Rio de Janeiro's favela assemblage: Accounting for the durability of an unstable object

Journal:	*Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*
Manuscript ID	EPD-2016-0152.R2
Manuscript Type:	Article
Keywords:	assemblage, favela, informality, inequality, critical theory, urban theory

Rio de Janeiro's favela assemblage: Accounting for the durability of an unstable object

Assemblage thinking offers a new conceptual toolkit for analysing the relationship between society and space. However, major questions remain regarding both its ontological propositions and how it might be applied to the analysis of specific socio-spatial objects. This article contributes to these debates by using assemblage thinking to trace the long-term development of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. These territories have undergone a range of seemingly contradictory changes over recent decades. On one hand, expanded infrastructure and service provision and improved social outcomes have meant favelas have moved closer to, and in some cases surpassed, areas officially designated as "formal". On the other, they continue to be heavily stigmatised, targeted by exceptional forms of governance, and subject to militarisation and abuse by police and non-state armed groups. Tracing these developments over time, I argue that the favela is best understood as an assemblage of heterogeneous, interacting elements that operate according to diverse logics. Despite continual pressures to deterritorialise, or break apart, a density of components and relations has ensured the continual reterritorialisation of the "favela" as a distinct object of perception and action over more than a century, with far reaching consequences for residents and the wider city.

Keywords: assemblage, favela, informality, inequality, segregation

'Assemblage', a concept originally derived from the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) has belatedly entered the geographical lexicon in recent years (eg. McFarlane 2011, Anderson et al. 2012). Evoking an imaginary of complex interactions between heterogeneous elements and across scales that leads to the emergence of contingent socio-spatial configurations, 'assemblage thinking' offers a new vocabulary and theoretical toolkit for analysing the relationship between society and space. Indeed, some see it as holding the potential to revolutionise spatial theory by widening the cast of actors (including non-human actors) understood as contributing to socio-spatial transformations, complexifying understandings of the relationship between economic and extra-economic processes, and opening up new ways of imagining future urban politics (McFarlane, 2011).

However, a range of questions remain. The ontological propositions of assemblage thinking have been challenged for their alleged inability to penetrate surface appearances and separate out the "necessary" and "contingent" factors that drive socio-spatial change (eg. Brenner et al., 2011; Storper and Scott, 2016). Even among those who use the term, there is, as yet, little agreement regarding whether a coherent 'assemblage theory' does (or should) exist and, if so, of what might be its central propositions (DeLanda, 2006; Buchanan, 2015; Nail, 2017). And even to the extent that assemblage thinking may be understood to constitute a collective theoretical undertaking among its proponents in geography and urban studies, there seems to be very little consensus about what objects of analysis assemblage thinking can most effectively capture and at which scales.

Much work to date has focussed on relatively small-scale objects and/or approached them from the perspective of the everyday, whether this be urban street markets (Simone, 2011), construction practices in informal settlements (Dovey, 2012) or the tactics and circulations of homeless populations (Lancione, 2016). Such analyses are commendable in their commitment to 'thick description', illuminating in the way they draw attention to multiple agencies and processes of "coming together", and provocative in their claims that emergent properties at the micro-level can scale up to produce change at higher levels. On the other hand, by focussing on the small-scale/everyday they remain vulnerable to critiques that would assign such assemblages epiphenomenal status in relation to causally preeminent factors presumed to operate at higher spatial scales and/or according to an "underlying" (usually economic) logic (Brenner et al. 2011; Storper and Scott 2016).

By contrast, this article contributes to these debates by mobilising 'assemblage' to analyse the long-term trajectory of a relatively large and durable *object*: the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. In recent decades, these territories – which house some 1.5 million people, close to a quarter of the city's population (IBGE, 2010) – have undergone a range of dramatic and seemingly contradictory changes. The incomes and consumption of Rio's favela residents have grown markedly and there have been notable improvements in health and education outcomes (Perlman, 2010a). Once

lacking in the most basic of infrastructure and services, many favelas are now highly consolidated and served by a wide range of public interventions. In these respects, the "favelas" have collectively moved closer to and in many cases surpassed physical and socio-economic conditions in territories officially designated as "formal" (Neri, 2010). At the same time, however, other trends have tended to reproduce, and in some cases even intensify, their social and spatial marginalisation. Favelas remain subject to militarisation and abuse by heavily armed drug traffickers, militias and police to a far greater extent than other urban territories (Machado da Silva, 2010). Meanwhile, the state continues to act in *exceptional* ways in favela territories, frequently bypassing procedural norms and failing to sustain planned policy interventions (McCann, 2014; Fischer, 2014).[1]

Analysing the long-term development of this 'urban assemblage' reveals the influence of different actors, relations and logics, both internal to and beyond the favelas, and the way they have varied over time and across space. These processes have driven trends of both 'deterriorialisation' – weakening the categorical and territorial distinctiveness of the favelas as a socio-spatial entity, and the consequences of their separation – but also of 'reterritorialisation' that serves to reinforce these effects. The overall result has been the preservation of the favela as a distinct object of perception and of action over more than a century, even as these areas and the wider city have undergone continual, complex, and interdependent processes of transformation. I argue for understanding this *durability* of the favela assemblage using the notion of 'viscosity', as a density of elements and relations that sustains an overarching form despite continual transformations of its content. Drawing links with critical political economy approaches, I shall argue that capital continually *flows through* the favela assemblage, and its relationships with the wider city and with the state, without *determining* these relationships or the outcomes they produce. As such, I suggest using assemblage thinking to analyse this kind of

[1] Indeed, the national census (IBGE, 2010) refers to favelas – where close to a quarter of Rio's population lives – as 'subnormal agglomerations'. These are defined as, "collections of at least 51 housing units, most of which lack essential public services, which occupy or have until recently occupied publicly or privately owned land, and are characterised by disordered and dense occupation".

object can build upon the crucial insights of critical political economy without reproducing the unhelpful distinction between "underlying" causal and contingent "surface" phenomena.

