Conference on populism: verbatim report

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To define populism

Under this title a conference was held at the London School of Economics and Political Science between 19 and 21 May 1967.

The verbatim report of the conference, of which only a few copies have been made, can be consulted at the Library, London School of Economics and Political Science. A reasoned summary of the conference was published in the journal of comparative politics, Government and Opposition, Spring number, 1968. The papers presented to the conference, with three further studies, will be published under the title Populism by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, and Macmillan, New York. The Humanitarian Trust, London, generously helped with a grant towards the preparation of the proceedings for publication.

List of participants

J. Alcock (Bradford)
Prof. S.L. Andreski (Reading)
Sir Isaiah Berlin (Oxford, chairman of session)
Dr. Conrad Brandt (Oxford)
Dr. Peter Calvert (Southampton)
Nigel Clive (Foreign Office)
Maurice Cranston (LSE)
F.W. Donkin (Oxford, chairman of session)
Prof. R.P. Dow (LSE)
Geoffrey Engholm (Sussex)
E. Gallo (Oxford)
Prof. Ernst Gellner (LSE, chairman of session)
Prof. Julius Gould (Nottingham)
George Hall (Foreign Office)
C.G.M. Hessey (Cambridge)
Prof. Richard Hofstadter (Columbia)
Ghita Ionessi (LSE, rapporteur)
James Joll (Oxford)
Ellen de Kadt (LSE)
Emmanuel de Kadt (LSE)
Dr. Werner Kalb
Dr. John Keep (School of Slavonic and East European Studies)
Francis Lambert (Institute of Latin American Studies)
Dr. E. Lampert (Kecke)
Shirley Latwin
Dr. L.J. Macfarlane (Oxford)
Prof. Donald MacMillan (LSE, chairman of session)
Dr. I. de Mauhriam (Sussex)
Prof. G.P. Mancini (Bologna)
Kenneth Minto (LSE)
Prof. W.H. Morris Jones (Institute of Commonwealth Studies)
Dr. John Saul (Shef-er, chairman of session)
Prof. Leonard Schapiro (LSE, chairman of session)
Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, chairman of session)
Dr. T. Shanin (Sheffield)
Geoffrey Shillinglaw (School of Oriental and African Studies)
Dr. Zoltan Szabo
Prof. Alain Touraine (Paris)
Prof. P. Venturi (Torino)
Dr. Andrej Walicki (Warsaw)
Derek Waller (School of Oriental and African Studies)
Prof. Peter Wiles (LSE)
Prof. Peter Worsley (Manchester, chairman of session)
London School of Economics

Conference on populism

May 20-21, 1967

VERBATIM REPORT
THE CHAIRMAN: I have the genuinely very pleasant task of welcoming members of this Conference on behalf of the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am no means clear why this task has fallen to me, except that there is a theory that I have been built into the walls and foundations of this building, out of which a number of people would like to chip me. That is by the way. What I have to say on behalf of the School is merely this: here we have always tried to bring together people from many countries and many disciplines to advance their thinking and understanding in the social sciences. We have seen this as our primary task. We see a conference of this sort as an important and extraordinarily delightful opportunity to pursue this aim.

I wish to say on behalf of the School that everyone is welcome, and this welcome extends to making very free of the facilities of the School during the next two days. I very much hope that people will make use of the provisions which have been made for lunch and particularly this evening for the dinner which is being given by the School and also for lunch and dinner tomorrow.

I should like to make a small point about the timetable. We are going to begin to assemble tomorrow morning at 9.30 so that we can start our proceedings at, or, if possible, slightly before 10 o'clock - a little later than is suggested in the official programme. We believe this to be more realistic. Perhaps we shall be able to make a start before 10 o'clock.

I should like now to call on Professor Leonard Schapiro to tell you something about the origins of the Conference and then, after him, there will be a few words from the master mind behind all our organisation, Mr. Ionescu, on the mechanics of our working.

PROF. LEONARD SCHAPIRO: Perhaps I had better leave the question of the origins of the Conference to Mr. Ionescu, because, as Professor MacRae rightly said, it was his idea and his inspiration. I am merely one of the many wheels of the machine.
which he erected. However, although I have also been built into the fabric of this institution, I should like for a moment to speak as a participant.

Speaking for the participants, we are grateful to the School for offering its hospitality and promises to us, and for making it possible for us to meet in one of its most desirable rooms. Although it is in the tradition of the School to do that - and I hope that it long may remain so - I think that we owe the School our special thanks for that. I should also like to mention that we owe our thanks both as organizers and as participants to the Humanitarian Trust, which very generously made us a grant towards the publication of the proceedings. It is certainly the intention that the proceedings should be published in one form or another. I say "in one form or another" because we have not been able to decide as yet in what form they should be published - whether in book form or in some form in connection with the journal "Government and Opposition". There are matters which will have to be looked into within the limits of possibility. Professor Gallner, Professor Worsley, Professor Hofstadter and Mr. Ionescu will be consulting on that in order to do the best that can be done about it.

May I say a word on the way in which I see these various groups of meetings. They are, as it were, attempts, as we saw it, though without being rigid about it, to see whether there is such a thing as "populism", something which applies to the various movements to which the name has been given, and which is more than a mere coincidence of name. We thought that at the first meeting the matter could be examined in terms of those ideologies which could be described as populism as against those which could not. Then, this afternoon we could look at the political forms which populism takes - the relationship between populist movements and political parties, and so on. Then tomorrow morning we could consider the comparison between the older populisms before the First World War, in Russia and America, and the later ones, those in the contemporary world, or at any rate the movements to which that name has been applied. We hope that that might lead by the afternoon, in the final and general discussion, to some kind of attempt either to say what populism is, or to decide that it is not possible to say what it is.

I suppose that one should apologize for having made this a rather crowded, essentially working Conference. But, on the other hand, time is so short and we so seldom get the opportunity to gather together for discussion that we felt that probably all participants would welcome the rather intense programme of work which we have devised. Mr. Ionescu will know much better than I do about the method of work and organization. Therefore, I leave the description of the rest of the practical arrangements to him.

Mr. G. IONESCU: I will take only a few minutes to tell you about what I think we can call the rules of the game. As Prof. Schaps reminded us, we are meeting here with the purpose, as our first letter to you stated, of defining populism. Although in the valuable and excellent papers which we received the twelve authors have bulldozed for us a lot of the ground and opened the first paths in this kind of jungle of a problem, they were neither expected to offer the final and comprehensive definition, nor to agree with each other. But thanks to them, we are well on our way. However, the Conference has still to do its job, which is to define, if this is possible, populism.

It seems to me that this Conference is, in a sense, what I would call a work of instant research. There is no doubt in my mind that we shall be breaking new ground. Although there are several almost classic works on some of its aspects, there is not, to my knowledge at least, one single work on the concept itself. The term continues to be used in many different ways. There is no doubt either, that we have in our midst a number of people who know a great deal about the subject, so it can be reasonably assumed that we can attempt a definition.

How should we do this work? In so far as the people who were invited to this Conference were invited in view of their knowledge of the subject, one of the rules of the game is obviously that every one of them should make their contribution, or contribute to the discussions. I should like to offer a little statistical estimate. I think that there will be, by and large, 40 speakers and we have altogether 700 minutes to play with. Therefore, the organizers have each participant a credit of between 20 and 30 minutes to be used as he wishes during the first meeting and also the general meeting, in which we should like everybody to join.

I think that the other rule of the game is to try to stick as much as possible to the main question which we are asking: Can a single concept of populism be extrapolated from all the populisms and their aspects which we shall look at; or shall we conclude, on the contrary, that what people call by the same name in different parts of the world and different periods of history are entirely different things and as such should be left different and should be called each by another and more specific name? It seems to me that our ten reports are rather divided on the subject. For instance, Prof. Worsley's stands at the optimistic and of believing that there is such a thing as a universal concept of populism, whereas Dr. Wolicki's report is pessimistic and believes that there are many things of the same name.

This is why we have thought it better - and this is the third rule of the game - to group the papers round the three main questions: First, what is what and what is not populist ideology; secondly, why is populism a political movement and yet it does not
usually crystallise in political parties and, thirdly, what are the differences between the populism of before the First World War and that of after the Second World War?

There is an enormous amount of overlapping, and it would be very difficult to disentangle and keep all these things separate, but we thought that the papers of Professor Mocanu, Professor Morley and Worsley, Walker and Shillinglaw should provide the framework for the first meeting; the papers of Professor Hoffetseder, Professor Marui, Mr. Rogholm and Mr. Malicki for the second historical meeting; and the papers of Messenger, Stewart and Wingo as, last but not least, Mr. Boll for the political meeting. We have asked the rapporteurs not to present their papers at the beginning of the meeting, for everybody is meant to have read them by now, but to answer at the end of each meeting the various observations or references which might have been made about their papers during the discussion.

The fourth rule of the game is this. We have asked, and ask again, speakers to put down in advance their names for the meeting or meetings at which they would prefer to make their main contribution to the discussion so as to have as much order as is possible, but at the same time we should like the Conference to be as much of a round table discussion as possible.

There is also somebody described as a rapporteur here. His role—and this is the final rule of the game—will be to listen carefully to everything which will be said and to try to clarify points which might be more useful for the general conclusions and then at the beginning of the Sunday meeting I shall endeavour to submit draft conclusions and definitions which afterwards will be offered for the general discussions.

The language of the Conference will be English, but anybody who prefers to speak in French is welcome to do so. The discussions are both tape recorded and taken down in shorthand.

THE CHAIRMAN: You have heard from Professor Schapiro and Mr. Ionescu what we are trying to do. As Chairman of this session, I want to maintain an open and round table atmosphere. But I think that perhaps we should remember that the people listed on the blackboard have expressed particular interest in this morning's subject. Perhaps Professor Andreski would like to begin.

PROF. S.I. ANDRESKI: Unfortunately, I have to transgress the rules laid down by our organizer. The point which I want to make concerns all the sub-headings of this Conference, especially the definition of populism which is supposed to be the last thing which we are to discuss. It seems to me that if one reads the papers which have been distributed, it is obvious that by populism they mean very different things, although I must add that I see no reason why people should be prevented from using the word "populism" in different senses. Perhaps what we shall achieve will be not an agreed definition but rather an elucidation of the various possible definitions.

I have made a short list of the various meanings which the authors have attached to the word. One is that populism is any kind of movement aiming at the redistribution of wealth, regardless of how it is done; the second is that it must be a movement of protest on the part of the lower classes. The third variant is further restricted to a movement not just of the lower classes in general but of the rural lower classes in particular. The fourth interpretation is that populism is a movement which aims at the preservation of a traditional rural way of life. The fifth meaning is that of idealisation of the peasant. In view of the discrepancies among these various meanings, we could either adopt a very broad definition, saying that populism is any kind of movement which aims at the preservation or improvement of the position and freedom of the lower classes, or we would have to specify the various narrower meanings.

The other general point is the problem of the discrepancy between words and deeds. Everybody knows that such discrepancy is never absent, but it is equally obvious that it varies enormously. There are some people who take their ideologies seriously, while others do not. Although their existence is generally known, nobody has so far offered an explanation of these fluctuations. It would be a valuable contribution, if somebody would try to construct a theory which would explain why, under certain circumstances, ideologies are taken seriously and why in others they just elicit lip service. Clearly there must be a certain degree of harmony between the content of an ideology and the structure of society, but one would have to specify the factors which produce mutual reinforcement or its opposite. The unification of the world in terms of communication, incidentally, has led to a situation in which an ideology may be professed, not because it corresponds to local conditions, but because it sounds good by international standards imposed by countries which are leading in the industrial sphere.

This brings me to African populism. If one looks at the behaviour of the African leaders it is clear that the last thing that they are is populists in any of the senses
mentioned previously. In no way do they imitate the peasant ways. The Russian populists occasionally dress like the peasants but this does not happen in Africa. The agenda is the dress of the wealthy classes, not of the ordinary African. If we take clothes as an index of the attitude to the peasant way of life, they rule African populism right out; there is not such a thing.

There are, however, examples of vestimentary populists, such as Kościuszkowicz or Wincenty Witos, the Polish Prime Minister at the time of the Pilsudski coup d'état, who used to appear in Parliament and elsewhere dressed like a peasant. He refused to wear a tie. To judge by the clothes, the Cuban Fidelistas as well as the Chinese communists are unquestionably populists who are trying to bridge the gap of disdain.

In Africa the rulers are too near to the peasant condition to idealise it. Like other cults, a genuinely believed populist mythology - not just phraseology - requires a certain distance from the object of the worship.

PROF. EDGAR SETON-WATSON: I would throw out some ideas which I think should be thrown out at a fairly early stage. In a way, they are connected with what has just been said.

First of all, it seems to me that whatever else populism may be, it includes one element which there cannot be populism without, and that is idolisation and worship of the people. The people are the repository of certain basic virtues which have become lost, perverted, and so on. This purity of the people is contrasted with the sins of the elite, which may be a traditional, oppressive tyranny like the Russian tsarism or a Philistine, materialistic, oppressive bourgeois like that of the United States, or it may be an attack against clever people and intellectuals generally. There may be other forms. This particular kind of sins held against the elite depend on the situation, but the essence is that the people are held up as an object of veneration and purity.

This idolisation of the people should be contrasted with and distinguished from various other things. In the first place, it should be distinguished from flattery. Flattering the people and demagoguery is a characteristic of all mass democratic and quasi democratic movements of the Left and Right in history. If we take any movement which flatters the people and call it populist, the word loses any meaning at all.

Secondly, it should be distinguished from mobilising the people. Political movements and political leaderships and ideological groups which require a technique of mobilising the masses, as the main instrument to hit their enemies with, are.

the virtues of the people. This phenomenon of mobilising the people is not the same as flattering the people. The first is demagoguery; the second is modern mass mobilisation technique.

Here, Communists and other mass movements - perhaps Fascists - enter into the picture. To regard Mao Tse-Tung's Communist as populist is absolutely insane. Here is a case of a tremendously efficient technique of mobilising the people, but the sin is not to raise up the people in any abstract sense. There is no idolisation of the simple virtues of the people inherent in Maoism, even though you might find a little bit of that in the terminology of it.

The third thing which you must distinguish it from is political ideologies which have a rational plan. It seems to me that Marxism is not populism. There have been cases of illegal underground Communist movements which have had a great deal of what I might call a populist people-idolising mentality. Marxism, as an ideology, was different. Here was planning an ideal order. It was intellectualising in a rational scheme. The essence of Marxism is that those who practise it claim to be rational, scientific people. Their aim is scientific criteria measured by intellectual categories and not just a worship of the people. Therefore, Marxist and all rationalistic political ideologies are something different from populism.

Those points suggest some of the things which populism is not and one essential thing which populism is, but this is only a small part of the picture. If we take idolisation and worship of the people, something like this can be found a long way back in history. There is much in the papers about a cult of the noble savage in the eighteenth century, but you can go further back than that. You can find a whole strand, a sort of deviant from Christianity expressed sometimes by Christianity, heretics or otherwise and sometimes by those who are not Christians but deriving from that element in Christianity which stressens the humble and meek till at all costs. From this is drawn the conclusion that because people are humble, meek, poor, primitive and ignorant and are living in incredible squalor they are, therefore, more virtuous than anybody who is not living in equal and that equal and misery in themselves are virtuous. I do not think that Christianity ever says that, but it is a deviation from Christianity. Possibly a worship of the most equal, most miserable, most oppressed and most insulted goes back through Christianity to an earlier Judaic tradition.

I should like to make two more brief points. I should have thought that we would do well to devote some attention to talking about words. I rather hoped that the philosophers among us would do this. There are four words which I would commend to your attention as worth talking about. They all appear to mean the same thing in four different languages, but in fact they do
not. The words are "people", "narod", "popul": and, in some ways, almost the most important word of all, "volk", with the adjective of that word and all that it has meant historically.

Lastly, the ideologies of populism which one might regard in one way or another as populist come from, on the whole, intellectuals. Populist movements start with the intellectuals rather than with the people, although the people are drawn in. It seems to be that the role of the intellectuals is important. In this connection, I would say that another word which we should talk about is "intelligentsia". What I propose to say is particularly relevant to Russia. I should be inclined to try to limit but I think that it is impossible - the use of the word "intelligentsia" to the particular phenomenon which I mention now, that is the position of the modern educated person of the nineteenth, twentieth or twentieth century belonging to the modern intellectual elite of the day who finds himself in a society which is overwhelmingly traditional in background and which is being rapidly and artificially modernised from above. This situation is a special one. The pattern is that the government, the rulers, the autocrats decide to modernise and start it artificially and rapidly. One of the first things which he is bound to do is to create artificially a small modern intellectual elite. It has been artificially created and it finds itself in the middle of a different kind of society, and all sorts of frustrations and troubles result from that.

This is the classical Russian example, not so much after Peter the Great as in the nineteenth century. It is the pattern in many African and Asian countries. The kind of situation in which the intelligentsia has been artificially created and is particularly aware of its artificial position provides an extra impulsion to it to worship, idolise and feel a conscience pang towards the people. This has been classically expressed in the Russian "To the people" movement. This whole notion "To the people" is control. You find it in Balkan and other countries, but insofar as this predicament of the modern intellectual elite in a backward and artificially modernising country is a central feature, it is right and understandable that so many of the papers should have stressed the developing society-intellectual - the African situation, and so on. It is understandable that they should have talked about nationalism emerging in those societies. But we must distinguish between them. Because this sort of modernising intellectual predilection is essential to our problem, we should not, for that reason, simply equate any kind of traditional society nationalism with populism. There is a danger that in some of our papers we may do that.

Lastly, although the people-idolising mentality has predominantly turned up in this kind of society, it need not necessarily be so. The United States is the obvious exception to this. I am not sure to what extent the populist leaders in the United States were intellectuals. I am not sure to what extent one could say that they were intellectual or semi-intellectual. They were, I suppose, anti-intellectual. But the element of idolising the poor, the object and the rejected can be found certainly in an advanced society and in an urban society. It does not have to be in a peasant or modernising society. I suppose that the American populists of the turn of the century were not the only example of this. The civil rights movements and the attitudes of radical young intellectuals in the United States - the most advanced society there has ever been - and the idolisation of the people and the negro masses may be a significant fact.

Therefore, I would put before you a distinction between idolising the people, and mobilising and flattening the people, and a distinction between worship of the people and forming rational plans for social blueprints. We should also consider the special role of the intelligentsia in modernising society. Finally, I would make a plea that somebody talks to us about words and tells us what is meant by "peasants".

THE CHAIRMAN: One thing which we shall have to consider very carefully is what is the exact value of the word "peasants", should now like to ask Professor Alain Touraine to speak to us.

PROF. ALAIN TOURINAINE: My first remark will be very near the comment just made by Professor Sutton-Watson. Our main difficulty is to speak of a well-rounded, well-organised, class ideology defending the Gemeinschaft or traditional society. It seems to me that in almost all cases, except some extreme cases, the first characteristic of a populist movement is that it is, above all, very organised and full of contradictions. Two contradictions should be pointed out. First, it is a movement or an ideology defending some traditional values and, at the same time, directly oriented towards problems of economic change or economic problems. All kinds of populist ideologies deal with problems of social control, of economic change. So it is not just backward looking, but forward looking. It is a sort of ideology about the type of social change. Secondly, as Professor Sutton-Watson has just pointed out, most of the time, but not always, it is about peasants but not by peasants. It is not produced by peasants.

Therefore, instead of describing from within what the populist ideology is, I should like, first, to define the kind of social situation which produces such an ideology. Perhaps not in all cases, but in a large array of different cases, we can find three inter-related elements of the social situation which produces populism. First, it is about a social category which is halfway engaged in a process of economic change, a category which is defined, not by economic circumstances or as an interest group, but in a
process of collective social mobility, be it upward or downward. In Africa or Latin America, it is often, but not always, upward social mobility. In the United States, it is probably more downward social mobility. But the main fact is that these categories are halfway in a sub-cultural or traditional culture and part of a new predominant economic system.

The second main element is that the centres of economic power are in a parallel situation. The economic power seems always to be alien to the society with which it is directly concerned. That can take different aspects. The most obvious is a colonial situation in which economic power belongs to a colonial power - that is, to foreigners. But in a relatively traditional dual society, the power of the oligarchy can appear as a foreign power for the rest of society. Instead of there being, as, say, in Western Europe, a direct opposition between two conflicting elements of an industrial society - like factory owners and workers - it is a free-to-free relationship. We have an indirect and partial relationship. Both elements are engaged in their country, so they are defined in terms of aspiration and achievement at the same time.

The result of the situation is that in between there is a certain free space between economic power and the mass which is used for some institutional gain. There is, therefore, a large discrepancy between economic power and political organisation. There is a certain fluidity of an intermediary level of political gain. This can be expressed in terms of the existence of some elements of middle class. It is not a social class which will intervene in the middle, but some centres of influence - intellectuals, politicians, military people. Instead of a stable and fundamental conflict which is a direct conflict - like a colonial power-colonised people, workers-factory owners - we have a game which is not with two elements but three. Populism is never directly a challenge of the predominant economic system. Populism is always more than economic mobilisation or economic change. It is always less than change in the economic system or in the system of economic power.

The ideological or non-ideological aspect of the populist movement depends essentially on the type of relationship which exists between these three elements. Let us take some very rapid examples. If the mobilisation of the mobilising mobilisation in a Gersonian sense is very limited, if the traditional society is more destroyed or shattered than changed, if at the same time the centres of economic power are far removed from the society, the space of free gain for these middle elements will be maximum. In that case, populism can appear essentially as an intellectual manipulation or an ideological manipulation for the sake of the interest of the middle ruling class of the mass. The comments made by Dr. Soul and others about Africa seem to be near this kind of extreme situation. Where populism is more an ideology than a movement, more an effort to create artificially a kind of social and cultural unity in a rural society which is largely disorganised.

To go on to the second stage of mobilisation, if we consider a society where there is a beginning or a promising mobilisation of the rural masses, and where the centres of economic power are less removed from the rest of society, the free space for these middle class elements is reduced. Here we see that populism begins to be not just an ideology, but a movement. But due to the fact that the masses as much are not mobilised, it is not a social movement, but much more an intellectual movement.

This situation, which may be the Russian situation, is different both from a situation of pure political ideology and from the third situation which I shall describe, which is a situation of real social movement. Populism appears as a social movement when the mobilisation of the masses is much more advanced. Perhaps tomorrow I will have an opportunity to speak at greater length about Latin America. But it is essential to state that there is no reason to say that populism is always about peasants. In Latin America, it is fundamentally not about peasants. In one of the papers there is a reference to A.P.R.A., S.R.A. always comes first, and S.R.A. in, in my opinion, very little populist.

Most of the big populist movements - and perhaps the most typically populist movement is the Colombo Government - including the Right Wing populist movements, are based on urban population and essentially on migrants. That means that they are based on a highly mobilised population - people coming from the countryside or from small towns to the cities. In this kind of situation, we have a very strong feeling of the dependence of the economic system in a semi-colonial system or, like in Argentina, in an economy which is directed from outside by the conditions of world markets. In that situation, we see that the movement as such is relatively important. But it can never be understood without taking into consideration the manipulative role of some elements of the middle class whose position is always ambiguous, making an alliance with the new mobilised masses against the oligarchy and, at the same time, trying to maintain or create a kind of social equilibrium and political integration. The dual aspect which is quite obvious in the two aspects of the Peronist movement or in the Yawar movement and in others shows that it is always necessary to use these three elements of structural analysis of a populist movement.

I am much less sure about the possibility of applying this kind of general scheme to situations of downward social mobility, because the three kinds of examples which I have just mentioned are examples of mobilised or pre-mobilised masses. What happens when some categories of rural workers or peasants, or some urban categories, are going down? Returning to the remarks made by Professor Amin-Warson, probably the main difference between a populist movement and a non-populist movement is always the existence of a middle element. If some category - say, small shopkeepers or craftsmen directly opposed the big new factories
or the concentration of economic interests into big corporations at a certain stage of industrialisation, there is a direct link—perhaps a Peasant or Poujadist movement or extremism at the centre, but there is no populism. There is populism in the situation where there is some possibility of political gain in the middle. That is why they express themselves through votes and political actions. There are always these three elements.

The whole array and diversity of populist movements can always be located between some kind of extreme situation where the face-to-face conflicts within a relatively integrated social and economic system predominate. Populism appears where there is no such integration when the two main opponents are both within and without and when this intermediary situation leaves some free space for political and intellectual manipulation in between.

DR. ANDRZEJ WALICKI: I feel that my command of English is not sufficient to express everything that I have to say, but please treat with tolerance the linguistic accent in my speech.

First, I must defend myself against the view that I am simply against a more universal definition of populism. In Poland I have published two books, a large introduction and many articles on populism. I have often pointed out the fact that there were some features in Russian populism which are not to be found in the different populisms of the present day.

However, it is one thing to look in Russian populism for such features which pointed to and anticipated the different populisms of the present day, and another to attempt to define Russian populism in terms of present day populism. I must reject any attempt to define populism which puts the emphasis on the relationship between Russian and present day populism but at the same time defines modern populism in a way which emphasises those features of it which have very little in common with Russian populism. If we want to put the emphasis on the relationship between Russian populism and contemporary populism—and I do not say that we must do so—perhaps it is not necessary—but if we wish to treat Russian populism as a prototype or a pattern for different populisms of the present day, we must define contemporary populism in a way which draws attention to those features which, indeed, have some relationship with Russian populism.

My remarks will be divided into two parts. One part will be destructive and the other part constructive. I shall confine myself to the three papers which were classified as dealing with the ideological aspect. We have a very interesting paper by Professor Worsley. But certain points in his definition of populism contradict the idea that the populism which he is defining has Russian populism as its prototype. For instance, there is "the proposition that socio-economic classes are not the crucial social entities that they are in developed countries." I do not think that this can apply to Russian populists who were very conscious of the class division. The main idea of Russian populists of the seventeenth, the idea of the so-called social struggle as opposed to the political struggle, was based on the absolutisation of the class struggle. They thought that the class struggle could be separated from the struggle for global political change. They had no idea of axial solidarity.

Professor Worsley goes on to say: "The Party is the agency of liberation, and the Party-State the agency of development (unlike early Russian populism) . . ." The idea of an _ideology_ was hardly to be found in Russian populism. Also, Professor Worsley uses the expression "earlier Russian populism" meaning nineteenth century Russian populism. But Russian populism of the sixties and seventies is classical populism, not early populism. What is "earlier"? If it is classical, it is not early. It looks as if Professor Worsley considers fully fledged Russian populism to be social-revolutionary and early Russian populism of the nineteenth century. No historian of Russian social thought would agree with this usage.

Then Professor Worsley says: "The unity of the nation is expressed in the single-party, and sometimes elaborated into a philosophy which links Party, nation, village-life, and self-activity into an ideological complex." That feature cannot be found in Russian populism except perhaps in Tkachev, but he was not very typical in this respect.

Later, Professor Worsley says: "Populism is a development ideology par excellence. It is an ideology of transition, from 'rural ideology' to modernised society'. I have pointed out that two very interesting features in the ideological and economic programmes of such Russian legal populists as Bolshakov and Voronov. Indeed, their ideology was not only an economic programme, but a programme of development. They proposed something like a non-capitalist way of industrialisation. But in the case of Russian populism the stress was not upon development but upon non-capitalist development and not upon modernisation but upon non-capitalist modernisation. There were some populists— for instance, Mikhailovsky—who were ready to sacrifice development who thought that it was much more important to develop along non-capitalist lines than to develop. Development as such was not very important. Professor Worsley says: "It is, very much, a development ideology, not only an ideology of national independence . . .". But Russian populism was not an ideology of national independence. If we wish to treat Russian populism as a prototype, we must put emphasis on this difference.

The last generalisation which Professor Worsley makes is that "the key atomic unit in the anarchist dream is the free individual independent producer". In the case of Russian anarchists,
that was not so. Russian anarchists were also communists. There were populists who were at the same time anarchists, but there were also populists who were not anarchists. For instance, legal populists were, as a rule, state Socialists. They believed that a strong state, even a czarist state, could curb the economy, and they were in favour of state interference because they believed that the state could prevent capital development. Therefore it was possible to be a populist and at the same time to be a statist, although it was not possible to be both an anarchist and a statist. The two concepts of populism and anarchy in the case of Russia overlap, but only partially. It was possible to be an anarchist without being a populist, and it was possible to be a populist and a statist at the same time.

Professor Hofstadter has written that "the United States has not had a peasant class; ... that the United States has had ... is a class of cash-conscious commercial farmers." Therefore, we cannot say that Russian populism was of the same species as American populism. It was something very different. One of the main ideas of the Russian populists was to prevent Russian peasants from becoming "cash-conscious commercial farmers". There is an article which was written by Lenin in his paper "The Economic Content of Populism" as a typical example of the ideology of classical Russian populism. This article contained such statements as "The farmer is a true soldier in the ranks of civilization"; "Russian peasants must not become farmers. It is our first enemy - farming; 'Farmers are begetting capitalists'. The Russian peasants in their present economic and political conditions are something different. There was a violent hostility towards farming.

I come now to the constructive part of my remarks. Populism is a dynamic and not a static concept. It is possible to arrive at a definition on the basis of those components which would embrace some typical features of both Russian populism and American populism. I have not yet found them in the paper presented to this Conference, using them to formulate a general definition. Populism is the socialism which emerges in backward peasant countries facing the problems of modernization. It must be a peasant-oriented socialism, usually idealising peasants. It is expressed and organised by intellectuals. It represents - this is very important from my point of view - a curious blend of the tendency towards modernization with an idealisation of a great past. This is what Professor MacKenzie called the 'element of romantic primitivism', but I do not agree that this is the essence of populism. It is only one of the components, and I would not define populism only in terms of romantic primitivism.

There has been a reference to "looking for non-capitalist ways of solving the problems of modernisation". This is treating capitalism as a social disease which attacks one's country from without. Hence the equation of capitalism with Europeanism - very important both for Russia and for the countries of the so-called third world. Here we have a combination of the external and internal aspects of the response to the problems posed by industrialization. All these features we can find in the papers.

I would like to make another distinction: that between populism and peasantism. In a paper on Peasant I have found a reference to Mitrany's book "Marx Against the Peasant", where Mitrany simply identifies peasantism with populism, but this is fallacious. Populism is a Socialist phase of peasantism. Lenin expressed this by saying that populism is the advocacy of radical agrarian change guided by Socialist dreams. Populism is a combination of plans for non-capitalist modernization of backward countries with dreams of a socialist future. Let us not in this context forget the impact of Western socialism, one of the main sources out of which Russian populism emerged. Like socialism, populism was a global ideology, not merely a political or economic programme. It was a vision of the world, a view of personality and society. There is nothing like this in simple peasantism, which does not involve Socialist dreams. On the contrary, peasants are not Socialists as a rule. Therefore I do not agree that Witos could be called a populist. Witos was a peasantist. We did have populism in Poland during the romantic period. Some populists were Utopian Socialists, aiming at a global transformation of society. We had populism in the first half of the nineteenth century in Poland, but after that it was replaced by peasantism.

In Russia, the transition from populist to peasantist was more direct. For example, the legal populists could be treated as a link between populism and peasantism. Socialist peasant orientation here was a link between populism and peasantism. Populism is peasant-oriented, whereas peasantism is peasant generated. Populism is a peasant-orientated socialism. Peasantism cannot be socialism.

I found in the book of Mitrany a quotation from a Russian peasantist, Constantin Puler: 'Every Socialist must be a populist and cannot be a Socialist except through being a populist' - in Romania, of course. But not every populist need be a Socialist. I would put it like this: Every populist must be a Socialist and cannot be a populist except through being a Socialist. Otherwise, he is not a populist but a peasantist. This is why American populists are different from populists in Russia - because American populists had nothing in common with socialism.

I am not against the very broad definition of populism. I realise that it is possible to define populism in such a way that it includes all radical movements which are led by intelligentsia, which appeal to the masses, and which are not confined to the working class but stand for the cause of the people as a whole. All these movements could be called populist movements. It would be useless to insist that the word 'populism' can only be used in the exact sense in which it is used by historians of Russian social thought. I think that we should avoid a controversy of terminology. But if we wish to treat Russian populism as a prototype of present-day populism, we must concentrate on those features of present-day populism which have something in common with Russian populism.
I should like to say something more general and direct, not personal. We have a very interesting problem. I said earlier that we must look at the word "peasant". In this country, in the United States, and, for that matter, in areas of Africa - such as the West African cocoa farmers - we are not dealing with people who are peasants. We are dealing with capitalist farmers - different scales and of different nature. Nevertheless, we might want to distinguish general ideological features which are likely to occur among and appeal to all cultivators and then make a division between the different kind of cultivators thereafter. From the point of view of definition and understanding, we might find this a useful procedure.

PROFESSOR WILEY: I believe that I am the only economist present: a very pleasant feeling in some ways - I am, as it were, socially promoted and intellectually displaced. To each, of course, his own, and I think that each of us is showing the clever hoof of academic self-interest in offering these definitions, so I will offer mine. But I will declare my interest first. I am a sociological economist, I am of British nationality and I have long resided in the United States. So I define populism as something about virtue residing in simple people and in their traditions. It has to be loosely organised and without a strict ideology. It is very useful simply to say what results from that complex. Unlike Dr. Wallis, who seems to be some kind of Russian, I do not regard Russian nineteenth century populism as the sole prototype. I think that it is productive to look at such definitions and take such attitudes as would include nineteenth century American populism and certain features of my own country.

But I share Dr. Wallis's doubt as to the utility of this concept in the modern world. I do not think that the behaviour of African states at the United Nations is linked productively in any intellectual sense, with this essentially nineteenth century word. I would rather use the word and define it to suggest that this nineteenth century phenomenon has a number of residues in the modern world. A number of markedly populist features are to be detected in Mao Tse Tung, Nehruah and Lonin.

Populism is an anarchy, but a moderate one. I think that it is more anti-establishment than anarchist in principle - anti-elitist. We have not heard enough about anti-elitist movements. Therefore, I do not want to define it as socialism. I would rather say that Russian populism is socialist populism and United States populism is capitalist populism; and I would define British populism as the usual British compromise.

Thirdly, it concerns small enterprises as a general rule, but not only peasants. It says, as in the Russian case, have ideas about abolishing even small enterprises and going communitarian, but it does not actually do so. It is about and comes out of small enterprise societies. Where there is a lot of land and a society is very rich, the small enterprises are big enterprises, but we should not exclude populism just because the people who adopt it, although small by their standards, have large enterprises by somebody else's standards.

A curious and purely economic point is that populism always believes in monetary expansion. The Russian populists resisted the adoption of the gold standard. The American populists were pro-gold. The thing that I shall call Birmingham populists were against the London bankers. It is a general principle that if you have a small enterprise you like inflation, because your own personal income depends on it. You cannot survive a slump on fixed interest or, perhaps, on half of your previous income. You go out of business. Therefore, monetary expansion is a regular feature of all nineteenth century populism. That means that, on the whole - and even Russia might be included in this - small capitalism is all right. It is financiers who are attacked, and, certainly in the Russian case, large capitalists, I do not detect very much anti-kulak feeling. I do not detect even the word "kulak" in the nineteenth century.

Can there be an urban populism? I think that Professor Toumne is absolutely correct: surely there can. Something very similar to classical populism of the United States or the Russian kind was evident in Britain throughout the nineteenth century, especially in the town of Birmingham: a town of small masters at that time, not exporting but concerned with the internal market, the town which produced all the monetary cranes. You can allow your historical imagination to play upon what would have happened if Engels had lived in Birmingham and not Manchester.

There are many remnants of this kind of urban populism in modern Britain. There are literary remnants such as Professor Richard Hoggart. There are the novels of Wells and Arnold Bennett. There is the fact that we do not call our Left Wing party a Socialist Party unless we wish to make propaganda against it. Its official name is "The Labour Party". There is the whole Chartist movement. There have been many manga of popularists. Populism - and here I must disagree with Professor Jenks-Morton - opposes gross inequalities of income and wealth. But surely it permits those inequalities which are traditional among populists - the inequalities of the Russian village, the inequalities of the Middle Ages, the enormous inequalities of the Middle East. These were not the object of populist attack for the simple reason that they were traditional. Therefore, I do not think that we should include in the definition of populism a desire to be extremely poor, to be rejected, to the oppressed, to the Maxin Gorki lot. On the contrary, populism, as a whole, is against that kind of person.

Can you have an affluent populism? I like always to point out to my United States pupils that their present President is an affluent
populist and behaves in very many ways like that. An enormous number of policies can be explained quite simply by the fact that he used to be a straight populist, but then he made fourteen million dollars.

