Asset Pricing with Index Investing∗

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Abstract

We theoretically analyze how index investing affects financial markets using a dynamic exchange economy with heterogeneous investors and two Lucas trees. We identify two effects of indexing: lockstep trading of stocks increases market volatility and stock return correlations but reduction in risk sharing decreases them. Overall, indexing decreases market volatility but has an ambiguous effect on the correlations. Also, index investing decreases an investor’s welfare, but indexing by other investors partially offsets the loss. When the introduction of index trading opens financial markets for new investors, the improved risk sharing makes market returns more volatile and stock returns more correlated.

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1. Introduction

Starting from the 1970s, passive index investing has been consistently gaining popularity among institutional and individual investors. According to the 2019 Investment Company Fact Book (http://www.icifactbook.org), 36% of households that invested in mutual funds in 2018 owned at least one equity index mutual fund. The proportion of index funds in all equity mutual fund assets increased from 8.7% in 1998 to 29% in 2018. Moreover, the funds benchmarked to the S&P 500 index managed almost 29% of all assets invested in index mutual funds. Index investing was initially promoted by proponents of the efficient market hypothesis (e.g., Malkiel, 1973; Samuelson, 1974) and has an increasing number of supporters due to the inability of the money management industry as a whole to outperform the market (e.g., Malkiel, 1995; Fama and French, 2010; Lewellen, 2011) and high costs of active investment for society (e.g., French, 2008). It is blessed even by successful investors like Warren Buffett, who in his 2013 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders argued that “the goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his ‘helpers’ can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.”

Despite the growing popularity of index investing, its broad economic impact is not well understood. While many academics and practitioners tout indexing as the best investment strategy for ordinary investors, others raise concerns that the proliferation of index trading can increase volatility of stock returns, make the returns more correlated, and thereby hurt market participants (e.g., Wurgler, 2011; Sullivan and Xiong, 2012). The objective of our study is to assess those concerns from a theoretical perspective and provide a rigorous analysis of how index investing affects statistical properties of returns and investor welfare. We build a dynamic general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with two Lucas trees and two groups of investors dubbed type P investors (professional investors) and type I investors (index investors). We interpret the type P investors as professional market participants such as hedge funds, actively managed mutual funds, proprietary traders, etc., who can implement complex
trading strategies that involve individual assets. The type I investors are unsophisticated market participants like individuals who manage their savings and retirement accounts and can trade only the market portfolio of Lucas trees (index). Consistent with our interpretation of the investors, we also assume that the type I and type P investors have different risk aversion.

The emergence of index mutual funds in the 1970s and the proliferation of exchange traded funds (ETFs) in the 2000s reduced the cost of owning well-diversified portfolios for ordinary investors and had two implications. First, some investors who held individual stocks switched to passive indexing to minimize transaction and asset management costs. Second, cheap index funds opened the equity market for many households that did not own stocks before.\footnote{Index investing likely contributed to the increase in equity market participation from around 30\% in the early 80s to almost 50\% nowadays (e.g., Li, 2014).} We separately investigate those two effects by comparing our main economy with two benchmark economies. In the first benchmark, which we call the unconstrained economy, all investors can trade all assets individually. In the second benchmark, the type I investors are excluded from the market, and in each period they consume a fixed fraction of the total dividend. The type P investors can trade all assets. Such a setup provides a stylized description of financial markets before the proliferation of indexing, and it is dubbed the pre-indexing economy.

Our analysis delivers several results. Most importantly, we find that switching from trading individual stocks to index trading by a fraction of investors produces two effects: lockstep trading of the stocks, which occurs when investors trade the index, and the reduction in risk sharing produced by a smaller number of financial assets traded by indexers. The first effect increases market volatility and the correlation between stock returns, whereas the second effect decreases them. Overall, indexing decreases market volatility but can either increase or decrease the correlation depending on the state of the economy. In contrast, the possibility to trade indexes in the economy with investors who were previously excluded from financial markets increases the volatility of stock returns and the correlation between them. Those effects mainly result from improved risk sharing rather than from lockstep trading of stocks caused by indexing. We also analytically relate the differences between various equilibrium characteristics in the
economy with indexing and in the unconstrained economy to portfolio distortions produced by indexing. Finally, we conduct the welfare analysis and find that the inability to trade individual stocks decreases an investor’s welfare, but indexing by other investors partially offsets the loss through improving investment opportunities.

To see the economic intuition behind those effects, consider an unconstrained economy in which all investors can trade all assets. Because the investors have different risk aversion, they trade to share risks, and risk sharing affects the statistical properties of stock returns. Assume, for example, that a positive cash flow shock hits one of the stocks. Because in equilibrium less risk-averse investors hold a larger share of their wealth in stocks than those who are more risk averse, the shock disproportionately increases the wealth of the less risk averse investors and decreases the aggregate risk aversion in the economy. Thus, risk sharing produces a variation in the aggregate risk aversion, which in turn produces a common variation in the stock discount rates. As a result, the volatilities of returns become higher than the volatilities of cash flows, and the returns become correlated even when cash flows are independent.²

Compared to the unconstrained economy, indexing introduces two new effects. First, investors exert price pressure on all stocks simultaneously by buying and selling the market portfolio as a whole and thereby increase the volatility and correlation of returns.³ This lockstep trading effect is responsible for the perception of indexing as a source of a positive correlation between stock returns, which is shared by practitioners (e.g., Sullivan and Xiong, 2012) and appeared in popular press.⁴ Second, the risk sharing between investors, which is another source of the volatility and correlation, is lower in the economy with indexing than in the unconstrained economy. In total, indexing decreases market volatility but has an ambiguous effect on the correlation of stock returns, which is determined by the relative strength of the two effects that work in opposite directions. To disentangle the lockstep trading and reduced risk sharing effects, we consider a modified specification of our economy dubbed a lockstep-trading econ-

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²Xiong (2001), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Cochrane et al. (2008), Bhamra and Uppal (2009), Longstaff and Wang (2012), and Ehling and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2016) discuss in detail how risk sharing among investors affects the dynamics of stock returns.
³A similar effect arises in Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Basak and Pavlova (2013, 2016), and Grégoire (2020).
omy. In this economy, the type I investors exogenously put in the index the same fraction of their wealth as they put in both stocks in the unconstrained economy and optimize only their consumption policy. Because the portfolio optimization is switched off, the type I investors do not change their allocation of wealth to stocks in response to reduced risk sharing opportunities. Thus, the differences in the equilibrium characteristics between the unconstrained and lockstep-trading economies are naturally interpreted as solely produced by lockstep trading.

Overall, our analysis implies that the ongoing debates on indexing should consider not only the lockstep trading of stocks but also the general equilibrium effect of reduced risk sharing to portray a more complete picture of how indexing changes stock returns.

It is also instructive to compare the economy with indexing and the pre-indexing economy. When indexes become accessible to those investors who were initially prohibited from participating in financial markets, it opens up risk sharing, which produces the effects described above. In particular, index trading inflates market volatility and makes stock returns correlated even when the fundamentals of the stocks move independently. Thus, our analysis provides a potential theoretical explanation for empirical findings that indexing can make stocks more volatile and more correlated (e.g., Vijh, 1994; Greenwood and Sosner, 2007; Boyer, 2011; Sullivan and Xiong, 2012; Leippold et al., 2016; Ben-David et al., 2018; Da and Shive, 2018; Grégoire, 2020). Because we assume that all investors are rational, our explanation substantially differs from that in Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis et al. (2005), who relate the comovement of stock returns to behavioral biases. We also find that allowing index trading in the pre-indexing economy affects the equilibrium characteristics and investors’ welfare much stronger than imposing indexing constraints on some investors in the unconstrained economy. Thus, the economy with indexing is much closer to the unconstrained economy than to the pre-indexing economy, and index trading makes it possible to share risks at a highly efficient level.

Finally, we explore welfare implications of index investing. To quantify them, we use the certainty equivalent loss (CEL) of an investor from the unconstrained economy and the certainty equivalent gain (CEG) of an investor from the pre-indexing economy who become type I investors in the economy with indexing. The CEL contains two components: one is pro-
duced by the inability of the investor to arbitrarily adjust portfolio weights, and the other arises because indexing by other investors distorts investment opportunities. We find that the first component is positive (the inability to trade individual stocks decreases welfare), whereas the second component is typically negative (the change in investment opportunities increases welfare). However, the first component is larger, and the total CEL is positive, albeit small: an investor from the unconstrained economy would give up less than 0.004% of his wealth for not becoming a type I investor in the economy with indexing. In contrast, compared to the pre-indexing economy, investors are much better off in the economy with a tradable index: allowing index trading can be equivalent to increasing cash flows in the pre-indexing economy by tens of percentage points. Overall, despite making stock returns more volatile, index trading makes previously constrained investors much better off by facilitating risk sharing, but those unconstrained investors who switch to indexing lose only a small fraction of their welfare. Thus, indexing is not detrimental as feared in the literature (e.g., Wurgler, 2011; Sullivan and Xiong, 2012).

Our paper belongs to the large literature that uses the dynamic exchange economy framework with heterogeneous investors to study equilibrium effects of various economic frictions.\(^5\) Such frictions include restricted stock market participation (e.g., Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Guvenen, 2009; Chien et al., 2011), intermittent trading (e.g., Chien et al., 2012), short-sale and borrowing constraints (e.g., Detemple and Murthy, 1997; Basak and Croitoru, 2000; Kogan et al., 2007; Gallmeyer and Hollifield, 2008; Gomes and Michaelides, 2008; Chabakauri, 2015a), portfolio concentration constraints (e.g., Pavlova and Rigobon, 2008), margin constraints (e.g., Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Chabakauri, 2013; Rytchkov, 2014; Brumm et al., 2015), and transaction costs (e.g., Buss et al., 2015; Buss and Dumas, 2019). Gromb and Vayanos (2010) survey the literature on the frictions that produce the limits to arbitrage. Dumas and Lyasoff (2012) develop a general approach to solving incomplete-market models with one Lucas tree.

In particular, our paper is related to Chabakauri (2013) that analyzes a model with two stocks, two groups of investors with different risk aversion, and margin constraint. However, there are substantial differences between the papers. First, the indexing constraint in our paper is intrinsically different from the margin constraint: the former changes over time in line with the weights of the market portfolio, whereas the latter stays the same. As a result, Chabakauri (2013) and our paper have different economic implications: indexing amplifies stock return correlations in some states of the economy, whereas the margin constraint unambiguously decreases them. Second, the equilibrium processes in Chabakauri (2013) are stated in terms of the Lagrange multiplier of the portfolio constraint, whereas we explicitly solve the utility maximization problem of constrained investors and directly relate the equilibrium characteristics to portfolio distortions produced by indexing. Finally, our equilibrium is described by a system of two differential equations, in contrast to three equations in Chabakauri (2013).

Another related paper is Shapiro (2002). It considers a general equilibrium model in which a fraction of logarithmic investors can implement only the trading strategies consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis (IRH), and indexing is one of them. In contrast to our paper, Shapiro (2002) does not solve the model for the equilibrium characteristics and mostly focuses on qualitative implications of portfolio constraints for interest rates and risk premiums. Thus, our results are novel even for a model in which constrained investors have logarithmic preferences.

Dynamic models with indexing are also considered by He and Shi (2017) and Grégoire (2020). He and Shi (2017) consider an economy with two groups of unconstrained investors who have heterogeneous beliefs and study the effect of indexing on the welfare of an infinitesimal index investor. In contrast, all investors in our model have the same beliefs, and index investors have a nonnegligible weight. Grégoire (2020) uses the perturbation analysis to approximate the solution to the model and demonstrates that indexing increases comovement of stock returns. However, all investors in Grégoire (2020) have identical preferences. As a result, there is no risk sharing among them, which is one of the channels through which indexing affects the market equilibrium in our model.
Our result that indexing can decrease the correlation of stock returns echoes the conclusion of Malamud (2016), who argues that the introduction of new ETFs can produce a similar effect. However, the mechanism of the effect in Malamud (2016) is different from ours. Malamud (2016) assumes that ETF investors are subject to exogenous demand shocks, and the ETF prices may deviate from the ETFs’ net asset values because of the limits to arbitrage. The entry of new ETFs creates a demand substitution effect whereby a part of the investors’ demand shifts to new ETFs. The demand substitution effectively produces two imperfectly correlated shocks to asset prices, which reduces the volatility and comovement of asset returns.

Our paper is also related to the studies of equilibrium effects produced by benchmarking of asset managers’ compensation to a particular index (e.g., Gómez and Zapatero, 2003; Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011; Basak and Pavlova, 2013; Basak and Pavlova, 2016; Buffa and Hodor, 2018; Buffa et al., 2019). One of the insights of this research is endogenous arising of partial indexing in the presence of index-based incentives. Also, several papers examine the effects of benchmarking and indexing on informational efficiency and welfare in economies with heterogeneously informed investors (Bond and Garcia, 2018; Breugem and Buss, 2019). In contrast, we abstract from the origin of indexing and, therefore, identify the implications of indexing that are produced by indexing itself and that are uncontaminated by other frictions in the economy including the informational frictions.

2. Model

2.1. Assets

There are three assets in the economy: a risk-free short-term bond in zero net supply and two risky stocks. The supply of each stock is normalized to one share, which is a claim on a stream of dividends produced by a Lucas tree. The dividends $D_{1t}$ and $D_{2t}$ follow geometric Brownian motions

$$\frac{dD_{it}}{D_{it}} = \mu_{Di} dt + \Sigma_{Di} dB_{t}, \quad i = 1, 2,$$  

(1)
where $\mu_{Di}$ are constant expected dividend growth rates, $\Sigma_{Di}$ are constant $1 \times 2$ matrices of diffusions, and $B_t$ is a $2 \times 1$ vector of independent Brownian motions. The rate of return on the bond $r_t$ and the stock prices $S_{1t}$ and $S_{2t}$ are determined in the equilibrium. The excess return on each stock $i$ is defined as
\[
dQ_i = \frac{dS_{it} + D_{it} dt}{S_{it}} - r_t dt,
\]
and the vector $Q_t = [Q_{1t} \ Q_{2t}]$ follows a diffusion process
\[
dQ_t = \mu_{Qt} dt + \Sigma_{Qt} dB_t,
\]
where the matrix of the risk premiums $\mu_{Qt} = [\mu_{Q_{1t}} \ \mu_{Q_{2t}}]'$ and the matrix of the diffusions $\Sigma_{Qt} = [\Sigma_{Q_{1t}}' \ \Sigma_{Q_{2t}}']$ are also determined in the equilibrium. In those notations, the volatility of stock $i$ is $\sigma_i = \sqrt{\Sigma_{Qi} \Sigma_{Qi}'}$, and the correlation between stock returns is $\rho_t = \Sigma_{Q1t} \Sigma_{Q2t}' / (\sigma_1 \sigma_2)$.

Taken together, the stocks constitute a market portfolio (index), which pays the aggregate dividend $D_t = D_{1t} + D_{2t}$ and has the price $S_t = S_{1t} + S_{2t}$. Using Itô’s lemma and Eq. (1), the dynamics of the dividend $D_t$ can be written as
\[
\frac{dD_t}{D_t} = \mu_{Dt} dt + \Sigma_{Dt} dB_t,
\]
where $\mu_{Dt} = u_t \mu_{D1} + (1 - u_t) \mu_{D2}$, $\Sigma_{Dt} = u_t \Sigma_{D1} + (1 - u_t) \Sigma_{D2}$, and $u_t = D_{1t} / D_t$. The excess return on the index is defined as
\[
dQ_I = \frac{dS_t + D_t dt}{S_t} - r_t dt,
\]
and using Eq. (3), its dynamics can be described as
\[
dQ_I = \mu_{I} dt + \Sigma_{I} dB_t,
\]
where $\mu_{I} = (\mu_{Q1t} S_{1t} + \mu_{Q2t} S_{2t}) / S_t$ and $\Sigma_{I} = (\Sigma_{Q1t} S_{1t} + \Sigma_{Q2t} S_{2t}) / S_t$. By construction, the index is value-weighted, and its expected return and diffusions are value-weighted averages of
the expected returns and diffusions of the individual stocks. The volatility of the index is
\[ \sigma_{It} = \sqrt{\Sigma_{It} \Sigma'_{It}}. \]

2.2. Agents

The economy is populated by two groups of competitive agents dubbed type P investors (professional investors) and type I investors (index investors). Each group consists of a unit mass of identical investors who have CRRA preferences. The type P and type I investors differ in two respects. First, they have different coefficients of risk aversion, which are \( \gamma_P \) and \( \gamma_I \), respectively. Second, the trading strategies that the investors can implement depend on their type: the type P investors can trade all assets individually, whereas the type I investors are constrained to trade only the risk-free bond and market portfolio. Specifically, the type P investors form a portfolio of the stocks \( \omega_{Pt} = [\omega_{P1t} \omega_{P2t}]' \), where \( \omega_{P1t} \) and \( \omega_{P2t} \) are the fractions of their wealth \( W_{Pt} \) allocated to stocks 1 and 2, respectively, and invest the rest of their wealth \( \alpha_{Pt} = 1 - \omega_{P1t} - \omega_{P2t} \) in the bond. In contrast, the type I investors allocate their wealth \( W_{It} \) between the index and the bond with the weights \( \hat{\omega}_{It} \) and \( \alpha_{It} = 1 - \hat{\omega}_{It} \), respectively. Thus, the weights of the individual stocks in the portfolio of the type I investors are \( \omega_{It} = \hat{\omega}_{It}[S_{It}/S_t \ S_{2t}/S_t]' \).

The types of investors admit a natural interpretation. The type P investors can be thought of as professional traders such as hedge funds, actively managed mutual funds, proprietary traders, etc., who are relatively risk tolerant and can implement sophisticated trading strategies that involve individual assets. The type I investors are unsophisticated market participants such as individual investors who manage their savings and retirement accounts. They are more risk averse than professional investors and trade only the index, not individual stocks. Lower risk aversion of the type P investors is also consistent with endogenous occupation choice models, which predict that risk tolerant individuals self-select themselves into entrepreneurial activities such as creating and managing hedge funds (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979). That prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence (Hvide and Panos, 2014).

We do not specify the reason why the type I investors can trade only the index, which allows
us to study the implications of indexing without contaminating the analysis by other economic frictions. This approach follows many studies in economics and finance that investigate equilibrium implications of various impediments to risk sharing without endogenizing them.\(^6\) In practice, indexing can be an optimal response to various factors such as information processing costs, organizational and management costs, transaction costs, etc. For example, investors with limited attention may allocate their learning capacity to macroeconomic factors rather than to firm-specific information (e.g., Peng and Xiong, 2006) and trade only the market portfolio. Investors may prefer to categorize assets in various classes and invest in indexes because this simplifies asset choice (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Even mutual fund and pension fund managers, whose compensation is related to index performance directly or indirectly through the response of fund flows to fund performance, may find it optimal to partially allocate assets under management to index portfolios (e.g., Basak and Pavlova, 2013). In Internet Appendix E, we present a modification of our model that demonstrates how the equilibrium with index investing endogenously arises when the type I investors are unconstrained in their portfolio choice but derive disutility from managing a complex portfolio of individual risky assets.

The optimization problem of the investors in our model has the standard form: each investor \(j = P, I\) chooses a consumption stream \(C_{jt}\) and portfolio weights \(\omega_{jt}\) that maximize the CRRA utility

\[
U_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^{\infty} e^{-\beta \tilde{t}} \frac{C_{jt}^{1-\gamma_j}}{1-\gamma_j} d\tilde{t} \right] \tag{7}
\]

subject to a budget constraint, which is

\[
dW_{Pt} = (r_t W_{Pt} - C_{Pt})dt + W_{Pt}\omega'_{Pt}(\mu_{Qt}dt + \Sigma_{Qt}dB_t) \tag{8}
\]

for the type P investors and

\[
dW_{It} = (r_t W_{It} - C_{It})dt + W_{It}\omega'_{It}(\mu_{It}dt + \Sigma_{It}dB_t) \tag{9}
\]

for the type I investors.

2.3. State variables

The model has two Lucas trees and two types of investors. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the state of the economy is described by two variables. The first variable is the consumption share of the type I investors \( s_t = C_{1t}/D_t \), which is bounded between 0 and 1.\(^7\) In general, \( s_t \) follows a diffusion process

\[
ds_t = \mu_{st}\,dt + \Sigma_{st}\,dB_t, \tag{10}
\]

where the scalar \( \mu_{st} \) and the \( 1 \times 2 \) matrix \( \Sigma_{st} \) are determined by equilibrium conditions. The second state variable \( u_t = D_{1t}/D_t \) measures the relative share of the dividend on the first stock in the aggregate dividend.\(^8\) The process for \( u_t \) is obtained by applying Itô’s lemma to the definition of \( u_t \) and using Eqs. (1) and (4):

\[
du_t = \mu_{ut}\,dt + \Sigma_{ut}\,dB_t, \tag{11}
\]

where \( \mu_{ut} \) and \( \Sigma_{ut} \) are determined by exogenous model parameters:

\[
\mu_{ut} = u_t(1 - u_t)(\mu_{D1} - \mu_{D2}) - (\Sigma_{D1} - \Sigma_{D2})(u_t\Sigma_{D1} + (1 - u_t)\Sigma_{D2})', \tag{12}
\]

\[
\Sigma_{ut} = u_t(1 - u_t)(\Sigma_{D1} - \Sigma_{D2}). \tag{13}
\]

By construction, \( u_t \) belongs to the interval from 0 to 1. When \( 0.5 < u_t < 1 \) (\( 0 < u_t < 0.5 \)), the first (second) stock has a larger dividend, and we refer to it as the larger stock.

