Imperial dialectics and epistemic mapping:

From decolonisation to anti-Eurocentric IR

… Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in there world, “we” lived in ours. The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other going.

-Edward Said (1979: 43-44)

The “global,” then, often seems to be a geopolitical placeholder, a term signifying not (or not only) Western.

-Duncan Bell (2013: 256)

A durable tendency of International Relations (IR) scholarship in the last fifteen years has been to promote the addition of ‘non-Western’ ideas, practices, and histories to correct disciplinary Eurocentrism.¹ This article argues that this is not a solution, but a significant part of the problem. Rather than producing a global discipline, or a discipline more attuned to power in the production of knowledge, the addition of the non-Western as a distinct category of thought and practice contributes to an ethnification of world political inquiry. This reproduces a hierarchical imperial imaginary: a divided image of the world based on essentialised constructions of ethnic and cultural difference.

The problem often begins with essentialised conceptions of empire and ‘the Western.’ Reviving the critiques of some mid-20th century anticolonial nationalists,
anti-Eurocentric critics tend to reduce empire to its oppressive, exclusionist, or assimilationist practices. While empires could be all of these things, critics tend to ignore or diminish the productive role of empires in enabling the politics of identitarian difference (Cooper, 2005: 23). Rather than merely excluding, these politics formed the basis for elite post-colonial expertise and representation (Said 1979; Kelly and Kaplan, 2001; Shaw, 2002; Muppidi, 2012). The conflation of empire with the West therefore obfuscates the designs and coexistence of non-Western empires and would-be empires.

Critics also tend to accept an ahistorical and essentialist vision of the Western as representing secular rationalism. An image is thus produced of Western IR as lacking its cultural, spiritual, or relational other half: a lack which the non-Western must be brought in to correct (e.g. Shahi and Ascione, 2016). While pointing out the limitations of the Western/non-Western binary is not new (e.g. Doty, 1996; Grovogui, 2006; Bilgin, 2008; Shilliam, 2010; Hutchings, 2011), many scholars still seem resigned to it as a necessary tool which will eventually produce a more inclusive discipline somewhere down the line.ii The fundamental claim of this article is that adding ethnicised or culturalist representations of non-Western traits will never deliver a global or post-imperial IR. Adding ethnic and cultural variations on IR concepts such as sovereignty, agency, or cosmopolitanism contributes to a world divided by imperial categories, and props up the subordinate power claims of local universalisms. A fuller and more complex picture of humanity is denied in favour of stereotypes. Transversal processes of co-constitution and strategic alliance-making are obscured by representations of autogenous difference.

This article argues that projects to add the non-Western should be understood as a dimension of difference assertion internal to dialectical relations with hegemonic
knowledge formations. By this I do not mean to redeploy the well-established and over simplistic critique that any counter-hegemonic assertion of cultural difference is orientalist or an instance of self-imposed alienation (e.g. Chibber, 2013). Rather, that epistemic difference should be understood as part of a non-linear process of representation, which is not autonomous from the uneven political terrain on which global North and South, or ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ race relations take place.

While many IR scholars now recognise the need to situate approaches to world politics in more historical and relational analysis, this article seeks to make a contribution to how more historical and relational analysis should be approached when it comes to legacies of imperial hierarchy. Developing an interpretive analysis of anti-imperial intellectual history and recent anti-Eurocentric IR scholarship, this article offers a critique of how the Western and non-Western are represented by our current scholarly discourse. Building out from this critique, I draw on the writing and political biographies of William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) Du Bois and Frantz Fanon to advance two concepts: epistemic mapping and imperial dialectics. I approach Du Bois and Fanon comparatively, as two generations of theorists attempting to address the problems of an imperial world order. Like contemporary critics of Eurocentric IR, Du Bois and Fanon wrote from the global South against dominant Western knowledge formations. Their anti-imperial struggles sometimes elicited, what I call, epistemic mapping: a claimed ownership or close association between particular ways of thinking, seeing, or knowing the world with particular places, imagined communities, or social identities and subjectivities. However, Du Bois and Fanon deployed these constructions of the non-Western as part of reflexive and changing tactics embedded in their evolving anti-imperial strategies. They each shifted from the politics of ethno-cultural particularism, precisely because of the
inability of these politics to sustain anti-imperial momentum after the Second World War and African decolonisation. For Fanon more explicitly, representations of difference were inextricable from imperial dialectics: historical social formations which result from imperial encounters and changing political conjunctures, and which should not be taken for universal, timeless, or generic relations between coloniser and colonised. The significance of this for inquiry is that representations of the Western and non-Western are co-constituted, subject to social and political relations which are multi-axial, and are strongly determined by historical developments.

By contrast with Fanon and the later Du Bois, many contemporary scholars construct the non-Western as a concrete corrective to Eurocentrism. This is because knowledge institutions such as the modern university tend to incentivise the reification of different definable and coexisting knowledge genres (Said, 1979; Mamdani, 2012; see Berrey, 2015; Reus-Smit, 2017). Such a practice would have been recognisable to Fanon as either belonging to a particular moment of subaltern self-assertion, or the conservative cultural nationalist politics of the anti-colonial right. In arguing for the addition of the non-Western to the Western, in order to get the global or the post-imperial, contemporary scholars reproduce the ethnicised definitions and arguments for coexistence of cultural nationalists. Against the stated intentions of some anti-Eurocentric IR scholars, this results in conceptions of non-Western difference which have historically serviced the interests of experts and national elites within an imperial world order. Thus the practice of epistemic mapping in contemporary inquiry evinces a form of imperial dialectics which exists in our own disciplinary ontologies and frames of analysis.