2. Assemblage thinking and cities

2.1 What are assemblages?

At the most basic level, assemblage simply denotes "the "holding together" of heterogeneous elements" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 323). However, the varied ways in which Deleuze and Guattari invoke the concept at different points has left some doubt regarding how they saw assemblages as emerging, transforming and disbanding over time. For example, the symbiotic evolution of the wasp and the orchid through a mutual "capture of code" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 11), appears to occur contingently and without external impulse in a process analogous to the notion of 'entrainment' in complexity theory (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 404). By contrast, the 'man-horse-bow' assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977), formed by the 'nomadic war machine' of the Asian Steppe, suggest assemblages are over-determined responses to structuring external conditions. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari: "there are always machines that precede tools, always phyla that determine at a given moment which tools, which men will enter as machine components in the social system being considered" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977: 119). This distinction underpins some recent "discontent" (Buchanan, 2015) regarding DeLanda's (2006; 2016) efforts to establish a formalised post-Deleuzoguattarian 'assemblage theory'. These debates also have important implications for thinking about the importance of scale, power and capital in in the formation of socio-spatial assemblages, and links to recent debates in urban theory (see below).[2]

[2] Further complicating the picture is the growing popularity of another theoretical tradition with which assemblage thinking shares several aspects: actor-network theory (ANT). Both proponents (eg. Farías, 2011) and critics (eg. Brenner et al., 2011) of ANT have tended to conflate it with assemblage thinking, despite there being important differences between between it and the Deleuzoguattarian tradition (see Müller and Schurr, 2016). The discussion here sticks firmly to the latter.

Given the disagreements about the precise way in which Deleuze and Guattari intended assemblage to be used and how best to proceed with the concept today, it may be more helpful to use the term 'assemblage thinking', denoting a set of core insights and analytical orientations, as opposed to a formal 'assemblage theory' that would need to be adopted in its entirety. Though far from exhaustive, I will identify three core features of assemblage thinking that I think those who use the term would largely agree upon and which will form the foundation of the analysis to follow. These are: (1) 'relations of exteriority'; (2) anti-essentialism; and (3) the notions of (de/re)territorialisation.

DeLanda (2006) helpfully pins down Deleuze and Guattari's *machinic* – as opposed to *organismic* – vision of society as being constituted by 'relations of exteriority'. Organismic metaphors, characteristic of functionalism, and in a different way the notion of 'totality', derived from Hegel and central to Marxian theory, rest on an imaginary of 'relations of interiority', that postulates the social world as "a seamless web of reciprocal action, or as an integrated totality of functional interdependencies, or as a block of unlimited universal interconnections" (DeLanda, 2006: 19). DeLanda argues that such 'macro-reductionism', denies the possibility of emergence, because if the "role" of a part within the functioning of a whole is determined *a priori*, it cannot be seen to possess the capacity for generative interaction with other entities. By contrast, a component of a machine, depending on the capacities it possesses, may be detached and reconnected to other machines. In this process, although the meaning of the *part* is transformed, it preserves its own autonomy and its potential for at some point becoming part of different assemblage (Nail, 2017: 23). This does not mean that processes of integration between multiple entities may not occur in assemblages, even to the extent that individual parts lose most of their independence. However, even in these cases the relations between them must be seen as, "not *logically necessary* but only *contingently obligatory*: the historical result of their close coevolution" (DeLanda, 2006: 11-12).

A second key feature of assemblage thinking is its opposition to 'essentialism' (Nail, 2017: 23-24; DeLanda, 2006: 26-47). Aristotelian 'taxonomic essentialism' proposed a three-level ontological hierarchy of the genus, the species and the individual, each of which constituted a kind of universal template (DeLanda, 2006: 26-29). Any given entity, at any of these levels, could be regarded as possessing an 'essence', or particular set of distinguishing characteristics that marked it out as unique. By implication any internal diversity within a group would be understood as random variation around a central prototype. This understanding is belied by evolutionary theory, however. Species do not have timeless essences, but are instead assemblages of components that have been temporarily stabilised through reproductive isolation and are still liable to change through the mechanisms of genetic mutation and natural selection. This means that not only are they constantly undergoing 'morphogenetic' transformation, but that this process integrates both the constraints imposed by inheritance *and* the often highly contingent influences of the environment and the other entities with which it interacts (as in the example of the wasp and the orchid). As such, a species should be seen as "an *individual entity*, as unique and singular as the organisms that compose it, but larger in spatio-temporal scale" (DeLanda, 2006: 27). Unlike taxonomic essentialism then, "the ontology of assemblages is flat since it contains nothing but differently scaled *individual singularities*" (*ibid.*: 28).

Leading on from this, a third key feature of assemblages are the processes of territorialisation–deterritorialisation–reterritorialisation through which they emerge, hold together, transform and, potentially, decompose. The initial 'territorialisation' of assemblages establishes them as relatively stable formations, whose structure is reinforced by its internal and external relationships (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 508-510). These assemblages will exhibit perpetual 'deterritorialising' tendencies (also called 'lines of flight'), whereby elements of the assemblage seek to break away. However, these will typically be 'reterritorialised' by the overriding force of the assemblage, through the power relations and the self-perpetuating routines it contains. These competing tendencies produce feedback loops whereby change continues but without allowing the assemblage to decisively break apart. This only

occurs in cases of 'absolute deterritorialisation', when deterritorialising tendencies ultimately overwhelm the reterritorialising ones. As Deleuze and Guattari note, it is the varied and complex dynamics of specific assemblages that determine their durability:

> There are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage. (3-4)

This is important as it highlights the fact that, despite its emphasis on process, transformation and becoming, assemblage thinking is also capable of accounting for the *persistence* of particular social formations. In this regard, their term 'viscosity' is particularly useful. Saldanha (2012: 18) has offered an evocative description of how this concept might be understood:

> To evoke the continuous but constrained dynamism of space, I want to propose the figure of viscosity. Neither perfectly fluid nor solid, the viscous invokes surface tension and resistance to perturbation and mixing. Viscosity means that the physical characteristics of a substance explain its unique movements. There are local and temporary thickenings of interacting bodies, which then collectively become sticky, capable of capturing more bodies like them: an emergent slime mold. Under certain circumstances, the collectivity dissolves, the constituent bodies flowing freely again. The world is an immense mass of viscosities, becoming thicker here, and thinner there.

This idea will be taken up later to account for the durability of Rio de Janeiro's favelas as a socio-spatial assemblage.

2.2 Assemblage and critical urban theory

While assemblage thinking has been taken up enthusiastically in geography and urban studies in recent years, it has also been met with resistance in some quarters. For example, in their instructive exchange, Brenner et al. (2011) rejected McFarlane's (2011) suggestion that assemblage thinking could help to renew and

extend the project of critical urban theory. Brenner et al. argue that an 'ontological' (as opposed to 'empirical' or 'methodological') use of assemblage is incapable of accounting for the systemic dynamics of spatial development under capitalism. Specifically, they claim that its inability to offer, "mediation or at least animation through theoretical assumptions and interpretive schemata" means that the approach inevitably descends into a form of 'naïve objectivism' in which it is impossible to distinguish between the trivial and important elements and processes that make up a given assemblage (Brenner et al., 2011: 233). Instead, they argue that the method of critique, derived from the Frankfurt School and ultimately Marxian dialectics, is best equipped to penetrate surface appearances and access the inner workings of social relations and the production of space under capitalism. This underlying logic provides the 'context of contexts' in which the formation of empirical assemblages takes place.