\(^7\)The consumption share of one of the agents is often used as a state variable in economies with heterogeneous agents (e.g., Bhamra and Uppal, 2009, 2014; Longstaff and Wang, 2012; Chabakauri, 2013; Rytchkov, 2014).

\(^8\)This state variable is standard in the models with multiple Lucas trees (e.g., Menzly et al., 2004; Cochrane et al., 2008; Martin, 2013).
2.4. Equilibrium

We define the equilibrium in the model as a set of stochastic processes for the risk-free rate \( r_t \), expected excess returns \( \mu_{Qt} \), diffusions of returns \( \Sigma_{Qt} \), consumption streams \( C_{jt} \), \( j = P, I \), and portfolio strategies \( \omega_{jt} \), \( j = P, I \), such that

1. \( C_{jt} \) and \( \omega_{jt} \) solve the utility maximization problem of investor \( j \);
2. the aggregate consumption is equal to the aggregate dividend: \( C_{It} + C_{Pt} = D_t \);
3. the markets for the stocks and bond clear:
   \[ \omega_{Pit} W_{Pit} + \omega_{Iit} W_{Iit} = S_{it}, \quad \alpha_{Pit} W_{Pit} + \alpha_{Iit} W_{Iit} = 0. \]

Assuming that the state of the economy is fully described by \( s_t \) and \( u_t \), we look for the equilibrium processes \( r_t, \mu_{Qt}, \Sigma_{Qt}, \mu_{It}, \) and \( \Sigma_{It} \) as functions of those variables: \( r_t = r(s_t, u_t) \), \( \mu_{Qt} = \mu_Q(s_t, u_t) \), \( \Sigma_{Qt} = \Sigma_Q(s_t, u_t) \), \( \mu_{It} = \mu_I(s_t, u_t) \), and \( \Sigma_{It} = \Sigma_I(s_t, u_t) \). The same representation should exist for the drift and diffusion of \( s_t \): \( \mu_{st} = \mu_s(s_t, u_t) \), \( \Sigma_{st} = \Sigma_s(s_t, u_t) \). It is also convenient to introduce i) the price-dividend ratios of the index and individual stocks \( S_t/D_t = f(s_t, u_t) \) and \( S_{it}/D_{it} = f_i(s_t, u_t) \), \( i = 1, 2 \), and ii) the wealth-consumption ratios of the type I and type P investors \( W_{It}/C_{It} = h(s_t, u_t) \) and \( W_{Pt}/C_{Pt} = h_P(s_t, u_t) \). The derivatives of those functions with respect to \( s_t \) and \( u_t \) will be denoted by the corresponding subscripts. Finally, we denote the risk aversion of a representative investor as

\[
\Gamma_t = \left( \frac{s_t}{\gamma_I} + \frac{1 - s_t}{\gamma_P} \right)^{-1}. \tag{14}
\]

The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium and describes how to compute various equilibrium characteristics. To simplify notation, in the rest of the paper we omit the subscript \( t \) of all variables as well as the arguments \( s \) and \( u \) of all functions.

**Proposition 1** The equilibrium in the model is characterized by the functions \( r, \mu_s, \Sigma_s, \Sigma_I, f, \) and \( h \) that solve a system of algebraic and partial differential equations (A1) – (A6) from the Appendix. The market price of risk \( \eta \) and the expected excess returns on the index \( \mu_I \) are given by Eq. (A7). The price-dividend ratio \( f_i \) of stock \( i = 1, 2 \) solves Eq. (A8).
excess returns on individual stocks $\mu_{Q_i}$, $i = 1, 2$, and return diffusions $\Sigma_{Q_i}$, $i = 1, 2$, are given by Eq. (A9).

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

The formulas from Proposition 1 reveal a technical trick that helps us simplify the analysis. In general, the description of an equilibrium in an economy with two trees and two types of investors involves three differential equations: two of them are for the stock price-dividend ratios and the third is for the wealth-consumption ratio of one of the investor types (e.g., Chabakauri, 2013). However, in the economy with index investors, the equilibrium can be found by sequentially solving two sets of equations: the first is a pair of quasilinear differential equations for the price-dividend ratio of the index and the wealth-consumption ratio of the type I investors; the second is a pair of linear differential equations for the price-dividend ratios of the individual stocks. Intuitively, the simplification occurs because only the index is traded in the equilibrium and only its price, not the prices of individual stocks, is needed to describe the dynamics of the economy. In Section 3, we numerically solve the system of equations (A1) – (A6) and demonstrate various equilibrium properties.

As we show in Internet Appendix D, our model can be generalized by assuming that all investors have recursive preferences of Duffie and Epstein (1992). However, in this case the characterization of the equilibrium is more complicated because the stochastic discount factor directly depends on the investors’ wealth-consumption ratios and their derivatives. Nevertheless, even in the case of recursive preferences, we managed to describe the equilibrium in terms of a system of differential and algebraic equations that can be solved by the same numerical techniques as in the CRRA case. Those equations are presented in Proposition ID1, which generalizes Proposition 1 to the model with recursive preferences.

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9Models with investors who have heterogeneous recursive preferences have been considered by Isaenko (2008), Chabakauri (2015b), Gărleanu and Panageas (2015), Drechsler et al. (2018), and Borovička (2020), among others.
2.5. Analysis of the equilibrium

In this section, we analytically describe several properties of the equilibrium in our model. To identify the effects of indexing, we compare the equilibrium characteristics with their counterparts in the unconstrained economy. The latter differs from our main setting by the assumption that all investors can trade all assets individually. The equilibrium in the unconstrained economy with heterogeneous CRRA investors and two Lucas trees is described by Proposition 2 in Chabakauri (2013). Specifically, in the unconstrained economy the diffusion $\Sigma_s$ is

$$ \Sigma_{s}^{unc} = \frac{\gamma_P - \gamma_I}{\gamma_P \gamma_I} s(1 - s) \Gamma D. $$

(15)

The equations for $\mu_s$, $r$, and $\eta$ can also be analytically solved, and the solutions are

$$ \mu_{s}^{unc} = \frac{s(1 - s) \Gamma}{\gamma_P \gamma_I} \left( (\gamma_P - \gamma_I)(\mu_D - \Sigma_D \Sigma_D') + \frac{(\gamma_P - \gamma_I)\Gamma^2}{2 \gamma_P \gamma_I} \Sigma_D \Sigma_D' \right), $$

(16)

$$ r^{unc} = \beta + \Gamma \mu_D - \frac{\Gamma^3}{2} \left( (1 - s) \frac{1 + \gamma_P}{\gamma_P^2} + s \frac{1 + \gamma_I}{\gamma_I^2} \right) \Sigma_D \Sigma_D', \quad \eta^{unc} = \Gamma \Sigma_D. $$

(17)

Eqs. (15) – (17) show that in the unconstrained economy the evolution of the endogenous state variable $s$ (which is determined by $\mu_s^{unc}$ and $\Sigma_s^{unc}$) and the discount factor (which is determined by $r^{unc}$ and $\eta^{unc}$) do not depend on the price-dividend ratio $f$ or wealth-consumption ratio $h$. Therefore, as demonstrated in Chabakauri (2013), the differential equations for those ratios are linear, decoupled, and easy to solve.

Index investing changes the equilibrium compared to the unconstrained economy because it distorts the portfolio of the type I investors. To characterize the distortions, it is convenient to introduce a portfolio with the following weights:

$$ \omega_0 = (\Sigma_Q')^{-1} \left( \frac{\Sigma_Q^{-1} \mu_Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u' \right). $$

(18)

The portfolio $\omega_0$ solves the utility maximization problem of an investor who is identical to a type I investor in all respects, including the wealth-consumption ratio, but who can trade
individual stocks. The following proposition reveals a connection between the portfolio \( \omega_0 \) and the optimal portfolio \( \omega_I \).

**Proposition 2** The optimal portfolio \( \omega_I \) can be represented as

\[
\omega_I = \arg \min_{\omega \in \Omega} (\omega - \omega_0)'\Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' (\omega - \omega_0),
\]

where \( \Omega \) is the set of all index portfolios, and \( \omega_0 \) is defined by Eq. (18). The optimization implies that the vector of portfolio diffusions \( \Sigma'_Q \omega_I \) is a projection of the portfolio diffusions \( \Sigma'_Q \omega_0 \) on the index returns, that is,

\[
\Sigma'_Q \omega_I = \Pi_I \Sigma'_Q \omega_0,
\]

where the projection operator is \( \Pi_I = (\Sigma'_I \Sigma_I)/(\Sigma_I \Sigma'_I) \).

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

Intuitively, Proposition 2 states that the portfolio \( \omega_0 \) is an unfeasible target of a constrained investor, who chooses the index portfolio to be as close as possible to \( \omega_0 \). As a result, the optimal index portfolio turns out to be a projection of the target portfolio \( \omega_0 \) on the set of all feasible index portfolios. The next proposition shows explicitly how indexing changes the model equilibrium compared to its unconstrained counterpart.

**Proposition 3** In the equilibrium described by Proposition 1, the drift \( \mu_s \) and diffusion \( \Sigma_s \) can be represented as

\[
\mu_s = \mu_s^{unc} + a \Sigma_D \Sigma'_Q (\omega_I - \omega_0) + b (\omega_I - \omega_0)' \Sigma_Q \Sigma'_Q (\omega_I - \omega_0),
\]

\[
\Sigma_s = \Sigma_s^{unc} + \frac{s(1-s)}{\gamma_P} \Gamma (\omega_I - \omega_0)' \Sigma_Q,
\]

where \( \mu_s^{unc} \) and \( \Sigma_s^{unc} \) are given by Eqs. (16) and (15), respectively, and the coefficients \( a \) and \( b \)
The risk-free rate \( r \) and the price of risk \( \eta \) can be represented as

\[
\begin{align*}
\eta &= \gamma_P \Sigma_{CP}, \\
r &= \beta + \Gamma \mu_D - \frac{1}{2} \Gamma ((1 + \gamma_I) s \Sigma_{CI} \Sigma'_{CI} + (1 + \gamma_P)(1 - s) \Sigma_{CP} \Sigma'_{CP}) ,
\end{align*}
\]

(24)

where \( \Sigma_{CP} \) and \( \Sigma_{CI} \) are the consumption diffusions of the type \( P \) and type \( I \) investors:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Sigma_{CP} &= \frac{\Gamma \Sigma_D}{\gamma_P} - \frac{s \Gamma}{\gamma_P} (\omega_I - \omega_0)' \Sigma_Q , \\
\Sigma_{CI} &= \frac{\Gamma \Sigma_D}{\gamma_I} + \frac{(1 - s) \Gamma}{\gamma_P} (\omega_I - \omega_0)' \Sigma_Q .
\end{align*}
\]

(26)

The partial differential equation for the wealth-consumption ratio \( h \) can be rewritten as

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + h_s (\mu_s + \frac{1 - \gamma_I}{\gamma} \Sigma_s \Sigma_Q^{-1} \mu_Q) + h_u (\mu_u + \frac{1 - \gamma_I}{\gamma} \Sigma_u \Sigma_Q^{-1} \mu_Q) \\
+ \frac{1}{\gamma_I} h \left( (1 - \gamma_I) \left( r - \frac{\Pi_I}{2} (\omega_I - \omega_0)' \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' (\omega_I - \omega_0) \right) + \frac{1 - \gamma_P}{2 \gamma_P} \mu_Q (\Sigma_Q' \Sigma_Q)^{-1} \mu_Q - \beta \right) + 1 &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(27)

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

Proposition 3 highlights the channels through which indexing affects the equilibrium. Eqs. (21) – (26) imply that the equilibrium processes can be represented as the processes in the unconstrained economy adjusted by linear or quadratic functions of \( \Sigma_Q (\omega_I - \omega_0) \). This fact explicitly shows that the adjustments appear because index investors are constrained and cannot form the portfolio \( \omega_0 \). The term \( \Sigma_Q' (\omega_I - \omega_0) \) can be viewed as a measure of portfolio distortions produced by indexing. Using Eq. (20), it can be written as \(-(I_2 - \Pi_I) \Sigma_Q' \omega_0\), where \( I_2 \) is a \( 2 \times 2 \) identity matrix. Note that \( \Sigma_Q' \omega_0 \) is the transposed diffusion of returns on the unconstrained portfolio \( \omega_0 \), so \((I_2 - \Pi_I) \Sigma_Q' \omega_0 \) represents the variation in the returns on the portfolio \( \omega_0 \) that is orthogonal to the index and cannot be hedged by index investors. Thus, the additional terms
in Eqs. (21) – (26) can be viewed as a result of restrictions on risk sharing among investors imposed by indexing.

The constraints on risk sharing change the evolution of the state variable $s$, which determines the dynamics of all other equilibrium characteristics. Eq. (15) implies that in the unconstrained economy, the variation in $s$ is produced solely by the variation in the total dividend $D$, which is the source of the aggregate risk in the economy. How the individual dividends $D_1$ and $D_2$ contribute to $D$ is irrelevant because all investors trade all risky assets and perfectly hedge tree-specific shocks.\textsuperscript{10} In contrast, Eq. (22) shows that in the presence of index investors, the diffusion $\Sigma_s$ has an additional term that is not collinear to $D$. Therefore, the shocks to $D_1$ and $D_2$ individually affect $s$.

Proposition 3 also reveals how indexing changes the risk-free rate $r$ and market price of risk $\eta$, and how its impact can be traced to reduced risk sharing and portfolio distortions. Eq. (26) demonstrates that portfolio distortions change the consumption diffusions $\Sigma_{CP}$ and $\Sigma_{CI}$ thereby affecting the volatilities of the investors’ consumption processes. Indeed, reduced risk sharing is likely to make the consumption process of more risk averse type I investors more volatile than in the unconstrained economy, and the effect is opposite for the less risk averse type P investors. Eq. (24), which holds both in the constrained and unconstrained economies, shows that consumption volatilities determine the risk-free rate through the third term, which is associated with precautionary savings of investors (e.g., Cochrane, 2005). Indexing has a substantial impact on the equilibrium when the type I investors constitute a large fraction of all investors, that is, when $s$ is close to 1. In this case, precautionary savings in the economy are mostly determined by the type I investors. Because the volatility of their consumption is amplified by indexing, the type I investors have stronger incentives to save than in the unconstrained economy, and this decreases the equilibrium risk-free rate.\textsuperscript{11}

The relation between the market price of risk $\eta$ and portfolio distortions is even more straightforward. Eq. (25) shows that $\eta$ is proportional to the diffusion of the type P investors’

\textsuperscript{10}The dividend share $u$ is still a state variable because it affects the expected growth rate and volatility of the total dividend.

\textsuperscript{11}We numerically demonstrate this effect in Section 3.2.2.
consumption diffusion $\Sigma_{CP}$, whose relation to portfolio distortion is described by Eq. (26).

The differential equation (27) for the wealth-consumption ratio $h$ of index investors provides additional insights. Compared to its counterpart for unconstrained investors, Eq. (27) contains an additional term $\frac{1}{2}\gamma_I(\omega_I - \omega_0)'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'Q(\omega_I - \omega_0)$, which is produced by the portfolio constraints faced by the type I investors. This term can be combined with the risk-free rate $r$, and this fact yields the following corollary.

**Corollary 1.** Consider an unconstrained investor with the coefficient of risk aversion $\gamma_I$ who becomes an index investor in the same economy. This transition changes the investor’s wealth-consumption ratio exactly as a decrease of the risk-free rate by $\frac{1}{2}\gamma_I(\omega_I - \omega_0)'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'(\omega_I - \omega_0)$.

Corollary 1 states that the wealth-consumption ratio of the index investor is the same as that of an unconstrained investor in the economy with a lower risk-free rate $r - \frac{1}{2}\gamma_I(\omega_I - \omega_0)'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'(\omega_I - \omega_0)$ but with the same other equilibrium processes. An unconstrained economy with a modified risk-free rate is a version of the fictitious unconstrained economy of Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992), which is often used to solve utility maximization problems of constrained investors (e.g., Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Chabakauri, 2013, 2015b). However, the Cvitanić and Karatzas (1992) fictitious economies are obtained by adjusting both the market price of risk and the risk-free rate, whereas according to Corollary 1 the indexing constraint is equivalent to an adjustment of the risk-free rate only.

The differential equation (27) also shows that the investor’s wealth-consumption ratio is affected by indexing directly and indirectly. The direct effect is represented by the term $\frac{1}{2}\gamma_I(\omega_I - \omega_0)'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'(\omega_I - \omega_0)$, which is quadratic in the portfolio distortions $\Sigma_Q'(\omega_I - \omega_0)$. The indirect effect is produced by changes in the equilibrium processes that determine the coefficients of Eq. (27). As immediately follows from Eqs. (22) – (25), those changes have linear terms in $\Sigma_Q'(\omega_I - \omega_0)$, so indexing has the first-order indirect effect on the investor’s wealth-consumption ratio. We further investigate the direct and indirect effects of indexing in Section 3.4, in which we relate the wealth-consumption ratio to the investor’s welfare and separate the welfare...
implications of portfolio constraints and distorted investment opportunities.

3. Numerical analysis

Even though we can characterize the impact of indexing on various equilibrium characteristics analytically, the differential equations that describe the equilibrium do not have closed-form solutions. Moreover, the most interesting characteristics such as the volatilities of stock returns and the correlation between them are nonlinear functions of $\Sigma_s$, $f$, $f_u$, and $f_s$. As a result, the impact of indexing on volatilities and correlations can be found only numerically. In this section, we compute the equilibrium from Proposition 1 using the finite-difference approximation described in Internet Appendix A, compare the equilibrium to its analogs in the two benchmark economies, decompose the impact of indexing into the lockstep trading effect and the reduced risk sharing effect, and examine how indexing affects investors’ welfare.

3.1. Model parameters

We calibrate the model parameters so that the growth rates and volatilities of the two dividend processes are identical: $\mu_{D1} = \mu_{D2} = 0.018$, $\Sigma_{D1} = [0.045\ 0]$, and $\Sigma_{D2} = [0 \ 0.045]$. We follow previous studies (e.g., Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Dumas and Lyasoff, 2012; Chabakauri, 2013) and identify the aggregate dividend with the aggregate consumption, and the chosen parameter values are in the ballpark of the estimated mean and volatility of the consumption growth rate in the United States. The dividends of the stocks are assumed to be uncorrelated.

Because we interpret the type P investors as financial professionals and the type I investors as individual investors, we set $\gamma_P = 1$ and $\gamma_I = 5$, and this choice is consistent with individual investors being more risk averse than professionals. In contrast to the vast majority of the papers that study equilibria in incomplete markets, we do not assume that constrained investors have logarithmic preferences. On the one hand, this complicates the analysis because the hedging demand of such investors affects the properties of the equilibrium and should be taken into account. On the other hand, the assumption $\gamma_I > 1$ makes the analysis more realistic. The
time preference parameter $\beta$ is 0.03 for all investors.

In Internet Appendix C, we explore the robustness of our results to changes in the model parameters and consider two alternative specifications. In the first of them, the Lucas trees have different dividend processes with the parameters $\mu_{D1} = 0.01$, $\mu_{D2} = 0.03$, $\Sigma_{D1} = [0.01 \ 0]$, and $\Sigma_{D2} = [0 \ 0.08]$. In the second specification, the index investors are less risk averse than the unconstrained investors, and we set $\gamma_I = 1$ and $\gamma_P = 5$.

3.2. Economy with indexing vs. unconstrained economy

We start with comparing the equilibrium variables in the economy with indexing and the unconstrained economy discussed in Section 2.5.\footnote{The equilibrium characteristics of the unconstrained economy with the parameters from Section 3.1 are presented in Internet Appendix B.} For variables that can take only positive values, we consider percentage changes produced by indexing. Because correlations can switch their signs, we present simple differences in them.

3.2.1. Market volatility and correlation

Consider first the impact of indexing on market volatility and the correlation between stock returns. The left panels of Fig. 1 plot the changes in $\sigma_I$ and $\rho$ as functions of the state variables. The graphs show that indexing unambiguously decreases market volatility but can increase or decrease the correlation depending on the state of the economy. In particular, the correlation increases when the stocks have comparable sizes (when $u$ is close to 0.5) but decreases when the sizes are substantially different.

Those effects can be understood through examining how indexing distorts the investors' trading strategies. In the unconstrained economy, the stock volatilities and correlation are determined by the dividend processes and risk sharing among investors. Because less risk-averse type P investors hold a larger share of their wealth in stocks than more risk averse type I investors, a positive dividend shock to one of the stocks disproportionately increases their wealth and decreases the aggregate risk aversion in the economy. The induced variation in the
aggregate risk aversion produces a common variation in the stock discount rates. As a result, the volatilities of stocks are higher than the volatilities of the dividends, and the returns are correlated even when the dividends are independent.

