

Discussion of Estimating Linearized Heterogeneous Agent Models Using Panel Data by Tamas Papp and Michael Reiter

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Abstract

The techniques proposed in Papp and Reiter (2020) allow the use of cross-sectional and aggregate data observed at different frequencies in the estimation of dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models. However, the question is whether technique is getting ahead of what is sensible in terms of currently available empirical strategies to estimate macroeconomic models which are – without exception – misspecified.

Keywords: Solution techniques, heterogeneous agents, misspecification.

1. Introduction

During the nineties, the first algorithms were developed to solve models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty. There are now several algorithms.¹ The method proposed in Reiter (2009) stands out in being much faster than other algorithms. As discussed below, the “Reiter approach” is not suitable for all models, but if it is then it comes with a massive computational advantage. Papp and Reiter (2020) extend the Reiter approach to make it suitable for estimation when cross-sectional information is not available at the same frequency as aggregate data, a situation that is quite typical.

In section 2, I describe the Reiter method in the most straightforward way. This may be of some educational value, since the Reiter method is often combined with additional

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¹See Algan et al. (2014) for an overview.

11 bells and whistles which obscure its intrinsic ability to obtain a numerical solution at low
12 computational cost. This detailed discussion will make it easy to illustrate a weakness of the
13 Reiter method and that is dealing with occasionally binding constraints. In the presence of
14 occasionally binding constraints, it is important for the Reiter method – and more so than
15 for other perturbation methods – that the fluctuations in aggregate uncertainty are really
16 small. This weakness can be easily overcome by using penalty functions instead of inequality
17 constraints, which often are actually more realistic than inequality constraints.

18 In section 3, I discuss Papp and Reiter (2020) in detail and I will refer to my discussion
19 in section 2 and reiterate that the complexity can be reduced if penalty functions are used
20 instead of inequality constraints.

21 The last section touches upon a more fundamental issue. Maximum Likelihood (ML), a
22 full-information estimation method, is used by Papp and Reiter (2020) to estimate the model.
23 ML and especially its Bayesian version are by far the most popular estimation procedure for
24 stochastic dynamic macroeconomic models. Are these methods the right ones when we know
25 that macroeconomic models are misspecified in at least some nontrivial dimensions? And the
26 question should be asked whether the sophisticated extensions proposed in Papp and Reiter
27 (2020) alleviate this fundamental problem or make it worse? That is, are computational
28 technique to solve models perhaps ahead of available empirical methodologies?

29 **2. The Reiter method**

30 In models with heterogeneous agents, the policy rules depend on the cross-sectional dis-
31 tribution of agents' characteristics, a high-dimensional and typically complex object. It does
32 so through a limited set of prices such as the wage rate and the rental rate of capital. With-
33 out aggregate uncertainty these prices are constant. At a given set of prices, simple solution
34 techniques can be used to obtain approximations to the individual policy rules. Given those
35 policy rules one can then check whether equilibrium conditions hold. Iteration procedures or
36 an equation solver can be used to find equilibrium prices.

37 The situation is quite different in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. The cross-

38 sectional distribution is then time-varying and its role no longer characterized by a finite set
39 of constant prices. Thus, the true solutions of the model are functions of this high-dimensional
40 object with an unknown functional form. Since the functional forms of the policy functions
41 are also unknown, we are faced with a challenging numerical problem.

42 Reiter (2009) proposes a procedure which is computationally *much* faster than alterna-
43 tives. Recall from the discussion above, that solving the model without aggregate uncertainty
44 is not that challenging even if one uses accurate global projection methods. The starting point
45 of the Reiter approach is the assumption that aggregate uncertainty is relatively small and
46 its impact on the economic outcomes relatively minor. This means that economies with
47 aggregate uncertainty display relatively minor fluctuations around the economy without ag-
48 gregate uncertainty. It is obviously true that aggregate uncertainty is much smaller than
49 idiosyncratic uncertainty. And aggregate uncertainty does have only a limited impact in
50 many existing models.² Reiter (2009) points out that the consequence of this observation is
51 that one can use a fast numerical technique, namely perturbation, to deal with that part of
52 the solution problem that changes the dimensionality of the problem so drastically, that is,
53 aggregate uncertainty.

54 The underlying principles of the Reiter method are straightforward and very sensible.
55 Nevertheless, I struggled to find a way to explain to my students what programming of the
56 Reiter method actually entails. Without understanding the structure of the program to be
57 written, students will also not understand how powerful the Reiter method is.