Clearly, this critique highlights a crucial point: that the emphasis assemblage thinking places on materiality and often highly contingent interactions between diverse actors can risk losing sight of aspects of social organisation – like capital accumulation and class struggle (or, indeed, hegemonic gender roles, power-laden racial stereotypes and so on) – that exhibit systemic logics and thus transcend specific empirical contexts. On the other hand, such analyses, and the approach defended by Brenner et al. (2011), appear, effectively, to conform to the description of 'relations of interiority' provided by DeLanda. As such, they do not offer a response to what is perhaps the principal critique assemblage thinking makes of dialectical models. Furthermore, it is precisely the attribution of empirical phenomena – understood (and therefore easily dismissed) as "surface manifestations" – to a dominant underlying logic that assemblage thinking seeks to avoid. Even the 'empirical' use of assemblage that Brenner et al. (2011) condone, which would reduce it to representing temporary stabilisations of arrangements in which capital(ism) is always the primary "animating" force, precludes us from pursuing this line of thinking. Instead, it seems that other approaches are needed that can allow us to explore potential of assemblage thinking for reimagining relationships between diverse actors and logics on more equal and 'distributed'

terms, while still keeping in view the importance of capital (as well as other powerful structuring forces). I shall return to this question in the conclusion.

3. The territorialisation of the favela

In the case of Rio de Janeiro's favela assemblage, economic and extra-economic logics appear to have been wrapped up in processes of territorialisation (and as I shall outline below, de/reterritorialisation) since the very beginning. At the time that the favela was "invented" (Valladares, 2005) as a distinct socio-spatial category at the end of the nineteenth century, there were certainly novel socio-economic processes driving the proliferation of self-built housing on the hillsides of Rio's historic city centre – among these the recent abolition of slavery, rising migration, and embryonic industrialisation. However, as Fischer (2014) points out, collections of shacks inhabited by the landless poor had long existed in and around the city. In fact, the popularisation both of the term "favela" and the belief that it designated a distinct "category of urban pathology" (Fischer, 2014: 13-14) were as much the result of changing elite perceptions produced by "Brazil's integration into international debates about poverty, sanitation, racial degeneracy and urbanism" (*Ibid.*). That is to say, the initial *emergence* of the favela assemblage owed as much to the positivist ideology, cultural pretensions, and symbolic and racial prejudices of the leaders of Brazil's nascent Republic as it did to changing economic realities.

Perverse social and institutional relations were also inseparably bound up with favela growth. Notwithstanding their horror at the sight of the favelas, the contradictory interests of Rio de Janeiro's elite would help to fuel their dramatic growth during the first decades of the twentieth century. First the Republican state focussed its destructive energies on the squalid *cortiços* (slum tenements) of the city centre without offering any alternative housing options for the poor, thus driving them to settle the vacant hillsides in and around the old city (Valladares, 2005). Initially ignored by the authorities, growing concern about these settlements led to intensified removal efforts by the 1920s and 30s (Fischer, 2008). However, by this point many elites had become deeply implicated in favela urbanisation through the clientelist networks and rentier practices they cultivated within these territories.

Standing to benefit from their survival, wealthy patrons offered political and legal protection to favelas on an individual basis meaning that they tended to avoid removal even as the state remained hostile to their existence (*ibid.*: 61-62). Consequently, the favelas would persist but in a state of legal limbo where they would never gain the status of legitimate neighbourhoods.

It was not only perverse social and institutional relations, but also the city's physical geography itself, that was intermingled in this emergent assemblage. The hillsides, floodplains and degraded industrial areas where favelas were established usually had little real estate value and were therefore easier for both the authorities and land speculators to overlook. They also merged neatly with the economic interests and social norms of the elite, by providing a local labour force while simultaneously preserving social segregation. At the same time, these territories often had ambiguous ownership status, making it difficult for proponents of removal to establish firm legal grounds and rally and sustain political support for clearing (Fischer, 2008: 222).

Another factor we should note as contributing to the territorialisation of the favela is race and the racialisation of different bodies in the city. Analysing historical patterns of residential segregation in Brazil is notoriously complex (see Telles, 2004: 17-19). This is not simply to do with major issues concerning historical data on race, but also the fact that race itself in Brazil might helpfully be understood as a complex assemblage, given widespread miscegenation and the way patterns of racialisation and racism vary across space and different social contexts (Telles, 2004). Nonetheless, evidence suggests that early favela settlements were dominated by afro-Brazilians from Rio and its rural hinterland in the years following the abolition of slavery (McCann, 2014: 689). These origins and an enduring association in the elite (and to a lesser extent popular) imagination between blackness, poverty and informality, seem to have established a widespread perception of favelas as spaces of blackness. While favela residents do remain disproportionately likely to black or brown (Zaluar, 2010: 12), today a large proportion of Rio's black population live outside of favelas, and the favelas themselves have become more racially and

culturally diverse over time with inward migration particularly from the northeast of the country (McCann, 2014: 648-700). Both concrete processes of social/racial segregation and the symbolic flattening of complex racial geographies should thus be understood as forces that (re)territorialise the favela assemblage.

The combination of legal exclusion, physical precarity and racial stigmatisation all contributed to the consolidation of the favela as a *residual* category within the city's socio-spatial hierarchy. This can be demonstrated through comparison with other forms of low-income housing. Between the 1930s and 1960s successive governments expanded social housing provision in Rio de Janeiro (see Burgos, 1998). However, new *conjuntos habitacionais* (housing projects) overwhelmingly catered to a favoured minority of the city's poor who were employed in the public sector or key industries. Meanwhile, the self-built *loteamentos* (land subdivisions) that from the 1950s onwards grew rapidly at the urban periphery also contained a small but significant barrier to access via the requirement of regular mortgage payments that would, in theory, eventually bestow a land title (do Lago, 2003). Such settlements were often isolated, precarious, lacking basic infrastructure, and faced their own legal obstacles to land titling. However, on the whole they usually suffered from lower levels of social and legal exclusion than the favelas (Perlman, 2010a: 31-35).