Indexing produces two new effects that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, it further increases market volatility and the return correlation because indexers hold an equal number of the shares of each stock and trade both stocks in lockstep. On the other hand, indexing reduces the volatility and correlation because it hampers risk sharing among investors. To isolate the lockstep trading effect from the reduced risk sharing effect, we consider a modified specification of the economy dubbed a lockstep-trading economy. In this economy, the type I investors exogenously put in the index the same fraction of their wealth as they put in both stocks in the unconstrained economy and optimize only their consumption policy. All other components of the model are the same as before. Because the portfolio optimization is switched off, the type I investors do not change their allocation of wealth to index in response to reduced risk-sharing opportunities. Thus, the differences in the equilibrium characteristics between the unconstrained and lockstep-trading economies are naturally interpreted as solely produced by lockstep trading.

More specifically, in the lockstep-trading economy, we exogenously set \( \hat{\omega}_I = \omega^{unc}_{11} + \omega^{unc}_{12} \), where \( \omega^{unc}_{11} \) and \( \omega^{unc}_{12} \) are the optimal portfolio weights of the type I investors in the unconstrained economy, and assume that each type I investor maximizes utility (7) with respect to the consumption \( C_I \) subject to the budget constraint (9). The equilibrium in the lockstep-trading economy is described by Proposition 4.

**Proposition 4** The equilibrium in the lockstep-trading economy is characterized by the functions \( r, \mu, \Sigma, \Sigma_I, f, \) and \( h \) that solve a system of algebraic and partial differential equations (A60) – (A65) from the Appendix.

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

As in the case of the economy with indexing, the equilibrium in the lockstep-trading economy
cannot be found analytically, and we compute its characteristics using the numerical techniques described in Internet Appendix A.

Fig. 1 presents the decomposition of the changes in market volatility and the correlation produced by indexing into the components associated with lockstep trading and reduced risk sharing. The middle column shows the differences in the characteristics between the unconstrained and lockstep-trading economies, which are solely produced by the lockstep trading effect. The right column presents the differences in the same variables between the lockstep-trading economy and the economy with indexing; those differences measure the reduced risk sharing effect.

The obtained decomposition delivers several insights. Consider first the graphs for the correlation, which is increased by indexing when the stocks have comparable sizes but decreased when one of the stocks is substantially larger than the other. Fig. 1 sheds new light on this pattern by demonstrating that lockstep trading increases the correlation in almost all states of the economy, whereas reduced risk sharing decreases it in all states. The reduced risk sharing effect is stronger and more than offsets the lockstep trading effect when the stocks have different sizes, so the correlation becomes lower than in the unconstrained economy. When the stocks have comparable sizes, risk sharing is almost unaffected by indexing, and the lockstep trading effect dominates. As a result, the correlation between stock returns is higher than without indexing. Overall, the interplay between the two effects explains the shape of the correlation surface.

Lockstep trading and reduced risk sharing also have opposite effects on market volatility. Fig. 1 demonstrates that lockstep trading unambiguously increases it, which is a consequence of a higher correlation between stock returns and reduced diversification when investors simultaneously buy or sell multiple assets. In contrast, market volatility, which is higher than the volatility of the aggregate dividend because of risk sharing, decreases when risk sharing is reduced. Both the lockstep trading and reduced risk sharing effects disappear when stocks have equal sizes, but the reduced risk sharing effect is more pronounced in the other states of the economy. As a result, the overall market volatility is lower in the economy with indexing.
than in the unconstrained economy.

In Internet Appendix D, we numerically explore how indexing changes market volatility and the stock correlation when investors have recursive preferences. We find that the main effects are qualitatively similar to those in the economy with the CRRA preferences: indexing typically decreases market volatility, but its effect on the correlation is ambiguous. However, indexing has a quantitatively stronger impact on market volatility in the economy with recursive preferences. Thus, in a model with more realistic preferences the consequences of indexing can be more pronounced and practically important.

3.2.2. Risk-free rate, market prices of risk, and individual stock volatilities

Next, we examine how indexing changes the risk-free rate, market prices of risk, and individual stock volatilities. Because the dividend processes of the stocks have identical parameters, we plot only the component $\eta_1$ and volatility $\sigma_1$; $\eta_2$ and $\sigma_2$ are easily obtainable by flipping the graphs around $u = 1/2$. To interpret the results, we also consider the first component of $\Sigma'_Q(\omega_I - \omega_0)$. As discussed in Section 2.5, the vector $\Sigma'_Q(\omega_I - \omega_0)$ represents the variation in returns on the unconstrained portfolio $\omega_0$ that is orthogonal to the index, and it can be viewed as a measure of portfolio distortions produced by indexing.

The results are plotted in Figs. 2 and 3. The graph for portfolio distortions $[\Sigma'_Q(\omega_I - \omega_0)]_1$ demonstrates that they naturally disappear when either there is only one stock in the economy ($u = 0$ or $u = 1$) or the sizes of the stocks are identical ($u = 1/2$) because in those cases the indexing constraint is not binding. Furthermore, $[\Sigma'_Q\omega_I]_1 > [\Sigma'_Q\omega_0]_1$ ($[\Sigma'_Q\omega_I]_1 < [\Sigma'_Q\omega_0]_1$) when the first stock is small (large), so indexing makes the type I investors’ portfolio returns more (less) sensitive to dividend shocks of the smaller (larger) stock. Also, the magnitude of the effect is larger when $u < 1/2$ because by trading only the index it is harder for the type I investors to share risks associated with the smaller stock.

The graphs for the changes in the risk-free rate and market price of risk are directly related to the graph for portfolio distortions. According to Eqs. (25) and (26), the changes in $\eta$ produced by indexing are proportional to $\Sigma'_Q(\omega_I - \omega_0)$ with a negative coefficient, which is evident in the
As discussed in Section 2.5, indexing amplifies the consumption volatility of the type I investors, which increases their precautionary savings and drives the risk-free rate down. This pattern is illustrated by the graph for $\Delta r/r_{\text{unc}}$, and the effect is stronger when the type I investors dominate the economy. The two troughs in the graph are explained by larger portfolio distortions produced by indexing in the states around $u = 0.25$ and $u = 0.75$.

The effects of indexing on the risk-free rate $r$ and the market price of risk $\eta_i$ explain why indexing increases the price-dividend ratios $f_i$ of the smaller stock. Indeed, the approximate Gordon formula $f_i \approx 1/(r + \eta \Sigma_{D_i} - \mu_{D_i})$ shows that the price-dividend ratio increases when both the risk-free rate and the market price of risk become lower but may decrease when a lower risk-free rate is offset by a higher market price of risk.13 As follows from the discussion above, the former happens for the smaller stock and the latter may happen for the larger stock.

The impact of indexing on the individual stock volatilities $\sigma_i$ can also be traced to the portfolio distortions $\Sigma'_Q(\omega_I - \omega_0)$. First, note that because $\sigma_i = \sqrt{\Sigma_{Q_i} \Sigma'_{Q_i}}$, the percentage change in the volatility produced by indexing in the first-order approximation can be written as $\Delta \sigma_i/\sigma_{i\text{unc}} \approx \Sigma_{Q_i} \Delta \Sigma'_{Q_i}/(\sigma_{i\text{unc}}^2)$. Second, using that $\Sigma_{Q_i} = \Sigma_{D_i} + (f_{Is}/f_i) \Sigma_s + (f_{Iu}/f_i) \Sigma_u$ (this is Eq. (A9)), the change in $\Sigma_{Q_i}$ in the first-order approximation can be decomposed as

$$
\Delta \Sigma_{Q_i} = \Delta \left( \frac{f_{Is}}{f_i} \Sigma_s \right) + \Delta \left( \frac{f_{Iu}}{f_i} \Sigma_u \right) \approx \Delta \left( \frac{f_{Is}}{f_i} \right) \Sigma_{s\text{unc}} + \Delta \left( \frac{f_{Iu}}{f_i} \right) \Sigma_{s\text{unc}} + \Delta \left( \frac{f_{Is}}{f_i} + f_{Iu}/f_i \right) \Sigma_u,
$$

where the last equality follows from Eq. (22). Thus, there are direct and indirect channels through which indexing changes the return diffusions. The first term in Eq. (28) is proportional to $\Sigma'_{Q_i}(\omega_I - \omega_0)$, and it represents the direct effect of portfolio distortions on $\Sigma_{Q_i}$. The last two terms are produced by the changes in the price elasticities with respect to the state variables $s$ and $u$; this is the indirect effect of indexing. Fig. 3 plots the described decompositions of $\Delta \sigma_i/\sigma_{i\text{unc}}$ and $\Delta \Sigma_{Q_i}$. Because the stocks have identical dividend processes, we present the

13Chabakauri (2013) discusses the approximate Gordon formula in more detail.
results only for the first of them; the graphs for the other stock can be obtained by flipping all graphs around $u = 1/2$.

The top row of panels in Fig. 3 demonstrates the decomposition of $\Delta \sigma_1/\sigma_{1,unc}^1$ into two terms associated with the changes in the diffusion components $\Sigma Q_{1,1}$ and $\Sigma Q_{1,2}$. In general, both shocks $dB_1$ and $dB_2$ contribute to the volatility of the first stock, but the change in $\Sigma Q_{1,1}$ has a much stronger effect than the change in $\Sigma Q_{1,2}$: the graphs for $\Delta \sigma_1/\sigma_{1,unc}^1$ and its first component are almost indistinguishable. Intuitively, the stock returns load more strongly on their own dividend shock ($dB_1$ in the case of the first stock), so the diffusion of that shock largely determines the stock volatility and the change in it. Thus, to understand the impact of indexing, we can focus on how it changes $\Sigma Q_{1,1}$.

The bottom row of panels in Fig. 3 decomposes $\Delta \Sigma_{Q_{1,1}}$ according to Eq. (28), where the middle and right panels plot the contributions of portfolio distortions and changes in the price elasticities, respectively. The graphs unambiguously show that the former is an order of magnitude larger than the latter, and the shapes of the surfaces in the bottom left and middle panels are almost identical. Thus, the impact of indexing on the stock volatility is mostly determined by the portfolio distortions that it creates.

The comparison of the top left panel of Fig. 2 and the bottom middle panel of Fig. 3 suggests that the contribution of portfolio distortions $[\Sigma_Q'(\omega_I - \omega_0)]_1$ into the volatility is shaped by two additional factors. First, when the share of the index investors’ consumption decreases ($s$ approaches 0), the impact of the portfolio distortions on diffusions and volatilities becomes weaker, even though the portfolio distortions themselves do not disappear. This result is intuitive since in the limit $s \to 0$ the influence of index investors on the equilibrium becomes negligible, although their portfolios still nontrivially deviate from the unconstrained portfolio. Second, Eq. (28) demonstrates that $[\Sigma_Q'(\omega_I - \omega_0)]_1$ is negatively related to the change in the volatility because it is premultiplied by the derivative $f_{unc}^{1s}$. The latter is negative because the price-dividend ratio decreases with $s$: for higher $s$ the proportion of the more risk-averse investors in the economy and the required risk premium are higher and the prices are lower.
3.3. Economy with indexing vs. pre-indexing economy

So far we used the unconstrained economy as the benchmark for gauging the impact of indexing. In this section, we consider an alternative benchmark that differs from our main model by the assumption that the type I investors, who are still interpreted as unsophisticated investors, cannot trade financial assets at all. Such a setup provides a stylized description of financial markets before the advent of indexing and is dubbed pre-indexing economy. It helps us understand the degree to which the possibility to trade indexes, which simplify the access to financial markets for unsophisticated investors, alleviates trading constraints and completes the markets.

Specifically, we assume that in the pre-indexing economy the type I investors are endowed with the cash flow \( s_0D \), where \( s_0 \) is an exogenous parameter bounded between 0 and 1. Without access to financial markets, the investors must consume all cash flows in each period. The type P investors still can trade all assets individually, and their behavior determines asset prices. Because all type P investors have the same preferences, the dynamics of such an economy coincide with the dynamics of an economy with homogeneous investors and two trees that produce the dividends \((1 - s_0)D_1\) and \((1 - s_0)D_2\), respectively. Such economies are studied by Cochrane et al. (2008) and Martin (2013), and their equilibrium characteristics are readily available. Note that all characteristics are functions of only the first dividend share \( u \). Moreover, because only the type P investors can trade with each other and the consumption share \( s_0 \) is an exogenous parameter, the equilibrium processes in the pre-indexing economy are the same as in the limit \( s \to 0 \) of our main economy. The equilibrium characteristics of the pre-indexing economy with the parameters from Section 3.1 are presented in Internet Appendix B.

Fig. 4 shows how the pre-indexing economy characteristics change as a result of allowing the type I investors to trade bonds and the market index. Most importantly, indexing makes the individual stock returns and the market returns more volatile, and this effect has an intuitive explanation. The ability of both types of investors to trade the index makes the market more complete and facilitates risk sharing among investors. As a result, the equilibrium characteristics become closer to their counterparts in the unconstrained economy. In particular, risk
sharing inflates volatilities and makes the returns much more correlated than they are in the pre-indexing economy.\footnote{A similar mechanism is responsible for excessive volatility produced by introducing a nonredundant derivative in Bhamra and Uppal (2009).} Thus, our results provide a potential theoretical explanation for empirical findings that indexing can make stocks more volatile and more correlated (e.g., Sullivan and Xiong, 2012; Leippold et al., 2016; Ben-David et al., 2018; Da and Shive, 2018; Grégoire, 2020). Note that the investors in our model are perfectly rational, and this fact distinguishes our explanation from those in Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis et al. (2005), who explain the comovement of stock returns by behavioral biases.

Fig. 4 also shows that index investing increases the risk-free rate and market prices of risk but decreases the price-dividend ratios. Indeed, the less risk-averse type P investors prefer to hold more risky assets than the type I investors. To finance their positions, they borrow from the type I investors, and this pushes the risk-free rate up. Also, the ability to trade the index allows the type I investors to partially unload their exposure to dividend shocks to the type P investors. As a result, the market price of risk increases but the stock prices decrease to make large positions in the risky assets sufficiently attractive to the type P investors.

3.4. Welfare analysis

Finally, we explore how indexing affects the investors’ welfare. To quantify the welfare implications of indexing, we use the certainty equivalent loss (CEL). The CEL is defined as the maximal fraction of wealth that an investor in the state \((s, u)\) of the unconstrained economy would give up for not being an index investor in the same state of the economy with indexing. More formally, we consider the function \(CEL(s, u)\) that solves the following equation:

\[
J_{\text{unc}}((1 - CEL(s, u))W, s, u, t) = J(W, s, u, t),
\]

where \(J_{\text{unc}}(W, s, u, t)\) and \(J(W, s, u, t)\) are the investor’s indirect utility functions in the unconstrained economy and in the economy with indexing, respectively. Using Eq. (A27), the CEL
of a type I investor can be written as

$$CEL(s, u) = 1 - \left( \frac{h(s, u)}{h_{unc}(s, u)} \right)^{\gamma_I},$$

(30)

where $h(s, u)$ and $h_{unc}(s, u)$ are the wealth-consumption ratios of the type I investors in the constrained and unconstrained economies.

There are two channels through which indexing affects the investor. First, it restricts the portfolio choice and makes the investment policy suboptimal. Second, it distorts prices and investment opportunities because in the economy with indexing many investors are constrained. To disentangle the contributions of those factors to the CEL, we compute two additional certainty equivalents: the first one dubbed $CEL_1$ measures the loss in utility produced by constraints, and the second one dubbed $CEL_2$ measures the welfare effect of distorted investment opportunities. We define $CEL_1$ and $CEL_2$ as solutions to the following equations:

$$\tilde{J}((1 - CEL_1(s, u))W, s, u) = J(W, s, u), \quad J_{unc}((1 - CEL_2(s, u))W, s, u) = \tilde{J}(W, s, u),$$

(31)

where $\tilde{J}(W, s, u)$ is the indirect utility function of a hypothetical unconstrained investor with the coefficient of risk aversion $\gamma_I$ who lives in the economy with index investors. Again, using Eq. (A27), we find that

$$CEL_1(s, u) = 1 - \left( \frac{h(s, u)}{h_{unc}(s, u)} \right)^{\gamma_I}, \quad CEL_2(s, u) = 1 - \left( \frac{\tilde{h}(s, u)}{h_{unc}(s, u)} \right)^{\gamma_I},$$

(32)

where $\tilde{h}(s, u)$ is the unconstrained investor’s wealth-consumption ratio. It solves Eq. (27) with $\omega_I = \omega_0$. Note that $1 - CEL(s, u) = (1 - CEL_1(s, u))(1 - CEL_2(s, u))$, so when the utility losses are small, the CEL can be decomposed as $CEL(s, u) \approx CEL_1(s, u) + CEL_2(s, u)$.

Panel A of Fig. 5 presents $CEL$, $CEL_1$, and $CEL_2$ of a type I investor for our standard calibration of the parameters.\(^{15}\) It shows that the CEL is positive in all states, so the investor

\(^{15}\)Because the type P investors have logarithmic preferences, their wealth-consumption ratios are equal to $1/\beta$ in both constrained and unconstrained economies, and their welfare is unaffected when the indexing constraints are imposed on other investors.
unambiguously prefers to be in the unconstrained economy. The decomposition of \( CEL \) into \( CEL_1 \) and \( CEL_2 \) reveals that \( CEL_1 \) is always positive but \( CEL_2 \) is mostly negative. Thus, the welfare loss is largely produced by the inability of the investor to freely adjust portfolio weights in the economy with indexing (the component \( CEL_1 \)), not by price distortions (the component \( CEL_2 \)). Intuitively, \( CEL_1 > 0 \) because keeping the investment opportunities fixed, any constraint that makes the originally optimal portfolio infeasible reduces the investor’s welfare. In general, the constraint distorts both the myopic and hedging demand of the investor: the former distortion worsens the risk-return tradeoff that the investor faces, the latter distortion hampers the investor’s ability to hedge the time variation in investment opportunities. The sign of \( CEL_2 \) is more ambiguous. By definition, \( CEL_2 \) compares the welfare of an unconstrained investor in the economies with and without index investors, so it is determined by the difference in investment opportunities in those economies. Typically, \( CEL_2 \) is negative (an unconstrained investor benefits from constraints imposed on other investors) because a lower volatility of the market returns in the economy with indexing makes the investment opportunities more attractive.

Fig. 5 also shows that the welfare implications of indexing are particularly strong when the economy is dominated by the type I investors (when \( s \) is close to 1). Indeed, in those states, the equilibrium distortions produced by indexing are the largest because the majority of the investors are impacted by the constraint. The effects are also stronger when one of the dividends constitutes approximately 25% of the total consumption in the economy. Indeed, as demonstrated in Section 2.5, the effect of indexing on the wealth-consumption ratio is determined by portfolio distortions through the term \( \frac{1}{2} \gamma_1 (\omega - \omega_0) \Sigma Q \Sigma' Q (\omega - \omega_0) \) in Eq. (27). When \( u = 0 \) or \( u = 1 \), the index contains only one stock, and the economy is identical to an economy with one tree. Therefore, there are no distortions produced by indexing, and the welfare is unchanged. When \( u = 0.5 \), the stocks have identical sizes, so even in the unconstrained economy investors would put equal fractions of their wealth in each stock, that is, hold the index portfolio. As a result, the indexing constraint is effectively nonbinding, and the welfare distortion is low. Consequently, the effect of indexing is the strongest in the intermediate states around \( u = 0.25 \) or \( u = 0.75 \).
To quantify the welfare implications of opening index markets for all investors in the pre-indexing economy, we use the certainty equivalent gain (CEG) of a type I investor. In the pre-indexing economy, such an investor consumes the cash flow $s_0 D_t$ and has the indirect utility function $J_0(s_0 D_t, u, t)$. In the economy with indexing, an asset with the cash flow $s_0 D_t$ has the price $(S_t/D_t)s_0 D_t = f(s, u)s_0 D_t$, and it is equal to the investors’ wealth. The CEG is defined as the minimal additional fraction of the aggregate dividend that the type I investor in the pre-indexing economy should receive to make him indifferent between being in the pre-indexing economy and in the economy in which he can trade the risk-free asset and the index. Formally, the CEG solves the following equation:

$$J_0((1 + CEG(s, u))s_0 D_t, u, t) = J(f(s, u)s_0 D_t, s, u, t), \tag{33}$$

where $J(W, s, u, t)$ is the type I investor’s indirect utility function in the economy with indexing. To find the CEG, note that by definition

$$J_0(s_0 D_t, u, t) = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-\beta t} \frac{(s_0 D_t)^{1-\gamma_I}}{1-\gamma_I} dt \right], \tag{34}$$

where the dynamics of $D_t$ are described by Eq. (4). This indirect utility function can be found in a closed form, and the result is stated in Proposition 5.

**Proposition 5** The indirect utility function of a type I investor who lives in the pre-indexing economy is

$$J_0(s_0 D_t, u, t) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma_I} (s_0 D_t)^{1-\gamma_I} h_0(u) \exp(-\beta t), \tag{35}$$

where the function $h_0(u)$ is given by Eq. (A69) in the Appendix.

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

Using the indirect utility functions from Eqs. (35) and (A27), Eq. (33) can be solved for the CEG:

$$CEG(s, u) = f(s, u) \left( \frac{h(s, u)^{\gamma_I}}{h_0(u)} \right)^{1-\gamma_I} - 1. \tag{36}$$
Note that the CEG does not depend on the share of the total dividend $s_0$ consumed by the type I investors in the pre-indexing economy.

