The Rise and Fall of Social Democracy, 1918-2017*

Giacomo Benedetto[†] Simon Hix[‡] Nicola Mastrorocco[§]
April 9, 2020

Abstract

We describe the electoral history of one of Europe's most successful party families over the past 100 years in 31 countries. With a unique and newly collected dataset of national election results, and a large number of economic and social variables measured for each country-election observation, we find that two main factors drive the electoral performance of social democratic parties: public sector spending, and the size of the manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that most of the fall in support for social democratic parties in recent years is correlated with a decline in the number of industrial workers as well as a reduction in the propensity of social democratic parties' core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them.

Forthcoming, American Political Science Review

^{*}We would like to thank Thomas Koenig and 4 anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also would like to thank Tarik Abou-Chadi, James Adams, Lawrence Ezrow, Christopher Hanretty, Oliver Heath, Sara Hobolt, James Snyder, and Herbert Kitschelt for comments on an earlier version of the paper, and Federico Fabio Frattini, Laura Chitty, Etienne Goh, Fariba Ghazizadeh, and Eponine Howarth for research assistance.

[†]Royal Holloway, University of London, Contact Information: giacomo.benedetto@rhul.ac.uk

[‡]London School of Economics and Political Science, Contact Information: s.hix@lse.ac.uk

[§]Trinity College Dublin, Contact Information: n.mastrorocco@tcd.ie

1 Introduction

There is a large body of research on the rise of populist parties (e.g. Colantone and Stanig 2018; Dinas et al. 2019; Guiso et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). Less attention has been paid to a corollary of this trend: the electoral decline of the centre left. Across Europe, social democratic parties that once commanded over 40 percent of votes have collapsed to the low twenties, teens, or lower. We do three things to investigate these patterns. First, we describe the variations in support for social democrats over the last century in 31 countries. Second, we undertake a time-series cross-sectional analysis to identify some of the correlates of the electoral fortunes of social democrats. Third, we supplement this aggregate-level analysis by looking at individual-level support for social democratic parties between 2002 and 2016.

Our aim is not to provide a causal explanation of the rise and fall of social democracy. By introducing a new dataset of elections for 31 countries over 100 years, we provide descriptive evidence of a time-consistent relationship between two main factors, public sector spending and industrial production, and votes for social democratic parties. Our findings suggest that most of the fall in support for social democrats is correlated with a decline in the number of industrial workers as well as a reduction in the propensity of these parties' core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them.

2 Evolution of Social Democracy

There has been extensive work on the evolution of social democratic parties. For example, scholars have looked at their formation (e.g. Sassoon 1996; Bartolini 2000), the strategic challenge of appealing to the middle class while maintaining working class support (e.g. Przeworski and Sprague 1986), the rise of a social dimension cross-cutting the traditional left-right (e.g. Kitschelt 1990), how electoral systems shape their behaviour (e.g. Iversen and

Soskice 2006), and globalization (e.g. Garrett 1998; Boix 1985). We include all the factors discussed in this literature and we complement them with a wide range of other variables, such as public spending, welfare spending, employment in industry, and electoral turnout.

We analyze all democratic elections in Europe over 100 years, starting from 1918. Many European countries extended suffrage at the end of WWI. We define democratic elections as all elections that were held in a year when a country had either a Polity score or a 'Political Competition' score greater than 5.1 We count countries that had populations larger than 500,000 in 2017 and who had democratic elections for at least one 20-year period. These criteria produce 579 elections in 31 countries, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1: Democratic elections in Europe, 1918 - 2017

		Number	Number of
Country	Years counted as democratic	of years	elections
Albania	1992-2017	26	8
Austria	1918-32, 1945-2017	88	27
Belgium	1918-38, 1944-2017	95	29
Bulgaria	1918-23, 1990-2017	35	12
Croatia	1991-2017	27	8
Cyprus	1970-2017	48	10
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	1918-38, 1945-46, 1990-92, 1993-2017	51	14
Denmark	1918-39, 1943-2017	97	38
Estonia	1918-33, 1991-2017	43	13
Finland	1918-39, 1944-2017	96	29
France	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	25
Germany	1919-32, 1949-2017	83	28
Greece	1920-36, 1944-48, 1974-2017	64	24
Hungary	1920-43, 1990-2017	52	12
Ireland	1921-2017	97	30
Italy	1918-21, 1946-2017	76	20
Latvia	1920-33, 1990-2017	42	13
Lithuania	1991-2017	27	7
Luxembourg	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	20
Macedonia	1991-2017	27	8
Netherlands	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	28
Norway	1918-39, 1945-2017	95	26
Poland	1918-30, 1990-2017	41	12
Portugal	1975-2017	43	15
Romania	1925-38, 1990-2017	42	14
Slovakia	1993-2017	25	7
Slovenia	1991-2017	27	7
Spain	1977-2017	41	13
Sweden	1918-2017	100	29
Switzerland	1918-2017	100	26
United Kingdom	1918-2017	100	27
Total			579

¹See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.

Which parties do we count as social democratic? Usually, only one party was a member of the Socialist International or Party of European Socialists at a particular time. For the cases where several parties were members of these organizations, we combined the vote-shares for these parties — see Appendix Table A1. Parties with different ideological origins at different stages have been described as social democratic, such as the Italian Communist Party (PCI) since the late 1960s. We run two robustness tests to address this issue. First, we estimate the models with the vote-share of all left parties as the dependent variable (social democratic, communist, and green). Second, because of the particular case of Italy, we estimate the models counting the PCI rather than the PSI as the social democratic party in Italy from 1968 onwards, since after that year the PCI became more moderate, the PSI remained in government with the centre right, and the PCI was the main opposition. We put together the data on vote shares from Nohlen and Stoever (2010), and cross-checked the data with national electoral commissions where possible.




Figure 1: Three measures of the electoral performance of social democratic parties

Note: Total share of votes = total votes for social democratic parties in a year in the 31 countries divided by total votes cast in all elections. Total share of the electorate = total votes for social democratic parties in a year in the 31 countries divided by total eligible voters in an election. Average share of votes = average share of votes for social democratic parties in a year in each of the 31 countries.

Figure 1 exemplifies the breadth of this dataset and shows three measures of social democratic parties' electoral performance. Measured by the average vote share (percent) across our countries in a given year, support for social democrats peaked in the 1950s. Measured by the total share of votes across Europe, support for these parties peaked in the late 1990s, because of the high performance of social democrats in several larger countries (Germany, UK, and Italy). Measured by the total share of the electorate, support for social democrats declined in the late 1980s and fell precipitously in the 2000s (Figures A1-A2).

One issue is that social democracy has meant different things in different periods. The main stages of the evolution of social democracy can be summarized as three 'waves'. Figure 2 shows the periodization of these waves. Here, we coded each party by looking at their positions in manifestos (for the post-1945 period), as well as historical descriptions (for the pre-1945 period) (Jacobs 1989; von Beyme 1985; Sassoon 1996; Bartolini 2000). The first wave, of a parliamentary road to socialism, started after the WWI, when most social democratic parties broke from revolutionary politics and aimed to achieve socialism via a parliamentary route, sometimes blending parliamentary and revolutionary objectives. With the rise of industrial society, many expected these parties to win electoral majorities (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Indeed, social democrats won over 30 percent of the vote in some of the first elections after WWI (in Germany and Austria). In the mid-1920s, the Swedish and Austrian parties exceeded 40 percent, while the Belgian party reached 39 percent. The 1920s and 1930s also saw brief periods in government for social democrats in Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, the UK, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, most often in coalition or tolerated by other parties. When in government, social democrat-led reforms included maximum working hours, paid annual leave, collective bargaining, and pensions systems. But, in this period, not all workers supported socialist parties, as some supported Catholic or communist parties. Meanwhile, the social democrat electorate also included agricultural workers and some middle class supporters (Neisse 1930; Lipset 1983). These early successes ended with the Great Depression. Democracy collapsed in most of central and eastern Europe while support for social democrats fell in western Europe. There were some exceptions, as social democrats achieved 38 percent in the UK, over 40 percent in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, and a historic peak of 29 percent in Switzerland.




Figure 2: Three waves of social democracy

Note: Dark red = Wave 1: parliamentary road to socialism party
Red = Wave 2: cross-class catch-all party
Pink = Wave 3: third way/neue mitte

The second wave of social democracy involved the transformation of the parties into mainstream electoral machines. After WWII, most social democratic parties attempted to reach beyond their traditional working class base (e.g. Kirchheimer 1966), accepting that social democrat voting industrial workers were unlikely to generate a majority (Sassoon 1996, p.42). This new strategy started in Scandinavia in the 1930s, then spread to social democratic parties in the UK, France, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the 1940s, and to Germany, Italy and Switzerland in the 1950s. These 'catch-all' parties downgraded class-based politics, in favour of policies that appealed to public sector employees, urban pro-

fessionals, and agricultural labour. Many social democrats focused on establishing a social market (an objective shared with Christian democrats), building a welfare state, nationalizing natural monopolies, macroeconomic demand management, and in later yearsliberal social policies on divorce and gender equality. Universal welfare policies also shifted the preferences of sections of the middle class as well as centre right parties (e.g. Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). These shifts enabled social democrats to form governments with liberals and Christian democrats, and in the immediate post-war years social democrats were in government almost everywhere and in single-party governments in the UK, Sweden, and Norway. Most social democratic parties saw their support peak in the 1960s and 1970s, although whether this success was a result of societal changes or moderating party positions cannot be identified with our data.

Following the 1970s oil crisis, changes in global trade patterns and rising unemployment and inflation, market liberalization, and monetarist economics gained momentum, while green movements also squeezed support. European integration, globalization, and the collapse of communism facilitated a renewal of social democracy (e.g. Garrett 1998; Boix 1985). A third wave of social democracy emerged around the idea of a third way or new middle (neue mitte), which emphasized regulating markets, supply-side economic management, balanced budgets, and social liberalism and environmentalism (e.g. Giddens 1998). By 1998, social democrats were back in office in every western European country except Spain, Norway, and Ireland; governing alone in the UK, Portugal, Sweden, and Greece, leading coalitions in Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, and serving in grand coalitions with the centre right in Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Switzerland. Also, in central and eastern Europe, former communist leaders used third way social democracy to distance themselves from the past, and emerged as electoral winners except in Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

But, starting in the early 2000s, social democrat support collapsed almost everywhere.

Between 2000 and 2017 most social democratic parties secured their lowest levels of support since 1918, or 1945 for the post-war democracies, or 1989 for the new democracies in central and eastern Europe.²

This suggests that different factors shaped the success of social democratic parties in different periods. In the interwar period, the parties emerged from industrial labour, became more moderate in the postwar period as they expanded support to public sector workers, then adapted their positions following globalization in the 1970s, and faced new challenges following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Great Recession in the 2000s. To investigate this story we look at each of these periods in turn. Empirically, this periodization also fits the availability of data for some key variables. For the interwar period, we found data on manufacturing and public spending, but data on party positions are not available until after WWII, while data on employment in industry and globalization only start in the 1970s. In the empirical analysis we test that our results are not driven by the choice of our periodization, by estimating the models starting 5 years before and after our cutoff years.