All of this meant that by the mid-twentieth century, the favelas possessed a range of distinctive properties that were dominant (if not necessarily ubiquitous) within the category and far less prevalent outside of it, and which collectively served to reterritorialise them as a socio-spatial assemblage. These properties can be listed as: (1) makeshift housing in dense and irregular settlement patterns, located in precarious environments (especially hillsides); (2) a complete absence of infrastructure and services formally provided by the state; (3) formal legal *exclusion* combined with personalistic social and political *inclusion*; (4) a majority black population and symbolic construction as spaces of blackness; (5) the status of *residual category* within Rio de Janeiro's socio-spatial hierarchy. However, subsequent developments would show these properties to be almost entirely contingent, rather than *necessary*, components of the favela assemblage.

4. Deterritorialisations: The fraying physical and social boundaries of the favela assemblage

a) Material–symbolic transformations

If at mid-century the favelas were typified by their location on hillsides and other precarious environments, makeshift housing, and the visible absence of public infrastructure, this material-symbolic component of the favela assemblage would undergo a radical process of *deterritorialisation* over subsequent decades. After decades of systemic inertia in the face of the "favela problem", rising tensions generated by the collision of favela and middle-class urbanisation processes in the 1950s and 60s united elite opinion behind an aggressive policy of mass favela removal (see Brum, 2012). The policy failed miserably in its aim of ridding the city – and even central and wealthy areas – of their favelas (Brum, 2012), but it did have the unintended consequence of considerably weakening the link between the urban poor and makeshift, self-constructed housing. The resettlement of evicted *favelados* in sprawling territories of poorly built and subsequently abandoned *conjuntos habitacionais* at the urban periphery helped to ensure that the favela lost its status as Rio's residual category of urban poverty. At the same time, it contributed to the emergence of hybrid formations that complexified the notion of what exactly it was that constituted a favela.

As Brum (2012) has carefully reconstructed, processes of "favelisation" occurred within many of these *conjuntos habitacionais* in the decades following their construction. In Cidade Alta, in Rio's North Zone, the inflexible design of the apartment blocks could not accommodate growing families or the entrepreneurial activities that had animated favela life. This led many residents to construct informal extensions and shop fronts on their apartments, giving them the *ad hoc* appearance traditionally associated with favelas. Meanwhile, the onerous requirement for meeting monthly mortgage payments and market demand from outside of the original population led to the both the emergence of a black market in apartment sales and sub-letting as well as the establishment of entirely new favelas in the surrounding area. By contrast, in some blocks residents managed to organise

collectively to prevent informal construction and preserve the integrity of the original buildings and public spaces.

These diverse processes have produced a scenario in which different observers categorise these micro-territories in different ways (Brum 2012). Neither the better preserved nor the "favelised" apartment blocks are officially considered by the state to be favelas. However, Cidade Alta, like other *conjuntos habitacionais* built to house evicted *favelados*, is regarded as such by many outsiders, suggesting they have carried the stigma of the favela with them. Residents themselves, meanwhile, express ambiguity, exaggerating micro-territorial distinctions and invoking hegemonic constructions of what constitutes a "favela", in which the aesthetic appearance of a neighbourhoods is presumed to reflect the social condition of its residents, despite being a very poor indicator of this (see also [redacted]).

At the same time that many *conjuntos habitacionais* were undergoing processes of favelisation, the favela assemblage also underwent deterritorialisation from within through transformations that reduced homogeneity between settlements more clearly belonging within the favela category. Most of the new favelas that appeared during this period were built on flat land at the urban periphery, rather than inner-city hillsides. The emergence of both new social movements and new forms of political clientelism that accompanied Brazil's redemocratisation during the 1980s meant that these areas tended to benefit from more centralised co-ordination than had older favelas (do Lago, 2003). As a result, these 'favela-*loteamentos*', as do Lago (2003) describes them, tended to exhibit a radically different morphological form, with more orderly street patterns and important infrastructure components like drainage and water systems often built in from the start. Although still characterised by legal exclusion and neglect by the state – indeed, usually more so than more centrally-located favelas – they were thus able to avert some major infrastructural challenges. Residents of many of these favela-*loteamentos* refer to them as "*vilas*" (workers' quarters) or even "*condomínios*" (condominiums), both to register their aesthetic distinctiveness and to distance themselves from the entrenched stigma

associated with the favela ([redacted]).

During the same period, older favelas also experienced important physical transformations. The return of democratic politics to Rio de Janeiro came in the form of the populist State Governor Leonel Brizola and a radical urban reform agenda, including favela upgrading projects and an ambitious land regularisation programme (McCann, 2014). While the latter largely failed in its aims (see below), the general climate surrounding redemocratisation seemed to signal a broad shift in policy towards favelas, now prioritising on-site upgrading over removal. This greater sense of security fuelled a construction boom as favela residents began to invest in upgrading their homes, rebuilding them with bricks and adding additional floors and aesthetic embellishments (Cavalcanti, 2008).

The following decade saw a deepening of these processes of physical consolidation via the larger and more comprehensive *Favela Bairro* ('Favela Neighbourhoood') urban upgrading programme (Burgos, 1998). This brought paved streets, street lighting, landslide defences, recreational areas, and various social services into a large portion of the city's favelas. It is important to note that after upgrading these areas did not cease to be "favelas" in either official or popular discourse. However, they were left more consolidated and better serviced than many peripheral *loteamentos* and *conjuntos habitacionais*, thus challenging both the favela's status as a residual socio-spatial category and its association with state absence.

b) Social-economic diversification and the end of favela residualism

Alongside these material–symbolic transformations, the favela assemblage has also been deterritorialised by socio-economic diversification within and between favelas, and by trends towards convergence with non-favela areas on a range of social indicators. This appears to result from long-term shifts in favela residents' insertion into the urban economy along with new patterns of residential mobility. As was pointed out by Preteceille and Valladares (1999), already in the late 1990s favelas had ceased to be "a locus of poverty" in the city with a majority of Rio's urban poor

living in other kinds of settlement.[3] Subsequently, Neri et al. (2010) suggest that a long-term process of convergence in poverty levels is underway, with poverty falling in favelas and rising in non-favela areas.

Income data tell a similar story. National-level data show that between 2003 and 2013 average incomes rose by 38%, while for the favela population it was 55% (Meirelles and Athayde, 2014). This was primarily the result of rising levels of formal employment – which it found was now the condition of more than half of working-age favela residents (*ibid.*: 53-61). These trends led the authors to the highly dubious claim that 65% of favela residents had become "middle class" (*Ibid*.: 30), using an income-based definition that not only excludes other important aspects of social class (Scalon and Salata, 2012), but also makes the claim highly sensitive to cyclical economic trends. Nonetheless, deeper changes to the educational and occupational structure in favelas suggest that the end of favela residualism at least, if not the absolute upward mobility of large numbers of favela residents, is likely to be an irreversible process (Perlman 2010a).