I believe that peace and isolationism - here I cease to speak as an economist - are part of populism. I am inclined to use them as belonging to the definition of the word. It enables one to exclude the Russian Tzar, who otherwise would be rather difficult to exclude from being a populist. You would have to put in something about peace or disinterest in foreign affairs in order to get him out.

May I put two other questions of the type: Was Chartism populism? Am I not right in thinking that Gandhi was one of the most perfect of the old nineteenth century populists? Have we an expert here who could tell us about that? I should have thought that he exhibited every part of the nineteenth century syndrome and must be regarded perhaps as the last classical populist. Can it go without religion? My inclination is to say "no". A populist must believe in God. William Jennings Bryan believed in God. There is a whole anti-intellectualist acceptance of tradition. Should I say "acceptance of religion" rather than belief in it personally? At least that is part of the definition of populism.

I was very struck by the absence of intellectual leaders, so far as I am aware, in the United States populism. The reason for this is not to do with populism. After all, most movements have intellectual leaders. It just happens that in the United States, in the nineteenth century, there were no intellectual leaders in politics. When we find that there was no intellectualism of this kind in United States populism of that time, all we are making is a generalisation, not about populism, but about the United States.

(adjourned for coffee)
attention to the peasantry after the first great defeat of the Chinese trade-union movement in 1925. **We have seen that this shift of attention led him by early 1927 to the heights of enthusiasm expressed in his report on the peasant movement in Hunan; but it should be noted that this report is no more typical of his other political writings than of communist writings in general. Its lyrical, anti-Marxist tone is no longer to be found in his next published report, written in the autumn of 1928, even though the Party had by then lost nearly all of its foot-holds among the urban workers.*** From his mountain refuge on Chingshankus, Mao even admitted (if only for the record) that nothing but continued urban leadership could save the Party from degeneration into petty-bourgeois radicalism. Moreover, he admitted that part of his band of Robin Hood-like followers would have to be dispersed unless they could be taught to be class-conscious like proletarians. Henceforward, he said more and more often, on the need to educate and re-educate the Party's rural following: an emphasis that may seem populist in spirit unless it be remembered that by 'education' Mao meant first and foremost Marx-Leninist indoctrination. In fact, he meant more; the remoulding of one's whole mentality in such a way that, regardless of one's actual class background, one becomes proletarian in spirit.

Such remoulding (or kai-tao) became more and more necessary for the Party's survival as it ran out of real proletarian adherents; but the success of it was, I only moderate until the Japanese invasion of China gave it a powerful impulse - at least in one direction. As late as November 1938, Mao still found the peasantry lacking 'national consciousness' and a sense of solidarity - shortcomings they gradually overcame by being increasingly exposed to the invaders' atrocities.***

But the penurious war by which Mao and his generals first defeated the Japanese and, later, their Nationalist rivals could only be won at some sacrifice of the Party's central authority. Only by concessions to local initiative not always easy to reconcile with 'democratic centralism' could the Party Centre gain or retain the allegiance of scattered villagers. The traces of this experience still remain clearly visible in Mao's post-war use of the 'mass line' to gain the broadest possible support for any one of his policies. First, his party cadres 'go to the people', both to learn from them and to instruct them, but not - as we shall presently see - in the manner of the Populists. The cadres 'go to the people', first, to sound out their sentiment and, secondly, to transform that sentiment into enthusiasm for any one given policy of the Party Centre. The Party Centre, for its part, takes account of popular sentiment in formulating its policies and certainly prefers persuasion to coercion in the process of giving effect to them. It also leaves more room for 'action from below' than the Soviet leaders have been willing to grant in the face of Lenin's explicit warnings against yielding to 'spontaneity';

but then, one may wonder how much true spontaneity has inspired the 'mass line' in China. The Chinese leaders have often admitted that 'communism' on the part of the cadres has supplanted persuasion - or that, in plain words, the will of the masses had to be bent forcibly to conform to the general 'mass line'.

This is not to deny that a populist streak runs through Mao Tse-tung's thinking and occasionally tingues it to the point of making it seem anti-Marxist. But for every one of Mao's 'populist' boasts about more than six hundred million Chinese standing solidly united, we find many more admissions, Marxist in spirit, of struggle behind that unity. Though not a class struggle, properly so-called, it is its direct descendant: a struggle of the 'people' against anti-people who wish to return to capitalism. The will of the people, as expressed by Mao, remains in this sense 'proletarian'; but it is notnarodnaya volya, any more than the Red Guards are Populists.

PROF. W.H. MORRIS-JONES: Professor Seton-Jackson said that one could not expect populisms to be too coincident because if they were essentially anti-Glitic movements it would depend on what was the character of the elites. I think that the variations we find in populist movements must depend also, more than people seem so far to have acknowledged, on what is around in the way of local ideas. Each populist movement springs up in a particular intellectual situation and is bound to derive some of its colour from that.

On Professor Wilc's point, Gandhi was too complicated to be a classical anything, let alone populist. But it is a good example of the way in which you cannot have populist thinking in India without its being coloured by such elements of populist thought as were put forward by Gandhi.

A further complication is that we have been talking as if there were a series of national populisms. This would seem to exclude the possibility that you can have different kinds of populist movements in one country even at a particular time. I think that this is certainly the case in many Asian countries. You have some populist movements of thought which are of the kind described here that is, total world views, cases for a transformation of the nature of society, a change in the way of life - and others which are quite local protest movements against a particular kind of outside domination which cannot be coped with or faced. You can have little local populisms inside a country running concurrently with and in no way connected with larger populist movements.

I cannot avoid taking examples from India, which is not a bad thing, because Asia means to have got left out of the picture rather badly. I should have thought that the main populist stream of thought in India at the moment was that associated with Jai Prakash Narayan and his writings, which were mainly influential, if at all, in Northern India. They were certainly in the form of wide-ranging
radical ideas. But I should have thought that none of the sentiments to be found in the writings of Tsarist separatists in the South had strong populist strains quite unconnected with Narayan and more limited in scope.

Reference has been made to social situations of frustration as being a sort of common starting point to populist thought and populist movement. I wonder whether one could go further than this in the association of populism with frustration. To my mind, it is not simply that populism arises in situations where the wants of groups are confronted with an impasse which they cannot understand, which they find distasteful and painful; it is also that a characteristic of populist thought is that it is self-fulfilling. Populists ask for things which are so impossible that they perpetuate the sentiment and feeling of frustration. It is more than an idealisation of village life. It is a demand that village life should be everything that it patently is not. They ask for a communitarian society in the most sharply divided of all conceivable societies. They ask for a representative democracy in a situation where the clearest feature is profound apathy. They have chosen as their leading points all the things on which it is almost impossible to make headway. This connection between populism and frustration seems to me to be of a more intrinsic kind than merely the result of certain people finding themselves in a frustrating social situation.

I agree with many points made about contradictions. The one about primitivism as against development achievement has been put clearly enough. I would want to stress perhaps a little more than has been done another contradiction - that between praise of the unscientific and the scientific, and, simultaneously, a claim that what is being put forward is a scientific and rational programme because it conforms to something which is latent at least in human nature. This happens certainly in the Asiatic situation, because many populists are ex-Marxists and they have not been able to get so far away from their Marxism as to be willing to abandon the prestige which attaches to the scientific and rational claim. While there are strong romantic elements in their thought, and while their understanding of the social situations in which they are trying to act is certainly unrealistic, nevertheless the main claim which they make is that their thought is scientific and that what they are putting forward is a solution, not to a particular problem, but to a total world problem and that out of their thought can come the solution not only of India or any other individual country but of the world.

Agrarian, yes, but again one can have fairly subtle forms of this where the campaign is not against industry in any simple way, but taken the form of proposals and programmes which would tame or render less damaging industrial development, and, therefore, notions of agro-industrial communities of a completely new kind. All this is part of the general theme that this country need not take the course taken by other countries, that new 'mixes' are possible. This would be one of the main ones.

I would not regard the 'words and deeds' dichotomy as essential. I should have thought that many Indian populist leaders were in fact noted and up to a point respected for carrying out in their personal lives the sort of things which they professed. But this does not make their movement any more effective.

DR. L.J. MACFARLANE: I start by taking up what Professor MacRae says in his paper very early on, that if we are to make sense of populism we must treat it as though it is, although not only, an ideology. That seems to me to have been borne out by a number of contributions as well as by the papers. The most that we can say is that there are certain situations with common features, characteristics and situations and, therefore, they have certain points which we can see in most or some of them. This entitles us, perhaps, to classify them as populist movements, but certainly not to say that they have a common ideology. Some of them, on the basis of these features, may erect an ideology. They pick out local situations, local ideas and needs to build one up, or they may not produce an ideology at all.

One of the values of Mr. Walicki's papers is that he showed that, among what seems to be in many ways the more unified of populist movements, Russian populism, there are a number of different strands of thought, so that it is difficult to talk of the ideology of Russian populism but only of an ideological structure within which many positions are possible. Some of these positions are complementary to one another, some of them are in contradiction to one another. Some of them look back to the golden age of the past and are willing to defer industrial development if it means going through capitalism. Others see it primarily in terms of a means of skipping the capitalist phase of development and industrialising under state control. There is a big difference of emphasis.

What is most striking, comparing Russian populism with American populism, in the paucity of the ideas we find in American populism. It is very much an "ag'in" movement; it is against Wall Street, financial speculation and corrupt politicians. It has some populist ideas on money, but certainly it has no developed theory. It is stretching it rather too far to talk of the ideology of American populism. I would go along with Mr. Ninogue when he talks about the rhetoric rather than the ideology of American populism.

Professor MacRae lists seven ideological features of populism. I do not suggest that he is proposing that all these are there in any particular combination, but he obviously thinks that...
they are common, important features which make it possible to talk of an ideology of populism. He talks of the peasant, of a new primitivism, fraternity, the value of belonging to a group, conspiratorialism, anti-progressivism, the idea of the restoration of the old order (although it may be in a new form) the emphasis on the complete man against the division of labour, the emphasis on locality, a-political and anti-party.

It is very doubtful whether we can talk of these ingredients as being either necessary or sufficient ingredients. There are many cases in which these ingredients are absent and others in which they are present. We have not got a developed ideology. Professor Worsley, in his book, points to Saskatchewan populism, which is not conspiratorial; it is progressive. It resulted in the formation of a political party, and it had a sociological ideology.

It is also very doubtful whether we should talk of McCarthyism in America as an example of populism. I do not see how McCarthyism either incorporates the principles which Professor MacKee talks about or the ideas which Professor Worsley puts forward in his book. It does not help very much to label a movement like McCarthyism as populism. We have to be careful how we use such labels. Similarly, I doubt whether one can call Poujadism populism. It is a reaction to a particular set of circumstances and policies, and when they are satisfied or met or broken that is the end of it. One could talk in this way of the agricultural riots in Britain of the 1830's as being this sort of reaction. When we go back to this sort of period in British history, we are dealing with people who were not educated, in the main, and who did not have leaders who could express their ideas on paper. Therefore, by and large, we know very little about the ideas behind these movements. This sort of movement has as much claim to be regarded as populist as Poujadism.

Professor MacKee admits that none of the points which he made would apply well before the nineteenth century. Something like the seventeenth century "digging" philosophy, a quite sophisticated sort of ideas, very much looking back to the past, restoring the true England which existed before the Roman Conquest, with every man getting his own piece of land of which he had been robbed. The ideas of what we think of as populism can be applied in an industrial, non-rural situation as much as in a rural situation, even if they are more common in a rural situation.

Mr. Minogue's idea of populism being seen as a sharp reaction by those who find themselves peripheral to the centre of political power is useful. We find it in something like Chartism; Professor Wiles suggested. I thought that there is a much closer parallel between the ideas of Chartism and Saskatchewan populism than between Saskatchewan populism and Poujadism. If we look at the turn of the twentieth century as a populist philosophy, are we dealing with people coming into an industrialised situation, with somewhat sort of agricultural rural roots, similar to what happened in Britain at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century? You get this protest movement against what has happened in the past, with certain regrets that the past has gone.

but looking forward to a new order of things which will create something new. We have to be aware of the danger of giving populism a label which can apply to everything, so that we have to spend all our time trying to find different brands of populism, just as there are different brands of soap powder in the shops.

I react very strongly against the idea of treating Maoism as populism. The authors take of the early period of the C.C.P., as broadly carrying out populist policies, but they earlier define populism as rejecting the necessity and desirability of proletarianising the peasantry and say that the rural society is better than the urban. It does not seem to me to make sense to talk of Maoist or Chinese Communism in terms of these two categories, which they regard as distinctive of populism. Mao's attitude to the peasantry went beyond that taken by Lenin, but it was based on the attitude taken by Lenin. It is a question of tactics. You take account of peasant demands, but you have the conception of the wholesale transformation of peasant village life.

After 1927, the Chinese Communists had no industrial base. They were cut off from the town. They were forced to go into the village. They take up this idea of a party built on peasants primarily. But even in the Human report, Mao distinguished very clearly, as Lenin had done much earlier, between rich, middle and poor peasantry and suggested that it was only the poor peasants who had taken the revolutionary line. This is not pure Leninism, but it is based on it. The idea was to bypass capitalism which was what Russia had done. Mao's idea was to bypass capitalism, as Russia had both without having to go through collectivisation. I do not think that those ideas in Leninism - the idea of a new democracy, a bourgeois democratic revolution - are interpretable in terms of populism. They are only a transitional stage to socialism, and most important, in this transitional stage of the joint dictatorship of workers, peasants, and progressive bourgeois everything is clearly to be under the firm control of the C.C.P. No-one is more clear on this than Mao himself.

PROF. F. VENTURI: Many of the points which I wanted to stress have been stressed by Professor Vailicki. He is right when he says that we must think of populism in Socialist terms. It is not true to say that populism is socialism and that you can just put a sign for the two things. The real problem is to find out what are the connections between the populist and Socialist movement and ideology and problems. We return to populism as a situation of some moment in the general development of socialism. The most important thing is to think a little of the idea that populism can be defined in a way in which one is looking backwards and forwards at the same time. But certainly that is true of socialism at certain moments.

Take, for example, the Socialism which came out of the French Revolution which was the origin of the ideology of St. Simon, George Lefebre, the great French historian, said that he was looking to the peasantry and to the communal habits of the peasants in his own
Pierre where he was born. Socialism was the thought that you could take the idea of the communal life in the past and try to translate it in modern terms. You can do translations of this kind in modern populist terms when you take from the past not only the fact that you want a pre-capitalist society translated in modern terms, but the ancient pre-capitalist society has some forms which could be good even in the future. That is true for the France. It is certainly true of Baboeuf and of the agricultural socialism of England at the beginning of the nineteenth century. I think that the great book of Costa on collectivism in Spain explains these ideas very well. It comes from the idea of the common fields and from the common earth, and it can be translated in ideological forms. That is one of the ways to Socialism, and that is the populist way.

Let us take another example - the importance of the peasants in the new deal of the Socialists in France after the commune. There is an important element of populism in Jacobin. He thought that the society of free proprietors and free people who lived in the South of France could be transformed in a Socialist frame and could become real Socialists. From this point of view, coming back to Russia, I am not of the opinion of Dr. Walicki that they were not socialist. They were populist and socialist.

DR. A. WALICKI: I thought of the transition from populism as a phase of socialism to populism.

PROF. VENTURI: If you take the old movement from Babeuf to the present situation in the world, socialism is much bigger and larger than Marxism. In Russia the result was very important. In the constitutional elections, the majority of the Russian people voted Socialist in different shades. When we think that Russia acquired the bourgeois democratic revolution and came directly to socialism, that was not only the will of the Communist Party, of Lenin or Stalin; that was, in a way, the situation of Russia. Russia voted for socialism in the majority. In the constitutional assembly, it would be possible to see all the phases of socialist thought and ideas from populism to bolshevism. It is in this frame that we can better understand the populist movement, not only in Russia, but especially in the nineteenth century.

May I give a very important example about which, unfortunately, I do not know enough, and that is Yugoslav. The populist element in Titocin is much more important than it is in Maoism. We must understand populism as a movement of the twentieth century in Europe. We must look specially at the Bourbons, and perhaps to the peasant movement in Italy and the Communist Party in Italy in some ways. Gramsci had to translate the word 'masi'. He said that the Communist Party must be 'nationalistic popular'. He could not translate it in one word. He translated it in two words. That was the only way to do it. I see populism as one special kind of socialism, and I think that the Russian example from this point of view is specially important.

MR. GREGORY ENGEL: I was worried earlier as to whether populism existed in Africa at all if one viewed the matter in the light of the two obvious historical precedents - the Russian and American examples. But I think that a case can be made out for the existence of populist movements and the style of conducting political activities to which this label could be legitimately attached. My reasons for asserting this are based, admittedly, on a limited example, although it is possible to find others, I am sure.

My remarks relate to the peculiar situation which has developed during the last 60 years in the kingdom of Buganda. Here there has been a group of people with a genuine grievance which dates back to the period when there was a revolution which removed them from a great deal of their social status and the land which they controlled as clan leaders. This left them with an identifiable and continuing grievance. Their opponents were the big landlords who occupied freehold estates under a remarkable system of freehold land tenure. We have the elements here of something which is not altogether different from the older historical examples about which we have been hearing.

In recent years there have been outbreaks of violence of popular enthusiasm within this kingdom, which contains two vital populist elements. One is that it is backward looking in the sense that these people want a return to the situation as it was before 1900 which, as one moves away from it, appears more and more as a golden age. The second is that it is also forward looking because in their attack on the big landlords they were careful to include a demand for democratic rights - that is, a demand that there should be popular elections so that they could control the political situation.

The interesting thing about this is that the so-called nationalist leaders have not been able to capitalise on this. Their ideological universe draws on very different kinds of roots. There is one which has been imported from people like Bourbou, who have been read at university, and there is the other one, which is increasing in volume, which stems from their reflection on their position in Africa as political leaders.

Both those are forced to pay attention in Buganda - one could find other instances - to populism as I have defined it. But it has meant that populism has not been intellectually led. It is a movement without leaders, because the leaders are doing something else. They are trying to manipulate the whole system, not just a part of it, as with the Buganda populist leaders.

Therefore, I should like to put in a bid for identifying pockets of populism in Africa from examples of this kind. I do not want to get in an argument with Professor Andzicki. There was an awkward moment when I thought that he was producing a sort of fifth account which I said that you could not have populism in Africa, because the political leaders were clothes and that they were not sufficiently removed from the peasantry for populism to have appeared. It is possible to refute this line or argument, but it would take me far
There are, however, some common elements, which are not universally agreed upon, but for which one usually draws some general support. There is the reaction to capitalism, the reaction to externality, and so on. There is massness, at least in aspiration, if not in the realization. There probably would be agreement on what one might call the Janus syndrome or, to use the language of Marx, that there are both "tried" and "modern" elements in populism. It looks back in order to look forward. Fifthly, it is an ideology elaborated by, usually, the intelligentsia and other elements for or on behalf of the masses, and the realization of this in action is not necessarily always achieved. This latter one might call "not so much a way of life, more a program" phenomenon.

I do not suppose that we shall ever reach agreement about some of the differences, and it might be worth highlighting them. First, there are some empirically identifiable ones. There is the difference between those who, like Professor Wall and Professor Venti, emphasized that it is a strand within socialism, and those who would extend the label to cover many kinds of radicalism, including most forms of radicalism or populism, Nationalism, and the North American phenomenon of the entrepreneurial, money-focused individualist, speculative, capitalist owning operator - quite different from movements within a socialist framework.

An unexamined difference has emerged between those who insist on the global potential characteristic of the populist ideology and those who insist that it is a hotch-potch of sectional and locally assimilated elements. There is a further division of opinion, analysis, and interpretation between those who would locate it or identify it specifically as a peasant or rural phenomenon and those who would extend it to embrace various forms of non-rural urban society.

I suggest three points which have not clearly emerged in the discussion in order to promote further division. Professor Venti began to touch on the issue of communitarianism, which we must face in the coming session. It will involve us in difficult questions of the delineation of the frontier between anarchosyndicalism and populism in particular and in a discussion of the difference between unitary populisms and others.

Secondly, we have not discussed much the extent to which the movements do involve the mobilization of large masses of people who are analytically, structurally identifiable as belonging to different classes or sub-segments of classes. The third issue for attention is the "not so much a program" problem - the extent to which they are actually participatory mass movements of the people, the extent to which this is merely rhetoric or aspiration.

Finally, the diffusion of populism as a phenomenon of some considerable interest was raised incidentally in the form of...
discussion about the words used. This is important in that it focuses attention on the ideological sources which inform contemporary populist thinking. We know very little about where Nyere, Amin and, or whoever it may be get their "populist" ideas from.

MR. GEOFFREY SHILLINGLAW: I should like to comment on one or two remarks made about Maoism in the papers. First, Professor Vorsey says at the bottom of page 18 of his paper: "The common central element, here, between Maoism and populism is the... abandonment of the notion of the 'hypoconic' class, and of the notion of the class struggle itself in the post-revolutionary period." I doubt if this is true about Maoism. Certainly the notion of class struggle has not been abandoned. A little earlier Professor Vorsey talks about one of the elements of populism being "the displacement, for all practical purposes (and even to a large extent in theoretical pronouncements), of the revolutionary proletariat or even the poor peasantry as the leading revolutionising agency, by the Party and/or the Army..." My feeling would be that identification of the Army as one of the elements in populism is rather an elitist concept. I would rather class any ideology or attitude of mind which identified the Army as the leading revolutionising agency as an elitist rather than a populist one.

The second brief point was in Mr. Minogue's paper on page 15, where he says: "Populism is a reaction by those whose profoundest impulse is to industrialism". This, I think, is the core of what we are debating. I disagree with this, as I tried to argue in the paper. I suggest that populism is a reaction by those whose profoundest impulse is not to industrialism. (Professor Ulan, in his book, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism, argues that Marxism, historically performed the role of bringing together those whose profoundest impulse was not to industrialisation and then leading them into industrialisation.) May I ask Mr. Minogue to expand on his statement?

MR. MINOGUE: Not at this minute. I think that you are probably right. It is something which I will mention tomorrow.

MR. SHILLINGLAW: The third point which I should like to raise has already been discussed, and that is whether populism is Socialist or not. Professor Walicki came down heavily on the side of saying that it is Socialist. He cited Steere, the Romanian populist, and rephrased him. This puts us in the dilemma that we have to rephrase somebody who acknowledged himself to be a populist and yet who said that not all Socialists need be populists nor all populists Socialists. I should like this criticism to be expanded and to have an explanation of Steere's attitude.

THE CHAIRMAN: If possible, it would be better to leave that to another session.

MR. JOHNSON: I was thinking that we should invite someone in the afternoon to speak about East Europe.

THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

MR. BRUCE WALLIS: I get the feeling that perhaps the title of our paper is a little misleading, giving the impression that we are defining Maoism as populism. Perhaps there should be a question mark after the title of the paper to which the answer given in the paper is no - a qualified "no", but a "no" nevertheless. On the question of bypassing the capitalist stage of historical development - a concept characteristic of the nineteenth century Russian populists - this occurs in Maoism, but there all similarity ends. It is obvious that this was a tactical move, replacing the stage of bourgeois dictatorship by one of new democracy under which the Communist Party would have total power. There is obviously no similarity between that and the nineteenth century Russian populists.

As Professor Seton-Watson said on the question of peasants being a populist trait - another speaker referred to the peasants being an object of virtue - one can see this in Maoism. It is definitely there, running right from the Hunan report of 1927, or even earlier, to the present day, but nevertheless overridden to a large extent by Mao seeing the peasants more as a method of achieving the revolutionary end rather than an object of virtue in themselves. They are a means to a revolutionary end by the fact that China is predominantly a peasant society and by the situation into which Chinese Communists were forced in 1927 into the countryside.

One thing which we did not mention in our paper which has been brought up elsewhere is the question of populist states which are in some way on the periphery of economic power. China would fairly clearly fall into this category, and this has been made explicit in Lin Piao's 1965 statement on the global situation
I agree on a of getting in of the kind which structure, in the generalisation in the Conference, not what this is to. This is one of the two categories, surely there must be some kind of goodness in being in this state whereas it is obvious, to my mind, that China desires above all to industrialise and to leave the world countrieside and join the world cities, and that therefore the Lin Piao statement is a cry of frustration at the aleness at which it is achieving this aim. Once again, Macnism is not populism.

PROF. DONALD MACRAE: Going back to my paper, I stress again what I said briefly to Professor Wallis, that it is a paper about ideology and involves a certain conception of ideology which I do not ask other people to share. It is not intended, therefore, to be a paper which defines populism, which is the purpose of our Conference, but it makes a contribution in one important direction towards such a definition.

I should like to take up a point of Professor Andrekson; that we do not have a theory of occasions on which ideological structures of this kind - I am assuming for the moment that there is one - emerge. I agree with him. But I would make a sociological generalisation which is probably not clear and on which there might not be agreement if it were clear. In most societies, we can analytically separate the culture of the society in the sense in which the anthropologists use the word "culture" and the social structure, particularly the institutional structure, of the society. In circumstances in which there is a congruence between these two, and precisely where the institutional structure is weak and the cultural elements of the society are strong, you do not get ebullitions of the kind we call populism as serious factors in society. It is when there is a simultaneous weakness in both these areas that you get such ebullitions, and from this I think that one could work out a certain understanding of the emergence into practical importance of items of this kind.

This leads me quite directly to what I think is a disagreement with Mr. Macfarlane. He wants, on the one hand, to say that we should call populism everything which has ever been called populist in concrete historical and contemporary situations. I am sure that that is not "on", and perhaps I misunderstood him on this point. But I was struck by the fact that the constellation of items making up the ideology of populism seemed to me, when in answer to Mr. Iwamatsu's invitation I prepared this paper, very much more coherent and not consistent but recurrent than I had believed.

I therefore disagree with the identification of populism with socialism although all populism appeals to the state to rectify a disapproved of situation. All populism is certainly statist in this sense. This is one of the points of differentiation between populism and most things which have been legitimately called anarchism and distinguishes it from some forms of communistian. Stalinism is to be present. There is much more overlap than one might expect, for other reasons, in Russian and American populism. I am still unconvinced that I am wrong in this belief. Perhaps I am unconvinced because I suspect that it do not adopt either as an ad hoc working sociology or as an overt and developed sociology a position which approximates to Marxism. I mean "Marxism" with a very small "m" in the sense that people of political complexions can be said to have certain ideas about the relationship of ideology to social structure. My view is probably very much more un-Marxist than that of the majority of people here. It is out of that that the views which I have tried to express develop.

I should like to turn to Marx. There is an interesting point at issue. The concern of the matters with which we are concerned of Marx belongs to Marx certainly after 1848, particularly to Marx of the 1860's and 1870's, and to Engels after Marx's death. One name which has not been mentioned so far and which I do not think occurs in any of the papers is that of Eccarius, that rather nice German craftsman who met seriously formulated - this was accepted by Marx and Engels as a formulation - the position of Marxism towards the agrarian world in Europe, including Slavonic Europe. That is a view which is quite incompatible with any kind of populism. Mikhailovsky is urging that if the Eccarius-Marx position is correct, then the right thing to do is to encourage the division of labour and sow in a direction which makes any hope of the populist dream being realised quite impossible.

But today when one talks of Marxism, one talks of a large variety of things, particularly not of the Marxism based on the Marx after 1848, but of the earlier Marx. In the earlier, romantic Marx there are things which, if they are not populist - and I do not think that they are - are extremely congruent with populism.  

X Cf. J.C. Eccarius, "Kings Arbeiters Widerlegung"
It is these things which have re-emerged and which perhaps are transforming some of the manifestations of Marxist politics today and may also be associated with - they are not derived from certain things which are happening in the incorporation of populist elements in the general Marxist position. This is not to disagree with Dr. Brandt or with Mr. Waller and Mr. Millinglaw.

I do not expect agreement on this and, perhaps, if is not necessary for our discussion. The total repertoire of items to recombine in ideologies in the European world or which are derived from Europe is comparatively small. Outside China, this repertoire is basically one developed within Christianity, or if it contained Judaic elements, these are elements which developed within Judaism after the rise of Christianity and do not belong to earliest history, the Old Testament history of Judaism. For there there were certain apocalyptic elements which seem to have populist overtones.

I stress two things which Professor Wiles said and with which I agree. One is the importance of his point about inflation and the other is his point about anti-militarism in populism. I hope that we shall not lose sight of either of these things. I do not believe that, although there is a populist trend in English thinking, there has been a real populist movement since industrialism in this country. I would say that Cobbett was undoubtedly a populist and could have been used to illustrate my paper extremely well, but I do not think that the Chartists were populists. I think that people like Chesterton, G.D.H. Cole, and all sorts of other unlikely people, were populists, but, on the whole, their populism has not been tremendously influential.

Professor Hoggart, among our contemporaries, is a populist, but it is not populism which explains his influence. Why this populism has not come off in this country is to be explained in terms of the structure rather than the culture of English society, but that is a large point.

I would stress one thing which I think is important. It takes me slightly back to Mr. Walicki and my paper. Just as populism is statist in a curious sense of that term, but in a real sense, we must say that even if populism can be individualistic, it is always against any form of competitive individualism - not merely competitive individualism in an economic sense, but in all spheres and areas of life. If we lose sight of that, we lose sight of certain very important things about it.

I conclude with a word about what Professor Worsley said. What he said about my position was basically correct, and I would agree with it. We could develop a classification, a taxonomy, of different varieties of populism which have in common a massive overlap of ideological items, but which nevertheless diverge seriously from this common element. This might be one of the things which could come out of our further proceedings.
Afternoon Session

Chairman: Mr. F.W. Deakin

THE CHAIRMAN: I have very strict instructions that we should move from definitions to examples. I do not think that it is up to the Chairman to produce guide lines of discussion, but I hope that members of this Conference will not feel inhibited or confined to the three main subjects in the papers, namely, Russia, America and China. As this is a meeting of a historical nature, we should extend our examples to other regions of the world and try to reach more precise definitions tomorrow. We have touched briefly on India and Africa. I suggest that we might discuss populism in Eastern Europe. I should perhaps disclose a personal secret: my neighbour, Mr. Ionescu, is the nephew of Mr. Stare, the Rumanian populist.

Secondly, as you will see from the list of names on the blackboard, we shall extend the discussion to Latin America which was touched on by Professor Touraine this morning. A point which also has not been raised, and which may come up tomorrow, is whether there are any populist elements in the study of European Fascism.

PROF. ALAIN TOURAIN: I wish to introduce Latin America into the debate. The first point to be made is to try to draw a distinction between two situations and two types of social movements in Latin America - the so-called populist movement, or the populismo, which are essentially based on urban populations, and movements based on rural populations, be they the Mexican revolution or some aspects of the Bolivian one or part of the Peruvian popular movement. In that case, there seems to be a direct opposition between the vast mass of the peasants and essentially the Indians of the countries I have mentioned which have large Indian populations and, on the other side, the oligarchia which is represented as a very traditional elite. In those cases, we can have revolutions or pre-revolutionary movements, but it is precisely in the countries where there is already a great deal of movement from the countryside to the city that a different kind of movement appears.

Many of the characteristics which have been described in peasant societies can apply to the Mexican revolution or the Peruvian movement when the A.P.R.A. was founded in 1924. It was described as an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement. There is nothing similar in the movement created in Columbia, in Bogoté, in Argentina, in Brazil or in Chile. Therefore, the first point is that there is a very distinct set of movements organised round new urban masses.

The second characteristic is the fact that the political system is relatively open, because of a certain liberal middle class tradition, and because of the characteristics of industrialisation. The fact that industry is relatively limited in most of these countries except Argentina and the fact that they had to go in for more imports meant that the weight of the industrialisation was not as heavy as it was in Europe and the necessity of harsh social control by industrialists was not felt necessary.

The third point is the existence of a ruling class which is partly linked to foreign interests. It can be said that populism is stronger in all situations when the oligarchy is more unified, more modern and more powerful. Compare Argentina, which has a ruling class, with Peru where there is no unity between the traditional land owners of the interior and the capitalist land owners of the North coast. That explains many of the differences.

On the whole, it can be said that the populist movement in Latin America is the consequence of a crisis in the economic system and in the system of legitimacy. Most of the movement appeared after the crisis. This was the case in Columbia, Argentina and Chile after the first crisis in 1920. It was obviously the case in Brazil.

Therefore, we have a mixture of three different elements. One is the mass movements of new workers. The second is the double attitude of political centres in the middle class. On the one side there is a tendency to make an alliance with the new masses and on the other side there is a stronger force to restore the shattered social order and to manipulate the new urban masses, not for the sake of their interests, but just for the sake of the restoration of a certain order. Generally, when the alliance with the new masses is more visible, the intelligentsia plays the main role. When the main problem is the restoration of a political order, the military takes the lead, as was the case in Argentina. It was a totally different case in Chile and Brazil.

What is more interesting from an analytical point of view is to try to make a comparative analysis of the different
movements in terms of the changes in the relative position of the three elements to which I have referred. It can happen that the push upwards of the new urban masses and the reinforcement of a middle class as an element of the political system are much more pronounced than the defensive attitude of the oligarchy. In that case, we can see a passage from a populist movement to a popular front movement. A classical case is the Chilean case. After the Allende regime in the 1920's, which was dominated by the middle class in 1929, there was a popular front which was an alliance between new workers and the middle class which was less and less populist. Sometimes the movement from below can be the strongest element of the whole picture. Those in the middle can be scared and can oppose this movement and try to make an alliance with the old oligarchy. In that case, we can see, as we had in the last years in Bolivia, a tendency to return from the populist stage to the rural revolution.

The tendency in Latin America is to simplify the gene with the three players. With the middle class being disorganized and relatively weak in some countries, we have a direct clash between the new urban masses and the oligarchy or foreign interests. This was the case in Venezuela and Colombia at the time of the dictatorships of Roca and Pera. This populism, which is more or less leftist at the beginning, tends to become Right Wing, extremist and authoritarian. Another possibility is that the movement downward of the popular masses and of the middle class political elements are parallel, and so the story ends with the triumph of an oligarchical reaction against a popular revolution, which was the unique case in the Dominican Republic.

Finally, we have situations in which it is the middle class which reinforces its own power in front of popular classes whose bargaining power is diminishing and against an oligarchy which is going down, too. Then populism is progressively incorporated into a middle class constitutional government. This was referred to in Professor Lazar's paper. This is to a large extent the Chilean case where the populist aspect is the alibi type of government which is essentially based on middle class and whose main purpose is to develop the capacity for investment of the Chilean economy, and populism is simply an indirect means of controlling a floating population. The bargaining power of the masses is diminishing and a new alliance appears between some elements of the middle class and of the oligarchy, and that leads in turn to a military reaction as happened in Brazil, Peru and perhaps, to some extent in Argentina.

By making a comparative analysis, I meant to show that it is possible to explain, not only the general nature of the populist movement in Latin America, but in a more historical way the history, changes and outlets of the populist movement due to the fact that what happens in any kind of populist movement in Latin America can be predicted from the relative change of position of one or other of the elements in this threefold structure.

MR. INGELSTAD: You referred, Professor Touraine, to the alibi type of populism. Would you go so far as to say that they use populism for mobilization?

PROF. TOURAIN: No. I mentioned this alibi type of attitude in a process of disintegration of populism. At the beginning, an autonomous type of populism appears in the Argentine case when the political crisis is the main fact and some of the middle elements can try to manipulate these new masses. But, nevertheless, the push upwards towards social and economic integration of the new masses is a reality. It is different from the Chilean situation where at the last election in 1964 some big support was given to the Christian Democratic Party in some suburban parts of Santiago, in some very poor sectors of the city. But it is a floating population. It is not a population in a process of integration. It is in a process of disintegration, because the capacity of the economy to absorb migrants diminished after 1955.

MR. JOHN KEMP: I address myself to the Russian example, because we all agree that this is the prototype of the populism which we have seen since in other countries.

I begin by congratulating Dr. Walicki on his very learned and most stimulating paper. He did us a great service in successfully dispelling some of the myths which have clouded the subject of Russian populism for so long. For example, the idea that there was a hard and fast line of division and conflict between populists, on the one hand, and Marxists on the other. He has rightly pointed out that their ideas influenced one another. He has salvaged the reputation of Danielsen, who stoutly maintained his Marxist faith, despite a barrage of criticism from Marxists in Russia like Plekhanov and his followers and Engels, who does not seem to have come out as a very good Marxist. My remarks are intended to encourage Dr. Walicki to proceed a little further in correcting some of the distortions of vision which are still fairly common, and I think that some traces of them remain in his paper.