3 Correlates of Electoral Support for Social Democratic Parties

To understand what factors correlate with these cross-country and cross-time variations we collected a wide range of institutional, economic, social, and political variables. The Appendix contains a full list of variables.

We estimate two different types of time-series cross-sectional models:

$$V_{it} = \alpha + \beta W_{it} + \phi X_{it} + \gamma_i + \theta_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

²Few countries bucked this trend. This was the case in Albania, Croatia, Denmark, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and the UK.

$$\Delta V_{it} = \alpha + \beta \Delta W_{it} + \phi \Delta X_{it} + \gamma_i + \theta_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

Model 1 uncovers long-term changes in the levels of support for social democratic parties, while model 2 (a first-differences model) examines short-term changes, between elections. In the equations, V is a social democratic party percent vote share in country i at time (election) t; α is a constant; W is a vector of independent variables; X is a vector of control variables; γ are country fixed-effects; θ are decade fixed-effects and country-specific time trends; β , and ϕ are the parameters to be estimated; and ϵ is the error term. We estimate both types of models with ordinary least squares. This historical longitudinal cross-sectional analysis allows us to tackle such a large and important question. However, it poses a trade-off. Although conditional on a large set of controls and fixed-effects our exercize remains descriptive as this type of time series analysis poses several empirical challenges such as omitted variable bias, unit roots, and time trends interferences. We address some of these issues later.




Figure 3: Public spending and industrial production in Western Europe

Note: For 18 western European countries, the graph plots measures of public spending as a percent of GDP and our three measures of industry: the manufacturing index, for 1918-1939 (from League of Nations trade data, measuring the volume of trade in manufactured goods relative to 1953); industry as a percent of GDP, for 1950-2017 (share of industrial output as a percent of GDP at constant 2005 prices); and percent of total employment in industry, for 1970-2017. The lines are plotted by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.

As a start, Figure 3 plots two main independent variables (for 18 western European democracies): public spending as a percent of GDP, and several measures of the size of industry/manufacturing. Public spending increased steadily from the 1920s to the 2000s, consistent with Wagner's (1890) law on developed economies that embark on social progress.³ Industrial production rose until the 1970s and then declined dramatically, as a result of structural changes, globalization and technology.

To investigate these relationships further, Table 2 presents the correlates of social democratic party vote shares between 1918 and 1939 for the 16 countries who held democratic elections in this period and with the limited set of available variables. Trade in manufactured

³Peacock and Wiseman (1961) find consistent growth in public expenditure when Labour held office.

Table 2: Correlates of social democracy party vote shares, 1918-1939

	Analysis of levels							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Public spending (% of GDP)	-0.101	-0.0236	-0.184	0.129	-0 00593	0.109		
Tublic spending (70 of GET)	(0.157)	(0.140)	(0.443)	(0.337)		(0.368)		
District magnitude (log)	-2.344	-3.327	3.597*	6.259***	,	5.130*		
District magnitude (10g)	(5.917)	(7.156)	(1.727)	(1.583)		(2.411)		
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-1.108	-1.955	0.238	-0.199	\ /	0.0831		
be party in gov t (single party)	(2.035)	(2.049)	(2.311)	(2.034)		(1.897)		
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	0.535	0.529	1.424	2.556*	\ /	1.294		
DD party in gov t (coantion 1 ivi)	(3.818)	(2.706)	(1.512)	(1.334)		(1.811)		
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-0.462	-2.097	-8.349***	-8.993***		-9.544***		
bb party in gov t (coantion-junior)	(3.600)	(2.596)	(2.382)	(2.030)		(2.084)		
Turnout	0.273*	0.194	0.198	0.0348	(5) -0.00593) (0.433) * 3.731) (2.299) 0.355) (1.975) 6 0.360) (1.904) ** -9.563*** -9) (2.229) 6 0.0291) (0.212) 0.260** (0.0925) 49 0.454 11 ces (11) 0 0.448) (0.534) 5.751) (4.596) -2.381** -9) (0.804) -1.576) (1.618) -7.460) (4.717) -0.318) (0.384) 0.0307 (0.118) 38 0.214 10 Yes	-0.00804		
Turnout	(0.141)	(0.164)	(0.185)	(0.159)		(0.200)		
Manufacturing index	(0.141)	(0.104)	(0.165)	(0.159)	\ /	0.181		
Manufacturing index						(0.171)		
Observations	77	77	49	49	,	49		
R-squared	0.234	0.329	0.277	0.428	-	0.482		
Number of countries	0.234 16		0.277	0.428				
Number of countries	10	16				11		
	Analysis of differences							
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
Public spending (% of GDP)	-0.0487	-0.0589	0.0642	0.0940	0.448	0.431		
,	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.534)	(0.476)		
District magnitude (log)	-2.339	-0.918	-3.679	$0.435^{'}$,	$6.450^{'}$		
0 (0,	(9.189)	(7.545)	(8.628)	(5.080)	(4.596)	(5.372)		
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-1.987***	-1.869**	-2.017**	-1.532		-2.049**		
3 1 3 3 4 (4 8 4 1 4 3)	(0.661)	(0.730)	(0.748)	(0.876)	(0.804)	(0.812)		
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.853	-0.316	-1.604	-0.461	,	0.302		
Parady 8a : - ()	(1.531)	(2.159)	(1.909)	(3.097)	(0.433) (0.433) (1.3731 5.4299) (1.3731 5.4299) (1.3755 0.355 0.360 (1.975) (1.975) (1.904) (1.904) (1.904) (1.904) (1.905) (1.904) (1.905)	(2.868)		
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-2.447*	-2.848**	-8.183*	-11.32	\ /	-6.974		
22 party in gev t (coantien jamer)	(1.178)	(1.075)	(4.466)	(7.528)		(4.475)		
Turnout	-0.125	-0.128	-0.139	-0.179	,	-0.336		
Tarriout	(0.312)	(0.307)	(0.470)	(0.477)		(0.415)		
Manufacturing index	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.110)	(0.111)	\ /	-0.0251		
Wallandovaring index						(0.140)		
Observations	61	61	38	38	(/	38		
R-squared	0.063	0.077	0.107	0.163		0.247		
Number of countries	15	15	10	10		10		
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes		
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		
Country-year time trends	No	Yes	No	Yes		Yes		
Country-year time trends	INO	res	110	168	NO	res		

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Models 7 to 12 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). From Model 3, the sample composed by the sub-set of countries for which the manufacturing index is available. Manufacturing Index available for: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom.

goods in this early period is strongly correlated with votes for social democratic parties. We do not find evidence that public spending was related to support for social democrats in this period. Together, these findings are consistent with the description of wave 1 social democratic parties, who based their support on industrial labour. Third, when these parties made

it into government, they generally lost support, whether as a single party of government or as a senior or junior coalition partner. This result is consistent for all the periods we look at.

Table 3: Correlates of social democracy party vote shares, 1945-2017

	Analysis	s of levels	Analysis o	f differences
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.157** (0.0577)	0.193*** (0.0586)	0.168** (0.0725)	0.163** (0.0729)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.172** (0.0812)	0.170* (0.0839)	0.148** (0.0684)	0.150** (0.0687)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.00290 (0.0358)	-0.00343 (0.0346)	-0.0357 (0.0299)	-0.0357 (0.0297)
District magnitude (log)	0.574	0.787	0.948	0.912
	(1.292)	(1.308)	(1.596)	(1.581)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.0576* (0.0298)	-0.0552* (0.0316)	-0.0614** (0.0265)	-0.0619** (0.0266)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	1.335 (1.256)	1.097 (1.230)	-3.175*** (0.957)	-3.187*** (0.962)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	0.976 (1.327)	0.634 (1.285)	-2.507** (0.963)	-2.506** (0.966)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-2.849*** (0.912)	-3.056*** (0.925)	-2.461*** (0.721)	-2.451*** (0.721)
Turnout	-0.0839 (0.106)	-0.0861 (0.101)	0.300** (0.130)	0.299** (0.129)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	381	381	353	353
R-squared Number of countries	0.162 31	0.176 31	0.169 31	0.170 31

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Models 3 and 4 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Controls: GDP per capita (log), GDP growth, EU member, Eurozone member, presidential system. Full results in Appendix Table A3.

Table 3 presents the correlates of social democratic party vote shares between 1945 and 2017. Because of data availability we add several economic control variables as well as some key political variables, in particular the left-right locations of social democratic and centre right parties (from party manifestos), as well as the interaction of left-right party positions

and the electoral system. We include the policy positions of centre right parties as these were the main competitors for social democratic parties in most countries. We accept that the positions of other parties are also relevant, particularly for the decline of social democratic parties in more recent periods.

Several results are worth highlighting. First, public spending after 1945 is positively related to support for social democratic parties, and this result holds both for the long-term trends as well as for short-term (between election) changes. The effect is sizeable too: a one standard deviation increase in public spending is associated with an increase of about 1.5% in vote share for social democratic parties. What we do not know from this result, though, is whether more public spending leads to more support for social democrats or whether a larger public sector means more workers with an interest in voting social democrat.⁴

Second, regarding party positions, we find evidence that social democratic parties gained votes when they moved to the centre (closer to the median voter) and lost votes when they moved to the left. We do not find an effect of the left-right position of the main centre right competitor on social democratic support. We replicated this analysis breaking the left-right down into separate economic and social dimensions — see Appendix Table A6 — and we found that social democratic parties won more votes when they were more free market on the economic dimension but more conservative on the social dimension. These results challenge some existing research, for example, that there is little evidence of the link between parties' positions and their electoral performance (e.g. Adams 2012), and Kitschelt's (1990) contention that social democrats should gain support as they become left-libertarian. However, further investigation reveals that this result on the social dimension is mainly driven by parties in Eastern Europe (after 1989), where several parties, in Romania and Slovakia for example, became socially conservative from the early 2000s and gained votes at the expense of more liberal-cosmopolitan parties. In contrast, there is little evidence

⁴We know that public spending can also rise when social democrats are not in office (Borooah 1987).

in western Europe of a connection between social democratic parties' positions on a social dimension and their electoral performance.

We also find that the electoral effect of social democratic parties' positions is magnified by the electoral system. We find an interaction between the electoral system and the left-right position of a party, such that the larger the district magnitude, the lower the support for a social democratic party as the party moves rightwards. Intuitively, this is consistent with existing theory (e.g. Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Iversen and Soskice 2006), which highlights the threat of being outflanked by more left-wing parties in countries with proportional electoral systems. So, in higher district magnitude (proportional) electoral systems, social democratic parties lost support as they become more centrist whereas in lower magnitude (majoritarian) systems, they gained support as they moved towards the median voter.

Table 4 presents the results for the era of globalization, after 1975. Data availability enables us to add a number of new control variables. In particular, we include a globalization index, which combined 43 economic, social, and political variables, such as net and total trade volume, net immigration and total foreign born population, technological integration, and so on (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019). We also now include welfare spending as a percent of GDP. This allows us to look at public spending on redistribution as opposed to total public spending, which also includes public employment. As before, we find a statistically significant correlation between public spending and social democratic support. In addition, we find that the magnitude of the relationship between public spending on welfare and social democratic support is over twice the size of the magnitude of the relationship between total public spending and social democratic vote shares. This suggests that social democrats benefitted both from more public sector employment and greater wealth redistribution.

