



## **Hostages to both sides: favela pacification as dual security assemblage**

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Abstract: Research on security and governance in marginalised urban spaces in Latin America has pointed to complex cycles of conflict and negotiation between state and non-state actors. However, many questions remain about the dynamics of such arrangements and how they may be affected by top-down policing reforms. Presenting fieldwork conducted in Tuiuti, a 'pacified' favela in Rio de Janeiro, this article proposes that 'assemblage thinking' can shed light on these issues. Despite rhetoric of reclaiming territory for the state, I argue that Tuiuti's UPP (Police Pacification Unit) did not produce a new state-led security regime, but rather overlaid and fused with previous security practices enacted by traffickers. This gave rise to a 'dual security assemblage' characterised by the co-production of security through an emergent division of policing functions. The consequences for Tuiuti's residents were thus not enhanced social control at the hands of police, but rather greater uncertainty about the rules they were expected to observe and whom was responsible for enforcing them. By identifying the broader power inequalities surrounding this local security assemblage and the ways in which they constrained its (trans)formation, I reject the claim that assemblage thinking offers a depoliticised or merely descriptive view of the social world.

## **“Hostages to both sides”: Favela pacification as dual security assemblage**

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### **Abstract**

Research on security and governance in marginalised urban spaces in Latin America has pointed to complex cycles of conflict and negotiation between state and non-state actors. However, many questions remain about the dynamics of such arrangements and how they may be affected by top-down policing reforms. Presenting fieldwork conducted in Tuiuti, a ‘pacified’ favela in Rio de Janeiro, this article proposes that ‘assemblage thinking’ can shed light on these issues. Despite rhetoric of reclaiming territory for the state, I argue that Tuiuti’s UPP (Police Pacification Unit) did not produce a new state-led security regime, but rather overlaid and fused with previous security practices enacted by traffickers. This gave rise to a ‘dual security assemblage’ characterised by the co-production of security through an emergent division of policing functions. The consequences for Tuiuti’s residents were thus not enhanced social control at the hands of police, but rather greater uncertainty about the rules they were expected to observe and whom was responsible for enforcing them. By identifying the broader power inequalities surrounding this local security assemblage and the ways in which they constrained its (trans)formation, I reject the claim that assemblage thinking offers a depoliticised or merely descriptive view of the social world.

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### Abstract

Research on security and governance in marginalised urban spaces in Latin America has pointed to complex cycles of conflict and negotiation between state and non-state actors. However, many questions remain about the dynamics of such arrangements and how they may be affected by top-down policing reforms. Presenting fieldwork conducted in Tuiuti, a ‘pacified’ favela in Rio de Janeiro, this article proposes that ‘assemblage thinking’ can shed light on these issues. Despite rhetoric of reclaiming territory for the state, I argue that Tuiuti’s UPP (Police Pacification Unit) did not produce a new state-led security regime, but rather overlaid and fused with previous security practices enacted by traffickers. This gave rise to a ‘dual security assemblage’ characterised by the co-production of security through an emergent division of policing functions. The consequences for Tuiuti’s residents were thus not enhanced social control at the hands of police, but rather greater uncertainty about the rules they were expected to observe and whom was responsible for enforcing them. By identifying the broader power inequalities surrounding this local security assemblage and the ways in which they constrained its (trans)formation, I reject the claim that assemblage thinking offers a depoliticised or merely descriptive view of the social world.

**Key words:** Latin America; Security; Crime; Favelas; Pacification; Assemblage.

“Rocinha is ours”. So read the headline of *O Globo*, Rio de Janeiro’s leading newspaper, on 14 November 2011 (Sintracoop, 2011). This was the day after the city’s largest favela had been ‘pacified’ by special police and the armed forces. According to the report, over the space of two hours the state “retook” the favela and would now “re-establish services for its 100 thousand residents” (*Ibid.*). A few months later, a new *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (Police Pacification Unit, UPP) would be installed to retain a permanent police presence in the area.

The meaning of *O Globo's* words was unmistakable. For years, Rocinha had been dominated by one or other of Rio's major drug trafficking factions, who had used the favela's vast, warren-like territory as a logistical base and marketplace for large-scale drug trafficking (Glenny, 2015). They had also exercised a powerful influence over social and political life in the favela and, in the view of the authorities as well as much of Rio's population, constituted major source of insecurity across the wider city. "Rocinha is ours" meant the state had finally taken control of this "parallel" territory.

Only a few years later, *Globo's* headline rings hollow. In February 2018, federal troops were sent to Rio to contain what embattled President Michel Temer framed as a profound security crisis. Two months later, it was announced that the number of UPPs in the city would be halved from 38 to 19 through a combination of closures and mergers, allowing the security ministry to reduce costs and more flexibly redeploy police to other areas (Exame, 2018).<sup>1</sup> Against a backdrop of severe austerity and a general rise in crime across the city, the sense of crisis was intensified by the spectacle of open conflict erupting in numerous pacified favelas. Indeed, in late 2017 large gun battles had broken out between rival groups in Rocinha itself, with police struggling to reimpose order. The UPPs' apparent inability to keep favelas "pacified" begs the question of what had gone wrong. Had the authorities gained power in these favelas and then lost it again? Or had they never really "pacified" them at all?

As much of the literature on security, policing and crime in Latin America has identified, agents of the state need not only be physically "present" in particular spaces to enforce the law, but must also be effective at responding to the demands of their populations within the bounds of institutional and legal protocol (Arias and Goldstein, 2010; Garmany, 2014). Such conditions clearly do not prevail in Rio de Janeiro's favelas (Machado da Silva, 2010; Arias and Barnes, 2017; Penglase, 2009). However, even where police do not provide effective public security, traffickers cannot be said to oversee a "separate" order. Police and other state agents contribute in crucial ways to the way governance in favelas occurs by helping to shape

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<sup>1</sup> Both Rocinha and Tuiuti (the case I will present below) retained their UPPs in this reorganisation. However, the victories of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil's recent presidential election and of Wilson Witzel in Rio de Janeiro's gubernatorial election (yet to assume office at time of writing), both on far-right law-and-order platforms, seem to foreshadow a dramatic shift away from the pacification approach and the likelihood of a significant increase in police violence in favelas.

the opportunity structures in which criminal actors operate via the ways in which they repress, tolerate and/or collude with illegal activities, and the extent of their (in)ability and (un)willingness to guarantee the rights of residents (Misse, 2007; Arias, 2006; Garmany, 2014; Feltran, 2010). The question surrounding police interventions like pacification is not whether the state “arrives” or not, but in what ways – and with what consequences – they alter the constellation of forces that together produce local (in)security.