58 In this section, I present what I have found to be a useful way to teach the Reiter method.
59 In addition, I will use the exposition to make one fundamental point regarding the way
60 borrowing restrictions are incorporated into our models. Reiter (2009) and Papp and Reiter
61 (2020) follow the literature and capture such restrictions by limiting the maximum amount on
62 can borrow with an inequality constraint. At interesting parameter values, this means that
63 agents are at times not constrained (and the consumption/savings decisions is determined

²It is not true in all models. In the model of Den Haan et al. (2017), aggregate risk has an important quantitative impact on individual behavior and the economy with aggregate risk cannot be considered as a perturbation of the corresponding economy without aggregate risk.

64 by the usual Euler equation and the budget constraint) and are at times constrained (and
 65 the borrowing constraint and the budget constraint are the relevant equations).

66 2.1. The Model

The economy used to explain the algorithm is a Krusell-Smith type economy modified to make the exposition easier. The firm problem is identical to the one of the standard neoclassical growth model. That is, firms hire N_t effective units of labor at wage rate w_t and hire K_t capital units at rental rate r_t . Specifically, the firm problem is given by

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{K_t, N_t} K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha} \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & K_t r_t + N_t w_t = z_t K_t^\alpha + N_t^{(1-\alpha)}, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

67 where z_t is a productivity shock. The law of motion for z_t is given by

$$\ln z_t = \rho \ln z_{t-1} + e_{z,t}, \tag{2}$$

68 with $\mathbb{E}_t[e_{z,t+1}] = 0$. The Reiter method uses first-order perturbation to deal with the fluc-
 69 tuations due to $e_{z,t}$ which means that we do not need to make any additional distributional
 70 assumptions regarding $e_{z,t}$ to derive the policy functions.³

The first-order conditions are given by

$$r_t = \alpha z_t K_t^{1-\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha}, \text{ and} \tag{3}$$

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha) z_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{-\alpha}. \tag{4}$$

71 Firm size is not determined with constant returns to scale. Thus, we can work with a

³If second-order perturbation would be used, then we need to know the standard deviation to derive the policy functions. Of course, one would need to make distributional assumptions if one wants to generate simulated time paths.

72 representative firm.

There is a unit mass of workers whose behavior is characterized by the following optimization problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_{i,t}, k_{i,t}} \ln c_{i,t} - G(k_{i,t}) \\ \text{s.t.} \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

$$c_{i,t} + k_{i,t} = r_t k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t} + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t-1},$$

73 where $c_{i,t}$ is the consumption of worker i , $k_{i,t}$ is the capital level chosen in period t available for
74 production in period $t+1$, and $e_{i,t}$ is an idiosyncratic worker-specific productivity disturbance.

Instead of the popular inequality constraint to limit how much one can go short in capital (borrowing), i.e. $k_{i,t} \geq \bar{k}$ with $\bar{k} \leq 0$, there is a penalty function, $G(k_{i,t})$, with the following properties

$$\frac{\partial G(k)}{\partial k} \leq 0, \tag{6}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 G(k)}{\partial k^2} \geq 0, \tag{7}$$

that is, the penalty gets smaller (or remains the same) as capital increases and the shape is convex. A simple example would be⁴

$$\begin{aligned} G(k) &= k^2 \text{ if } k < 0 \\ &\text{and} \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

$$G(k) = 0 \text{ if } k \geq 0. \tag{9}$$

75 Below, I will discuss the relationship between penalty functions and occasionally binding
76 borrowing constraints in more detail and also highlight how the choice between these two

⁴An alternative is $G(k) = (k - \bar{k})^{-\phi}$ with $\bar{k} < 0$ which converges to the inequality constraint specification, $k \geq \bar{k}$, as ϕ goes to infinity.

77 options affect the suitability of the Reiter method.

Workers' first-order conditions are given by

$$c_{i,t} + k_{i,t} = r_t k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t} + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t-1}, \quad (10a)$$

$$\frac{1}{c_{i,t}} + \frac{\partial G(k_{i,t})}{\partial k_{i,t}} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{1}{c_{i,t+1}} (r_{t+1} + 1 - \delta) \right]. \quad (10b)$$

78 An increase in $k_{i,t}$ has the usual cost of giving up a unit of consumption, but has the benefit
79 of reducing the penalty unless $k_{i,t}$ is such that $\partial G(k_{i,t})/\partial k_{i,t} = 0$.