Part of the explanation for this concerns endogenous socio-economic change within the existing favela population, primarily due to geographic variations in labour market conditions. For example, favela residents in the wealthy South Zone tend to earn significantly more than their counterparts in the poorer North and West Zones (Pero et al., 2005). However, there is evidence that the progressive marketisation of favela housing may be also acting as a sorting mechanism, leading some higher-earning groups coming from both within and from outside the informal housing sector to relocate to favelas with more favourable conditions.

Again, this relates to changes associated with the redemocratisation process. The enshrinement of substantial squatters' rights in the 1988 Constitution and the creation of a new layer of intermediate legal tools during the 1990s – such as '*Habite-se*' documents that certify the structural integrity of favela homes – instilled greater confidence, and have led to rising property sales and the emergence of a

[3] They found when using education and income measures that favela residents mainly fell into decile bands below the city average, but that they didn't form the majority in any of these and that some twelve per cent were above the average.

vibrant rental sector (Perlman, 2010b). As a result, Abramo (2003) suggests that the favela housing market came to resemble a "single market" across the city, with house prices varying according to factors like location, infrastructure, and levels of violence. At the height of the house-price boom of the late 2000s, the difference between the cost of the average home in Vidigal, the most expensive favela, and a typical peripheral favela was as much as ten-to-one (Perlman, 2010b: 16).

These processes certainly should not be exaggerated. The lack of land titles in most favelas, the informal and highly localised channels through which sale and rental opportunities typically circulate, and continuing stigma and security concerns all still represent substantial barriers to entry to the favela housing market (Abramo, 2003; Perlman 2010b). Recent examples of "favela gentrification", for example, are limited to a very small number of favelas where specific conditions prevail. Nonetheless, between the endogenous transformation of the social structure within favelas and intensified spatial sorting between them and to a lesser extent from outside, it is clear that favelas have ceased to occupy their former residual position. In terms of social structure, then, the favela assemblage has undergone extensive deterritorialisation meaning that the formal–informal divide no longer neatly maps on to patterns of socio-economic inequality in the city.

5. Reterritorialisations: Exceptional governance, durable borders

a) Violence and urban fragmentation

It has so far been argued that over recent decades Rio's favela assemblage has been substantially deterritorialised through internal diversification and the blurring of the boundaries – both material–symbolic and socio-economic – that had previously distinguished it from other types of neighbourhood. However, this clearly has not resulted in a waning of the favela as an object of reference, identification and various forms of action. This section argues that, indeed, just as it was experiencing those processes of deterritorialisation, it was *reterritorialising* along other lines.

The process by which urban militarisation and spiralling violence came to be organised around Rio de Janeiro's formal–informal divide has been extensively

covered in the literature (eg. Lopes de Souza, 2000; Gay, 2010) and so requires only a brief recap here. From the early 1980s onwards Rio de Janeiro became integrated into the emerging global cocaine trade, first as a transit point and later as a major market in its own right. Part of this process resembled the experience of other major cities, in that the more lucrative *wholesale* stage was controlled by shadowy figures financing and co-ordinating international supply chains, while a part of the *retail* stage was carried out by small dealers operating in the night-time economy with little attendant violence. However, another part of the retail market took on rather distinct dynamics, becoming highly territorial, extremely violent and almost exclusively focussed on the city's favelas.

There were various reasons why the drug trafficking factions that emerged from this context came to base their operations in favelas. Not least among these was the favelas' geography and morphology. Many were favourably located near to key transit points, like the city port, train stations, and major highways, as well as the prime consumer markets of the wealthy South Zone (Gay, 2010: 206-07). Meanwhile their narrow streets and complex layouts facilitated the discrete storage of drugs and arms, and the ability for gangs to defend territory from rivals and evade capture by police (*ibid.*). Social conditions also contributed, as poverty and high levels of unemployment among young men in favelas provided a steady flow of recruits for the gangs. Each of these factors suggests that the rise of the drug trade acted as an 'assemblage converter' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 324-25) for the favelas, by taking existing, contingent features of their structure and injecting them with new, emergent content.

Another important contributing factor, also fitting such an interpretation, was the somewhat distinctive pattern of sociability in favelas, which combined high levels of internal social cohesion with intense suspicion of the police – both legacies of the historic failure of the state to provide for and protect favela populations. These dynamics combined with the traffickers' capacity for violence, persuaded residents to observe the so-called "*lei do morro*" ("law of the hill") by turning a blind eye to illegal activities (see Penglase, 2009). In exchange for this, the traffickers, who

typically hailed from the same favelas and were themselves embedded in local social networks, maintained security in the neighbourhood by outlawing petty crime and violence committed by non-traffickers. Although broadly beneficial to the maintenance of local order within favelas, this came at a high cost as residents became vulnerable to abuses by the traffickers themselves. At the same time, the onus on controlling territory frequently turned many favelas into battle zones between rival gangs. Military-style policing by the state intensified in response, treating favelas as enemy territories where the human rights of residents could be disregarded with effective impunity (Machado da Silva, 2010; Gay, 2010).

This account suggests that favela militarisation was largely the result of dynamics within the favelas themselves (notwithstanding the market demand for cocaine coming from outside). However, these developments must be placed in the context of socio-spatial transformations occurring on a larger scale. Over the same period, elite neighbourhoods were also being fortified with walls, CCTV cameras and private security, while urban areas that were controlled by no hegemonic armed group came to be seen as insecure "neutral territories" to be avoided after dark (Lopes de Souza, 2000). These interlinked, centrifugal processes were linked to a more general transformation of social relations as an increasing sense of insecurity fuelled what Machado da Silva (2010) describes as a 'violent sociability', characterised by an individualisation of demands for security and a greater willingness to condone extra-legal means of attaining it. It was within this context that, encouraged by sensationalistic media portrayals, favelas became a kind of universal scapegoat for rising violence in the city and the police were handed increasing powers for repressing them (Machado da Silva, 2010).