For our standard calibration of the parameters, the graph for the CEG is presented in Panel B of Fig. 5. The CEG is positive, so risk sharing facilitated by index trading is beneficial to the investors despite producing excessive volatility and comovement of asset returns. The comparison of Panels A and B of Fig. 5 shows that the gain in utility produced by introducing of index trading is several orders of magnitude larger than the loss produced by investors’ switching from trading individual assets to trading the index: the former can reach 20%, whereas the latter does not exceed 0.004%. Although our model cannot provide accurate magnitudes of the effects, so large differences are unlikely to disappear in a more realistic model.

Fig. 5 also shows that the CEG decreases with $s$. Indeed, there is almost no benefit from trading the index when the type I investors dominate in the economy with indexing (when $s$ is close to 1) because in this case the risk-absorbing capacity of the type P investors is small, and the type I investors are exposed to almost the same fluctuations in the aggregate dividend as in the pre-indexing economy. In contrast, when the share of the type I investors is small (when $s$ is close to 0), a large part of the aggregate risk can be unloaded by the type I investors to the type P investors through trading the index and risk-free asset. This opportunity makes the type I investors substantially better off than in the pre-indexing economy.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the impact of index investing on the market equilibrium. Our analysis reveals that switching of some investors from trading individual stocks to trading the index decreases the volatility of market returns but has an ambiguous effect on the return correlation. Although it is widely recognized that indexing changes the dynamics of stock returns because it induces lockstep trading of many individual securities, our analysis shows that indexing also affects risk-sharing opportunities, which determine the incentives to trade, and this by itself has an impact on volatilities and correlations of stock returns. When the
introduction of index trading opens financial markets for new investors, improved risk sharing makes market returns more volatile and stock returns more correlated.

Our analysis can be extended in several directions. In particular, our model can accommodate alternative types of indexes such as fundamental indexes, which were proposed in the literature and implemented in practice (e.g., Arnott et al., 2005). Also, it could be interesting to consider a setting with multiple trees in which only a subset of the trees is included in the index. Such a model could help investigate how the choice of assets for the index affects the equilibrium properties and provide a fully-fledged general equilibrium analysis of the correlations between the assets included and excluded from the index. This extension is likely to be harder to analyze than our model because of a larger number of state variables. Finally, it may be interesting to endogenize the dividend processes using a production economy framework and examine the impact of indexing on firm behavior. The analysis of how portfolio constraints affect corporate policies could be a particularly fruitful direction for future research.

Appendix. Proofs.

Proof of Proposition 1. The equilibrium functions \( r, \mu_s, \Sigma_s, \Sigma_I, f, \) and \( h \) solve the following system of equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
r &= \beta + \Gamma \left( \mu_D - \frac{1}{2} (\gamma_I + 1)s \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' \right. \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{2} (\gamma_P + 1)(1 - s) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right)' \left. \right), \quad (A1) \\
\mu_s &= -\Sigma_s \Sigma_D' + \frac{s(1 - s)}{\gamma_I \gamma_P} \Gamma \left( \mu_D (\gamma_P - \gamma_I) + \frac{\gamma_I (\gamma_I + 1)}{2} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' \right. \\
&\quad - \frac{\gamma_P (\gamma_P + 1)}{2} \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right)' \left. \right), \quad (A2) \\
\Sigma_s &= \frac{\gamma_P - \gamma_I}{\gamma_I \gamma_P} s(1 - s) \Gamma \Sigma_D \Pi_I - \frac{s}{h + sh_s} (h \Sigma_D + h_u \Sigma_u)(I_2 - \Pi_I), \quad (A3)
\end{align*}
\]
The expected excess returns on individual stocks

We derive Eqs. (A1) – (A9) in several steps.

The price-dividend ratio

where \( \Pi_i \) solves the following differential equation:

where \( \Pi_i = (\Sigma_i' \Sigma_i)/(\Sigma_i \Sigma_i') \). The market price of risk \( \eta \) and the expected excess return on the index \( \mu_i \) are

The price-dividend ratio \( f_i \) solves the following differential equation:

The expected excess returns on individual stocks \( \mu_{Qi} \) and return diffusions \( \Sigma_{Qi} \) are

We derive Eqs. (A1) – (A9) in several steps.

A. Price-dividend ratios

First, we derive equations for the price-dividend ratios \( f_1, f_2, \) and \( f \). By definition, \( S_i = D_i f_i \). Applying Itô’s lemma to this equation, we get

\[
\frac{dS_i}{S_i} = \frac{dD_i}{D_i} + \frac{df_i}{f_i} + \frac{dD_i}{D_i} \frac{df_i}{f_i},
\]
where
\[
d f_i = f_{is}(\mu_s dt + \Sigma_s dB) + f_{iu}(\mu_u dt + \Sigma_u dB) + \frac{1}{2} f_{iss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s dt + \frac{1}{2} f_{isu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u dt + f_{ius} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_s dt. \tag{A11}
\]
Using Eq. (1),
\[
\frac{dS_i + D_i dt}{S_i} - r dt = \left( \mu_{Di} - r + \frac{1}{2} f_{iss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} f_{isu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + \frac{1}{2} f_{ius} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_s 
\right. \\
\left. + (\mu_s + \Sigma_{Di} \Sigma'_s) \frac{f_{is}}{f_i} + (\mu_u + \Sigma_{Di} \Sigma'_u) \frac{f_{iu}}{f_i} + 1 \right) dt + \left( \Sigma_{Di} + \frac{f_{is}}{f_i} \Sigma_s + \frac{f_{iu}}{f_i} \Sigma_u \right) dB. \tag{A12}
\]
This process should coincide with the process for excess returns from Eq. (3), so
\[
\mu_{Qi} = \mu_{Di} - r + \frac{1}{2} f_{iss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} f_{isu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + \frac{1}{2} f_{ius} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_s \\
+ (\mu_s + \Sigma_{Di} \Sigma'_s) \frac{f_{is}}{f_i} + (\mu_u + \Sigma_{Di} \Sigma'_u) \frac{f_{iu}}{f_i} + 1. \tag{A13}
\]
\[
\Sigma_{Qi} = \Sigma_{Di} + \frac{f_{is}}{f_i} \Sigma_s + \frac{f_{iu}}{f_i} \Sigma_u. \tag{A14}
\]
Eq. (A13) is a differential equation for \( f_i \):
\[
\frac{1}{2} f_{iss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} f_{isu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + f_{is} (\mu_s + \Sigma_{Di} \Sigma'_s) \\
+ f_{iu} (\mu_u + \Sigma_{Di} \Sigma'_u) + (\mu_{Di} - r - \mu_{Qi}) f_i + 1 = 0. \tag{A15}
\]
By definition of the market price of risk \( \eta \), \( \mu_{Qi} = \Sigma_{Qi} \eta' \). Plugging this representation for \( \mu_{Qi} \) in Eq. (A15) and using Eq. (A14), we arrive at Eq. (A8). The same steps applied to the index yield the differential equation for the index price-dividend ratio \( f \):
\[
\frac{1}{2} f_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} f_{su} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + f_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_u + f_s (\mu_s + \Sigma_{D} \Sigma'_s) \\
+ f_u (\mu_u + \Sigma_{D} \Sigma'_u) + (\mu_D - r - \mu_I) f + 1 = 0. \tag{A16}
\]
The index diffusion is related to the diffusions of the state variables as
\[
\Sigma_I = \Sigma_D + \frac{f_s}{f} \Sigma_s + \frac{f_u}{f} \Sigma_u, \tag{A17}
\]
and this equation is similar to Eq. (A14).

**B. Utility maximization problem of the type P investors**
The type P investors can trade individual stocks, so from their perspective the market is complete. The first-order conditions of their utility maximization problem can be interpreted as pricing equations that relate the risk-free rate $r$ and the expected excess returns $\mu_Q$ to their discount factor $\Lambda$ (e.g., Cochrane, 2005):

$$r = -\frac{1}{dt}E\left(\frac{d\Lambda}{\Lambda}\right), \quad \mu_{Qi} = -\frac{1}{dt}E\left(\frac{d\Lambda dS_i}{\Lambda S_i}\right), \quad i = 1, 2. \quad (A18)$$

Since the investors have the CRRA preferences, their discount factor is $\Lambda = \exp(-\beta t)(C_P)^{-\gamma}$. Hence,

$$\frac{d\Lambda}{\Lambda} = -\beta dt - \gamma_P \frac{dC_P}{C_P} + \gamma_P(\gamma_P + 1)\left(\frac{dC_P}{C_P}\right)^2. \quad (A19)$$

Itô’s lemma applied to $C_P = (1 - s)D$ together with Eqs. (4) and (10) yields

$$\frac{dC_P}{C_P} = \mu_C dt + \Sigma_C dB, \quad (A20)$$

where

$$\mu_C = \mu_D - \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_D \Sigma_s'}{1 - s}, \quad \Sigma_C = \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s. \quad (A21)$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{d\Lambda}{\Lambda} = -\beta dt - \gamma_P \left(\mu_D - \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_D \Sigma_s'}{1 - s} - \frac{\gamma_P + 1}{2} \left(\Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s\right)^'\right) dt$$

$$- \gamma_P \left(\Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s\right) dB. \quad (A22)$$

Using Eq. (A18), we find the risk-free rate $r$ and the expected excess returns $\mu_Q$ and $\mu_I$:

$$r = \beta + \gamma_P \mu_D - \frac{\gamma_P}{1 - s} (\mu_s + \Sigma_s \Sigma_D') - \frac{\gamma_P(\gamma_P + 1)}{2} \left(\Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s\right)^' \left(\Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s\right)', \quad (A23)$$

$$\mu_Q = \gamma_P \Sigma_Q \left(\Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s\right)', \quad \mu_I = \gamma_P \Sigma_I \left(\Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s\right)' \quad (A24)$$

C. Utility maximization problem of the type I investors

The type I investors maximize the CRRA utility from Eq. (7) subject to the budget constraint from Eq. (9). Because they can trade only the index and the risk-free bond, from their perspective the market is incomplete, and the utility maximization problem should be solved directly. In particular, their indirect utility function $J$ satisfies the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation
\[
\max_{\{C_I, \hat{\omega}_I\}} \left[ e^{-\beta t} \frac{C_I^{1-\gamma_I}}{1 - \gamma_I} + \mathcal{D}J \right] = 0, \tag{A25}
\]
where \(\mathcal{D}J = \mathbb{E}[dJ]/dt\) is given by
\[
\mathcal{D}J = J_W (rW_I - C_I + \hat{\omega}_I W_I \mu_I) + \frac{1}{2} J_W W_I^2 \hat{\omega}_I^2 \Sigma_I' \Sigma_I' + J_W \hat{\omega}_I W_I \Sigma_I \Sigma_I' + J_W u \hat{\omega}_I W_I \Sigma_I \Sigma_u' + J_s \mu_s + J_u \mu_u + \frac{1}{2} J_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} J_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + J_{us} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + J_t, \tag{A26}
\]
and the subscripts of \(J\) denote derivatives with respect to the corresponding variables. When investors have the CRRA preferences, it is standard to look for the indirect utility in the following form:
\[
J = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma_I} W_I^{1-\gamma_I} h^{\gamma_I} \exp(-\beta t), \tag{A27}
\]
where the function \(h\) depends on the state variables \(s\) and \(u\). The maximization in (A25) with respect to \(C_I\) together with Eq. (A27) yields the optimal consumption:
\[
C_I = W_I h^{-1}, \tag{A28}
\]
so \(h\) is the optimal wealth-consumption ratio. Similarly, the maximization in (A25) with respect to \(\hat{\omega}_I\) gives the optimal weight of the index:
\[
\hat{\omega}_I = \frac{1}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'} \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_I \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_I \Sigma_u' \right). \tag{A29}
\]
The substitution of Eqs. (A28) and (A29) back into (A25) yields a differential equation for \(h\):
\[
\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{us} \Sigma_u \Sigma_s' + h_s \mu_s + h_u \mu_u + \frac{\gamma_I - 1}{2} \left( \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' - \frac{1}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'} \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_I \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_I \Sigma_u' \right)^2 \right) h \\
+ \frac{1}{\gamma_I} ((1 - \gamma_I) r - \beta) h + 1 = 0. \tag{A30}
\]

D. Dynamics of the state variable \(s\) and returns on the index
Next, we find the expressions for \(\mu_s\), \(\Sigma_s\), \(\mu_I\), and \(\Sigma_I\). Itô’s lemma applied to \(C_I = sD\) yields
\[
\frac{dC_I}{C_I} = \mu_C dt + \Sigma_C dB, \quad \frac{dC_I^{-\gamma_I}}{C_I^{-\gamma_I}} = \left( -\gamma_I \mu_C + \frac{1}{2} \gamma_I (\gamma_I + 1) \Sigma_C \Sigma_C' \right) dt - \gamma_I \Sigma_C dB, \tag{A31}
\]
where
\[
\mu_{CI} = \mu_D + \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_s \Sigma_{I}'}{s}, \quad \Sigma_{CI} = \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s. \tag{A32}
\]

Using \( C_I = W_I h^{-1} \), the indirect utility function from Eq. (A27) can be rewritten as
\[
J = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma_I} C_I^{-\gamma_I} W_I \exp(-\beta t). \tag{A33}
\]

Applying Itô’s lemma to this equation and taking into account Eqs. (9) and (A31), we get
\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = \left( -\beta - \gamma_I \mu_{CI} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma_I (\gamma_I + 1) \Sigma_{CI} \Sigma_{CI}' + r - h^{-1} + \bar{\omega}_I (\mu_I - \gamma_I \Sigma_I \Sigma_{CI}') \right) dt + (\bar{\omega}_I \Sigma_I - \gamma_I \Sigma_{CI}) dB. \tag{A34}
\]

Alternatively, Itô’s lemma applied to Eq. (A27) yields
\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = D \frac{dJ}{J} dt + \left( (1 - \gamma_I) \bar{\omega}_I \Sigma_I + \gamma_I \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \gamma_I \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) dB. \tag{A35}
\]

Noting that Eqs. (A27) and (A28) imply that
\[
e^{-\beta t} \frac{C_{I,1} - \gamma_I}{1 - \gamma_I} = J h^{-1} \tag{A36}
\]
and using the HJB equation (A25), we get \( D \frac{dJ}{J} = -J h^{-1} \) and rewrite Eq. (A35) as
\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = -h^{-1} dt + \left( (1 - \gamma_I) \bar{\omega}_I \Sigma_I + \gamma_I \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \gamma_I \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) dB. \tag{A37}
\]

Matching the drifts and diffusions in Eqs. (A34) and (A37) and using \( \mu_{CI} \) and \( \Sigma_{CI} \) from Eq. (A32), we get
\[
\frac{1 + \gamma_I}{2} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' + \frac{r - \beta}{\gamma_I} + \bar{\omega}_I \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} - \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \Sigma_{CI}' \right) = \mu_D + \frac{1}{s} (\mu_s + \Sigma_s \Sigma_{CI}'), \tag{A38}
\]
\[
\bar{\omega}_I \Sigma_I - \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s - \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u = \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s. \tag{A39}
\]

Eq. (A39) helps to derive a system of equations for \( \Sigma_I \) and \( \Sigma_s \). Plugging the optimal portfolio weight \( \bar{\omega}_I \) from Eq. (A29) into Eq. (A39) yields
\[
\frac{\mu_I \Sigma_I}{\gamma_I (\Sigma_I \Sigma_{I})'} - \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( I_2 - \frac{\Sigma_{I}' \Sigma_I}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_{I}'} \right) = \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s, \tag{A40}
\]
where $I_2$ is a $2 \times 2$ identity matrix. Multiplying this equation by $\Sigma'_I$, we get

$$\mu_I = \gamma_I \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma'_s \right) \Sigma'_I,$$

which together with the expression for $\mu_I$ from (A24) gives

$$\Sigma_s \Sigma'_I = \left( \frac{\gamma_I}{s} + \frac{\gamma_p}{1-s} \right)^{-1} (\gamma_p - \gamma_I) \Sigma_D \Sigma'_I. \quad (A42)$$

The substitution of this equation in Eq. (A41) yields $\mu_I = \Gamma \Sigma_D \Sigma'_I$, where $\Gamma$ is defined in Eq. (14). This expression for $\mu_I$ is a part of Eq. (A7). Plugging it into Eq. (A40), introducing the matrix $\Pi_I = (\Sigma'_I \Sigma_I)/(\Sigma_I \Sigma'_I)$, which is a projector operator on the vector $\Sigma_I$, and rearranging the terms, we get

$$\Sigma_s = (\gamma_p - \gamma_I) \left( \frac{\gamma_I}{s} + \frac{\gamma_p}{1-s} \right)^{-1} \Sigma_D - s \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u + \frac{1}{\gamma_I} \Gamma \Sigma_D \right) (I_2 - \Pi_I). \quad (A43)$$

The solution of this equation for $\Sigma_s$ is

$$\Sigma_s = (\gamma_p - \gamma_I) \left( \frac{\gamma_I}{s} + \frac{\gamma_p}{1-s} \right)^{-1} \Sigma_D \Pi_I - \frac{s}{h + h_s} (h \Sigma_D + h_u \Sigma_u) (I_2 - \Pi_I). \quad (A44)$$

Using the definition of $\Gamma$, we obtain Eq. (A3).

Eqs. (A17) and (A44) jointly determine $\Sigma_s$ and $\Sigma_I$. The substitution of $\Sigma_s$ from (A17) in (A44) yields an equation for $\Sigma_I$:

$$\Sigma_I = \frac{f}{f} \left[ (\gamma_p - \gamma_I) \left( \frac{\gamma_I}{s} + \frac{\gamma_p}{1-s} \right)^{-1} \Sigma_D + \frac{s}{h + h_s} (h \Sigma_D + h_u \Sigma_u) \right] \Pi_I$$

$$+ \left[ \Sigma_D - \frac{f_u}{f} \Sigma_u - \frac{f_s}{f} \frac{s}{h + h_s} (h \Sigma_D + h_u \Sigma_u) \right]. \quad (A45)$$

To solve this equation, we use the following lemma.

**Lemma 1.** Consider a linear space with a scalar product $(\cdot, \cdot)$ and denote by $\Pi_x$ the orthogonal projection on the vector $x$. Also, let $a$ and $b$ be two vectors and assume that $(b, b) > 0$. Then, the equation for $x$

$$x = \Pi_x a + b \quad (A46)$$

has the unique solution

$$x = \frac{(a + b, b)}{(b, b)} b. \quad (A47)$$

38
Proof of Lemma 1. The application of the operator $\Pi_x$ to both sides of Eq. (A46) gives $x = \Pi_x a + \Pi_x b$, which together with the initial Eq. (A46) implies that $\Pi_x b = b$. Hence, the vector $b$ belongs to the subspace spanned by the vector $x$, so $x = \lambda b$, $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$. The substitution of this expression in Eq. (A46) yields $\lambda b = \Pi_b a + b$, which implies $\lambda = (\Pi_b a + b)/(b, b)$. Finally, $(\Pi_b a, b) = (a - (I - \Pi_b)a, b) = (a, b)$, where $I$ is the identity operator. Q.E.D.

Eq. (A45) has exactly the form of Eq. (A46) with $\Sigma_I$ corresponding to $x$. Hence,

$$
\Sigma_I = \left( f \Sigma_D + f_u \Sigma_u + f_s (\gamma_P - \gamma_I) \left( \frac{s}{s} + \frac{r}{1-s} \right)^{-1} \Sigma_D \right) \left( f \Sigma_D + f_u \Sigma_u - \frac{sf_s}{h + sh_s} (h \Sigma_D + h_u \Sigma_u) \right) \left( f \Sigma_D + f_u \Sigma_u - \frac{sf_s}{h + sh_s} (h \Sigma_D + h_u \Sigma_u) \right) \times \left( \Sigma_D + f_u \Sigma_u - \frac{sf_s}{f} (h \Sigma_D + h_u \Sigma_u) \right).
$$

This is Eq. (A4). To derive the expression for $\mu_s$, we use Eq. (A38), which together with Eq. (A41) yields

$$
\frac{1 + \gamma_I}{2} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' + \frac{r - \beta}{\gamma_I} = \mu_D + \frac{1}{s} (\mu_s + \Sigma_s \Sigma_D').
$$

Eqs. (A23) and (A49) can be viewed as a system of linear equations for $r$ and $\mu_s$. Its solution is given by Eqs. (A1) and (A2).