The remainder of this article is comprised of three sections and a conclusion. The first section situates Du Bois and Fanon within the context of the imperial ‘Black
Atlantic’, and draws on their anti-imperial politics to reveal the production of a hierarchical and divided political imaginary. The second section shows how this imperial imaginary is reproduced in contemporary academic discourse. The third section draws on Du Bois’s and Fanon’s anti-imperial world politics: their concerns about identitarian politics and their advocacy of internationalism and cultural revolution. The article concludes by briefly suggesting alternative ways forward.

The imperial division of the world

The past decade and a half has seen major corrections to the ‘wilful forgetting’ of empire by what has traditionally been a Eurocentric or predominantly ‘American social science.\textsuperscript{iv} The ‘re-turn to empire in IR’ is now well underway, with a rich, growing literature on the various forms of connection between empire, world politics, international order, and the discipline of IR itself (Bayly, 2014; e.g. Keene, 2002; Inayattullah and Blaney, 2004; Shilliam, 2010; Vitalis, 2015; Thakur, et. al., 2017). Yet there remain limits to the extent to which the imperial frame of analysis can so far be construed as ‘reconstructive’ rather than simply ‘additive’ (see Pasha, 2010: 218). This is particularly the case when it comes to the question of how to conceptualise notions of identity, subjectivity, and difference which are historically rooted in imperial relations. While several scholars now call for inclusion of the non-Western to address Eurocentric erasures and violence, far fewer seem fully ready to acknowledge that such addition requires equal attention to the problem of representation in our scholarly practice. Representations of the non-Western in contradistinction to the Western are inherent to anti-Eurocentric IR scholarship, yet these representations also have origins in the imperial division of the world.
The anti-imperial archive serves as a crucial yet still under-utilised resource in addressing these issues. While some critical IR scholars draw on specific works and concepts by certain anti-imperial thinkers, few studies read these through a longer historical trajectory of critical thought on empire and situate it in relation to its social world. As a consequence it becomes too easy to associate certain works, concepts, or thinkers with a transhistorical, non-Western perspective. To be fair, it is only relatively recently that political theorists have begun to situate the writings of canonical Western thinkers in relation to their social world (see Valdez, 2017). What such an approach can reveal is that claims to epistemic difference are not entirely new, but have resonances with past political efforts to integrate ethno-culturally different societies into a connected and unequal world order. Thus epistemic difference should not be seen simply as a reflection of an externally existing reality, but as a process of representation which is power laden and dialectical.

The categories which would eventually evolve into a rhetorical commonplace of West/East or West/non-West were born bound up in contestation over the meaning of ethno-cultural difference within a world order divided by empires (Said, 1979; 1993; Doty, 1996; Salter, 2002; Aydin, 2007; Biswas, 2007; Barkawi, 2010; Go and Lawson, 2017). The imperial division of the world was both discursive and material. Writing for a UNESCO conference in 1972, Amílcar Cabral argued that colonial social genesis and fragmentation were the result of ‘imperialist capital’, which

imposed new kind of relations on the indigenous society, imparting to it a more complex structure, and engendered, fostered, sharpened, or resolved contradictions and social conflicts… it gave birth to new nations based on
human groupings or peoples at different stages of development. [2016 (1972)]: 160-161]

The territories in Africa and the 'new world', which would become associated with pan-African and black radical politics, were differentiated by imperial capital and forced labour flows in various ways (e.g. Williams, 1994 [1944]; Hopkins, 1973; Rodney, 1982; Gilroy, 1993; Jones, 2005; Shilliam, 2009). African territories were differentiated between coastal societies, which had centuries of engagement with outsiders, and inland societies, which were sometimes understood to have remained more traditionally African (Shumway, 2014). Within coastal and inland societies, there was further differentiation between tribal elites, the Western-educated middle classes, and different segments of the masses. There were also differentiations between colonies, which reflected not only their respective European rulers, but their various uses and importance for imperial extraction, security, and administration. Thus, the experiences of colonial subjects in Senegal and the Gold Coast differed from those of Jamaica, Martinique, or St. Kitts. Though not colonial subjects nominally, the societies and politics of African Americans, linked as they were to the Atlantic slave trade, were also shaped by imperial-colonial structures of relation.

The imperial politics of division were not either assimilationist or exclusionist. Rather, they worked to include different classes of ‘native’ populations in different ways (Anghie, 2007; Cooper, 2014; Getachew, 2019). For example, at the height of imperial confidence during the mid-19th century, Britain advanced policies to assimilate West Africans through ‘commerce and Christianity’, and train them in bureaucratic, military, and legal professions as future leaders of a ‘civilised’ Africa to come (Zachernuk, 2000: 44). Later and in different contexts, empires implemented
policies of non-intervention or indirect rule. These policies could provide alibis for the perceived futility of trying to convert and incorporate natives, or were designed to maintain control within a rationale of preserving indigenous culture (Crowder, 1964; Mantena, 2010; Mamdani, 2012). By the early 20th century, there existed a transnational class of colonial elites, lobbying for greater access to positions of authority and influence within the imperial network. When policies of indirect rule were established after WWI, many of these elites were denied leadership roles on the grounds that they failed to authentically represent the cultures of their people. Meanwhile, representatives of ‘traditional’ culture, religion, and politics could rule with relative autonomy over local communities. Colonial officials who believed themselves experts on native culture were often open to manipulation by these representatives (Parsons, 2014: 8, 20).