This scenario of favelas as exceptional territories within a fragmenting urban landscape also gave rise to two further important developments from the 2000s onwards, both of which have tended to reinforce favela territorialisation and exceptionalism in new ways. The first of these was the emergence of so-called "militias", primarily in favelas in the city's western periphery (see Zaluar and

Conceição, 2007).[4] Mainly consisting of off-duty police officers, these groups arose to prevent the emergence of drug trafficking and violent conflict that had become endemic elsewhere in the city. However, many have subsequently morphed into large, organisationally sophisticated and heavily armed mafias, running lucrative protection rackets and exercising monopoly control over local utilities and services. While their activities tend to be accompanied by lower levels of physical violence than is found in areas controlled by drug traffickers, they share with them the ability to operate in favelas with impunity.

The second major shift began in 2008 as Rio de Janeiro's military police began a steadily expanding programme of favela 'pacification' (Cano, 2012). In stark contrast to the hitherto dominant model of favela policing, based on mobile and frequently bloody capture-and-kill operations, *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (Police Pacification Units, *UPPs*) were designed to establish a permanent presence in favelas and build relationships and trust with local organisations and residents. While the programme had some initial success in reducing violence, it did so in ways that strongly reinforced favela exceptionalism. UPPs militarised territory in much the same way as drug traffickers, reterritorialising favela borders through patrolling and surveillance (Fleury, 2012). While open conflict between police and traffickers in pacified favelas declined – despite traffickers continuing to operate in these areas – high-profile cases of abuse against residents indicated that police could continue to act with impunity. Indeed, individual UPP commanders were formally granted special powers within their territories, for example in the adoption of tactics like curfews and blanket stop-and-search (*Ibid.*). Much like the traffickers and militias, then, pacification reproduced the favelas as militarised spaces of exception.

a) Exceptional governance

While policing provides the most visible example of exceptional governance arrangements in favelas, it is hardly unique in this regard. As McCann (2014) has persuasively argued, even as more positive forms of state intervention developed in

[4] It should be noted that militias also operate in non-favela areas in Rio's West Zone, and so in that sense their expansion embodies a (very negative) form of deterritorialisation.

favelas during the 1980s and 90s it was channelled through structures that served to reinforce, rather than weaken, the division between them and the rest of the city. The evolution of another key political and social institution shaping favela life – the residents' association – bears this out. Residents' associations were established in the 1950s, under the tutelage of the Catholic Church, to formalise the representation of favela residents and act as a conservative bulwark against political radicalism (Burgos, 1998). These bodies had a statutory obligation to articulate the relationship between the state and favela residents, were required to hold regular presidential elections, and were afforded collective representation via a citywide federation. They also came to exercise an important social role within communities, for example by mediating conflicts and co-ordinating the subdivision of favela land.

Politically neutered under the military regime, residents' associations became major drivers of radical urban reform during the 1980s as a new generation of favela activists challenged more pliable older leaders in local elections (McCann, 2014: 960-1110, 1457-1534). However, the residents' associations' intermediary position in the context of redemocratisation and rising violence often meant they distorted state interventions to the detriment of long-term reforms. As mainstream democratic institutions struggled to meet the basic demands of favela residents, residents' associations often found they could wrest more immediate benefits by delivering resident votes *en masse* to clientelistic politicians in exchange for investments in local infrastructure. In many cases, moreover, residents' associations were subdued or brought under the direct control by drug traffickers and militias pursuing their own agendas (McCann, 2014: 2545-2754).

Even when they remained independent, residents' associations sometimes served to stymie radical reforms, or at least to ensure they were implemented in ways that reproduced the favelas' separation. An exemplary case of this was Brizola's land titling programme *Cada Família Um Lote* ('A Plot for Every Family') (see McCann, 2014: 1534-1621), which the residents' associations ended up opposing because they perceived it would weaken their role as informal planning authorities and threaten their status as intermediaries between favela residents and the state. In

this regard, the comparison with semi-formal *loteamentos* is striking. While conditions for *loteamento* regularisation were from the outset more straightforward, part of the reason they were invariably successful is that their residents' associations did not constitute a powerful intermediary layer of governance, allowing land titling to be carried out directly with individual residents.

Despite the distorting influence of criminal groups, clientelist politicians and residents' associations in articulating the state in favelas, some more direct state interventions *have* managed to bypass these intermediaries and implement far-reaching reforms. In this respect, the *Favela Bairro* programme stands out for its comprehensive and holistic, if highly technocratic, approach to carrying out upgrading in a large proportion of the city's favelas. However, in many respects even these interventions themselves came to reinforce, rather than challenge, divisions between favelas and the wider city. For example, *Favela Bairro* had no tools for dealing with land titling or trafficker dominance, and thus in these areas tended to simply reproduce existing conditions, for example by bolstering informal real estate markets and providing gangs with new public spaces to dominate (McCann, 2014: 3123-3146).

More recently, the urban reform agenda associated with the 2016 Olympics served to reterritorialise the favela assemblage in both familiar and novel ways. Despite apparent the shift away from favela removals since redemocratisation, large numbers of favela residents have been evicted from their homes in recent years on diverse, and often highly questionable, legal grounds ([redacted]). These processes highlight the continued underlying legal insecurity of favelas in spite of the various nominal constitutional and legal protections supposed to avoid such outcomes. They also demonstrated the political weakness of favela populations when faced with a policy programme that can unite the political class, business interests, and much of public opinion (see Brum, 2013).

Meanwhile, other seemingly more benign favela policies have also reasserted favela exceptionalism in recent years ([redacted]). For example, large investments in monumental transport and infrastructure projects, such as

controversial cable-cars installed in some of Rio's most visible favelas, have been carried out without meaningful consultation and seemingly designed more for the benefit of tourists than residents themselves. As such, these interventions also suggest that favelas continue to be treated by government as spaces in which normal democratic and legal protocol need not apply. Indeed, this represents perhaps the most consistent feature of state engagement in favelas. From the mass removals of the 1960s to *UPPs* and cable-cars in the 2010s (though with the partial exception of *Favela Bairro* in the 1990s), the state has always tended to act as though it were responding to an emergency that could only be addressed through drastic and geographically targeted interventions that bypassed broader democratic procedures. This history "in the present tense", as Fischer (2014) aptly puts it, has come at the expense of gradual, mainstreamed policies that would probably, over the long term, have had more positive outcomes for favela residents and more extensively deterritorialised the favela assemblage.