Another key result is the relationship between employment in industry and support for social democrats. Again, the results lend support for the proposition that industrial workers have been their core supporters, and hence that the decline in industry since the 1970s is

Table 4: Correlates of social democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1975-2017

	Analysis of levels					Analysis of differences			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.249* (0.129)		0.222* (0.122)		0.229** (0.110)		0.206 (0.125)		
Welfare spending (% of GDP)		0.509** (0.243)		0.532** (0.239)		0.839** (0.318)		0.864** (0.327)	
Employment in industry (%)	0.981*** (0.277)	0.970** (0.348)	0.866*** (0.274)	0.862** (0.324)	0.147 (0.327)	0.224 (0.334)	0.167 (0.330)	0.207 (0.323)	
Globalization index	0.027 (0.350)	$0.251 \\ (0.451)$	0.036 (0.345)	0.226 (0.428)	0.210 (0.473)	0.411 (0.365)	0.179 (0.477)	0.431 (0.378)	
Social Dem. left-right position	0.102** (0.048)	0.046 (0.034)	0.100** (0.048)	0.049 (0.035)	0.029 (0.038)	$0.040 \\ (0.026)$	0.032 (0.039)	$0.040 \\ (0.026)$	
Centre Right left-right position	-0.006 (0.051)	0.062 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.051)	0.049 (0.055)	-0.051 (0.043)	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.050 (0.042)	-0.024 (0.037)	
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-0.347 (1.451)	-0.148 (1.826)	-0.598 (1.431)	-0.524 (1.806)	-3.523** (1.393)	-3.908** (1.428)	-3.456** (1.397)	-3.954** (1.407)	
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.936 (1.435)	-1.002 (1.304)	-0.791 (1.460)	-1.001 (1.302)	-3.651*** (1.093)	-4.516*** (1.007)	-3.583*** (1.110)	-4.579*** (1.027)	
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-3.214** (1.348)	-4.703*** (1.314)	-3.233** (1.348)	-5.031*** (1.303)	-3.705*** (1.028)	-5.843*** (1.152)	-3.714*** (1.029)	-5.837*** (1.157)	
Turnout	0.121 (0.148)	0.072 (0.157)	0.100 (0.139)	0.038 (0.142)	0.313* (0.171)	-0.003 (0.208)	0.309* (0.167)	-0.000 (0.207)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country-year time trends	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Observations	244	193	244	193	227	171	227	171	
R-squared	0.223	0.308	0.240	0.335	0.234	0.343	0.239	0.344	
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22	27	22	

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Models 5 to 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Controls: union density, district magnitude, employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, life expectancy, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, percent in higher education. Full results in Appendix Table A4.

one of the key reasons for the long-term decline in their support. We find little evidence that short-term changes in industrial employment affects social democratic support. We also do not find a relationship between globalization and support for social democrats. But, we do find a negative relationship between union density and social democratic support, which runs counter to some existing views about the power of unions and support for wealth redistribution (e.g. Crouch 2017).

Table 5 shows the results for 1989 to 2017, for the post-Cold War period (1989-2017) and the post-Great Recession period (2000-17). Again, the public spending variables are signifi-

Table 5: Correlates of social democratic votes after the Cold War and the Great Recession

(1) 0.269 (0.166) 0.628* (0.338) 0.373 (0.424) 0.135* (0.072) 0.008 (0.052) -2.967 (2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*	(2) 0.815** (0.385) 1.265** (0.462) 0.534 (0.475) 0.054 (0.053) 0.069 (0.056) -2.371 (2.145)	(3) 0.223 (0.153) 0.462 (0.375) 0.438 (0.423) 0.139* (0.070) 0.009 (0.052)	0.750** (0.353) 1.019** (0.488) 0.711 (0.441) 0.059 (0.050)	0.818** (0.304) 0.632 (0.761) 0.983** (0.366) 0.029	(6) 1.900*** (0.574) 1.949* (1.001) 1.118* (0.623)	(7) 0.792** (0.293) 0.578 (0.756) 1.106**	(8) 1.873** (0.493) 1.785* (1.022)
(0.166) 0.628* (0.338) 0.373 (0.424) 0.135* (0.072) 0.008 (0.052) -2.967 (2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*	(0.385) 1.265** (0.462) 0.534 (0.475) 0.054 (0.053) 0.069 (0.056) -2.371	0.462 (0.375) 0.438 (0.423) 0.139* (0.070) 0.009	(0.353) 1.019** (0.488) 0.711 (0.441) 0.059	(0.304) 0.632 (0.761) 0.983** (0.366)	(0.574) 1.949* (1.001) 1.118*	(0.293) 0.578 (0.756)	(0.493) 1.785*
(0.338) 0.373 (0.424) 0.135* (0.072) 0.008 (0.052) -2.967 (2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*	(0.385) 1.265** (0.462) 0.534 (0.475) 0.054 (0.053) 0.069 (0.056) -2.371	(0.375) 0.438 (0.423) 0.139* (0.070) 0.009	(0.353) 1.019** (0.488) 0.711 (0.441) 0.059	(0.761) 0.983** (0.366)	(0.574) 1.949* (1.001) 1.118*	(0.756)	(0.493) 1.785*
(0.338) 0.373 (0.424) 0.135* (0.072) 0.008 (0.052) -2.967 (2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*	(0.462) 0.534 (0.475) 0.054 (0.053) 0.069 (0.056) -2.371	(0.375) 0.438 (0.423) 0.139* (0.070) 0.009	(0.488) 0.711 (0.441) 0.059	(0.761) 0.983** (0.366)	(1.001) 1.118*	(0.756)	
(0.424) 0.135* (0.072) 0.008 (0.052) -2.967 (2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*	(0.475) 0.054 (0.053) 0.069 (0.056) -2.371	(0.423) 0.139* (0.070) 0.009	(0.441) 0.059	(0.366)		1.106**	
(0.072) 0.008 (0.052) -2.967 (2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*	(0.053) 0.069 (0.056) -2.371	(0.070) 0.009		0.029		(0.424)	1.493* (0.753
(0.052) -2.967 (2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*	(0.056) -2.371			(0.061)	0.114 (0.097)	0.035 (0.064)	0.133 (0.100)
(2.005) -0.368 (1.444) -3.425*			$0.060 \\ (0.060)$	-0.137* (0.067)	-0.006 (0.066)	-0.143** (0.064)	-0.038 (0.068
(1.444) -3.425*	. ,	-3.211 (2.078)	-3.010 (2.501)	0.359 (3.413)	-1.581 (4.283)	0.153 (3.410)	-2.269 (4.348)
	0.307 (1.034)	-0.492 (1.432)	0.033 (1.088)	-1.725 (1.557)	0.334 (1.482)	-1.776 (1.548)	-0.103 (1.509)
(1.923)	-4.609** (1.709)	-3.497* (1.971)	-4.983** (1.873)	-4.571** (1.767)	-3.409 (2.103)	-4.757** (1.797)	-4.184° (2.328)
$0.116 \\ (0.172)$	-0.088 (0.191)	$0.112 \\ (0.172)$	-0.092 (0.190)	-0.007 (0.245)	-0.346 (0.265)	0.011 (0.234)	-0.287 (0.239)
180 0.204 27	$ \begin{array}{r} 141 \\ 0.323 \\ 22 \end{array} $	180 0.209 27	$141 \\ 0.341 \\ 22$	107 0.502 27	84 0.534 22	107 0.505 27	84 0.548 22
(9)	(10)	(11)	Analysis of (12)	differences (13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
0.281* (0.139)		0.267* (0.142)		0.646** (0.312)		0.644** (0.313)	
	0.893** (0.392)		0.918** (0.382)		1.497** (0.690)		1.615* (0.668
-0.206 (0.345)	0.573 (0.398)	-0.207 (0.343)	0.588 (0.408)	0.354 (0.515)	0.652 (0.725)	0.340 (0.566)	0.565 (0.704
-0.035 (0.556)	0.300 (0.464)	-0.031 (0.556)	0.283 (0.460)	0.423 (0.487)	0.281 (0.716)	0.434 (0.475)	0.568 (0.723)
$0.024 \\ (0.055)$	0.019 (0.047)	$0.028 \\ (0.056)$	0.017 (0.047)	-0.037 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.080)	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.008 (0.077
-0.054 (0.048)	$0.000 \\ (0.048)$	-0.055 (0.048)	$0.001 \\ (0.048)$	-0.155*** (0.048)	-0.073 (0.107)	-0.155*** (0.048)	-0.076 (0.113
-4.958*** (1.705)	-4.183** (1.996)	-5.046*** (1.698)	-4.099* (2.016)	-1.011 (2.040)	-4.025 (2.907)	-1.018 (2.065)	-4.292 (2.825
-4.042*** (1.177)	-3.780*** (1.320)	-4.053*** (1.175)	-3.793*** (1.327)	-3.515* (1.829)	-2.334 (2.037)	-3.511* (1.838)	-2.597 (2.042
-4.516*** (1.258)	-5.468*** (1.430)	-4.545*** (1.243)	-5.470*** (1.453)	-4.281* (2.151)	-4.740* (2.690)	-4.282* (2.162)	-4.725 (2.671
0.312 (0.210)	-0.014 (0.228)	0.314 (0.211)	-0.015 (0.228)	$0.094 \\ (0.246)$	-0.085 (0.348)	$0.096 \\ (0.243)$	-0.034 (0.331
170 0.270 27	136 0.333 22	170 0.271 27	136 0.334 22	107 0.452 27	84 0.403 22	$107 \\ 0.452 \\ 27$	84 0.415 22
	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	0.281* (0.139) -0.206 (0.345) -0.035 (0.556) 0.024 (0.055) -0.054 (0.048) -4.958*** (1.705) -4.042*** (1.177) -4.516*** (1.258) 0.312 (0.210)	0.281* (0.139) 0.893** (0.392) -0.206 0.573 (0.345) 0.398) -0.035 0.300 (0.556) 0.464) 0.024 0.019 (0.055) (0.047) -0.054 0.000 (0.048) (0.048) -4.958*** -4.183** (1.705) (1.996) -4.042*** (1.177) -5.468*** (1.258) 1.430) 0.312 0.312 0.014 (0.210) 0.228) 170 136 0.270 0.333 27 22 Yes Yes	$\begin{array}{c} 0.281*\\ (0.139) & 0.267*\\ (0.142) \\ \hline \\ 0.893^{**}\\ (0.392) \\ \hline \\ -0.206 & 0.573 & -0.207\\ (0.345) & (0.398) & (0.343) \\ -0.035 & 0.300 & -0.031\\ (0.556) & (0.464) & (0.556) \\ 0.024 & 0.019 & (0.028\\ (0.055) & (0.047) & (0.056) \\ \hline \\ -0.054 & (0.047) & (0.056) \\ -0.054 & (0.048) & (0.048) \\ (0.048) & (0.048) & (0.048) \\ -4.958^{***} & -4.183^{***} & -5.046^{****}\\ (1.705) & (1.996) & (1.698) \\ -4.042^{***} & -3.780^{***} & -4.053^{****}\\ (1.177) & (1.320) & (1.175) \\ -4.516^{***} & -5.468^{***} & -4.545^{****}\\ (1.258) & (1.430) & (1.243) \\ 0.312 & -0.014 & 0.314\\ (0.210) & (0.228) & (0.211) \\ \hline 170 & 136 & 170\\ 0.270 & 0.333 & 0.271\\ 27 & 22 & 27 \\ \hline \end{array}$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1 to 8 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Columns 9 to 16 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Controls: employment in agriculture, district magnitude, women in work, urban population, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, union density, percent in higher education. Full results in Appendix Table A5.

cant, although this time only the welfare spending variable is significant in all specifications. In addition, employment in industry is only significant for 1989-2000, not for 2000-2017.