These strategies of imperial division elicited different types of difference claim. The two categories of difference claim that frame the remainder of the discussion can be termed the particular as universal and the particular as particular. While the particular as universal asserts difference to both resist assimilation and emphasise shared humanity, the logic of the particular as particular is to emphasise essential difference to establish autonomy (cf. Paipais, 2011). Rather than necessarily sequential, or abstractly opposed or harmonious, these two types of claim are subject to processes of dialectical engagement between actors within connected and unequal social orders. This tension can be seen in the scholarship and activism of Du Bois and Fanon, and is reproduced in contemporary anti-Eurocentric scholarship.

*Epistemic mapping - self-definition against and for empire*
The image of Europe as a realm of material success, scientific discovery, democracy, and secular rationalism could sustain a vision of non-Westerners as benefactors of white guidance, at best, or perennial children in need of intervention at worst. Obversely, European thinkers since the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment -- such as Herder, Las Casas, and Voltaire -- had argued that Europe should respect, or even learn from, the spiritual and cultural essences of Eastern cultures or indigenous Amerindians (Bailey, 1992; Todorov, 1996; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: ch. 2). A typical tendency of anti-colonial nationalist discourse in the late 19th and 20th centuries was to appropriate and reverse the tropes of spiritual richness, artistic sensibility, or rootedness in communal values. These traits were used as a basis for arguments that non-Westerners – because of their distinct histories, practices, cultures, and intellectual traditions -- had the potential to become even better liberals, socialists, soldiers, or moderns than Westerners (Chatterjee, 1986: 55, 138-139). Used to defeat the legitimation scripts of exclusion and imperial encroachment, these arguments further associated specific qualities with Western and non-Western ethnicity, culture, and history.\textsuperscript{vi}

I call this practice epistemic mapping. Epistemic mapping is a representational practice based on the notion that different ideas, practices, or thought systems have a single geographical provenance, or can be coded according to a set of particular social relations or embodied social subjectivities. Whereas epistemic difference was sometimes invoked in the late imperial context to reject the politics of assimilation and exclusion, epistemic mapping \textit{institutionalises} particular representations of difference for purposes of comparison or critique.

Comparing the arguments of Amitav Acharya – the leading proponent of ‘Global IR’ – with the early racial nationalist arguments of W.E.B. Du Bois, reveals
continuity in the imperial structure of this practice. Acharya argues that the goal of Global IR is to ‘subsume, rather than supplant, existing IR theories and methods’ (Acharya, 2014b: 649; 2016: 6). Mainstream IR should not be reconstructed, but augmented in various ways by the insights of the non-West (Acharya, 2014b: 650). This means deeper incorporation of Area Studies to add empirical breadth and depth (Acharya, 2014b: 655), and drawing on ‘non-Western traditions’ such as ‘Hindu epic literature and Buddhist philosophy’ to augment methodological practice (Acharya, 2016: 8). Presenting himself as a representative of the ‘non-Western World’, Acharya claims that the desire for ‘relative autonomy and recognition’ within the existing international order is more representative of the global South than those politics which sought or seek to transform it (Acharya, 2014a: 16).

Du Bois’s scholarship before 1940 was also marked by the assertion of non-Western cultural traits, and the promotion of non-Western contributions to the global democratic project. His arguments emerged in opposition to both white nativist rhetoric in the United States (Foley, 2010: 170), and the project of global white supremacy, which continued to legitimate imperial rivalry and Euro-American ‘stewardship’ of the colonies after WWI (Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Vitalis, 2015; Pedersen, 2015; Younis, 2017; Getachew, 2019). Du Bois’s representations of blackness were consistent with Lamarckian evolutionism and the Boasian turn in American anthropology. These academic paradigms attributed difference to environment and history rather than biology, and were referenced by both racists and anti-racists to essentialise cultural traits as a basis for policy (Reed Jr., 1997: 120; Vitalis, 2015: ch. 2).

While more sophisticated than biological explanations, sociohistorical development still attempted to code whole groups of people according to generic
traits. In 1924’s *the Gift of Black Folk*, Du Bois devotes each chapter to a different contribution made by the black race to the United States and to the democratic forces of the world. He explains black contributions with reference to the cultural development of the race in relation to its African setting. Du Bois writes that ‘[t]he Negro is primarily an artist…. [th]e only race which had held at bay the life destroying forces of the tropics, has gained therefrom in some slight compensation a sense of beauty, particularly for sound and color, which characterizes the race’ (Du Bois, 2014 [1924]: 104). Du Bois’s criticism of European empire during this period presupposed that the fates of Europe and ‘darker peoples’ were linked through longstanding imperial relations (Du Bois, 2016 [1920]: 23-25). Writing in 1920, Du Bois attributed the greatness of Europe to its ability to capitalise on non-European knowledge: ‘Why, then is Europe great? Because of the foundations which the mighty past have furnished her to build upon: the iron trade of ancient black Africa, the religion and empire-building of yellow Asia, the art and science of the “dago” Mediterranean shore’ (Du Bois 2016 [1920]: 23, italics added).