80 **Assumptions to help the exposition.** To shorten the equations, and for this reason
81 only, I assume that

$$\delta = 1. \quad (11)$$

82 Furthermore, I assume that the idiosyncratic shock, $e_{i,t}$, is not only *i.i.d.* across individuals
83 but also across time. This means that the only cross-sectional distribution one has to keep
84 track of is the cross-sectional distribution of individual capital, $k_{i,t-1}$. By contrast, if $e_{i,t}$ is
85 a first-order Markov process, as is usually the case, then one would need to keep track of
86 the cross-sectional *joint* distribution of $k_{i,t-1}$ and $e_{i,t}$. This is not problematic for the Reiter
87 method, but would introduce more notation, variables, and equations.

88 Finally, I assume that $e_{i,t}$ can take on two values, ε_L and ε_H with equal probability,
89 $\varepsilon_L < \varepsilon_H$, and $\mathbb{E}[e_{i,t}] = 1$. This means that expectations over $e_{i,t+1}$ can be replaced by a
90 simple sum. The Reiter method can easily deal with continuous support of $e_{i,t}$ by using
91 Gaussian quadrature which also boils down to representing the conditional expectation with
92 a finite sum, but this would introduce additional notation.

93 **Equilibrium.** Let f_{t-1} denote the cross-sectional distribution of end-of-period $t-1$ capital
94 holdings, which is equal to the beginning-of-period t distribution. We use period $t-1$
95 subscripts because what matters for period t are the capital stocks chosen in period $t-1$

96 and carried over into period t .⁵ Since there are a continuum of workers, this is fully pinned
 97 down by f_{t-2} and the value of z_{t-1} . The set of aggregate state variables consists of f_{t-1} and
 98 z_t and will be denoted by s_t . The set of state variables relevant for the individual are s_t as
 99 well as $k_{i,t-1}$ and $e_{i,t}$.⁶

The equilibrium is given by

$$\frac{1}{r_t k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t} - k_{i,t}} + \frac{\partial G(k_{i,t})}{\partial k_{i,t}} = \tag{12a}$$

$$\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{\tilde{j}=1}^2 \frac{1}{2} \frac{r_{t+1}}{r_{t+1} k_{i,t} + w_{t+1} \varepsilon_{\tilde{j}} - k_{i,t+1}} \right]$$

$$r_t = \alpha z_t K_t^{1-\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha}, \tag{12b}$$

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha) z_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{-\alpha}, \tag{12c}$$

$$N_t = 1, \tag{12d}$$

$$K_t = \int_k k f_{t-1}(k) dk, \tag{12e}$$

$$f_t = \Gamma(f_{t-1}, z_t). \tag{12f}$$

100 Note that the expectations operator in equation (12) is only over $e_{z,t+1}$. The summation
 101 takes care of the idiosyncratic shock.

102 2.2. Numerical approximation

103 Before we start with a description of the Reiter method, let's recall what we would do
 104 if we approximate an individual policy function using projection methods. We would use a
 105 flexible functional form such as a polynomial or a spline to approximate individual behavior
 106 and the inputs are the state variables. That is,

$$k_{i,t+1} = P(e_{i,t}, k_{i,t-1}, z_t, f_{t-1}; \eta), \tag{13}$$

⁵That is, we use notation consistent with Dynare convention.

⁶If $e_{i,t}$ is an *i.i.d.* variable, then a sufficient state variable to characterize the individual is their cash-on-hand level, i.e., $r_t k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t}$. This could be used in the solution method, but is not done here since it makes the equations less transparent.

where the vector η contains the coefficients of the approximating function. Since $e_{i,t}$ can take on only two values, we can solve for two separate policy functions. That is,

$$k_{i,t+1} = P(k_{i,t-1}, z_t, f_{t-1}; \eta_L) \quad \text{if } e_{i,t} = \varepsilon_L, \quad (14)$$

$$k_{i,t+1} = P(k_{i,t-1}, z_t, f_{t-1}; \eta_H) \quad \text{if } e_{i,t} = \varepsilon_H. \quad (15)$$

To implement the Reiter method we will write this as

$$k_{i,t+1} = P(k_{i,t-1}; \eta_L(z_t, f_{t-1})) \quad \text{if } e_{i,t} = \varepsilon_L, \quad (16)$$

$$k_{i,t+1} = P(k_{i,t-1}; \eta_H(z_t, f_{t-1})) \quad \text{if } e_{i,t} = \varepsilon_H. \quad (17)$$

107 For example, if $P(\cdot)$ is a second-order polynomial in $k_{i,t-1}$, then its three coefficients are the
 108 elements of η and each coefficient is a function of the aggregate state variables.