6. Conclusion: A dynamic, durable, heterogeneous assemblage

The analysis presented here of Rio de Janeiro's favela assemblage identifies diverse processes of both deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. These have allowed the favelas to transform radically over time, develop physically, socially and economically, and improve the lives of many favela residents in important ways. Nonetheless, it also demonstrates that the "favela" has nonetheless retained its integrity as a distinct socio-spatial category in which things are "done differently", with far reaching consequences for both residents and the wider city. This analysis raises several important issues regarding the contribution assemblage thinking can make to our understanding of how cities develop over time. In this conclusion, I would like to highlight three in particular: (1) the *de-essentialisation* of socio-spatial categories; (2) rethinking the *durability* of socio-spatial configurations using the concepts of 'reterritorialisation' and 'viscosity'; (3) acknowledging *distributed agency* and the intermingling of economic and extra-economic logics in the formation of urban assemblages.

The first point concerns the non-essential and dynamic nature of even the most

highly 'territorialised' of socio-spatial categories. As I have argued, the "favela" emerged under specific historical conditions that initially bestowed it with a clear set of distinguishing characteristics. However, very few if any of these survive today. These areas no longer constitute a residual socio-spatial category that houses only the poorest urban residents. Favela homes and public spaces are, in many cases, highly consolidated, thanks to the investments made over time by residents and, belatedly, by the state. Many favelas do retain visual markers of difference in their irregular built form and hillside locations, although not even these features are universal or unique to them. Favelas continue to be racialised as spaces of blackness and do contain disproportionately high numbers of darker skinned residents, however if anything racial segregation between favelas and non-favela areas has fallen over time. Absence of legal title does remain a near-universal condition in favelas and may be considered a rare constant feature of the favela assemblage. However, even here, additional layers of rights and regulations have grown up that provide significant legal and procedural bases for property sales and for resisting eviction. In sum, the overwhelmingly *provisional* nature of these different features mark the favela out as a 'singularity', rather than an essential category. That is to say, it is a unique assemblage that emerged via a historical process of territorialisation, and has developed over time through complex interactions between entities both internal and external to it, producing a dynamic and ongoing negotiation of its boundaries.

This highlights a second important question: if assemblages are subject to relentless deterritorialising pressures from both within and without, how do they "hold together"? Here the related notions of 'reterritorialisation' and 'viscosity' are particularly helpful. They remind us that although contexts and relations are always heterogeneous and dynamic, they may nonetheless develop powerful cohesive tendencies. This occurs as different components and processes operating under 'relations of exteriority' become progressively integrated, despite still retaining the potential capacity for acting autonomously. This is how the notion of 'structure' is partially preserved in assemblage thinking – as the consolidation of feedback loops that reproduce similar trajectories for the actors bound up in them, while always

leaving open the possibility for a degree of diversity in individual outcomes and for the possibility of transformations at the systemic level (see Deleuze, 2002).

In response to the disagreements discussed above about the scalar dynamics surrounding processes of (re)territorialisation – whether assemblages emerge *from below* (à la DeLanda) or as a solution to problems posed at a higher scale (as argued by Buchanan, 2015) – I would argue that the one of the strengths of assemblage thinking is precisely to allow for the empirical disentangling of interactions across scales. In the case of Rio de Janeiro's favelas, we can identify complex combinations of both exogenous and endogenous factors driving reterritorialisation. These forces may be highly asymmetric in their relative strength, but they nonetheless clearly both exhibit causal influence. For example, exceptional governance may play a crucial role in reterritorialising the favela. However, even this largely top-down influence is bound up with *ways of doing things* that have developed among residents and various influential actors acting at a more local level. These practices range from diffuse, everyday forms of sociability to the diverse techniques that different actors – from residents' associations and clientelist politicians, to drug traffickers and *UPP*s – have developed to pursue their objectives within favelas. While such innovations always emerge from – and are constrained by – prevailing conditions and relationships at any given moment, they have also served to alter those conditions and relationships. This means that the factors that reterritorialise the favela assemblage are always different to those that initially gave rise to it. Nonetheless, at the aggregate level the assemblage exhibits the quality of 'viscosity' – a persistent stickiness that cannot be attributed to any single causal factor.

This raises a third, and perhaps more controversial argument: that while socio-spatial assemblages are inevitably riddled with unequal power relations of various kinds, they are more than simply a product of these. Here it is instructive to return to Brenner et al.'s (2011) argument about critical political economy and the 'context of contexts'. It is clearly true that capital flows through the favela in various ways – whether through informal property markets or state-led regeneration projects, the multi-national corporations that employ favela residents or the demand for cocaine

met by favela-based drug traffickers. However, it is not clear that the act of identifying these flows is, in and of itself, particularly helpful for understanding why the favela assemblage has developed in the way it has. Some capital flows – like the rising incomes of many favela residents – have tended to deterritorialise the favela assemblage, while others – like the prejudicial effects of real estate speculation on land titling initiatives – has reterritorialised them. The extent to which capital is a de- or reterritorialising force at any given moment is thus a question that cannot be logically deduced, but only empirically assessed.

This observation may be entirely compatible with the 'context of contexts' argument, if its proponents only seek to claim that capital circulation is *immanent* to processes of urban assemblage formation, and not that they *determine* them. Even so, given the clear presence of other logics that are also wrapped up in assemblage formation, and which exhibit a high degree of autonomy from capital and from one another, it would seem perverse to privilege capital *a priori* as constituting a singular, overarching "context". Of course, favela households and electoral campaigns, police departments and drug traffickers must all, ultimately, pursue their objectives while reproducing themselves within a capitalist economy. However, this minimum requirement is hardly prescriptive of how exactly they might choose to do so. Furthermore, the historically generated laws, institutions and social norms, and even the physical morphology of favelas, can, conversely, be seen as providing the "context" within which capital is realised. Actors that fail to effectively navigate this this unique and challenging context see their resources destroyed.

All of this suggests that, even if it is inseparable from power relations in wider society, the favela assemblage cannot merely be viewed as an 'empirical' expression of a higher logic. Rather, it is a productive force, internalising and rearticulating diverse forces present in the wider city and society, but also superceding them. This produces consequences – of exclusion, violence, stigma and so on – that are both greater and more particular than those dictated by wider social, racial and other inequalities. It also indicates that challenging these forms of inequality are likely to be necessary but insufficient to pursuing social justice outcomes for favela residents.