Presenting fieldwork conducted in Tuiuti – a favela located in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone –, and drawing on ‘assemblage thinking’ (Richmond, 2018), I argue that rather than representing the arrival of a new state-led security regime, the UPPs overlaid and fused with the pre-existing regime dominated by traffickers. In this way, they constituted what I describe as a ‘dual security assemblage’, where both sides came to co-produce security through complex arrangements of implicit co-operation, accompanied by constant mutual surveillance. In the case of Tuiuti, the consequence for favela residents was not necessarily enhanced social control at the hands of police, but rather greater uncertainty. As the new terms of police–trafficker coexistence became routinised, residents were forced to navigate a local security environment in which both the *de facto* rules they were expected to observe, and *whom* had responsibility for enforcing them, had become hopelessly blurred.

The way in which I mobilise ‘assemblage’ builds upon previous use of the concept in geography (eg. McFarlane, 2011; Baker and McGuirk, 2011; Richmond, 2018) by using it to identify complex scalar relations and the unpredictable ways in which these shift over time and mesh together in space. However, I also go on to think explicitly about the power dynamics that help to produce and delimit particular urban security assemblages. This reveals assemblage approaches to be far from the caricature of a depoliticised and merely descriptive ‘naïve objectivism’ (Brenner et al., 2011; Storper and Scott, 2016) and instead as a valuable tool for identifying how broad asymmetries of power persist through and constrain the emergence of local security conditions without directly *determining* them. As I shall describe, the UPP programme was designed in ways that revealed highly skewed power relations and was imposed on favelas in a top-down fashion. However, in the case of Tuiuti, the interaction of specific features of the programme with embedded local relationships meant pacification ultimately materialised in a relatively unimposing way. Nonetheless, this local

accommodation developed within the a broader logic that continued to systematically deny favela residents access to meaningful public security.

### **Urban security regimes in Latin America: Towards an assemblage approach**

#### *Security in Latin America's marginalised urban spaces*

Rio de Janeiro has long been seen as an emblematic, if in some ways eccentric, case of the endemic gang and police violence that has plagued many Latin American cities over recent decades. Although violence has been an ever-present feature of social regulation in the city, new explosive forms of conflict emerged in the 1980s as armed drug trafficking groups emerged and entrenched themselves in the city's numerous favelas (Richmond, 2018; Arias and Barnes, 2018). By the 1990s, internecine splits had given rise to fierce inter-factional rivalries and a system of market competition through the violent contestation of favela territory. Police, meanwhile, adopted counter-insurgency tactics, making periodic and often violent incursions into favelas in pursuit of particular targets before leaving again. In addition to the threat of stray bullets, favela residents effectively see their rights suspended during such operations. Use of arbitrary stop-and-search and house raids are common, and prosecutions resulting from deaths at the hand of police extremely rare. These dynamics are partly reinforced by public opinion, which became increasingly tolerant of indiscriminate and extra-legal methods of policing favelas as the latter were scapegoated as the main source of insecurity in the city (Machado da Silva, 2010). However, the human cost and spill-over effects also generate political pressure to seek more effective and less bloody policing responses (McCann, 2014).

By 2008, such concerns had led to the creation of the UPP programme. This strategy prioritised reducing the violence and visibility of drug trafficking, rather than repression of the drug trade itself, via the implantation of permanent, specially-trained pacification units in favelas. Originally, the UPPs were presented as part of a broader agenda of social integration of favelas through a range of urban and social interventions, although most of these were gradually watered down or abandoned (Richmond and Garmany, 2016; Richmond, 2015). In any case, the rhetoric of integration always sat uncomfortably with a favela-specific policing model that created distinct security protocols and hierarchies in these territories (Fleury, 2012; Pereira Leite, 2014; Richmond, 2018). Individual UPP commanders were granted special

powers within the areas they controlled, with discretion for adopting tactics like curfews and stop-and-search (Fleury, 2012). Variations in approaches adopted, as well as in security conditions and historical relations between police, traffickers and residents, appear to underpin differences in the results and reception of the programme in different favelas (Vilarouca and Ribeiro, 2016).

The more repressive features of the UPP programme and the highly uneven geography of where units were established – concentrated in favelas located near to wealthy areas and key urban infrastructure – led many to view it as a ‘neoliberal’ policing strategy, designed to protect new urban circuits of capital accumulation via the repression of marginalised groups (eg. Saborio 2013; Freeman, 2014). Taking a longer view, others have situated “pacification” as a recurring nation-building strategy in Brazil since the colonial era, that aims to incorporate subaltern social and racial groups through the combined use of violence and ‘tutelage’ (Pacheco de Oliveira, 2014; Pereira Leite, 2014). However, while economic and “civilising” logics were clearly both present in the design of the UPP programme, such analyses are of limited use for the question addressed here – of how pacification has actually played out on the ground. That is to say, just because the UPPs *sought to* dominate favela territory does not mean they were necessarily successful in doing so.

Some ethnographic accounts of pacification have highlighted tensions and contradictions in the implementation of pacification and resident perceptions of the programme. For example, Menezes (2014) interprets the rumours circulating among favela residents in different phases following pacification as an attempt to understand the shifting relational dynamics between police and traffickers. Rather than the unambiguous imposition of a new state-led order, residents experienced uncertainty, having no established precedent for knowing what pacification would mean in practice. Larkins (2013), meanwhile, highlights the way in which ‘spectacular’ forms of policing favelas, designed for televised consumption by the middle classes, bears little relation to residents’ experiences. In this way it paradoxically reinforces trafficker influence in favelas by showing up the farcical nature of the state’s claims to sovereignty.