This suggests that after the 2008 financial crises, industrial workers had not only declined in numbers, but were now less likely to support social democrats.

Robustness tests: We undertake three robustness tests. First, to test whether our results depend on our definition of social democratic parties, we estimate the models with three alternative dependent variables: (1) our social democratic vote share variable, but counting the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as the social democratic party in Italy from 1968 onwards (instead of the PSI); (2) total left vote share, of all votes for social democrats, radical left, and other left parties; and (3) centre right vote share, of votes for the mainstream centre right parties in each country. The results (in Appendix Tables A8 and A9) reveal that the existing correlation between public spending and social democratic votes is even stronger for the 1945-2017 period when counting the PCI rather than PSI. We also find that the key relationships we uncover only hold consistently for social democratic parties but not for all votes for left parties. Similarly, employment in industry is unrelated to support for the centre right, although there is some evidence that public spending is related to support for the centre right in the 1945-2017 period, but not in the 1975-2017 period. In short, only support for social democratic parties seems closely linked to the size of the manufacturing and public sectors.

Second, to explore the heterogeneity of the effect, we break down the analysis by region. Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the pattern of support for social democratic parties in North-Western Europe, Scandinavia, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe. These figures show heterogeneity across and within regions, although North Western Europe, Scandinavia and Southern Europe all show a clear 'rise and fall' pattern. We also estimate the models separately for the 18 Western European and 13 Eastern European cases (in Table A10 in the Appendix), and for Southern Europe, Scandinavia, and the rest of Western Europe (in Table A11). The effect of public spending holds for Western Europe and Southern Europe, but when broken down to the smaller number of cases (in A11), the lack of power reduces

the significance.

Third, given our attempt to trace the arc of social democracy over a century, issues of periodizations are crucial. To test whether our results are driven by our choice of periods, we undertake a sensitivity analysis by randomising when we stop and start the periods we analyze: so, starting in 1950 rather than 1945, in 1970 or 1980 rather than 1975, and in 1985, 1995 or 2005 instead of 2000 or 1989 or 2000. The results of this analysis (in Appendix A12, A13, and A14) suggest that our choice of periods in the main analysis has no effect on our main results.

4 Who Votes for Social Democratic Parties?

The results from this aggregate analysis can only be suggestive of particular relationships between individual voters and social democratic parties. For the most recent period, though, we can see whether the aggregate patterns can be observed at the individual-level, using the European Social Survey (ESS). The eight ESS waves, from 2002 to 2016, cover the period of the Great Recession (2007-10), the refugee crisis (2015-16), and the decline in support for social democratic parties. Fourteen countries in our aggregate data are included in all ESS waves: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.


Following the aggregate results, we focus on the propensity of someone in a manual job in industry (manufacturing, construction, or extraction) or who was a public sector employee (health and social care, education, or public administration and defence) to vote for a social democratic party. To investigate whether social democratic parties are attracting new professionals, as Kitschelt (1990) and others have suggested, we also include a measure of whether someone is a socio-cultural professional (legal services, the media, the creative industries, and universities) (Oesch 2006). We estimate a linear probability model for each

wave separately, with country-fixed effects, and we control for a person's gender, whether they live in a city or town, and their age.

The results are summarized in the bottom panel of Figure 4 (see Appendix Table A15). The top panel shows the average percent of employment in manufacturing and the public sector in the 14 countries at the time of each ESS wave, using Eurostat data. Together, these data reveal a particular perspective on the decline of the social democratic electoral coalition. First, while employment in the public sector has remained stable, employment in industry declined by almost 20 percent in just 12 years (from 24.4 to 21.1 percent of the workforce). Second, there has been a decline in support for social democratic parties amongst industrial workers and public sector employees, although public sector employees remain more likely to vote social democrat than industrial workers. In addition, support for social democrats amongst socio-cultural professionals has remained stable. This coheres with Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2019), that social democrats can lose votes if their policies are opposed by (public sector) trade unions, as well as Piketty's (2018) view that social democrats now mainly rely on the support of 'Brahmins', who in our measures are public sector employees and socio-cultural professionals.

In short, in the most recent period, social democratic parties have been hit by a triple effect: 1) there has been a decline in the size of one of the main groups that have traditionally supported social democrats (industrial workers); 2) there has been a decline in the propensity of their core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them; and 3) these losses have not been compensated by gains in support amongst the newer professional classes.

Figure 4: Industrial workers, public sector employees, and socio cultural professionals, and social democratic voting



Note: The bottom panel shows the effect of being an industrial worker (extraction, manufacturing, or construction), a public sector employee, or a socio-cultural professional on voting for a social democratic party. The data are from 8 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) for 14 countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. The models are estimated with country fixed-effects and several socio-demographic control variables. The full results are in Appendix Table A14. The top panel shows the percent of total employment in manufacturing and the public sector in these same 14 countries, from Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), using the same measures for manufacturing and public sector employment as in the

5 Conclusion

The story of the electoral performance of social democracy over the past century is the story of the rise and fall of a particular electoral coalition. Social democratic parties emerged after 1918 to represent the industrial working class. The primary goal of these parties

was to win an electoral majority and to transform capitalism. This strategy was limited by the size of this social group, and the fact that not all workers supported socialism. Only after social democratic parties moderated their policies (moved closer to the median voter), could the electoral coalition be broadened. By adding another group (public sector workers) to the coalition, social democratic parties started to win between one-third and a half of all votes in many countries. This new coalition established social democrats as one of the main electoral forces in European politics since 1945, on the back of growing public sector employment. From the 1950s to the 1990s social democracy sought to manage or moderate capitalism mainly via increasing public spending. Yet, this coalition unravelled in the 2000s. Globalization and technological change meant that one pillar of this coalition, industrial workers, was now a relatively small group in most countries. Also, as social democratic parties tried to appeal to younger, urban professionals, many industrial workers increasingly supported other parties (such as the populist right or radical left). This left social democrats relying increasingly on public sector employees. But, with the growing constraints on public spending after the Great Recession, this was no-longer a winning strategy. Can social democratic parties build a new electoral coalition? We leave this to others to answer, and hope our results and our dataset encourage new research in this area.

References

- Abou-Chadi, Tarik and Markus Wagner. 2019. "The Electoral Appeal of Party Strategies in Post-Industrial Societies: When Can the Mainstream Left Succeed?" *Journal of Politics* 4:1405–1419.
- Adams, James. 2012. "The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15:401–419.
- Bartolini, Stefano. 2000. Political Mobilization of the Europe Left 1860-1980: The Class Cleavage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles. 1985. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." American Political Science Review 93:609–624.
- Borooah, Vani K. 1987. "The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, 1960-86." European Journal of Political Economy 3:493–521.
- Carey, John M. and Simon Hix. 2011. "The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 55:383–397.
- Colantone, Italo and Piero Stanig. 2018. "Global Competition and Brexit." American Political Science Review 112:201–218.
- Crouch, Colin. 2017. "Membership Density and Trade Union Power." European Review of Labour and Research 23(1):47–61.

- Dinas, Elias et al. 2019. "Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?"

 American Political Science Review 113(2):442–455.
- Dreher, Axel. 2006. "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization." Applied Economics 38(10):1091–1110.
- Eatwell, Roger and Matthew Goodwin. 2018. National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. London: Pelican Books.
- Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1998. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. London: Polity Press.
- Gingrich, Jane and Silja Häusermann. 2015. "The Decline of the Working Class vote, the Reconfiguration of the Welfare Support Coalition and Consequences for the Welfare State."

 Journal of European Social Policy pp. 50–75.
- Guiso, Luigi et al. 2019. "Global Crises and Populism: the Role of Eurozone Institutions." Economic Policy 38:95–139.
- Gygli, Savina et al. 2019. "The KOF Globalisation Index Revisited." Review of International Organizations 14:543?574.
- Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." American Political Science Review 100:165–181.
- Jacobs, Francis. 1989. Western European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide. London: Longman.

- Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira et al. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press chapter The Transformation of Western European Party Systems, pp. 177–200.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1990. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. 2012. *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lipset, Seymor Martin. 1983. *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*. London: Heinemann.
- Neisse, H. 1930. Sozialstatistischen Analyse des Wahlergebnisses.
- Nohlen, Dieter and Philip Stoever. 2010. *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Oesch, Daniel. 2006. Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Piketty, Thomas. N.d. "Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict (Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017)."

 WID.world working paper series. Forthcoming.
- Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sassoon, Donald. 1996. One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York Press.

Timmer, Marcel P. et al. 2015. Routledge Handbook of Industry and Development. London: Routledge chapter Patterns of Structural Change in Developing Countries, pp. 65–83.

von Beyme, Klaus. 1985. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Wagner, Adolph. 1890. Finanzwissenschaft. Leipzig: Winter.

The Rise and Fall of Social Democracy, $1918\mbox{-}2017$ - Online Appendix

6 Appendix 1: Description of the Variables

Centre Right economic left-right position: Economic left-right location of the main centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu).

Centre Right left-right position: Left-right location of the main centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

Centre Right social liberal-authority position: Social left-right location of the main centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

Centre Right vote share: Vote share of the centre right (conservative and Christian democratic) party/parties (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions. We allocated parties to party families via their European and international party memberships and existing categorizations, in particular Von Beyme (1985),Jacobs (1989), and Hix and Lord (1997).

District magnitude (log): Natural log of the electoral system median district magnitude in the year of the election. Source: Boix (1999), Carey and Hix (2011), the Constituency-Level Election Archive (CLEA) (http://www.electiondataarchive.org), and estimated from the size of the legislature.

Employment in agriculture (percent): Employment in agriculture (as a percent of total employment) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS

(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).

Employment in industry (percent): Employment in industry (as a percent of total employment) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.IND.EMPL.ZS.

EU member: Country is a member of the ECSC, EEC, or EU in the year of the election. Source: European Union (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history en).

Eurozone member: Country is a member of the Eurozone in the EU in the year of the election. Source: European Union

(https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history en).

 $\ensuremath{\mathbf{GDP}}$ $\ensuremath{\mathbf{growth:}}$ Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the year of the election.

Source: Maddison Project data

(http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm). Corrected to remove extreme outliers (less than -25 or greater than 25). Missing data entered from closest source, such as Penn World Tables (http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/pwt.html) or World Bank Development Indicator, or closest year in Maddison Project data.