Two points in particular might be made one on the chronological periodization of Russian populism, and the other
on its content. On the chronology, it is noteworthy that, while Dr. Walicki gives us a date for the beginning of classical populism, 1865, which is a very acceptable date, he does not give a date for when the classical period ended. One might have thought that 1900 or 1901 was a fairly obvious, even self-evident, turning point. But he does not give it. His silence may not be accidental. It may reflect a quite understandable reluctance to recognize the importance of the period which came afterwards - the period between 1900 and 1910 - in the history of populism thought in Russia, and particularly the importance of Victor Chernov. It seems to me clear in retrospect that this is this period, not the 1870's, which represents the classical period of populism, whether one considers it as a movement or an ideology.

Dr. Walicki argues that this period represents a transition to nationalism - that you have populism and something else called nationalism which comes afterwards. But in this latter phase it is not the peasants who shape the policy of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. It might have been better for that Party if the peasants had done so. On the contrary, it remains an intellectual creation right up to the end of its days, and it is as an intellectual creation that it wins a remarkable degree of support, clearly manifested in the elections to the Russian constituent assembly in 1917. Whether, as Dr. Walicki suggested, this represents a victory for Socialism, and indicates that the Russian people voted for Socialism, I am not sure. But it was an affirmation of popular confidence in the party which claimed to stand for the peasants' interests, as the proprietors of their land claimed to stand for rural democracy or co-operative economics and all the other ideals for which the Socialist revolutionaries fought against opponents on the right, Conservatism, and Marxism on the left.

Chernov's achievement was precisely this, that he brought to a triumphant conclusion the process which Dr. Walicki rightly noted for the earlier phase, and that is the fusion of Russian Marxist ideas and notions which were traditional to Russian agrarian Socialism. Chernov brought this about in a very practical and realistic manner which was relevant to contemporary conditions. Perhaps this practicality of his was why his opponents, being more abstract, dogmatic and rigid, were rather jealous of his success and accused and accused him as a syncretist and of being inconsistent in his ideas. That is not to say that, although Chernov produced a good programme, he was a good party organizer. That is a different question.

In this final phase of populism, the new ideas took over all that was healthy, vigorous and constructive in the heritage of this old narodничество of the 1870's, which Dr. Walicki calls a classical age.

Coming to the context, I am referring to the individual libertarian and, above all, the moral aspect, which is perhaps the key to our understanding of the phenomenon. If we continue to apply the old class formulae and to regard the populists as petty bourgeoisie, as they were often regarded in the 1890's, we are not getting close to the truth as we can, because the movement began as an act of moral revolution against the existing establishment in the Russian state and against the tyranny of accepted ideas which had hitherto held intellectuals in subjection. It was a triumphant assertion of the right of men to shape his destiny and pursue the truth as he saw fit - everything for which Belinsky and others of his time had fought. That is why Mikhailovsky, the greatest of the populists perhaps as a thinker, kept a bust of Belinsky on his desk and said on one occasion that if the mobish crowd ever dared to penetrate into the quiet of his study and try to smash the statue of Belinsky, he would resist them to the death. So you have this libertarian aspect as well as the Socialist element of populism. These two elements are in contradiction throughout its history. The populists never succeeded in settling this question, and one has to deal with both aspects.

May I make the other point which are not so fundamental. One is about religion, which Professor Miles raised. The idea here, perhaps, is that populist Socialism is a secularised form of certain tendencies in Russian religious thought - certain discontents, anti-establishment tendencies. Dr. Walicki mentioned Belinsky, this character in the late 1860's, and said that he was influenced by Marx. But for more interesting is the fact that Belinsky went off to study the old belief communions in certain parts of Russia, and some work has been done by Soviet scholars on the interaction between religious dissent in Russia and populism thought at this time.

Secondly, Mikhailovsky's theory of progress, his hostility to the division of labour, perhaps owed more to Auguste Comte than it does to Marx. This idea of progression through stages of history was common ground to the nineteenth century thinkers in Europe, and one should be chary of attributing it to Marx. It was not directly his, because his influence as a philosopher in Russia in the 1860's and 1870's was much slighter than his influence as an economic or social theorist.

I come lastly to Professor Bonfante's remarks about semantics and the meaning which should be attached to the word narod and where it stands in relation to the German Volk or the French people. The Russian populists used to distinguish between narod and narodnaya - people and nations - which is why you cannot translate narod into a language like Italian. To the French, people simply means all citizens. To the Germans, Volk is a kind of mystical body. The Russian narod may fit in between the two.
Narod is all people except for the possessing class, except for the establishment. It is the 99 per cent, who some of the more utopian members of the sect believe would accept the new regime once the old one had been overthrown. It was a highly unrealistic, if not abstract, concept, but perhaps less abstract than the German Volk and more abstract than the French peuple.

Mr. Walicki started his comments by referring to Dr. Walicki's paper. Dr. Walicki had left out a major body of Russian populist thought which underlined the social and economic ideology of the populist social theorist. One could possibly exclude from the discussion of populism the work of the populist social scientist as being more factual than the general political theory discussed by Dr. Walicki's paper. But then one should also exclude Lenin or at least split Lenin between his political programme and his studies of the development of the economy of Russia. The social research developed by so-called statisticians of Zemstvo (the regional local authorities) had a clear conceptual content. That was highly significant and possibly, the most important contribution of populist thought to the ideologies and images of contemporary Russia.

Dr. Walicki had referred to the impact of Marxism on populist thought; the influence was mutual, however. There was not just one important Marxist scholar who analysed the Russian peasantry in the nineteenth century, namely, Lenin, but at least three - Lenin, Gorvich and Krykhcheva. The importance of Lenin had, of course, grown in stature in the twentieth century for obvious reasons. Yet the other two had tried to integrate the element of social analysis put forward by Chomikowsky into Marxist thought and their work and impact cannot be disregarded. That was not the end of that tradition, because the tradition of trying to integrate Marxist and populist thought was carried on by Mezlov, Khryashcheva and others. One could find traces of that tradition even in some of the contemporary work of Soviet scholars. Mr. Shamin did not think an additional analysis of the impact of populist ideology on the media of social sciences would undercut Dr. Walicki's conclusions, which he accepted. However, he believed that without that additional dimension of social analysis the scheme of understanding would be regrettable limited.

It had been said that a populist movement was basically an intelligentsia movement, not a movement of the peasantry. Mr. Shamin said that he did not agree that it was a question of either populist or elitism. Elitism was implicit in any populist movement.

PROF. G. F. MARCHINI: It was Professor M. R. Maria J. n., I believe, who said that different brands of populism may develop and thrive in the same country; a very precise and useful statement. There are many cases of populism in Italy. There has been a Pisanian in Italy, as S. M. D. D. I. has aptly pointed out; there is a case today of the Christian Democratic left (the R.C.L.I., Fanfani, the late Father Milan and a few others). But by far the most important example of populism in contemporary Italy has been, in my opinion, the Communist Party especially during the 1930s.

I believe that the inspirer of this attitude was Antonio Gramsci. Of course, I am not prepared to say that Gramsci was a fully fledged populist. What I mean is that there was an evident and powerful populist trait, particularly in his late thinking. In the works, of Gramsci's, Republic and populist (syndicalist) inspiration is just think of his early emphasis in the works of populism as a body of political thought that superseded the party and uni in the leadership of the working class. The watered down by a more narrow enthusiasm of populism in the 1930s was the case when he was in jail. His n i f party as the 'sollen grine', this, I believe, is the title of the English translation of his book, in Machiavelli, as a 'get intellectual' creating and directing a populist and national coalition is a remarkable example of populism. And, of course, populism, in the works of populism Italian style. I am not at all sure, as it has been suggested, that by using the phrase 'popular and national coalition' Gramsci was trying to translate into Italian the Russian concept of 'nar dana'. I am rather inclined to believe that he borrowed the phrase from his writings on the modern ideas; that is, this finds reference to the popular-national nexus. Now, if this idea died in 1932 1 year before the heyday of the nar-dana.

I find this concept between the 'national' and the 'nationalist' Gramsci extremely stimulating, was it only because its senti n infuriates present-day Italian Communist intellectuals? and it is a pity that I have no time to elaborate on it. I shall confine myself to pointing out that, once the notion of popular and national will is adopted, the very idea of the proletariat as the 'agent of change' , to put it like Wrigth Mills, is bound to wither away, and even the notion of proletariat hegemony, for all the lip service paid to it (and Gramsci paid a lot of them), dwindles to nothing. The emphasis is necessarily laid on the humble, the oppressed, the downcast; the constant struggle for a new society is replaced by that of redress. Now, or rather old, sometimes ancestral, values come to the fore.

Sociologically, Gramsci identified the Italian humble and downtrodden especially as the Southern peasants; and this - mind you - in a country where, unlike Russia of 1917 or China of 1949, as much as 26% of the active population was engaged in industrial activity and boasted a pretty remarkable record of paganism, stamina and organizational ability. The Southern peasants should have been led.
by the party from behind the scenes to the limelight of national politics; they should have become an essential component of the new state. In the light of this programme, it is no wonder, I believe, that the aspect of Machiavelli's book which interested Gramsci most was the task that the Florentine Secretary entrusted to the prince: building a powerful national state in Italy. Let us not forget that to Machiavelli one of the fundamental preconditions of the prince's success was that he involved in his struggle for national unification all the people by substituting a national militia of townsfolk and countrymen for the traditional mercenary armies used in the Italian wars.

When I mentioned all this to Professor Worsley during lunch he showed some surprise. Wasn't Gramsci - he asked - the Marxist thinker who most emphasized the role of the intellectuals? Wasn't he the philosopher of the intellectuals par excellence? Prof. Worsley will be even more surprised hearing the following quotation from Gramsci's 'Letteratura e Vita Nazionale': "The word 'democracy' should be taken (by the intellectuals) not only in its legal, secular meaning, but also in its Catholic, even reactionary meaning. What really matters is (for the intellectuals) to get in touch with the people, with the action as an active living unit, whatever the contents of its life may be'. Nor is this all, my dear Worsley; Gramsci went so far as to urge the Italian intellectuals to 'Go down to the people... however backward and conventional they may be'. "There will not be a new Renaissance - he wrote - if we don't start writing novel stories of the lowest kind or third-rate melodramatic operas'. Now I am not going to say that this is intellectual baiting in the tradition of American Bible-belt fundamentalism; but you will grant me, I hope, that it isn't either a magnification of the intellectuals' role in society!

From 1945 to 1963 the Communist Party of Italy turned its back on the industrial proletariat. The centre of proletarian action in the Northern factories had traditionally been the works councils. The councils had won certain privileges for themselves in 1947; but the Communist-oriented Labour Confederation so adequately supported them during the employer counteroffensive of 1949 and 1950 that a majority of the FIAT workers in the city of Turin (and of Gramsci) voted in 1954 for the candidates of the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic unions, the protégés of Walter Reuther and old George Meany. The metal-workers contract, which is the pattern-setting arrangement in Italy since it covers one million, three hundred thousand workers, was renegotiated for eight years, between 1948 and 1956. Most energies of the party were employed for the organisation of women - admittedly a downtrodden segment of our society - , the small retailers, the relatively well-off _muazzari_ (sharcroppers) of Emilia and Tuscany, and the self-employed farmers throughout the country. In other words, the Communists devoted themselves above all to the organisation of _kulaks_ , because this is what Italian independent farmers and _muazzari_ are, actually or potentially.

In the sixties the situation has changed. The percentage of the population engaged in agricultural activity has dropped to about 20% and the C.G.I.L. - the Communist-inspired labour organisation - has, so to speak, returned to the factories, though with a new approach, essentially a social-democratic approach to labour-management relations. But there has been a populist cargo of tremendous importance and lasting consequences in the history of the Italian Communist Party. I find it striking that Antonio Gramsci - the man Professors Stuart Hughes and George Lichtheim describe as a Marxist thinker alongside whose writings Lenin's theoretical works look crude indeed - should have been responsible for the deflation of the Marxist and revolutionary potential of the party he so much contributed to mould.

MR. JAMES JUILL: I want briefly to try to extract the Anarchists from this discussion and, in contradiction to Dr. Shinnin, to suggest that they do not belong here, and perhaps to express the hope that at some time someone will organise a comparable conference on anarchism where, no doubt, we should find it as difficult to define what an anarchist is and what an anarchist's ideology consists of as we are finding with populism.

It is true that the psychological attitude of anarchists and, in many cases, the social situation of anarchists are similar to those of the populists. There is the desire for a total reversal of moral values, the feeling that society has got entirely on to wrong lines and that we have to jolt it back by an enormous shock on to a direction where the potentialities of human beings can develop properly. Because of this rejection of the values of existing society, many of the individual policies in anarchist programmes are similar to the points in populist programmes. There is a desire for some kind of original primitive pure rural life. We find it very strongly in Froudeum, who is looking back from the wickedness and corruption of Paris to the purity of peasant life. We get it with Bakunin, with his insistence on the moral values and moral mission of the peasantry. But we also get, not only a desire to look back to some idealised pre-industrial past, but the desire to leap at once into a totally new world which bears no relation to past experience because it is a new dimension to human social organisation. This is very strong in anarchic socialism, particularly in Andalucia, where although there is a great sense of solidarity in the pueblo, in the village, the society which they are looking forward to is not a revival of a past society, but an entirely new society based on social justice, repartition of the land, and so on.

In common with the populists, the anarchists held as the great villain the whole set-up of banking and exchange. The anarchists went much further than the populists. They did not want simply to substitute silver for gold. They wanted to get rid of money altogether as being an automatically corrupting influence in society. On the other hand, their
attitude to industrial society seems to me ambiguous, partly because we find anarchist movements in certain industrial sectors, particularly in the textile mills of Catalonia, but strongly among the more artisan-type industrial activities in the Jura. Because they are prepared to accept some degree of industrialisation, they were forced to produce a planning, an industrial organisation and, as a result of this, there was in the 1890's a shift over to anarcho-syndicalism and an attempt to provide a reasonable method of running industrial life. This is the point at which the real difference between populism and anarchism emerges.

The anarchists had a picture of a new social order about which they were reasonably clear. Whether it was attainable or whether it was so revolutionary that it was never attainable, they nevertheless had a clear plan of social organisation and a clear idea that this must be carried out by individuals and not, in any circumstances, by the state. On the other hand, the populists had clear ideas about the new values which they wanted to introduce and clear ideas about the new social order which they wanted to introduce, and were comparatively indifferent to the means by which these changes were brought about. If the Russian state would reform itself in accordance with their programmes, they would be delighted to accept that reform from the state.

While these two movements have many things in common - one could go on with an analysis to show that often the social and economic situations which led to them were similar - they differ in kind because of the anarchists' insistence on the means by which changes must be brought about and because of the kind of vision of the ultimate society of the anarchists in which state and government would never have a place in any circumstances.

PROF. HUGH SESTON-WATSON: I return to my point about idolisation and worship of the people as an essential characteristic of populists and to see whether we can go on with the process of demarcating populists and non-populists by reference to historical examples: I mean by 'populist' the ideology of worshipping the people. In extreme form the notion of the people is a God substitute. Somebody said that there is a religious element in populism. Some movements which might be called populist were still religious. Others rejected religion, but the people as a substitute for God while not perhaps essential to populism, was, by and large, a legitimate oversimplification of the attitude of the Russian populists. You can have small groups of people, more or less conspiratorial, of this type, and you can have fairly large political movements of this type developing in opposition to a government which they are fighting.

What you cannot have is populist régimes. Once they are in power, they are not populist any more. The business of running a government is quite different from the business of admiring an ideal people. You can have a government in power which appeals to all sorts of nationalistic mystiques - traditionalist, romantic, historical mystiques - to whip up popular enthusiasm to give itself a mass base. This is not populism. These are people who are governing, and they are ruling and organising their subjects and telling them what to do. They are winning, or capturing, or cheating the confidence of their subjects, but they are not people-worshippers. You can have populist ideologies and parties, but not populist régimes.

Secondly, you can have something else which is a movement, again in opposition, which contains elements of populism, but which I would not call a populist movement. This is a distinction which has not been stated categorically and which we may find useful. First, I would agree with Professor Venturi that the Russian populist movement and all the Eastern European populist movements in their early and purer stages were Socialist. This is, perhaps, merely another way of saying that this phenomenon of worshipping the people which appeared in Eastern Europe, including Russia, in the late nineteenth century appeared at a time when Socialism was the movement of ideas into which this sort of attitude to the people was integrated. They were almost bound to be Socialists because Socialism was the movement of that time - the source of all their inspiration. The Russian movement was Socialist right to the end. I agree with what Dr. Keppe says. The S.R. Party is certainly a continuation of it and continued to be a Socialist party.

The movements in the Balkans are interesting. Here you had in several Balkan countries a populist movement which was rather small but which had one or two outstanding people with ideas, and practical revolutionaries, who clearly belonged to the populist and Socialist tradition. But from the activities of those people there gradually emerged political movements which ceased to be Socialist and which passed through two stages. First, they became peasant movements. This is where Dr. Walicki's remark about populists becoming peasantists is true in regard to the Balkans and Poland, but not in regard to Russia. There was never a peasant party in Russia. The S.R. never became a peasant party, and after 1917 things were completely different, whereas in Poland the Wyzwolenie group which had a populist background became a peasant party. In Serbia, you have the transition from Korkovich, who was essentially a narodnik Socialist, to Nikol Pashich, who began by being a sort of Socialist, a revolutionary, and ended up as a sort of novostyle Turkish pasha and plutocrat of the most reactionary kind.

Taking Rumania, Store, who I should have thought was clearly a populist ideologue of a sort, was an inspiration in the founding of the peasant party of Rumania. Therefore, you have in the case of Rumania and Serbian Socialist populism turning into peasantism and the peasants taking it over and making it much more moderate and perhaps losing its Socialist character. Then you have a third stage where the peasant movement is completely embourgeoisied and comes even to be a peasant movement, and you have the get-rich-quick types who put their hands on the moneymakers of Serbia and Jugoslavia - Pashich is a symbol of that - and in Rumania you have people like Tiu Micu, who was a very respectable and admirable man, but nonetheless a middle-class provincial lawyer, taking over his party so that it became pensionized and embourgeoisied. It comes to be populist altogether.
A point which was made earlier was that you can have a populist element in movements which are not populist. The Yugoslav Communist Party has been mentioned. In the 1930's, before the war of liberation, there was an underground Yugoslav Communist Party. As long as it was led by a few Comintern people, it was not very effective.

The success and dynamism of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia in the late 1930's was attributable to students, and young people who were not perhaps literally students, who were essentially populists in their outlook and behaviour and yet were in the service of a Marxist movement. Marxist doctrine is not populist doctrine. But the young people of Belgrade University, who were not or less Marxist, "went to the people". Their attitude to, and idealisation of the people were far closer to the narodniki of the Russia o. the 1970's than to the new stream-lined Belorussian party.

Another example of populist mentality, which may seem odd, can be found in a Fascist Party - the Romanian Iron Guard. It came into being as a gang of thugs and police provocateurs, but it became a mass movement in the thirties and recruited precisely the sort of people I have been talking about - Romanian students, young people, village priests, young rural intelligentsia, school teachers, and so on, who were indignant about the peasants' suffering, who were impoverished and badly treated. They led a kind of revolutionary peasant movement. I do not think that their aim was to create a peasant society, but it was the sufferings of the peasants which aroused their indignation, sympathy and compassion and their desire to make a revolution. This was associated with Fascism and anti-Semitism, which was part of the picture.

Who was the enemy? It depends on which enemy one is fighting - whether camu or bureaucrats, or big land-owners, or the bourgeoisie. In this case, it was the Jews. This was largely a myth, largely untrue and largely propaganda nonsense, but it had an element of truth in it. The small capitalist element with which the exploited peasant came into contact was, in many places, Jewish. You will remember Bebel's phrase that anti-Semitism was the Socialism of the ignorant. This element of anti-Semitism in the Romanian Iron Guard was a sort of ersatz revolutionary feeling. I am saying this, not because I admire the Romanian Iron Guard - I lived there for a time, and I had no reason to admire or like it - but because it recruited people of this kind, some of whom I knew and admired. Their strong and weak points are essentially the same as those of the original populists.

The Nazi Party is different in many ways. Above all, it operated in a highly industrialized, highly advanced society - a situation which was quite different from that in the developing societies of Yugoslavia, Russia and the Balkans. But this kind of strange völkisch element, the anti-Semitic element - worse of the two, a reactionary, mythical, ridiculous as it seems to us, romantic view of the German past - was an element of intellectual enthusiasm, a kind of element of populism in a certain Nazi intelligentsia within the Nazi Party which was not without importance. But I am not saying that the Nazi Party as a whole was populist, least of all Hitler. Most of the bosses of the Nazi Party were not. But some of these people - Rosenberg, Darré, and so on - had something in common with the black African racist apartheid ideology of the present time. An element of populism in to be found in a movement which is not in itself populist.

Peron was another man who had a great ability to mobilise the masses into his movement and lend them to victory and use them to rise to power. But was he a populist in the sense that he had a mythical view of his people? Was Peronism a populist movement, or was Peron simply a brilliant demagogue who had a modern, streamlined demagogic technique.

I come finally to populism in Asia and Africa. I have been talking about certain populist mentality, an intelligentsia, which wants to serve the people. We find this kind of attitude at certain stages among the intelligentsia of various Asian and African peoples in the period of their struggle against colonialism or in the struggle against a sort of imperialist-dominated reactionary régime. But there seems to me a difference between the mentality of these people and their Russian-Balkan prototype, which is thin. Whereas the Russian-Balkan prototype was concerned, above all, with service to the people and an idealistic desire to sacrifice oneself to serve the people, the modern Afro-Asian post-war variant is much more concerned with modernisation, with making his country independent, and with modernising and developing it both because modernisation is a good thing for his people and country, and particularly because modernisation will create big jobs for the boys, including himself. There is a self-interested careerist element which is essential to the Afro-Asian type, which is almost absent in the Russian-Balkan pre-1917 type. The Afro-Asian one is concerned with efficiency and the earlier one is concerned with justice. We have the passion for justice on the one hand and the desire for modernisation on the other.

I suppose that this reflects the different world situations in which it operated. First, the stage of world economic development was quite different. The problems of industrialisation and modernisation loomed larger in the 1950's than they did in the 1870's. Secondly, and less important, the colonial régime, and even the quasi independent Middle Eastern régimes against whom they were fighting, were very much aided in their treatment of them than the Russian or Balkan rulers. The Russo-Balkan régime of the late nineteenth century oppressed with real cruelty and savagery, which created a spirit of idealistic self-sacrifice. On the other hand, it was not difficult to fight against the British government in the Gold Coast. As for some of the later African states, they merely had to shout for independence and they got it almost immediately. The experience through which they went was utterly different.

But it is possible that there may be in future in African states a repetition of what happened in the Russia of the 1870's. The militarist or authoritarian or totalitarian régimes may produce revulsion, hatred and despair among the young people. The parallel with the Balkans is not bad one, because in the first flush of independence everyone in the Balkans was enthusiastic, believing that at last they had got the Turks
out and that they were free. They soon found that the heroes of independence turned into neo-colonial bosses just as brutally as the Turks before. They had to fight the battle all over again for two or three generations long. This predicament is already occurring in some African states. So we may see Narodnaya Volya in Africa in 1975.

Mr. Hall: I should like to say something about Latin America. I will not touch on some of the parties mentioned which have been called populist, but I should like to talk about one particular party - Acción Popular in Peru, which is the government party. It is a very new party. I shall try to describe what it is without necessarily saying now it links up with populism and perhaps touch a little on the A.P.R.A. Party, which is the much better known - it is also called a populist party - in Peru.

Professor Selon-Watson talked about the impossibility of populist regimes. We have in Peru what calls itself a populist regime. Acción Popular is the government party, although it is in coalition; but its coalition partner is very small. The President is the founder of Acción Popular. It embodies what the Party stands for. He founded it and formed it; it belongs to him. It was developed roughly between 1948 and 1955. Perhaps I can attempt to show that it has no real or traceable roots outside Peru.

If you ask Bolaúnde what the programme of the Acción Popular Party is, he will tell you that it is Peru. If you ask him what he means by that, he says, "The conquest of Peru by the Peruvians". What is he talking about? He is talking about national integration. He is concerned with the question of who is a Peruvian. There is very much in doubt, and still is in doubt. If you talk to people in Peru, they will tell you that they are white or Indians or come from Arequipa or they may be born in Peru, but they are Europeans. It is difficult to find anybody who calls himself a Peruvian. Bolaúnde's programme of the conquest of Peru by the Peruvians is also concerned with the physical integration of the country. The question of communications is uppermost in his mind. But, above all, the conquest of Peru by the Peruvians is a return to the glories of the past. It is a reaction against the intolerable conditions of the Peruvian people in the Sierra, in the high mountains of Peru. Bolaúnde sees the answer to Peru's problem in a return to the great traditions of the Incas and the pre-Inca Indian civilisations of the country. He sees it as a solution to the individual's problems and the problems of the country.

The principal institution which Bolaúnde would wish to see developed as an institution is the so-called "minka" - the voluntary communal labour of the Incas and pre-Inca communities. He calls this Popular Co-operation. The idea of Popular Co-operation is to be applied as a doctrine and dogma to all the problems of the country and all sections of the country and its people. He sees it also as an answer not only to the internal problems but to the external problems of the country or to the problems which have been introduced into the country from the exterior. He sees it as a way for Peru which is not capitalism and which is not Communism - a third way. He does not advocate the application of this solution outside Peru. This is a purely Peruvian solution for a Peruvian situation.

Bolaúnde is not, and most of his followers are not, anti-foreign. But they are anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist; whether that colonialism or imperialism comes from capitalism or Communism. I was fascinated to hear Professor Ventura talk about the translation of pre-capitalist society into modern terms and bringing in some of the institutions of the past. This is exactly how Bolaúnde sees it. He sees also a direct link between himself and the people. This is a mystical charismatic thing. He does not believe in the possibility of the people of Peru making wrong choices or doing wrong things. In the elections of 1962, when he was narrowly defeated but co-coalition had an absolute majority to become President, he was absolutely convinced that there had been fraud in the elections. He did not heed any figures because he thought that the people could do no wrong and it would have been wrong not to choose him. He still feels this very much. The people of the highlands in Peru feel the same way about him. There is a mystical bond between them; there is an organic feeling. It is not, as Bolaúnde sometimes think, an understanding between equals. They look upon him as a strong man from the moon who says things which mean something to them and who believe in them and they believe in him. It works. I have seen him talking to the peasants. He has learnt to speak their language in the last ten years or so. He decides things on the spot with them. If he tells them that they must wait for agrarian reform and that they must not invade local lands, then that is what happens.

This kind of feeling is reminiscent of the paper by Professor Narul and Dr. Engholm. They talk about the Presidential coup in Tanzania becoming the symbol, the general ethos, of anti-pluralism. I am not sure about Bolaúnde and anti-pluralism because he believes in some intermediary organisations of a traditional kind, he is very careful about keeping to them - and not the Presidential coup; but the Presidential coup is something which has a part in this general ethos. On page 11 of the same paper there is a quotation from Nyere who one could put straight into the mouth of Bolaúnde and it would be very characteristic - about the place of honest voluntary work in society.

Another significant thing about the Acción Popular ideology is its attitude to international relations. Fundamentally, Bolaúnde is not interested in international relations. It is interested only in Peru. It is interested in foreign relations in so far as they have a direct effect on Peru. However, one of the planks of this government in relations with all the peoples of the world. It consistently does not maintain relations with all the governments of the world, but it wants to have relations and trade with all the people of the world.
Then there is the question of the attitude to finance and banks. One of the planks of the platform of Acción Popular was the nationalisation of the Central Bank. This was one of the first things which was done. Action was also taken against other banking institutions. Under previous governments, the accounts of the central government were held by private banks who used to make a lot of money in this way. But this has been transferred to the State or Government cash boxes. This was claimed to be the popularisation of national financing.

The question of the anti-military character of popular movement has been raised. To a large extent, Acción Popular came into power on the banks of the military. They were supported by the military. It is nevertheless true that Belaunde personally is anti-military. He has difficulties with the military and, on the whole, the military institutions have no part in his general philosophy or ideology except as uniformed development forces to assist in the internal development of the country.

What about the roots of the Acción Popular philosophy? Belaunde comes from the town of Arequipa in the highlands, which is basically Spanish — perhaps more Spanish than Lima. He comes from a very aristocratic family. Arequipa however is in the middle of an agricultural area. His uncle was very much involved in his youth in the question of the frontiers of Peru. The question of geological and historical work on the delineation of frontiers has had a very marked effect on Peruvian thinking and particularly on the Belaunde family. The whole question of national identity comes into this. His father similarly was a politician who was concerned with those things and also with the reactions against modern capitalism which were produced by the introduction into Peru of the business cycle.

Belaunde was partly educated in France. He is certainly an admirer of Boulanger. However, he is not consciously a populist in the sense that we are talking about. He does not know anything about populism. He sees himself as a purely Peruvian product. Undoubtedly he owes a debt to Haya de la Torre who has influences from Marxism. Belaunde is a strong Catholic. If he were to see some of our papers here and if he were to hear some of the comments made about Russian populism as being the prototype of populism, he would be extremely surprised since he has never heard of any of those gentlemen with Slavonic names like Plekhanov. He would not understand them if he read them. He is an intellectual, but of a very mystical kind. He is an architect, and an artistic architect rather than a scientific architect. The remarks made about clothes have been harshly treated. Clothes are very significant. Belaunde likes to go round dressed in Indian dress.

I said that Belaunde does not understand about populism. He also does not understand about Socialism. He would suggest that his brand of populism had anything to do with Socialism which, as a doctrine, he abhors. Professor Venturi opened up the question of

Socialism and what it consisted of. If we are to define Socialism, we shall find that Socialism and populism are intertwined. Belaunde, if he knows anything about Socialism, knows something about Babeuf, Saint-Simon and Owen; but as for Marx or anyone like him he certainly would not understand them, and if he did he would find them very anti-mathetic.

What about the reality of the Peruvian situation in regard to Acción Popular? The vote for Acción Popular come from the peasant areas of Peru. They come from the highlands and from the towns, and from the younger intellectuals, whether they are rich, poor or middle class. Belaunde won the 1953 election because he received the support of everyone to the left of him, including the Communists. His proposals for a return to Inca ways provide the possibility of an answer being found to the problems of the highlands. To a certain extent, Acción Popular is working and can work in this situation. But it provides no answer for the towns and industry of Peru or for the capitalist agriculture of the Peruvian coast. This comprises something like 30 to 40 per cent. of the Peruvian people.

When questions are asked as to how Popular Co-operation is to be applied to the industrial and capitalist sector, there is a lot of talk about co-operatives and other kinds of participation by the workers in industrial institutions. But in Peru there are perfectly straight mixed economy development policies of exactly the same kind as are carried on in other Latin American countries and countries elsewhere. When we talk about the coastal agricultural workers, the small proprietors and craft trade unions, we touch on the other group called populist, A.P.R.A. In spite of the myths about it, this never made any progress in the highland areas as far as votes are concerned.

There is one section of the Peruvian community which I might touch on namely, the petite element, which is of great importance in Peru, where the migration from the country to the town is one of the leading social and economic phenomena. The position of migrants in Peru is, as far as I know, different from that of the migrants in other areas in Brazil, Venezuela, Chile or Argentina. The so-called barrandas — the shanty towns around Lima in which one and a quarter million of the population of nearly two and a half million live — are not slums or high grade pibgledy associations of rootless elements who have no place in society. They are incipient suburbs. They are settlements on a communal basis, organised by the people themselves. Usually they are people of the same local origins from the Sierra who are building their own homes by self-help, laying out their own towns, electing their own mayors, and building their own schools. They are carrying out (sic) popularly they are doing it for themselves. They are getting assistance from the government. But the interesting thing is that they do not support any political group and would not be called populist politically. They tend to be politically apathetic or to vote in a completely mixed fashion, depending on the kind of job that they have.
I think that it may be a saucy analogy, but in Peru perhaps Acción Popular is Russian style populism trying to deal with an area in Peru which has similarities to nineteenth century Russia, whereas A.P.R.A. has similarities to United States populism and deals with an area comparable with the United States in the late nineteenth century.

PROF. F. VENTURI: Professor Wallot has given us a good basis for discussion. I want to defend my book. The only thing to do is to write a history of a movement - not about the ideas of a movement, nor of the social situation which gave the basis to the movement. The task of the historian in this case was to write a history of the whole movement. That is why it is too large and too broad and, at the same time, too little. Professor Wallot's point of view and mine are different. He starts from the history of the ideas. I am starting from the point of view of the history of a political movement. That is more complicated, and probably less clear. That is why it is necessary to put in the history of populism some people and to take out some other people.

Let us take the most extreme example - the one of Mikhailovsky. I have to reply what Le Place said to Napoleon when he was asked why he did not put God in his treatise on astronomy. He said that in his astronomical calculations he could not find God. My researches into the books which these revolutionary people read in Russia during the 25 years in which the classical populist movement existed show that Mikhailovsky was not very much read. I found that many of the people had less importance as thought but more importance as influence. That is why Mikhailovsky did not have a very great impact in the history of the Russian movement for populism. It may be that he is right and I am wrong.

The great problem of Lenin is a problem of methodology. I do not believe that the weapons which are necessary to fight against a movement are generally the best way to understand it. I suppose that Lenin's definition of populism was a perfect instrument to fight against populism and not understand it. That in why I cannot accept it. Lenin was full of the great Russian tradition, but he could not have an historical or sociological or philosophical point of view agreeing with populism. He knew perfectly well that that was his own great rival. They were instruments of political struggle and not a way to understand the facts.

The heritage from one class to the other was so big that the class element was put aside and the classical populist took out of Hertzen, not his mobility side, but one thing which is much more important. It is a political way of life and a religion, in the sense that you must not only believe in populism, but live as a populist. This is what Hertzen created. This is the immense difference in the democratic or liberal movement of the nineteenth century.

The people who fought for independence and liberty during the Risorgimento fought for their ideas and sometimes died for them; but they did not believe that all their own life had to be created on the model of a political creed. That was a new thing out of Russia, especially out of

Hertzen. That is why I do not believe that it is possible to divide the classical populism into two parts, even in this very accurate and moderate way that Professor Wallot has done, with Hertzen on one side and the classical populism on the other side. They have in common a moral and ethical attitude, and that is the important thing. As far as the influence of Marx on Russian populism is concerned, if you divide the populism in this way you can trace a very large amount of Marx's influence in the second part of the classical populism, as Professor Wallot called it. But I suppose that the influence of Proudhon is the greater.

I was interested to hear what Professor Seton-Vatston said about populist Socialists in Russia and populists starting to be nationalist and after that becoming a bourgeois party of central Europe. This happened in no other part of the world. My reply is very simple, because the populist movement in central Europe and the Balkans was connected with national problems. The great agent of corruption from this point of view of Socialist populism in nationalism. So we have to contrast nationalist movements and populist movements. They are contrary things. When they met, as in Peru, they corrupt the Socialist side, the most important side, of the populist ideology. I am not sure that the development of Russia was much faster than the development, for example, of Hungary or Bohemia. Those parties became bourgeois and nationalist because they were connected with nationalism. They are two elements which are near, but when they meet and when the social side of the story fades away it is, from this point of view, corrupt.

As far as the influence of Chernyshevsky and Sol'nik y Yolla in concern Professor Kemp is right, because the idea of putting together freedom and the land is most important for the real populist. Hertzen is the man who taught the Russians that without the problem of individual liberty the problem of a populist Socialist was unthinkable. From this point of view, the theoretical originality of Hertzen may be greater than that expressed in the paper of Professor Wallot. May I say how much I admired and enjoyed reading his paper.

MR. G. ZOEKOF: May I add a footnote to what Professor Seton-Vatston said about splitting the original populist movement? Surely we should take into consideration the fact that there were in the East European countries two acts of reforms - agrarian reform and electoral reform. The populist movement in those countries became strong after these reforms.

PROF. VENTURI: In Serbia?

MR. G. ZOEKOF: Serbia had a very strong peasant movement.

PROF. VENTURI: But not many agricultural reforms, as far as I remember.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: Yes, there were.

(Adjourned for ten)
PROF. P. WILSON: I should like to bring us back to the Socialist nature of populism. In the bar at lunchtime, I thought of another purely individualist populism apart from the United States variety—that is, Social Credit in Alberta. It fulfills all my criteria for being a genuine individualist movement. It is inflationary; it is biblical—it originated in a school of Bible knowledge; it looks inward upon itself; it attributes virtue to the simple people; it is anti-establishment—or it was when it originated. Therefore, we have two perfect cases of individualist populism, both from North America.