The emphasis in these accounts on complex relationships between the state, traffickers and favela residents fits with recent developments in the wider literature on crime and



governance in Latin America. In Rio de Janeiro itself, scholars such as Misse (2007) and Arias (2006) have described illegal markets as being regulated by networks that contain criminal actors, state agents and economic elites who use money and influence as well as violence in managing their relationships. Depending on the actors, markets and spaces in question, this may produce diverse types of 'plural order' in cities, seen for example in the contrasts between trafficker- and militia-dominated favelas (Arias and Barnes, 2017). In cities such as São Paulo (Feltran, 2010; 2012; Denyer Willis, 2015), Medellín (Abello-Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014), Mexico City (Becker and Müller, 2013) and Kingston (Jaffe, 2013), hybrid formations characterised by fluctuating dynamics of conflict and negotiation have been identified in which armed criminal groups take advantage of both gaps left and institutions created by the state to strengthen their own local influence. Notwithstanding great diversity across cases, these dynamics and tensions appear to characterise policing in marginalised urban spaces across much of Latin America and the Caribbean (Arias and Goldstein, 2010).

#### *Assemblage thinking and socio-spatial (trans)formations*

In light of such negotiated, multi-polar relations between state and non-state actors, I propose that 'assemblage thinking'<sup>2</sup> offers some useful tools for conceptualising these arrangements' relational, scalar, temporal and causal dynamics. With its origins in the philosophical writings of Deleuze and Guattari, 'assemblage' refers most basically to the "the 'holding together' of heterogeneous elements" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 323) in partially stabilised formations (see Nail, 2017; Richmond, 2018). The concept has become particularly popular among geographers and urbanists in recent years due to its apparent ability to incorporate diverse actors – both human and non-human – and the complex interactions between them, into contextually sensitive accounts of socio-spatial (trans)formations (eg. Anderson et al. 2012; McFarlane 2011; Baker and McGuirk, 2017). However, there is considerable disagreement, not to mention much confusion, about whether and how the concept might be usefully applied to social and geographical analysis (McFarlane, 2011; Brenner et al., 2011; Storper and Scott, 2016; Buchanan, 2015; 2017).

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<sup>2</sup> I use the term 'assemblage thinking' rather than 'assemblage theory' to acknowledge that while use of the term is diverse and not reducible to a single uniform theory, it does signal a set of shared concerns, insights and theoretical tools (Richmond, 2018).

As many have noted, assemblage itself is a problematic translation of the original French *agencement* (Nail, 2017; Buchanan, 2017). While the former suggests an emergence of order among different entities, the latter implies the active arrangement of pieces by an external agent. However, Deleuze and Guattari also used the term in different ways, for example in their references to biology (which are closer to the English *assemblage* and have had greater influence over geographers) and in their writings on psychoanalysis (see below). These ambiguities seem central to current disagreements. Geographers' use of assemblage has tended to emphasise features such as the irreducibility of context, the contingency of relations, and 'distributed agency' between the social and the material (eg. Farías and Bender, 2010; McFarlane, 2011). This has attracted criticism from those who argue that such an approach is incapable of distinguishing between "necessary" and "contingent" elements of assemblages, and ends up becoming a form of "naïve objectivism" (Brenner et al., 2011; Storper and Scott, 2016). In this way, they argue, mapping assemblages becomes a purely descriptive exercise, denuded of any capacity to identify broader structuring logics and, therefore, of shedding light on how power inequalities are (re)produced.

Such criticisms are partly related to questions of temporality. Use of assemblage in geography has tended to invoke a particular temporal imaginary that emphasises flux, contingency and becoming in contrast to one of static structures that reproduce socio-spatial inequalities in relatively predictable ways. It can thus appear to defend a kind of 'presentism' – "a reification of the present moment in practice in intellectual, political and ethical terms, and a view of the present moment as a pure event" (Jones and Garde-Hansen, 2012: 7). However, as has been argued elsewhere, assemblage is equally suited to identifying the *persistence* of social and spatial arrangements and the inequalities and injustices they generate (Richmond, 2018; Saldanha, 2006). Key here are the twin concepts of de- and reterritorialisation (Nail, 2017: 33-36). Where the relations that surround a given assemblage change or are weakened, the assemblage may display deterritorialising tendencies. However, in most cases these will be counteracted by a process of reterritorialisation, which sustains the assemblage, adjusting it to and/or assimilating new elements and relations. Reterritorialisation, in this way, calls to mind Lampedusa's (2007) famous dictum that "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change". In fact, only in the rare event of 'absolute deterritorialisation' are assemblages definitively broken apart. As this implies, assemblages are fundamentally shaped

by unequal power relations, as stronger reterritorialising processes tend to overpower weaker deterritorialising ones.

If assemblage thinking is in fact capable of encompassing varying temporal dynamics, it is also clearly well suited to developing sensitive accounts of spatial relationships (Bonta and Protevi, 2004). Some of Deleuze and Guattari's most evocative writings refer to the generative interactions of diverse entities in particular environments. The wasp and the orchid, for example, are entirely distinct species but their encounter in space allowed them to evolve together and incorporate one another into their respective reproductive routines (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 10). The "refrain", or repetition, of such routines gives consistency to such relationships, assigning functions to different actors and delineating the spaces in which they may occur (*Ibid.*: 323). As the word implies, then, as well as determining *duration*, territorialisation *occupies space*, mutually imbricating social and spatial arrangements.