109 For the Reiter method, it is important that

- 110 1. one characterizes the whole cross-sectional distribution and
- 111 2. one can write down computer code to describe its law of motion given the policy function
 112 of the agent.

113 Reiter (2009) and Papp and Reiter (2020) use a histogram, that is, a grid with a vector
 114 that contains the mass of agents at each grid point. Given the histogram of this period's
 115 beginning-of-period capital holdings, f_{t-1} , z_t , and the individual policy rule one can calculate
 116 next period's histogram.⁷ Here, I will use a version of the Reiter method as it is implemented
 117 in Winberry (2018) because it simplifies the equations and, thus, makes it easier to understand
 118 the structure of the Reiter method. Instead of a histogram, Winberry (2018) uses a flexible
 119 functional form from the class of functions proposed in Algan et al. (2008) to characterize
 120 the cross-sectional distribution. If one knows the parameters of the approximating density,
 121 then one knows everything there is to know about the distribution. An example of a second-

⁷If a capital choice falls between grid points one has to allocate the associated mass over the two adjacent grid points.

122 order approximation would be the Normal density. For this application we will use as the
 123 parameters of the Normal, the mean, $\mu_{k,t-1}$ and the un-centered second moment, $\Omega_{k,t-1}$.
 124 Knowing these two statistics, one can immediately calculate the standard deviation and use
 125 the standard expression of the Normal density.

Now, let's turn to the second requirement. Is it possible to write down exact equations for the law of motion of this (approximate) distribution if one has this period's distribution and the policy function of the agent. Specifically, can we write down computer code that relates $\mu_{k,t}$ and $\Omega_{k,t}$ to $\mu_{k,t-1}$ and $\Omega_{k,t-1}$? We know that

$$\mu_{k,t} = \int_k \left(\begin{array}{c} \frac{1}{2}P(k; \eta_L(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) + \\ \frac{1}{2}P(k; \eta_H(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) \end{array} \right) \frac{1}{\sigma_{k,t-1} \sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(k-\mu_{k,t-1})^2}{2\sigma_{k,t-1}^2}} dk, \quad (18)$$

$$\Omega_{k,t} = \int_k \left(\begin{array}{c} \frac{1}{2}P(k, \eta_L(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1}))^2 + \\ + \frac{1}{2}P(k, \eta_H(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1}))^2 \end{array} \right) \frac{1}{\sigma_{k,t-1} \sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(k-\mu_{k,t-1})^2}{2\sigma_{k,t-1}^2}} dk, \quad (19)$$

where $\sigma_{k,t-1} = \sqrt{\Omega_{k,t-1} - \mu_{k,t-1}^2}$. To turn this into computer code, we approximate the integral using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature. That is,

$$\mu_{k,t} = \sum_{j^*=1}^{J^*} \left(\begin{array}{c} \frac{1}{2}P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_{k,t-1}\zeta_{j^*}; \eta_L(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) + \\ \frac{1}{2}P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_{k,t-1}\zeta_{j^*}; \eta_H(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) \end{array} \right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \Omega_{j^*} \quad (20)$$

$$\Omega_{k,t} = \sum_{j^*=1}^{J^*} \left(\begin{array}{c} \frac{1}{2}P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_{k,t-1}\zeta_{j^*}; \eta_L(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1}))^2 + \\ \frac{1}{2}P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2}\sigma_{k,t-1}\zeta_{j^*}; \eta_H(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1}))^2 \end{array} \right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \Omega_{j^*}, \quad (21)$$

126 where ζ_{j^*} and Ω_{j^*} are the Gauss-Hermite nodes and weights and J^* the number of quadrature
 127 nodes.

128 **The actual algorithm.** We are now all set to spell out the actual algorithm. To solve for
 129 the individual policy rule we are going to use a projection method. Thus, we need a grid
 130 for individual capital. Let κ_j with $j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$ denote the J grid points for the worker's
 131 capital holdings, where J equals the number of coefficients of the approximating function.

132 i.e., the number of elements of η . For example, if $P(\cdot; \eta)$ is a second-order polynomial, then
 133 $J = 3$. We want the Euler equation for the agents at the two productivity levels to hold at
 134 all $2 \times J$ grid points.

135 We have done quite a bit of preparatory work, but we are now ready to write down a
 136 perturbation system that can be solved using a program like Dynare to generate both the
 137 nonlinear projection-based individual policy rule as well as the perturbation-based responses
 138 to aggregate disturbances.