I should like to use the word 'co-operative' with a little more emphasis. We would not want to call the populism, if that is the right word, of the rural movements of Ireland, of Saakatchewan, of Scandinavia, or the Iron Guard of Romanian Socialism; we would want to call them, and naturally do call them, co-operative. I suppose that we should define both 'co-operative' and 'Socialist.' I mean by 'Socialist'—and I am sorry to have to say these things—the public ownership of the means of production. It is inflationary; it is coupled, if possible, with central planning. I mean by 'co-operative' the agreed ownership on a small scale, in localities, in a democratic manner of some of the means of production. There is always in co-operative societies a good deal of private enterprise—on principle. We have rather forgotten that there is a large amount of purely co-operative populism.

Once we have that word firmly before us, is there a case for saying that there is any Socialist populism at all? Is not Marxian/co-operative and profoundly non-Socialist as defined? I am open to correction, largely because I do not know anything about any given example of populism above cocktail party level. It may be that there were genuinely Socialist, as I understand that word, narodniki. The mir was the traditional co-operative. In the mir you had mostly your land all the time. In any case, livestock was meant to be privately owned. Lenin did not call it Socialist. I do not call it Socialist. I do not suppose that Mr. Attlee would have called it Socialist. It was owned in part co-operatively, especially in repartitional communes, and was engaged privately in virtually all cases. The cropping plan of the individual was very seldom determined by anybody except himself. Management was more private than ownership. Therefore, there is not a case for using the word 'Socialist' in connection with the mir, and so a fortiori not with populism.

I should like another expert to compare for us the mir and the ejido. There is something about the American Grango movement which excites the same atmosphere as the mir. The Grango is certainly something which one could want to call populist. I do not know very much about the Grango, but I have had to read about the ejido. The ejido is an old-fashioned mir. As far as Aztec records go, it is the same as the old Aztec calendar. It is not repartitionalist. There are certain restrictions on inheritance. Management is strictly private. The cropping plan of the individual is private. The ownership of livestock is private. Yet we all want to say that Mexico is one of the most populist of countries.

I pass now to less important points. I deal first with the role of racial myths about oneself, about the people. I do not mean anti-Semitism. It may not be coincidental that there are many myths about the racial origins of the people who are populists. The first populists were the Biggers. The Biggers believed in the Norman Rocko. They believed that the English people were essentially Anglo-Saxon and that there had been superimposed on them a Norman-speaking aristocracy. This essentially racial distinction was of political importance at the time of the Commonwealth.

The Irish are a splendid example of all sorts of populism. The racial myth in that country, with its stress not so much on race as upon language, is notorious. I was fascinated to hear from Mr. Hall about the Inca myth in Peru. I proposed to bring up the Aztec myth in Mexico in any case. The case I was told about Boleando, the case I was reminded of Córdoba. The Mexican murals are full of populist mythology and they date back to beyond the same Spanish conquest, which also took Peru, to an imagined Inca period. The Mexican Ejido claims descent not from the Spanish communitaries, who have been described by Josquin Costa, but from the Aztec calpulli. There is a certain tendency in populist movements everywhere to adopt a racial myth if they can.

On the intellectual origins of Titoism—and I say this merely in order to provide the Nordic of St. Antonys's into correcting us—it is obvious that the self-administration of Yugoslavia is not populist. This self-management is an imposed system from above. It is what the French call 'voulu.' It did not arise out of something which had been suppressed in the post-war period. It was born apparently in the brain of Tito in about 1950. It appeals to the future and not to the past. Professor Venturi mentioned the Zadruga. The necessary sources say that the Zadruga was finished in the early part of the inter-war period. It is highly improbable that the Zadruga contributed very much, because there is just one place where you do not get self-management, and that is in Yugoslav agriculture, which is what one would expect if the tradition of the Zadruga had survived in a strong way. The Titoists do not claim any kind of origin in Balkan history or thinking. They clearly look back to the Paris Commune, which you might call populist in some sense, but I should not like to do so myself. But it would be interesting to hear from an expert as to whether there were not proto-Titoist ideas current in the Balkans in the late 1930's.

THE CHAIRMAN: We have not talked about American populism so far. I should, therefore, like to break the order and ask Professor Hofstadter to speak.

PROF. R. HOFRADTERR: I came to the Conference thinking that our two types of populism would be Russian populism and American populism and that a good deal of our time might be spent trying to decide whether we

1. El Colectivismo Agrario en España, Madrid 1925.
stature. You have, not a situation in which a highly intellectualized elite is romanticising a moment of the population, but rather an elite drawn out of the lower middle class - country lawyers, small town merchants, occasional capitalists of middle stature who have come up against credit difficulties - who forged the intellectual apparatus of the movement.

One of the interesting latent assumptions of American populism is the idea that the basic mechanisms of a market society are quite adequate to achieve remedies for the ills which they are trying to redress. This fits in with Professor Wille's reference to inflation. The prevailing assumption was - although one draws this out largely by implication rather than by manifest statement in populist literature - that if you rectify the monetary and credit system of the country, other reforms will follow hard upon that, and will be easy to achieve because the back of the unwholesome banking elite will have been broken. Also, the other reforms which one might advocate are relatively trivial compared with achieving the inflation which is always sought for in movements of this kind.

A question was raised earlier about the place of the man of peace in populist movements. It is interesting and perhaps significant of the American climate of opinion that American populism had a strong militarist bent, but by no means a militarist one. American populist attitudes towards peace were always based on hostility to military establishments. This is an anti-establishment kind of ideology rather than a pacifist one. There was a tremendous fear, rooted in the late eighteenth century American thinking about the evil effects on republicanism of a standing army. It became axiomatic that one could trust a people's army but not a professional military establishment.

One has to sort out the element of nostalgia. Someone said today that a populist movement looked back in order to look forward. This is certainly the case with American populism. The golden age which American populists had in mind was generally the period of the 1830's and 1840's - the early nineteenth century in the United States. You find this note recurring over and over again in populist literature - that in those days there were no beggars and no poor to speak of in the United States. It was only in the period after the civil war, with the gradual conquest of society by deflationary bankers working in concert with bankers abroad, that the people were given an unsatisfied form of society.

Populism in the United States was forward-looking in the sense that it took a totally pragmatic view of the use of the state. It was statist in the sense that there was no inhibitions among populist thinkers about the use of government, whether on a state or national level, bringing about certain kinds of reforms, and in this respect the inheritance of populism is quite strong. It runs into the era of the New Deal.

A little bit might be said about the after-history of American populism. During the McCarthyist period, quite a number of us were intrigued by the way in which McCarthy and some of his followers took up an anti-establishment style which plainly owed a lot to the populist ambience of American thought. There was no intention - or if there was
It was doubtless misapplied - to attribute a kind of genetic affiliation of McCarthyism to earlier agrarian movements, although some people have spent a lot of energy in refuting us on this count. McCarthy was of a different stripe. It is significant that a far right movement should have found it expedient and possible to twang these populist strings if it could. Today there is a certain feeling in many quarters of the New Left, as it is getting to be called, that they owe something to populist ancestry. It would be interesting to look into the extent to which there is any kind of intellectual continuity between the populism of the 1890's and the contemporary new left. Some of the new left people think that there is, but my impression is that they are not really very much interested in the populism of the 1890's. This is one case in which ignorance is an advantage.

The Chairman: Some of the forces which took the form of populism in the United States in a country with some slight similarities in its origins - Australia - found their way into the Labour Party. Perhaps somebody can talk about this and say something significant. The fact that there should be a Labour Party in Australia is due to obvious facts of American history.

Prof. B. MacRae: May I return to Professor Wiles's questions, because I should be interested to hear an answer to them. He is the first person who has said anything about ejidos which did not bore me stiff. His questions should be answered by the experts before they go out of their minds.

The Chairman: Can anyone answer those questions?

Prof. P. Wiles: I do not think that I put a question on ejidos.

Mr. C.A.M. Henriksen: The point about the ejidos brings in the question which was raised of the possibility of populist régimes, because at the beginning Mexican intellectuals looked back to the calpulli organization, but immediately they started setting up ejidos the problem of how they were to be financed arose. So you get from the beginning a distinction between those ejidos which benefit from state credit and those which are starved of it. The reason why the whole ejido has proved a disappointment was that when Cardenas came on the scene in the thirties you get a distinction between the ejido and the collective ejido which is the one which Cardenas tried to be. But the ejido where the private element was allowed to develop was the one which increased agricultural production. So you get it tied 50/50 with the question of agricultural efficiency. One of the reasons why so many intellectuals have been disillusioned from the Mexican revolution has been a disappointment in the way in which the ejido has worked out in practice.

Prof. P. Wiles: The collective ejido?

Mr. Henriksen: Yes. Mexico is the only country in Latin America with this tremendous agricultural expansion in productivity; but it is in the private sector, not in the collective ejido.

Prof. Wiles: I was not talking about the collective ejidos, but even during the period of Cardenas it involved only about two per cent of the agricultural labour force. It can be almost demonstrated that that was Communist influenced. The Communist Party of Mexico wanted to collectivise ejidos. That is Socialist, but it looks as if the influence came from the Soviet Union.

The Chairman: On the other hand, the Mexican régime as it has developed could not be described as populist. You have these ejidos and survivors of a revolutionary tradition.

Mr. Henriksen: There are pockets. It is very uneven. It is difficult to generalise, but, as far as the official ideology goes, I think that this is true.

The Chairman: Would Professor Hofstadter say something about the presence or absence of populism in the Negro problem? Is populism within the Negro community or a populist attitude by the Negro intelligentsia towards their own people relevant or not?

Prof. Hofstadter: In so far as you want to call populist anything that sentimentalizes or romanticizes the folk, there is something of this on the part of Negro intellectuals. In the past, there has been a bit of it on the part of white intellectuals. The more Negro spokesmen like Stokely Carmichael take it up in slogans like "Black Power", it is a bit early to say whether this is an important strain. The Negroes in America are suffering from a serious trauma about identity like almost any people who want to mount up a movement of some kind. They are looking for a past which is not just a past of slavery and oppression, a past of aspiration, struggle, achievement and so on - and moreover not just one of achievement in Africa. African art will bring no solace. This is a hard thing for them to do, but it is one of the things which they are calling for. They are asking for a study of Negro history which will give them a mythology and morale of a kind which they need.
prof. wiles: when by, say, 1900 everybody was agreed that socialists meant clause 4, did the populists think up clause 6? 

the chairman: that is difficult to answer. it is a little bit off our subject.

prof. peter wolley: like professor hofstadter, i became increasingly uneasy about the north american movement. i have lived under a populist regime, and that is why i cannot accept that populisms cannot be regimes. my first experience of it was saskatchewan, albeit in its perhaps second or third stage, when it had become socialist and, indeed, communist. there were theorists, but they were not intellectuals, and they were certainly not taking it to the people. they were drawn from the ranks of some of the people professor hofstadter mentioned, but largely from the ranks of preachers (methodists, and others). tommy douglas has precisely this background; he is in holy orders. abe hart of social credit in alberta was another theorist with a fundamentalist background. i have also not the grand old man who was saskatchewan's early theorist of populism (whose works are still circulated and read and are currently printed in pamphlet form.) some of these were intellectuals going to the people. they were drawn not from the ranks of the farmers, but from the quasi-intellectual middle strata.

the big fundamental difference which alarmed me when i read professor hofstadter's paper was that he placed emphasis, correctly, on the money aspect of north american populism - on the speculative, entrepreneurial, privateindividualistic, market oriented, capitalist, small scale economy. that is what it was and what it remained in most cases. when i read rough
Moosereen’s book on Social Credit in Alberta, I criticized his use of the phrase “petty bourgeois”, but I am becoming more and more convinced that perhaps it was right. Social Credit in Alberta and, I suspect, much of the other North American populism contrast vividly with my direct experience of the Saskatchewan movement, which is physically embodied today, and has been for a couple of decades, in cooperatives. The scheme of Saskatchewan Co-Operatives, constructed by elevators owned by the Wheat Pool, there are Co-operatives, credit organizations and a whole infra-structure of other cooperative organizations of a very diversified kind. When the CCF came to power as a government eventually, it had become more Socialist. These populists, then, were not individualists of the private entrepreneurial kind that your populists were in North America, Professor Hofstadter, and therefore there in more than one North American populism (or mine is populism and yours is not?)

The history of the settlement of the West varies. It is not simply a history of small homesteaders with their axe chopping down the bush. It is a history of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and of government support (deliberately provided largely to keep the Americans out of the West): the Indians were conveniently shot for the farmers, or shipped off to reservations where they remained; the University of Saskatchewan was created in 1906, long before none of our universities, and was previously the kind of land-grant college as well distributed in the United States (whose raison d’etre was, among other things, to experiment with discovering the appropriate strains of wheat). So there was an immense amount of state support, for the most part, to the pioneer of the frontier. He was not an isolated frontiersman. Many other forms of support, notably subsidies, continued. Land was also sold off at nominal prices.

This brings me to Professor Wiles’ point which Professor MacRae wishes us to discuss: Is this Socialism, or is it co-operation? This is a definition matter. Speaking metaphorically, as an aesthetic, but, as a Socialist, I have always understood this element of co-operation, of participation, of democratic involvement, to be a cardinal part of what is meant by Socialism and not merely centralised state control planning. If you like to define it in that way, you arrive at a different result. But empirically and historically also, it can be demonstrated that this is the case. The Labour Party in Britain contains within its organisational structure the co-operative movement. A phrase like “social ownership” or “public ownership” in state control, state control is not Socialism. There are all sorts of state control. There are Clause 4 is not the beginning and end of Socialism.

There is further empirical evidence, in the areas I have been talking of, of the direct continuance of the community of co-operative elements within the broad mainstream of some kind of overall Socialism. The Saskatchewan Co-Op, became more specifically Socialists and was one of the cardinal building blocks, with the unions principally, in the contemporary New Democratic Party, which is the leading Socialist opposition party in Canada. Institutionally, there you have it. You cannot therefore separate Socialism from co-operation.

THE CZECHOSLOVAKIA: There is one country in Central Europe which is interesting from the point of view of populism which we have not spoken of yet which I did not mention earlier in my example, namely, Hungary, a Central European, not Balkan country with a powerful land-owning class, a very poor peasantry, and an old established peasant party of a rather conservative kind and an old established socialist party of a rather conservative kind and an old established Social Democratic Party with its acute social class conflict and political conflict between the two. There appeared a group which was clearly populist. I should like Mr. Szabo, who was part of that movement, to say something about it.

Mr. Sztako said that he was very reluctant to say anything about the populist group in Hungary, first, because he did not want to introduce another country into the discussion, and, secondly, because he was not a student in politics or any of the social sciences. A further incompatibility was that he was a populist.

He said that he became a populist when he was 21. He liked very much the poetry of a certain poet and translated it. At the same time, he was a radical in political thinking at the university, and he had many Communist friends in the then illegal Communist Party in Hungary. However, they had absolutely no idea about social status in Hungary. In 1931 and 1932 the situation in Hungary was fluid. Many young people such as teachers got together in an endeavour to solve social problems of Hungary. Two groups of a similar kind were created in Budapest. People started in an empirical way to try to find a solution to the problem. They got the first idea, and then tried to find a solution.

In 1936 a group of about twelve writers was formed. The older ones were about 30 and the younger ones were 22 or 23. About two-thirds of them were members of the intelligentsia—poets, writers, university-educated people—but they were of peasant origins. One of them spent three years in Paris and went to the Sorbonne. When he returned to Hungary he became one of the leaders. Some of the books which those people published became best sellers, to everybody’s great astonishment, and created a huge outcry.

Out of this emerged a movement which in 1937 formed a political programme. It had two aims. First, it asked for the complete transformation of society in Hungary in a Socialist way. This populist movement was a Socialist movement, and nobody who was told about it found it very important. The next year, a meeting of the group was dispersed by mounted police, and the five writers who had signed the declaration in 1936, two days after the assembly started to move towards the right.

The Marxist writers in Prague had created the movement and called it, not populism, but peasant Socialism or people’s Socialism. The literary movement in Hungary had ended just after the war because of the censorship. Anything radical was contrary to the interests of the country.

The Hungarian experience proved that populists seemed to be more at home in movements than in political parties. At the moment that the National Peasant Party was formed, the literary movement faded out.
SIR EDWIN BERLIN: I should like to make two brief statements on
Professor Venturi's remarks. One is about his observation about Herzen
as the man who infected Russian populists with that sense of total
commitment which is a hallmark of Russian populists. "Total commitment"
is a misleading phrase. I am the last person to wish to downplay
Herzen's importance, but it appears to me that he was not the person
who communicated this particular element to them. The notion of individual
liberty, of emancipation, of the need for individual independence as
part of the general social programme - that is his burden. Social
commitment originated elsewhere.

Someone has said in his paper, quite correctly, that Russian
populism was less a social and economic programme before the eighties
and nineties, as (at the beginning) a search for salvation, one of the
preferred routes being a Tolstoyan demand to integrate oneself with the
life of the peasants, emphasis on the debt which was owed to the
peasants, and about the need to repay that debt. This was a specific
Russian motif which one does not often find among populists elsewhere.
This was a particular species of the total insistence on total social
commitment: this demand does not come primarily from Herzen at all; it
comes rather more from Belinsky. He is the severely moral teacher who
introduced the categories imperative - the stern duty to total commit-
ment, which forbids a man to divide himself into various types of
activity. He is not allowed to say that as a political being that he
believes one thing, while as a husband or artist he believes something
else. This -and is a falsification of one's integral nature.

This view may rest on a myth, or a total illusion, but this
was the element which Belinsky injected into the scene, and the fact
that he came from and spoke for the "underprivileged", i.e. the poor,
gave it a particular force. Herzen argued more against oppression:
Belinsky - detachment and escape.

The other point which I wish to make is something which we shall
have to discuss willy-nilly tomorrow. This is a dangerous but unavoidable
subject, namely, the relationship of nationalism to populism. Professor
Venturi correctly said that nationalism corrupts populism. No doubt it
does. Yet they began very close to each other. Nobody could say that
Chernyshevsky was a nationalist, or that any of the Russian populists
of the sixties and seventies took interest in foreign peoples. They
were victims of total national self-pre-occupation, which is again a
Russian phenomenon. Unlike earlier and later scientists they thought
entirely about their own Russian past, present and future, and saw
themselves as a unique problem. Hence the notion of Russia alone as
capable of avoiding capitalism, which stems partly from this national
self-absorption.

I do not wish to enlarge on the historical basis of the
connection between nationalism and populism, but it seems to me to
have been born somewhere in the 1760's or 1770's in Germany and to be
a response to some kind of national humiliation in Germany, then as in
Russia later, populism stresses the "internal" values of the chosen
group as against the "external" values of the enlightened cosmopolitism
of the philosophers of the eighteenth century. The Germans, like the
Russians, tried hard not to be nationalists, but the Volk with which
both began pervades the ideas of both. Hence this nexus is something
which we shall have to touch upon.

That party, being one of the four anti-Populist parties. became part
of the coalition after 1995. However, being a peasant party, it did
not function too well, because it was not a class party.

Dr. Szabo said that he could not recall that anybody in Hungary
had tried to arrive at a definition of populism. The nearest thing to
a definition was the belief that those who followed the old, the poor
and the oppressed did not lose their way in their ideas. Populism was
not so much an ideology, but an approach and a method.

In the Hungarian movement, idolization of the people or worship
of the people was totally absent. Dr. Szabo agreed that this was basic.
The relationship of populists towards the people or with the people
should be capable of definition.

MR. F.W. BERKIN: I shall be brief, for one reason: what I have to
say is negative, not positive.

Points have been made about Svetozar Markovitch by you,
Mr. Chairman, and Professor Venturi. It is difficult to label
Markovitch as a populist. It is perhaps significant that the
contemporary Yugoslav official historians are very anxious to avoid
this subject altogether. There is no printed edition of his work. To
my knowledge, there is only one essay written by a young Marxist essayist
who was killed in the war. But a better essay was written by the
same man on young Bemski. Perhaps one could trace and define a slightly
populist tradition in the early radicals.

With regard to the partisan movement, I would only say that I do
not think that there are any traces of populism in the sense that we
have been discussing today. One can find many other trends which are
not Marxist. One can even find members of the Black Hand. One point
which has been made is very suggestive, namely, that if one looks
beyond the hard core of the Marxist party in the thirties, one finds
perhaps the real strength of the movement in the organizations of the
women, of the young and of the aged. The partisan movement, both
before and during the war touched the age groups which were not
mobilized into traditional political parties. On the other hand, I
would not go so far as to say that this was in any sense a non-Marxist
phenomenon. If one looks at the text books and pamphlets used by the
women's organizations or the students of Belgrade University, one
sees that they are simply a basic Marxism.
In the case of other populisms— for example, American populism—there is an even stronger nationalist element which it is difficult to leave out. There is a xenophobia of a specific kind which is, on the whole, absent from Russian populism except for certain isolated movements in the sixties and seventies among the peasants and the half populists who agitated among the peasants for the sole purpose of increasing general discontent and inciting to revolution.

If one asked what the early populists contemplated in the way of a regime after the turnover, there would, I think, be silence. In Chernyshevsky you get exceedingly unclear notions about partly local, partly centralised economic control, but if you asked what they thought would happen after the Czarist regime had been destroyed they would merely have said that the people would rise and justice would reign. More than this I have failed to find.

Professor Andriski: I should like to say a few words about certain aspects of Poland's past which tie up with the remark made by Professor Venturi about how nationalism corrupts populism; although it does not matter, of course, whether we call it corruption or something else as long as we realise that nationalism can up to a point substitute itself for class-oriented populism. When one reads the things said at the turn of the century by Polish writers, one sees many elements similar to those which one finds in the narodniki, changed and transfigured into a national rather than class interpretation. It is significant that the People's Party (known abroad as the Pansa Party)—which was a narrowly based class party and whose support among the intelligentsia was on the whole confined to the sons of peasants who had been to school—was strongest in that part of Poland which was most leniently treated by the governing power before the First World War: namely, Galicia and Silesia. There the oppression was stronger, elements of populism were mixed up with nationalism and, therefore, one could doubt whether the resulting phenomenon could be simply called populism. Towards the end of the last century there grew in Western Poland a strong movement for educating the common people and organizing them into co-operatives, sports clubs, and so on, but it was very nationalistically coloured. As the higher classes were to a great extent enfranchised there was a confluence between nationalism and populism.

Senator Berlin: I may have given the impression that Belinsky was a populist. If I did, I was at fault. He was not. Towards the end of his life he believed in state controlled or single capitalist industrialization, or something like it. The identification of the “integral” personality with the peasant does not belong to him. He did not romanticize the common man; still less the peasants whom he knew too well.

Professor Venturi: The populists had the fundamental idea that social transformation was important and that political things were bad. From that came the attitude towards all national programmes. It is only in the Russian populism that you find something of this kind. The most important factor is the attitude of Chernyshev in the Crimean War. The important thing is how the peasants are organized in Lombardy. That is no more the ancient cosmopolitism or general internationalism.

The Chair: A cynic might observe that the Russians did not show themselves to be interested in national expansion because they already ruled. Fifty-five per cent of the population of the Russian empire were already non-Russian.

Dr. Andrus Wallit: I shall begin with what Professor Berlin and Professor Venturi said. It is not accidental that the Russian Socialists were more internationally minded than the European Socialists. It is quite understandable that an honest Socialist in Russia should adopt such an attitude. But what kind of attitude should an honest Socialist have adopted in those oppressed countries like Poland—in a country where the cause of the oppressed nation coincided with the struggle for general human rights which were being trampled upon? An honest Socialist in a country like Poland should have adopted the following attitude. He should have distinguished between the ruling classes, the Government which oppressed him, and the Russian or German people. This was done by Polish Socialists in the romantic period. They fought for national liberation of all peoples, including those who lived in oppressor states. I would protest against the idea that there was something about Russians which made them more internationally minded. I would not say that that was the case.

Romantic populism in Poland was bound up with nationalism in the English sense of the word. “Polish nationalism” is a derogatory term, but in Poland it was a national movement which was nevertheless bound up with the idea of an international community and with the collective salvation of all mankind.

I was asked what I meant by rephrasing State. I did not wish to correct State. I did not wish to say that State was not able to express what he wanted to say or that I was in a position to express his ideas better than he did. I propose a different definition of populism. Certainly he meant by “populist” something different from what I mean. I do not believe that there is one correct meaning of the word “populist”. I do not wish to wage a struggle against different usages of the word “populism”. I do not believe that it is possible to come to a general agreement that we should use the word “populist” only in this and not that sense. Everything depends on definition, and definition in its turn, depends on the purpose it is to serve.
There are two main definitions. One, definition, which I
share broadly with Professor Venturi, is that populism is a type
of phase of socialism which is typified by a specific combination of
looking backward to the past and, at the same time, looking forward.
"Populism" is a general term for all radical movements which appeal
to the people, which usually, but not always, idealise the people,
and not only a particular class of the people.

What Dr. Kepp said was quite right. There was, on my part,
a certain reluctance to recognise the importance of twentieth century
populism. My knowledge of nineteenth century populism is greater
than my knowledge of twentieth century populism. For the
influence of Soviet scholars and Lenin's conception of populism also
was instrumental in my thinking.

But my definition of populism, and my conception of it, can be
defended. My idea of populism is not limited to the question of how
to avoid and prevent capitalism. This is a phase of a populist movement,
not the whole story, and it is only the first phase which in fact
ended with the industrialisation of the nineties. After came a
second phase, and following the victory of Socialist revolution, the
third phase. I limited myself to the first phase of populism, nineteenth
century populism and within this conception I will defend the view that
classical populism was the populism of the seventies and eighties, and,
to some extent, even the nineties, but before the seventies it was
early populism.

I will not talk very much about Michurinovsky, because I agree
that the influence of Coma was very important. In my paper, I tried
to deal with only two particular problems. Nevertheless, I will defend
the view that the influence of Marx was very instrumental in the
development of populist ideology. According to Marx there are three
stages. There is the first stage of self-sufficiency and property, then
the period of the divorce between the means of production and producer,
and finally socialism as a partial restoration on a higher plane of the
archaic or medieval property relationship. What I have tried to say
is that, although it may seem paradoxical, it was Marx's Capital which
caused Russian democrats to conceive of capitalism as the enemy number
one, thus contributing to the intensification of the idealisation of the
pre-capitalist social relationships.

I come to the point about economists and statisticians. I am
grateful to Mr. Shanin for telling us about this particular dimension
of populism. I am now in the middle position. At one extreme is
Professor Venturi, at the other extreme is Mr. Shanin. We have heard
that the mainstream of populism consisted of social scientists. I
agree that such a dimension of populism did exist, and I think it is
an additional argument in favour of the view that the concept of
populism should not be confined to the revolutionary movement. The
concept of populism should embrace, not only revolutionary movements,
but legal populism. There is no real disagreement between Professor
Venturi and myself. It is only a terminological disagreement.

Professor Venturi agrees with me that social populism is a
chapter in the history of socialism. If one wants to write a history
of socialism without any additional explanation, it will be a history
of socialist movements. One should title the book "A History of Socialist Movements". If populism was a chapter in the history of socialism, by the same token it was a socialist doctrine first, and the movement is defined by a
reference to doctrine. So doctrine came first. If I were Professor
Venturi, I would have given a different title to my book. I would
have called it "A History of the Revolutionary Populist Movement in
Russia".

I took Lenin's definition only as a starting point. There are
great aspects of Russian populism which were not seen or not taken into
account by Lenin. Lenin wished to expose the bookkeeper-looking phase of
the populist age. But, nevertheless, his definition could be applied
- it works. As a means of classification of who was a populist and who
was not a populist, Lenin's definition is still very good. Lenin
included Tenchev as a populist. I think that he was right. Lenin
believed that Chernyshevsky was partially populist and partially not
populist. He was right. In this sense, I accept Lenin's definition.

I doubt whether Hertzen lived as a populist. I think that he
lived as an aristocrat. He was attacked by the younger generation
because of his aristocratic style of living. But that is a minor
point. I agree that populism should be seen within the context of the
Socialist tradition as a whole.

(The Conference adjourned)
Sunday, 21 May 1967

Morning Session

Chairman: Prof. Peter Worsley

THE CHAIRMAN: We move on from discussion at the first meeting, which was primarily of ideas, beliefs, systems of ideas and ideology, and from the second meeting, which looked at the classical and historical manifestations - the Narodnik and North American movements - which leaves a lot of residual movements which we have not dealt with so far, particularly those in the contemporary and recent underdeveloped emergent countries of Africa and Asia. But by no means will we confine discussion to those countries. It is simply that here is a place in the programme in which they can be represented and talked about. I hope that those of you who are Narodniki, Populists, and so on, will not feel repressed in this situation. It is residual in some other respects too, which make it less tidy, and it may well, therefore, begin to spill over to this afternoon, when we can pull together the strands of the several discussions.

Equally, one would not want to prejudice discussion of what are broadly labelled the political aspects. We have been discussing the political aspects throughout, but I take this title to have the implication of structural and organisational aspects of the movement: such issues as the distinction between a movement and a party; whether populism can be a movement or a régime; whether it is inherently left or may also appear in right varieties; the conditions under which it emerges, the forms it takes, the social functions - if I am allowed to use that term - that it implies and serves in a given society; its relationship with related and perhaps intertwined forms of organisation (other parties, nationalism, and so on); the sources of social support (on which Professor Touraine opened discussion yesterday); class composition, differentiation, social mobility, and so on.

Finally, I would like to put in my own private ear: that if we are to discuss particularly Afro-Asian movements and to appraise recent populism, one has to do this very much within a world context. It struck me yesterday, listening to the discussion on nineteenth century Russia, that just as the populists there were, on the one hand, struggling intellectually, debating with the Marxists on the left, and fearing the onslaught and inroads of capitalism on the right - on the other side of the fence - so, too, the populists in the contemporary Afro-Asian world have tried to remain uncommitted as between Moscow on the one hand and Washington on the other hand.
We all tend to be "specific" populists: in Peru, Kenya or wherever it may be but we must not lose sight of the fact that this is a world phenomenon taking place in the context of what is a world battle.

A large number of speakers have indicated an interest in participating in this discussion and I would like to go ahead and call on Mr. Kennenny.

Mr. C.A.R. Kennenny: I am a little worried about the application of the term populism to the Latin American scene. For that reason, I shall concentrate mainly (apart from the Acción Popular movement discussed yesterday, which as far as I know the only movement in Latin America which specifically calls itself populist) on what I think is a clear example of a populism phenomenon, namely, Castroism and the Cuban revolution.

The first thing that I should like to emphasize is a point which has been mentioned in the historical context but which, I think, is brought out very forcibly in Cuba and reflects one of the peculiarities of the populism movement by youth. Generational conflict, as we know only too well, is always with us, but one of the interesting questions is to ask why, at particular places and at particular times, this takes a political form. In the 1920s and 1930s fascism capitalized very much on this generational conflict aspect.

In Latin America it is not so much the "youth" as the younger generation which is seen as being the repository of virtue. I would say that built into Latin American radical movements, and particularly Cuba, is the myth of the incorruptibility of youth. If one looks at the actual mechanics of the Cuban revolution, the part played by the students of Havana university, particularly after it was closed down by Batista and 20,000 students were thrown out on to the streets, is absolutely crucial to an understanding of this movement.

This can be seen in a broader Latin American context if one goes back to the 1918 university reform movement started in Argentina, which as far as I know has no parallel elsewhere. This popularized the idea that society will be regenerated not only by the younger generation but by the younger generation using the university as a mass of focus. It is in the way in which Guernica talks about the revolutionary focus, that is, the university reform movement which was thinking of the university. You create your democratic or populist society, your quality between professors and students in the university, and you move away from that. This has been the longest example of a revolutionary movement trying to change society in Latin America.

The first point which I would make is the extreme importance of youth in the Latin American context and particularly its integral importance in an understanding of Castroism: the way in which, for example, Castro continually goes into the university in order to renew contacts with the student body. It is significant that on one of those occasions, the 15th March, an anniversary of when many students were killed in assaulting Batista's palace, he makes a speech from the university stage and this is nearly always the major policy statement of the year. I think that this is quite deliberate. In a sense, he recharges his batteries from contact with the younger generation.

Secondly, in Castroism there is a very strong ruralist element. But it is all very curious in a Cuban context, because Cuba is one of the most highly urbanized countries in Latin America. (For point which should be made for those who are not very well acquainted with the Latin American field: that it is a very highly urbanized continent.) We are coming to the stage when more people live in cities and towns than live in the countryside. In fact, something like 60 per cent of Cuba was urbanized and yet, of course, the economy is entirely dependent on the export of agricultural crops.

One of the real legacies of the colonial period was the urban mentality of the Spaniards which has left an enormous gap between town and country. Castro has quite deliberately set out to try and break down the psychological barriers which have made the professional classes, the middle classes, extremely reluctant to take up any sort of career in agronomy or anything like that. If you look at the way in which the faculties have been reformed in the university, you will see that the traditional position of law faculties, helping with potential prakti ker, has been drastically reduced and agronomy, chemical sciences and the rest has been expanded.

There are lots of aspects of this ruralism and, of course, the guerrilla mystique is another one of them. This brings me to one of the very complicated questions in the case of Castroism: the way in which it has become more and more a cold war and the way in which the old Communist Party has tried to impose its own categories on the movement.

The traditional Communist Parties in Latin America are urban; they have shown next to no interest in the rural population and as a result you have a direct confrontation between the traditional Communist Parties and the Castroist groups. I think, incidentally, that it is wrong to talk about Chinese influence. I do not think that Chinese influence is particularly strong in Latin America. There are Chinese groups, especially in Peru, but I think that this is something which has come out of the Cuban experience.

Castro tends to think in moral, not in economic categories. Although he declares that he is a Marxist, I think that this is very superficial. I think that his whole imagination can be seen in a Cuban populist tradition stemming from the great thinker Jose Marti, who was a Cuban Nationalist, and in the way in which he continually talks about the "moment mos", for example, in many of his speeches. This is the strong moral emphasis which gives a certain resonance to this debate which is common to all communist countries but is particularly fierce between the question of moral and material incentives.

The old Cuban communists, with their support in organized labour, argue in favour of material incentives, Castro and Guerena (before he disappeared) argue in favour of moral incentives, that you cannot create a new society without this moral purification and moral revolution. This sort of thinking has not been in with the traditional, as I understand it, popular emphasis on the whole man that we were breaking down yesterday and the question of moral regeneration.
Another point which can follow on here, after mention of the communist, is Castro's extreme reluctance to institutionalize the revolution. This seems to raise another general point on the analysis of populism. It may be that he wants to avoid the example of Mexico, but certainly, if one looks at the very curious history of the Cuban Communist Party (the new Communist Party which was formed five years ago), not the old one — it still has not had its national congress; and it is very unclear where the actual focus of power lies outside Castro himself. Of course, the actual official theoretical journal of the Communist Party of Cuba has recently ceased publication because, as it may, there are certain ideological questions which have to be cleared up.

I think that the reluctance to institutionalize the revolution can also be related to Castro's own desire to keep his predominant position in it. This raises the question which, rather curiously, has not been raised so far: that is — and I use this word with a certain reluctance — the question of charismatic leadership. One has to take the distinction between those leaders who manipulate communications media and those who achieve direct rapport with the people with personal contact.

I would have thought that Peron was perhaps an example of the first, whereas Salumne, but more specifically Castro, is an example of the second. Mrs. Peron obviously had charismatic elements here. Perhaps Mr. Ollio will tell us something about this.

This raises the problem of what happens to a populist movement which becomes tied to a leader of this sort. If you take in Colombia, when Gaitan — who had some of this 'charisma' — was murdered, his followers went on the rampage in Bogotá, burning and murdering. Once they had done this, the whole movement lost its impetus and broke up.

Peron raises a very interesting question: can there be Peronism without Peron? And there is the question of APRA in Peru and Hoy de In Torre existing since 1924. As the dictator of the old man harder, so the successor of his populist movement harder. This is one point which we should look into: the whole question of charismatic leadership.

The next point, following on from what Professor Norris Jones said yesterday about how the availability of the general sort of ideas lying around in a society determines the type of movement, seems to me to be very important in the Latin American context. Here I would like to distinguish between the demonstration effect and the frustration effect of foreign ideologies in Latin America, the demonstration effect broadly speaking being the revolution of rising expectations from contact with a highly developed consumer society in the North, with the frustration effect of foreign ideologies whereby Latin American intellectuals, as a means of escaping from oppressive North American influence, look, and I think increasingly, to European examples. This seems to me to be a very big problem.

There are so many present examples that it is very difficult for an intellectual group to decide which are the most relevant for their own particular societies. In the case of, say, Mexico and Peru, where you have people who are visibly different and who have been exploited — namely, the Indians, and where you have a distinctive culture, with visible remains as at Tiahuanaco or Machu Picchu — you can have a situation where the populist movement glorifies the pre-Spanish past and it has what I would call a folkloric base.