E. Differential equations for $f$ and $h$

Eq. (A5) for the price-dividend ratio $f$ follows from (A16) after noting that $\mu_I = \Gamma \Sigma_D \Sigma_I'$ and $\Sigma_I$ is given by Eq. (A17). Eq. (A6) for the wealth-consumption ratio $h$ is derived from Eq. (A30). Using the expression for $\mu_I$ from (A41) and noting that (A43) implies that

$$
\left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u + \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) (I_2 - \Pi_I) = 0,
$$

we get

$$
\left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' - \frac{1}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'} \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_I' \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_I' \Sigma_u \right)^2
$$

$$
= \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)'
$$

$$
- \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \Pi_I \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)'.
$$
This transformation allows us to eliminate the quadratic terms with \( h_s \) and \( h_u \) from Eq. (A30) and get Eq. (A6). Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Any portfolio \( \omega \in \Omega \) has the form \( \omega = \theta \omega_M \), where \( \theta \) is a scalar and \( \omega_M = [S_1/S_2/S]^t \) is the market portfolio. Therefore, the optimization problem in (19) is one-dimensional and reduces to the minimization of \((\theta \omega_M - \omega_0)(\theta \omega_M - \omega_0)' \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' (\theta \omega_M - \omega_0)\) with respect to \( \theta \). The first-order condition is \( \omega_M' \Sigma_Q' \Sigma_Q (\theta \omega_M - \omega_0) = 0 \), and its solution for \( \theta \) is

\[
\theta = \frac{\omega_M' \Sigma_Q' \Sigma_Q \omega_0}{\omega_M' \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' \omega_M} = \frac{\Sigma_I (\Sigma_Q' \omega_0)}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'}.
\]

Using the definition of \( \omega_0 \) from Eq. (18) and noting that \( \Sigma_I \Sigma_Q^{-1} \mu_Q = \omega_M' \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q^{-1} \mu_Q = \mu_I \), we get

\[
\theta = \frac{\Sigma_I}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'} \left( \frac{\Sigma_Q^{-1} \mu_Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h_s} \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h_u} \Sigma_u' \right) = \frac{1}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'} \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h_s} \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h_u} \Sigma_u' \right) = \hat{\omega}_I.
\]

To obtain Eq. (20), note that

\[
\Sigma_Q' \omega_I = \Sigma_Q' \omega_M \frac{\Sigma_I (\Sigma_Q' \omega_0)}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'} = \frac{\Sigma_I' \Sigma_I (\Sigma_Q' \omega_0)}{\Sigma_I \Sigma_I'} = \Pi_I \Sigma_Q' \omega_0.
\]

Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** First, we derive Eq. (22). Note that

\[
(\omega_I - \omega_0)' \Sigma_Q \overset{(i)}{=} \omega_0' \Sigma_Q (\Pi_I - I_2) \overset{(ii)}{=} \left( \frac{\mu_Q (\Sigma_Q')^{-1}}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h_s} \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h_u} \Sigma_u' \right) (\Pi_I - I_2)
\]

\[
\overset{(iii)}{=} \left( \frac{\gamma_P}{\gamma_I} \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1-s} \Sigma_s \right) + \frac{h_s}{h_s} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h_u} \Sigma_u \right) (\Pi_I - I_2)
\]

\[
\overset{(iv)}{=} \left( \frac{\gamma_P}{\gamma_I} \Sigma_D + \frac{s \gamma_P}{\gamma_I (1-s)} \left( \frac{h_s}{h_s} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h_u} \Sigma_u + \Sigma_D \right) + \frac{h_s}{h_s} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h_u} \Sigma_u \right) (\Pi_I - I_2)
\]

\[
\overset{(v)}{=} \frac{\gamma_P}{1-s} \Gamma^{-1} \left( \frac{h_s}{h_s} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h_u} \Sigma_u + \frac{1}{\gamma_I} \Sigma_D \right) (\Pi_I - I_2) \overset{(vi)}{=} \frac{\gamma_P}{s (1-s)} (\Sigma_s - \Sigma_{s unc}),
\]

(A55)
where $I_2$ is the $2 \times 2$ identity matrix. Equality (i) in (A55) uses Eq. (20), equality (ii) exploits the definition of $\omega_0$ from Eq. (18), equality (iii) is the result of substituting the market price of risk from Eq. (A7), equality (iv) applies Eq. (A50), equality (v) uses the definition of $\Gamma$ from Eq. (14), and equality (vi) immediately follows from Eq. (A43). Resolving the equality between the first and last terms in (A55) for $\Sigma_s$, we get (22).

Eqs. (21) and (26) are obtained by plugging the representation of $\Sigma_s$ from (22) into (21), (A32), and (A21) and using $\mu_s^{unc}$ from (16). Eq. (24) immediately follows from combining Eq. (A1) with (A21) and (A32). Eq. (25) is a combination of (A7) and (A21).

To derive Eq. (27), note that the indirect utility function of a type I investor $J$ solves the following HJB equation:
\[
0 = \max_{\{C, \omega \in \Omega\}} \left[ e^{-\beta t} \frac{C^{1-\gamma_I}}{1-\gamma_I} + J_W(W_I(r + \omega'\mu_Q) - C_I) + \frac{1}{2} J_{WW}W_I^2\omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'\omega + J_{W_I}W_I\omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q' + J_{W_I}W_I\omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q' \right]
\]
\[
+ J_{W_I}W_I\omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q' + J_{s\mu_s} + J_{u\mu_u} + \frac{1}{2} J_{ss}\Sigma_s\Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} J_{uu}\Sigma_u\Sigma_u' + J_I \right],
\]
where $\Omega$ is the set of all index portfolios. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we conjecture that the value function is given by Eq. (A27) and obtain the optimal consumption (A28). The substitution of (A27) and (A28) into (A56) yields
\[
\frac{1}{2} h_{ss}\Sigma_s\Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu}\Sigma_u\Sigma_u' + h_{su}\Sigma_s\Sigma_u' + h_{su}\Sigma_u\Sigma_s' + h_{s\mu_s} + h_{u\mu_u} + \frac{h}{\gamma_I}((1 - \gamma_I)r - \beta) + 1
\]
\[
- \frac{(1 - \gamma_I)h}{2} \min_{\omega \in \Omega} \left[ \omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'\omega - 2\omega' \left( \frac{\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_Q\Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_Q\Sigma_u \right) \right]
\]
\[
+ \left( \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_u \right)' = 0.
\]

Note that now the equation involves minimization, not maximization, because the optimized function has been multiplied by a negative factor. Using the definition of $\omega_0$ from Eq. (18), the minimized expression from (A57) can be written as
\[
\omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'\omega - 2\omega' \left( \frac{\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_Q\Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_Q\Sigma_u \right) + \left( \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h}\Sigma_u \right)'
\]
\[
= \omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'\omega - 2\omega'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'\omega_0 + \left( \Sigma_Q'\omega_0 - \frac{\Sigma_Q^{-1}\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} \right)' \left( \Sigma_Q'\omega_0 - \frac{\Sigma_Q^{-1}\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} \right)
\]
\[
= (\omega - \omega_0)'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'\omega(\omega - \omega_0) - \frac{2}{\gamma_I} \omega_0'\mu_Q + \frac{1}{\gamma_I} \mu_Q'(\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q')^{-1}\mu_Q
\]
\[
= (\omega - \omega_0)'\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q'(\omega - \omega_0) - \frac{2h_h}{\gamma_I h}\Sigma_s\Sigma_Q^{-1}\mu_Q - \frac{2h_h}{\gamma_I h}\Sigma_u\Sigma_Q^{-1}\mu_Q - \frac{1}{\gamma_I} \mu_Q'(\Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q')^{-1}\mu_Q.
\]
Collecting all terms, we get

\[
\frac{1}{2}h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2}h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + h_s \left( \mu_s - \frac{1 - \gamma_l \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' - 1}{\gamma_l} \mu_Q \right) + h_u \left( \mu_u - \frac{1 - \gamma_l \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' - 1}{\gamma_l} \mu_Q \right) + \frac{h}{\gamma_l} \left( 1 - \gamma_l \right) \left( r - \frac{\gamma_l}{2} \min(\omega - \omega_0) \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' (\omega - \omega_0) \right) + \frac{1 - \gamma_l}{2 \gamma_l} \mu' Q (\Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q')^{-1} \mu_Q - \beta \right) + 1 = 0. \tag{A59}
\]

Using Proposition 2 and Eq. (19), we arrive at Eq. (27). Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** The equilibrium functions \( r, \mu_s, \Sigma_s, \Sigma_I, f, \) and \( h \) solve the following system of equations:

\[
r = \beta + \Gamma \left( \mu_D - \frac{1}{2} (\gamma_l + 1) s \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' - \frac{1}{2} (\gamma_P + 1)(1 - s) \right) \times \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right)' - \frac{\gamma_P \hat{\omega}_I}{1 - s} \left( \frac{\gamma_P - \gamma_l}{\gamma_l \gamma_P} s (1 - s) \Gamma \Sigma_D - \Sigma_s \right) \Sigma_I', \tag{A60}
\]

\[
\mu_s = -\Sigma_s \Sigma_D' + \frac{s (1 - s)}{\gamma_l \gamma_P} \Gamma \left( \mu_D (\gamma_P - \gamma_l) + \frac{\gamma_l (\gamma_l + 1)}{2} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' \right) - \frac{\gamma_P (\gamma_P + 1)}{2} \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right)' \\
+ \hat{\omega}_I \left( \frac{\gamma_P - \gamma_l}{\gamma_l \gamma_P} s (1 - s) \Gamma \Sigma_D - \Sigma_s \right) \Sigma_I', \tag{A61}
\]

\[
\Sigma_s = -\frac{1}{\hat{\omega}_I \frac{f_s}{f} - \frac{h_u}{h} - \frac{1}{s}} \left( \Sigma_D (\hat{\omega}_I - 1) + \Sigma_u \left( \hat{\omega}_I \frac{f_u}{f} - \frac{h_u}{h} \right) \right), \tag{A62}
\]

\[
\Sigma_I = \frac{1}{\hat{\omega}_I \frac{f_u}{f} - \frac{h_s}{h} - \frac{1}{s}} \left( \Sigma_D \left( \frac{f_s}{f} - \frac{h_s}{h} - \frac{1}{s} \right) - \Sigma_u \left( \frac{f_u}{s f} + \frac{f_u h_s}{f h} - \frac{f_s h_u}{f h} \right) \right), \tag{A63}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{2}f_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2}f_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + f_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + f_s (\mu_s + \Sigma_D \Sigma_s') \\
+ f_u (\mu_u + \Sigma_D \Sigma_u') + \left( \mu_D - r - \gamma_P \Sigma_I \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right)' \right) f + 1 = 0, \tag{A64}
\]
\[
\frac{1}{2}h_{ss}\Sigma_s\Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2}h_{uu}\Sigma_u\Sigma'_u + h_{us}\Sigma_u\Sigma'_s + h_s\mu_s + h_u\mu_u \\
- \left( \hat{\omega}_l \frac{\gamma_I(\gamma_I - 1)}{\gamma_I} \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{1}{1 - s} \Sigma_s \right) \Sigma'_I - \frac{\gamma_I - 1}{2} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' \right) \right) h + 1 = 0. \quad (A65)
\]

The price-dividend ratio \( f_i \) solves Eq. (A8). The expected excess returns on individual stocks \( \mu_Q \) and return diffusions \( \Sigma_Q \) are given by (A9).

The proof of the proposition closely follows the proof of Proposition 1, so to save space we present it with less details. In particular, the analysis of the price-dividend ratio presented in part A of the proof of Proposition 1 does not change, and Eqs. (A15) – (A17) still hold. Moreover, Eqs. (A14) and (A15) together with the definition \( \mu_Q = \Sigma_Q \eta' \) again give (A8). Similarly, the utility maximization problem of the type P investors from part B is the same and yields Eqs. (A23) and (A24). Combining Eqs. (A16) and (A24), we get (A64). The utility maximization problem of the type I investors is now different and yields a different HJB equation:

\[
\max_{\{C_I\}} \left[ e^{-\beta t} \frac{C_{I}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma_I} + \mathcal{D} J \right] = 0, \quad (A66)
\]

where

\[
\mathcal{D} J = J_W (r W_I - C_I + \hat{\omega}_l W_I \mu_I) + \frac{1}{2} J_W W_I^2 \hat{\omega}_I^2 \Sigma_I \Sigma'_I + J_{W_s} \hat{\omega}_l W_I \Sigma_I \Sigma'_s + J_{W_u} \hat{\omega}_l W_I \Sigma_I \Sigma'_u \\
+ J_s \mu_s + J_u \mu_u + \frac{1}{2} J_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} J_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + J_{us} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_u + J_I \quad (A67)
\]

and \( \hat{\omega}_l \) is fixed as \( \hat{\omega}_l = \omega_{11}^{unc} + \omega_{12}^{unc} \). The indirect utility function and optimal consumption are still given by (A27) and (A28) but the equation for \( h \) becomes

\[
\frac{1}{2}h_{ss}\Sigma_s\Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2}h_{uu}\Sigma_u\Sigma'_u + h_{us}\Sigma_u\Sigma'_s + h_s\mu_s + h_u\mu_u \\
+ \frac{\gamma_I - 1}{2} \left( \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' \right) \hat{\omega}_I \Sigma_I \Sigma'_I - 2 \hat{\omega}_I \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_I \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_I \Sigma'_u \right) \right) h \\
+ \frac{1}{\gamma_I} (1 - \gamma_I)r - \beta) h + 1 = 0. \quad (A68)
\]

The dynamics of the state variable \( s \) and returns on the index derived in part D also change, although the discussion that leads to Eqs. (A38) and (A39) is still valid. Eqs. (A17) and (A39) represent a system of linear equations for \( \Sigma_s \) and \( \Sigma_I \), which can be easily resolved, and the solutions are given by (A62) and (A63). Also, using (A39), Eq. (A68) can be written as Eq.
(A65). Finally, Eqs. (A23) and (A38) represent a system of equations for \( r \) and \( \mu_s \), and its solution is given by (A60) and (A61). Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 5.** The expectation (34) can be found using the results of Proposition 4 from Martin (2013). In particular, the function \( h_0(u) \) coincides with the stock price-dividend ratio in the Martin (2013) economy and can be written in terms of the hypergeometric functions \( _2F_1(a, b; c; x) \) as

\[
h_0(u) = \frac{4}{X^2(\lambda_1 - \lambda_2)} \left( \frac{1}{(\gamma_I - 1 + 2\lambda_1)u^{\gamma_I-2}} _2F_1 \left( \frac{\gamma_I - 1 + 2\lambda_1}{2}; \frac{\gamma_I + 1 + 2\lambda_1}{2}; \frac{u - 1}{u} \right) 
+ \frac{1}{(\gamma_I - 1 - 2\lambda_2)(1-u)^{\gamma_I-2}} _2F_1 \left( \frac{\gamma_I - 1 - 2\lambda_2}{2}; \frac{\gamma_I + 1 - 2\lambda_2}{2}; \frac{u}{u - 1} \right) \right),
\]

where \( X^2, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, Z^2, \) and \( Y \) are constants given by

\[
X^2 = (\Sigma D_1 - \Sigma D_2)(\Sigma D_1 - \Sigma D_2)', \quad Y = \mu D_1 - \mu D_2 - \frac{\gamma_I + 1}{2}(\Sigma D_1\Sigma D_1' - \Sigma D_2\Sigma D_2'),
\]

\[
Z^2 = 2\beta + (\gamma_I - 1) \left( \mu D_1 + \mu D_2 - \frac{\gamma_I + 1}{4}(\Sigma D_1\Sigma D_1' + \Sigma D_2\Sigma D_2') - \frac{\gamma_I - 1}{2} \Sigma D_1\Sigma D_2' \right),
\]

\[
\lambda_1 = \frac{\sqrt{Y^2 + X^2Z^2} - Y}{X^2}, \quad \lambda_2 = -\frac{\sqrt{Y^2 + X^2Z^2} + Y}{X^2}.
\]

Q.E.D. (A72)

**References**


Malamud, S., 2016. A dynamic equilibrium model of ETFs. Unpublished working paper. EPFL.


Fig. 1. Correlation of stock returns and market volatility. The left panels of the figure demonstrate how indexing changes the correlation of stock returns $\rho$ and the market volatility $\sigma_I$ compared to the unconstrained economy. The middle and right panels show the lockstep trading effect and the reduced risk sharing effect, respectively. The superscript $\text{lockstep}$ indicates the variables from the lockstep-trading equilibrium described in Section 3.2.1; the superscript $\text{unc}$ indicates the variables from the unconstrained equilibrium. All variables are functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. 

\[ \rho - \rho^{\text{unc}} \]

\[ \rho^{\text{lockstep}} - \rho^{\text{unc}} \]

\[ \frac{(\sigma_I - \sigma^{\text{unc}}_I)}{\sigma^{\text{unc}}_I} \]

\[ \frac{(\sigma^{\text{lockstep}}_I - \sigma^{\text{unc}}_I)}{\sigma^{\text{unc}}_I} \]

\[ \frac{(\sigma_I - \sigma^{\text{lockstep}}_I)}{\sigma^{\text{unc}}_I} \]
Fig. 2. Other equilibrium characteristics. This figure plots the measure of portfolio distortions \([\Sigma_Q'(\omega I - \omega_0)]_1\) and shows how the price-dividend ratio \(f_1\), the risk-free rate \(r\), and the market price of risk \(\eta_1\) change due to indexing relative to the unconstrained economy. The superscript \(unc\) indicates the variables from the unconstrained equilibrium. All variables are functions of the consumption share \(s\) of the type I investors and the share \(u\) of the first dividend \(D_1\) in the aggregate dividend \(D\).
Fig. 3. Decomposition of the changes in $\sigma_1$ and $\Sigma_{Q1,1}$ produced by indexing. This figure shows how indexing affects the volatility of the first stock $\sigma_1$ and the diffusion component $\Sigma_{Q1,1}$. The first row of the panels relates the changes in $\sigma_1$ to the changes in the diffusion components $\Sigma_{Q1,1}$ and $\Sigma_{Q1,2}$. The second row of the panels decomposes $\Delta \Sigma_{Q1,1}$ into the components produced by portfolio distortions and changes in the price elasticities. All variables are functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. 
Fig. 4. **Comparison with the pre-indexing economy.** This figure shows how the market volatility $\sigma_I$, the volatility of the first stock $\sigma_1$, the correlation of returns $\rho$, the risk-free rate $r$, the market price of risk $\eta_1$, and the price-dividend ratio of the first stock $f_1$ change when indexing is introduced in the pre-indexing economy. The superscript $\text{pre}$ indicates the variables from the pre-indexing equilibrium. All variables are functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. 
Fig. 5. Welfare analysis. Panel A presents the certainty equivalent losses $CEL$, $CEL_1$, and $CEL_2$ in the economy with indexing compared to the unconstrained economy. Panel B presents the certainty equivalent gain $CEG$ in the economy with indexing compared to the pre-indexing economy. All variables are functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. 
Internet Appendices for
“Asset Pricing with Index Investing”

Internet Appendix A. Numerical methods

As follows from Proposition 1, all equilibrium processes in our model can be expressed in terms of the price-dividend ratio \( f \) and the wealth-consumption ratio \( h \), which satisfy the system of quasilinear differential equations (A5) and (A6). Those equations do not admit an analytical solution, so we solve them numerically. We use the standard finite-difference approach, which prescribes to approximate an infinite-horizon economy by an economy with a large finite horizon \( T \), discretize the time interval \([0, T]\) and domains of state variables, and solve the discretized equations backward as a sequence of systems of linear algebraic equations (e.g., Lapidus and Pinder, 1999).

Specifically, we introduce a vector of functions \( F = [f, h]' \), denote the first and second partial derivatives of \( F \) with respect to the state variables \( s \) and \( u \) as \( F_s, F_u, F_{ss}, F_{uu}, \) and \( F_{us} \), and write the system of equations (A5) and (A6) adjusted for a finite horizon economy as

\[
A_{ss}(F, F_s, F_u, s, u)F_{ss} + A_{uu}(F, F_s, F_u, s, u)F_{uu} + A_{us}(F, F_s, F_u, s, u)F_{us} + A_s(F, F_s, F_u, s, u)F_s = 0,
\]

where \( A_{ss}, A_{uu}, A_{us}, A_s, A_u, \) and \( A \) are diagonal \( 2 \times 2 \) matrices with the elements that correspond to the coefficients of differential equations (A5) and (A6). Note that Eq. (IA1) includes the time derivative \( \partial F/\partial t \), which appears as an additional term in Itô’s lemma applied to the time-dependent price-dividend ratio and indirect utility function in the derivation of Eqs. (A5) and (A6) presented in the Appendix.

Next, we set \( T = 500 \) and using a backward recursion solve Eq. (IA1) at the discrete moments \( t = T, T - \Delta t, \ldots, \Delta t, 0 \) and in the discrete states \( s = 0, \Delta s, 2\Delta s, \ldots, 1, \) and \( u = 0, \Delta u, 2\Delta u, \ldots, 1, \) where \( \Delta t = 0.1, \Delta s = 0.01, \) and \( \Delta u = 0.01. \) In particular, the time
solution $F(t)$ is found by solving discretized equation (IA1) in which all derivatives of $F(t)$ are replaced with their finite-difference approximations, and the equation coefficients are computed using the solution $F(t+\Delta t)$ at time $t+\Delta t$ obtained in the previous step. Thus, the coefficients of the discretized equation do not depend on the time $t$ solution, and $F(t)$ solves a system of linear algebraic equations. Because the time horizon $T$ is large, the sequence $F(t)$, $t = T, T-\Delta t, \ldots, \Delta t, 0$, converges to a time-independent solution $F$, which describes an equilibrium in the infinite-horizon economy. We verify the convergence by observing that the discrete approximation of the derivative $\partial F/\partial t$ has the order of magnitude $10^{-7}$ at $t = 0$.