In his influential writings on assemblage, DeLanda (2006; 2016) describes such ecological assemblages as characterised by 'relations of exteriority'<sup>3</sup> – although the 'heterogeneous elements', like the wasp and the orchid, are integrated into the assemblage, they remain distinct entities and, at least in theory, capable of acting independently of it. DeLanda contrasts this with a vision of 'relations of interiority' whereby a part is understood to exist exclusively as a function of the whole (DeLanda, 2006: 19). There is an implicit scalar logic here, whereby assemblages emerge out of the interaction of parts in a primarily bottom-up fashion, as opposed to 'macro-reductionist' models (*Ibid.*) where parts are assumed to be by-products of fully integrated "totalities". This insight is particularly helpful for challenging fallacies of composition and hasty generalisations that would attribute the same "underlying" cause or structure to empirical phenomena that exhibit some superficial resemblance. On the other hand, it is not necessarily clear what organises a bottom-up assemblage, where component parts appear to have no motive force beyond a kind of crude vitality, and no logic to their interactions apart from an elusive force of "self-organisation". This may not be a problem if more systematic logics can be identified in assemblages on a case-by-case basis. However, the risk, as highlighted by Brenner et al. (2011), is of failing to identify broader logics

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<sup>3</sup> DeLanda's version of assemblage theory draws on evolutionary and complexity theory and, as he acknowledges, departs from Deleuze and Guattari's in important ways (DeLanda, 2006: 3-4).

– of capital(ism), structured gender or racial inequalities, exclusionary regimes of citizenship and so on – that inevitably traverse different local assemblages and are likely to be implicated in their reterritorialisations.

For not dissimilar reasons, though within a Deleuzoguattarian framework, Buchanan (2015; 2017) rejects such an approach and calls for assemblage thinking to return to Deleuze and Guattari's writings on psychoanalysis (eg. Deleuze and Guattari, 1983; 1987: 26-39). Citing a key conceptual precursor of assemblage, the 'desiring machine', Buchanan argues that assemblages are not the product of complex, contingent interactions. Rather, they are collections of associations drawn together by an individual subject to alleviate a particular condition (Buchanan, 2015). The specifics of an assemblage are thus of analytical interest to the extent that they offer insights into the 'machine' that produced them. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 3) ask: "Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And given a certain machine, what can it be used for?" Buchanan's emphasis on the generative forces surrounding the (trans)formation of assemblages is not a turn to 'totality', however. The machine applies a "principle of inclusion and exclusion", but does not *determine* the outcome, and is characterised by shifting and uncertain relations between internal and external elements, and between material content and semiotic expression. "Something always escapes" (Buchanan, 2017: 471).

Based on these arguments, Buchanan (2017: 468-73)<sup>4</sup> presents a brief but intriguing example of how assemblage thinking can be applied to questions of policy development and socio-spatial (trans)formations. A house-building programme for indigenous Australians living in a remote region ran over budget, leading to discontent among predominantly white, tax-paying city dwellers that was clearly underpinned by deep social inequalities and racist attitudes. This led to desperate efforts to reduce costs which played out through negotiations between various actors involved in the assemblage – government, the contracted housebuilder, white voters, indigenous programme beneficiaries – each of whom possessed different degrees of power for pursuing their desired outcomes. What ultimately resulted was the construction of substandard housing that was nonetheless presented to the public as a successful rescue of the programme. As Buchanan explains, the transformation of this programme occurred

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<sup>4</sup> Based on research by Lea (2015).

within limiting conditions imposed by language, materiality, history, economic resources and so on. While there are limits to what can be defined as a “home”, this may be stretched within what historically imposed limits will allow, for example, the kinds of homes that society would tolerate indigenous Australians living in, the financial resources made available and so on.

That is to say that real actors negotiate how policies and spaces may be transformed, often with highly unpredictable results. However, these tend to reterritorialise within certain limits, weighed down by social inequalities and subject to processes and relationships that transcend local sites of assemblage. In what follows, I shall analyse how pacification materialised in Tuiuti favela through complex, locally developed arrangements between police, traffickers and residents, though in ways that ultimately remained within broader logics of inequality and insecurity in the city.

### **Tuiuti favela: Before and after pacification**

Tuiuti is a favela with a population of approximately 5,700 residents, located within the neighbourhood of São Cristóvão in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone (IBGE, 2010). Physically, it is typical of Rio’s older hillside favelas having an irregular form that betrays an incremental and informal process of construction, densification and verticalisation over several decades (see Figure 1). Despite this, compared to other such favelas, Tuiuti is relatively open, with a road accessible to cars running along the main ridge of the hill. The built environment is also highly consolidated, having benefitted from the *Favela Bairro* (‘Favela Neighbourhood’) upgrading programme in the 1990s, which brought paved streets, stairways, street-lighting, and recreational spaces to the area. The favela also contains some public services although these struggle to meet high levels of demand in the area (Richmond, 2015).

#### **<FIGURE 1>**

*Figure 1. Tuiuti has a dense and irregular built form typical of Rio’s older hillside favelas, but is also highly consolidated with multi-floor homes and paved streets and stairways*

The analysis that follows is based on eight months of fieldwork carried out in Tuiuti in 2013, beginning just over a year after it had been pacified at the end of 2011. The research included semi-structured interviews with thirty residents who varied in terms of age, gender, race, and socio-economic circumstances, as well as participant observation through involvement with

the residents association and two local NGOs. While I did not carry out interviews directly with police or traffickers, I was aware of their presence and attentive to their spatial practices. Nonetheless, the analysis that follows should not be interpreted as a direct account of these actors' respective strategies and internal deliberations. Rather it is based on my respondents' and my own interpretations of how pacification had materialised in the neighbourhood. As such, my approach accords with that taken by Menezes (2014), who conceives of rumours circulating between residents as an attempt to ontologically stabilise and make knowable a highly uncertain situation.

### *Tuiuti before pacification*

According to the accounts of older residents, Tuiuti was drawn into Rio de Janeiro's dynamic of gang and police violence at an early stage. Following a period of intense violent conflict between two local street gangs in 1979, Tuiuti and its emerging cocaine trade soon fell under the control of the *Comando Vermelho* (CV) faction, who have dominated the favela ever since. Over this time, drug trafficking in Tuiuti has remained relatively stable, certainly compared to other favelas which have seen more explosive patterns of conflict between rival gangs and police. As one respondent remarked, after the CV took over:

There were no more problems. No-one killed any more. Whoever died was involved... If you died from a bullet there, it was an isolated incident. It's not like that kind of thing where it's every day stray bullets. [Male, 45]

From time to time the peace has been broken during internal disputes, typically on the few occasions when a local '*dono*' (drug boss) was killed or imprisoned and his subordinates struggled to succeed him. There have also been periodic gun battles with police. According to residents, these often occurred when police operations spilled over from the larger neighbouring favela of Mangueira, also controlled by the CV, which was the target of more frequent and intense police interventions.