GDP per capita (log): Natural log of GDP per capita in the year of the election.

Source: Maddison Project Data (1990 Int. GK dollars). Missing data entered from closest source, such as Penn World Tables, or World Bank Development Indicator, or closest year

in Maddison Project data.

Globalization index: KOG Globalization index (https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html). Source: Gygli et al. (2019).

Higher education: Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (percent) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SE.TER.ENRR.

Inflation: Consumer price inflation (annual percent) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG.

Life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth, total (years) in the year of election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.DYN.LE00.IN.

Manufacturing index: Index of manufacturing production (1953=100), which measures the volume of trade in manufactured goods in a country relative to 1953. Source: UN International Trade Statistics, 1900-1960.

Population: Natural log of total population in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.TOTL.

Population aged 0 to 14: Population aged 0 to 14 (percent of the total) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS.

Population aged 65 and over: Population aged 65 and older (percent of the total) in

the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS.

Population growth: Population growth (annual percent change) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.GROW.

Post-tax inequality (GINI): Post-tax and spending income inequality in the year of the election, as measured by GINI coefficient. Source: Standardized World Income Inequality Database, version 5.1 (http://fsolt.org/swiid).

Public spending (percent of GDP): Government expenditure in the year of the election (as a percent of GDP). Source: combined from general government final consumption expenditure in the year of the election (as a percent of GDP) from the World Bank Development Indicator (GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS) and government expenditure in the year of the election (as a percent of GDP) from Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/public-spending).

SD economic left-right position: Economic left-right location of social democratic party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

SD party in gov't (coalition-junior): coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social democratic party is in a coalition government, but does not hold the Prime Minister position. Source:Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.

SD party in gov't (coalition-PM): coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social democratic party is in a coalition government, and also holds the Prime Minister position.

Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.

SD party in gov't (single-party): coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social democratic party is in government, and is the only party in the government. Source:Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.

SD social liberal-authority position: Social left-right location of the social democratic party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

(Semi) Presidential system: Presidential, semi-presidential, or power-sharing regime in the year of the election. Source: Robert Elgie (http://www.semi(Semi)Presidentialism.com/?p=1053).

Share of industry in GDP: Share of the industrial sector in gross domestic product, measured in constant 2011 international-dollars. Source: Timmer et al. (2015).

Social Democrat left-right position: Left-right location of the social democratic party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.

Social Democratic party electorate share: Share of total electorate (percent) won by the social democratic party in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

Social Democratic party vote share: Share of votes (percent) won by the social

democratic party in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

Total left vote share: Vote share of the social democrats and the radical/ other left party/parties (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

Turnout: Turnout (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election commissions.

Unemployment: Unemployment in the year of the election, as a percent of the total labour force (modelled International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate. Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS.

Union density: Trade union density (measured as the percent of total wage earners who are trade union members) in the year of the election. Source: ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 51 countries between 1960 and 2014 (http://www.uva-aias.net/en/ictwss).

Urban population: Urban population (as a percent of total population) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS.

Women in work: Labour force participation rate, female (as a percent of the female population aged 15 or older), national estimate. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SL.TLF.CACT.FE.NE.ZS.

Years of democracy: Number of years of continuous democracy in the year of the election (POLITY>7), counted from year of first election, and then starting again at 1 following a period of a non-democracy. Source: Polity IV project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).

Youth unemployment: Youth unemployment in the year of the election, as a percent of the labour force aged 15 to 24 (modelled ILO estimate). Source: World Bank Development Indicator, SL.UEM.1524.ZS.

7 Appendix 2: Supplementary Figures and Tables

Sweden (SAP) Denmark (SD) Norway (DNA) Finland (SSDP) -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 -0 -United Kingdom (Labour) Ireland (Labour) Netherlands (SDAP-PvdA) Belgium (PSB-BPS / PS/SP) 60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 --60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 Luxembourg (PS-LSAP) Germany (SPD) Austria (SDAPÖ/SPÖ) Switzerland (SPS-PSS) 60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 -0 --60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 Italy (PSI/FdP/PDS-DS-PD) France (SFIO-PS) Spain (PSOE/PSC) Portugal (PS) 60 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 50 40 30 20 10 0-Greece (UFWFR etc/PASOK-DS/Potami) Cyprus (EDEK/KISO) 60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 -0 -


Figure A1: Vote shares of social democratic parties in Western Europe


Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.

Poland (PPS/SLD/UP-LiD-ZL) Lithuania (LSDP/SDC-AB) Latvia (LSDSP etc./SDLP-SC) Estonia (ESDTP-ESTP/SDE) 60 -50 -40 -30 --60 -50 -40 -30 20 -20 10 -10 0 --o Czech. (ČSD/ČSSD/ČSS/SDL) Slovakia (SDL/SDSS/SDA-Smer) Hungary (MSZDP-SZDP/MSZP-Ö) Croatia (SDP) 60 --60 50 -40 -30 -20 --50 -40 -30 -20 10 -0 --10 -0 Albania (PS/PSD/LSI) Romania (PSD/PSDR-USL) Slovenia (ZL-SD/LZJ-PS) Macedonia (SDSM) -60 -50 -40 60 -50 40 -30 -20 30 -10 20 -0 10 0-Bulgaria (BSP-B/BSP-KzB) 60 -50 -40 -30 -20 10

Figure A2: Vote shares of social democratic parties in Eastern Europe

Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.





Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing. North Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Table A2: Cases of social democratic parties

Country	Abbr	Name	English name	Years
Albania	PS	Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	Socialist Party of Albania	1992-2017
Albania	PSD	Partia Socialdemokrate e Shqipërisë	Social Democratic Party of Albania	1992-2017
Albania	LSI	Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrim	Socialist Movement for Integration	2004-2017
Austria	SDAPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs	Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria	1918-1945
Austria	SPÖ	Sozialistische/Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	Socialist/Social Democratic Party of Austria	1945-2017
Belgium	BWP/POB	Parti Ouvrier Belge/Belgische Werkliedenpartij	Belgian Labour Party	1918-1945
Belgium	PSB/BSP	Parti socialiste Belge/Belgische Socialistische Partij	Belgian Socialist Party	1945-1978
Belgium	PS	Parti socialiste	Socialist Party (Wallonia)	1978-2017
Belgium	SP / SPa	Socialistische Partij / Socialistische Partij Anders	Socialist Party / Socialist Party Differently (Flanders)	1978-2017
Bulgaria	BSP-B	Balgarska rabotnicheska sotsialdemokraticheska partia (shiroki sotsialisti)	Bulgarian Social Democratic Workers Party (Broad Socialists)	1919-1923
Bulgaria Croatia	BSP / KzB SDP	Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiya / Koalitsiya za Bulgaria Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske	Bugarian Socialist Party / Coalition for Bulgaria Social Democratic Party of Croatia	1991-2017 1992-2017
Cyprus		Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske Kinima Sosialdimokraton Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosi Kentrou / Kinima Sosialdimokraton	Movement of Social Democrats / Social Democrats Movement	1992-2017
Cyprus	EDEK/ KISUS	kinima Sosiaidimokraton Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosi kentrou / kinima Sosiaidimokraton	Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers Party / Czechoslovak Social Democracy / Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party /	1960-2017
Czachaclawakia /Czach Banublia	čenen / čen	Československá sociálně-demokratická dělnická / Československá sociální demokracie	Czech Social Democratic Workers Party / Czechosiovak Social Democracy / Czechosiovak Social Democratic Party /	1920-1946
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic		Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik	German Social Democratic Workers' Party in the Czechoslovak Republic	1920-1946
Czeciiosiovakia/ czecii nepublic	DJDAI	Sociálni demokracie / Československá strana sociálně demokratická / Česká strana sociálně	derman Jouan Democratic Workers Farty in the executosiovak Republic	1320-1330
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic	sn/čssn	demokratická	Social Democracy / Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party / Czech Social Democratic Party	1990-2017
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic		Československá strana socialistická	Czechoslovak Socialist Party	1990-1991
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic		Strana demokratickej l'avice	Party of the Democratic Left	1992-1995
Denmark	SD	Socialdemokratiet	Social Democrats	1918-2017
Estonia		Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatiline Tööliste Partei / Eesti Sotsialistlik Tööliste Partei	Estonian Social Democratic Workers' Party / Estonian Socialist Workers' Party	1918-1933
Estonia	SDE	Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond	Social Democratic Party	1992-2017
Finland	SSDP	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue	Social Democratic Party of Finland	1918-2017
France	SFIO	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière	French Section of the Socialist International	1918-1965
France	FGDS	Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste	Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left	1965-1969
France	PS	Parti socialiste	Socialist Party	1969-2017
Germany	SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Social Democratic Party of Germany	1918-2017
Greece	UFWFR	United Front of Workers, Farmers and Refugees	United Front of Workers, Farmers and Refugees	1926-1927
Greece	ALP	Agricultural and Labour Party	Agricultural and Labour Party	1928-1934
Greece	APF	All People Front	All People Front	1935-1945
Greece	NPU	National Political Union	National Political Union	1946-1948
Greece	PASOK / DS	Panellinio Sosisalistiko Kinima Ellados / Dimokratiki Symparataxi	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement / Democratic Alignment	1974-2017
Greece	Potami	To Potami	The River	2015-2017
Hungary		P Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt / Szociáldemokrata Párt	Hungarian Social Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party	1920-1994
Hungary	MSZP Ö	Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungarian Socialist Party	1989-2013
Hungary Ireland	O Lab	Összefogás Labour Party	Unity Labour Party	2014-2017 1918-2017
Italy	PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano / Partito Socialista Unificato (1968)	Labour Party Italian Socialist Party / Unified Socialist Party	1918-2017
Italy	FdP	Fronte del Popolo (PCI+PSI)	People's Front	1948-1952
Italy	PCI/PDS/DS	Partito Democratico della Sinistra / Demoratici di Sinistra	Democratic Party of the Left / Democrats of the Left	1967-2005
Italy	Ulivo / PD	L'Ulivo / Partito Democratico	The Olive Tree / Democratic Party	2006-2017
Latvia	LSDSP	Latvijas Sociāldemokrātiskā Strādnieku Partija	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party	1920-2017
Latvia	SLAT / TSP	Saskaņa Latvijai - Atdzimšana Tautsaimniecībai / Tautas Saskaņas partija	Harmony for Latvia / National Harmony Party (of Russian minority)	1990-1994
Latvia	SDS / SDP	Sociāldemokrātu savienība / Sociāldemokrātiskā partija	Social Democratic Union / Social Democratic Party	2002-2005
Latvia	SDLP	Sociāldemokrātiskā Labklājības partija	Social Democratic Welfare Party	2002-2005
Latvia	SC/SDPS	Saskaņas Centrs / Sociāldemokrātiskā Partija "Saskaņa"	Harmony Centre / Social Democratic Party "Harmony"	2006-2017
Lithuania	LSDP	Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija	Social Democratic Party of Lithuania	1991-2017
Lithuania	LDDP	Lietuvos demokratinė darbo partija	Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania	1991-2003
Lithuania	SDC-AB	Social-Democratic Coalition of Algirdas Brazauskas	Social-Democratic Coalition of Algirdas Brazauskas	2000-2003
Luxembourg	PS / LSAP	Parti socialiste / Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei	Socialist Party / Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	1918-2017
Macedonia	SDSM	Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia	1990-2017
Netherlands	SDAP	Sociaal Demcratische Arbeiders Partij	Social Democratic Workers' Party	1918-1945
Netherlands	PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid	Labour Party	1946-2017
Norway	DNA	Det norske Arbeiderpartei	Labour Party	1918-2017
Poland	PPS	Polska Partia Socjalistyczna	Polish Socialist Party	1919-1928
Poland	SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Democratic Left Alliance	1990-2017
Poland	UP	Unia Pracy	Labour Union	1993-2006
Poland	LiD	Lewica i Demokraci	Left and Democrats	2007-2010
Poland	ZL	Zjednoczona Lewica	United Left	2015-2017
Portugal	PS FREE	Partido Socialista	Socialist Party	1975-2017
Romania Romania	FPSR PSD	Federația Partidelor Socialiste din România	Federation of Socialist Parties from Romania	1926-1927
Romania Romania	PSD FDSN	Partidul Social Democrat Frontul Democrat al Salvării Nationale	Social Democratic Party Democratic National Salvation Front	1928-1948 1992-2005
Romania Romania	PSDR PSDR	Frontul Democrat al Salvàrii Nationale Partidul Social Democrat Român	Democratic National Salvation Front Romanian Social Democratic Party	1992-2005 1996-2011
Romania Romania	USL	Partidui Social Democrat Roman Uniunea Social Liberală	Social Liberal Union	2012-2017
Slovakia	SDL	Strana demokratickej ľavice	Party of the Democratic Left	1993-2005
Slovakia	SDSS	Sociálnodemokratické strana Slovenska	Social Democratic Party of Slovakia	1993-2005
Slovakia	Smer	Smer-sociálna demokracia	Direction Social Democracy	2002-2017
Slovakia	SDA	Sociálnodemokratická alternatíva	Social Democracy	2002-2017
Slovenia	ZL/SD	Združena lista socialnih demokratov / Socialni demokrati	United List of Social Democrats / Social Democrats	1992-2017
Slovenia	LZJ-PS	Lista Zorana Jankovića – Pozitivna Slovenija	Zoran Janković's List – Positive Slovenia	2011-2013
Slovenia	ZL	Združena levica	United Left	2014-2017
Spain	PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	1977-2008
Spain	PSC	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya	Party of the Socialists of Catalunya	1977-2008
Sweden	SAP	Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti	Social Democratic Workers' Party	1918-2017
Switzerland	SPS/PSS	Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz/Parti socialiste suisse/Partito Socialista Svizzero	Social Democratic/Socialist Party of Switzerland	1918-2017
Switzerianu				
United Kingdom	Lab	Labour Party	Labour Party	1918-2017