Although Du Bois argued that these different civilisations should follow their own particular historical and cultural lines of development, he also held that different civilisations should aspire to a world standard of civilisation. Consistent with one logic of imperial race development, ethnic and cultural categories such as black or non-Western must be preserved until the people they represent can make important civilisational contributions. In his pre-war and inter-war work, Du Bois appropriated the imperial challenge for races to prove themselves as races by re-establishing their own empires. Referring to pre-colonial African empires such as Songhai, Benin, and Mali, Du Bois argued that the black race should avoid miscegenation until it has built ‘a great black race tradition of which the Negro and the world will be as proud in the
future as it has been in the ancient world’ (cited in Wolters, 2003: 158). While Du Bois opposed the violence and exploitation of European empire, he also envisaged an integrated Pan-Africa which would be built on modern standards of civilisation and guided by a black elite who could speak for an authentic black culture.

Du Bois’s practice of both defending the potential of black populations to become civilised, as well as defending traditional African folkways and particularities, stemmed from the contradictions in engaging multiple audiences within a multi-axial social and political order. For Du Bois, civilisation was to take place with respect to inherent group traits – a sentiment which appealed to dominant ideas about authentic African difference within the American university (see Posnock, 1997: 336) – but ‘postulation of an exotic black particularity’ also demonstrated the need for a cultured, educated black elite as ‘spokespersons’, ‘keepers and translators of the culture’ with respect to a dominant white constituency (Reed Jr. 1997: 58). Representations of African exoticism would have also appealed to some audiences during a moment when concern with ‘overcivilisation’ was in vogue with affluent metropolitan whites.

As we will see in section three, Du Bois eventually shifted away from epistemic mapping towards international class consciousness and strategic anti-imperial alliances. However, Du Bois’s pre-1940 cultural nationalism is illustrative of the imperial structure of the discourse. The continued prominence of cultural nationalist arguments in the period after WWII provides important context for Frantz Fanon’s aversion to the politics of imperial coexistence.

*Imperial dialectics and the lure of coexistence*
Empire maintained dehumanising hierarchies of race and culture, but also created overtures to multicultural coexistence which could maintain imperial order by extending authority to colonial clients. Subverting and building on Hegel’s dialectics of reciprocal recognition, Fanon observed that late empire could extend formal equality and rights without dismantling the fundamental hierarchy of a master/slave relationship. ‘The White man is a master who allowed slaves to eat at his table’, Fanon wrote (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 194). Recognition in the imperial context did not necessarily mean emancipation, but could imply the extension of imperial power in the form of ethnic and cultural inclusion (see Coulthard, 2014).

Fanon’s imperial dialectics problematise the idea that a variety of different representations of difference can be sustained simultaneously and harnessed at will for different strategies (cf. Sabaratnam, 2011). This is because the deployment of ‘self and other’ representations helps construct the social and political reality of that ‘self and other’, while simultaneously negating other potentialities (Mamdani, 2012). Such representations are politically consequential and highly ambiguous, and so their reification as scholarly knowledge has to be avoided.

Colonialism, in the sense that Fanon confronted it, was a specific kind of war, where the arrestment – not necessarily the death – of native culture is a tool of domination. Cultural and racial chauvinism are not the primary concern of empire. Rather, it is the ‘gigantic business’ of ‘colonial war’ that makes ‘the enslavement… of the native population’ the ‘prime necessity.’ Colonial enslavement required that native populations’ cultural ‘systems of reference’ had to be ‘broken.’ This is not initially chauvinism for its own sake, but a ‘condition’ which accompanies and legitimates ‘[e]xpropriation, spoliation, raids, objective murder’ (Fanon, 1980 [1956]: 33). Colonialism did not necessarily lead to the death of native culture. ‘On the contrary’,
Fanon wrote, it takes a culture ‘once living and open to the future’ and renders it ‘closed, fixed in the colonial status, caught in the yoke of oppression’. Subverting Hegelian recognition, empire made it impossible ‘for a man to evolve otherwise than within the framework of a culture that recognizes him and that he decides to assume’ (Fanon, 1980: 34).