That system of equations is given by

$$\frac{1}{r_t \kappa_j + w_t \varepsilon_L - k_{L,j}} + G'(k_{L,j}) = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{\tilde{j}=1}^2 \frac{1}{2} \frac{r_{t+1}}{r_{t+1} k_{L,j} + w_{t+1} \varepsilon_{\tilde{j}} - P(k_{L,j}; \eta_{\tilde{j}}(\mu_{k,t}, \Omega_{k,t}))} \right] \quad (22a)$$

$$k_{L,j} = P(\kappa_j; \eta_L(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) \quad (22b)$$

$$\frac{1}{r_t \kappa_j + w_t \varepsilon_L - k_{H,j}} + G'(k_{H,j}) = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{\tilde{j}=1}^2 \frac{1}{2} \frac{r_{t+1}}{r_{t+1} k_{H,j} + w_{t+1} \varepsilon_{\tilde{j}} - P(k_{H,j}; \eta_{\tilde{j}}(\mu_{k,t}, \Omega_{k,t}))} \right] \quad (22c)$$

$$k_{H,j} = P(\kappa_j; \eta_H(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) \quad (22d)$$

$$r_t = \alpha z_t \mu_{k,t-1}^{1-\alpha}, \quad (22e)$$

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha) z_t \mu_{k,t-1}^\alpha, \quad (22f)$$

$$\mu_{k,t} = \sum_{j^*=1}^{J^*} \left(\begin{array}{l} \frac{1}{2} P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2} \sqrt{\Omega_{k,t-1} - \mu_{k,t-1}^2} \zeta_{j^*}; \eta_L(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) + \\ \frac{1}{2} P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2} \sqrt{\Omega_{k,t-1} - \mu_{k,t-1}^2} \zeta_{j^*}; \eta_H(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1})) \end{array} \right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \Omega_{j^*} \quad (22g)$$

$$\Omega_{k,t} = \sum_{j^*=1}^{J^*} \left(\begin{array}{l} \frac{1}{2} P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2} \sqrt{\Omega_{k,t-1} - \mu_{k,t-1}^2} \zeta_{j^*}; \eta_L(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1}))^2 + \\ \frac{1}{2} P(\mu_{k,t-1} + \sqrt{2} \sqrt{\Omega_{k,t-1} - \mu_{k,t-1}^2} \zeta_{j^*}; \eta_H(z_t, \mu_{k,t-1}, \Omega_{k,t-1}))^2 \end{array} \right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \Omega_{j^*}, \quad (22h)$$

139 where we have used $N_t = 1$. The two Euler equations hold for $j = \{1, \dots, J\}$ and thus
 140 represent $2J$ equations.

141 For a choice of $G(k)$ and numerical values for the parameter values, this is a system
142 that can be solved with perturbation methods. How is it possible that Dynare can solve
143 for a higher-order projection-based individual policy rule even when it uses first-order per-
144 turbation? And how is it possible that this simple solution method can solve a model with
145 heterogeneous agents in the presence of aggregate uncertainty? And – conditional on having
146 reasonable initial values for its steady state – does so almost instantly.

147 Finding the perturbation solution of this system consists of two steps.

148 1. Find the steady state.

149 2. Determine how this steady-state solution changes if the stochastic variable changes. In
150 this system, the only stochastic variable is z_t . The realizations for $e_{i,t}$ are parameters
151 in the perturbation system.

152 At the steady state, z_t is constant. Solving for the steady state means solving for the
153 constant values of the J constant values of η , the constant values of μ_k and Ω_k , and the
154 constant implied values of r and w . The steady state version of the system in equation (22)
155 gives the system of equations to solve for these values. The solution for μ_k implies values for
156 r and w which imply a partial-equilibrium solution to the nonlinear policy function of the
157 individual characterized by the η coefficients. In equilibrium, μ_k is such that given the value
158 of Ω_k and the distributional form assumption, the distribution remains constant. Solving for
159 the steady state is typically the hardest part of deriving a perturbation solution. And one
160 may need good initial conditions.⁸ Note that this “steady state” solution takes into account
161 precautionary savings, since the $2J$ Euler equations take into account the nonlinearities of
162 the original problem are are not an approximation around the steady-state solution in which
163 $e_{i,t}$ is also constant.

164 The perturbation solution of this system tells us how this steady state solution consisting

⁸This system is actually well-behaved and not hard to solve. Specifically, given the monotonicity properties an iteration procedure that adjusts the value of r depending on whether there is excess demand or excess supply works very well. This can be used to solve the system for some parameter values and these can be used as initial conditions in a program like Dynare if the system needs to be solved for several parameter values as is the case when one estimates the model.

