing damage, and public opinion. Some of the information they

provided was already known through signals, aerial photographs, or mail censorship. But the

RPS 'eyewitness' angle helped corroborate and explain pre-existing intelligence, helping to build

a clearer image of German capacity and intention beyond what any other intelligence source

could offer alone. Binding these features together was the fact that most refugees wanted to

assist, proving, once more, that the Royal Patriotic School's detainees were Britain's genuine

Allies.

Acknowledgements:

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[1] Security Officer's Report on AB 47, 16 June 1941, WO 208/3663, The National Archives at Kew (TNA).

[2] 'Extract from C.I.U. comments on MI19(RPS) Reports,' undated, WO 208/3667, TNA.

[3] Technically, the acronym should be RVPS but in government correspondence it is frequently referred to as RPS; the relevant Directorate of Military Intelligence detachment there also used RPS in their name.

[4] In his work on the French in Britain, for instance, Nicholas Atkin mentioned that refugees were interrogated in RPS but discussed the process only in descriptive terms: Atkin, *The Forgotten French*, 40-48.

[5] Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, 250-1; Jeffery, *The Secret History of MI6, 1909-1949*, 366.

[6] Hinsley and Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol.4*, 339-41.

[7] Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol.2*, 33.

[8] Ibid., 192.

[9] Tobia, "Victims of War: Refugees' First Contacts with the British in the Second World War," 131–47.

[10] Such focus has mainly been on the interrogations of Axis prisoners of war: Bell, *Britische Feindaufklärung im Zweiten Weltkrieg*; Bell, "'One of Our Most Valuable Sources of Intelligence'"; Fedorowich, "Axis Prisoners of War as Sources for British Military Intelligence, 1939–42." Some exceptions to this include Tobia's work (note 9 above) and Bak, "Second World War interrogations and British foreign intelligence."

[11] Gatrell, "Refugees—What's Wrong with History?"

[12] Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War,* 61-81.

[13] See Newbery, "The Study of Interrogation."

[14] Overall, MI5 was focusing on Germans who were already in Britain in 1914 rather than on refugees: "Vol.1, 'F' Branch report: Prevention of Espionage, 1914-1918," 1921, KV 1/35, TNA. Even when it came to refugees the focus was again on identifying agents and in any case those interrogations were not systematic. In the case of Belgians, for example, an officer was 'loaned' to MI5 from the Belgian War Ministry and was tasked with visiting some refugees in order to identify 'doubtful cases': Unknown to DDSS, 28 November 1939, KV 4/374, TNA.

[15] No newspaper article and no parliamentary debate has been identified that made mention to RPS in 1941-1945.

[16] 'History of the London Reception Centre, 1940-45,' (undated and unsigned; possibly written by Lt-Col Baxter of MI5 in mid-1945), KV 4/7, TNA.

[17] John Curry, 'History of the Security Service,' 197, KV 4/2, TNA.

[18] Minute by Major Burne (D4b) to D4, 15 May 1940, KV 4/375, TNA.

[19] 'History of the London Reception Centre, 1940-1945,' KV 4/7, TNA.

[20] Flight Lieutenant WV Emanuel (A12(a)) to Wing Commander Plant (AI1(a)), 17 May 1940, KV 4/375, TNA.

[21] 'War Refugees from Belgium and Holland,' Report by Aliens Advisory Committee, 18 May 1940, KV 4/375, TNA.

[22] Memo by E.N Cooper, 20 May 1940, KV 4/375, TNA.

[23] 'History of the Security Service,' 370-2, KV 4/3, TNA as cited in Black and Brunt, "Information Management in MI5 Before the Age of the Computer," 162.

[24] Draft Memorandum of Alien Arrivals from Ports Abroad, prepared by Dick White of MI5 (undated, possibly October/November 1940), KV 4/339, TNA.

[25] 'Security Intelligence Centre, Conference on the Royal Patriotic School, Wandsworth,' 3 January 1941, KV 4/339, TNA.

[26] SI 784/2/4, 21 March 1941, KV 4/340, TNA.

[27] 'History of the Security Service,' 201, KV 4/2, TNA.

[28] Various categories were exempted at different points, see KV 4/7 and FO 371/32230, TNA.

[29] Circular no.146 to Security Control Officers, 4 January 1941, KV 4/340, TNA.

[30] 'Enemy' nationals were interrogated in London's Oratory Schools, which were serving as an internment camp, while Britons were invited for interrogation at Room 055 of the War Office or Devonshire House in Hampstead, both used by MI5: 'History of the Security Service,' 393, KV 4/3, TNA. Occasionally Britons with evidence against them were held in prison, see KV 4/7, TNA.