The iteration procedure starts from the terminal solution $F(T) = [\Delta t \Delta t]'$. Indeed, the index price and the type I investors’ wealth at the terminal date are equal to $S_T = D_T\Delta t$ and $W_{IT} = C_{IT}\Delta t$, respectively, so the price-dividend ratio and wealth-consumption ratio at time $T$ are $f(T) = \Delta t$ and $h(T) = \Delta t$. The spacial boundary conditions for the discretized version of Eq. (IA1) are obtained by taking the limits $s \to 0$, $u \to 0$, $s \to 1$, and $u \to 1$ in Eq. (IA1). The computation of the boundary conditions is incorporated directly into the numerical algorithm. Appendix B in Chabakauri (2013) provides further details.

Having solved Eq. (IA1) and obtained $f$ and $h$, we find $r$, $\mu_s$, $\Sigma_s$, and $\Sigma_I$ as functions of the state variables using Eqs. (A1) – (A4). Also, we compute $\eta$ and $\mu_I$ from Eq. (A7). To find the price-dividend ratios $f_i$, we solve differential equations (A8). Note that those equations are linear because their coefficients are known functions of the state variables. Therefore, they are solved using the finite-difference approximation that no longer requires a backward recursion. The remaining equilibrium variables are obtained from Eq. (A9).

To find the equilibrium in the unconstrained benchmark economy, we also use the finite-difference approximation. However, in this case the differential equations for the price-dividend ratios and wealth-consumption ratio are linear and decoupled, so each of them is solved individually without a backward recursion. Those computations closely follow Chabakauri (2013).
Internet Appendix B. Benchmark economies

In this Internet Appendix, we present the equilibrium characteristics of the unconstrained economy and pre-indexing economy, which are the benchmarks in the analysis conducted in the main part of the paper.

Unconstrained economy

Consider first an unconstrained economy in which all investors can trade all assets individually. The equilibrium in this economy is characterized by Proposition 2 in Chabakauri (2013), and the corresponding $\Sigma$, $\mu$, and $r$ are given by Eqs. (15), (16), and (17). For the parameters from Section 3.1, the equilibrium characteristics are presented in Fig. IB.1. Because the parameters of the stock dividend processes are identical, we plot the characteristics of the first stock only.

Fig. IB.1 demonstrates that the volatilities of returns on the market and individual stocks tend to be higher than the volatilities of the corresponding dividends, and this is a consequence of dynamic risk sharing among investors with different risk preferences (e.g., Bhamra and Uppal, 2009; Longstaff and Wang, 2012). Fig. IB.1 also shows that the volatility is more amplified for the larger stock (the first stock when $u > 1/2$). The stock returns are positively correlated even though the correlation between dividends is zero because the prices of both stocks are affected by time varying aggregate risk aversion (e.g., Cochrane et al., 2008; Ehling and Heyerdahl-Larsen, 2016). Also, dividend shocks of the larger stock have a higher price of risk. This is not surprising because the larger stock is a better proxy for the whole market, and the risk associated with it has a stronger effect on the investors’ consumption.

Fig. IB.1 also demonstrates that the risk-free rate $r$ and the market price of risk $\eta$ are increasing functions of the type I investors’ consumption share $s$. As discussed in Wang (1996), the risk-free rate is determined by both the investors’ equilibrium expected consumption growth and consumption volatility. On the one hand, the investors who are more risk averse have a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and prefer to borrow more to smooth their consumption over time. This drives the equilibrium risk-free rate up. On the other hand, the higher risk aversion of the investors makes them less tolerant to consumption volatility and increases their
Figure IB.1: This figure presents the equilibrium characteristics of the unconstrained economy as functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. The model parameters are as follows: $\mu_{D1} = \mu_{D2} = 0.018$, $\Sigma_{D1} = [0.045\ 0]$, $\Sigma_{D2} = [0\ 0.045]$, $\beta = 0.03$, $\gamma_I = 5$, and $\gamma_P = 1$.

precautionary savings. This drives the equilibrium risk-free rate down. In our case, the first effect is stronger than the second one. As a result, the risk-free rate is higher when more risk averse type I investors dominate the market (when $s$ is close to 1) and lower when the type P investors dominate (when $s$ is close to 0).

The increasing relation between $\eta_1$ and $s$ is also intuitive: the more risk averse type I investors, whose impact increases with $s$, require a higher compensation for holding risk than the type P investors. Also, $\eta_1$ is an increasing function of the size of the first stock $u$ because investors require a higher compensation for holding the risk associated with a shock to a larger stock. Finally, because both the risk-free rate and market prices of risk are increasing functions of $s$, future dividends are more heavily discounted when $s$ is high, and the price-dividend ratio $f_1$ decreases with $s$.  

1As demonstrated by Wang (1996), the relation between the risk aversion and risk-free rate can be nonmonotonic.
Pre-indexing economy

As another benchmark, we consider the pre-indexing economy, in which the type I investors cannot trade at all, and the prices are determined by the optimal behavior of the type P investors. More details on this economy are provided in Section 3.3. Because the type P investors have logarithmic preferences, this benchmark economy has exactly the same properties as the economy in Cochrane et al. (2008). We find the equilibrium variables using the analytical formulas from Martin (2013).

Figure IB.2: This figure presents the equilibrium characteristics of the pre-indexing economy as functions of the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. The model parameters are as follows: $\mu_{D_1} = \mu_{D_2} = 0.018$, $\Sigma_{D_1} = [0.045\ 0]$, and $\Sigma_{D_2} = [0\ 0.045]$, $\beta = 0.03$, and $\gamma_P = 1$.

The main equilibrium characteristics for the parameters from Section 3.1 are presented in Fig. IB.2. As before, we plot only the characteristics of the first stock because those of the second stock can be obtained by flipping the graphs around $u = 1/2$. For a better comparison with the economy with indexing, the price-dividend ratio in Fig. IB.2 uses the tradable fraction of the dividend as the denominator.

The graphs highlight several properties of the equilibrium. As in Cochrane et al. (2008), the volatilities of returns differ from the dividend volatilities, the returns are correlated even though the dividend shocks of the stocks are independent, and the market price of risk rises with the size of the stock to compensate investors for a higher risk associated with a larger stock.
Figure IC.1: This figure presents the equilibrium variables in the unconstrained economy as functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. The model parameters are as follows: $\mu_{D_1} = 0.01$, $\mu_{D_2} = 0.03$, $\Sigma_{D_1} = [0.01 \ 0]$, $\Sigma_{D_2} = [0 \ 0.08]$, $\beta = 0.03$, $\gamma_I = 5$, and $\gamma_P = 1$.

Internet Appendix C. Alternative parameters of the model

In this Internet Appendix, we explore the robustness of our results to various changes in the model parameters. In particular, we consider stocks that have different dividend processes and investors with alternative coefficients of risk aversion.

Heterogeneous trees

In our main analysis, we assume that the dividend growth rates and diffusions of the dividend processes are the same for both stocks, so all heterogeneity across the stocks is produced by the
endogenous difference in the stock sizes. As a result, the portfolio distortions caused by indexing are relatively small, and all effects are relatively weak. However, in reality there is a substantial heterogeneity in the stock dividend processes, which may amplify the impact of indexing. To entertain this possibility, we consider a specification with heterogeneous dividend processes in which the expected dividend growth rates and diffusions of dividends are different and calibrated as $\mu_{D1} = 0.01$, $\mu_{D2} = 0.03$, $\Sigma_{D1} = [0.01 \ 0]$, and $\Sigma_{D2} = [0 \ 0.08]$. Thus, the first tree can be interpreted as a mature firm with a relatively low expected dividend growth rate but stable cash flows, and the second tree can be viewed as a young firm with a high dividend growth rate but relatively volatile cash flows. All other parameters are the same as in our main specification described in Section 3.1.

Fig. IC.1 presents the equilibrium in the unconstrained economy with heterogeneous trees. Because the stocks’ dividend processes no longer have identical parameters, we plot the characteristics for both stocks. The graphs confirm many observations from our main analysis and reveal new patterns. In particular, the volatilities of both individual stocks and the market tend to be higher when the economy is dominated by the more volatile second stock. This happens because both the fundamental volatility and the volatility produced by risk sharing are higher.

Fig. IC.1 also shows that the correlation between stock returns is high and positive in some states but negative in the others. To explain the sign of the correlation, we follow Cochrane et al. (2008) and decompose the covariance between stock returns as

$$
\text{cov} (dQ_1, dQ_2) = \text{cov} \left( \frac{dD_1}{D_1}, \frac{dD_2}{D_2} \right) + \text{cov} \left( \frac{df_1}{f_1}, \frac{df_2}{f_2} \right) + \text{cov} \left( \frac{dD_1}{D_1}, \frac{df_2}{f_2} \right) + \text{cov} \left( \frac{dD_2}{D_2}, \frac{df_1}{f_1} \right). \quad (IC1)
$$

The first term in Eq. (IC1) is equal to zero because the dividends are uncorrelated. The second term is small, so, as in Cochrane et al. (2008), the covariance between stock returns is mainly determined by the last two terms. The third term is positive because $f_2$ is an increasing function of $u$, and the shock $dD_1$ is positively correlated with innovations in $u = D_1/(D_1 + D_2)$. The fourth term is negative when $u \in (0.5, 1)$ because in that interval $f_1$ is an increasing function of
$u$, and innovations in $u$ are negatively correlated with the shock $dD_2$. Moreover, the fourth term is large in absolute terms because the dividend $D_2$ is more volatile than the dividend $D_1$. As a result, the correlation of stock returns is positive when $u \in (0, 0.5)$, but can become negative when $u \in (0.5, 1)$.

It remains to explain why the price-dividend ratio $f_1$ increases with $u$ when $u \in (0.5, 1)$. Fig. IC.1 shows that in this region the risk-free rate $r$ is a decreasing function of $u$. As a result, the dividends are discounted at a lower rate in the vicinity of $u = 1$ (where the first stock dominates the economy) than in the vicinity of $u = 1/2$, and the price-dividend ratios of both stocks are higher. Thus, the ratios $f_i$ are increasing functions of $u$, and this fact gives rise to the negative correlation between stock returns. Note that the described effect crucially relies on the heterogeneity of both drifts and diffusions of the dividend processes: when either drifts or diffusions are the same for both stocks, the correlation is positive in all states of the economy.

Fig. IC.2 compares the equilibrium characteristics in the economy with indexing and in the unconstrained economy in the case of heterogeneous trees. It demonstrates that many effects of indexing are qualitatively similar to those in the economy from the main part of the paper and illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2. In particular, we find that indexing reduces the volatility of market returns $\sigma_I$ and the risk-free rate $r$. It also again has an ambiguous effect on the correlation between stock returns. As before, the presence of index investors tends to increase (decrease) the volatility of the larger (smaller) stock. Finally, all effects tend to be strong when the risk-averse type I investors consume a substantial fraction of the total dividend. Thus, our main conclusions are robust to the heterogeneity in the stock dividend processes.

Nevertheless, the heterogeneity in the dividend processes quantitatively changes the impact of indexing on the equilibrium characteristics. The graphs in Fig. IC.2 show that it makes many effects much stronger than they are in our main model. For example, the correlation between stock returns in the economy with indexing can be lower by almost 0.15 than in the unconstrained economy, whereas this difference does not exceed 0.01 when the parameters of the dividend processes are identical. Similarly, the differences in the volatilities and risk-free rates reported in Fig. IC.2 differ by an order of magnitude from their counterparts in Figs. 1 and 2.
Figure IC.2: This figure shows how the equilibrium in the unconstrained economy with heterogeneous trees changes due to indexing. All variables are functions of the consumption share \( s \) of the type I investors and the share \( u \) of the first dividend \( D_1 \) in the aggregate dividend \( D \). The model parameters are as follows: \( \mu_{D_1} = 0.01, \mu_{D_2} = 0.03, \Sigma_{D_1} = [0.01 \ 0], \Sigma_{D_2} = [0 \ 0.08], \beta = 0.03, \gamma_I = 5, \) and \( \gamma_P = 1. \)
Alternative coefficients of risk aversion

Next, we investigate the sensitivity of our conclusions to the assumption $\gamma_P = 1$ and $\gamma_I = 5$, which implies that the index investors are more risk averse than the unconstrained investors. We consider the equilibrium in exactly the same model as in the main part of the paper but set $\gamma_P = 5$ and $\gamma_I = 1$. Because now the type I investors have logarithmic preferences, their wealth-consumption ratio is constant: $h = 1/\beta$. As a result, the system of equations that describes the equilibrium simplifies, and instead of two differential equations (for the wealth-consumption ratio $h$ and index price-dividend ratio $f$) it contains only one of them (for the index price-dividend ratio $f$). Nevertheless, the equation does not have an analytical solution, and, as in Section 3, we solve it numerically.

Because in the unconstrained case the reassignment of the coefficients of risk aversion is equivalent to relabeling the agents, the graphs of all equilibrium variables in the unconstrained economy can be obtained from the graphs in Fig. IB.1 by flipping them around the plane $s = 1/2$. Therefore, we present only the graphs for the changes in the equilibrium variables produced by indexing.

The comparison of Fig. IC.3 with Figs. 1, 2, and 3 shows that our conclusions about the impact of indexing on the volatilities of returns, risk-free rate, and correlation between returns are insensitive to whether the more risk-averse or less risk-averse investors are assumed to be constrained. We again observe that indexing decreases the volatility of market returns and the risk-free rate, but has an ambiguous effect on the individual volatilities and correlation. In particular, indexing increases (decreases) the volatility of the larger (smaller) stock. However, now all effects are more pronounced when $s$ is close to 0, not to 1. To understand this pattern, recall that one of the channels through which indexing affects the equilibrium characteristics is the reduction in risk sharing. Because the general equilibrium effects of risk sharing among investors are stronger when more risk averse investors dominate the economy (Fig. IB.1 clearly illustrates this fact), the impact of indexing is also likely to be stronger when a representative investor is more risk averse. This is exactly what happens around $s = 0$, where the more risk averse type P investors dominate the economy.
Figure IC.3: This figure shows how the unconstrained equilibrium changes due to indexing when the type I investors are less risk averse than the type P investors. All variables are functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. The model parameters are as follows: $\mu_{D1} = \mu_{D2} = 0.018, \Sigma_{D1} = [0.045\ 0], \Sigma_{D2} = [0\ 0.045], \beta = 0.03, \gamma_I = 1$, and $\gamma_P = 5$.

**Internet Appendix D. Alternative preferences**

In this Internet Appendix, we consider the same model as in the main part of the paper but assume that all investors have recursive preferences in the form of Duffie and Epstein (1992). In particular, each investor solves the following optimization problem:

$$ J_t = \max_{\{C_t, \omega_t \in \Omega\}} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^{\infty} f(C_\tau, J_\tau) d\tau \right], \quad (ID1) $$

where

$$ f(C, V) = \begin{cases} \frac{\beta(1-\gamma)V}{1-1/\psi} \left[ \left( \frac{C}{((1-\gamma)V)^{1-\gamma}} \right)^{1-1/\psi} - 1 \right], & \psi \neq 1, \\ \beta(1-\gamma)V \left[ \log(C) - \log((1-\gamma)V) \right], & \psi = 1, \end{cases} \quad (ID2) $$
subject to the budget constraint

$$dW_t = (r_t W_t - C_t) dt + W_t \omega'_t (\mu_Q dt + \Sigma_Q dB_t). \quad \text{(ID3)}$$

The risk aversion parameters $\gamma$ and elasticities of intertemporal substitution $\psi$ are $\gamma = \gamma_P$, $\psi = \psi_P$ for the type P investors and $\gamma = \gamma_I$, $\psi = \psi_I$ for the type I investors. As in the main part of the paper, the type P investors are unconstrained ($\Omega_P = \mathbb{R}^2$), but the type I investors can invest only in the risk-free bond and index ($\Omega_I$ consists of index portfolios). The following proposition, which is an analog of Proposition 1, describes the equilibrium in the model.

**Proposition ID1.** The equilibrium in the model is characterized by the functions $r$, $\eta$, $\mu_s$, $\Sigma_s$, $\Sigma_I$, $h$, $h_P$, and $f$ that solve a system of algebraic and differential equations. The functions $h$ and $h_P$ satisfy the following partial differential equations:

$$\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_u$$

$$+ h_P \left( \mu_s + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_s \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_P}{\gamma_P} \eta + \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right)' + \mu_u + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_u \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_P}{\gamma_P} \eta + \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right)' \right)$$

$$+ h_P \left( (\psi_P - 1) r + \frac{\psi_P - 1}{2 \gamma_P} \eta' \eta - \beta \psi_P \right) + 1 = 0, \quad \text{(ID4)}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_u$$

$$+ h_s \left( \mu_s + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_s \Pi_I \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_I}{\gamma_I} \eta + \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right)' \right) + h_u \left( \mu_u + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_u \Pi_I \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_I}{\gamma_I} \eta + \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right)' \right)$$

$$+ h \left( (\psi_I - 1) r + \frac{\psi_I - 1}{2 \gamma_I} \eta' \Pi_I \eta - \beta \psi_I + \frac{2 - \gamma_I - \psi_I}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) (I - \Pi_I) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right)' \right) + 1 = 0,$$

$$\quad \text{(ID5)}$$

where the market price of risk $\eta$ is given by

$$\eta = \gamma_P \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right) + \frac{\gamma_P \psi_P - 1}{\psi_P - 1} \left( h_{ps} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_{pu}}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right) \quad \text{(ID6)}$$
and $\Pi_I = (\Sigma_I'\Sigma_I)/(\Sigma_I\Sigma_I')$. The rest of the equations are algebraic:

$$r = \beta + \frac{1}{s\psi_I + (1-s)\psi_P} \left[ \mu_D + \frac{(\psi_I - \gamma_I)s}{2(1-\psi_I)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right)' \right.\left. - \frac{\psi_I(\gamma_I\psi_I - 1)}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h_s}{h} \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h_s}{h} \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' \right.\left. + \frac{(\gamma_P - \psi_P)}{2(\psi_P - 1)}(1-s) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} \right)' - \frac{\psi_P(\gamma_P\psi_P - 1)}{2(\psi_P - 1)}(1-s) \times \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} + \frac{h_p}{h_p} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_P}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} + \frac{h_p}{h_P} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_P}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right)' \right], \quad \text{(ID7)}$$

$$\mu_s = -\Sigma_s \Sigma_D' + \frac{s(1-s)}{s\psi_I + (1-s)\psi_P} \left[ \left( \psi_I - \psi_P \right) \mu_D + \frac{(\psi_I - \gamma_I)\psi_P}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right)' \right.\left. + \frac{\psi_I \psi_P(\gamma_I\psi_I - 1)}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h_s}{h} \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h_s}{h} \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' \right.\left. + \frac{(\gamma_P - \psi_P)\psi_I}{2(\psi_P - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} \right)' + \frac{\psi_I \psi_P(1 - \gamma_P\psi_P)}{2(\psi_P - 1)} \times \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} + \frac{h_p}{h_p} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_P}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1-s} + \frac{h_p}{h_P} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_P}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right)' \right], \quad \text{(ID8)}$$

$$f = (1-s)h_p + sh, \quad \text{(ID9)}$$

$$\Sigma_I = \frac{(f\Sigma_D + f_s\Sigma_u + f_s\Psi_1)(f\Sigma_D + f_u\Sigma_u + f_s\Psi_2)'(f\Sigma_D + f_u\Sigma_u + f_s\Psi_2)' \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{f_s}{f} \Sigma_u + \frac{f_s}{f} \Psi_2 \right)}{(f\Sigma_D + f_u\Sigma_u + f_s\Psi_2)(f\Sigma_D + f_u\Sigma_u + f_s\Psi_2)' \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{f_s}{f} \Sigma_u + \frac{f_s}{f} \Psi_2 \right)}, \quad \text{(ID10)}$$

$$\Sigma_s = \Psi_2 + (\Psi_1 - \Psi_2)\Pi_I, \quad \text{(ID11)}$$

where $\Psi_1$ and $\Psi_2$ are given by

$$\Psi_1 = \frac{(\gamma_P - \gamma_I)\Sigma_D + \frac{(\psi_P\gamma_P - 1)h_p}{\psi_P - 1} \frac{h_p}{h_P} - \frac{\psi_I\gamma_P - 1\gamma_I}{\psi_I - 1} \frac{h_u}{h}}{1-s} \left( \psi_P - \psi_P - 1 \right) (1-s) \left( \Sigma_s + \frac{h_P}{h} \Sigma_u \right), \quad \text{(ID12)}$$

$$\Psi_2 = -\frac{s}{h + sh_s} \left( h\Sigma_D + h_u\Sigma_u \right). \quad \text{(ID13)}$$

**Proof.** Because many steps of the proof are identical or very similar to those of the proof of Proposition 1, we present them with less details and focus on the modifications produced by
recursive preferences. In the derivations, we assume that $\psi \neq 1$.

A. Utility maximization problem

The type P investors solve the optimization problem (ID1) – (ID3) with $\gamma = \gamma_P$ and $\psi = \psi_P$, whereas the type I investors solve the same problem but with $\gamma = \gamma_I$ and $\psi = \psi_I$ and an additional portfolio constraint $\omega_t \in \Omega_I$. Below we solve the optimization problem (ID1) – (ID3) with arbitrary $\gamma, \psi,$ and $\Omega$ and omit the subscripts $P$ and $I$. To simplify notations, we also omit the subscript $t$.

