

Extended Data Table 2B | Effect of professional identity/banking condition on honesty in bank and non-banking employees in the Middle East

Explanatory Variable	
Professional identity/Banking condition	-0.007 (0.043) <i>p</i> =0.875
Professional identity/Banking condition X Bank employees	0.029 (0.051) <i>p</i> =0.578
Bank employees	0.022 (0.038) <i>p</i> =0.562
Age	-0.002 (0.002) <i>p</i> =0.258
Male	0.044 (0.027) <i>p</i> =0.103
University Education	0.011 (0.052) <i>p</i> =0.840
Relative Income	-0.011 (0.009) <i>p</i> =0.217
Years in Industry	-0.001 (0.002) <i>p</i> =0.578
Number of observations	2,150
Sample	ME bankers and non-banking employees

Probit estimates. The dependent variable is a reported winning toss. The reported results are marginal effects calculated at the median levels of the covariates, and the standard errors (in parentheses) have been corrected for clustering at the individual level. The median covariates are a measure of the change in probability of reporting a winning outcome. The model is per Cohn et al run on participants from their main study (*n*=128) and non-banker population (*n*=133) to demonstrate that priming professional identity led to higher levels of reported winning tosses relative to non-bankers. Reported winning tosses are regressed upon a dummy for the professional identity condition and individual characteristics, and an interaction term for professional identity and bank employees (*n*=148 (bankers) + 67 (non-bankers) =215). Significance levels: **p*<0.10, ***p*<0.05, ****p*<0.01 (two-sided Wald tests).