[31] The exact number varies between 32,000 and 34,000 people, depending on the file (or combination of files) used. Using data found in MI5's departmental history of RPS, the total comes to 34,085 people.

[32] Weiler (Aliens Department, HO) to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1 September 1951, HO 352/26, TNA.

[33] Draft from Rawlinson (MI9) to Deputy Director Naval Intelligence, WO 208/3510; Kingsley Rooker (British Mission, Clarence House) to Lord Bessborough (French Welfare, Foreign Office), 9 November 1942, FO 1055/9, TNA.

[34] Circular no.806 to Security Control Officers, 3 December 1943, KV 4/343, TNA.

[35] 'Arrangements regarding sending individuals to the Royal Patriotic Schools' by Lt-Col Adam (MI5), 15 September 1941, HO 213/1981, TNA.

[36] 'History of the London Reception Centre, 1940-45,' 7, KV 4/7, TNA. Recent historiography argues that the *Abwehr* continued making attempts to infiltrate the British forces. But given MI5's archival limitations we can only assume that the threat was countered. See Bennett, "MI5 and German Attempts to Penetrate Allied Air Forces 1941–4."

[37] 'History of the Security Service,' 207, KV 4/2, TNA.

[38] 'History of the London Reception Centre 1940-45,' 2-3, KV 4/7, TNA.

[39] See Black and Brunt, "Information Management in MI5."

[40] 'History of the Security Service,' 371, KV4/3, TNA.

[41] Ibid., 370.

[42] Section X, 'The Indexes,' KV 4/152, TNA.

[43] 'History of the London Reception Centre, 1940-45,' 21-5, KV 4/7, TNA.

[44] 'History of the Security Service,' 202, KV 4/2, TNA.

[45] Hiley, "Counter-Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First World War."

[46] "History of the Security Service," 202-3, KV 4/2, TNA.

[47] "History of the London Reception Centre," 14-7, KV 4/7, TNA.

[48] Ibid., 21-5.

[49] White to Petrie, 18 March 1943, KV 4/201, TNA.

[50] White to John Senter (SOE), 15 March 1943, KV 4/201, TNA.

[51] Senter to White, 4 December 1943, KV 4/208, TNA.

[52] See HS 9/1044/4, TNA.

[53] 'History of the Security Service,' 202, KV 4/2, TNA; also WO 208/3511, TNA.

[54] Jeffery, *The Secret History of MI6,* 361, 485-491, 635. See also Harrison, "British Radio Security and Intelligence."

[55] 'History of the Security Service,' 377, KV 4/3, TNA.

[56] Entry for 25 August 1941, 22-3, KV 4/188, TNA as cited in Harrison, "British Radio Security and Intelligence," 72.

[57] Aldrich and Cormac, "From Circumspection to Centrality"; Andrew, "Churchill and Intelligence."

[58] Minute 10, MI4 to MI9, 1 May 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[59] Acton-Burnell to MI9, 4 June 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[60] Rawlinson (MI9) to Acton-Burnell, 26 May 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[61] Acton-Burnell to MI9(a), 1 September 1941, WO 208/3510; Home Defence (Security) Executive: Committee on Royal Patriotic School, 9 September 1941, HO 213/1980, TNA.

[62] Rawlinson to DG White, 5 September 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[63] Acton-Burnell to MI9(a), 27 December 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[64] Minutes of meeting at Ministry of Economic Warfare on 7 November 1942, WO 208/3510, TNA.

[65] 'Present Strength of MI19(RPS)', January 1945, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[66] Wing Commander SD Felkin (AI1(k)) to MI19(a), 22 September 1941, WO 208/3510, TNA; SD Felkin 'Intelligence from Interrogation,' 31 December 1945, AIR 40/1177, TNA.

[67] See SD Felkin, 'Intelligence from Interrogation,' 31 December 1945, AIR 40/1177, TNA.

[68] A file containing 199 reports from September to November 1941 has either been lost or misplaced and is missing from the TNA catalogue; the first six reports ever produced are also missing.

[69] See Wheatley, "MI5's Investigation of Ronald Sydney Seth?"; Grosjean "FIDO: French Pilot and Security Service Double Agent *Malgré Lui*."

[70] See A.G Proudlock (GHQ(HF)) to Acton-Burnell, 26 January 1942, WO 208/3460, TNA.

[71] Acton-Burnell to MI19, 7 August 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[72] These percentages are from calculations for this article and are based on 2,982 individuals; the rest appear not to have been graded.