Several factors help to explain why drug trafficker dominance of Tuiuti prior to pacification had not been accompanied by the same levels of violence found elsewhere. One was that the long-standing *dono* had a policy of avoiding confrontation with the police and so had kept violence and the visibility of trafficking operations to a minimum. Another factor is that the

relatively open layout of Tuiuti may have made it unsuitable as a defensible base, while its relative distance from key transport supply routes also reduced its value as a site for large-scale drug distribution. Because of this, Tuiuti remained in effect a junior partner to Mangueira as a centre of CV operations in the region. Finally, the two other smaller favelas in the surrounding region are also CV-controlled, while the nearest favela to be controlled by a rival faction is sufficiently distant to make have made inter-factional conflict historically rare. A further, crucial aspect of the relative stability of the pre-pacification trafficker regime in Tuiuti relates to trafficker–resident relations. In broad terms, the way in which the CV embedded itself within and also reshaped patterns of sociability in Tuiuti fits with experiences across Rio de Janeiro’s trafficker-controlled favelas. Given its longevity and weakly marketised housing sector,<sup>5</sup> Tuiuti’s population is both highly stable and densely networked. This helped traffickers to embed their presence in community life, but also served to constrain them in important ways. Although a negligible proportion of residents has any meaningful involvement in the drugs trade, gang members are known to all residents and are likely to have large numbers of relatives in the neighbourhood. This obliges traffickers to maintain outward displays of respect for residents, or at least those who are deemed worthy of such status (see Arias and Rodrigues, 2006). One resident described how such relationships shaped local sociability prior to pacification:

Those of us who have lived here a long time end up knowing even the people who are involved in those things. And so, despite their involvement, as we’ve known them a long time, we have that “security”, in quotation marks, that they will respect us, because they know us. That’s really what happens. If it was a person coming from outside alone, before I would have had a certain fear to say “yeah go up there”. Because, it’s like this, a person from outside, they might think “What’s this guy doing? Why’s he looking?”  
*[Female, 38]*

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<sup>5</sup> In a study of housing market dynamics in twelve favelas, Abramo (2003) found that Tuiuti had the lowest proportion of residents who had bought or were renting their current property, with the vast majority having inherited from relatives.

These dense network ties stretching across the divide between drug traffickers and ordinary residents might be assumed to blur this distinction. However, they seemed to have had the counter-intuitive effect of reinforcing it. Instead of drawing residents into the business of drug trafficking, it apparently promoted a consensus among traffickers to respect the neutrality of those not involved in the drug trade. One resident explained:

Here the little guys [*“carinhas”*] just wanted to sell drugs [...]. It was never to mess with the community, with people, residents. [...] When the traffic was worse here... There are always some who are more cunning, you know? The ones who work for someone but think they'll knock him off, and then he finds out. And God they tried it and the guy knocked them off. But it was just with them and not with the family, just with the people who were actually working in it. The family itself, he never went to get the family like you hear in other places, to kill the family, or expel them, you understand.  
*[Female, 46]*

In more concrete ways, the CV regime in Tuiuti pre-pacification offered the kinds of “services” widely associated with trafficker dominance of favelas (see Penglase 2009). Forms of criminality not associated with drug trafficking itself – domestic abuse, rape, theft, robbery etc. – were explicitly forbidden and violently punished. Mediation was offered to resolve day-to-day disputes and traffickers made some *ad hoc* investments in community amenities. In exchange for these benefits, residents were expected to observe the traffickers’ rules and remain quiet about their illegal activities. The density of networks spanning the trafficker–resident divide may be conceived as having promoted a peculiar form of ‘collective efficacy’ in Tuiuti (Sampson, 2012; Arias and Barnes, 2018). That is to say, the thick web of overlapping relationships and obligations to some extent checked the indiscriminate use of violence by the local CV command and generated pressures on them to assist the community in concrete, if limited, ways.

This scenario should not be romanticised. Trafficker interventions were made on an inconsistent basis and rested on resident hierarchies and personal channels of access to senior traffickers (Penglase 2009). Relations with the community were ultimately determined by the priorities and violent *modus operandi* of the drugs trade. Traffickers openly sold drugs,



flaunted weaponry in public spaces and requisitioned buildings in the community for their own use. Their violence was uncompromising when their own interests were challenged. One highly respected local resident described how her family had been unable to prevent the “execution” of her brother who had become addicted to drugs and accumulated debts. Meanwhile, in spite of his own circumspection, the *dono*’s obligations to the CV hierarchy meant that Tuiuti’s residents suffered when he was obliged to provide support to traffickers from neighbouring Mangueira, provoking police incursions. Clearly, any civilising effect community cohesion might have had on trafficker behaviour towards residents could be quickly overridden by the imperatives of maintaining power and the flow of illicit profits.

In sum, prior to pacification we can identify a relatively stable set of routines, practices and expectations between traffickers and residents in Tuiuti that preserved a minimal degree of predictability. Nonetheless, traffickers remained broadly unaccountable to and sometimes violent towards residents. They also depended upon and contributed to residents’ lack of access to public security. At the same time, such security arrangements did not give politicians, police or the wider non-favela-residing public the sense of control they desired over spaces like Tuiuti, generating political demands at the state-level that would ultimately give rise to the UPP programme.

#### *The post-pacification scenario*

Under the exogenous influence of pacification, security arrangements in Tuiuti were radically transformed beginning in late 2011. Following months of preparatory police operations – including one that led to a gun battle along the main entry road into Tuiuti – and advanced warning in the media, heavily armed police entered Tuiuti and neighbouring Mangueira on 3 November. They were met with no resistance. Tuiuti’s *dono* had fled the area a few days earlier, and the lower-ranking CV “soldiers” who remained ceased to carry arms or sell drugs in the open. Subsequently, a small UPP base was installed in the most visible and symbolically potent location possible – next to the resident’s association in Tuiuti’s central square (Figure 2). This was the site of the former *boca de fumo* (drug sale point), recently vacated by the traffickers.