The value function $J$ solves the following HJB equation:

$$\max_{\{C, \omega \in \Omega\}} \left\{ f(C, J) + J_W(W(r + \omega^\prime \mu_Q) - C) + \frac{1}{2} J_{WW} W^2 \omega^\prime \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q^\prime \omega + J_{Wu} W \omega^\prime \mu_u + J_{us} \mu_s + \frac{1}{2} J_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s^\prime + \frac{1}{2} J_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u^\prime + J_{us} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u^\prime \right\} = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (ID14)

The first-order condition with respect to $C$ gives

$$\frac{\beta(1 - \gamma)JC^{-1/\psi}}{((1 - \gamma)J)^{1-1/\psi}} = J_W.$$  \hspace{1cm} (ID15)

Assuming that the value function is

$$J = (\beta^\psi h)^{1-1/\psi},$$  \hspace{1cm} (ID16)

where the function $h$ depends on the state variables $s$ and $u$, and substituting (ID16) into (ID15), we find that $C = Wh^{-1}$. Thus, the function $h$ coincides with the investor’s wealth-consumption ratio. Note that

$$f(C, J) - CJ_W = \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma)J}{\psi - 1} \left( \frac{C}{((1 - \gamma)J)^{1-1/\psi}} \right)^{1-1/\psi} - \frac{\beta(1 - \gamma)J}{1 - 1/\psi} = \left( \frac{1}{h} - \beta \psi \right) \frac{(1 - \gamma)J}{\psi - 1}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (ID16)

Using this fact and substituting the value function from (ID16) into Eq. (ID14), we obtain the
following equation for $h$:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + h_s \mu_s + h_u \mu_u + h((\psi - 1)r - \beta \psi) + 1 \\
+ \frac{(2 - \gamma - \psi)}{2(\psi - 1)} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' \\
+ (\psi - 1) h \max_{\omega \in \Omega} \left\{ \omega' \mu_Q + \frac{1 - \gamma}{\psi - 1} \omega' \Sigma_Q \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) - \frac{\gamma}{2} \omega' \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' \omega \right\} = 0. \quad (ID17)
\end{align*}
$$

In the case of the type P investors, $\Omega_P = \mathbb{R}^2$ and the optimization with respect to $\omega$ yields

$$
\omega = \frac{1}{\gamma_P} (\Sigma_Q')^{-1} \left( \eta + \frac{1 - \gamma_P}{\psi_P - 1} \left( \frac{h_{ps}}{h_P} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_{pu}}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right) \right)', \quad (ID18)
$$

where $\eta' = \Sigma_Q^{-1} \mu_Q$. Putting this solution back into Eq. (ID17) and rearranging the terms, we get

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + h_{ps} \left( \mu_s + \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma_P} \Sigma_s \eta' \right) + h_{pu} \left( \mu_u + \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma_P} \Sigma_u \eta' \right) \\
+ h_P \left( (\psi_P - 1)r + \frac{\psi_P - 1}{2\gamma_P} \eta \eta' - \beta \psi_P + \frac{1 - \gamma}{2\gamma_P \psi_P - 1} \left( \frac{h_{ps}}{h_P} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_{pu}}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_{ps}}{h_P} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_{pu}}{h_P} \Sigma_u \right)' \right) + 1 = 0. \quad (ID19)
\end{align*}
$$

In the case of the type I investors, $\Omega = \{ \omega : \omega = \hat{\omega} [S_1/S \ S_2/S]' \}$, where $\hat{\omega}$ is a scalar weight of the index in the investor’s portfolio. Therefore, Eq. (ID17) becomes

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + h_s \mu_s + h_u \mu_u + h((\psi_I - 1)r - \beta \psi_I) + 1 \\
+ \frac{(2 - \gamma_I - \psi_I)}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' \\
+ (\psi_I - 1) h \max_{\omega_I} \left\{ \omega_I \mu_I + \frac{1 - \gamma_I}{\psi_I - 1} \omega_I \Sigma_I \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) - \frac{\gamma_I}{2} \omega_I^2 \Sigma_I' \Sigma_I \right\} = 0. \quad (ID20)
\end{align*}
$$

The optimal portfolio of the type I investors is given by

$$
\hat{\omega}_I = \frac{1}{\gamma_I \Sigma_I' \Sigma_I} \left( \mu_I + \frac{1 - \gamma_I}{\psi_I - 1} \Sigma_I \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' \right), \quad (ID21)
$$
and Eq. (ID20) reduces to

\[
\frac{1}{2}h_{ss}\Sigma_s\Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2}h_{uu}\Sigma_u\Sigma_u' + h_{su}\Sigma_s\Sigma_u' + h_s\mu_s + h_u\mu_u + h((\psi_I - 1)r - \beta\psi_I) + 1
\]
\[
+ \frac{(2 - \gamma_I - \psi_I)h}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \frac{h_s\Sigma_s}{h} + \frac{h_u\Sigma_u}{h} \right) \left( \frac{h_s\Sigma_s}{h} + \frac{h_u\Sigma_u}{h} \right)',
\]
\[
+ \frac{(\psi_I - 1)h}{2\gamma_I\Sigma_I\Sigma_I'} \left( \mu_I + \frac{1 - \gamma_I}{\psi_I - 1}\Sigma_I \left( \frac{h_s\Sigma_s}{h} + \frac{h_u\Sigma_u}{h} \right)' \right)^2 = 0. \quad (ID22)
\]

B. Dynamics of the state variable \(s\) and returns on the index

The definition of the consumption share \(s\) implies that \(C_P = (1 - s)D\) and \(C_I = sD\). Using Itô’s lemma, we obtain the consumption processes of the type P and type I investors:

\[
\frac{dC_P}{C_P} = \mu_{CP}dt + \Sigma_{CP}dB, \quad \frac{dC_I}{C_I} = \mu_{CI}dt + \Sigma_{CI}dB, \quad \text{(ID23)}
\]

where

\[
\mu_{CP} = \mu_D - \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_D\Sigma_s'}{1 - s}, \quad \Sigma_{CP} = \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s}, \quad \text{(ID24)}
\]

and

\[
\mu_{CI} = \mu_D + \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_D\Sigma_s'}{s}, \quad \Sigma_{CI} = \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s}. \quad \text{(ID25)}
\]

Next, we represent \(dJ/J\) of both types of investors in two different ways and match the drifts and diffusions of the obtained processes. Because the equations below are valid for both types of investors, we omit the subscripts \(P\) and \(I\). On the one hand, using \(h = W/C\), we rewrite Eq. (ID16) as

\[
J = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma}(\beta W)^{\psi(1-\gamma)/(\psi - 1)} C^{1-\psi}. \quad \text{(ID16)}
\]

Applying Itô’s lemma to this equation and taking into account Eqs. (ID3) and (ID23), we get

\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = \frac{\psi(1 - \gamma)}{\psi - 1} \left( r - h^{-1} - \frac{1}{\psi}\mu_C + \omega' \left( \mu_Q - \frac{1 - \gamma}{\psi - 1}\Sigma_Q\Sigma_C' \right) - \frac{\psi - \gamma}{2\psi(1 - \psi)} \Sigma_C\Sigma_C' \right.
\]
\[
margnote{16}
\left. + \frac{1 - \psi\gamma}{2(\psi - 1)} \omega' \Sigma_Q\Sigma_Q' \right)dt + \frac{\psi(1 - \gamma)}{\psi - 1} \left( \omega' \Sigma_Q - \frac{1}{\psi}\Sigma_C \right)dB. \quad \text{(ID26)}
\]
On the other hand, Itô’s lemma applied to Eq. (ID16) yields

\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = \mathcal{D}J dt + (1 - \gamma) \left( \omega' \Sigma_Q + \frac{1}{\psi - 1} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \right) dB. \tag{ID27}
\]

The HJB equation (ID14) implies that \( f(C, J) + \mathcal{D}J = 0 \), so

\[
\frac{\mathcal{D}J}{J} = -\frac{f(C, J)}{J} = \psi(1 - \gamma) \left( \beta - \frac{1}{h} \right),
\]

where we use \( f(C, J) \) from (ID2) and \( J \) from (ID16). Matching the drifts and diffusions in Eqs. (ID26) and (ID27), we get

\[
r - \beta - \frac{1}{\psi} \mu_C + \omega' \left( \mu_Q - \frac{1 - \gamma}{\psi - 1} \Sigma_Q \Sigma_C' \right) - \frac{\psi - \gamma}{2(\psi - 1)} \Sigma_C \Sigma_C' + \frac{1 - \psi \gamma}{2(\psi - 1)} \omega' \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' \omega = 0, \tag{ID28}
\]

\[
\omega' \Sigma_Q = \Sigma_C + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u. \tag{ID29}
\]

First, we consider this system of equations for the type P investors. Plugging the optimal portfolio weight \( \omega \) from (ID18) and \( \Sigma_{CP} \) from (ID24) into (ID29), solving for \( \eta \), and restoring the subscript P, we get Eq. (ID6). Using that \( \mu_Q = \Sigma_Q \eta' \), \( \omega' \Sigma_Q \) from (ID29), \( \Sigma_{CP} \) from (ID24), and \( \eta \) from (ID6), we transform Eq. (ID28) into

\[
r - \beta - \frac{1}{\psi_p} \left( \mu_D - \frac{\Sigma_s + \Sigma_D \Sigma_s'}{1 - s} \right) - \frac{\gamma_p - \psi_p}{2(\psi_p - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right)' - \frac{1 - \gamma_p \psi_p}{2(\psi_p - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} + \frac{h_p s}{h_p} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_p u}{h_p} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} + \frac{h_p s}{h_p} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_p u}{h_p} \Sigma_u \right)' = 0. \tag{ID30}
\]

Eqs. (ID28) and (ID29) for the type I investors yield two additional relations for the equilibrium functions. Using that for the type I investors \( \omega' \Sigma_Q = \hat{\omega} \Sigma_I \), where \( \hat{\omega} \) is given by Eq. (ID21), noting that \( \Sigma_C \) is given by Eq. (ID25), and multiplying both sides of Eq. (ID29) by \( \Sigma_I' \), we get

\[
\mu_I = \gamma_I \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) \Sigma_I' + \frac{\psi_I \gamma_I - 1}{\psi_I - 1} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \Sigma_I'. \tag{ID31}
\]
Plugging this representation of $\mu_I$ back into Eq. (ID21), we find that

$$\hat{\omega} = \frac{\Sigma_I}{\Sigma_I' \Sigma_I'} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' .$$  \hfill (ID32)

Using Eq. (ID29) again, we get

$$\left( \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_u + \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) (I_2 - \Pi_I) = 0 .$$  \hfill (ID33)

Note that Eq. (ID33) coincides with Eq. (A50) from the proof of Proposition 1. To simplify Eq. (ID28) for the type I investors, note that $\omega' \mu_Q = \hat{\omega} \mu_I$ and $\omega' \Sigma_Q \Sigma_Q' \omega = \hat{\omega}^2 \Sigma_I \Sigma_I'$, where $\mu_I$ and $\hat{\omega}$ are given by (ID31) and (ID32), respectively. Using $\mu_C$ and $\Sigma_C$ from (ID25), Eq. (ID28) for the type I investors becomes

$$r - \beta \frac{1}{\psi_I} \left( \mu_D + \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_D \Sigma_s'}{s} \right) - \frac{\gamma_I - \psi_I}{2 \psi_I (\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right)'$$

$$- \frac{1 - \gamma_I \psi_I}{2 (\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \Pi_I \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' = 0 ,$$

which together with (ID33) yields

$$r - \beta \frac{1}{\psi_I} \left( \mu_D + \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_D \Sigma_s'}{s} \right) - \frac{\gamma_I - \psi_I}{2 \psi_I (\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right)'$$

$$- \frac{1 - \gamma_I \psi_I}{2 (\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' = 0 .$$  \hfill (ID34)

Eqs. (ID30) and (ID34) can be viewed as a system of linear equations for $r$ and $\mu_s$. Its solution is given by Eqs. (ID7) and (ID8).

To find equations for $\Sigma_s$ and $\Sigma_I$, we use that $\mu_I = \eta \Sigma_I'$, where $\mu_I$ is from Eq. (ID31) and $\eta$ is from Eq. (ID6). After rearranging the terms, this equation yields $\Sigma_s \Sigma_I' = \Psi_1 \Sigma_I'$ or $\Sigma_s \Pi_I = \Psi_1 \Pi_I$, where $\Psi_1$ is defined by (ID12). Using this fact, Eq. (ID33) can be resolved for $\Sigma_s$ as

$$\Sigma_s = \Psi_1 \Pi_I + \Psi_2 (I_2 - \Pi_I) ,$$  \hfill (ID35)
where $\Psi_2$ is defined by (ID13). This is Eq. (ID11). As in the proof of Proposition 1, the second equation in the system for $\Sigma_s$ and $\Sigma_I$ is given by the diffusion of index returns represented in terms of the index price-dividend ratio $f$:

$$\Sigma_I = \Sigma_D + \frac{f_s}{f} \Sigma_s + \frac{f_u}{f} \Sigma_u.$$  \hspace{1cm} (ID36)

This is Eq. (A17). Substituting $\Sigma_s$ from (ID35) into (ID36) and rearranging the terms, we get

$$\Sigma_I = \frac{f_s}{f} (\Psi_1 - \Psi_2) \Pi_I + \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{f_u}{f} \Sigma_u + \frac{f_s}{f} \Psi_2 \right).$$ \hspace{1cm} (ID37)

This is an analog of Eq. (A45) from the proof of Proposition 1. As there, we solve it by applying Lemma 1, which yields (ID10).

**C. Equations for $h_P$, $h$, and $f$**

Finally, we obtain quasilinear differential equations for $h_P$ and $h$. Note that Eq. (ID6) implies that

$$1 - \frac{\gamma_P}{\psi_P} \frac{h_{Ps}}{h_P} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_{Pu}}{h_P} \Sigma_u = \gamma_P \left( \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right) - \eta.$$ \hspace{1cm} (ID38)

Therefore, Eq. (ID19) can be rewritten as (ID4). To transform Eq. (ID22) into quasilinear differential equation, note first that Eq. (ID33) can be rewritten as

$$\frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u = - \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) (I_2 - \Pi_I) + \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \Pi_I$$

and, therefore,

$$\left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) (\frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u)' = \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) (I_2 - \Pi_I) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)'$$

$$+ \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)'.$$ \hspace{1cm} (ID39)
Using (ID39), the last two terms of Eq. (ID22) become

\[
\frac{(2 - \gamma_I - \psi_I) h}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \left( \frac{\mu_I^2}{\psi_I - 1} \right) \left( I_2 - \Pi_I \right) \left( h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u \right) + \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \right) \\
+ \frac{(\psi_I - 1) h}{2\gamma_I} \left( \frac{\mu_I^2}{\psi_I - 1} \right) \left( \frac{2(1 - \gamma_I)\mu_I}{\psi_I - 1} \right) \left( h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u \right) + \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \right) \\
= \frac{(2 - \gamma_I - \psi_I) h}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( I_2 - \Pi_I \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \\
+ \frac{(1 - \gamma_I) h}{\gamma_I} \eta \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \\
= \frac{(2 - \gamma_I - \psi_I) h}{2(\psi_I - 1)} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( I_2 - \Pi_I \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \\
+ \frac{(1 - \gamma_I) h}{\gamma_I} \eta \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right),
\]

where it has been used that \( \mu_I = \Sigma \eta \). Multiplying Eq. (ID31) by \( \Sigma_I (h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u) \) and \( (\Sigma_I \Sigma_I^\prime) \) and using again that \( \mu_I = \Sigma \eta \), we get

\[
\left( \gamma_I \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) - \eta \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) = \frac{1 - \psi_I \gamma_I}{\psi_I - 1} \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right) \Pi_I \left( \frac{h_s \Sigma_s + h_u \Sigma_u}{\Sigma \Sigma^\prime} \right).
\]

Combining this equation with (ID40) and collecting like terms, we arrive at Eq. (ID5).

Finally, we derive the equation for \( f \). The market clearing condition implies that \( W_P + W_I = S \). Noting that \( W_I = hC_I, W_P = h_P C_P, \) and \( S = f D \), we get that \( f = (1 - s) h_P + sh \), and this is Eq. (ID9). Q.E.D.

As in the main part of the paper, we demonstrate the impact of indexing by comparing equilibrium variables in the economy with indexing and in the unconstrained economy. The equilibrium in the unconstrained economy with recursive preferences is described by Proposition ID2.

**Proposition ID2.** The equilibrium in the economy without indexing is characterized by the functions \( r, \eta, \mu, \Sigma, h, \) and \( h_P \), that solve a system of algebraic and differential equations. The
functions $h$ and $h_P$ satisfy the following partial differential equations:

$$\frac{1}{2} h_{Pss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{Puu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{Psu} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u'$$

$$+ h_{Ps} \left( \mu_s + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_s \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_P}{\gamma_P} \eta + \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right) \right) + h_{Pu} \left( \mu_u + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_u \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_P}{\gamma_P} \eta + \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{1 - s} \right) \right)$$

$$+ h_P \left( (\psi_P - 1)r + \psi_P - \frac{1}{2} \eta' \eta - \beta \psi_P \right) + 1 = 0, \quad (\text{ID}41)$$

$$\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u'$$

$$+ h_s \left( \mu_s + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_s \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_I}{\gamma_I} \eta + \Sigma_D - \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) \right) + h_u \left( \mu_u + \frac{1}{2} \Sigma_u \left( \frac{1 - 2 \gamma_I}{\gamma_I} \eta + \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) \right)$$

$$+ h \left( (\psi_I - 1)r + \psi_I - \frac{1}{2 \gamma_I} \eta' \eta - \beta \psi_I \right) + 1 = 0, \quad (\text{ID}42)$$

where the market price of risk $\eta$ is given by (ID6) and

$$\Sigma_s = \frac{(\gamma_P - \gamma_I) \Sigma_D + \left( \frac{\psi_P \gamma_P - 1}{\psi_P - 1} \frac{h_P}{h} - \frac{\psi_I \gamma_I - 1}{\psi_I - 1} \frac{h_u}{h} \right) \Sigma_u}{\gamma_P 1/s + \gamma_I s - \left( \frac{\psi_P \gamma_P - 1}{\psi_P - 1} \frac{h_P}{h} - \frac{\psi_I \gamma_I - 1}{\psi_I - 1} \frac{h_u}{h} \right)} . \quad (\text{ID}43)$$

The other equations coincide with Eqs. (ID7) and (ID8).

**Proof.** The proof of Proposition ID2 closely follows the proof of Proposition ID1. In particular, the utility maximization problem of the type P investors yields the same equation (ID19) for $h_P$. Because the type I investors are also unconstrained, the equation for $h$ is identical to (ID19) in which $\psi_P$ is replaced with $\psi_I$ and $\gamma_P$ is replaced with $\gamma_I$:

$$\frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma_s' + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma_u' + h_{su} \Sigma_s \Sigma_u' + h_s \left( \mu_s + \frac{1 - \gamma_I \Sigma_s}{\gamma_I} \eta' \right) + h_u \left( \mu_u + \frac{1 - \gamma_I \Sigma_u}{\gamma_I} \eta' \right)$$

$$+ h \left( (\psi_I - 1)r + \psi_I - \frac{1}{2 \gamma_I} \eta' \eta - \beta \psi_I + \frac{1 - \gamma_I \psi_I}{2 \gamma_I (\psi_I - 1)} \left( \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \right) + 1 = 0. \quad (\text{ID}44)$$

Also, removing of the indexing constraint does not change Eqs. (ID23) – (ID30), and the equation for the market price of risk $\eta$ is again given by (ID6). This equation can be rewritten as (ID38), and a simple algebraic manipulation yields Eq. (ID41).

Because the type I investors are unconstrained, Eqs. (ID28) and (ID29) that follow from their
optimization problem produce equations that are similar to those in the case of type P investors. 

Plugging the optimal portfolio weight

\[ \omega = \frac{1}{\gamma_I} (\Sigma_Q')^{-1} \left( \eta + \frac{1-\gamma_I}{\psi_I - 1} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \right)' \]  

(ID45)

and \( \Sigma_{CI} \) from (ID25) into (ID29), solving for \( \eta \), and restoring the subscript I, we get

\[ \eta = \gamma_I \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) + \frac{\gamma_I \psi_I}{\psi_I - 1} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right). \]  

(ID46)

Combining Eqs. (ID46) and (ID6) and solving for \( \Sigma_s \), we get Eq. (ID43). Also, rewriting (ID46) as

\[ \frac{1-\gamma_I \psi_I}{\psi_I - 1} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) = \gamma_I \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{\Sigma_s}{s} \right) - \eta, \]

we transform Eq. (ID44) into (ID42).

Finally, using that \( \mu_Q = \Sigma_Q \eta' \), \( \omega' \Sigma_Q \) from (ID29), \( \Sigma_{CI} \) from (ID25), and \( \eta \) from (ID46), we transform Eq. (ID28) into (ID34). Solving Eqs. (ID30) and (ID34) for \( r \) and \( \mu_s \) yields Eqs. (ID7) and (ID8). Q.E.D.