Crucially, Fanon never advocated the reification of ethno-cultural difference as the best anti-imperial strategy amongst others, and he certainly did not advocate ontologising specific representations of difference as part of academic knowledge production. Because of the subjugation of non-Western cultures within the material and social hierarchy of empire, the mobilisation of groups which had been diminished by Europeans was a potent tool to reclaim power in colonised countries. However, in turning culture outward, the danger was that it become an inert celebration of itself and not drive towards its own transformation. The mobilisation of identity was not purely for the sake of national independence, but necessary for the Third World to seize power on the world stage and to chart a political and economic course between the West and the Soviet Union (Hudis, 2015: 80-81). Failing to overcome the particular as particular would mean that newly independent nations would likely fail to integrate into larger, unified federations, and therefore remain susceptible to new forms of colonialism and division. In a reply to his admirer, the Iranian political thinker, Ali Shariati, Fanon wrote, ‘I respect your view that in the Third World… Islam, more than any other social and ideological force, has had an anti-colonialist capacity and an anti-Western nature.’ However, he concluded, ‘I, for one, fear that the fact of revitalizing the spirit of sectarianism and religion may result in a setback for a nation that is engaged in the process of becoming, of distancing itself from its future and immobilizing it in its past’ (cited in Hudis, 2015: 134).
Race is also (ultimately) too thin to serve as the basis for a sustainable revolutionary political formation. In his final work before his death, *Les Damnés de la Terre [the Wretched of the Earth]*, Fanon wrote that the ‘historical necessity in which the men of African culture find themselves to racialize their claims and to speak more of African culture than of national culture will tend to lead them up a blind alley’ (Fanon, 1963: 172, italics added). Race reaches a limit of its ability to unify, and becomes subordinated to the particularities of a new international political context (Fanon, 1963: 173-174). It is at this stage that class politics become especially important, because without continued revolutionary momentum, the ruling class of the newly independent nation will simply reproduce the chauvinism and oppressive relations of the colonial administration (Fanon, 1963: 125-128).

None of this was purely hypothetical. When Fanon was engaged with the revolutionary *Front de Libération Nationale* during the Franco-Algerian war, he was surrounded by native leaders who wished to make amends with the French Empire on culturalist terms. For example, the first president of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, wished for France to fully include its African territories as part of a multiracial, multicultural confederation (Cooper, 2014; Wilder, 2015). Like Du Bois, Senghor argued for African inclusion on the grounds that Africans had distinct cultural virtues and intellectual traits, which were complementary rather than antagonistic with those of Europeans (Howe, 1999: 26). This kind of argument was typical, though not exhaustive, of the mid-20th century literary and political movement, *Négritude*. During the Franco-Algerian war, Fanon took aim at Senghor and the ‘bards of Négritude’, who, construct an ‘inventory of particularisms’ out of ‘reified’ ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ (cited in Wilder, 2015: 134).
Demarcating the non-Western as a zone of difference to be devalued or mined for particularisms ultimately steals the right of the global South to its share of human history. Fanon’s answer to this is to assert the particular as universal by rejecting the notion that ideas, innovations, and histories rightfully or exclusively belong to particular groups: ‘I am a man, and in this sense the Peloponnesian War is as much mine as the invention of the compass’ (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 175). Part of this means recognising that, although ethno-cultural identity is crucial to the struggle against empire, it is secondary to the political struggle which creates other forms of identity and solidarity. ‘My black skin is not the wrapping of specific values’, Fanon writes (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 177). ‘Every time a man has contributed to the victory of the dignity of the spirit, every time a man has said no to an attempt to subjugate his fellows, I have felt solidarity with his act’ (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 176).

One of the key takeaways from this analysis of Du Bois’s and Fanon’s representations of difference is the overlap, but fundamental difference, between representation for academic praxis and representation for political/activist praxis. In the process of political/activist praxis, representation might take different forms depending on the strategic content of the dialectical response to hegemony. Essentialism might be condoned in these circumstances, or simply emerge as a reaction. However, it is not the role of academic praxis to condone essentialism, but to offer accounts for why or how it is possible for essentialism to take place. Yet, it is essentialism in academic praxis which is sometimes produced by anti-Eurocentric IR.

**Re-dividing the world**
Epistemic mapping and anti-Eurocentric IR

Like Senghor and the early Du Bois, anti-Eurocentric scholars often reproduce the imperial division of the world when invoking the non-Western. In emphasising difference, anti-Eurocentric scholars occlude access to the values, practices, or political projects – good or bad -- that cut across or have been shared by people in the global North and South. While essentialism of this kind might sometimes seem politically necessary -- at least in the short term – its reliability as knowledge needs to be more closely interrogated.

To an extent, the incentive structure to add alternatives in the form of non-Western alternatives is passed down by mainstream IR theorists. For example, mainstream realists who have essentialised the ‘character’ of non-Western nations as a limit on the expansion of Western universalism (e.g. Huntington, 1997; Kissinger, 2014; see Reus-Smit, 2017), can provoke responses valorising non-Western universalisms. Or mainstream realists who argue that non-Western IR can offer nothing that Western IR does not already (e.g. Mearsheimer, 2016) can provoke a proliferation of exceptions in the form of ethnic and cultural particularisms.

Though not all anti-Eurocentric IR scholars are equally incautious about epistemic mapping, it is broadly practiced and seemingly difficult to avoid. Epistemic mapping is brought in to offer ‘global’ or ‘post-Western’ alternatives to IR’s ‘analytical bifurcations’ – such as West/East, theoretical/atheoretical, subjective/objective – but actually elaborates on these bifurcations. When Acharya points to constructivism’s role in ‘opening space for scholarship on the non-Western world’ because of its emphasis on ‘culture and Identity’ he is drawing on an older bifurcation based on the notion that while the West has ‘knowledge’, the non-West has ‘culture’ (Acharya,
Similarly, Yaqing Qin (2018) reproduces a familiar stereotype about the West operating from a knowledge culture of ‘rationality’, whereas China operates from an epistemology of ‘relation.’ Robbie Shilliam has been a foremost scholar in pointing out the different uses of the Western, and the inherent problems of representing an authentic non-Western removed from colonial history (2010). However, in his recent work, the Black Pacific, he claims the ability (though not unproblematic) to speak for the lived experiences and ‘living knowledge traditions’ of Maori and Pasifika peoples. These living knowledge traditions, Shilliam argues, provide access to an epistemic alternative to ‘Western modernity’, supposedly free of ‘Western’ hierarchy or violence (Shilliam, 2015: 7-12). These claims sometimes come with troubling assertions of a hegemonic national philosophy or religion as the basis for epistemic difference. For example, Confucianism is equated with Chinese in a manner which celebrates a particular representation of national identity and buries internal contestation and the myriad historical forces which shaped contemporary China. Note, for example, that Qin’s book on Chinese IR contains no reference to international communism or Mao Zedong as intellectual or cultural influences on modern China.