<IMAGE 2>

Figure 2. The UPP base, located in Tuiuti's central square

Other changes also soon became apparent. Despite having just one physical base in the area, UPP officers began to carry out foot and car patrols around Tuiuti. A few respondents mentioned seeing or hearing of incidents of young people being searched and harassed by police without good reason, and of officers being abusive to residents. Although, as mandated, UPP representatives would formally meet with the residents' association, local NGOs and service providers once a month to address community concerns, it soon became clear that the local commander could act with untrammelled authority if he wished to. One incident in particular revealed the extent of the UPP's power. A group of residents arranged a party in a playground where such events were commonly held, but failed to register the event with the UPP in advance. When the party began, police informed residents that as they had not requested prior permission it could not go ahead. When guests refused to leave, police dispersed the crowd using tear gas. Such stories of conflict arising from a mismatch between formal police protocol and long-standing informal practices among residents were widely reported across pacified favelas (World Bank, 2012: 69-73).

Such accounts would fit with a view of pacification as an aggressive new regime of social control designed to repress the favela population – one in which the programme's "neoliberal" character might be sufficient to account for the concrete form it took. However, other aspects of the post-pacification scenario sit uncomfortably with such an interpretation. It was an open secret that traffickers continued to operate in the community, with drugs and guns still circulating, albeit less visibly. The previous *dono* had been replaced by an internally promoted successor, whom, according to one respondent, everyone including the police knew about. They also clearly continued to exert powerful influence over residents, local businesses and institutions. This influence was laid bare in February 2013, when a UPP officer was robbed at gunpoint and two murders were committed in Tuiuti on the same night (Werneck and Ramalho 2013).<sup>6</sup> The following day, businesses in Tuiuti and Mangueira kept their doors shut at the behest of the traffickers – a display of enforced deference that was commonplace prior to pacification. In another example, in 2014, evidence emerged that

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<sup>6</sup> Conflicting rumours circulated about the crime, of it either being an internal conflict within the CV or an execution of CV members by a rival faction from another North Zone favela.

candidates for Rio's municipal council elections were prevented from campaigning in Tuiuti in order to guarantee the victory of the traffickers' preferred candidate (Soares, 2016). Clearly pacification had not significantly disrupted either drug trafficking networks or traffickers' influence over social and political life in Tuiuti.

All of this could simply mean that despite their best efforts the police were simply unable to flush out the traffickers. However, this view also appears difficult to sustain. My experience walking around Tuiuti was that the UPP's "control" of the territory was fairly limited. I rarely saw police circulating far from the base and they seemed reluctant to pursue minor forms of illegality. Indeed, some respondents complained that policing in Tuiuti was too light-touch to be effective, and that the UPP turned a blind eye to much that went on. On more than one occasion, I saw groups of young men smoking marijuana close to the UPP base. One respondent said that when she complained to an officer about marijuana being smoked by her home she was told that it was the UPP's objective to catch "those who sold drugs, not those who used them". Another remarked that she believed the traffickers were "having a party" with the UPP, as they knew nothing would be done to interfere with their activities. Clearly, Tuiuti's post-pacification security scenario cannot simply be characterised as a repressive state-led regime with the UPP replacing traffickers as the dominant force.

### **A new refrain: Pacification as dual security assemblage**

There are many possible ways to account for the contradictory evidence and diversity of resident attitudes regarding pacification in Tuiuti. One factor is that the UPP would likely have affected different parts of the population in different ways according to factors like age, gender, race and social conditions (World Bank, 2012). Young, dark-skinned men would be more likely to have had negative interactions with police and thus to see the UPP as an aggressive force of occupation. By contrast, elderly people and those with young children might feel less threatened by police and see their presence as enhancing security. Other important factors may include the individual's attitudes towards the pre-pacification trafficker-led regime, and the physical proximity of their home and daily routine to the UPP base, where police presence would be most strongly felt.

There is also the question of temporality – of how new forms of coexistence between police and residents developed over time. That is to say that the diversity of opinion is likely to have

reflected a specific moment in the gradual routinisation of the UPP and mutual familiarisation between residents and police (Menezes 2014) – of a “refrain” territorialising a new assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 310-351). One respondent expressed such a view:

*Respondent [Female, 36]:* It’s improved, it’s improved a lot, you know. It’s like this, when the UPP entered there were some problems, some confusion. Because people didn’t want to accept them, to get used to them, and it was complicated...

*Interviewer:* Confusion like what?

*Respondent:* Ah, it’s that they prohibited people from doing lots of things.

*Interviewer:* Like the parties?

*Respondent:* Yes that’s it. “Ah there’s a party in your house, the noise is too loud, you have to turn it off”, you understand? So it was like they arrived like that without knowing the rhythm of the community. [But] now it’s good.

However, while we might be able to identify differential impacts across time, space and a diverse resident population, the interviews and fieldwork also allowed for the identification of certain consistencies in the picture that emerged from the routinisation of the UPP, and the parameters it established for both police and trafficker action. In the remainder of this article I argue that what emerged can helpfully be understood as a ‘dual security assemblage’. This assemblage emerged from the efforts of both the UPP and the traffickers achieve their objectives while adapting to the unavoidable presence of the other.

The mutual accommodation of police and traffickers within this assemblage is largely forced upon them by the constraints both face. On one side, it is clear that Tuiuti’s traffickers would be unable to resist the UPP directly. On the other, despite their superior force, the police are unable to mobilise the resources or use the kinds of tactics that would be needed to have any chance of ejecting the traffickers from the territory. However, the stalemate is also made possible by the two sides’ respective strategic priorities. If traffickers are still able to profit from the drugs trade even in the presence of the UPP, past practices of visibly territorialising favela territory and engaging in open conflict with police may not be necessary. Similarly, if the primary aim of the UPP programme is to reduce the violence and visibility of the drug

trade, rather than eliminating it altogether, repressive action against suspected drug traffickers can be used sparingly. In fact, given the reputational risks to the programme of high profile conflicts or human rights abuses, light-touch policing may be the most rational approach for commanders to take. Taking into account this partial compatibility of the respective objectives of the UPP and traffickers in Tuiuti, pacification ceases to look like straightforward state repression, and more like a new set of parameters within which localised modes of coexistence could develop.