Table A3: Correlates of social democratic party vote shares, 1945-2017

	Analysis	s of levels	Analysis o	f differences
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.157**	0.193***	0.168**	0.163**
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.172**	0.170*	0.148**	0.150**
	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.003	-0.003	-0.036	-0.036
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.030)
District Magnitude	0.574	0.787	0.948	0.912
	(1.292)	(1.308)	(1.596)	(1.581)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.058*	-0.055*	-0.061**	-0.062**
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	1.335	1.097	-3.175***	-3.187***
	(1.256)	(1.230)	(0.957)	(0.962)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	0.976	0.634	-2.507**	-2.506**
	(1.327)	(1.285)	(0.963)	(0.966)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-2.849***	-3.056***	-2.461***	-2.451***
	(0.912)	(0.925)	(0.721)	(0.721)
Turnout	-0.084	-0.086	0.300**	0.299**
	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.130)	(0.129)
GDP per capita (Madison)	3.577	5.310	2.008	2.447
	(2.877)	(3.238)	(2.969)	(2.910)
GDP growth (Madison)	-0.097	-0.057	-0.166	-0.167
	(0.138)	(0.145)	(0.224)	(0.225)
EU member	-1.136	-0.385	-1.283	-1.052
	(2.055)	(2.055)	(1.476)	(1.572)
Eurozone member	2.646	2.848	-0.082	-0.021
	(2.182)	(2.112)	(1.335)	(1.307)
Presidential system	11.214**	10.644**	2.444	2.463
	(4.179)	(3.886)	(4.763)	(4.777)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	381	381	353	353
R-squared	0.162	0.176	0.169	0.170
Number of countries	31	31	31	31

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Models 3 and 4 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Standard errors in parentheses. 38

Table A4: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1975-2017

	Analysis of levels			Analysis of differences				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.249*	0.222*			0.229**	0.206		
	(0.129)	(0.122)			(0.110)	(0.125)		
Welfare spending (% GDP)			0.509**	0.532**			0.839**	0.864**
			(0.243)	(0.239)			(0.318)	(0.327)
Employment in industry (%)	0.981***	0.866***	0.970**	0.862**	0.147	0.167	0.224	0.207
	(0.277)	(0.274)	(0.348)	(0.324)	(0.327)	(0.330)	(0.334)	(0.323)
Globalization Index	0.027	0.036	0.251	0.226	0.210	0.179	0.411	0.431
	(0.350)	(0.345)	(0.451)	(0.428)	(0.473)	(0.477)	(0.365)	(0.378)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.102**	0.100**	0.046	0.049	0.029	0.032	0.040	0.040
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.006	-0.008	0.062	0.049	-0.051	-0.050	-0.024	-0.024
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.037)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-0.347	-0.598	-0.148	-0.524	-3.523**	-3.456**	-3.908**	-3.954**
	(1.451)	(1.431)	(1.826)	(1.806)	(1.393)	(1.397)	(1.428)	(1.407)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.936	-0.791	-1.002	-1.001	-3.651***	-3.583***	-4.516***	-4.579***
•	(1.435)	(1.460)	(1.304)	(1.302)	(1.093)	(1.110)	(1.007)	(1.027)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-3.214**	-3.233**	-4.703***	-5.031***	-3.705***	-3.714***	-5.843***	-5.837***
	(1.348)	(1.348)	(1.314)	(1.303)	(1.028)	(1.029)	(1.152)	(1.157)
Turnout	0.121	0.100	0.072	0.038	0.313*	0.309*	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.148)	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.142)	(0.171)	(0.167)	(0.208)	(0.207)
Union density	-0.197	-0.184	-0.457**	-0.442**	-0.113	-0.106	-0.454*	-0.456*
	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.191)	(0.182)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.241)	(0.245)
Higher education	-0.057	-0.017	-0.052	0.014	-0.040	-0.039	-0.177	-0.175
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Life Expectancy	2.500***	2.769***	0.850	1.573**	1.916	1.827	-1.289	-1.310
	(0.707)	(0.714)	(0.639)	(0.585)	(1.241)	(1.221)	(1.575)	(1.570)
District magnitude (%)	2.033*	1.922*	1.835**	1.667***	1.071	1.053	1.247	1.233
	(1.166)	(1.051)	(0.667)	(0.583)	(1.270)	(1.219)	(0.851)	(0.836)
Employment in agriculture	0.490*	0.394	0.543	0.479	0.116	0.135	-1.072**	-1.102**
	(0.272)	(0.259)	(0.583)	(0.516)	(0.306)	(0.315)	(0.461)	(0.481)
Women in work	0.072	0.087	-0.035	-0.010	-0.062	-0.078	-0.218	-0.214
	(0.161)	(0.155)	(0.138)	(0.131)	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.217)	(0.223)
Urban population	-0.070	-0.030	-0.220	-0.125	-0.324	-0.336	-0.623	-0.624
	(0.228)	(0.231)	(0.256)	(0.248)	(0.608)	(0.615)	(0.459)	(0.449)
Population (log)	-5.476	-6.076	16.241	11.144	-36.827	-45.650	-10.967	-6.510
	(12.266)	(11.672)	(17.767)	(15.900)	(46.721)	(47.695)	(47.187)	(48.821)
Population aged 65 and over	0.261	0.398	0.939	0.999	-1.306	-1.330	-1.197	-1.210
-	(0.955)	(0.953)	(0.923)	(0.908)	(0.793)	(0.836)	(0.971)	(0.982)
Population aged 0 to 14	-0.018	-0.060	0.380	0.285	1.499	1.575	1.605	1.529
-	(0.537)	(0.554)	(0.560)	(0.629)	(1.047)	(1.070)	(1.056)	(1.103)
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
	244	244	193	193	227	227	171	171
Observations R-squared	244 0.223	$\frac{244}{0.240}$	193 0.308	193 0.335	227 0.234	227 0.239	171 0.343	171 0.344

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences).

Table A5: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1989-2017

		Analysis of levels			Analysis of differences			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.269	0.223			0.281*	0.267*		
	(0.166)	(0.153)			(0.139)	(0.142)		
Welfare spending (% GDP)			0.815**	0.750**			0.893**	0.918**
			(0.385)	(0.353)			(0.392)	(0.382)
Employment in industry (%)	0.628*	0.462	1.265**	1.019**	-0.206	-0.207	0.573	0.588
	(0.338)	(0.375)	(0.462)	(0.488)	(0.345)	(0.343)	(0.398)	(0.408)
Globalization Index	0.373	0.438	0.534	0.711	-0.035	-0.031	0.300	0.283
	(0.424)	(0.423)	(0.475)	(0.441)	(0.556)	(0.556)	(0.464)	(0.460)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.135*	0.139*	0.054	0.059	0.024	0.028	0.019	0.017
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Centre Right left-right position	0.008	0.009	0.069	0.060	-0.054	-0.055	0.000	0.001
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	-2.967	-3.211	-2.371	-3.010	-4.958***	-5.046***	-4.183**	-4.099*
	(2.005)	(2.078)	(2.145)	(2.501)	(1.705)	(1.698)	(1.996)	(2.016)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-0.368	-0.492	0.307	0.033	-4.042***	-4.053***	-3.780***	-3.793***
,	(1.444)	(1.432)	(1.034)	(1.088)	(1.177)	(1.175)	(1.320)	(1.327)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-3.425*	-3.497*	-4.609**	-4.983**	-4.516***	-4.545***	-5.468***	-5.470**
	(1.923)	(1.971)	(1.709)	(1.873)	(1.258)	(1.243)	(1.430)	(1.453)
Turnout	0.116	0.112	-0.088	-0.092	0.312	0.314	-0.014	-0.015
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.210)	(0.211)	(0.228)	(0.228)
Union density	-0.156	-0.143	-0.662*	-0.669*	-0.028	-0.025	-0.236	-0.207
e mon density	(0.160)	(0.155)	(0.348)	(0.336)	(0.174)	(0.172)	(0.452)	(0.492)
Higher education	0.011	0.039	-0.105	-0.065	0.023	0.021	-0.113	-0.107
Inglier education	(0.087)	(0.094)	(0.128)	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.154)	(0.153)
District magnitude (%)	3.193**	3.037**	2.501***	2.341***	2.119	2.101	1.774***	1.764**
District magnitude (70)	(1.387)				(1.690)	(1.653)		
El	0.443	(1.314) 0.347	(0.703) 0.371	(0.687) 0.251	0.106	0.113	(0.623) -0.852	(0.626) -0.918
Employment in agriculture								
Women in work	(0.263) 0.075	(0.244) 0.096	(0.849) -0.269	(0.743) -0.220	(0.297) -0.056	(0.299)	(0.693) -0.027	(0.740) 0.018
women in work						-0.091		
II la	(0.213)	(0.222)	(0.189)	(0.198)	(0.305)	(0.340)	(0.302)	(0.355)
Urban population	-0.407	-0.292	-0.452	-0.251	-1.071	-0.980	-1.075	-1.178
D 1 1 (1)	(0.316)	(0.352)	(0.419)	(0.414)	(1.303)	(1.388)	(1.248)	(1.402)
Population (log)	0.091	1.331	36.301*	38.016*	-32.993	-28.514	-10.697	-14.727
	(16.104)	(16.198)	(19.970)	(19.812)	(49.717)	(48.114)	(52.510)	(52.238)
Population aged 65 and over	0.112	0.365	1.045	1.434	-1.987*	-1.988*	-1.774	-1.809
	(0.970)	(1.058)	(0.938)	(1.038)	(1.115)	(1.118)	(1.456)	(1.495)
Population aged 0 to 14	0.796	0.886	1.194	1.376	0.450	0.587	1.399	1.288
	(0.853)	(0.861)	(0.825)	(0.859)	(1.126)	(1.185)	(1.267)	(1.301)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	180	180	141	141	170	170	136	136
R-squared	0.204	0.209	0.323	0.341	0.270	0.271	0.333	0.334
Number of countries	27	27	22	22	27	27	22	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences) Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A6: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 2000-2017