165 of a nonlinear individual policy rule and a cross-sectional distribution responds to aggregate
166 uncertainty. To fully understand this, we should know what is known and what is not
167 known in the system. The state variables in the system above are z_t , $\mu_{k,t-1}$, and $\Omega_{k,t-1}$ and
168 a perturbation solution consists of functions of these three variables. Now consider the $2J$
169 equations of the Euler equation at the $2J$ grid points. Imagine we substitute out this period's
170 and next period's interest rate and the wage rate on both sides of the Euler equation. Then
171 we are left with $2J + 2$ equations in the $2J + 2$ unknowns. The perturbation approach will
172 tell us what these functions are as a function of z_t , $\mu_{k,t-1}$, and $\Omega_{k,t-1}$.⁹

173 **Occasionally binding constraints, the penalty function, and the Reiter method.**

174 With the specifics of the Reiter method spelled out, I can make a fundamental point about
175 the use of occasionally binding constraints as used in Reiter (2009) and in Papp and Reiter
176 (2020). The Reiter method can deal with occasionally binding constraints. But it has one
177 practical and one fundamental problem. With an inequality constraint, optimal behavior is
178 characterized by the two-part Kuhn-Tucker conditions. That is, an agent's capital choice
179 may be determined by the Euler equation (when the agent is not constrained) *or* by the
180 constraint. In terms of the perturbation system given in equation (22), this means that for
181 some j s, i.e., for some grid points, the Euler equations remains the right equation, but for
182 others it has to be replaced with the borrowing constraint. The practical problem is that
183 one has to find out at which grid points the constraint is binding and at which grid points it
184 is not binding. One has to do this before one obtains the perturbation solution. This would
185 not be problematic if one solves the model for one set of parameter values, but would be
186 problematic if one has to solve it many times at different parameter values, which would be
187 the case if one estimates the model.

188 There is a more fundamental problem. Implicit in the perturbation approach is that
189 the equations do not change if there are changes in the aggregate disturbance, z_t . That

⁹A first-order perturbation solution will give a first-order approximation for the laws of motion for $\mu_{k,t}$ and $\Omega_{k,t}$. Since we actually have analytical (nonlinear) expressions for these state variables for given policy functions, we could use these instead of the first-order approximations when generating model data.

190 is, if an agent is at the constraint at the steady state value of z_t , then the perturbation
191 solution assumes that this remains the case if z_t changes. This may be plausible if one
192 has just a few grid points with large gaps in between them. The cut-off level of capital at
193 which the constraint becomes binding may then always be in between the same two grid
194 points. However, with nontrivial idiosyncratic risk one may very well need a fine grid to
195 get an accurate individual policy rule. Then this property is unlikely to remain true unless
196 fluctuations in z_t are really small.

197 These problems are not present if penalty functions are used instead of borrowing con-
198 straint. Moreover, in many cases penalty functions actually make more economic sense than
199 inequality constraints.¹⁰ Note that an inequality constraint is also a penalty function and
200 a very peculiar one. That is, the penalty is equal to 0 as long as $k_{i,t} \geq \bar{k}$ and infinite if
201 $k_{i,t} < \bar{k}$. It seems more sensible that it becomes gradually more difficult to borrow and only
202 as one borrows more and more it will be met with prohibitive cost increases.¹¹ In the model
203 above, I put the penalty function in the utility function, but that was mainly because such
204 a penalty function only enters the model equations through the Euler equation. A more
205 realistic implementation would consist of letting a penalty function affect the interest rate
206 paid on short positions with the penalty increasing in the amount borrowed.

207 **3. The contributions of Papp and Reiter (2020)**

208 The motivation of Papp and Reiter (2020) is the recent surge in the use of micro-level
209 data to estimate macroeconomic models. Estimation will require evaluation of an objective
210 function such as the Likelihood or the posterior at many parameter values. Consequently,
211 one would need a very fast solution algorithm. The Reiter approach has the potential to
212 do exactly this. If the cross-sectional information used is part of the perturbation system,

¹⁰The natural borrowing limit is a theoretical justification for an inequality constraint. In practice, however, natural borrowing constraints are not used because they turn out to be so weak that they do not constrain agents.

¹¹Den Haan and De Wind (2012) show that models with smooth penalty functions can generate behavior that is very similar to that obtained in models with occasionally binding inequality constraints.