### *Becoming–police, becoming–bandidos*

This argument suggests that police and traffickers in Tuiuti tolerate one another reluctantly. However, respondents' accounts suggest that they were in fact able to benefit in more positive ways from one other's presence. A recurring complaint among residents, mentioned previously, is that petty forms of criminal activity unconnected to drug trafficking and almost unheard of prior to pacification had become increasingly common. Marize, 53, a lifelong resident who had raised her adult son in Tuiuti and had a large extended family in the area, described how she viewed the changes in security conditions:

Before, I was really in favour of the UPP coming here. God, for me it was a dream for them to come here. [...] I was in favour of them coming because I thought that lots of things were going to change. Even though it wasn't violent before, I thought it was going to improve. But I think it got worse. With the entry of the UPP the *dono* here left. He left and we ended up without law, you understand. So those other *bandidinhos*<sup>7</sup> started to cause lots of trouble. They started to rob. They started to smoke marijuana close to us. Sometimes the smell enters my house, you understand, and you can't complain.

She explained that a convicted criminal who was out on parole living back in Tuiuti was rumoured to have burgled the homes of several residents. However, although a group had gone to the UPP to complain they had been told that the police couldn't do anything due to

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<sup>7</sup> "*Bandido*", literally "bandit", is the term widely used to refer to drug traffickers and other career criminals. Marize refers to "*bandidinhos*", or little *bandidos*, to refer to petty criminals.

a lack of evidence. In light of this, she believed that overall pacification had *reduced*, rather than enhancing, the state of security in the area:

Today I'm... [here], my son is working, my husband is working, I won't leave the window open any more [...] because I'm scared. When it was the *bandidos* I left it open, because people are more scared of the *bandidos* than of the police here, you know. After the UPP arrived it became a mess, you understand.

While Marize saw this as the result of police weakness and incompetence, there is a straightforward explanation for why the police are less adept at dealing with such incidents. To detain a suspect the police require a minimal level of evidence of probable guilt. "Knowing" someone is guilty based on their character, track record and because rumours have circulated about their alleged activities is not sufficient. By contrast, trafficker justice, embedded as it is in local relationships and hierarchies of legitimacy (Arias and Rodrigues 2006; Penglase 2009), faces no such impediments or delays. Indeed, as Marize rightly observes, the fact that the ex-convict she described would be presumed guilty and punished efficiently under trafficker rule would probably act as a far greater deterrent than the unlikely prospect of him being investigated and charged by police.

Police are certainly aware of this security gap between the kind of order traffickers had been capable of imposing prior to pacification and of their own inability to do so. In this regard, and although it may seem paradoxical, the traffickers could in fact be of use to the UPP. Traffickers were no longer able to openly mete out summary justice with impunity as they had before, and appeared to be relying on softer means of retaining influence. One respondent explained that the presence of a former senior trafficker who had served a prison sentence and supposedly was no longer involved continued to act as a deterrent to potential petty criminals in the area:

They're still here, the people who used to be involved with the crime [ie. traffickers]. They still live here. We know who they are. The police also know who they are. But it's like this, those people have served their time and supposedly aren't involved any more... There's no way to prove it. So if they live here and don't owe anything, and they maintain a certain order...

because they're people that the rest of the young people respect... it helps to keep things ok, they help to improve things. For example, here we don't have any kind of problem. Because one of those people is a person who lives in a house right here opposite, who was the manager of the old *boca*, he lives opposite us. So like, if anyone does anything against us, he's the first to know, because he lives opposite. And so, who's going to do anything? Because even if he's not involved any more, he knows how to fight, right? [...] Because like, trouble on his doorstep is going to draw more attention to him. [Female, 38]

This account suggests that police can benefit from the continued presence of respected traffickers who are able to deter petty criminality in a way that the police themselves cannot. This would not require direct collusion. The police could merely seek to preserve this state of affairs by not actively pursuing such figures. In this way, although seemingly locked in an conflictual relationship, police and traffickers may have found that in fact their best course of action was to cooperate in preserving a state of relative calm in the area.

We are reminded here of Deleuze and Guattari's (1987: 11) discussion of the wasp and the orchid – two autonomous entities that incorporate one another into their respective reproductive processes. In Tuiuti's emergent dual security assemblage, there is a becoming–police of the *bandido*, and a becoming–*bandido* of the police. The *bandido* learns to play an auxiliary policing function and the police learn to acquiesce in certain forms of criminality. As the police became integrated within their new environment they embarked on a process of adaptation and learning, beginning to prioritise some objectives over others and working out the most effective ways of achieving these. The result was that although the UPP programme had been intended to reduce trafficker influence in favelas, in Tuiuti it ended up becoming dependent on it.

### *Hostages to both sides*

If Tuiuti's dual security assemblage allows both police and traffickers to achieve their baseline objectives, residents were clearly divided as to the benefits. Several interviewees saw pacification either as overly aggressive or, on the other hand, like Marize, to be too weak to have a positive impact. The majority, however, considered it to be a qualified improvement,

in particular highlighting that guns and drug-dealing were now far less visible and that they believed open conflict in the area to be less likely.

However, even these residents did not regard the UPP as having brought meaningful public security to Tuiuti and many described the difficulties of living under pacification. In particular, many found that constant mutual surveillance between police and traffickers, which made their coexistence within a dual security assemblage possible, brought new challenges and stresses for residents in their everyday circulations around the neighbourhood. When discussing her interactions with the police, Marize described how such surveillance played out:

I respect them. I say hello, greet them, you understand... But we can't have any interaction with them. We can't because of the *bandidos*. If a *bandido* sees us having a conversation they're going to think that we're... we can't. You can't offer them a cup of water. You can't offer... if you're having a barbecue... give them a little plate, you can't. Because they'll see us there and think that we're with the police.