In Chile, which is very largely Europeanized, where does the populist movement look for its ideals? It is largely derivative. It looks to Europe, it gets its ideas from Nisouli, Tollard de Chardin, etc. Professor von Lanz's paper on communitarianism in Chile brings out the funny and rather airy fairy nature of populist ideology there.

But in the case of Cuba, of course, this problem was very acute. There was a cultural vacuum, no pre-Spanish culture which could be idealized by the intellectuals and pre-revolutionary Cuba was characterized by an acute sense of cultural deprivation, open to pernicious foreign influences coming down from the North.

The way in which Castro is thinking and seeing Cuba's role in ideological terms, is quite similar to how Cuba has suffered more than any other Latin American country — the 20 years' war of independence against the Spaniards and then economic exploitation by the United States; and for this reason Cuba is better able to understand the problems of the rest of the continent and is morally in a much stronger position to provide the leadership. There is a short of, as I understand it, Polish Academic feeling that because Poland suffered more than any other country, it will thereby become the regenerator of Europe — so with Cuba and Latin America in Castroist ideology.

If you come back to Eva Peron, I hope you will not think it entirely flippant if I raise the question of the attitude of populist movements to women, because this is rather important. After all, if you appeal to the people and you exclude 50 per cent of the people just because of their sex, it seems to me to be a rather tenuous sort of populist movement. It is very important in the Latin American context, in a male-dominated society, where you have the macho complex — i.e., you must father as many children, preferably male children, as possible, whether legitimate or illegitimate — women are very much an exploited group. I think that built into Castroism is the view that the movement must emancipate women. I do not know whether this occurs in the Argentinian case.

In the case of Mexico, of course, there was a very strong feminist element in the 1920s, but it looks to me as if Mexican women are fighting a losing battle against male aggression and the macho complex.

Finally, the relationship between Castroism and nationalism. I think that the cultural vacuum in Cuba is one reason why anti-imperialism has already had to play an extremely important part in the story. But also, I think this was an imperative. Perhaps the break with the United States was unavoidable in the sense that you could not have a situation where, after you had created your populist revolution, you had your enemies, etc., coming down from the United States with a whole set of cultural ideas. What many Cubans fear more than anything else is to find themselves in a Puerto Rican situation where the sense of cultural deprivation was increased. I think, therefore, that this business of cutting themselves
off, creating a sort of insular situation, is something which a populist movement, if it is to draw sustenance from its own roots, must inevitably do. Better the devil at 10,000 miles than the devil on the doorstep.

The fact that Russian influence comes in is the price that has to be paid, but one doubts that Russian influence is anything like as strong as it may appear on the outside. Ultimately, the populist strand in Castroism and the Continental philosophy which this can be seen in the whole development of revolutionary strategy and the attack being made on traditional communist parties — will come out on top.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. We want to group preferably a number of speakers on Latin America initially. The first four are therefore bracketed. Dr. Calvert.

DR. PUTNAM CALVERT: Ironically, I was not planning to say a great deal about Latin America, but I would attempt to draw together some strands which seem to have emerged during the course of this discussion which would certainly not be irrelevant.

As far as I can see, we have been talking basically about populism at three levels: Populism with a capital "P" in the United States and Russian populism in its manifestations in south-east Europe and Mexico, Peru, and wherever we may decide that we can talk about authentic populist movements, without the actual label of populism being attached to them; and we have been talking about a populist element in the politics of other countries.

Throughout, however, we have been talking more in terms of political movements. We have considered the question of ideology. I think we agreed more or less that the ideology was a flexible element, and my impression was that we might be coming round to a view that populism, strictly defined, was a movement which tended to exist in different ideological climates and to take on the hue of the environment, but basically that it was a rural movement seeking to realise traditional values in a changing society. This could be only a very broad basis for a definition.

This is important because if we look, for example, at the most clear and obvious example, that of North America, which we discussed last yesterday afternoon, we have a populism of the United States which is relatively early in historical time, occurring at the end of the nineteenth century. We have the populism of Saskatchewan and Mexico occurring in a climate in which socialist ideas are already widely prevalent, well-articulated and available for use to support certain points of view rather than others.

As a political movement, however, populism in each of those three areas seems to have been essentially a rural rather than an ideological construction. In each case undoubtedly, it seems to me, the political characteristic of promotion by the intelligentsia is much more regular than perhaps it has been made out. Particularly if I may refer to American populism — United States populism — I think that one has tended to forget how much the mobile quality of American life meant that the sort of people who dominated American populism were, in fact, the intelligentsia of their own particular communities.

I did a study some years ago on Governor Davis Waite, of Colorado, one of the few populists to reach gubernatorial level. He was born in New York in the 1820s, gradually migrated his way across the United States. Everywhere he went he set up a newspaper, wrote articles and became one of the intellectual centres of the community. He gradually moved his way across the United States until he wound up strategically in Colorado in a nice time for the Populist movement and became Governor of the State. He was a man whom I would have regarded as being cultivated and well read within the small, biballic context of the time.

I think that we could take this model as the basis for assuming that although populist leaders may not appear to have been, by standards of the world view, people who were distinguished contributors to the history of political thought, nevertheless they were powerful within their own communities and effective within the limits of their own field of operations. Coupled with this is the undeniable quality of the Americans in particular as preachers, as people who appeal as personalities. I am glad that Mr. Kennedy has raised this charismatic element, because this is fundamental. We are talking about moral movements and ethical values.

There are two points which I particularly want to take up. One is the comment on the apocalyptic nature of the populist world view as exemplified by Ignatius Donnelly in Caesar's Column. I think that this can be overcome a bit. After all, Ignatius Donnelly is writing at the same time as H.G. Wells was formulating his ideas, and it seems to me that the apocalyptic view presented in Caesar's Column is not all that different from Wells The Sleeper Okanagan — for example, from his view of the inevitability of destruction of the order of society as it was — and yet I do not think that one would turn round then and say that socialism was liable to an apocalyptic view. There are apocalyptic socialists and there are non-apocalyptic socialists.

The North American populists were realists. They had a realistic view of this alien element, this alien structure of power, the alienness of the money tics. This seems to me, in the Latin American context at least, and certainly in the other examples we have been given, to have been the consistent factor governing the realism of their political approach. If they are faced with a problem of doing something about a situation which is effectively speaking beyond their control, how realistic can one expect their responses to be?

It is all right talking about populists not having a coherent programme, a series of actions which they will perform once they get into power. But if they are conscious within their situation of something that is too big for them to deal with, I do not see how one can expect to have a consistent reaction in this sense because the moment one attempts to apply the reaction, one finds oneself up against an unknown problem.

This takes me to Professor Wilcox' comment on Gordones. It is true that the Cordoves achievement was limited to taxing the big view.
but it was very considerable by the standards of its day. But it is a bit hard on Cordemans to say that on the one hand he was a populist, which undoubtedly he was, but that on the other hand, however, his most populist characteristic - the land distribution element - was forced upon him by the communists. I do not think that I could wear this one historically speaking.

I think that this would be a misunderstanding of the role of a leader like Cordemans in playing off so many powerful elements and in the Spanish-Mexican context the very well articulated Marxism which was already well developed by the 1920s. This problem could not have conceivably faced anyone in an earlier generation and it could not face any populist movement today, for the simple reason that the standpoints are by now well established and, therefore, people have much more defined preconceptions about it than they had in the 1920s and 1930s.

Therefore, if we look for populism today, we will look for a different sort of animal. We are looking for a type of movement. We need not expect to find the same sort of ideologies as were found in either of those two periods. Therefore, in a sense, we can relate this to what happens when a populist movement achieves power.

As I see it, a populist movement can form a government. There can be a populist government within a system which society is accepted more or less generally. One cannot have a populist regime as such because the characteristic of a populist movement is to take on the ideological hue of its surroundings. One cannot speak of a dominant populist system or society. One can only talk about the populist party within a society of a different sort of hue. Therefore, to that extent, populism is a 'non-ism' in the sense that it is not an ideological phenomenon. It is a political one.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. A number of issues arise out of Mr. Hennessy's contribution and the last contribution which also appear in the papers. One is the question of the nature of the elite, including the charismatic component, if any, I would have thought that in the section concerning Latin America, too, we should discuss the question of the urban nature or otherwise of populism. Mr. Hennessy told us, for example, that there is a rural mystique in Central America, the guerrilla movement and so on, which seems to be very different from what would be conventionally called 'populism' the Peronist kind. So perhaps this would be worth talking about.

MR. DE KNAUT: An isolated point to begin with. We must not lose sight of the fact that populism is an ideology: the view of a (usually small) group of persons about the nature of the people and their place in society. But yesterday, during the discussion, I had the feeling that for a good part of the time we were talking about the history of ideas rather than the history of ideology. One of the things that we do not want to do too much is to get involved in an analysis of the ideas of people who now in any sense become the ideological leaders of a politically active group.

I want to begin by taking up Peter Worsley's suggestion that there is a first stage and a second-stage populism. That makes a good deal of sense to me. There are really two major sets of populisms which do, of course, have a large number of characteristics in common but which also differ quite considerably from each other. An important difference in that, on the one hand, we have a kind of protest, or opposition, or marginal populism, a populism of people who seem to have nothing to lose and a lot to gain. On the other hand, we find a government, which is the more invitational populism, a populism of people who seem to have a lot to lose.

Remember the idea put forward yesterday by Professor Seton-Watson of 'jobs for the boys'. The latter type appears often to develop out of the former, which seems especially to have been the case in Africa.

These two types of populism are perhaps especially distinguished by the nature of the expected involvement of the masses, whether they are peasant or urban. Various papers and many speakers have pointed to that aspect of the ideology of populism which calls for mass involvement and mass participation. May have also stressed the question of the populistic or populist ideology which calls for the involvement of the people that one should help themselves and promote their own welfare. In the concept of most of these people or marginal populist movements there is probably an authentic identification of the movement's ideologies and members with the masses, and there is a feeling among them that the masses themselves should really find their own destiny, that the masses should somehow fully participate in the control of a new kind of society.

I don't think that that is true for the majority of the governing or 'integrative' populism. For their case we would do well to remember Ken Minogue's distinction between rhetoric and ideology: very often there is much of the former and little of the latter. Therefore, the involvement of the masses rather than a true feeling of letting the masses find their own destiny. At worst, there is manipulation of the masses, which in, incidentally, very often achieved through previously existing paternalistic dependency structures in the society.

To the extent that a government movement allows the expression of the interests of the people 'as a whole', of the masses, it might usefully be called populist. Alastair Hennessy's discussion of Croatanism is quite relevant in this respect. If, however, such a governing movement is loath manipulative and paternalistic, basically it is keeping the masses in check rather than letting the masses decide on their own solutions to the problem of running society, which is the sort of thing that has happened in Latin America: it is what populism was about in its later stage, and it is certainly what Seton-Watson was about in Brazil. Then I do not think there is much point in calling it populism.

In this context I would now like to turn briefly to Professor Von Lenger's paper. It has the merit of clearly showing up the elements of paternalistic manipulation by the now ruling Christian Democratic Party in Chile, the rhetorical aspects in their otherwise populist ideology. On another point however, he seems to have missed the evidence. This occurs when he takes rather literally the views expressed in one single publication, where some stress is placed on the importance of the early Christian world view. Von Lenger sees this as a (populist) return to a pristine Christian community. This shows that he fails to understand the way in which Latin American radical Catholic groups, for the Christian government, use the sources of religious thought - the Church Fathers, the Bible and so on.
They do not go back to these sources because they have some kind of primitivist view of the world. On the contrary, they use 'primitive' or 'orthodox' texts in order to combat the less 'primitive' views which are currently held by the 'establishment' of a church of which they consider themselves very much a part. It is the radical nature of the primitive texts in the present circumstances which is the relevant point here.

Finally, I would like briefly to look at the extent to which the characteristics which have been put forward as belonging to populist movements are present among the existing small radical Catholic protect groups in Latin America. These groups seem to have much in common with the first kind of populism which I have tried to discuss, namely protest populism. They have, as far as I know, never been called populist, nor has the similarity with other populist movements been noticed.

The movements in question are elite movements in which the drive comes from a very small number of people: students, intellectuals, and so on. Those people continuously talk about the masses - but the movements in no sense really originate from the masses. They romanticize the ordinary and they romanticize the people. Thus in Brazil, during the period of Guadalupe, one saw the rise of the Movement of Popular Culture, (Movimento de Cultura Popular), set up in the first instance by Marxists, but later joined - and developed in a non-Marxist direction - by radical Catholic groups and individuals who gave the organization a clearly populist twist. It led to a tremendous romanticization of the masses, of the people, of the culture of the people. It wanted to ater Brazilian culture back to the 'culture of the people' and away from the sophisticated (and especially: imported) culture, which had supposedly been imposed upon them. Furthermore, speaking again in general terms, there is, among these radical Catholic groups in Latin America, a strong stress on direct participation by the people, finding concrete expression in co-operative and theoretical expression in communitarianism.

There is, of course, another source of these ideas: the Catholic social doctrine of subsidiarity. This doctrine, its a little simplified, that one 'should aim at getting things done, socially and politically, in the smallest and most intimate social unit which can operate effectively'. It was developed, as a doctrine, in Europe, in opposition to centralising, state-encompassing socialism. But the radical groups we are talking about, interested though they may be in participation and cooperation, do see that in Latin America the state has to play a very important role. This, in fact, leads them to clash with the traditional anti-state, Catholic viewpoint. The radicals realize that the context of the mid-twentieth century is quite different from that of even only 30 years ago. And they have taken their cue from - and are impressed, perhaps over-impressed by - the socialist bloc.

These radical Catholic groups, moreover, have developed a strong utopian element. Donald Mackee spoke about the single spectacular event which the populist movement craves for - the escape from the burden of history. That too one finds again in this kind of movement. The hope for an escape from the burden of history finds expression in the belief that it is possible to create a society without evil or 'contradictions', as well as in the hope for the emergence of a radically new kind of man.

One also quite clearly encounters the conspiratorial element. But here we have to be careful. These people may have an exaggerated tendency to blame everything on the bad Americans, on the C.I.A., or on the local capitalists. However, as Peter Worsley has already pointed out, there are important elements in the really existing social, political, and economic situation which make this kind of view not totally irrelevant.

What does this all amount to? So far we have been thinking along the following lines. We have been enumerating the traits that are found in these movements we have labelled populist. We have discovered that the label is rather widely applicable - in some cases to hitherto 'unsuspected' situations. We have tentatively, decided that there are two kinds (or perhaps stages) of populism - for each of those, thus, we have begun to construct an 'ideal' type. These ideal types should prove useful, because we can look at situations like those I have described for Latin America and begin to ask ourselves relevant questions. Questions such as why, in some cases on finds most characteristics of the ideal type, and in others a much less complete set. Questions, then, also about the way in which those traits hung together, about the dynamics of populism: questions which may give us some reasons why populism (full-fledged) does develop under certain circumstances and not under others. That is, after all, what Weber was trying to do about capitalism, when he looked at societies which did not develop the full-fledged thing, and asked why this had been so. That is the kind of approach we might in the end find useful; it is certainly what this gathering has stimulated me to do with my own research data on radical Catholicism in Latin America.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I particularly appreciate the emphasis which you have introduced of the study of ideology (a) as a system and (b) in terms of its social niche and the contrast between that and the history of ideas which are two distinct things and have tended to become rather blurred and confused in the discussion. I understand that after a period of remarkable self-restraint, Professor Schapiro suddenly wishes to erupt in the middle of Latin America. Is that right?

PROF. LEONARDO SCHAPIRO: Not particularly. I have one or two remarks to make, but they are very close to what Mr. de Kadt has just said although they do not relate to Latin America in particular.

THE CHAIRMAN: If they relate to what Mr. de Kadt has said, please carry on.

PROF. SCHAPIRO: The relationship really consists in that I, too, have considerable difficulty - perhaps I ought not to be here at all - in seeing the relevance of the term 'populism' to many of the variable phenomena which we are discussing. But possibly Mr. de Kadt's invocative of Weber, gives us some consolation that our efforts may after all not be in vain.
My particular difficulty about attempting to construct even an ideal scenario is that we are talking about something which is a meme to, which comes into our language from America, from the end of the nineteenth century; and then, being historians, we remember that there was a thing called populism in Russia which the dictionaries translate as "populism", and so we say that we must relate it to that prototype. This may be right, but it creates difficulties, because I do not myself see any serious relationship between what we have been told, what one knows, about American populism, and what one knows about Russian populism.

As many people, including Ken Minogue and now de Kadt, have pointed out, one obviously has to see these movements, ideologies or whatever they are in the context of their own particular history. The first thing that I could not help thinking about all yesterday when populism was being discussed was that one element which somehow seemed to me to be missing was that all these ideas, all these emotions which grew up in Russia in the nineteenth century, grew up on the soil of orthodoxy, I may say well that a lot of people who, so to speak, practised populism had deserted orthodoxy. But that all this grew up on the soil of orthodoxy, with its particular sense of the divine mission of the people and of the presence of Christ among the simple and humiliated people which is so strong in Russian tradition, something which has been there for centuries, cannot, it seems to me, be left out of account.

However, what I am primarily concerned with, and this is where I feel that I am very much in agreement with de Kadt - is that we were perhaps concentrating yesterday very much on ideas, whereas if we are to talk about Latin America and Africa and populism in those areas, we have to talk a little bit about the realities of politics. The realities of politics when it comes to populism in its Russian prototype was only touched upon very much in passing by Professor Sitton-Watson, but otherwise scarcely discussed.

The reality of Russian populist politics, as I understand it, was the relationship which these people saw, which the ideologists saw, between the people and the duties of the leader. After all, all politics consist to some extent of establishing some kind of relationship between the leader of a party or of a movement and those whom he claims to lead. Personally I take populism, as Dr. Kope does, right into the revolution and even later. It is arguable that there are elements of it there today, but certainly 1917 and 1918 must be taken into account, because that was when the theory came to be tested. That was when the Chumovs and the Kerenskys, who was populist in background, and a lot of the so-called Croat members of the provisional government who were in effect populists in their tradition, had to act and when they had to act what one to the fore was precisely the populist tradition of leadership - the anti-fascist tradition that on no account must you attempt to impose a doctrine on the people, that the people must learn to speak with the people, and that you must merely give expression to it; that the people's will ultimately always will be right. Borkuado was astonished that the people did not vote for him - astonished and hurt. Lenin would not have been astonished and hurt. He would merely have said that it was a badly managed election.

But this innocent faith that the people's voice must always be right, that this is the absolute essence of the Russian Provisional Government. Every single one of their acts is inubed with the fear that if they do not let the voice of the people be heard - if they try to keep them in order, even to try to stop chaos - they will be missing against history and against the Revolution. Every single speech of Kerensky, and particularly of Leo, the first Prime Minister, is steeped in this fear. Chumov, the leader of the so-called liberal revolutionaries, the latter-day populists, was faced with an overwhelming majority of votes in the country at the election of the constituent assembly and yet he could do absolutely nothing to defend it. It is no good complaining about this. That is the nature of populism. populism - that is why I agree as much with de Kadt - is essentially something which is inconsistent with the kind of realities of politics and of leadership which, in the Russian case, Lenin's ideas represent.

To talk of charismatic populism or populism led by leaders, which seems to me to be the case in Latin America as far as I can understand it - the successful or the less successful ones, that is - to talk of led populism, populism with charismatic leaders, the sort of manipulated or exploited populism, all that kind of thing, if I might borrow a phrase from another great populist, Khruzhchev, is like talking about fried snowballs. It is something which to me is totally inconsistent.

If we want to forget about the Russians, well and good. Let us leave all that aside on a popular piece of Russian history which has nothing to do with anything else and then try to find our model. But if we take the Russian experience as a prototype, it seems to me that the element of anti-fascism, the fear that the people's will will be frustrated by leaders who attempt to impose upon it, cannot be ignored.

May I remind you of perhaps one of the most dastardly Russian populists - Alexander Balk - with his detachment of Red Guards with Christ at the head of them in "The Twelve" - with his idealisation of the mob, writing in his diary in June 1917, words to the effect of "How dare we, the intellectuals, attempt to dictate to this wise and all-knowing people" - all this in the middle of the riots. That kind of sentiment, this intoxication, was something which was, I suppose, to a very large extent the populists' own invention and their own myth. It was, I think, a reflection of this deliberate refusal and deliberate abstention from the duty of leadership. That seems to me to be an historical and political fact.

I was enormously interested in what Professor Racovici said about Gramsci and, as it were, populism being reflected in Italian communism, curious as it may seem that any kind of communism could have anything to do with populism, because in that respect they are poles apart. That seemed to me to be a fascinating element.

Another way in which this kind of factor in my view should be applied is to the question of populism and fascism. Of course, there are elements of populism in the fascist movement, in national socialism, particularly in the exploitation of a certain ideology and of certain realms of thought and tradition. But when it comes to leadership - there you have the big difference. That is in the way I personally would not
be able to see these expansionist movements, or for that matter the Caudillist Latin American ones as being in the same category because it is a different attitude to the problem of what you do with the people. You may exploit the same kind of sentiments, but what matters is what you do about it. It is whether you are dealing with small protest movements which de Kadt described; or whether it is that you are merely pretending, so to speak, to act for the people, but are really manipulating them to get their votes and carry out some kind of policy of the leader. That seems to me to be the essential difference and one which, in the search for definitions we ought not to leave out of account.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Professor Schapiro. With that nostalgia for Lenin, security and order, we will break for coffee.

(Adjourned for coffee)
The nationalistic and industrial sides of the ideology were much more ephemeral. They were inherited from former conservative governments who had feared considerably the rate of growth of the industrial sector since the middle 1930's. A growing economy with a labour intensive basis, made possible the existence of the 1949 political coalition. Other factors were also important, namely, the fears of some industrialists of a possible return of export oriented economic policies and, perhaps more important, the presence of traditional leftist parties (Socialists and Communists) in the political coalition opposing Perón (this was particularly important in the case of the Church and the Army). But when the economic situation of the country began to crumble (ca. 1950) and the risks above mentioned faded out, the peronist coalition started to crumble away. By 1955, the Army and the Church led the coup d'etat that put an end to the Perón régime. Needless to say, the coup was received with great enthusiasm by the bulk of industrial entrepreneurs.

The so-called populist features of "peronismo" were neither central nor permanent characteristics of the movement even in its early stages. Many of the "unypical" features of peronism (authoritarianism and the like) can indeed be traced in any other western labour movement. On the other hand, it would be difficult to find avid populist movements one with the sort of stubborn identification with organized labour that has characterized peronism throughout its history.

DR. MACVORAG: I would like to follow on from Mr. de Kadt to see whether we can cut populism down to size. This is what we are concerned with. Too many people are likely to get in on the act and we want to make it a manageable act. This is one aspect of what we want to do. The other thing is to try to compartmentalize populism to some extent, to get some dimensions of it so that we can put them in particular squares of populism rather than having them in a composite whole where they are with other animals which are more likely to gobble them up than to mate with them.

The dimension which first occurs to me is the one we have already talked about, the stages of which we have spoken, and the other is in relation to the strength of populism. We can look at populist populism both in relation to ideology on the one hand, and in relation to the movement itself on the other hand. We could talk of a strong ideology of populism, or rather a strong populist ideology, because I do not consider that there is an ideology; there are ideologies which are populist: where there are well differentiated sets of ideas, where they are at an integrated, satisfied community, where they aim at affecting the whole life of those in the community, where they are built on the concept of the natural goodness of man as he is rather than the idea that there is any change in communism or fascism in having to build a new man, in transforming man. The existence of some of these features will enable us to say that this is a strong form of populist ideology which we are dealing with.

With weak populist ideologies we are dealing with people concerned usually with a very immediate issue, with a comparatively narrow range of grievances and expectations. I think that in those terms a weak populist ideology tends to spill over into the concept of a pressure group of people with a narrow sort of objective which may be satisfied relatively simply and which does not involve the transformation of the nature of society. Clearly, in ideological terms I think we would say that American populism is very obviously weak in this sense.

The strength of the movement side: at one end of the scale we will find the sort of thing we were talking about yesterday in Hungary, with a few scattered intellectuals who may have little or no contact with those for whom this appeal is to act; and at the other end of the scale the strength that we get is of a populist government or a government which is claiming to be populist which is put into the position of trying to realise the objectives that it has.

We can see that there will be difficulties here if you have a movement with a strong populist ideology which is then in a position of strength. There is a contradiction exposed between what it is trying at, and the unreality of some of its aims if it may collapse or it may take the form of seeming to betray the principles for which it stands.

There are stages of populism: I think we are more or less agreed on this point. We have the take-off point for industrialisation, the early stage the stage one of industrialisation, and here we have either a reaction against the prospects or the early effects of industrialisation. I emphasise here that this can be either rural or urban. It may well be that the reaction is on the part of urban workers and particularly if they are handcraft or home industry workers, their reaction would be of this form.

Secondly, we are likely to see this in forms of making for and trying to get some sort of state intervention. Clearly there is a very different sort of situation if this early stage of dealing with the prospect of industrialisation is one where you are the state; the whole perspective of dealing with the ill consequences of industrialisation is altered if you are the people who have power. Secondly, if industrialisation is well under way, we are likely to see populist type movements here again. We have not developed effective means of applying pressure on society or of getting their expectations realized. It may be because an event suddenly throws up a certain group of people who are not well established within the existing means of getting their expectations or interests looked after, or it may be an existing group finds that the existing means simply do not get the results they want. Therefore, I think that we would contrast this with those who have developed the established means, who will on the one hand perhaps have formed political parties. On the other hand, if they are more narrow and sectional, they will have become well established pressure groups.

This stage two populism is likely to be weak ideologically. This is not necessarily so, but there is quite a strong chance of it. In this area they will take their distinctive nature from whom they see to be their main enemy. "What is the main reason why we find ourselves in this subordinate exposed position?" And so the characteristic which will appeal to people is the fact that it is anti-Jewish, because the Jews are the enemy, or the financiers or coloured immigrants are the enemy. These groups are likely to be rather weak ideologically but they may be very strong from an organisational point of view. They may attract hundreds of thousands or millions of people. If they become strong as a movement, there is a counter tendency that one would expect that either an existing party will bid for their support, as in the case of South American populism, or they may become a sort of formalised pressure group if the worst dangers or fears, the ones which seem overwhelming, are overcome.
There are one or two other features that I would like to mention quickly in passing. A populist movement is liable to rapid changes. We may think that we have pinned it down, but if we go away and come back a few years later, we will find that it is a different animal with rapid changes of fortune and position and even of objectives in what may be the characteristics of the movement at one stage because—and this is particularly true of second stage populism—the situation changes and, therefore, what they are trying to do changes.

Also, the stronger the ideological content, the greater the frustration you are likely to get, either because you do not make any headway, because you cannot get the support which you want or alternatively, as I said earlier, you get the position where you think that you can achieve your objective but then you find that your objective simply is not realisable within the context of what you are trying to do.

My last point is again one on which I think there is general agreement. There are a number of cases where we are not dealing with populist movements or ideologies but with movements or ideologies which have populist elements in them. What we should try to do is to restrict as far as possible those to which we are giving a populist label from those in which there are populist elements, otherwise the thing will get extremely confusing with other sorts of labels like nationalism, on the one hand, and socialism, on the other hand. Nazism, to which Professor Schapiro referred, is a good example of a movement which has all three these labels. It was nationalist, it was socialistic to a real extent, and it was populist in that it had quite a number of the elements of what one might call aspects of American populism—anti-finance, anti-big business, anti-chain store and anti-foreigner. These combined with a sort of socialist way of dealing with things, nationalism on a scale which makes the Labour Party look a very weak and wimpy organisation, and nationalism of course very strongly. But I do not think that we would want therefore to describe it as a populist movement although it had an important populist strain in it.

The Chairman: Thank you. We will now have an additional group of the regional contributions from Africa. Dr. Boshoff?

Dr. Boshoff: Would it be possible for me to comment after Dr. Saul? I prefer to do that.

The Chairman: Certainly.

Dr. Saul: I think that Professor Worsley was going to say something in reply to some of the points I made in my paper. I do not know whether I should put my points now.

The Chairman: In that event, I think that it would be more logical for Peter Worsley to speak now.

Prof. Worsley: As I said, I am on the list. I remember that commercial on television some months ago for the TV Times in which a bearded apartment in a soap box addressing a rather unimpressed cloth-capped worker says: "Revolution. All out on Monday, comrades. The revolution is due to begin." The other man replies, "You can't go out on Monday because television is showing football." So the apartment says "Tell all out on Tuesday." "You cannot do that" he is told—because of some other Programme. He goes through the whole of the week but still the worker will not respond. So off the worker goes to watch television. The apartment turns to the audience and says "Oh dear, and I so wanted a revolution." I would similarly like to believe that the sharpening of class consciousness that John Saul spoke of, or the emergence of a more clearly delineated class-pattern in East Africa is beginning to display itself. In reading the paper, I felt myself transported back in time where I started with all this business through reading Lenin on the development of capitalism in Russian agriculture. What he seemed to me to be saying to the Narodniki and others is "Do not talk about 'people'. Do not talk about vague macro-entities of this kind: 'the' peasants or 'the' masses. Analyse the situation in such refined class terms and analyse the processes of differentiation that is taking place in the countryside." Hence that is the general place where modern Marxist theory of large, middle and small peasants emerges.

Basically, I think that this is the same kind of operation which John Saul has very successfully and carefully done. He has been quite right to be pleased with it having perhaps blundered a lot of this. I should say in self-defence that I think it is not as blurred as all that. For example, the passage from Strigl's book on Buganda which he cites as a crucial instance of class differentiation visibly occurring under our eyes in Africa was not only cited in my work, but I actually put in the figures as well.

Secondly, there is always the problem of distinguishing oneself as analyst and commentator: in reproducing what the populists say, without at the same time appearing necessarily to approve of it. The formula which he cites from my book is a little more nuanced than perhaps he gave me credit for. I said there that the theory, or the notion, that society is very largely homogeneous, and that the great mass of the population are peasants, was not simply delusion. I was implying that a lot or some of it was, and was also a manipulative doctrine.

This manipulative element is very important because when Professor Schapiro talked earlier this morning about the utilisation of populist elements in Russian and Russia, for example, he reminded me vividly that in Hitler's early speeches there was a lot of reference to planning, even five-year planning. The word 'workers' occurs in the party title, and there was a lot of appeal to elements and themes which would find ready echo in a population already infected by socialist and communist ideas. But was it for Welfarism? Nazism was not socialism. It used Socialist 'elements', certainly, but the total framework of action was anything but socialist. One can find therefore elements incorporated, manipulated and utilised for quite other ends than that to which they were attached when embedded in their original context.

Broadly, therefore, it seems to me that the Lenin/Narodnik debate is a crucial confrontation. One of the sub-variants of this great theme running through modern sociological literature is the relevant utility of
Thirdly, it is against outsiders in general - bigmen, the city, intellectuals, all the people that the populace classically dislikes - tax collectors and government extension officers in agriculture. Those people generally get into trouble and very often are the people around whom peasant riots centre.

Fourthly, the struggle becomes not necessarily one between one class and another class, but a struggle very often against something called the state. I was very interested a few weeks ago in listening to Theodore Shanin, discussing the history of Russian agrarian discontent up to about 1925, in which he said that, I think, 50 per cent of the outbreaks of agrarian rebellion and discontent that he had studied were directed not at another class, but primarily against the state (or manifestations of the state in the form of particular individuals, officials, and so on.) Am I right?

MR. SHANIN: It was 1906.

PROF. WORLEY: Thank you. Why is it, therefore, that what would appear to be a nice ready-made situation for the maximisation of sharpening of class-awareness and inter-class hostility does not produce it so rapidly and directly? One of the reasons which Theodore suggested was simply that a lot of people die, and infant mortality, and even adult mortality, are very important ways in which, for example, land pressure is alleviated; emigration is another basic mechanism.

Migration, and periodic migration, which has been the dominant form in East, Central and Southern Africa, means that you are oscillating between town and countryside; you are sending money back to the village; the village becomes dependent on labour migrants in many cases and functions effectively by virtue of the money that is siphoned back into the rural areas. Watson's work on the Shona demonstrates this. There is the whole process of circulation in general, in which, in times of distress and economic breakdown (for example, the depression of the 1930s) tons of thousands of people go back to their villages, which is always there as a kind of safety net, so whereas it is built into the structure of your kinship connections you give access to land and title to land in rural areas.

There is also the fact that there may be (and there is a lot of evidence from Meyer Forten's Kallonisi right through to more recent African data, reinforced also by more of Theo Shanin's material) a cyclical process going on in the present-farming household-economy, in which you do not just simply get a polarisation of large farmers, middle pocket headchief horticulturalists, and landless proletarians, but an oscillation in the rise and fall of households, for reasons which are connected with the structure of the family and which are not solely technological or economic. That being the case, this is an inhibitory mechanism which cuts across what otherwise would be a dominant tendency towards polarisation and differentiation.

Finally, in Africa at least, in most parts - of course there are areas in which this is not true - there is a lot of land. I am reminded of a comment on Australia that they exploited the colonies with the capital and the labour but that they forgot to export the
relations of production. What happens is that the people who were supposed to do all the work on the land for the squatters had access to land themselves, since Australia was "empty", and they started farming on their own account.

In Africa, unlike say Java - and I suppose that one could make a broad global antithesis between Asia and Africa - there is still the possibility of feeding yourself at the very lowest level because of access to land, which is a very important inhibiting mechanism which prevents many of the phenomena of severe class polarization and distress which is found more essentially classically in Asia and may have a lot to do with their different political developments.

It is for these various reasons which in general, I suppose, could be summed up as the circulatory nature of the African labour force, that we should be very cautious before assuming that although one can empirically trace incident or even quite advanced class differentiation in occupations, economic, market and other terms, this will somehow necessarily quickly produce manifestations and registration of these economic facts in the political sphere, particularly in the emergence of conscious class identification and class hostility.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does Mr. Ionescu wish to say something?

MR. IONESCU: Not really. Perhaps Dr. Saul would be kind enough to summarize some of the ideas for people who have not yet been able to read his paper.

DR. JOHN SAUL: I will go over my paper briefly by way of anticipation. I begin by making two general points: one is the difficulties some of which have come out clearly in the ongoing discussion, one being the difference between the distinction of ideas and ideology and the characterization of movements. One of the aspects of the African literature has been the tendency to lump two things together and to talk about movements as populist when in fact what one seems to be talking about is ideas on the part of a relatively small group of people within the leadership of a specific political movement. Some people have tended to generalize from ideas that certain people have to characterize to involve everybody in a particular movement. That is one general point.

My second point was that, again in the literature, there seems to be a difference of definition of populism between a group which sees populism as meaning somehow the will of the people, that a populist ideology and populist movements are either an ideology which says that the will of the people is somehow important and the key criterion for political activity, and related to that on a movement level characterizations of movement as somehow a popular movement as distinct from a minority movement.

Secondly, Professor Worsley talked particularly about the group in which populism has a response to the impingement of capitalistic development in changing societies and he had seen populist ideologies and populist movements as responding to the changes which these are bringing in traditional and changing societies.

In the first section I went on to look at some of the people who have in the literature used the idea of populism as expressing the will of the people, taking a number of case studies where that term has been used, particularly a study by Low on Buganda, which Dr. Engels mentioned yesterday.

I tried to show the way in which, using the term rather loosely, Low has observed some of the differentiations within the movement and made the general point out of this that one of the dangers of a term like populism is that it tends to oversimplify and makes particular movements more monolithic than they often are. I think that this has been particularly true in Africa and increasingly, for example, in the study of the nationalist movements.

We have seen the way in which various groups, for a variety of reasons, come together in a moment of nationalism which was articulated as a popular movement at the highest level by the leadership but often in terms of the group which were involved at the local level had very different ends in view than some sort of national popular movement. In fact, the interplay between leadership and mass within a movement of this sort is very important and the terminology of populism, at least in certain examples which I have cited, has tended to get in the way of covering the full complexity of a specific situation.

Professor Schapiro has just made the point that there is a danger in any generalization, but it seems to be particularly a case in the generalization of populism, of oversimplifying the contextual characteristics of different movements and blurring some of the distinctions between them. There seems to have been, at least in the African literature, a term which has tended to do this, which has tended to lead to a danger of hypothesizing a whole variety of ways in terms of the spread of popular involvement, in terms of the level, uniformity and consciousness of various people involved in specific movements. This was the main point that I made. There are a number of other points.

I also made a distinction that Professor Seton-Watson began to make yesterday on the different types of possible popular movements, if you like, and the different types of sociocultural which tend to characterize pre-independence and post-independence Africa. There are certain continuities between them but also certain distinctions between these movements.