		Analysis	of levels		Analysis of differences			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public Spending (% of GDP)	0.818**	0.792**			0.646**	0.644**		
	(0.304)	(0.293)			(0.312)	(0.313)		
Welfare spending (% GDP)			1.900***	1.873***			1.497**	1.615**
			(0.574)	(0.493)			(0.690)	(0.668)
Employment in industry (%)	0.632	0.578	1.949*	1.785*	0.354	0.340	0.652	0.565
	(0.761)	(0.756)	(1.001)	(1.022)	(0.515)	(0.566)	(0.725)	(0.704)
Globalization Index	0.983**	1.106**	1.118*	1.493*	0.423	0.434	0.281	0.568
	(0.366)	(0.424)	(0.623)	(0.753)	(0.487)	(0.475)	(0.716)	(0.723)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.029	0.035	0.114	0.133	-0.037	-0.038	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.080)	(0.077)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.137*	-0.143**	-0.006	-0.038	-0.155***	-0.155***	-0.073	-0.076
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.107)	(0.113)
SD party in gov't (single-party)	0.359	0.153	-1.581	-2.269	-1.011	-1.018	-4.025	-4.292
	(3.413)	(3.410)	(4.283)	(4.348)	(2.040)	(2.065)	(2.907)	(2.825)
SD party in gov't (coalition-PM)	-1.725	-1.776	0.334	-0.103	-3.515*	-3.511*	-2.334	-2.597
,	(1.557)	(1.548)	(1.482)	(1.509)	(1.829)	(1.838)	(2.037)	(2.042)
SD party in gov't (coalition-junior)	-4.571**	-4.757**	-3.409	-4.184*	-4.281*	-4.282*	-4.740*	-4.725*
	(1.767)	(1.797)	(2.103)	(2.328)	(2.151)	(2.162)	(2.690)	(2.671)
Turnout	-0.007	0.011	-0.346	-0.287	0.094	0.096	-0.085	-0.034
	(0.245)	(0.234)	(0.265)	(0.239)	(0.246)	(0.243)	(0.348)	(0.331
Union density	-1.403***	-1.406***	-1.662***	-1.682***	-0.603*	-0.607*	-0.305	-0.286
	(0.324)	(0.318)	(0.471)	(0.439)	(0.326)	(0.338)	(0.658)	(0.664
Higher education	-0.132	-0.129	-0.192	-0.198	-0.153	-0.153	-0.154	-0.117
inglier education	(0.154)	(0.156)	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.188)	(0.187
District magnitude (%)	6.667***	6.795***	5.831***	6.178***	8.456***	8.463***	7.998***	8.005**
District magnitude (70)	(0.696)	(0.658)			(0.856)	(0.869)		(2.794)
F	0.153	0.075	(0.858) -0.282	(1.010) -0.529	0.518	0.516	(2.681) -1.062	-1.083
Employment in agriculture								
Women in work	(0.519)	(0.555)	(1.308)	(1.339)	(0.572)	(0.575)	(1.381)	(1.378)
women in work	0.262	-0.202	-0.571	-0.432	-0.168	-0.166	-0.025	0.154
***	(0.450)	(0.494)	(0.473)	(0.484)	(0.607)	(0.611)	(0.834)	(0.883)
Urban population	0.452	0.660	-0.069	0.333	-2.729	-2.727	-5.336***	-5.408**
D 1.1. (2.)	(0.861)	(0.888)	(1.135)	(1.140)	(2.544)	(2.555)	(1.876)	(1.799)
Population (log)	-15.089	-13.923	69.958	76.205*	12.364	12.418	33.798	33.826
	(20.793)	(20.159)	(41.905)	(43.486)	(65.421)	(65.911)	(75.560)	(81.849
Population aged 65 and over	-1.185	-0.683	0.048	1.235	-0.970	-0.981	-0.229	-0.498
	(1.364)	(1.956)	(1.417)	(1.895)	(1.871)	(1.854)	(2.403)	(2.282)
Population aged 0 to 14	6.257***	6.341***	6.919***	6.809***	2.697	2.669	3.208	2.828
	(1.321)	(1.364)	(1.683)	(1.582)	(2.041)	(2.030)	(2.306)	(2.093)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	107	107	84	84	107	107	84	84
R-squared	0.502	0.505	0.534	0.548	0.452	0.452	0.403	0.415
Number of countries	27	27	22	22	27	27	22	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences) Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A7: SD Economic and Social Left Right position over the period 1945 to 2017

	Aggregate Sample	Non East Europe	East Europe
	(1)	(2)	(3)
SD economic left-right position	0.170**	0.0747	0.554**
	(0.0712)	(0.0471)	(0.220)
SD social left-right position	0.156**	0.0829	0.549***
	(0.0702)	(0.0562)	(0.161)
Centre Right <i>economic</i> left-right position	0.0233	0.0494	-0.122
	(0.0448)	(0.0451)	(0.0993)
Centre Right $social$ left-right position	-0.0312	-0.0726*	0.0960
	(0.0482)	(0.0376)	(0.118)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	386	298	88
R-squared	0.171	0.249	0.457
Number of countries	31	18	13

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. All models estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A8: Robustness tests: social democratic party vote share vs. social democratic, including the Italian Communist party, vote share vs. total left vote share and vs. centre right vote share as dependent variables, 1945-2017

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Soc. Dem. vote share	SD with Communist Party	Total Left vote share	C. Right vote share
Public Spending (% GDP)	0.192***	0.207***	0.0843	0.143
	(0.0594)	(0.0602)	(0.0725)	(0.0888)
District Magnitude (log)	2.612	3.444***	2.714**	0.787
	(1.652)	(1.250)	(1.072)	(1.110)
Turnout	-0.172	-0.162	-0.131	0.0868
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.122)	(0.144)
GDP per capita (Madison)	6.958**	7.822**	6.560	0.752
	(2.928)	(2.883)	(4.066)	(5.049)
GDP growth (Madison)	-0.0666	-0.0453	-0.152	0.187
	(0.159)	(0.157)	(0.177)	(0.160)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade Fes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	409	409	409	409
R-squared	0.159	0.188	0.088	0.167
Number of countries	31	31	31	31

Note: Column 1 exhibits estimates for Soc. Dem as in Table 3; Column 2, includes the Italian Communist Party; Column 3 focuses on total left and Column 4 total right. All models are conditional on country Fes, Decade Fes and, progressively, Country Year Time Trends. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include regime types, european membership and parties left and right social and economic position.

Table A9: Robustness tests: social democratic party vote share vs. total left vote share and vs. centre right vote share as dependent variables, 1975-2017

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Soc. Dem. vote share	SD with Communist Party	Total Left vote share	C. Right vote share
Public Spending (% GDP)	0.753***	0.737***	0.140	0.202
	(0.260)	(0.250)	(0.352)	(0.271)
District Magnitude (log)	0.655**	0.546*	-0.114	0.385
	(0.313)	(0.293)	(0.301)	(0.336)
Turnout	0.164	0.373	0.198	0.104
	(0.400)	(0.346)	(0.410)	(0.476)
GDP per capita (Madison)	0.156	0.126	0.115	-0.0295
	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.152)	(0.155)
GDP growth (Madison)	-0.380**	-0.391**	-0.212	-0.285
	(0.177)	(0.180)	(0.172)	(0.288)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade Fes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	209	209	209	209
R-squared	0.317	0.337	0.160	0.294
Number of countries	22	22	22	22

Note: Column 1 exhibits estimates for Soc. Dem as in Table 3; Column 2, includes the Italian Communist Party; Column 3 focuses on total left and Column 4 total right. All models are conditional on country Fes, Decade Fes and, progressively, Country Year Time Trends. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include regime types, european membership and parties left and right social and economic position.