Long before the UPPs, Alvito (2001: 106-109) described the surveillance regime surrounding favela residents as 'double panopticism'. While agents of the state would monitor favela residents in various ways outside the favela, traffickers would monitor them inside. Tuiuti after pacification could also be described as a regime of double panopticism, but one now playing out under claustrophobic spatial conditions. With police and traffickers both permanently present within the favela, residents must deal with the fact that both may be watching *at the same time*. In order to navigate such a context, residents must simultaneously maintain an awareness of the presence and behaviour of both police and traffickers in order to know what they can and can't do at different times and places. However, they must also feign ignorance of possessing this knowledge. In the post-pacification context, residents must simultaneously *see* and *not see* both police and traffickers. They must see both, so as to know what it is they are supposed not to have seen (Penglase, 2009).

This schizophrenic form of governmentality can take a heavy psychological toll and is further compounded by residents' uncertain knowledge of the exact relationship between the police



and the traffickers. While residents were obliged to accept the claims of both sides to being implacable enemies, even this could not be taken for granted. One resident explained:

It's got worse since the police entered, I think. That's my opinion. Why? Because the police... It's the police with the *bandidos*. Us citizens see them [the police] pass the *bandidos* and they can't do anything, and that, for me, is why it's got worse. [...] The situation has left us hostages to both sides.<sup>8</sup> [...] It was bad, but not as bad as now. Because before the *bandidos* had an order, there was someone in charge... unfortunately. There was someone in charge and unfortunately you had to submit to the order of that person. Then it's like the police arrive and you think that order will end, and you'll be free, but it's not like that. There's the domain of the police, there's the domain of the *bandidos*, and we don't know who... [...] We're hostages to both sides. Because we know we can't trust in the *bandidos*, clearly, but we also can't trust the police. [...] We don't know if you speak to the police if they're going to deliver you to the *bandidos*. We don't trust them. We don't have that trust. [Female, 40]

Clearly then, some perceive Tuiuti's dual security assemblage as having further undermined both their freedom and their security. While opinion varied regarding the relative merits of pacification, all respondents agreed it was not the kind of security they had hoped for.

### **Conclusion: Rio de Janeiro's insecurity machine**

The case of Tuiuti's UPP offers important insights into how (in)security is assembled in urban space, particularly in marginalised spaces in Latin America. As outlined above, in such environments, the lack of a state monopoly on violence tends to produce hybrid formations that require the continual (re)negotiation of the terms of coexistence between state and non-state actors. The example presented here supports the argument that policing programmes aimed at strengthening state control in such spaces cannot be understood based the assumption that the state is either monolithic or independent of what it seeks to govern. Rather, the way such programmes materialise is inevitably an emergent outcome of

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<sup>8</sup> In Portuguese, "reféns dos dois lados".

interactions between diverse state and non-state actors, each driven by distinct objectives and evolving strategies for achieving these.

For Tuiuti's UPP, the primary objectives were to achieve a degree of territorial control, reduce violence and push drugs and arms trafficking underground, within the constraints of what budgetary and legal constraints would allow. Local traffickers, meanwhile, sought to continue profiting from the drugs trade and, as a means to this end, retain their influence over Tuiuti's residents. Although very different and potentially at odds with one another, in practice these objectives proved to be relatively compatible, provided certain terms of coexistence could be established. This appears, ultimately, to have given rise to an implicit division of labour between police and traffickers, which at the same time blurred the boundaries between them. This dual security assemblage could not have been known in advance – it was the product of real subjects making decisions in response to conditions that were changing in real time. These actors entered into a process of negotiation and mutual becoming imposed upon them by their enforced spatial coexistence and the constraints to action that each faced.

However, a larger question arises from this. 'Assemblage', as mobilised here, denotes not only the situated "coming together" of heterogeneous actors into new arrangements, it is also a way of thinking about *what kinds* of "coming together" are possible, of whether and how these can be sustained, and of what consequences they have for the different actors bound up in them. In Deleuzoguattarian terms, we must ask: what kind of *machine* could produce such an assemblage? What constraints and which "principles of inclusion and exclusion" (Buchanan, 2017) characterise it? This is clearly very different to asking which abstract or "underlying" logic can account for the form, and transformations, of the assemblage. The ontological imaginary at play is not one of determinations, but rather of degrees of freedom. Specific urban assemblages are not variations around a prototype produced by the same dominant/underlying process, but unique actualisations that emerge contingently within what virtual constraints may allow.

This doesn't mean that assemblage thinking cannot make use of explanatory tools that transcend the specific site and actors contained within it – a limitation that critics and even some advocates of assemblage thinking wrongly attribute to it. It simply means that it uses these tools with the assumption that while they may be necessary, they are very unlikely to

be sufficient causes. There are always relations of exteriority between the factors that shape a given assemblage, so that even in those rare cases when one factor appears to override all others, the possibility remains that autonomous forces capable of fundamentally altering the logic of the assemblage will emerge. So, for example, we should not ask how the UPP programme reflects the ideology, strategies and impacts of a “neoliberal” policing prototype. Instead, we ask what pressures and constraints the set of political priorities and governance technologies that we associate with neoliberalism place on those actors able to influence the resulting security assemblages. By the time such top-down infusions of energy have worked their way through different hierarchies, relationships and negotiation processes necessary for them to be actualised, the “neoliberal” elements may have become so diluted as to leave the concept with little explanatory power – even with the “actually existing” qualifier attached (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

Read in this way, any notion that an assemblage approach must imply a depoliticised or merely descriptive account of pacification couldn’t be further from the truth. Tuiuti’s dual security assemblage is clearly riven with tensions and inequalities “*all the way down*”. Even as local accommodations between police and traffickers preserved a degree of stability in the neighbourhood, these came at the cost of new forms of anxiety experienced by many residents. At the same time, they fit within, rather than challenging, the long-established terms of a broader political conversation that scapegoats favelas and their residents for urban insecurity and legitimates special measures for repressing them. Even if the way pacification actualised bore little resemblance to the best laid plans of the politicians and bureaucrats who designed it, it still reterritorialised within limits set by the larger machine. To paraphrase Lampedusa: the UPPs could change, as long as everything else remained the same.

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Figure 1  
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Figure 2  
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