I tried to talk a bit about that and relate it to what populism might mean in these contexts. I particularly brought in, in this context, Vando de Nove, whom I think is a thinker of Africa. At least, he is a North-West Indian but still he is very much working in the African context of Africa. As somebody who seems archetypal as a typical populist thinker, I suppose that Vando de Nove comes as near as anybody who has been there in terms of articulation of philosophy. In this instance, at least one side of it is a reaction to the elite and a reaction to what seems to be part of the people in some sense to rise against in the first instance the colonial powers and in the second instance the elite that is now in control. There are continuities here which are important as well, and I have outlined some of these in the paper.
The second thing which I took up was the notion of populism as the defense against capitalism. In this context I talked about Professor Worsley's observations in his book The Third World. One of the things, incidentally, which comes up in this, I think, is a difference of opinion between Professor Seton-Watson and Professor Worsley over the question of populist regimes. There is in a discussion here in Professor Seton-Watson's description of populist regimes of apportioning the nation-state as the end and the bounds of political action. It seems to me that there are tensions in a movement of a very similar order to those between to power by the leadership and the mass which might be ambiguous. There are also possibilities of situating a nation-state or particular movement or, now, regime in the context of an international social or economic order which make the type of solidarities at least a possibility.

Professor Worsley mentioned that the international dimension and the confrontation between regimes and an international order, particularly as an international economic order, can be a very important one. So it may be that the difference between a movement and a power of some kind be oversimplified. If in fact one conceives of a populist movement, it seems to me that one can conceive also of a populist regime, although there may be some ambiguities in that.

One of the important things that I tried to bring out in the paper on the question of populism as a defense against capitalism which has to be discussed, but which has not been sufficiently discussed, because yesterday we were quite concerned with question of ideas, is the necessity of situating my discussion of populism in the context of a process of social change. This ideology may be in fact the peg on which one would hang the relationship between ideas and the context in which they are articulated and therefore the relationship of them to movements which arise.

This is a very important aspect in two ways. First, yesterday again Professor Seton-Watson and several others mentioned the idea that populism in some ways was articulated in the context of a worship of the people. Professor Worsley spoke about populism as having a notion of the virtue of the people. One of the difficulties is that this tends to make the articulation of populist ideas rather too static a process.

One of the things which we have continually been in mind is that anything which we are calling populist is a changing phenomenon and a changing relationship to broad social changes. One of the important things which we said about populism is that it is probably an obvious point but it is still an important one - is that this is a set of ideas which we can isolate them which arise from a traditional community and tradition which are confronting the demands of industrialization and the demands of social change.

One of the aspects that makes ambiguous any easy reference to a populist set of ideas or a populist movement in that those movements themselves face a continually changing process. This means that their ideas are in flux. We noticed yesterday the way in which populist ideas of certain sorts seem to change and we tried to figure out why they change. This is because, particularly at the level of the leadership, there is a changing awareness of what is necessary to implement the values that they have. Oftentimes a leadership which has this sense of responsibility and solidarity with the people may find that because a process of change is taking place, their backward looking view is increasingly less related to goals which they would like to implement. It is too easy in a way to see a populist ideology once you look at a changing sort of thing and something which is situated in moments of social strife, to see it as an attack on the status quo, a straightforward worship of the people as they are at any given moment. There is a constant tension between a desire to protect the people, if you like, in the context of this idea and against capitalism, against this capitalistic incursion, and holding on to what they have and the awareness that this is changing, that their relationship to social development is in a changing one.

If we leave out the fact that the people, the constituency of leaders is a changing one, we lose some of the nuances of their changing ideas. This may account for some of the problems. We were talking yesterday about Maoism as well.

The two people who wrote the paper articulated very clearly that in Maoism there was this identification of the people of a very real order. This was seen as the populist dimension that the Chinese communists had some sense of responsibility for what was happening in the countryside. On the other hand, there seemed to emerge an awareness that perhaps more positive action was necessary to realize some aspects of these virtues.

I think that in the paper on Maoism one thing was perhaps left out which is also important because it fits in somewhere here. The dichotomy which was enunciated in the China paper was that Maoism was a compound of a view of the virtue of the people at the same time as it was a desire for production and that it was finally the desire for something which led to a rather harder line in the countryside.

This leaves out an important third dimension which must be brought in here. This brings us to the whole question about the relationship of populism to socialism. We have not quite buried that one. In China, one of the important elements there, a third dimension in addition to production and in addition to a desire for production, for solidarity with the people, is an awareness of this very fact of social change. The social change which is being articulated it seems to me, particularly in China - we can debate later what is happening in Africa - in the emergence of class differences and there is, I think, in China this third dimension to Maoism: that somehow by identifying with the status quo you are not really saying anything about social reality because what is happening is that social reality is changing. You have already articulated class differences which they are articulating themselves. If a more positive content is not brought into your programs, your decisions will have been made for you by the ongoing social changes.
Therefore a populist, it seems to me, is on this kind of knife edge. He is trying to protect the penury or whoever it is from what he sees to be the worst depredations of development in other countries and he is constantly aware that these changes may take place willily unless a more positive aspect is brought to the forefront.

The way that I have attempted to articulate this - this may be acceptably schematic, but I think that there is something to it - is to relate populist responses, insofar as one can talk about these at all, to the development of capitalist relations. As I say in my paper, Kilson and others have seen in Africa the impact of modernisation as primarily phrased in terms of the emergence of a cash nexus which carries with it, as he and others have seen it, the growth of differentiation.

I want to say something briefly about that, but those are obviously in Africa much less articulated than in other countries. It is however still a dimension of thinking of people in those kinds of movements or of those who have begun to ask those programmatic questions going beyond the romantic phase. This is perhaps the thing to which many of them are responding.

One of the things that may link Russian and American populism is their responses to this process of social change. It is not unidirectional but I think there is a movement in the whole process of modernisation from traditional solidarities through a people emerging into cash economy to differentiations within that cash economy. This can be deflected obviously by various types of traditions and so on; it does not take place in quite that logical progression.

But one can still see that in various situations there is a type of populism, if that is what we want to call it, that is reacting to the breakdown of traditional solidarities, which is attempting to retain certain types of solidarities, which is reacting against individualisation. If this kind of reaction is socialistic - it may or may not be; it is not very useful to define socialism merely in the ownership of the means of production and distribution. As Professor Worsley has said, it has rather broader implications. Whatever it is, however, I think that it is a reaction to this kind of capitalist differentiation.

The movement is in this direction insofar as it is not deflected by various other social forces. It is in the direction from the breakdown of communal solidarities. This is perhaps what the Russian populists - this is very schematic - obviously were reacting to. But it is a movement towards complete differentiation and it is also a movement towards industrialisation and advanced capitalization.

This is the point at which people who have emerged from traditional solidarities or who never had them, like the American farmers, are small individuals who confront a further phase of capitalist development which is the development of large capitalist sectors, finance capitalism and all these various things, and then articulate an ideology which is opposed to the furtherance of rationalisation of their position.

One of the things which is important about American populism - again, Professor Hofstadter knows more about this than I do - is that in the long run most of the American populists were definitively and economically dead. What happened in the rationalisation of American agriculture at a time, as he shows in his book The Age of Reform, many of these small farmers in America dropped out. They were defending themselves against something very real and there was the increased rationalisation of this capitalist processes, of the process of the articulation of differentiation in rural areas. So that is why to that we can find some thread running through some of these populist reactions in a reaction to this modernisation process, whether we call it capitalism, the advancement of capitalisation, modernisation or whatever else.

So that one of the reasons why we see a populist movement being drained off is that on the one hand people are driven back from the implications of a programme to defend what these virtues might be and becoming part of a conservative movement, becoming peasant movements which are bending in a slightly different way and perhaps in some instances their constitutuencies pass out of existence, or in the other hand moving towards more socialist philosophies which attempt to think out ways in which modes of production might be worked out which would carry on this defence and actually engage in defence rather than try through rhetoric and so on to pretend that it is not taking place. There is a point there. I am groping with what this might mean.

One of the other aspects that fits into this is the whole question of what is the co-operative content of populism, to what extent is co-operation or communalism a substitute for socialism; what is the logic of this. One of the difficulties is that when we use the term co-operative to talk about co-operatives as units in a way and co-operatives in the North American sense as unions of individuals or local groups coming together to defend themselves against what they see to be the outside economic forces, again, we have to differentiate different types of co-operation in the context of some model of what social changes are taking place.

My own point, with which I think that Professor Worsley tends to disagree, is that there co-operatives in a way are a substitute for what I think would be the impossible process at this stage of thinking of what kinds of modes of production might sustain lack of class differentiation. I am not sure that cutting off class differentiation is a possibility. Certainly co-operatives in terms of content has defending whatever those solidarity virtues are, which at one point or another have been necessary is an ambiguous instrument at best because it is in fact an instrument to which differentiation comes in a way.

I have seen in Africa, at least in Tanzania, which is a relatively undifferentiated and economically unrevolutionised society, a process by which co-operatives have been taken over by those few peasants who have differentiated themselves the most and have become to some extent at least instruments for further differentiation on their behalf. That, however, is a question which we might want to talk about: where co-operatives fit in and what sorts of populists react through co-operatives and what it means in terms of their basic goals.

I wanted to talk briefly about one of Professor Worsley's points. One of the things which has to be seen here when talking about class differentiation in Africa - and I have probably over-told this; I am at a relatively early stage of trying to find out what is happening there myself -
but one of the most important things there is the subsistence sector. One does not have large peasants and small peasants in quite the same way as perhaps there are in other societies. You have large peasants, small peasants, market-oriented peasants and subsistence peasants. What is happening is not necessarily a class polarization in Africa in terms of any form of class consciousness. You have a number of peasants who are staying in the subsistence sector, and insofar as they see co-operatives and so on as being used by large peasants and you see differentiations taking place, I think that there is a retreat to the subsistence sector in some extent, I hope we can talk more about this at some other time.

One of the things which we have not talked about sufficiently is the complexities of movements. I made this point at the outset. It is very important. We have talked about the complexity of ideas but we have to talk more of the complexity of the changing social context in which changing ideologies and movements are articulated but also get some idea of relationships between leadership and the led and the degree of awareness and also the relationships between the actual masses involved in these movements themselves as to what their foci are. Again, I think that populism as a term tends to blur this and to oversimplify. Certainly in the way it is used in the literature on Africa, it tends to oversimplify the uniformity of response of these various peasants. I have mentioned that at several points in the paper.

In the last section of the paper I mention the various ways in which ideologies can be used by movements. They can be used manipulatively and as an ideological rallying cry for movements. Whatever one thinks of them, they think that they are transforming and meeting the problems of transformation in a positive direction. They are used by many single-party states, of which Tanzania is one; a populist ideology is used for what they conceive, on the whole probably accurately, as progressive measures to bring about development.

Again, therefore, one has to look at the reasons why "elites" use these ideas as far as you can finally come down to a decision that populist ideologies are used by elites, and say not that such relationship to what the views of the mass, even though they may be mobilized to involvement, really are.

PROF. S. ANDERSEK: Concerning the problem of class struggles in Africa (which obviously has some bearing on the question of populism), I think that the explanation of why there is no clear-cut class struggle in Africa is quite simple and is connected with the problem of the relationship between populism and nationalism, and the fact that the struggle for wealth and other privileges is developing along ethnic divisions. I do not think have plenty of grounds for resistance against the wielders of authority and individuals who run power with them if we are to understand the way they are treated by the tax collectors, but the successful who try to force a large crowd of their clan-brothers who get a share in the spoils and remain very loyal to their luckier kinmen. Consequently a clear-cut class struggle cannot develop.

Concerning South Africa, I think that efficient repression is a sufficient condition of the status quo but one would still have to ask why it is so efficient, and the crucial point here is the unity of the privileged
Related to this point about rural newcomers in the Argentine case is a point which was made to me in informal discussion yesterday about the Romanian case -- i.e., the people who support the Iron Guard are again first-generation ex-peasants. This relates to the point which Professor Worsley was making about the length of time involved in moving from, in some senses, a rural to an urban culture. So that it is not possible simply to point to numbers of individuals in cities -- particularly when one has very rapid rates of urbanisation such as occur particularly in Latin America -- and use the resultant statistics as a definite criterion with which to argue that if populism is in some senses involved with the countryside, then these are not populist movements.

I was trying to get round this problem in using the expression "ruralist" in my paper, although it is not a very happy expression. My chief concern was to stress the importance of either the fact of rural origins or the actuality of being based in the countryside in some sense or the fact of fairly recent rural origin.

If I may come on to the question of the model, Professor Fournier yesterday came closest to what I had in mind and indeed elaborated details of a possible analytical model in considerably more detail than I had done. His model, as did the ideas which I threw out myself, arose out of a suggestion that one wanted to look at the specific contexts in which populism is used. We need to construct some sort of ideal type of populism (a term which both Professor Worsley and, later, de Kadt have used).

The construction of this model relates to the difficulties which we have been having over other movements which have more definite labels, or rather more conventionally accepted labels, such as McCarthyism, Nazism, etc. If we are talking about movements, the fact that one says, for instance, that McCarthyism is not simply a populist movement has led us rather too rapidly during the discussions to a negative position. That is to say, we have been concerned to say "No my movement" or "My particular area does not produce populist movements."

Taking, for instance, the example of nazism, and the fact that there is a populist movement encompassed within it, is not the particular details but the relevant approach to analysis with which I am concerned. There was a populist movement in Germany not merely in the 1920s but previously existing which was assimilated into, if one likes, the fully-fledged Nazi movement. As I mentioned in my paper, the process of that assimilation in terms of the ideology and interests of the particular supporters of the apocalyptic elements in full-bore nazism are described in considerable detail in Schweitzer's book on Big Business in the Third Reich. He elaborates what he calls "middle class coalitions", which had considerable discussion about co-operative forms, etc. In its sort of factor indicated in talking about the coalitional character of populist movements.

It may well be the case that this coalitional character is purely aspirant in some cases. It was my impression from a number of things which Professor Venturi said in his book that insofar as there was a populist important individual area, its base was substantially small, in urban areas, some attack thereafter to make contact with other sorts of older movements in the rural areas -- an unsuccessful attempt, but the coalitional character is at least an aspiration tentatively there.

The coalitional character may be imposed on a situation.

That is, in doing this analysis we may 'impose' the coalitional character in the sense that we point to differentiated interests and quickens in the society under study. Both Worsley and Saul in their book and paper respectively raise this question of the consequences of differentiation. Obviously this is particularly important in talking about African populism.

One anticipates political consequences resulting from or contemporaneous with differentiation, if one says that post-independence even a relatively small degree of economic development will result in differentiation and as a consequence a coalitional base to the movement party. Whether or not this coalitional base receives formal institutionalisation and whether it leads to class polarisation or has some other structural consequence is an open question. The possibility that not only class polarisation, but also the presence of relatively permanent conflict groups may be avoided by whatever means raises another problem which Dr. Saul mentioned. What type of production would be necessitated by a society which was not stratified? Obviously African leaders, either at the level of rhetoric or in actual policy making are attempting to 'implement' such a state of affairs.

I suggest in my paper the distinction between "manipulative" and 'spontaneous' populism. It is one which came up in our discussion yesterday and again this morning. I drew attention to the possibility that one would have this element. I think that it would be possible, and obviously this will be our concern this afternoon, to construct a model in which one would have the necessary elements for saying in what sorts of situation one will get manipulative populism and in what sort of situation one can speak about spontaneous populism.

To go back to Dr. Saul's paper, as I have said initially he is fairly sceptical about the possibility of generalising about populism. But the point I am making, about the necessity to construct an analytical model first and then take it to particular situations is precisely the point which he quite rightly stressed in warning importantly made by Kilson. Saul remarks that Kilson has articulated a usage of the concept 'populism' which avoids at least some of the limitations which we have mentioned above -- i.e., the difficulty of overgeneralising about a particular movement and about making assumptions about the activity of particular individuals involved in a movement. Kilson implicitly... attempts to situate 'populists' as merely one element of broader movements and processes of change, not merely as a global characterisation of relatively more complex phenomena.

One accepts that this is necessary in relation to a particular movement. I think that probably we have somewhat put the cart before the horse. This has come out in the sort of tentative terminology which we have been inclined to use by speaking about a populistic element in nazism, McCarthyism, etc. We will probably not get very far towards our goal of producing some sort of analytically useful definition of populism if we approach it in this particular way.

Two other points which I would stress about the model would be the question of the importance of the internal-external split, which came again this morning in remarks made by Dr. Hannan about the demonstration-fascination effects. I used the term "direct" and "indirect"
in my paper and, again, the remarks that Professor Tomkins made yesterday are highly relevant to what I had in mind, particularly when he was speaking about the absence of direct confrontation between social groups.

One final point which I would make about approaching the study of populism from this angle would be that the idea that we throw out under the general heading of institutionalisation would somewhat help to meet the problems inherent in the many possible ways of reducing this to its most general terms. Professor Macfarlane, for instance, has made a point about the rapid changes which one can find in looking at any particular populist movement.

Obviously, to go back to the point about populism, if we look at Peronism at present or even in the early 1950s, it is manifestly not a populist movement but in the early stages it may be argued that it is. One constructed a model for analysing the institutionalisation of such movements. In the Peronist case, the urban wing becomes a more organized quasi-1-hour movement as I describe it. This would help one to deal with the problem of what we have called ideological chameleonism.

It was suggested that one might study populism by looking at the context in which particular ideas emerge, but if one looks at the ideas one has the problem that some of the movements which we have discussed under the heading of populism take over and make use of a particular configuration of ideas which are already around. So that what one wants to look at is the relation of these ideas to the position of particular groups.

In an early phase of populism, one may get a particular group supporting the populist movement and at a later stage not supporting it, according to its changing social position.

MR. KENNEDY MINORIE: Let me make two rejections. One of them was pointed out by Mr. Shillinglaw. I made a remark about populism being an argument by people whose profoundest impulse is to industrialise. I was thinking at the time primarily of the American populists. Since a strong disposition has existed at this conference to unfrock the American populists as a collection of impostors, my generalisation is based on what is common to be, by the drift of our discussion, a peripheral example.

I think my remark is broadly true of a lot of African populists, and it is one of the impulses which underlies populist; but it has also emerged fairly clearly from the conference, that there is a perfectly genuine attachment to the village and rural life which industrialisation threatens.

The other rejection which I should make was pointed out to me by Professor Schapiro. I thought, for example, in the paper that Russian populism diminished and went into a decline after about 1890 or 1900, I am sure that he is perfectly right in denying this. My mistake is an example of the worst vice which an own make in history; that is to ignore the facts; the fact that it was a lost cause should not mean that one merely pushes it to one side.

I now want to move on, keeping as my motto: Bacon's remark that truth comes more easily from error than confusion. I want to put forward a number of schemas. I have been reminded as I listened to the attempts to define populism of the common case of complex living happily in sin for many years, who decide to get married - and live miserably ever after. Definition is like marriage in this respect. Populism is clearly something which can be loosely be used with a certain amount of meaning. If we marry these components together into a definition, we may well get something which will explode. It is a situation, as it were, of six intimations looking for a character.

We might ask in the first place: why do we want a definition of populism? If we are thinking historically, we do not need a definition. Any designation will do. The historian has his particular concrete material and he can use abstract terms simply at will.

If we were doing philosophy, we might start off, I suppose, from any point, but we would easily transform such a view in such a way that we would not be bothered by many of the complexity which we have discussed in the last two days. What we are left with is the enterprise of constructing a political science. We want a general theory of populism such that it ties together a number of things and says that these things are always found together and constitute this particular phenomenon. The definition has, as it were, a necessary connection simply by stipulation. At this point we need not worry about how much these things are found in reality.

What would we like to use the definition for is to be able to mount arguments or any formal! For example, populism has the characteristic XI; this thing is a populism; therefore, this has the characteristic II. Or populism is II; this is an X; is this also in all respects populism? We want to get a definition which would be sufficient to perform operations of that kind with it.

My next point is that populism is a self-characterisation. A good rule, I suppose, in both life and in political science is that one should distrust self-characterisation, because the way people and ideologies describe themselves is designed not to illuminate for academics but to get support and approval from others. Hence the populist emphasis on "people" presents the nicest, the best and the most support-gathering aspect of populism; it is something we should regard with a good deal of suspicion.

Throughout all our discussions we have found populism justling cheek by jowl with a number of other things on exactly the same level of abstraction - for example, anarchism, fascism, socialism, Marxism. All are ideologies. Therefore, it seems to me that the best tactic is at least briefly, to move up one level and to discuss ideologies generally. To do this, we need something to contrast them with. We need to find an area which is clearly non-ideological.

At this level of abstraction, two things seem to me to be worth contrasting with ideology. One of them has emerged in our discussions and the other has not. The first is tradition, because we are commonly dealing with situations where people have previously been ruled traditionally - that is, by sheikhs, by sultans, by tribal chiefs, and so on; and after a while they have become "modernised" and acquired themselves ideologies. Tradition is one entire style of politics. In the social sciences it appears as a comic
If we wish to adopt a philosophical transformation of these various ideologies, I would suggest that these transforming agents constitute the differentia by which one would attempt to bring some sort of order into the general field of ideologies.

The generic unity of ideology is further made plausible if we remember that any ideologist will trespass, plagiarise and steal bits of clothing from a fellow ideologist. Indeed, there is almost always a kind which could be called a kind of ideology kit - a set of devices, a set of images and particularly a set of emotions to which it is easy to appeal.

The actual technique or art of constructing an ideology is perfectly simple. We would all have in this room a perfectly capable of constructing an ideology for pixies, gnomes, Martians or any other class of people who are not adequately catered for in this field - and indeed, sometimes do - I trust involuntarily in our academic work.

I think it was Professor Worsley who characterised populism as a mass movement, marked by radical protest. These things are, I think, general characteristics of ideology. Because they are true of ideology, they are also true of populism, but they are not sufficiently tied into populism as a specific form of ideologies.

So the problem is to work out what specifically attaches to the concept of the people as the transforming agent of an ideological situation. In as far as we can find certain particular tricks of the populist trade, we could then in principle move on. I suppose, to find some connection between these tricks and political reality, between the actual political movement and its ideology.

I should make one important qualification: the way I have presented ideological politics makes it look like a transitional phase. It looks as if I am suggesting that first comes tradition, it breaks down, there is a ferocious ideological stage of politics and eventually people end up with what we have, which is political security, democratic, beyond ideology and so on. It is a simple picture of political development, but I do not for one moment think that it is true. Obviously ideologies erupt into all modern societies, turning up unpredictably.

All I want to do now is to suggest one abstract schema which occurred to me in the course of all this and which might be of use. This concerns the question of equality. It seems to me that when tradition breaks down, people begin to acquire certain notions of what this new world in all about and particularly the notion of equality, something which they did not have before. Having thought in these terms before, they are taught about Rousseau etc. from missionaries they learn that all people are to be equal before God and from schoolteachers that everyone is equal before the law. So that the question of equality becomes something to which, as a psychological matter of fact, people become sensitive.

Society thereafter appears as a structure of privileged. There are the superior in any respect, wealth, prestige and, perhaps most of all, education; and these are the inferior, the poor, those who have bad jobs, and so on. Inequalities in modern societies present people with the psychological problem of how to adjust to them. They are felt to be painful, not perhaps by everybody, but at least on some occasions the inequalities worry everybody.
It is obvious that many who are low down, who are less equal than others, will feel resentful at the system and be unhappy with the situation. But what is equally true is that those who are superior, the rich and the well educated, also suffer from some sort of feeling that equality is the norm and inequality is something wrong. The most familiar recognition of this fact appeared in the attacks upon bourgeois socialists as being people who simply suffer from a guilty conscience. But we need not worry about the motives which lead people to feel this way. The feeling of unease which afflicts the superior may well involve other motives than guilt; for example, the desire to impose a static perfection upon reality. Some may be dissatisfied with the flux of things and decide that it is inequality which causes the flux. In such a situation it is the educated elite who seek to abolish the very basis of their own superiority. Clearly this is a chapter of Hobbes which needs to be rethought.

What I suggest as a result of this abstract schema is that populism happens when the superior and the inferior come together in an attack upon the inequalities of the society in an early stage of the breakdown of tradition. Very commonly it is the superior who makes the first move; they may have to drum up discontent with inferiority before the movement can get under way. I have the feeling that some situation of this kind tended to happen in Russia. Indeed, in a sense, all ideologies are made up by the superior on behalf of the inferior. But this seems to me to be particularly true of populism.

Finally, I would suggest that so far as we want to generalise populism, we need to describe stages of growth. It could not be simply a definition. It would have to be a process.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I am very pleased with that final contribution.

(Adjourned for lunch)
I think that a Jacquesian, that sort of revolt, can come from below. But revolutions come from a much more complicated interplay of segments within a society and they involve, among other things, quite certain expectations of the intellectuals on a scale which has not been taken place in Africa. This means that intellectuals had an importance in the society which on the whole - allowing for one or two possible small exceptions - they don’t.

African nationalism is a different matter. Nationalism coloured by populism in Africa are to be taken seriously. Certainly, African populism and revolution in South Africa, I think, on the whole no. This, however, is said so briefly and it is, perhaps, a little off the field that I stop there rather than to elaborate it.

MR. MULANZU: I should like to make three brief comments in relation to what other speakers have said. First, I would like to have taken up John Saul’s remarks on Maoism. I take very well his point, if I understood him correctly, that populism should perhaps be considered in relation to emergence of class differentiation. One difficulty here is that the basic work on class differentiation after 1949/1950 has not yet been done and it is impossible to speculate about China as we can perhaps talk about Africa.

The second point concerns the distinction which Mr. de Kadt drew in relation to authentic identification, when he argued that one sort of populism - the protest or marginal populism - was one where the masses should participate fully, and he suggested the idea of self-help as being one of the characteristics of this. This element, if we want to treat this as populism, is very much present in policies pursued at least by the Chinese leadership. In fact, you get a rather paradoxical situation where perhaps you could say that the party as a whole is manipulative but that at the level of the co-operative - and here I speak up to perhaps 1955 or 1956 - very much stress was laid on genuine participation, genuine self-help, and the fact that the peasants themselves should make decisions in accordance with their own needs. Again, however, a lot more work needs to be done on this.

The third point which I wanted to make briefly concerned the list of attributes which Mr. Hompesy gave of Czautism, which I found very interesting. If you want to describe or characterise populism in such wide terms, there is a lot in the list which he gave which could be applied to Hompesy: for example, the role of youth. At the present moment in China, it is interesting to observe that Mao has, if one could call it, a rather young face. There is sense of some recent events, bypassed the middle generation and tried to draw on what he has called the successors to the revolution. This problem of successors to the revolution, of the role of youth in the revolution, is a continuing preoccupation with Mao.

Secondly, the strongly ruralist element which Hompesy mentioned, is, of course, very present in Maoism and the myth of Yenan and Mao’s "gurilla style" of approach to social change has been one source of criticism made by other party leaders. This certainly is a very on-going myth in China and has contributed, for example, to the position that the army has occupied the relationship between army and party and army and people.
Thirdly, Mr. Hennessy suggested that Castro thinks in terms of moral incentive as opposed to material incentives. Again, yes, if one wants to give this as a characteristic of populism, I certainly agree that it is a vital element of Maoism. Mao's whole emphasis on struggle is completely opposed to materialistic incentives. The central idea of the self-criticism so extensively practised in China is that, through the "change of thinking" produced by it, the masses can be brought to discard the Party's goals. Thus moral regeneration obviates the need for material inducement.

Again, Mr. Hennessy mentioned the role of women and suggested that the emancipation of women was almost built into Castroism. I do not know whether I would go so far as to suggest that this is built into Maoism, but at least it is one of the continuing concerns of Mao and we know that this attitude to women has influenced Mao himself very deeply.

Next, the relationship between Castroism and Nationalism. Mr. Hennessy suggested that the cultural vacuum in Cuba necessitated an anti-Americanism. I think again that one could make the same sort of remark about China, that there was a need to create an insular situation in China so that the new body politic develop its own roots.

Finally, I think that perhaps the most important point in this listing of characteristics was when Mr. Hennessy mentioned Castro's extreme reluctance to institutionalize the revolution. Yes, certainly, I think that we would want to say that also is characteristic of Mao. You might want to liken this with his anti-bureaucracy as one of the dominant elements of the Maoist vision of what sort of society should evolve from the body politic. But I think that the paradox in China may be that paradox in China would certainly not describe China itself as in any way a populist regime - that is, a regime which went side by side with this gave such a terrific emphasis on organisation, which seems to me to run completely counter to what I at least understand about populism.

PROF. G.P. MANCINI: I have been fascinated by the remarks made by Professor Schapiro. That evening, obviously, a narrow interpretation of his words would remove from the area of populism as we have tried to define it here a number of movements which stress the role of leadership in terms of various ideologies (and I suggest Professor Schapiro has used the latter word, perhaps unwittingly, in his classic Marxist meaning, that is essentially as "mystifications").

But I am not certain Professor Schapiro's view can be completely accepted. To be sure, the religion of the people is a fundamental feature of populism. But the deciding factor is, in my view, not the presence of a charismatic leader, no matter how great. Instead, it is the process of organisation. The revolution of the masses is the key to the success of populism.

Yesterday, I tried to describe the passion for the people living off agriculture which dominated the mind of Italian Communists during the 1950s. Of this passion I could give you one more example. In 1953 the Communist Party discovered what it itself christened "culture content", i.e. peasants' culture, imposing it on a bewildered but rapidly awakening, but also culturally quite receptive peasantry. In 1957, 70% of the Italian intellectuals who wanted to be in on the game got interested in the Tuscan religion in particular; they rediscovered the "integral man", the undivided soul in the Southern farmer or shepherd; they made a best-seller of a book by a self-styled peasant poet, Rocco Scolari; a little book about his people of Basilicata (the Italian deep South) with the improbable title "L'uomo poverello", which could be translated as "The little trollopy's grapes". I may assure you that today we all are slightly ashamed of not having feared to tread where angels do.

Of course, as I have pointed out, Professor Schapiro has most certainly a point. The respect for or the worship of the people, the refusal to politically rape the people are obviously essential ingredients of populism. It seems to me, however, that the religion of the people may take various forms. In certain historical situations, for instance when a populist element is grafted on a movement which has undergone or is critically undergoing the experience of Leninism, it may simply consist in a reluctance to bring exceeding pressure to bear on the people or in fostering greater participation by the people.

As an example, the Communist leaders in Italy and Fidel in Cuba, particularly in his famous "Playboy" interview - by the way, I wish somebody would explain to me why he called his interview "Playboy" to expand his views to Western readers - have both reacted to the charge that they manipulate the people by pointing out that through their organisations huge masses which previously vegetated in a state of utter apathy have come in contact with the realities of their existence in society. In other words, the P.C.I. and Castro have made a tremendous and active political participation possible where there was none.

I am of course quite aware of the limits inherent in this argument. Clearly enough, the political education of the masses by the Italian Communist Party has been allowed only up to a certain point the point where the masses begin asking questions involving the principles and substance of the party in other words, the party must, in the critical analysis of the masses, prompted by the party, turn from the outside (the Italian society as viewed through the screen of the P.C.I.) to the inside (the P.C.I. itself, perhaps already perceived by the very masses as a distorting screen). Nevertheless, in the Communist education there is something very real, something that could hardly be denied. But it not been for the Italian Communist Party the rural Castro and the rural South would probably still be described, as they cynically were by conservative pre-fascist politicians, as "preservers of wisdom", because they sent to parliament right-wing deputies who could in turn be manipulated by national conservatives such as Giolitti. I am inclined to believe that the same holds true as regards Cuba and I wonder whether Mr. Hennessy agrees with me on this very important point.

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PROF. SCHELPI: I would only observe that whether you call it
Cuttillius or personalism or something of that kind, the essential
difference, if you take the original model of Russian populism, is
that in the one case you have a leader on whom the whole thing hinges,
on whom the whole thing was built up; he does not regard it as his duty
to become, as it were, a vessel for the wisdom of the people. He is
giving his own imprint to the movement. That is totally alien, as I
understand it, to what these latter-day populists of 1917 when confronted
with an actual political problem regarded as their duty.

THE GILMOUR: Now we must address ourselves to the biting of the
people, a difficult part of our proceedings, which is the attempt to
formulate some kind of model or definition or formula into which we can
fit all the various types and nuances of populism which have been
discussed; or, if we think that we cannot do it, to give reasons for
our failure to do so, which might be equally fruitful. Perhaps we might
decide upon one or two models, or three or four models. At the moment,
I should like to conceal my own opinion about either the desirability or
possibility of this, which I hope to be able to formulate later.

Until 4:45, we had better simply have general discussion of the
subject started off by Mr. Ionescu, who will make a report on the lines
on which we should proceed. After that, people can speak for a maximum
of four or five minutes each, but with a right of speaking more than once.

MR. IONESCU: I am still not sure, at the end of the conference,
whether a definition will emerge from it. As the rapporteur I think that
a definition is not essential. The discussion, like the play, has been
the thing. And in any case, provided an agreement can be broadly reached
on what seems to me to have been the six issues most debated by the
conference, a broad and preferably short definition could still be
proposed by someone.

One controversial issue is whether populism is primarily an
ideology (or ideological), or a movement (or movements). Personally
from what I have heard during these forty-eight hours I think that the
majority are inclined to lean towards the ideological aspect.

But some of the speakers seem to have meant by this, and that is a
second issue, that populism is a sort of recurring mentality, appearing
in different historical and geographic contexts as the result of a special
social situation, for instance the situation of change faced by a society
in which, as Professor Tournel has described it, the middle-class factors
are either missing or too weak.

Thirdly, in this mentality what I would describe as the element of
political passion, more acute in populism than in any other
political psychologies. The political psychology of populism is imbued
with the feeling that identifiable or unidentifiable conspiracies are at
element, deliberately and consciously, against the people. The basic
attitude is one of defiance against the unseen outside forces.

As such populism is characterised by a peculiar animosity. Many
speakers have stressed that it was anti-capitalist, anti-urban, as well as
xenophobic and very often anti-Semitic. It carries with it great
deges of blind hatred.

In contrast, and this is the fifth point, it seems to me that one
of the large areas of agreement of the conference is the fact that
populism worships the people. But which 'people'? Surely not the proud
democracy of the Greeks or anything like the Herrenvolk. The people the
populists worship are the meek and the miserable, and the populists
worship them because they are miserable and because they are persecuted
by the conspirators. The fact that they are more often than not
embodied in the peasantry is because the peasants were and are, in any
underdeveloped societies, the most miserable of the lot - and the more
miserable they are the more worshipped they should be.

Finally this recurring mentality disappears usually by
absorption into stronger ideologies or movements. But here I disagree
with those who think it could lead only to, or is merely a phase of,
socialism. There are three possibilities. In some cases it could lead
to socialism. In others it leads to nationalism, and, as for instance
in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the century, it leads to populism.
This third possibility should not be overlooked.

THE GILMOUR: That gives us ground for discussion. What I propose as
a method of discussion is that people should speak freely now - a "free
for all", I think, is the term from a populist slogan - until 4:45, and
after adjournment we will try to generate something. The meeting is now
open for discussion.

MR. W. KENTON: I would suggest an approach to the question of
definition that is more cautious and more careful than that
proposed by Mr. Ionescu. Perhaps we might get a clue from Wittgenstein's
later theory of meaning, according to which it is not so much a matter of
looking for a common denominator or hard core of meaning, but looking for
essences or essences. We all know how things seem to fall into families:
Alfred resembling John and John resembling Angie, but all three having
nothing in common.

It is in these essences or essences of the family, different essences in each of them, which we find when we
look at the different forms of populism which have been expounded to us
at this conference, in the papers and in the discussion. We could not
surmise if we do not find anything which all these different populisms
have in common, but should rather give up the hope of finding such a
common denominator, and then might be more conscious of the differences
and the essences between the alleged members of the family and by
that means we might achieve something in the way of a definition. That
is, not by doing too much, we might do more.

I think as a matter of fact, however loose the membership of the
family may be, it is extremely useful to have this word "populism", especially in looking at countries like those in Africa because if one
goes to Africa, thinking in terms of democracy one is apt to come away
very disillusioned and disappointed. If, however, you go fortified with
the language of populism, you might come back home more stimulated although
perhaps no happier.
I disagree both with his theory of stages of political consciousness in terms of tradition, ideology and democracy and I also disagree - and here I may be in a minority - with his idea, which has been expressed by other people, of being able properly to distinguish stages within populism. I think that populists, once they have undergone certain kinds of experience, stop being populist although they may continue to export populist elements in their ideology. What I am saying is that routinisation, institutionalisation and power are death to populism. Although populist elements may survive, I think that is all that we can say.