213 such as $\mu_{k,t}$ or $\Omega_{k,t}$ in the system above, then one can use the Reiter approach without any
214 modification. However, cross-sectional information is usually only available at an annual
215 frequency whereas economic aggregates such as GDP are typically available at a quarterly
216 frequency.

217 One cannot derive the law of motion of annual dispersion by using only the law of motion
218 of quarterly dispersion. One would also have to use the individual laws of motion. This
219 means we will need some type of panel simulation. The idea of Papp and Reiter (2020) is to
220 use the idea underlying the Reiter approach to do this.

221 Specifically, suppose one wants to derive a perturbation-based law of motion for the annual
222 dispersion of capital holdings when the other data is quarterly. It involves the following steps.

- 223 1. Start with a large number of workers, N , with capital holdings and productivity levels
224 distributed consistent with the distribution of the economy without aggregate uncer-
225 tainty and with idiosyncratic uncertainty.¹²
- 226 2. Write down the equations that describe the choices of each agent for the first four
227 periods. Exactly as one would in an actual simulation, the idiosyncratic productivity
228 level changes over time according to its law of motion.
- 229 3. Write down the expression for the cross-sectional dispersion of annual capital holdings.

230 This is a perturbation system in which the object of interest, the cross-sectional dispersion
231 of annual capital holdings will be a function of the aggregate state variables over the last
232 four periods.

233 Why use a panel simulation of a finite number of individuals and not integrate over
234 all possible outcomes for each agent? With only two possible realizations for $e_{i,t}$ and four
235 periods, there are sixteen possible outcomes to consider and this alternative might still be
236 doable. But is unlikely to be feasible if more periods are involved and/or more realizations.

¹²As shown in Algan et al. (2014), simulating an economy with a histogram is more accurate than simulating with a large number of agents, since it completely eliminates sampling variation. But a quarterly time series of histograms does not allow us to construct a time series for the dispersion of *individual* annual capital holdings. The latter requires keeping track of individual workers and the cross-sectional histograms do not do that.

237 Papp and Reiter (2020) implement this idea in a model with discrete choice, namely the
238 agent has to choose between working and not working. This leads to an additional complica-
239 tion. With a discrete choice decision, there is a cut-off level which will depend not only on
240 the worker's idiosyncratic productivity level, but also on the aggregate state variables. This
241 creates a problem for the Papp-Reiter perturbation approach if a finite number of individuals
242 is considered. The reason is that the perturbation approach is based on partial derivatives
243 and these will not induce changes in the discrete choice employment decisions of the workers
244 included in the panel.¹³ Papp and Reiter (2020) propose a smoothing technique to deal with
245 this problem.

246 If penalty functions are used instead of inequality constraints, then there is an alterna-
247 tive solution which would also be able to deal with discrete choice. This would consist of
248 simulating the economy with N agents for T periods with a realistic volatility for z_t . When
249 using a realistic volatility for z_t , then one would capture changes in the cut-off level. To
250 obtain the (linearized) law of motion for the cross-sectional statistic of interest, one simply
251 runs a regression. T would have to be sufficiently large to avoid sampling variation. As ex-
252 plained above, this doesn't work with inequality constraints since the individual policy rules
253 are derived under the assumption that the area where the inequality constraint binds does
254 not change if z_t changes which is only guaranteed for arbitrarily small changes in z_t .

255 The paper documents that the proposed procedure is feasible. Specifically, it estimates
256 second moments of the shock processes and it documents that the estimate of the variance
257 of the idiosyncratic shock is substantially smaller if cross-sectional information is used.

258 4. Evaluation: Technique ahead of empirical methodology

259 The Papp-Reiter implementation of the Reiter approach is a clever one and may very well
260 stimulate the use of cross-sectional information in the estimation of business cycle models.

261 I wonder, however, whether it makes sense to increase the sophistication of our estima-

¹³The probability that a worker is exactly at the cut-off level happens with probability zero. At the cut-off level the worker is indifferent. Thus even then, there is an original discrete choice which is the same as the preferred one if z_t changes.

262 tion techniques without dealing with a much more fundamental problem. Prescott (1986)
263 writes in his “Theory Ahead of Business cycle measurement paper,” that “*The models con-*
264 *structed within this theoretical framework are necessarily highly abstract. Consequently, they*
265 *are necessarily false, and statistical hypothesis testing will reject them.*” Prescott argued that
266 economic variables are not always measured in conformity with economic theory. It is true
267 that we now have more and better data. Moreover, our theories have become richer and
268 including heterogeneity has been an important contributor in doing so. Nevertheless, I think
269 that it is still the case that all macroeconomic models are wrong and that we should take
270 this into account when we estimate them.