[73] For example see GJ Neill (MI3(a)) to MI19(RPS), 18 February 1944, regarding MI19(RPS)/2014, WO 208/3722, TNA.

[74] For intelligence on Norway, see Ulstein, "Norwegian Intelligence in the Second World War"; Thomas, "Norway's Role in Britain's Wartime Intelligence"; Thorne, "Andrew Thorne and the liberation of Norway". For intelligence on the Channel Islands, see Willmot, "Sabotage, Intelligence-gathering and Escape."

[75] MI19(RPS)/2348, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3738, TNA.

[76] MI19(RPS)2137-2140, 17-8 April 1944, WO 208/3728, TNA.

[77] Comment by Major Austin (GHQ, HF) on MI19(RPS)/1742, 14 August 1943, WO 208/3710, TNA.

[78] MI19(RPS)/1742, 14 August 1943, WO 208/3710, TNA.

[79] MI19(RPS)/2160, 5 May 1944, WO 208/3730, TNA.

[80] MI19(RPS)/2160, Comment by OC Dixon (R.E. Engineers Section, Theatre Intelligence Section, SHAEF), 23 May 1944, WO 208/3730, TNA; also 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3730, TNA.

[81] MI19(RPS)/2278, 17 July 1944, (MI10 comment on source slip), WO 208/3734, TNA.

[82] MI19(RPS)/1442, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3700, TNA.

[83] Gonin (NID1) to Acton-Burnell, 3 June 1943, (this is attached to MI19(RPS)/1569), WO 208/3704, TNA; repeated in 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3706, TNA.

[84] See reports MI19(RPS)/1569; MI19(RPS)/1569A-D, WO 208/3704, TNA.

[85] MI19(RPS)/1569, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3704, TNA.

[86] MI19(RPS)1346, 15 March 1943, WO 208/5166, TNA.

[87] 'Martian Report No.43', GS (Int), CIS, GHQ, Home Forces, 24 March 1943, WO 219/1936, TNA (emphasis in the original).

[88] 'Special points of interest to PID from interrogation of refugees', (undated and unsigned), WO 208/3475, TNA.

[89] Sefton Delmer to Rawlinson, 17 December 1941, WO 208/3460, TNA.

[90] MI19(RPS)/1093, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3690, TNA.

[91] MI19(RPS)/2271, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3734, TNA.

[92] 'Value of RPS Reports', by Michael Roberts (Central Intelligence Officer, BBC), 10 June 1942, WO 208/3460, TNA.

[93] 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3706, TNA.

[94] 'The work of AI3(c)2, produced for Air Intelligence Handbook – part IV', 20 July 1945, AIR 34/85, TNA.

[95] Kahn, "Intelligence in World War II."

[96] Ehlers, "BDA: Anglo-American Air Intelligence," 266-9.

[97] 'Intelligence from Interrogation', SD Felkin, 31 December 1945, AIR 40/1177, TNA.

[98] Ehlers, "BDA: Anglo-American Air Intelligence," 270.

[99] Ibid.

[100] MI19(RPS)/2539, 'Monthly analysis of Reports', WO 208/3747, TNA.

[101] MI19(RPS)/2539, 1 January 1945, WO 208/3745, TNA.

[102] Older reports did receive a comment retrospectively though this appears to have happened only on six occasions.

[103] For the case of the Channel Islands, see Smyth, "Denunciation in the German-Occupied Channel Islands."

[104] Based on the departure and arrival dates of 2,986 individuals – three quarters of those in reports. For the rest no dates are given.

[105] Calculation is based on the details given for 2,073 individuals.

[106] Cavendish-Bentinck to Major General F.H.N Davidson (DMI), 10 July 1941, WO 208/3460, TNA.

[107] John H. Godfrey (DNI) to Bingham, 4 August 1941, WO 208/3460, TNA.

[108] From Stawell to D.G White (MI5), 11 August 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

[109] Major Sanderson to Acton-Burnell, 26 January 1942, WO 208/3460, TNA.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Such instances are mentioned in MI19's war diary, WO 165/41, TNA.

[112] See 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3730, TNA.

[113] MI19(RPS)/2272, 15 July 1944, WO 208/3734, TNA.

[114] MI19(RPS)/2184, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3730, TNA.
[115] MI19(RPS)/2576, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3747, TNA.
[116] MI19(RPS)/1004S, 'Monthly Analysis of Reports', WO 208/3690, TNA.
[117] Minute by Ward, 6 August 1942, FO 371/32231, TNA.
[118] 'Points discussed and agreed by Captain Le May of MI9(a) and Lt Holterdahl of Norway House', 23 October 1941, WO 208/3475, TNA.

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