Other varieties of epistemic mapping allow for ‘hybrid’ forms of social, political, and economic organisation, but retain the essential origin of the individual components. For example, Agathangelou and Ling’s invocation of ‘Asian capitalism’, which they conceptualise as the result of ‘mater liberalism’s consummation with the Confucian world-order’ creates a hybrid category out of two essentialisms (2004: 27). Contrast this with Fanon, who refused to concede rightful ownership of human knowledge to particular peoples, regions, or civilisations.
The way that the debate is structured around these divisions leaves it poorly guarded against the double-edged valence of difference. Reduction of difference to ethnic and cultural categories (including European) can lead to reduction of groups to their worst practices, to virtuous caricatures, or disable the critiques of anyone seen to be outside these groups. That different societies have produced different cultural particularities is not in doubt; however, the meanings that intellectual origin claims carry are ambiguous and can be put to many different uses. Ancient Greece, for example, provides some of the major foundations of dominant Western thought, but in its historical context it had more cultural, intellectual, and political links with the civilisations of Asia Minor and Egypt. Both of these statements can be true, yet both can be emphasised in different ways for different effects (for example see, Duara, 1996: 40; Young, 2016; 33).

Take the claim, sometimes obliquely made, that non-Western perspectives are distinct sources of cultural cohesion, spirituality, or moral insight. For example, Arlene Tickner’s assertion that modern Western belief systems are based upon an instrumental relationship between human beings (subject) and nature (object) that translates into the instrumentalisation of knowledge or the view of knowledge as a commodity. Instead, many non-Western cosmogonies view the self, community and nature as interdependent parts of a single whole, with which their understanding of the relationship between knowledge and the natural world, and of the social function of knowledge in general, is markedly different. [Tickner, 2003: 305] Such a claim is not only essentialist, but politically ambiguous. Imperial authorities made similar claims about non-Western worldviews in order to justify exclusion on
the grounds that ‘natives’ were ill-adept for modernity, but also to cast doubt on the authenticity of ‘Westernised’ native critics. It is unlikely that Tickner means to essentialise; however, the characterisation of the non-Western as more attuned to communal values and the natural world emerges from the dialectical impetus to define the particular non-Western against the particular Western. The definition of the Western as rational and universalist is also constructed, and is complicated by any close inspection of the variety of communitarian religious beliefs, anti-modern sentiment, and counter-Enlightenment philosophy within modern Europe and the West. On the other hand, many non-Westerners also see knowledge as a commodity. Commodification of knowledge is therefore not explicable purely in terms of ethno-cultural thought systems.

This raises the related point that the non-Western alternatives being defined need not be insular or ‘communitarian’ in order to be essentialisms. The claim is not that the ‘non-Western’ circumscribes too narrow a section of humanity, but that it carves up the world into separate realms which are coded according to some ingredient which defines them in contradistinction to the Western. Arguments that non-Westerners have their own universalisms (Acharya, 2014b: 649-650), alternative sources of cosmopolitanism (Munro and Shilliam, 2010), or local humanisms (Nakano, 2010) demonstrate that political globalism is universal, regardless of whether or not its universality can be evaluated as serving progressive or conservative, emancipatory or oppressive political aims. However, attributing specific global visions to a particular social or historical experience supposedly shared by people with the same race and culture only makes sense within a politicised discourse where the value of the non-Western has been somehow challenged.
Then there are definitions of epistemic difference based on ‘lived experience.’ Although an improvement on territorial or raciological accounts, the ascription of cultural difference to a generic lived experience or social subjectivity can also reduce groups of people to stereotypes and monolithic value sets. This is evident in the work of some scholars who take Fanon primarily as a source of ‘epistemic blackness’, without fully addressing his concerns about racialisation and the geopolitical dimensions of decolonisation. For example, the philosopher Lewis R. Gordon writes that ‘Fanon’s body… is a subtext of all his writings…. Anxiety over embodiment is a dimension of Western civilization against which Fanon was in constant battle. The body, he laments, is a denied presence, and black people are a denied people’ (Gordon, 2015: 8). Even in as sophisticated an analysis of Fanon as Gordon’s, there is a danger of essentialism through the association of black identity with a particular way of thinking. For Fanon, black people were not so much universally ‘denied’ as relegated to certain roles within a social hierarchy—the French empire most specifically. Blacks could be higher or lower status, but race was the basis for social relegation which alienated the subject from a full, dynamic humanity. For Fanon, every particular experience is an instantiation of the universal, and his analysis of his own experience is a demand to be recognised as a fellow human with an equal stake in humanity. Blackness is not a generalisable perspective from which we can derive a non-Western knowledge, but a reminder to pay attention to the social and historical specificity of relation.ix