271 Empirical estimation of structural macroeconomic models is difficult. Over time, the pro-
272 fession has used quite different strategies that were discarded after criticism or disappoint-
273 ing performance. In the tradition of Tinbergen, the first approach consisted of estimating
274 time-invariant relationships between macroeconomic aggregates without taking into account
275 cross-equation restrictions. The Lucas critique revealed the flaws of this approach. In the
276 eighties, the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) approach of Hansen (1982) became
277 popular. The advantage of GMM is that one can estimate model parameters without writing
278 down the full model. Consequently, one can focus the estimation on only those parts of the
279 model that one is more confident about. Unfortunately, the small-sample properties of the
280 GMM estimator turned out to be quite bad.¹⁴ Calibration also has the advantage that pa-
281 rameters are chosen using only the dimensions of the model in which one has confidence. The
282 disadvantage of calibration is that one does not have a statistical measure of goodness of fit.
283 That is, one has to eyeball the results and decide whether the predicted model properties are
284 close to their sample counterparts. Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) is like calibration
285 but with proper statistical inference.

286 Although Simulated Method of Moments has sporadically been used in macroeconomics, it
287 has now been completely taken over by full information methods such as Maximum Likelihood
288 or the Bayesian version of Maximum Likelihood. Maximum Likelihood is rarely feasible unless

¹⁴See, for example, the 1996 special issue of the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, vol. 14(3).

289 – as is the case in Papp and Reiter (2020) – one estimates just a few parameters. The reason is
290 that finding the global maximum of the Likelihood function is extremely difficult given that it
291 often has a highly erratic shape. By combining the Likelihood with an informative prior, the
292 problem becomes much more tractable, especially with the help of Markov Chain Monte Carlo
293 techniques to trace the posterior. And this has become the dominant empirical technique
294 to estimate macroeconomic models. And if the Papp-Reiter approach is incorporated into a
295 non-trivial empirical project, then this is most likely the empirical strategy that will be used.

296 Whereas the small-sample properties of GMM were scrutinized extensively in the eighties
297 and nineties, we do not have such knowledge of the properties of MCMC techniques for typ-
298 ical macroeconomic applications. The Brooks-Gelman statistics are diagnostics to evaluate
299 whether the generated sequence of parameter values resembles the posterior distribution one
300 tries to recover. But there are no proper metrics to judge what are good and bad outcomes
301 for these statistics. Not that it matters, because the profession does not expect authors to
302 report these statistics and discuss whether the posterior is characterized accurately!

303 An even more striking omission from the empirical literature is dealing with the problem
304 that Prescott already pointed out in 1986 and that is that all macroeconomic models are
305 wrong. Calibration, GMM, and SMM are attempts to deal with this although in a limited
306 way. But the literature has moved away from these methods in favor of full-information
307 methods. Papp and Reiter (2020) is just one example of many. There are some papers that
308 do explicitly deal with misspecification when estimating structural models.¹⁵ But most do
309 not. Unfortunately, even the consequences of minor misspecifications can be substantial as
310 is documented in Den Haan and Drechsel (2019).

311 This detour through the history of empirical macroeconomics was done for a reason. So
312 let's get back to the empirical exercise in Papp and Reiter (2020). Couldn't one argue that
313 the Papp-Reiter approach reduces the problems of misspecification and data limitations and
314 is, thus, a step in the right direction? I am sure this will be true in some applications. But
315 the increased complexity and sophistication of the procedure also makes it much harder to

¹⁵See Den Haan and Drechsel (2019) and the discussion therein.

316 understand what happens in the estimation procedure. How does the smoothing technique
317 to deal with the discrete choice of the agent affect small sample properties? How does it
318 interact with misspecification of the model? Are richer models necessarily closer to reality or
319 do they make misspecification worse because they have to take a stand on more issues? Are
320 the small-sample properties of larger models better or worse than those of smaller models.
321 Do MCMC techniques work better for posteriors of complex models? We don't know the
322 answer to any of these questions.

323 It is great to see numerical and estimation techniques evolve over time. But it has to
324 go hand in hand with more research on the question how one should do empirical research
325 on how these currently popular methods perform in samples of realistic length. Both when
326 the empirical model is correctly specified and when it is not. Perhaps we should before we
327 estimate our models using these methods.

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