I would like to say a little about ideology which is relevant to what Mr. Ionescu has said. My own view is that humanity, perhaps regretfully, has a very limited repertoire of elementary ideas, many of which are extremely old, archaic and primitive. I sometimes go so far as to think that someone who has read Homer and Herodotus and selected books of the Old Testament, St. Paul and one or two other things, probably knows nine-tenths of the repertoire of ideas that are combined and recombined in ideology. I mean that seriously and not as a joke.

I believe both that the number of ideas of themes or items that combine and recombine is limited, and that these recombinations are not combinations of great logical consistency although they of course have their consistencies internal to the ideology and also in terms of external circumstances.

Occasionally new ideas are added, and they are usually added by people who are in some sense intellectuals, philosophers, prophets, social scientists and politicians of a less sophisticated type. They are transformed, superimposed upon, enhanced, the new elements become slippery once they are detached from their sources, and can be recombined in very different ways.

In a sense, I am suggesting that ideologies can be conceived as being like a balloon with dancers walking in the wings and reappearing in different costumes but in perpetual movement.

Some ideologies are morally theories, but very often theories are the rationalisations of the educated and those aspiring to education. Theory is not a necessary charter for ideology. Mr. de Kadt made a distinction between the history of ideas and ideology. I do not think that this distinction works, and this is one of the reasons why I support what Mr. Ionescu has said. I believe, in fact, that we are inevitably bound up with the histories of ideas, because ideas have sources; the limited number of ideas available have sources of the kinds which I have suggested.

There are many things that I would like to have said. I would like to make a point about something which Professor Venturi said yesterday which is relevant. Professor Venturi made a point, with which I am sure I agree, about the comparative unimportance of following (P) in populism as a movement in Russia. I agree about that in one sense. Looking at it as a historian, I would think that undoubtedly he is right, but Kisselovsky and people of that sort make overt much that is implicit in a situation, and he has this kind of importance. It is not the importance of direct influence.

Secondly, his articulation of these matters as part of the intellectual tradition of all other societies which we have been discussing is helpful to us in our thinking. Although he is absolutely
correct on the historical point, somehow Mikhailovsky seems to me to be of importance, and so do the intellectuals and artist-toros, even if they are crack-brained, seen to us to be helpful.

I would have liked to go on to say what I think are the major elements in rather more detail than Mr. Ionescu did, but I have exhausted my time.

DR. RAUL: I am rather uneasy about this concentration upon ideologies. It is something which some of us may feel is not legitimate. One of the things which has been raised very clearly in the way in which these ideologies can be used. It is clear that in some movements there are people who really identify with the people and there are people who manipulate these ideas. If we concentrate upon the ideas of the ideology or whatever it is called to the exclusion of situating these ideas both in terms of the changing society and in terms of the political movements with which they are related, we will find ourselves not talking about a lot of the things that we would want to talk about when we talk about populism.

It seems to me that this is an important dimension that may be dropped out and it will become the history of ideas without any situating in this way and without any ability to assess what they mean in social terms and how manipulative or non-manipulative they are.

PROF. ROGER SEIDMAN: It seems to me that Mr. Ionescu's scheme is a good one to work on but the essence of the ideology which are the populist mentality and the populist ideology? We must assume when we try and work it out that it is a genuinely held ideology. Manipulation by others obviously is another dimension. One should keep it distinct.

For our starting point, we might consider the content of populist ideology. What is a picture of what a populist ideology or mentality is we can then, now or later in life or in our later time, ask ourselves whether and to what extent this element is present in a given movement or, secondly, to what extent a given movement is wholly populist in character. But it is not so important to label movements as it is to be clear in our minds what the phenomenon is.

I want to clear away a little dead wood. There are a number of points which are not essential to the content of this ideology and which we can, therefore, eliminate now. One point which has been mentioned a good deal this morning is the appeal to a movement to which I would call the new urban poor — that is, the people who have come in from the countryside into industrialising areas, the unskilled working class, the unskilled manual workers in the urban agglomeration, as distinct from the established, efficient, disciplined working class.

In Eastern Europe some decades ago an obvious example was the contrast between the printing workers, who were permanent, well-organised workers, children of workers with a social democratic consciousness, and the other hired miscellaneous unskilled workers. The fact that populist movements in various societies at one time or another have appealed to these uprooted first-generation urban poor who do not yet deserve to be called working class...
However, there is a further differentiation to be made because it is possible, and it was indeed true, that some of these social elites, harboring on a populist programme, self-sacrifice for the people, serving the people, and so on, decided that the best way to operate was to have an elitist hierarchical conspiratorial organization. After all, the Narodnym Volja was nothing if not elitist in that sense, but it regarded the elite as an instrument, not as an aim. The question to what extent this problem is specific to populism is on which I am not clear.

I think that the distinction between an elite playing a role and an elite with elitist aims is significant. The distinction between an elite using elitist methods and an elite having an elitist society as its objective is important. The fascist portion, of course, aimed at an elitist hierarchical society. To then the elite was the end as well as the means.

I said yesterday that the Romanian Iron Guard, which was a Fascist movement, was not a populist movement but had a strong populist element in it. Undoubtedly it was elitist not only in its procedure, not only in the original of its leadership, which was produced by the development of the modern intelligentsia of Roumania, not only in its procedure which was conspiratorial, but even in its aim, which was a hierarchical society. Communists, on the other hand, and the Bolsheviks - if we take Lenin's original ideas - did not aim at an elitist society, although it worked out that way. Populists have in some cases been completely oblivious to the need for hierarchy, having been unrealistic and passive like what Professor Schopen said this morning about Kerensky. This has been their weakness. Other populists were elitist in method, but no populists were elitist in aim.

DR. FERDINAND C. CALVARY: Going on from what Professor Seton-Watson has said, this I hope will try to take another area out of the discussion. We are in essence dealing with two peculiar historical movements as the origin of the concept with which we are trying to deal, and we must not outside the bounds of discussion the question of whether or not American populism is populism or even, for that matter, whether Russian populism is populism. We are stuck with two specific historical equivalents and from these we must try to derive the general concept if we wish to use it for anything else. Any other method will be confusing.

Having gone on from that, it seems to me that very much the only thing which these two concepts have in common is not an ideological content, although there are ideological derivations which are important, but the fact of being a political movement, of being a response of a particular sort of circumstances.

While I would not go along with the view of those being a response to capitalism as such, I would like to advance the thought that they are a rural reaction to a centre of economic power, whatever the nature of that centre of economic power might be. It is a specific syndrome, a specific form of response to a suddenly perceived danger from without.

DR. KERENSKY: I apologise for the fact that I have not been at the first three meetings. Contrary to the last contributions, which tried to eliminate the point made by Mr. Ionescu, it seems to me that one point in the seven of the reconciliation which have been listed has been missed, and that is the question of leadership. It seems to me to be true that the intellectual leaders were as much as the transistor radio, as one of the papers said. One could, of course, say that other ideologies and movements were also led by bourgeois intellectuals rather than by representatives of movements who were trying to represent or for whom they tried to formulate an ideology, but I think that this is where the difference lies between populism and Marxism which Mr. Ionescu mentions.

In the peasant parties one found men who were actually peasants or former peasants. The intellectuals who conceived the idea of populism were invariably urban intellectuals. One could, of course, say that that applied to Marxism, too, but in the application of Marxism, both in the trade union and in the Socialist movements, there were representatives of the working class in leadership positions. This is where we should make a distinction between populist and peasant parties and try to apply the ideology.

Although I am an economist, I am inclined to think that it is right to stick to the ideology and not to dwell on the economic context of populism, otherwise we may find ourselves in a position where we argue what populist elements are in the National Farmers' Unions of the various countries, and that would be throwing the not a little too wide.

I do, however, think that economic aspects come in, perhaps not into this meeting or into this discussion, but they come in when one considers the question of whether populism could be overcome or replaced, particularly in the so-called third world, which is of course not one world but many different worlds.

When one asks oneself the question "Can populism be replaced or overcome in these territories", I am inclined to think that this reference to hostility towards the experience of risk or risk-taking is an important aspect which has economic undertones. Probably the only way to eliminate the influence of the populist ideology would be to speed up the process of risk-taking. But I will not say more because this may not be relevant in the session where we are concerned with definition.

PROF. TARRADE: I am quite in agreement with what Dr. Saul has said because it seems to me that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to create a general descriptive notion of populism. It is a characteristic feature of populist movements that they are in great part a movement of ideas that means movement laying with a certain intellectual and cultural tradition in such a way that the difference from, say, Marxism is that it does not appeal directly to an economic analysis of the situation. It is much more voluntaristic. It is much more concentrated on aims and objectives. It is normal, therefore, that there is a great diversity. Each movement has a particular ethos and the counterpart of that is that I do not think that it is possible to generalize and to isolate some common elements.
Secondly, I suppose that my impression is that it is equally impossible to define populism by a social basis. To speak of marginal people or marginal categories is certainly insufficient to speak about anomic as well, because that does not explain the formation of a movement. I suppose that it is quite insufficient, and it would be even false, to define the social root or social basis of a populist movement by a situation of a certain category in a process of social mobility. If people are just defunct, going upwards, that can explain the formation of a movement directed towards social integration, or if the people are a disorganized category that can explain a type of fascist movement or a short-term effort to retain some social status. The consequence of these two impossibilities seems to me to be that it is necessary to come back to an analysis of the situation.

I do not think that it is possible to define a general concept, not a descriptive notion, but a concept of populism, if not as a direct expression of a situation. I mean by that not some specific aspect, but a constellation of elements, because populism is always a political movement. By that I mean that problems of power are directly dealt with in some sense or another. At the same time, it is not an organized aiming at directly transforming the power situation.

I hope later to have an opportunity to try to define in a relatively precise way which kind of situation corresponds to a populist movement. I simply want to make clear now that I am impressed by the rise of questions raised by Mr. Ionescu, but I do not think that any of these features could be applied to all movements. It is necessary to use a relatively different method of concentrating on a study from an analytical point of view.

After all, if we were here to discuss socialism and what socialism is, I suppose that we would spend our first hour speaking about capitalism and processes of industrialization and then to understand socialism as a social response to an economic situation. The problem is, which kind of economic, institutional and political situation is at the root of the populist movements.

PROF. VENTURI: I was impressed by what Professor Seton-Watson said. It makes me think once more of a point about which I spoke yesterday. Of course, the problem of those uprooted peasants who come to the town is very important. I agree that that does not make the natural normal basis of a populist movement.

The proof can be given also in Italy. After all, the populist side of the history of the Communist Italian Party after the war was before the uprooting of the peasants of the south coming, for example, to my own town of Turin. Half of my town now is composed of peasants from the south and no populist movement is emerging. It is, therefore, true, that it is not a movement of the people, Communist, Socialist and so on, but not specifically and not always populist.

But the history of Russia makes one think that in one case this thing is possible. The peasants do not only bring to Turin from their own institutions of political organization, but the peasants who came from Aligores had something to bring to Moscow. That was imported to the textile industry in Moscow, Petersburg and so on. That was populism.

The difference is not only because they are peasants and they are uprooted, but because they have political organizations and ideas. The great difference in the history of the populist workers' movement and the Marxist populist workers' movement in Russia was exactly that. Afterwards, the greatest weapon was strike, and the tool was the organization inside the workers' movement industry. That was very important, as everybody knows, in the history of Russia, not only in the workers' movement, but generally. That is a populist idea in that it comes directly from the institution of the villages and the great tradition out of the village.

Secondly, a point from the problem of methodology. I agree, that is a great problem. For every student of history and ideas, what has been said is very important and true. I still think that as far as the historical point of view is concerned, the most important thing is the ideas. I do not believe in theology. I do not believe in religion. I am afraid, but I believe that religion is very important concerning historical problems - but not theology, or less theology. Therefore Mikhailov's theology of the workers' movement is not the man creating an ideology.

I was very much impressed about Professor Schapiro's problem of the context. I feel that this is the great problem. The difference among populist movements and others are very often this: "What is my duty in the face of the people?" Russian history teaches us that, and it is very important. I am afraid that very often it is true - I do not say always, but from a nineteenth century point of view.

Nineteenth century revolutionaries, with exceptions, thought that their duty was to take power and, if possible, to kill; in any case, to eliminate everybody who did not think as they did. That is a very twentieth century idea. But eighteenth and nineteenth century people did not even do that, even in the French revolution. Even Robespierre probably was not so sure that that was his duty. He did it in a way, but I take it that it was not his own ideology.

In the nineteenth century ideology, a revolution is specially and fundamentally a negative idea. It is to remove all the obstacles, everything that is impossible, to enable the people to govern themselves. That is the idea.

I was always extremely interested by my great master Salveni, who stopped the history of the French revolution in 1792. I always wondered why, from a nineteenth century point of view, it was right. Monarchy was destroyed, the people were freed, and that was the real revolution, probably after something bad had happened. He was interested from a historical point of view, but as far as one was the revolution, which Salveni was - the idea that after the king was killed and all the obstacles of feudalism were removed, in the end the masses could govern themselves - a revolution was there. I am afraid that we have improved too much in the twentieth century to understand this point of view of populism.
First, which leads product leadership themselves. Touraine
ways nationalism, the must therefore, any ideas roots of it. On
in the bridge Russian populism and populism in the countries of
the third world. I shall deduce from this second point two other points.

The third point, which is bound up with the second, is that because populism emerges in backward countries in confrontation with developed capitalistic states, the intelligentsia play a very large role in the leadership of the movement and in the formulation of its main ideas. The reason is obvious. The intelligentsia in backward countries is simply a product of the character of this confrontation with the developed countries. Hence also the worship of the people, because the intellectuals, the members of the intelligentsia, being the product of Westernisation, feel themselves alienated and put forward the idea of returning to the people who have roots in the soil.

Fourthly, the last feature, which is also bound up with this same confrontation with the developed capitalistic states, is the possibility of identifying capitalism with something which comes from outside and therefore, of course, the possibility of combining populist ideas with nationalism, with xenophobia, and so on.

In the last analysis I agree with Mr. Ionascu that there are three ways out of populism modern socialism, populism and nationalism. This outline is very similar to what I tried to say earlier in my paper. But perhaps it is clearer.

Mr. Hall: I do not want to comment directly on what Dr. Walicki has just said, but a little later one will come down more specifically to those questions of definition. Perhaps, however, what I will say will show that I disagree fundamentally with what he has said.

On the question of methodology, I agree very much with what Professor Touraine has said. Dr. Calvert talked about taking the American and Russian examples as models, and Professor Panturri presented the very dangerous idea that one should look to nascent ideas. This, I think, is very important in what he has said before about prototypes. If we talk about prototypes of populism, we will get ourselves into very great difficulty.

Those of us who know something about seventeenth century England, which has been touched upon slightly, will believe, I think, that if we start talking about prototypes we will need two new weeks on historical questions of prototypes of populism. We have, therefore, to do away with the idea of thinking of Russian or American populism as prototypes and we must come back to the kind of analysis of existing and historical situations of which Professor Touraine has spoken.

Dr. Walicki qualified what he said just now by talking about modern populism, but to talk about populism in general, to introduce the word "capitalism" in any way that can be easily defined or socialism in any which can be easily defined, seems to me to be particularly wide of the mark. We have to look at some other kinds of populism which do not necessarily employ the words "capitalism" or "socialism" or, perhaps, even "nationalism". But perhaps I am swinging easy to the school which says that it cannot be defined.

Prof. Andreescu: I would like to make a few general methodological or philosophical remarks about the whole problem. First, it seems to me that underlying assumption of some of the pronouncements which we have heard is the idea that there is something to be revealed, something that is intrinsic to populism; which is in a naive realist approach to the nature of concepts. It is obvious that we can define those things in any way we like. We could agree tomorrow to call cats dogs and dogs cats, and if we agreed that would be fine.

To decide on a definition, we have first to decide whether we want to use populism as a proper name for a specific historical phenomenon or as a generic sociological category. If we opt for the latter we may define it in such a way as to exclude all the movements which have in the past labeled themselves as populist.

We then have to decide why we want to define it one way instead of another. Obviously, we want to have some order and some pigeon-holes which will enable us to classify the phenomena which we are studying in the most convenient way, and therefore one of the considerations which must be taken into account is which other words do we have which might serve our purpose? For instance, the phenomena described by Professor Schapiro could be called purist demagoguery, or populist demagoguery. Some of the other features mentioned in our discussions could be described by the term egalitarianism, which I have not heard dispute its usefulness. If we were to be guided by criteria of utility we must make a survey of the related terms so that we make the best use of the existing vocabulary, and therefore let us define populism in such a way that it will not be co-extensive with other available terms.

Dr. Calvert: I feel sure that Professor Andreescu is pulling our leg gently in suggesting that as a sociological term we could define populism is pulled out of context to exclude the only two authentic historical instances in which we are able to agree. This would admittedly be possible but I feel sure that we will not attempt to do that.

At the same time, it is important to notice that the fact that one must define it in such a way as to include these historical instances does not mean that one must be bound by them to the exclusion of all others or that one is in any way elevating two historical categories into the classification of proto-poses. We are not talking about prototypes. We are talking about a historical problem from which we want to borrow a name it use to cover certain situations. Therefore, we are confronted with a specific set of circumstances.
Therefore, I do not feel that I can go along with Mr. Hall's remarks about the English situation. It is perfectly true that one could find prototypes there, no doubt going back to the sixteenth century, but this would not be particularly useful and I hope that we will chop off the discussion on this topic at this point.

MR. HALL: My words were an attempt to prevent us from doing exactly that.

PROF. ANDREWS: May I say that I was not doing any legpulling? I believe that it is perfectly possible to define populism in such a way as to exclude both of those two concrete historical phenomena. On the other hand, if we want to have a generic term to cover both it would have to be a fairly wide concept because they differ markedly from each other. Both we would have to include almost all the other phenomena which have been mentioned during our discussions.

The contrast between American populism and Russian narodnitschestvo are striking. One is engineered by the intelligentsia, the other emerges from the class concerned. One is defending the existing (and unusually high) status of the farmers, while the other is striving towards improving the condition of the oppressed peasants. The one shows a close commitment to a very crystallized form of political organization, while the other is just vaguely wanting to help the people and to tell them what to do.

One could probably find a number of other features which are highly divergent. For this reason, I suggest that if we have a definition which includes both, it will have to be a very general one, something like, "any movement which strives towards defense or the protection of interests of rural population", or something of that sort. If you narrow it down, you exclude one or the other.

DR. MCCABE: The thing which we are most concerned to do is to make the manageable, but I do not think that it will be manageable if we think in terms of constructing a new model or an ideal form of populism. We are more likely to get somewhere in following Professor Walton's idea of first saying those things which are not essential to populism. I would add to this that it need not be rural.

Secondly, because populism of its nature seems to be very much an "against" thing, we might say that there are certain fairly generalized aspects which populist movements are against. Professor Walton's thesis mentioned that they are anti-clerical. This needs strongly to be stressed because it delimits this sort of movement from other sorts of movements.

There are one or two other things which we might possibly add to this. It seems to me to be anti-specialisation; it is anti-rootslessness, the idea of being drift in the community; and perhaps more specifically, it is anti the existing current method of carrying on politics, either because the existing methods and instruments are inadequate to secure their objectives or because there just are not any instruments available to this particular group. I think that if we are rather more humble and try to see the things which are not essential to it, on the one hand, and see the things which it is definitely against, we may get a greater region of agreement.

On top of that, I do not think that we can talk of an ideology of populism. What we will have are certain common features which, I think, will be of a negative character. But on top of that there will be the specific things which the movement is against or is striving for. It needs emphasizing that as far as people coming into the movement are concerned, it will be the things which is specific which attracts them; its being directed against these business men, these Jews, or whatever it is. This distinctive feature of a populist movement cannot be brought into any general definition just because the movement may be directed against any one of a whole range of bodies.

It may be that in the future we shall see populist movements which are directed against the trade unions coming from those who feel unprotected and in some sense suffering from the activities of trade unions. We cannot, obviously, rule out the possibility of anti-trade unions or an anti-communist party in Russia there might be a basis of a populist movement if it could only get off the ground. We have got to aim rather lower in our sights if we are to make any move forward.

DR. KEE: I endorse Dr. Walick's working definition of populism, subject to two minor amendments: one to the preliminary clause to add that populism is a specific historical phenomenon, the only authentic version of which occurred in a particular country at a given time, namely, Russia between 1848 and 1875, which found emulators elsewhere in situations of rough equivalence, some of which took over features from Russia and some of which did not; and then to add the fourth point, yet a fifth to say that it is a secularised religion with a strong moral note based on a perversion of Russian orthodoxy influenced by European romanticism and such to impractical to be considered an ideology. That is my definition of populism.

PROF. ANDREWS: If Dr. Kee takes that standpoint, why would he insist on giving his pupils or his friends a name which has been invented by the Americans, whereas the Russians call themselves Narodniki? Why does he not call them Narodniki?

DR. KEE: I would add a footnote to say that there is no historical connection between Russian and American populism.
I would accept that, and I think that we can specify it a bit more — I do not know whether it is acceptable to you — in terms of one particular “becoming” process: the reaction to industrial challenge to an agrarian order which has been so widely talked about or, in a more modern derivation of it, the “development” problem.

I would say that we want to specify and locate populism in this temporally process, and secondly, to locate it in terms of its sociological niche in so far concepts of participation: and I have argued here from Professor Seton-Watson — I think that the peasant marginal niche is the relevant one: either amongst the peasants in the villages, or amongst the recent migrants from the villages, or in the minds of those people who think about that.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: It is true, but it is not specific.

PROF. WORSLEY: No, it is not specific, but that is where you find it.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: We agree on that: it is not specific to populism.

PROF. WORSLEY: We agree, but you do not find it anywhere else.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: Yes, you do.

PROF. WORSLEY: All right: So much for the led.

The leaders are a great problem. Three of Dr. Wallisch’s four points might be acceptable, but we know that the intelligentsia-leadership phenomenon is not true of the North American movements; and that introduces a severe problem.

Thirdly, I think that there is a way of finding a diffuse formula which might trouble the varieties of North American populism through rural Russian forms to even modern Afro-Asian ones. The element of stress on the desirability of participation would cover this. It would include individualistic conceptions of participation in the running of your own lives, even in making money and speculating on the market and in land values. It would also cover co-operative and various communitarian forms of economic organization.

MR. IONESCU: And administrative.
I would like first to correct the impression which I have given Professor Worsley. I do not think that these things are timeless.

I have great sympathy with everyone of these suggestions which have been offered towards definition, with the exception of one for a quite clear reason what was said by Dr. Kep. Dr. Kep is in a most respectable position that goes beyond that of the Getttingen school of Rank and this is highly respectable, but there are many other purposes which non have them to work in that particular tradition, and I think that we can try and go beyond it. If we fall, very well. We are still left with what Dr. Kep has said; that is fine.

A working definition is not a history nor a sociology. For less is it a model or a declaration of a timeless truth. It is an attempt to get at a useful device. Some of the useful devices which have been suggested, combining elements which I have heard said, to mention none arbitrarily, by Professor Seton-Watson, Professor Andreiski, Dr. Volicki and others, could be bound together for this end.

But I still would like to go back to ideology as in a sense a defining point and go through some of the items, rather too many of them perhaps, which might be looked at here and which might help us to bridge something which, I am convinced, is genuinely bridgeable and worth bridging, and that is the Russio-American gyp.

What I am proposing is that we treat - I am concerned a little like Professor Marshall McLuhan's saying that the medium is the message - the ideology as the reality - for our purposes and, not as a declaration of a philisophical position - and say that a movement is a populist one when the center of its existence, its acts and its propaganda contains a majority of the following elements. I have not worked out these elements in a good logical order but I am sure that they can be reduced to a smaller number.

One - to go back to a point which Professor Seton-Watson has been making - is the idealization of a Folk, and it has to be a particular one - not idealisation of the people, but a people.

Secondly, primitivism - i.e., I mean that the future is to be an improved archaic past. I took strongly here the point made by Professor Venturi that this could be seen as an improvement by an oldification, by a pruning process of the present - that is, by the nineteenth century - idea of revolution. This often involves archaism.

Thirdly, utopian; the state is justified in its interventions if these are to restore society to health, to produce the pruning process of which Professor Venturi speaks. It is not utopian in any other sense.

But fourthly, although it is utopian, it is even more social in its strong that society is more important and prior to, stronger than, embodies more values, than the state. The state is the instrument of society.

Fifthly, it is personalist; a belief in the whole man and that sort of thing. Sixthly, it is localized, even communistic.

Then the xenophobic. Then, an involvement of all these things in a hatred of an advanced stage of the division of labour, of advanced social differentiation, occupational differentiation, multiplication of social roles, call it what you will.

Then I come to a number of things which are perhaps almost accidental and yet I cannot help feeling that they will have a certain gravitational attraction for each other, but I cannot fully express what that attraction is: for example, anti-imperial, but not pacifism. The point stressed by Professor Willis about inflation, easy credit, currency reform, rather than economic planning, is perhaps an aspect of the point about society, and points about the society and the state, but it goes beyond them. I think. It is, therefore, worth looking at.

Then again, populism is conspiratorial; as the specific peoplo-is naturally good; therefore to explain why things are not good, there must be devils. You must have an idea of conspiracy. This goes along with the xenophobia, but not all xenophobia is conspiratorial and not all conspiracy theories are xenophobic.

Next, apocalyptic dreams. These may involve the dreams of a particular populist redeemer, a particular kind of populist hero, or a particular sort of mousses or Lycurgus or the like. However, I do not want to stress that.

Then, belief in spontaneity. This is something which we have not heard enough about but as a virtue, if you like, it is a separate aspect of being a whole man for a whole man is a spontaneous mass of untutored and immediate virtue. This is also important.

Then, an affiliation with religion. This applies more surely to the Russian than the American thing. The origin in one case is Orthodox and in the other case it is American Protestantism. But there are certain things which are perhaps in common there, and William Jennings Bryan is to be understood perhaps because of or through his religion.

I should have put earlier anti-elitist, but inspired often - as Professor Seton-Watson has said in one of the most valuable of our contributions - by an elite and prepared to use an elite in the destruction of an elitist situation. I have tried to summarize what I understood him to mean.

Then there is a point which is not stressed sufficiently but again was made by Professor Willis: it is either totally against competition, both economic and social competition, or it wishes to limit competition to a degree that will prevent the mass of inequalities and the emergence of new elites. It has a hostility, to use a phrase which appears in Mr. Ninagow's paper, to risk, not merely political risk, but also to economic risk.

When you have the majority of these things present you have a populist movement; and when not, not.

There are one or two other points which I should like to make on populism. First, our declaration, if we reach one, as we must so that we can all agree on this - must make a point which is so simple that
one is to make it, but it might not occur: that is, that the word "populist" is not equivalent to the word "popular." Secondly, we also might use that populist, which if we have not from this point of view is certainly a weak kind of ideological complex, is only important where alternative items such as nationalism or disciplined totalitarianism parties are absent. Of course, both nationalism and totalitarianism parties are explicit, as many other other, go, items from the populist ideology, but that is a different point.

Secondly, I would like to say that populism seems to me to be less a movement of the directly oppressed than of the displaced, in two senses of that word: of those who feel that they have been by-passed, and those who hold that their position ought to be central, because they are cultivators. I suggest the use of the word "cultivators," as a word to include small capitalist farmers as well as peasants, who are different kinds of creatures. Both come together very often in populism; those who believe that they are by-passed from the central position to which they feel that they are entitled or who feel that they have been made marginal. Hence, we get the sense of loss and the sigh for the restoration of the archaic past which I mentioned when I was talking about the ideological items.

Then, populism in a sense cannot properly be the ideology of a party. It can be the ideology of a movement and it may even go to the polls, but it cannot be a party for a reason which has come up once or twice: that populism believes that history is to be rectified - to go back to Professor Venturi's formulation - and then brought to an end, because static and therefore, there is no real sense for an on-going party. This is one of the things which helps to make populist was even as a movement.

Finally, I would like to ask a question. I wonder whether some things that will be very close to populism, incorporating many of those ideological items, might not be coming into existence in our own time - looking for the whole virtuous untaught spontaneus man in either of two directions with which we are unfamiliar in our political history.

One with which we are certainly unfamiliar is looking for the untaught, whole, spontaneous man in some sort of psychoanalytic cult, the sort of thing that underlies some of the things that Trents Fano is saying and giving a geographical basis, and which you get put forward in this country by Mrs. Leaing and Cooper.

Another place where this might be found, and something with which we are more familiar - we heard about it in the Argentine - may be that you look for your whole, untaught, spontaneous man not on this earth nor in touch with the sacred soil but in touch with a renewal of things through youth; virtuous because young.

These are questions which we might consider, although it is rather wicked of me to bring them in at this late point.

MR. ENGELM: I would like to make a small plea for something. It is a kind of black cat in a coal hole really. It arises in this sense from one of the pieces of elimination to which Professor Seton-Watson has drawn our attention and I agree with much of his approach.

All the examples which we have been discussing, with hardly any exceptions, have arisen in literate communities. In the Russian example, if I understand it correctly, the populist movement was a sort of pre-packaged deal. The intellectuals went to the peasants but the ideas had already been worked out, although in the American case articulated at grass roots level.

I would maintain, as opposed to Professor Medora that there are genuine examples to be found in Africa of populism which would satisfy many of the criterions which we have just heard but which have one characteristic which makes it exceptionally difficult to talk about them; that is the fact that they are not led by literate people. Therefore, the only way that one can find out about them in the absence of literary records is to conduct research by interviews etc. into particular outbreaks.

I do not think, therefore, that one wants to confuse populism of that kind with the kind of things that the articulate African political leaders are saying in intercepting to the outside world some disturbance in their own territory and explaining that it happened because of this, that and the other cause. This may be a distinctly misleading phenomenon. I nearly put in this plea for what I call the black cat in the coal hole. It is a difficult thing to pin down but I nevertheless think that it exists.

PROF. MACRAE: I know about these things but I had forgotten them. I accept the point.

PROF. HOFSTADTER: I would like to revert to Professor Medora's list of trades which means to me to be admirably comprehensive and it registers very much with me. Since it is a very long list of trades, it will not be quarrelling too much to say that there are two points on which one again you have to accept the Americans, where you make.

First, I think that you have to cut them out of any criterion of opposition, differentiation of labour. They are certainly not unequivocally opposed to modern industrial organisation and, secondly, on account of hostility to competition. Their conceptual model is based on acceptance of a competitive order. It has been massed about by monopoly and monopolistic organisations.

There is one way of putting it, which, in a sense, is latent in your list, but in, perhaps, worth restating or combining with some of the items. That is in that it seems to me that there is very little that is not in these movements as a part of their romantic primitivist orientation and this adulation of the folk or some part of the folk, a very profound anti-institutional bias which accords very much with what you said about party and even apparent exceptions like the interests of the American populists in forming a party dissolve if one looks at it broadly enough.
I suppose that most of us in our political thinking are used to conceiving man as a fallible instrument with his wicked side and reckoning with the fact that at some point or another our institutional apparatus will embody these failings.

The whole emphasis on getting back to the virtue of the volk somehow assumes that there is a way by which you can extract that virtue at the centre of the society, at the state, and circumvent or by-pass all the problems, that of institutions life which most of our thinking about human society deals with. You certainly find this in the American populists in these sense of the pure party that they were going to build, against which there was a tremendous reaction when they found, as one of them said, that there were bees and gyres, as in all the other parties.

Mr. TONGSON: Following Professor Hofstadter’s institutional point, I wonder whether Professor MacKe is likely to be a little precise. I also like very much your list, but when you spoke of statute what I think you meant is that they are for the division of the state, while they are in opposition as a political movement in opposition; but do you mean to say that they are also for the centralised state?

PROF. MACKE: No, I certainly do not mean a state. I mean that they have a tendency to use the state as an implement to carry out the kind of pruning of the existing order which was put very importantly by Professor Venturi as essential to the nineteenth century concept of revolution. The state is O.K. if under society, if to keep society pure by occasional interventions, which can sometimes be very drastic, as American populists wanted them to be.

May I say something on what Professor Hofstadter has said. The idea of the pure party is a point which we should look at because this is an idea of a non-party; it is a contradictory idea, and I am grateful for it. Such things in theory.

About competition, I would like to make a distinction. I would have thought that we should distinguish between competition as it actually occurs in complex societies which produce a situation tending towards monopoly, the importance of finance capitalism of different kinds, and so on. Against competition in this sense, purely American populists also is. Populists believe of course it the myth of the market, but they believe that the market has to be restored and they believe in a very limited kind of competition.

What I said was that you believe either in no competition or in a strict limitation of competition, which is also a utopia and a RELATED one. On the differentiation point, I think that you are absolutely correct.

Mr. KINGSLEY: I should like to make a few remarks about Professor MacKe’s process of definition by check list, which certainly is a very useful collection of characteristics to discuss, but in the end it is likely to be self-defeating. That is, it will give us an apparatus by which one might identify populism in a statistical way by saying, that if it has 60 per cent of these characteristics it is populism; and if it does not, it is not. This may help in identifying, but not in explaining, populism. For that, who, one needs is to find coherence within the check list, so that one can see what bits of it fit together and what bits of it are accidental. Unless we can achieve that, I do not think that we have achieved what we set out to do.

One principle which might be used in bringing order to these various characteristics is to see populism as both a revolution against some things and an affirmation of others; and, of course, the revolution and the affirmation will not be disconnected.

One of the things which comes up in Professor MacKe’s list, is a revolution against competition. This may explain why the elite is so enthusiastic about sinking itself in the great sea of the people. They want a situation where there is no damned merit nonsense, because the sheer strain of competition is something which people in general flow from if they possibly can.

In this context, one of the most interesting differentiations which has arisen this afternoon in Professor Beton’s definition between fascism, on the one hand, and populism on the other hand, in terms of elites versus glitzism.

Professor MacKe remarked that ideology is a reality. One might protest against supposing too clearly ideology and movement. The evidence we have of what people are feeling is partly what they say and partly what they do, and each needs to be checked against the other. When one talks about the ideology, one is also talking about the movement.

The CHAIRMAN: The hour for refreshment has come. According to my observations, 12 of the speakers say that it is possible to obtain some kind of, if not definition, at least a useful combination of criteria for the purpose of defining populism. Three suppose this to be on the whole not possible and, indeed, undesirable. Mr. MacFarlane, I think, is betwixt and between.

(Adjoined for ten)
Chairman: Sir Isaiah Berlin

THE CHAIRMAN: Now, we proceed with the task of producing or attempting to produce a model or models which we can regard as useful in identifying populism, either familiar in the Americas of the nineteenth century or the twentieth century, or in the Balkans, Africa, and so on. My task is to take suggestions as to how this should be done.

PROF. A. TOUNANGE: My starting point is that I certainly accept the lists which have been given by Mr. Ignatieff and Professor Mackie but an interest in trying to relate the organization of these attributes where the characteristics of a certain situation exist. There seems to be a special feature of all these attributes, because it seems to me that any kind of populist ideology or intellectual movement in an attempt to overcome some contradictions, or some opposite trend, and we should look at the situation which gives birth to such contradictions and to a course to overcome them.

I am struck by one major fact - that the social or institutional structure of the societies where populism arises seem to be divided into two. On the one side the main problem appear between some economic centres which are partly in the society and partly outside, which are regarded as some invasion from outside or some domination but which, nevertheless, are present in the society. On the other side there is, let us say, a mass - the word is not very good - which is partly engaged in a process of change and partly still out of it. So that there is a contradiction between these two elements of the political and economic situation.

But the main fact is that because there is some tension between these two elements, there is an absence of direct connection between these big problems or these objectives and the level of means and institutions. Because the centres of economic power are partly outside the society, the economic processes which are felt within it are considered in a fetish way. The people within their own society are more sensitive to their problems and tax problems more than to problems concerning the economic structure. At the same time, there is a parallel fetishism of the institutions: I mean the fact that the state or any kind of political institution, sometimes a party state, is considered in certain senses independently of the problem of economic decision-making.

Therefore, my general idea is that the populist situation is made up of a loose connection of these four elements:

1) a popular group - it does not matter which content it has: peasants in most cases, urban workers from rural extraction in others, but that does not matter too much;
2) centres of economic power;
3) some economic processes; and
4) some political channels.

The main fact seems to be that the social, political, economic and cultural facts are relatively independent of each other. We are not in an integrated society. When we speak about an industrial society, we assume that the connection between these various elements is not entirely direct, but at least it is much stronger. So the themes and the contents of a populist ideology are always an effort to overcome the absence of unity of the situation. I would accept all the themes which have been mentioned, just asking for a formulation in terms of double-faced orientations.