Table A10: Heterogeneity Analysis, 1945-2017

	Western	n Europe	Eastern	Europe
	$(1) \qquad (2)$		(3)	(4)
Public spending (% ofGDP)	0.0954*	0.131**	1.167***	1.343**
	(0.0505)	(0.0548)	(0.370)	(0.457)
District magnitude (log)	-0.706	-0.534	3.809	3.134
	(0.737)	(0.744)	(4.305)	(4.198)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.00435	-0.00235	0.0338	0.029
	(0.0075)	(0.0075)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Social democratic party in government	0.572	0.323	-2.536	-2.277
	(0.900)	(0.805)	(1.609)	(1.682)
Turnout	-0.0093	-0.0084	-0.189	-0.113
	(0.117)	(0.105)	(0.169)	(0.202)
GDP per capita (Madison)	2.878	4.506	8.073	3.267
	(2.984)	(3.729)	(4.855)	(6.089)
GDP growth (Madison)	-0.130	-0.0744	-0.321	-0.379
	(0.121)	(0.142)	(0.358)	(0.349)
Eu member	-1.079	-0.405	-5.546	-7.264
	(2.487)	(2.500)	(4.046)	(4.923)
Presidential system	11.51***	10.96***	4.657	5.523
	(1.656)	(1.631)	(7.391)	(8.090)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	294	294	87	87
R-squared	0.135	0.150	0.242	0.248
Number of countries	18	18	13	13

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties in Western Europe. Western Europe includes Southern European and Scandinavian countries. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the overall level of support for SD parties in Eastern Europe. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A11: Heterogeneity Analysis within Western Europe, 1945-2017

	Western Europe	Souther	n Europe	Scandinavia
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.119	-0.612**	-0.328	0.0284
	(0.112)	(0.149)	(0.293)	(0.114)
District magnitude (log)	-1.776	-0.239	1.826	2.587
	(1.538)	(0.563)	(1.041)	(3.912)
District mag.*SD left-right position	0.0125	0.0614	0.0450	-0.000531
	(0.0138)	(0.0310)	(0.0336)	(0.00912)
Social democratic party in government	-1.233	0.0705	-0.0491	0.423
	(0.841)	(1.523)	(1.690)	(0.424)
Turnout	0.0753	0.549*	0.585	-0.241
	(0.154)	(0.252)	(0.299)	(0.149)
GDP per capita (Madison)	12.03**	-9.341	-5.258	0.246
	(4.172)	(12.41)	(16.83)	(3.709)
GDP growth (Madison)	0.0536	-1.125**	-0.842*	0.221
	(0.141)	(0.257)	(0.356)	(0.147)
Eu member	-4.317**	11.71*	15.38**	-1.589
	(1.699)	(4.672)	(4.439)	(3.641)
Observations	155	59	59	80
R-squared	0.480	0.576	0.548	0.639
Number of countries	9	5	5	4
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Columns 1 exhibits estimates on the overall level of support for social democratic parties in Western Europe. Column 2 and 3 focus on Southern Europe. Column 2 studies the effect on SD parties, Column 3 includes the Italian Communist Party. Column 4 focuses on Scandinavian countries. All estimates are conditional on country fixed effects, decade fixed effects and, progressively, country year specific time trends. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A12: Randomization, 1950-2017

	Po	st-1950
	Analysis of levels	Analysis of differences
	(1)	(2)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.197**	0.148**
	(0.079)	(0.066)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.158	0.134**
	(0.097)	(0.059)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.012	-0.034
	(0.040)	(0.028)
District magnitude (log)	0.139	0.970
	(1.537)	(1.455)
District mag.*SD left-right position	-0.046	-0.056**
	(0.035)	(0.025)
Social democratic party in government	1.250	-6.392***
	(1.175)	(1.308)
Turnout (%)	-0.123	0.287**
	(0.107)	(0.122)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes
Observations	381	353
R-squared	0.176	0.170
Number of countries	31	31

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Column 1 estimates effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas Column 2 estimates changes in support between elections (first differences). The estimates replicate Table 3, but with a different time period, from 1950 onwards. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: GDP per capita (log), GDP growth, EU member, Eurozone member, presidential system.

Table A13: Randomization, 1970-2017 and 1980-2017

		Pos	st-1970		Post-1980			
	Analysis	of levels	Analysis of differences		Analysis of levels		Analysis of differe	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.205* (0.105)		0.225* (0.112)		0.110 (0.121)		0.200 (0.146)	
Welfare spending (% of GDP)		0.613** (0.238)		0.794** (0.362)		0.675** (0.241)		0.794** (0.362)
Employment in industry (%)	0.841*** (0.241)	0.810** (0.307)	0.201 (0.338)	0.267 (0.388)	0.766** (0.345)	0.939** (0.355)	0.152 (0.390)	0.267 (0.388)
Globalization index	$0.030 \\ (0.327)$	0.211 (0.437)	0.261 (0.488)	0.455 (0.426)	0.093 (0.362)	0.263 (0.447)	0.297 (0.496)	0.455 (0.426)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.078 (0.048)	0.048 (0.035)	$0.008 \\ (0.036)$	0.018 (0.030)	0.105** (0.050)	0.049 (0.040)	0.019 (0.038)	0.018 (0.030)
Centre Right left-right position	0.002 (0.048)	0.053 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.043)	0.002 (0.055)	0.050 (0.056)	-0.054 (0.043)	-0.023 (0.043)
Social dem. party in government	-1.675 (1.040)	-2.748** (1.280)	-3.475** (1.307)	-3.293** (1.523)	-3.071** (1.109)	-3.163** (1.350)	-3.960** (1.557)	-3.293** (1.523)
Turnout (%)	0.110 (0.136)	0.039 (0.144)	0.350** (0.160)	$0.202 \\ (0.210)$	0.041 (0.146)	-0.008 (0.168)	0.363** (0.172)	0.202 (0.210)
Union Density	-0.192 (0.116)	-0.463** (0.191)	-0.120 (0.144)	-0.436 (0.292)	-0.183 (0.140)	-0.517** (0.214)	-0.125 (0.161)	-0.436 (0.292)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	244	193	244	193	227	171	227	171
R-squared	0.223	0.308	0.240	0.335	0.234	0.343	0.239	0.344
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22	27	22

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Estimates replicate Table 4, but with a different time period. Precisely, Columns 1 to 4 perform the analysis from 1970 onwards, whereas Columns 5 to 8 do so from 1980 onwards. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant, and the control variables: employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, life expectancy, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, percent in higher education.

Table A14: Randomization, 1985-2017, 1995-2017, and 2005-2017

	Post-	-1985		-1995	Post-2005	
	(1)	(2)	Analysi (3)	s of levels (4)	(5)	(6)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.223 (0.151)		0.505** (0.209)		0.746* (0.396)	(-)
Public spending on social welfare (% of GDP)	(3 2)	0.905*** (0.239)	(* **)	1.032** (0.381)	(====,	0.843 (0.786)
Employment in industry (%)	0.627* (0.354)	1.007** (0.447)	0.547 (0.548)	1.033 (0.630)	0.428 (1.549)	1.507 (1.862)
Globalization index	0.248 (0.410)	$0.475 \\ (0.421)$	0.930*** (0.212)	0.984** (0.473)	-0.608 (0.994)	-2.814 (2.442)
Social Democrat left-right position	0.112 (0.068)	0.033 (0.050)	0.116* (0.062)	0.128* (0.062)	0.052 (0.066)	$0.007 \\ (0.104)$
Centre Right left-right position	$0.007 \\ (0.057)$	$0.075 \\ (0.054)$	-0.123** (0.051)	$0.007 \\ (0.068)$	-0.186*** (0.048)	0.021 (0.132)
Social democratic party in government	-2.833* (1.424)	-3.292* (1.615)	-2.289* (1.322)	-2.743 (1.752)	-2.714 (2.694)	0.260 (2.781)
Turnout (%)	0.083 (0.166)	-0.073 (0.167)	-0.004 (0.179)	-0.147 (0.219)	0.171 (0.206)	0.650 (0.532)
Observations	201	162	141	111	73	58
R-squared	0.171	0.340	0.496	0.471	0.474	0.504
Number of countries	27	22	27	22	27	22
			Analysis	of differences		
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Public spending (% of GDP)	0.297* (0.156)		0.661** (0.250)		0.484 (0.439)	
Public spending on social welfare (% of GDP)	(3 2 3)	0.873** (0.399)	(/	1.756*** (0.528)	(=)	-0.269 (1.036)
Employment in industry (%)	-0.104 (0.363)	$0.666 \\ (0.467)$	0.289 (0.452)	1.084* (0.536)	-0.992 (0.870)	-0.909 (1.354)
Globalization index	0.073 (0.530)	0.342 (0.488)	-0.270 (0.748)	$0.460 \\ (0.597)$	-0.095 (1.198)	-0.027 (1.373)
Social Democrat left-right position	$0.006 \\ (0.047)$	0.002 (0.036)	$0.006 \\ (0.066)$	-0.005 (0.055)	-0.086 (0.079)	0.051 (0.144)
Centre Right left-right position	-0.058 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.110* (0.054)	-0.016 (0.079)	-0.155* (0.086)	-0.065 (0.170)
Social democratic party in government	-4.432*** (1.590)	-3.420* (1.807)	-3.559** (1.404)	-4.119* (2.214)	-9.589*** (2.559)	-8.585** (2.724)
Turnout (%)	0.349* (0.189)	$0.164 \\ (0.221)$	0.295 (0.221)	$0.065 \\ (0.278)$	0.344 (0.230)	0.067 (0.375)
Observations	191	157	139	107	73	58
R-squared Number of countries	$0.207 \\ 27$	$0.206 \\ 22$	$0.258 \\ 27$	0.337 22	$0.573 \\ 27$	$0.560 \\ 22$
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social democratic parties, whereas models 7 to 12 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). The estimates replicate Table 5, but with a different time period. Precisely, Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8 perform the analysis for a period just before the end of the Cold-War, whereas Columns 3, 4, 9, and 10 for a period just after the end of it. Columns 5, 6, 11, and 12 perform the analysis for a period just after the Great Recession. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for the constant and the control variables: employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, union density, percent in higher education.

Table A15: Individual-level correlates of voting or a social democratic party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ESS Waves	1-2002	2-2004	3-2006	4-2008	5-2010	6-2012	7 - 2014	8-2016
Worker in industry	0.0311**	0.0392**	0.0386**	0.0303**	0.0122	0.0204	0.0209*	0.0189*
	(0.0107)	(0.0132)	(0.0137)	(0.0129)	(0.0122)	(0.0150)	(0.0117)	(0.00885)
Public sector employee	0.0784***	0.0862***	0.0646***	0.0805***	0.0790***	0.0632***	0.0664***	0.0583***
	(0.0158)	(0.0187)	(0.0146)	(0.0130)	(0.0115)	(0.0121)	(0.00976)	(0.00992)
Socio- cultural professional	0.0241*	0.0208	0.0352	0.0291*	0.0131	0.0402*	0.0261**	0.0245*
	(0.0126)	(0.0142)	(0.0200)	(0.0145)	(0.0135)	(0.0188)	(0.0121)	(0.0115)
Male	0.0108	0.00461	0.00101	-0.00188	0.00287	0.00502	0.00177	-0.00436
	(0.00640)	(0.00664)	(0.00732)	(0.00456)	(0.00671)	(0.00586)	(0.00429)	(0.00538)
Lived in a city	0.0205	0.0106	0.0415***	0.0214**	0.0350***	0.0264**	0.0231*	0.0359**
	(0.0117)	(0.00644)	(0.0117)	(0.00982)	(0.00893)	(0.00933)	(0.0113)	(0.0124)
Lives in a town	0.0186*	0.0236***	0.0292***	0.0273***	0.0168	0.0144	0.0172***	0.0120
	(0.00934)	(0.00764)	(0.00866)	(0.00581)	(0.00976)	(0.0105)	(0.00452)	(0.00833)
Age	0.00260***	0.00255***	0.00220***	0.00269***	0.00247***	0.00266***	0.00258***	0.00252***
	(0.000289)	(0.000374)	(0.000238)	(0.000294)	(0.000212)	(0.000273)	(0.000250)	(0.000287)
Observations	28,686	27,843	28,603	29,049	27,428	28,921	26,947	24,668
R-squared	0.018	0.018	0.016	0.021	0.020	0.022	0.023	0.023
Number of countries	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	14

Note: Dependent variable: vote for a social democratic party. Estimation: Linear probability model with country fixed-effects. Baselines: female, lives in a rural area, other professional and socio-economic status. Data from the 8 waves of the European Social Survey. Countries included: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Standard errors in parentheses.