Embodiment arguments are usually the vehicle for Fanon’s presence in IR, and are often accompanied with the claim that non-Westerners have profoundly different ways of practicing politics or being modern. For example, Vivienne Jabri (2014) invokes Fanon to theorise the ‘embodied presence’ of non-Western agency
within international order. Anna Agathangelou (2016) links different aspects of Fanon’s revolutionary dialectics to his conception of the subjugated black body. She is particularly interested in how Fanon’s conception of racial experience might present alternatives or ‘different’ ways of doing politics (Agathangelou 2016: 111; cf. Sekyi-Otu, 2009). In a similar argument, John M. Hobson contrasts the ‘different critique’ of ‘African-American Marxists’, including Du Bois, with ‘white Eurocentric institutional thinkers’ like Leonard Woolf (Hobson, 2012: 17, n. 20). However, the difference is not as stark as Hobson might hope. It is true that Woolf’s anti-racism was qualified by a belief in elite institutional development, but so was Du Bois’s anti-imperialism. Areas of overlap are thus obscured by the assumption that there are ‘black’ and ‘white’ ideas, which can be mapped onto generic ‘black’ and ‘white’ social realities.

Aside from its dubious reliability, the problem with epistemic mapping is essentially the same as the problem with the ethnicised counter claims of Du Bois or Senghor: it is too amenable to the purposes of imperial ordering and elite representation. It creates and services the two worlds of Said’s orientalist divide, rather than building an agenda based on analytical approaches which constructively problematise the divide.

*Logics of epistemic coexistence*

Fanon’s concerns about imperial coexistence continue to have relevance in the way that anti-Eurocentric scholars represent the relationship between Western and non-Western epistemes. Associations of Western and non-Western with specific traits are reinforced by scholarly prescriptions of how the two *ought* to interact. Anti-
Eurocentrism is therefore an ethos as well as an analytical approach. Anti-Eurocentric scholars tend to make arguments both in favour and against peaceful integration of the non-Western and the Western. Claims that the non-Western must make itself autonomous from the Western (e.g. Mignolo, 2009), or that non-Western IR must be added as a complement to Western IR to produce a more ‘inclusive and diverse’ discipline (e.g. Acharya, 2014; 2016) both tend to presuppose that the Western and non-Western exist ‘out there’ as de-contested and fixed (or, at least, de-contestable and fixable) realms of social and political inquiry. Each in its own way can reproduce imperial coexistence and recognition, Fanon’s ‘seat at the master’s table’ and Said’s orientalist division of the world.

Anti-Eurocentric coexistence reproduces an imperial image of the world based on a non-West which is spiritually rich, radically pluralist, and organically socialist, and a West which is hierarchical, absolutist, and secular. Anti-Eurocentric scholars sometimes essentialise the Western as a political and philosophical force which is chauvinistic at its root (e.g. Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Mignolo, 2011; Hobson, 2012). These approaches suggest a fundamental antagonism between Western and non-Western, but in doing so, produce flattened images of each. It then follows that steps must be taken to rid or purify the non-Western of embedded Western traits. Calling this a promotion of coexistence may seem counter-intuitive. Mignolo, for example, is certainly very critical of the Western, and extrapolates from this a professed desire for a different world. However, his critique comes with the assumption that the Western cannot or should not be transformed in any fundamental way. Rather, the Western is fixed and essentialised as an object of binary opposition. New universalisms of pluralism and horizontality must be derived from non-Western
thought systems, putting the Western in its place and leaving it alone (although, see Rojas, 2016).

Alternatively, scholars who favour non-Western diversification of social and political inquiry sometimes argue that purportedly ‘non-Western’ traits, such as ‘relationality’, can be added to ‘the Western’ in order to act as a mediating force on ‘its’ violence. Coexistence here is not only the prescribed mode of interaction, but it is the contribution that non-Western culture is making to the discipline. These scholars recognise conflict between West and non-West, but often downplay or ignore the power dynamics and structural inequalities within representations of Western and non-Western. Take Ling’s Daoist dialectics, which, though it makes the valuable offer of liminal identities between East and West, nevertheless reinscribes the divide by assigning ownership of relational conceptions to non-Western thought systems. Ling writes that Western political ‘common sense’ offers only intellectual resources for violence towards difference, not for recognition and negotiation (Ling, 2013: 12, 15). Strategies for negotiation – perhaps for any constructive, mutually-affirming political relations -- must therefore be taken from non-Western thought systems, such as Daoism and the yin/yang. She does not convey ‘hegemony, hierarchy, and violence’ as endemic to many societies across space and time, but ‘enactments’ of the dominant Western picture of the world. But for its many evils, the Western should not be subsumed, but balanced by the ‘parity, fluidity, and ethics’ offered by ‘other worlds’ (Ling, 2013: 14). Here, war and peace become fundamentally questions of attitude towards cultural or racial difference, not structurally determined results of historical inequality within and between societies.