For example, 1) is related to the fact that a large part of the population is still out of the process of economic change. So there is a defence of traditional values, but this is not practical as traditional values are not seen in a perspective of social change. Probably that is why populist movements speak about moral regeneration. They value tradition or vote more than they defend a past situation.

Secondly, the centres of economic power are partly outside society. They are both an orientation towards social control of economic change and looking for short cuts to avoid the contradictions of economic development, as Professor MacRae mentioned.

At the same time there is acceptance of social change, the will to develop a new type of social control and, at the same time, the image of a stable world. As much as there is a functional autonomy of the institutional system, we find in the same a double attitude which is distrust of institutions, organisations and hierarchies and, at the same time, a tendency to lean on state intervention or political intervention.

The fourth and final point is that because of the opposition to some economic processes more than opposition to economic power, there is a tendency not to fight on deep fundamental economic matters, but an opposition to economic processes which are viewed as the expression of irrational forces.
So I would say that we could perhaps look for a unity of populism, not in terms of a unity of content, but in terms of the unity of effort to deal with these opposing tendencies. The diversities of the ideologies correspond to the diversities of the element and the relative weight of the elements of the situation.

I do not know much about that, but it may be possible to draw some conclusion from the anti-elitist movement that Professor Seton-Watson referred to and which seemed to be quite central. This may be a direct or a functional expression of an absence of unity of movement which expresses itself in the absence of integration of the situation.

It is possible to have an elitist type of political movement just when we assume that all elements of the situation are relatively integrated to each other, and so the movement can go to one direction and the organizing problems of organization are the most important problems, but the meaning of the situation is one-dimensional.

At the same time, I suppose that it is possible to come back on the problems of relationship between populist and non-populist but connected movements. Because of this web of contradiction, it can happen that the movements not only give a certain emphasis on one of the elements but, much more than that, it can happen that the movements locate themselves on a lower level of integration of these diversified elements.

For example, it is quite possible that in some cases the movement is unable to maintain a certain unity among these opposite trends and so it is reduced to a movement of social integration of upward mobile people or, in some other cases, to a movement of anti-disintegration or a movement of defence against a loss of social status for downward mobile. But all of that would be, say, a connection of populist movement with a non-populist movement.

My main theme is essentially to say that beyond a list of attributes it is necessary to try to organize a list to understand that it is a series of contradictions and that this contradictory and unstable nature and diversity of populist ideology may be partly explained in terms of a specific social situation.

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THE CHAIRMAN: We really have a contrast between, on the one hand, an attempt to produce some kind of so-called analytical model or model of populism without necessarily bringing in questions of specific developments of specific kinds at specific places. On the other hand, there is the problem of historical change which does stress the specific nature of the development of populism in particular countries and places and times, in order not to blur or eliminate the characteristics of specific populisms in the interests of some kind of artificial unification.

I think we are probably all agreed that a single formula to cover all populisms everywhere will not be very helpful. The more embracing the formula, the less descriptive. The more richly descriptive the formula, the more that it will exclude. The greater the intensity, the smaller the extension. The greater the extension, the smaller the denotation. This appears to me to be an almost a priori truth in historical writing.

Having laid down these platitudes, there is one other point which occurs to me - I am in sympathy with Professor Andreiopol - that we must not suffer from a Cinderella complex, by which I mean the following: that there exists a shoe - the word 'populism' - for which somewhere there must exist a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it poorly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The princes is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there exists a shoe that fits, there exists a shoe that fits. This is the nucleus of populism, its essence. All other populisms are derivations of it, deviations from it and variants of it, but somewhere there lurks true, perfect populism, which may have lasted only six months, or in only one place. That is the Platonic idea of populism, all the others being dilutions of it or perversion of it. I do not think that this approach would be very useful, but this is what all persons pursue who think that words have fixed meanings, particularly in historial and sociological subjects. I do not know whether anyone does so. We must not, I suggest, be tempted in that direction.

At the same time, we must not be tempted in the other direction, which some have taken, to suppose that the word populism is simply a homonym; that there are movements in America, in Russia, in the Balkans and in Africa, that they are all called populism owing to confusions in human heads, but that they have too little in common; their differences are far greater than their similarities; and that therefore, nothing but confusion can be seen by using these general descriptions and we must try and fit seven, eight or nine perfectly precise terms to all these different things, which have little in common, and this may clarify thought.

Yet I also have a feeling that whenever a word is much used, even if it is an exceedingly confusing or over-rich word, like romanticism, idealism, populism, democracy, and so on, something real is intended, something, not quite nothing. There is a sense in which one should look for the common core.

I think that the most helpful contributions containing lists of attributes are those of Dr. Wielicki and Professor McName. The former produced four criteria and the latter, as far as I could count, produced 15. These are not entirely fungible. Still they are pointers.
I should have done some homework during the tea interval to try to see these things into bouquets or clusters to produce something smaller out of them. I do not know that I can do very much, but let us try the following on this assembly and after that debate can break out again. Supposing we say that what is common to all populisms is that it is not true, but we will try it on - as a cause and vaguely name it, which is intelligible to everybody here, the notion of Gemeinschaft - that is, the famous integral society which everybody talks about, some kind of coherency (all these words are capable of being shot down in the same way as populism) some sort of coherent, integrated society, which is sometimes called Volk, which has roots in the past, either imaginary or real, which is bound by a sense of fraternity and by a desire for a certain kind of social equality and perhaps liberty, but of the two equality is probably nearer its heart than liberty - and which is opposed to competitive, atomized society, although in the American case it obviously believes in limited competition which is regulated in some so-called 'natural' fashion as against all kinds of 'unnatural' distortions of it.

It is broadly speaking apolitical - that is to say, it is not principally interested in political institutions, although it is prepared to use the state as an instrument for the purpose of producing its ends. But a state organization is not its aim and the state is not its ideal of human association. It believes in society rather than in the state. The state is an instrument, as Professor MacRae said, moreover all these movements believe in some kind of moral regeneration. I am sure that that is common to them all.

In some sense they are dedicated to producing spontaneous, natural man who have in some way at some time became corrupted by something. There must have been a spiritual fall somewhere. Either the fall is in the past or it is threatening - one of the two. Either innocence has been lost and some kind of perversion of man's nature has occurred, or enemies are brooding within an attack from without. Who the enemies are, we do not need to classify. That will depend upon the specific situation.

The enemy may be capitalism, it may be foreign states which have forms of political, social or economic organization which threaten the spontaneous integral group and the sense of brotherhood which unites them. It still unites them, or once united them, so that one can now resurrect the unity from the past.

Populism certainly does not believe, so far as negative propositions are concerned, in the uniqueness of historical stages in the sense in which, say, most historians believe that nothing from the past can ever be rescued; that what has happened once has happened once and for all, and, therefore, that there is no way of looking back to the past to try to save its values. It may believe in the translation of these ancient values into contemporary terms, but it believes these values to be rooted somewhere in the past; they cannot be brand new. I do not think I know of any populism which assumes that man was born in a low or undesirable state and that the problem is somewhere in the future, a novel situation which has never given any evidence of existence in the past. Some degree of past directness is essential to all populisms.
Then we start with variations. For example - Dr. Wallace can put me right on this - there is on the one hand the root of socialism and on the other hand the root of positivism. These are alternative roots, and therefore, alternative species of the same thing. Again, you could probably say that there are certain other variants - for example, elitism. Some forms of populism believe in using elitism for the purpose of a non-elitist society and some object to it on the ground that even using elitism as a means leads to elitism in the end.

The controversy among the Russian populists in that respect is fairly degenerative. (I do not know whether there is an American parallel.) There was the famous controversy of Tskhov and Lavrov in the seventies, for example. Tskhov was advocating, for purely practical reasons, dictatorship by a small elite of professional revolutionaries, since otherwise capitalism could not be destroyed in sufficient time. Lavrov's counter-argument was that this would defeat itself: once an elite gained power one would not get rid of it and this would, in fact, perpetuate a totalitarian state in the very effort to create an anti-totalitarian one, an elitist state in the effort to produce an egalitarian one.

Some populists believed in an elite; some did not; some believed in it except as an instrument, a means to an end, so that to a large extent it was a tactical difference and not a real one. Of course, all these movements and ideologies wished to produce a fraternal, equal society and not a hierarchical or deferential one. Therefore they must be distinguished from other forms of what might be called romantic anarchism or romantic nostalgia: for a glorious golden past. There are dreams of a golden past in which men are anything but socially equal or self-governed.

The desire to return to the Middle Ages, of let us say, Chesterton or Bellow, had something in common with the craving for equality and fraternity, if only because they were anti-industrial, anti-individualistic, anti-capitalist. What they wanted to reproduce was a hierarchical order in which the king was on his throne served by his nobles, over a pyramid of subjects each placed by God or by nature in the station most appropriate to them. This "comparative" society, agrarian, state, clerical, non-industrial, is a cohesive, non-feudal Gemeinschaft but of course essentially unequal and deriving its beauty and unity and romantic attractiveness from its hierarchical or theocratic structure. All forms of populism are wholly opposed to this. You can say that these reactionary dreams and utopias have populist strains in them, because they are anti-industrial and collectivist, but they do not qualify as populist because they do not stress the essential elements of populism - fraternity, freedom from imposed authority, above all equality. Liberty is not essential. Some populist movements demand it, some do not; it is inessential.

What else is at stake? One final thing that I should like to say is that I cannot tell how many of Professor McRae's criteria this by now embraces. The opposition to centralised economic planning comes in under hostility to elites of any kind.

PROFESSOR MACRAE: Twelve, I think.

THE CHAIRMAN: Twelve is unexpectedly satisfactory. Twelve out of fifteen is very promising.

Now as to religion. Affiliation to a religion is, I think, a specific property of perhaps some streams of Russian populism - but populism obviously need not be religious. American populism has surely been tinged with Protestantism. But I dream that if you found some bone dry atheists to be members of a populist movement you would not exclude them on the ground that religious faith was at the heart of such an outlook, that it was at the very least a secularised form of an essentially religious movement.

Then there is the apocalyptic dream and the hero: yes, all populisms, it seems to me, are voluntaristic and anti-necessitarian. They do not accept an inevitable pattern of history. They believe that it is possible by means of a spontaneous gathering of the will of the good to leap into the new society and create these new men. They all believe this. They do not believe in a historicist time table. They do not believe in necessary stages of historical development, which causes this to grow from that, and that to grow inevitably from something else - a predictable ascent up a tremendous historical ladder, the rungs of which are unalterable, which makes it utopian or impossible to do certain things until the uniquely appropriate stages is duly and inevitably reached. This, after all, is one of the chief differences between every form of Russian populism and every form of Russian social democracy and Russian Marxism.

This war, after all, one of the fields on which the great battles is fought. It was to refute this determinism that Socialist Revolutionary followers exorted themselves - Herzen against the Western determinists of his time, Mikhailovsky against social Darwinism, Plechanov, and the Marxists, who looked on populism as utopian precisely because of this unhistorical standpoint. For the early Russian Marxists there was a rigid timetable, and unless we obey that, we would never get anywhere at all, even if, to some extent, the ends of the various socialist movements were not altogether different from one another.

There is one other point: false populisms. We need not spend too much time on this because I think that on this we have reached general agreement. False populism is the employment of populist ideas for ends other than those for which the populists desired. That is in particular employment by bonapartists or McCarthyites, or the "Friends of the Russian People", or fascists and so on. This is simply the mobilization of certain populist sentiment - say hostility to capitalism or to foreigners or Jews or hatred of organized religion, or of the market society, or of anything you like for undemocratic ends. The mobilized feeling could be genuine. This pseudo-populism does not necessarily involve cynical employment of tactics of "double-think" kind. It is clear that some of this type - Pouvists, Greenshirts, social historians and the like - did in fact sympathize with some populist sentiments, but employed them for the purpose of creating some kind of dictatorial or socially or racially unequal régime, which is totally incompatible with the fundamental - if not fraternity then, at any rate, the passionate egalitarianism - the real populist movement. This is different, for example, Bonapartism or Greek Tyrannies, which were in a certain sense also a revolt against the aristocracy, against traditionalism, against hierarchical and deferential systems, from populism proper. This probably applies equally to modern "tyrannies like Nefazzos Rhumahos".
Wherever the general will which these people profess to embody is ultimately embodied in the general himself, whether the general is a person or a group or a leader, wherever the general will is incarnated in this fashion, it is reasonable to suspect that a perversion of populism has occurred. That is why I think that the Black Poles populism, fascist populism, Bolshevik populism, various kinds of clerical populism, and so on, may share genuine elements with populism. But their goals are fundamentally incompatible with those of Herodotus of any kind; and that is enough to distinguish them.

Perhaps I have not embraced all Dr. Walicki's criteria. I have, perhaps, assimilated too enthusiastically with the subject of our discussion. I have behaved in an excessively "spontaneous" and "integralist" a fashion, too precipitately, without calculation of the results. Perhaps I should have said something about the intelligentsia. It is reasonable to say that, historically speaking, populism like all ideologies is created by ideologists. Ideologists are, on the whole, educated or half educated persons, and educated and half educated persons, particularly in Russia, tended to turn into an Intelligentia for certain historical reasons.

Dr. Walicki is right in supposing that one of the motives of most populist movements is the desire on the part of the creators of populism itself to be re-integrated into the general mass of the people from which they have become divided by their education, by their social position or by their origins.

Therefore, all populisms - I offer this as a general proposition about populism - distinguish between the alienated good and the alienated bad: the alienated good are persons who have become alienated as a result of historical circumstances, but are in a state of contrition. That is to say, they are repentant, they wish to repay their debt to society and re-integrate themselves into the mass of the people. They wonder, like Chernyshevsky, whether they sufficiently express the will of the people because they feel that they are not members of the people. They live at a distance from the masses and, therefore, they are always worried, honourably worried, about whether they are sufficiently penetrated by the spirit with which they wish to be at one.

This is the topic of the debate by Russian populists: do we "go to the people" to tell them what to do, or to learn from them? That right have we to tell the people what to want? The only person completely outside this is Troetch, who exposed the greatest possible contempt for the masses and wished to save it against its will. One day no doubt the people will be wise and rational, but we must not listen to what the present - stupid, reactionary, dull - say today. This, however, was, before Lenin, a comparatively marginal case.

This kind of populist who has a ferocious contempt for his clients, the kind of doctor who has profound contempt for the character of the patient whom he is going to cure by violent means which the patient will certainly resist, but which will have to be applied to him in some very coercive fashion, is on the whole ideologically nearer to fascist, fascist, communitarian, intellectual than to what might be called the core of populism. But such theorists exist. They exist and they have to be accommodated somewhere on our map.

For example, Chernov was a populist, and his authoritarianism is in part derived from that tradition.

There is one specific populist attribute which say or may not be universal - of that I am not sure; it is the one which Dr. Walicki rightly stressed. That is the advocacy of a social and economic programme for the single purpose of avoiding the horrors of industrialisation and capitalism; this is not a passion for integralism, nor the visionary now-modernism of William for in, this has nothing to do with Morris dancing, or arts and crafts or Gandhi's spinning wheels. Nor is a return to the Middle Ages; it is simply a sober theory of how we are to avoid the horrors of what is happening in the Western world. This is the kind of populism which was professed by sover statisticians and economists towards the end of the nineteenth century in Russia who were not necessarily partisans of some kind of Gemeinschaft. This was a perfectly rational social doctrine, founded, or at least aspiring to rest on sober calculation and estimate of the factors simply a social policy consisting with other social policies, something which, I should have thought, was probably most prevalent in backwater countries as Russia was in the nineteenth century, or the Balkans, not therefore equally prevalent in the United States and, therefore, representing a particular attribute of a particular populism at a particular time in a particular place. Beyond this I cannot go. I do not know whether all this constitutes a veritable model or not. I am afraid all I have done is to have spoken too long.

Mr. TOSCHEV: It seems to me that we are getting somewhere. We are only getting further, and I shall put together the points. We also listened to what Professor Tourain had to add. I think that we are getting towards a coherent formula.

Mr. HALL: I agree very much with almost everything you have said, Mr. Chairman, and indeed with most of what Professor Tourain also has said. The only point which I would not emphasise so much is the question of the economic situation, because I think it can come out of social or cultural challenges as well as of economic challenges. I have drawn upon, to throw in to the pool, two sentences seeking to make a very short definition of how I would see the matter, looking at populism from the point of view of movements. These are:

"Populist movements are movements aimed at power for the benefit of the people as a whole which result from the reaction of those, usually intellectuals, alienated from the existing power structure to the stresses of rapid economic, social, cultural or political change. These movements are characterised by a belief in a return to, or adaptation of, more simple and traditional forms and values existing from the people, particularly the more arcane sections of the people who are deemed to be the repository of virtue."

PROFESSOR ANDREISE: I find this stress on the word 'fraternity' very important because it distinguishes populism from another possible word, 'egalitarianism'. Fraternity means more than simple equality.
Regarding Mr. Hall's definition, I have one methodological objection, namely, that one should define classificatory concepts so as not to prejudice the genesis of the phenomena in question. We should define X in such a way that we can tell that something is X when we see it. If we define X as something which has originated from Y, we may in fact be prejudging a theoretical and empirical issue by definition, which is highly inadvisable.

I am impressed by the persuasive way in which Sir Isaiah has found the foot of Cinderella, in spite of his previous statement that it belongs to the realm of fantasy. I find his definition very appealing but I would still like to hear about the reasons why we should adopt it in preference to other possible definitions.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am simply presenting a true image. That is my own reason. Does Professor Seton-Watson accept Mr. Hall's definition about archaic sections of the people rather than something like the unfortunate or the oppressed?

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON: I do not think that I am very happy about "archaic". It is often that, but it does not have to be that. What I think is essential, and what came out of the end of the definition, is the belief that the people is better, it is right, and the fact that this belief is really held. People who do not really hold this belief passionately are not populists.

But I think that there is a certain tendency to prefer the very humiliated and suffering: the more equal and suffering a people is, the more right it is. If we go on record as saying that the most archaic or the most backward are always the best, I do not think that this would narrow it too much.

I have one general comment from your own observations, Mr. Chairman. I feel that the element of religion is, perhaps, a little more important than you suggested. As Dr. Minogue suggested earlier, these ideologies are at the moment a pure secularization. There is a close connection in time between the disappearance of religious faith and the emergence of populist ideology.

THE CHAIRMAN: You could say the same about Marxism or any secular ideology in that sense.

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON: Perhaps you could.

THE CHAIRMAN: But not about this one in particular.

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON: No. In this one, the place of God is taken by the notion of the people.

THE CHAIRMAN: Or class. All I would add is that there are two things which I would add to Mr. Hall's definition. One would be that the enemies of the people have to be specified, whether it be capitalists, foreigners, ethnic minorities, majorities or whoever it might be. They have to be specified. The people is not everybody. The people is everybody of a certain kind and there are certain people who have put themselves beyond the pale in some sort of way whether by conspiring against the people or by preventing the people from realizing itself or however it may be. They must be specified. The people is not the whole of society however constituted.

The other thing is that there is a studied vagueness about means of political action. I do not think that populist as such indicates the specific way in which it is to act. Provided that the people act as a whole to bring about that in which they believe - the means are left in various stages of indefiniteness. The people is not committed to any form of political action, except that on the whole it is directed against any form of control by minorities, whether representatives of a parliamentary democracy, or member of other institutions which it allows because of its fear of elites, even democratic ones as a permanent form of government.

MR. HALL: I did not detect any errors, but in answer to Professor Seton-Watson I was thinking of "emanating from the people, particularly the more archaic section of the people, are taken to be the repository of virtue."

A SPEAKER: Does your definition, Mr. Chairman, effectively exclude those populisms which are "in power"? I got the feeling from your list, with which I agree basically, that the sort of characterization which comes out of this fundamentally excludes most of the kind of movements that we have called populist at some part of the discussion, like the African populist states. I wonder whether you consider it to be true and, if so, what Prof. Worsley would have to say about it.

THE CHAIRMAN: I would suspect that it excludes the Africans, but I do not know enough about the facts.

THE SAME SPEAKER: How does that accord with the sense of the meeting?

THE CHAIRMAN: I would suspect that the African states tend to identify the general will of the people with some particular notion of it, which is the self constituted privileged expounder of this
will, dispensing pretty well with the need for continuous consultation which, I think, is at the base of real populist ideology. The real populist ideology is a kind of unbroken, continuous plebiscite as long as it is needed. At a certain point it will no longer be needed because everybody will be on family terms with everyone else. The idea is of a hugely extended family, in which you do not need constantly to consult its members because where relations are those of affection, there is a continuous general consensus, a pre-established harmony founded on sympathy which guarantees virtual unanimity on all central issues. Rousseau occasionally spoke in this fashion. But he was pretty pessimistic about its emergence.

MR. DE KAUT: The definition virtually seems to exclude the possibility of any movement which comes to power, because any movement which comes to power can no longer have these total characteristics — if this is so, and populism is basically a radical small movement in opposition it might be nice if we could be clear about this and whether this is true.

PROF. MACRAT: I said that one of the points I would like to have considered was the proposition that a populism which has become routinised or institutionalised over a long period or has come into power ceased to exist as a populism. That is one of the things which I have learned. I thought that it was true. I now think I know that it is true.

DR. SAUL: We have talked over, and Mr. Homoony talked about, Castro trying to create links with the people on a continuing basis. It seems to me that most of these characteristics could characterise the State. It may be that once a movement gets into power, the tendency is for it to institutionalise itself. I am not sure that it is all the way inevitable. The points which I made this morning are relevant that, on the one hand, one can still conceive of a state as being marginal to a world process and, therefore, seeing itself with most of these characteristics of the threat, whatever it is, being a continuing dimension of a particular leadership. One can also conceive of a leadership, even though it is in power, trying to retain those sort of links.

Also, I think that many of the ambiguities which one might raise about a state could be raised about the relationship between the leadership and the members of a movement. Mr. Homoony dismissed this possibility of a regime being populist, but if this is an acceptable one I am still not quite convinced that one could not conceive of a regime which held these specific differences.

PROF. ANDRESEK: I think that if we take relation between states as the basis for ascribing populism to some ideology, we would land ourselves in such a predicament that we would have to extend the privilege of deserving this label to Nazi regimes and fascists, because they all claim to have been representing the people.

DR. SAUL: There is a catch there, because in a way it is not necessarily a state-to-state relationship. It can be a people as a regime in relationship to an international economic process, just as it can be a particular segment of a state in via a particular economic process which is both national and international. I think again that this is the apothecary that I mentioned earlier. I am not sure that it is necessary to see it as a state-to-state relationship. It can be a regime relationship to a particular world economic process. This is at least a possibility. I am not sure that it can be dismissed quite that readily.

PROF. MANGINI: Cuba regards itself as being a liberated territory of America and the first region of a much wider and broader political construction that could be liberated in the end. I think, therefore, that what Mr. Saul says makes a great deal of sense. It solves the Castro problem.

PROF. SCHAPERO: As to Mr. Saul's definition, I worry about two things. One is the phrase "for the benefit of the people as a whole". First, "as a whole". "People of a whole" certainly does not mean everybody in the country. Quite obviously, as you, Mr. Chairman, have said yourself, there are some who are outside the pale.

In some way or other, therefore, "people as a whole" has to be rather more clearly defined and defined subjectively in terms of what the participants of the movement themselves believe the people at different times and at different stages to be.

The other words that I would question are "for the benefit of the people" standing by themselves. There has not been a treaty in history who has not acted in the name of the benefit of the people. The bloodiest of tyrannies ever known have been done in the name of the benefit of the people. Nobody ever says I am doing this for my own fun.

I come back to the point of leadership. To qualify as populism it has to be for the benefit of the people as determined by the people themselves, some element of that kind which shows that the participants of the movement believe that it is the people themselves who must say stop, otherwise you must leave open the suggestion that you can have leaders who will know better what is good for us and will impose it upon us. Subject to that, perhaps not as a definition, but as a general description it does not immediately raise objections in one's mind. I think that it is pretty good.
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guys very standards well. In the deal with consultation. The programme so states they see themselves or as they rhetorically themselves.

Internally, of course, when they come to power, other things happen. This applies to any opposition party. Nobody puts their programme into action; they operate within restraints, traditions, and so on; they often never intended to anyway. This could be applied to certain governments not a thousand miles away from here.

Internally, however, there are certain aspects of it which are institutionalized. Firstly, they experiment, sometimes on a large-scale, with cooperative and communitarian schemes - and, secondly, they practice consultation. Even if it is rhetorical, formal and illusory, it is there. Castro goes along and talks to the people. They have a rhetoric and an ideology. They call it and they teach people it and they communicate it. It is still there. They may have abandoned a great deal else, but it does not entirely disappear.

PROF. GELLNER: I am very unhappy about one thing pathologically, the same point as Professor Worsley has put, but for different reasons, a point shared by Professor Schapiro and Professor KoRo. That is, the exclusion of successful populists at all. A successful populist cannot be one or eligible. That seems to me to be wrong logically because it involves a kind of double act of criteria.

The test implication of the argument is that before they were in power, what they believed was true, but before they were in power what they believed was not available for testing because they were not in power; but in the sense in which they were falsified after the event, they were also falsified during their years in the wilderness as well. That is the mixture. It is partly an empirical business.

I think that our ambition has been misled by the very high standards which the Russian populists act in this business. They were very good populists. Tacitly, you might as well be a very good man a true and improving for somebody else is true. This obviously would not work. The idea is that logically it is perfectly variable. The obstacle to its realization in the facts. There is nothing illogical or contradictory in the action of a society which is bound by the kind of

affection which only religious sects have and which are bound by some kind of family relationship, hence the sociological problems. If you could have a regime of that sort, it would be a successful populist regime.

PROF. GELLNER: No. It is not quite as you have put it. As has repeatedly come out in the discussion, the plausibility of the realization does not simply hinge on the hard facts of the society of men. It also hinges on the kind of observation-definition of the concept of love. What is this people whom will is sovereign? The part of the populist system which seems to be essential to it is precisely the use of nebulous concepts. The artist abilities inherent do not necessarily arise because hard facts can be falsified.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think that the populist Press could give a list of sociological characteristics, sociology characterizing what they would regard as members of the people. They can do it.

PROF. GELLNER: This comes out quite clearly. I have a little experience of a populist kitchen. I spent two months in one under Mkwacha at a thing called the Institute of African Studies, which was not what it was called. Its conception of African studies was basically to prove that Africans had a glorious past and a glorious future with the provision of populist ideology. They had enormous difficulty in giving any concrete definition to what this African personality is.

Looking at it concretely, of course, Africans vary a great deal. If statesmen is to be a virtue, what do you do about those who build up false states? There are all kinds of other concrete contradictions. It is very difficult to make concrete. Nevertheless, the concept of being delivered. It was a kind of good ideological centre and the ambiguity was inherent in it. I would still want to call it populist although they were operating under conditions of success.

What hinges on this is a point made yesterday by Professor Schapiro, which seemed to me to be mistaken, and that is the exclusion of movements from populism if they have a charismatic leader. It seems to me to be logically neat and correctly to exclude any kind of systematic elitist doctrines on populism unless the elitism is of a temporary nature and tactically a device by which it is to be approached. But charismatic leadership is perfectly compatible if the belief is that the charismatic leader is legitimate precisely because he embodies this thing. The fact that the criteria embodying are unstoppable seems to me to be an important characteristic of this syndrome of ideas.

PROF. VENTURI: It may be that some of these points may be clarified if we turn to the economic side of the story. In the definition given by Mr. Hall, probably that is where I think he is too vague.
Mr. Seton-Watson: The comparison with the communist movement made by Professor Macfarlane is valuable but we have to ask ourselves the question: what is it that they do not do? What the communists do not do is more uncertain than what the populists do not do if only because the populists are mere utopians in their aims.

We may continue to think that communist governments are communist in spite of the fact that they do not achieve the withering away of the state, because the communists have laid down a whole body of doctrine about the stages through which you must pass first. Therefore, a very good case can be made in defence of any communist régime, that it must inevitably advance slowly but it has not betrayed; whereas if the populists' aim is fraternity, and a complete fraternal utopia, it is very obvious that they are not achieving that.

I would not want to be too dogmatic about this. I think perhaps I was too dogmatic in saying that the populists, once they are in power, come to be populists, although on the whole it seems to me that this is a different sort of situation from what communist governments have to face. It is very difficult for populists to be in power very long and remain populists, more difficult than it is for communists.

Dr. Macfarlane: Are you suggesting that it is a qualitative difference? Surely you could distinguish between those people who are trying to bring about a fraternity with all the difficulties involved and those who are not. The first category one would think of is a populist régime attempting to operate as a communist régime is attempting to operate, a good deal easier framework of reference as you say in explaining it and, therefore, the people would have a better idea of what they are trying to do and the way they have got to do it.

Prof. Seton-Watson: That is a good point. The transitional period is probably shorter.
The point I wanted to make was that I would be quite happy to accept Professor Seton-Watson's formulation in this area and that I think it is a pity if we allow these problems to take us away from something that actually is working.

There is one tiny footnote which I will permit myself. I think it is quite true that quite large numbers of individual historical populists were very sweet, generous and nice people, but one thing also has to be said. I do not think it has been demonstrated to us that populism in itself is, if I can bring categories of values and professional judgment into it, a nice thing. On the whole, I think not.

PROF. ANDRESEY: Surely these issues depend on the definition. If we include purist democracy in our definition and say that populism involves absolute compliance with the will of the people, then there could never be such a thing as populism in power, as this would be self-contradictory. The relations between 'have' and 'have-not' states constitute a different problem which should not be mixed up with the question of populism.

Personally I would like to define populism in such a way that, for one thing, it would be co-extensive neither with purist democracy nor with egalitarianism.

From Sir Isaiah's list, the items which appeal to me most are 'gemeinschaft', fraternity, the idealisation of the common man, and possibly idealisation of the past; although I have doubts about the last item. If an ideology contains the first three elements, I would be prepared to call it populism. For reason, I would call Castro a populist, because of his stress on fraternity. However, we would have to decide at which degree of authoritarianism we would say, 'No, this is no longer fraternity now. The big brother is too big.' But I think it is possible to conceive the idea of fraternity as including a big brother, provided that he is not too cruel to everybody but only to the unfaithful boys.
THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to add one historical footnote. There are certain philosophical presuppositions in populism. I wish to say something in connection with a point made by Professor Davoli earlier, in a very illuminating way. I do not wish to stress the hollowed name of Rousseau again. The point is that the doctrine begins in the eighteenth century. This is to answer to some extent something which Professor Galton and Professor Schapiro said. There was a doctrine in the eighteenth century according to which there had existed such a creature as a natural man. Natural man was done in by artificial man. I do not mean that someone did natural man in. Man did himself in. Natural man is struggling inside artificial man, trying to get out. This is what Diderot says.

Alternatively, you can conceive the situation as one in which there are large numbers - a majority - of natural men, who have at some time or other been done down by various minorities of artificial men. If you do not accept this proposition, and think that it is a fantasy, then the whole structure begins to collapse. Professor Davoli remarked that the notion of the populists - which is also to be found in the writings of his and my friend, the late Professor Salvemini, is that there are sottos who bind men, certain sottos with which artificial man is struggling natural man. If you strike off these sottos, natural man asserts himself and there is no further problem. You have reset his life, so to speak, in a natural pattern. No guidance, still less force, is required by the liberated prisoner. To direct him then is to make him again to substitute new notes for old.

There is no point, then, in making what the new organisation, the post-revolutionary establishment should do in the name of democracy? should there, for example, be consultation and plebiscites? All those questions fall away because they only arise in connection with the use of organised power; this is even a perversion of original uncorrupted human nature. This disaster has been brought about by some kind of terrible event: the Flood, original sin, the discovery of iron and agriculture, or whatever else it may be; there was a blissful natural state: then the Fall and the yearning for the original unity. This can be restored, possibly by violence.

If populists were asked who the people are, I think that they would produce a definite answer. They would say that the people is the majority of their society; natural men who have been robbed of their proper post in life: then try and point to groups of artificial, corrupt men leading down large groups of natural men. If the visionaries are not the large majority, populism fails. The Calvinist notion that a vast collection of corrupt man has to be rescued by a small minority of good men seeking to tell them that the truth is in the opposite of all populists' faith. That is the metaphysics of populism, although I know well that modern psychology may deny every part of it.

DR. WALLCOTT: About gemeinschaft, I think that it is a little more complicated. If we take, of course, of Russian populism, from this point of view. If gemeinschaft is so essential for the definition of populism, I would say that in this case Lavrov, whom everybody here treats as a populist, would not have been a populist because the whole history of Lavrov is a transition from the unconscious emotional solidarity of Castro - that is, gemeinschaft - to conscious solidarity between critical thinking individuals, which is not gemeinschaft. Why? But there are some elements of gemeinschaft here, of course, and I would add a little modification. I think that populists should be either in favour of the tradition of gemeinschaft or propose a kind of synthesis between gemeinschaft and some of the values which were created by the process of the emancipation of the individual and by certain bourgeois elites. I think that this would be gemeinschaft, but not necessarily pure gemeinschaft.

DR. SELAFFI: I think that Professor Schapiro was right in saying that this notion of the people was an operational one. By the same token, however, his concept that somehow the populists see these goals as being defined by the people is also a very difficult one to operationalise. This relates to my earlier point that even movements are institutionalised in some way, and the point has been made about striking off sottos.

It will be very difficult to characterise a particularly pure example of the people defining their goals by themselves, because there is a whole range of various ways in which people are approached and in which they are influenced. There are many people who hold good times or some of the carriers of ideas, and at the other extremes:whips and scourges are used. I think that it will be rather difficult to pin down. We have to think about this if we are to do the final definition. We would have to think about what sort of influences are legitimate and remain legitimate means for a populist leadership to use via the constituency to which they are in some relationship.

Striking off sottos can also vary over a wide range of possible activities to removing monopolies, to a wide variety of things that may in fact impinge in a very real way on people and be diverting them in some ways. Even to get back to the natural man, sometimes the person who is a natural man but not quite aware of it may have to be convinced. So there are these questions about relationships between leaders and led which still remain. It is too easy to say that somehow the people have to define them for themselves.

PROF. SCHAPIRO: We have, after all, an historical example in the Provencal Government of the way in which it was about to put in practice, and the result. This business of striking sottos, that was pure Prince Louis from beginning to end. The sottos were struck off, tyranny has fallen, and natural man has come out and, therefore, everything will now be all right.

That is perhaps what Professor Galton is wrong when he thinks that populism is compatible with a charismatic leader. The charismatic leader would become just precisely that sottos on the natural men which populists reject.
DR. MACFARLANE: Are we bending now to get into byways? We started by putting forward those principles and ideas of populism on which there seems to me to be a great deal of agreement. Then we had the problem of whether Mr. Hall's definition in terms of a movement would rule out actual populist régimes. That is why I suggested that we might get back on to the main road and without any slight of hand accommodate those who are concerned with populist régimes.

Let us take Sir Ianish Berlin's basic ideas of populism and say that these are the ideas of populism. It is a different question how these ideas get translated into movements and the forms they take and the particular problems which arise when a movement actually comes into power, which raise real questions about how far the ideas are practical and how one attempts to apply them.

I suggest that while we are perhaps not hoping to end up with something which we can all take home on a postcard and show to our wives as the reason for our absence, nevertheless we can get sufficient from these basic ideas of populism for Mr. Ionescu or someone else to frame for Government and Opposition without too many of us feeling that he has misrepresented what we really feel.

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think that a breathless world is expecting a communiqué from this assembly. I do not think that we need formulate our proposition in too precise a form.

Does anyone else wish to say anything ideologically? ... If not, I arrogate to myself the role of charismatic leader. My whole idea of populism I have learned in this assembly. Not for one moment would I claim to be expressing the views of anyone else or wish to be anti-populist in sentiment. But I would like to call on Professor Gellner to say a few words.

PROF. GELLNER: Like yourself, Mr. Chairman, all I have learned about populism I have learned at this conference. Consequently, I feel a great debt of gratitude to the person who has organised it. When I suggested earlier to the Chairman that a vote of thanks was required, I had completely forgotten that my name appears on the Organising Committee. That is entirely anonymous as far as I am concerned. I do not know about the others. As far as I could see, however, the effective and real work in organising this conference, which obviously was extremely well done and is profitable to me and, I believe, to everyone else, has been the work of one man, Gheorghe Ionescu, and I would like to propose a vote of thanks to him. (applause)

MR. IONESCU: I shared with my six colleagues on the Organising Committee all the work, and then I have shared with all of you, and with you, Mr. Chairman, the pleasure of all the very useful work that we have done here. I believe with Dr. Macfarlane that something will come out of it. Thank you very much.