A crucial question arising from this discussion is how straightforwardly the case of Rio de Janeiro's favelas might inform analyses of socio-spatial assemblages in other contexts. There are striking features pertaining to this case – a dramatic physical landscape, high levels of inequality and violence, 'exceptional' forms of governance – that may suggest it is entirely unique. However, it could simply be that such a case gives clearer expression to dynamics and forms of agency that are similarly present but are merely better concealed – or, perhaps, less productive of 'viscosity' – elsewhere. For example, why shouldn't the physical design of housing projects, the density of ethnic social networks, or the strength of homeowner associations not also exercise significant and autonomous forms of agency over trajectories of spatial development in cities of the global North? Could the physical, institutional, social and symbolic properties of "suburbs" or "ghettoes", and the interactions between these properties over time, not also drive long-term their trajectories in ways that are not sufficiently captured by other approaches to analysing socio-spatial development? Assemblage thinking may not yet have provided answers to such questions, but it has created the conceptual space in which they can be asked.

7. References

Abramo P (2003) A dinámica do mercado de solo informal em favelas e a mobilidade dos pobres, *Coleção Estudos Cariocas,* Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Pereira Passos.

Anderson B, Kearns M, McFarlane C and Swanton D (2012) On assemblages and geography. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 2(2): 171-189.

Bonta M and Protevi J (2004) *Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Brenner N, Madden DJ and Wachsmuth, D (2011) Assemblage urbanism and the challenges of critical urban theory. *City* 15(2): 225-240.

Brum M (2013) Favelas e remocionismo ontem e hoje: Da Ditadura de 1964 aos Grandes Eventos. *O Social em Questão* 29: 197-208.

Brum M (2012) *Cidade Alta: História, Memórias e Estigma de Favela num Conjunto Habitacional do Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio.

Buchanan I (2015) Assemblage theory and its discontents. *Deleuze Studies* 9(3): 382-

92.

Burgos MB (1998) Dos parques proletários ao Favela-Bairro: As políticas públicas nas favelas do Rio de Janeiro. In: Zaluar A and Alvito M (eds) *Um Século de Favela*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas. 25–61.

Cano I (ed)(2012) *Os Donos do Morro: Uma avaliação exploratória do impato das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública.

Cavalcanti M (2008) Do barraco à casa: Tempo, espaço e valor(es) em uma favela consolidada. *Revista Brasielira de Ciências Sociais* 24(69): 69-80.

DeLanda M (2016) *Assemblage Theory*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

DeLanda M (2006) *A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity*. London: Continuum.

Deleuze G (2002) How Do We Recognise Structuralism?. In Taormina M (ed) *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e): 170–192

Deleuze G and Guattari F (1987) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. London: Continuum.

Deleuze G and Guattari F (1977) Balance sheet – program for desiring-machines. *Semiotext(e)* 11(3): 117-135.

Do Lago L (2003) Favela-loteamento: Reconceituando os termos da ilegalidade e da segregação urbana. *Cadernos Metrópole* 9: 119-133.

Dovey K (2012) Informal urbanism and complex adaptive assemblage. *International Development Planning Review* 34(4): 349-367.

Farías I (2011) The politics of urban assemblages. *City* 15(3-4): 365-374.

Fischer B (2014) A century in the present tense: Crisis, politics and the intellectual history of Brazil's informal cities. In: Fischer B, McCann B and Auyero J (eds) *Cities From Scratch: Poverty and Informality in Urban Latin America*. Durham: Duke University Press. 9-67.

Fischer B (2008) *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fleury S (2012) Militarização do social como estratégia de integração – o caso da UPP do Santa Marta. *Sociologias* 14(30): 194-222.

Frischtak C and Mandel BR (2012) Crime, House Prices, and Inequality: The Effect of UPPs in Rio. *Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports* 542.

Gay R (2010) Toward uncivil society: Causes and consequences of violence in Rio de

Janeiro. In: Arias E D and Goldstein D M (eds) *Violent Democracies in Latin America*. Durham: Duke University Press.

IBGE (2010) *Censo Demográfico*

Lancione M (2016) The city and 'the homeless': Machinic subjects. In Frichot H, Gabrielsson C and Metzger J (eds) Deleuze and the City. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Lopes de Souza M (2000) *O Desafio Metropolitano: Um Estudo sobre a Problemática Sócio-espacial nas Metrópoles Brasileiras*. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil.

Machado da Silva L A (2010) "Violência urbana", segurança pública e favelas: O caso do Rio de Janeiro atual. *Caderno CRH* 23(59): 283-300.

McCann B (2014) *Hard Times in the Marvellous City*. Kindle Edition. Durham: Duke University Press.

McFarlane C (2011) Assemblage and critical urbanism. *City* 15(2): 204-224.

Meirelles R and Athayde C (2014) *Um País Chamado Favela: A Maior Pesquisa Já Feita Sobre a Favela Brasileira*. São Paulo: Editora Gente.

Müller M and Schurr C (2016) Assemblage thinking and actor-network theory: Conjunctions, disjunctions, cross-fertilisations. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 16: 217-229.

Nail T (2017) What is an Assemblage?. *SubStance* 46(1): 21-37.

Neri AL (ed)(2010) *Desigualdades e Favelas Cariocas: A Cidade Partida está se Integrando?* Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

Penglase B (2009) States of insecurity: Everyday emergencies, public secrets, and drug trafficker power in a Brazilian favela. *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 32(1): 47-63.

Perlman J (2010a) *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Perlman J (2010b) It all depends: Buying and selling houses in Rio's favelas. *Report for International Housing Coalition*, Washington D. C.: International Housing Coalition.

Pero V, Cardoso A and Elias P (2005) Discriminação no mercado de trabalho: O caso dos moradores de favelas cariocas. *Coleção Estudos da Cidade*, Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Pereira Passos.

Preteceille E and Valladares L (1999) A desigualdade entre os pobres – favela, favelas. In Henriques R (ed) *Desigualdade e Pobreza no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de

Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. 459-485.

[redacted]

Saldanha A (2006) Reontologising race: The machinic geography of phenotype. *Environment and Planning D* 24: 9-24.

Scalon C and Salata A (2012) Uma Nova Classe Média no Brasil da Última Década? O debate a partir da perspectiva sociológica. *Revista Sociedade e Estado* 27(2): 387-407.

Simone A (2011) The surfacing of urban life. *City* 15(3-4): 355-364.

Storper M and Scott A (2016) Current debates in urban theory: A critical assessment. *Urban Studies* 53(6): 1114–1136.

Telles E (2004) *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Colour in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Valladares L (2005) *A Invenção da Favela: Do Mito de Origem a Favela.com*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV.

Zaluar A (2010) Turf War in Rio de Janeiro: Youth, drug traffic and hyper-masculinity. Vibrant 7(2). 7-27

Zaluar A and Conceição IS (2007) Favelas sob o controle das milicias no Rio de Janeiro: que paz?. *São Paulo em Perspectiva* 21(2): 89-101.