To compare the equilibria in the constrained and unconstrained economies, we solve the systems of equations from Propositions ID1 and ID2 numerically using the same techniques as in the main part of the paper. We calibrate the preference parameters following Gârleanu and Panageas (2015) and set \( \gamma_I = 10, \gamma_P = 1.5, \psi_I = 0.05, \psi_P = 0.7, \) and \( \beta = 0.02. \) The dividends follow the same processes as in the main part of the paper: \( \mu_{D1} = \mu_{D2} = 0.018, \Sigma_{D1} = [0.045 \ 0], \) and \( \Sigma_{D2} = [0 \ 0.045]. \) Fig. ID.1 reports the changes in various equilibrium characteristics produced by indexing.

The comparison of Fig. ID.1 with Figs. 1 and 2 from the main part of the paper reveals that the graphs for the economies with the CRRA and recursive utility functions are qualitatively similar. We again observe that indexing typically decreases the market volatility and risk-free rate, but its effect on the correlation between the stocks and on the stock volatilities is ambiguous. In particular, indexing tends to increase the correlation when the stocks have comparable sizes but
Figure ID.1: This figure shows how the unconstrained equilibrium changes due to indexing in the model with recursive preferences. All variables are functions of the consumption share $s$ of the type I investors and the share $u$ of the first dividend $D_1$ in the aggregate dividend $D$. The model parameters are as follows: $\mu_{D_1} = \mu_{D_2} = 0.018$, $\Sigma_{D_1} = [0.045 \ 0]$, $\Sigma_{D_2} = [0 \ 0.045]$, $\gamma_I = 10$, $\gamma_P = 1.5$, $\psi_I = 0.05$, $\psi_P = 0.7$, and $\beta = 0.02$.

decrease when one of the stocks is substantially larger than the other. Thus, our main conclusions are robust to the choice of the preferences. Finally, note that quantitatively many effects of indexing are substantially stronger in the economy with recursive preferences than their analogs in the economy with the CRRA preferences. Hence, a more realistic specification of preferences can make the impact of indexing more pronounced and practically relevant.

Internet Appendix E. Index investing as an outcome of complexity aversion

In our main model, we assume that the type I investors trade only the index because of unspecified exogenous reasons. In this Internet Appendix, we present a modification of the model that demon-
strates how the equilibrium with index investing endogenously arises when the type I investors are unconstrained in their portfolio choice but have complexity aversion, that is, derive disutility from managing a complex portfolio of individual risky assets.\(^2\)

The main components of the modified model are the same as in the main model of the paper. We again consider a pure exchange economy with two Lucas trees that follow geometric Brownian motions and with two types of investors. The type P investors have the standard CRRA preferences and can trade all assets. The difference between the models is in the preferences of the type I investors. Specifically, we assume that the type I investors have the following utility function:

\[
U_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-\beta t} \frac{C_{Ht}^{1-\gamma_I}}{1-\gamma_I} g(A_{Ht}) dt \right],
\]

where \(\gamma_I > 1\). Thus, the type I investors’ utility is determined not only by the consumption \(C_{Ht}\), but also by \(A_{Ht}\), which is a set of risky assets in their portfolio at time \(t\) and a subset of \(A = \{\text{stock 1, stock 2, index}\}\). Eq. (IE1) represents the CRRA preferences with the new factor \(g(A_{Ht})\) that describes complexity aversion: it decreases utility when the investor’s portfolio includes assets that are hard to analyze and understand. Without losing generality, we set \(g(\emptyset) = 1\). Also, we assume that \(g(\{\text{stock 1}\}) = g(\{\text{stock 2}\}) = g(\{\text{stock 1, stock 2}\}) = g(\{\text{stock 1, index}\}) = g(\{\text{stock 2, index}\}) = \bar{g} > 1\). The assumption implies that (i) the individual stocks are “complex,” so holding them reduces the investor’s utility and (ii) the disutility of a portfolio with the individual stocks is the same irrespectively of how many individual assets the portfolio contains. To capture the idea that indexes simplify the portfolio choice and reduce the disutility from complexity of financial markets, we set \(g(\{\text{index}\}) = 1\). Because the index can be replicated by a portfolio of individual stocks and the investors cannot benefit from combining individual stocks with the index, the portfolios \{stock 1, index\} and \{stock 2, index\} are redundant and can be excluded from consideration.

\(^2\)The idea that economic agents have bounded rationality and prefer to reduce the complexity of decision making goes back to Simon (1955, 1956). Rubinstein (1998) provides a textbook exposition of various approaches to modeling bounded rationality. Recent theoretical studies of preferences that involve complexity include Ortoleva (2013), who provides an axiomatic treatment of “thinking aversion,” and Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015), who introduce “choice aversion” into a dynamic choice problem. Experimental evidence of complexity aversion is presented by Huck and Weizsäcker (1999), Sousino et al. (2002), and Moffatt et al. (2015), among others.
The utility function (IE1) is maximized subject to the standard budget constraint

\[ dW_t = (r_t W_t - C_t)dt + W_t \omega'_t (\mu_s dt + \Sigma_s dB_t), \]  

(IE2)

where \( \omega'_t = [\omega_{I(1)t} \ \omega_{I(2)t}] \) is a vector of portfolio weights consistent with the composition of the portfolio \( A_{It}. \) This condition implies that

\[
\omega'_t = \begin{cases} 
[0 \ 0], & \text{if } A_{It} = \emptyset, \\
[\omega_{I(1)t} \ 0], & \text{if } A_{It} = \{\text{stock 1}\}, \\
[0 \ \omega_{I(2)t}], & \text{if } A_{It} = \{\text{stock 2}\}, \\
[\omega_{I(1)t} \ \omega_{I(2)t}], & \text{if } A_{It} = \{\text{stock 1, stock 2}\}, \\
\omega_{I(\text{ind})t} \left[ \frac{u_1}{u_1+(1-u)f_2} \quad \frac{(1-u)f_2}{u_1+(1-u)f_2} \right], & \text{if } A_{It} = \{\text{index}\}. 
\end{cases}
\]

(IE3)

Note that in contrast to the main part of the paper, the type I investors optimally choose both the composition of the portfolio \( A_{It} \) and the portfolio weights \( \omega_{It}. \)

The main result of Internet Appendix E is the following proposition.

**Proposition IE1.** There exists \( \bar{g}_{min} > 1 \) such that for any \( \bar{g} > \bar{g}_{min} \) the equilibrium in the modified economy coincides with the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. In particular, in any state of the economy, the type I investors hold only the risk-free bond and the index, and the functions \( r, \mu_s, \Sigma_s, \Sigma_I, f, \) and \( h \) solve the system of algebraic and differential equations (A1) – (A6). The market price of risk \( \eta \) and the expected excess returns on the index \( \mu_I \) are given by Eq. (A7). The price-dividend ratio \( f_i \) of stock \( i = 1, 2 \) solves Eq. (A8). The expected excess returns on individual stocks \( \mu_{Qi}, i = 1, 2, \) and return diffusions \( \Sigma_{Qi}, i = 1, 2, \) are given by Eq. (A9).

**Proof.** The proof closely follows the proof of Proposition 1 from the main part of the paper, which is presented in the Appendix. We do not reproduce the equations that are the same in both proofs.

---

3For expositional convenience, we have slightly changed the notations compared to the main part of the paper. In particular, the portfolio weights of the type I investors are now denoted as \( \omega_{I(1)t} \) and \( \omega_{I(2)t} \) instead of \( \omega_{1t} \) and \( \omega_{2t}, \) and the scalar weight of the index is denoted as \( \omega_{I(\text{ind})t} \) instead of \( \tilde{\omega}_{It}. \)
A. Price-dividend ratios

This part of the proof is the same as in the proof of Proposition 1, and the equations for the price-dividend ratios $f_i$, expected returns $\mu_{Qi}$, and diffusions $\Sigma_{Qi}$ coincide with Eqs. (A15), (A13), and (A14), respectively.

B. Utility maximization problem of the type P investors

This part is also the same as in the proof of Proposition 1 and yields equations for the risk-free rate and expected returns that are identical to Eqs. (A23) and (A24).

C. Utility maximization problem of the type I investors

Because of the modified utility function and the lack of exogenous constraints on the portfolio weights, the utility maximization problem of the type I investors is different from its analog in the main part of the paper. In particular, the indirect utility function of the type I investors $J(s, u)$ solves a different HJB equation:

$$
\max_{\{C_I, A_I, \omega_I\}} \left[ e^{-\beta t} \frac{C_I^{1-\gamma_I}}{1-\gamma_I} g(A_I) + \mathcal{D}J \right] = 0, \quad \text{(IE4)}
$$

where $\mathcal{D}J = \mathbb{E}[dJ]/dt$ is given by

$$
\mathcal{D}J = J_W(rW_I - C_I) + J_s\mu_s + J_u\mu_u + \frac{1}{2} J_{ss}\Sigma_s\Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} J_{uu}\Sigma_u\Sigma'_u + J_{us}\Sigma_s\Sigma'_u + J_t + W_I \times
$$

$$
\begin{cases}
0, & A_I = \{\emptyset\}, \\
J_{W\omega_I(1)}\mu_{Q1} + \frac{1}{2} J_{W\omega_I(1)}^2\Sigma_{Q1}^2 + J_{W\omega_I(1)}\Sigma_{Q1}\Sigma'_1 + J_{W\omega_I(1)}\Sigma_{Q1}\Sigma'_1, & A_I = \{\text{stock 1}\}, \\
J_{W\omega_I(2)}\mu_{Q2} + \frac{1}{2} J_{W\omega_I(2)}^2\Sigma_{Q2}^2 + J_{W\omega_I(2)}\Sigma_{Q2}\Sigma'_2 + J_{W\omega_I(2)}\Sigma_{Q2}\Sigma'_2, & A_I = \{\text{stock 2}\}, \\
J_{W\omega_I(\text{ind})}\mu_I + \frac{1}{2} J_{W\omega_I(\text{ind})}^2\Sigma_{\text{I}}^2 + J_{W\omega_I(\text{ind})}\Sigma_{\text{I}}\Sigma'_I + J_{W\omega_I(\text{ind})}\Sigma_{\text{I}}\Sigma'_I, & A_I = \{\text{index}\}.
\end{cases}
$$

The subscripts of $J$ denote derivatives, and $\mu_I$ and $\Sigma_I$ are the drift and diffusion of the index returns. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we look for the indirect utility function in the following
The optimal portfolio weights depend on the choice of form:

\[ J = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma_f} W^{1 - \gamma_f} h(s, u)^{\gamma_f} \exp(-\beta t). \] (IE5)

The maximization in Eq. (IE4) with respect to \( C_I \) together with Eq. (IE5) yields the optimal consumption:

\[ C_I = W_I h^{-1} g(A_I) \frac{1}{\gamma_f}. \] (IE6)

The optimal portfolio weights depend on the choice of \( A_I \):

\[ \omega'_I = \begin{cases} 
[0, 0], & \text{if } A_I = \{ \emptyset \}, \\
\left[ \frac{1}{\Sigma Q_1^2 Q_1} \left( \frac{\mu Q_1}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_1 \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_1 \Sigma'_u \right) 0 \right], & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{stock 1} \}, \\
\left[ \frac{1}{\Sigma Q_2^2 Q_2} \left( \frac{\mu Q_2}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_2 \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_2 \Sigma'_u \right) \right], & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{stock 2} \}, \\
\left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma'_u \right)' \left( \Sigma Q \Sigma'_Q \right)^{-1}, & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{stocks 1, 2} \}, \\
\left( \frac{1}{\Sigma I^2} \left( \frac{\mu I}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma'_u \right) \right] \left[ \frac{u_f}{u_f + (1-u) f_2} \frac{(1-u) f_2}{u_f + (1-u) f_2} \right], & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{index} \}. 
\end{cases} \] (IE7)

Plugging Eqs. (IE6) and (IE7) into Eq. (IE4), we get a differential equation for \( h \):

\[ \frac{1}{2} h_{ss} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_s + \frac{1}{2} h_{uu} \Sigma_u \Sigma'_u + h_{us} \Sigma_s \Sigma'_u + h_s \mu_s + h_u \mu_u \\
+ \frac{\gamma_f}{2} \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) \left( \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right)' - \frac{1}{\gamma_f}((1 - \gamma_f) r - \beta) h + \min_{A_I} \left\{ \frac{(1 - \gamma_f) h}{2} \right\} \times \]

\[ \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{if } A_I = \{ \emptyset \}, \\
\frac{1}{\Sigma Q_1^2 Q_1} \left( \frac{\mu Q_1}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_1 \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_1 \Sigma'_u \right)^2, & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{stock 1} \}, \\
\frac{1}{\Sigma Q_2^2 Q_2} \left( \frac{\mu Q_2}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_2 \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_2 \Sigma'_u \right)^2, & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{stock 2} \}, \\
\left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma'_u \right)' \left( \Sigma Q \Sigma'_Q \right)^{-1} \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma'_u \right), & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{stocks 1, 2} \}, \\
\left( \frac{1}{\Sigma I^2} \left( \frac{\mu I}{\gamma_f} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma'_s + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma'_u \right) \right] \left[ \frac{u_f}{u_f + (1-u) f_2} \frac{(1-u) f_2}{u_f + (1-u) f_2} \right], & \text{if } A_I = \{ \text{index} \}, \\
+ g(A_I) \frac{1}{\gamma_f} = 0. \] (IE8)

Note that when \( A_I = \{ \text{index} \} \), Eq. (IE8) coincides with Eq. (A30).
D. Dynamics of the state variable \( s \)

The definition of the consumption share \( s \) implies that \( C_I = sD \), so using Itô’s lemma, we get

\[
\frac{dC_I}{C_I} = \mu_C dt + \Sigma_C dB,
\]

\[
\frac{dC_I^{-\gamma_I}}{C_I^{-\gamma_I}} = \left( -\gamma_I \mu_C + \frac{1}{2} \gamma_I (\gamma_I + 1) \Sigma_C \Sigma_C' \right) dt - \gamma_I \Sigma_C dB,
\]  

(IE9)

where

\[
\mu_C = \mu_D + \frac{\mu_s + \Sigma_s \Sigma_D'}{s}, \quad \Sigma_C = \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s.
\]  

(IE10)

Taking into account Eq. (IE6), the indirect utility function from Eq. (IE5) can be rewritten as

\[
J = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma_I} C_I^{-\gamma_I} W_I g(A_I) \exp(-\beta t).
\]

Applying Itô’s lemma to this equation and using Eqs. (IE2) and (IE9), we get

\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = \left( -\beta - \gamma_I \mu_C + \frac{1}{2} \gamma_I (\gamma_I + 1) \Sigma_C \Sigma_C' + r - h^{-1} g(A_I)^{1-h} + \omega'(\mu_Q - \gamma_I \Sigma_Q \Sigma_C') \right) dt + \left( \omega' \Sigma_Q - \gamma_I \Sigma_C \right) dB.
\]

(IE11)

Alternatively, Itô’s lemma applied to Eq. (IE5) yields

\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = \mathcal{D} \frac{dJ}{J} dt + \left( (1 - \gamma_I) \omega' \Sigma_Q + \gamma_I \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \gamma_I \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) dB.
\]

(IE12)

Noting that Eqs. (IE5) and (IE6) imply that

\[
e^{-\beta t} C_I^{1-\gamma_I} = J h^{-1} g(A_I)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_I}}
\]

and using the HJB equation (IE4), we get \( \mathcal{D} J = -J h^{-1} g(A_I)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_I}} \) and rewrite Eq. (IE12) as

\[
\frac{dJ}{J} = -h^{-1} g(A_I)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_I}} dt + \left( (1 - \gamma_I) \omega' \Sigma_Q + \gamma_I \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s + \gamma_I \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u \right) dB.
\]

(IE13)

Matching the drifts and diffusions in Eqs. (IE11) and (IE13) and using \( \mu_C \) and \( \Sigma_C \) from Eq.
(IE10), we get

\[
\frac{1 + \gamma_I}{2} \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right)' + \frac{r - \beta}{\gamma_I} + \omega_I' \left( \frac{\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} - \Sigma_Q \left( \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s \right) \right)'
\]

\[
= \mu_D + \frac{1}{s} (\mu_s + \Sigma_s \Sigma_D'), \quad \text{(IE14)}
\]

\[
\omega_I \Sigma_Q - \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_s - \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_u = \Sigma_D + \frac{1}{s} \Sigma_s. \quad \text{(IE15)}
\]

Note that Eqs. (IE14) and (IE15) hold for any set of assets \( A_I \). Moreover, when \( A_I = \{\text{index}\} \), they coincide with Eqs. (A38) and (A39), so in this case Eqs. (A40) – (A49) also apply. As a result, the dynamics of the state variable \( s \) are identical to its dynamics in the economy with indexing constraints and described by Eqs. (A2) – (A4).

**E. Optimal choice of \( A_I \)**

The arguments presented above demonstrate that if the type I investors choose \( A_I = \{\text{index}\} \) in all states of the economy, the equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium from Proposition 1. Hence, to prove Proposition IE1, it is sufficient to show that there exists \( \bar{g}_{min} > 1 \) such that for any \( \bar{g} > \bar{g}_{min} \) the type I investors do not deviate from \( A_I = \{\text{index}\} \) taking the investment opportunities as given.

Note that the value of the objective function at the solution of an unconstrained maximization problem cannot be lower than that produced by maximization with constraints. Applying this observation to the maximization in the HJB equation with respect to the portfolio weights, we get that in all states

\[
\frac{1}{\Sigma_{Q1} \Sigma'_{Q1}} \left( \frac{\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_{Q1} \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_{Q1} \Sigma_u' \right)^2
\]

\[
\leq \left( \frac{\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_{Q1} \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_{Q1} \Sigma_u' \right) \left( \Sigma_{Q1} \Sigma'_{Q1} \right)^{-1} \left( \frac{\mu_Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma_Q \Sigma_s' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma_Q \Sigma_u' \right),
\]

29
\[
\frac{1}{\Sigma Q_2 \Sigma' Q_2} \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_s \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_u \Sigma' \right)^2 \\
\leq \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_s \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_u \Sigma' \right)' \left( \Sigma Q \Sigma' Q \right)^{-1} \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_s \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_u \Sigma' \right),
\]

and

\[
\frac{1}{\Sigma I \Sigma' I} \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma' \right)^2 \\
\leq \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_s \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_u \Sigma' \right)' \left( \Sigma Q \Sigma' Q \right)^{-1} \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_s \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_u \Sigma' \right).
\]

In particular, those inequalities hold for the equilibrium with indexing. Also note that by definition, \( h > 0 \), so \( (1 - \gamma_I)h < 0 \). Hence, the optimization with respect to \( A_I \) in Eq. (IE8) yields \( A_I = \{\text{index}\} \) when in all states of the economy

\[
\frac{(1 - \gamma_I)h}{2} \frac{1}{\Sigma I \Sigma' I} \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma' \right)^2 + 1 \\
< \frac{(1 - \gamma_I)h}{2} \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma' \right)' \left( \Sigma Q \Sigma' Q \right)^{-1} \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q \Sigma' \right) + \bar{g} \gamma_I,
\]

where all functions are the same as in the equilibrium with indexing. This condition holds if

\[
\bar{g} > \bar{g}_{min} = \max_{s \in [0,1], u \in [0,1]} \bar{g}(s, u) \gamma_I,
\]

where

\[
\bar{g}(s, u) = \frac{(\gamma_I - 1)h}{2} \left[ \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_s \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_u \Sigma' \right)' \left( \Sigma Q \Sigma' Q \right)^{-1} \left( \frac{\mu Q}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma Q_s \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma Q_u \Sigma' \right) \right. \\
- \left. \frac{1}{\Sigma I \Sigma' I} \left( \frac{\mu_I}{\gamma_I} + \frac{h_s}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma' + \frac{h_u}{h} \Sigma I \Sigma' \right)^2 \right] + 1. \quad (IE16)
\]

This completes the proof. Q.E.D.

To demonstrate how the condition on \( \bar{g} \) from Proposition IE1 applies in the numerical example presented in the paper, we compute \( \bar{g}(s, u) \) and plot \( \bar{g}(s, u) - 1 \) in Fig. IE.1.
Figure IE.1: This figure plots the function $\bar{g}(s,u) - 1$ with $\bar{g}(s,u)$ from equation (IE16). The model parameters are as follows: $\mu_{D1} = \mu_{D2} = 0.018$, $\Sigma_{D1} = [0.045 \ 0]$, $\Sigma_{D2} = [0 \ 0.045]$, $\beta = 0.03$, $\gamma_I = 5$, and $\gamma_I = 5$.

The figure demonstrates that, as expected, $\bar{g}(s,u) \geq 1$ in all states, so investors hold the index instead of the individual stocks only when they receive disutility from the latter choice. However, the magnitude of disutility that justifies indexing is small: investors shun the individual stocks in all states if $\bar{g} > 1.0001$. This observation is consistent with a relatively small welfare loss produced by switching from trading two stocks to trading the index that we find in Section 3.4. It also demonstrates that the equilibrium with indexing constructed in the main part of the paper endogenously arises for a quantitatively realistic cost of complexity.

References