Another potential pitfall of the ethos of coexistence is that it elicits an open-ended demand for a proliferation of ‘different’ perspectives, removed from the
sociohistorical contexts wherein these perspectives gain meaning. The non-Western can thus become a kind of global ‘pick and mix’ for epistemic diversification or institutional strategy, and the specific, dialectical relations which elicit representations of the non-Western are broadly passed over. Unearthing different perspectives either becomes a virtue in itself – in the name of diversification – or as a means of retrieving perspectives which will grant greater ‘openness’ (Bilgin, 2016: 137-138; e.g. Grovogui, 2009: 138). This is, of course, not to say that greater openness and diversity would necessarily be undesirable. However, without a complementary impetus to assess these perspectives for their ability to produce or impede a more just society, let alone whether they are that ‘different’ to begin with, the politics of pluralisation are obscured (see Eun, 2019; Paipais, 2016).

There is thus a danger in depoliticising difference when making absolute virtues out of diversity and openness. While calls for diversity might be politically constructive, scholars should not advocate a plurality of representations of difference without rigorous critical analysis of those representations. Edward Said, in the same vein as Fanon, wrote from an analytical perspective which was highly conscious of geopolitical imperialism, and thus critical of certain ‘non-Western’ perspectives – e.g. ‘nativism’ – which he saw as detrimental to the political project of decolonisation (1993: 275-278). While he acknowledged that the non-West could not be reduced to an inferior or ‘backwards’ reflection of the West, he also did not support the coexistence of analytical approaches which reify non-Western difference (orientalism) and those that treat it as a discursive and material construct. This is because he knew that, while not the same as political praxis, academic knowledge has the power to shape the social world it studies, and can thus reproduce the imperial division of the world and attendant political agendas.
Dynamic difference and strategic knowledge

Not without reason, critics of Eurocentrism frequently call on Du Bois and Fanon as defenders of non-Western difference. However, as I have suggested, they tend to read them first as ‘non-Western’ thinkers, rather than as anti-imperial thinkers. In other words, they read them first as representatives of an ethnic or cultural perspective, rather than a political perspective. While culture and politics are not mutually exclusive, reduction of politics to culture can lead to flattened conceptions of the multi-axial and dynamic social worlds in which theory is produced. A correction to this can be made by emphasising the turn away from racialisation that both Du Bois and Fanon made in their later lives. Rather than an awakening to perspectives which were abstractly ‘more correct’, shifts in Du Bois’s and Fanon’s thought were embedded in the changing dynamics of relation which were part and parcel of the increasingly globalised confrontation with European empire. The takeaway here is not to abandon essentialised categories of ethno-cultural difference only to replace them with other political or identity categories, but to shift our analysis to the processes in which difference claims become viable and significant.

Du Bois and Fanon engaged with empire and colonialism as a transnational field of political action. The early to mid-twentieth century saw what Branwen Gruffyd Jones calls an ‘emergence of connected struggles and shared consciousness’ (2010). Anti-imperial leaders learned from and contributed to a ‘global canon of anti-colonial and revolutionary thought and experience’, which included diaspora activists, nationalists, anarchists, Marxists, and many others from around the world (2010: 55, italics in original). After the Second World War, Du Bois and Fanon
promoted internationalism and cultural revolution -- not valorisation of the non-Western -- as means to end imperialism.

After 1940, Du Bois came to advocate an alliance of shared political aims over ethnic and cultural nationalism. Although Du Bois was never entirely blind to class, and he recognised the political potential of proletarian revolution earlier (Horne, 1986; Henderson, 2015), the global ‘colour line’ was his predominant focus throughout the pre-war and inter-war periods. However, from 1940 on, Du Bois gradually shifted the ethno-cultural focus of his anti-imperialism towards a focus on international class consciousness and political unity. Rather than representative of a mainstream trend, the shift helped to marginalise Du Bois within the American Civil Rights movement and get him into trouble with the United States government (Horne, 1986; Gao, 2013: 64). Du Bois expanded his conception of ethno-cultural development to draw several different cultures and races together. He wrote that ‘physical’ kinship is ‘least’ significant, and ‘the badge of color relatively unimportant save as a badge.’ ‘The real essence’ of racial kinship, he wrote, ‘is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas’ (Du Bois, 1996: 640).

However, ‘the social heritage of slavery’ was not an invitation to flatten and codify the non-Western and promote its alternative universalisms. Following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Du Bois pointed to Japan’s imperialism in Asia as the cause of its downfall. He stressed the ‘structural limitations of racialist and nationalist opinion’ as giving oxygen to non-Western imperialism (Gao, 2013: 63). His advocacy of transnational and interracial solidarity based on anti-imperial democracy deepened following a visit to communist China in 1959. In his preface to
the Chinese translation of *the Souls of Black Folk* in 1959, Du Bois intimated that ‘the color line was now less important than class consciousness’ (Gao, 2013: 75). This was not exclusively a clarion call to non-white multitudes, but promotion of a strategic alliance of anti-imperial forces. During his visit, Du Bois also called on China to align itself with the United States and Russia: states he saw as being forces for anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in world politics (Gao, 2013: 63). That a closer or more detached assessment might have proved the United States and Russia unworthy of Du Bois’s endorsement is beside the point: political goals, at least in the current conjuncture, mattered more than ethno-cultural identity.

Fanon, in some ways subsuming Du Bois, was even less ambiguous: ethnic and cultural foundations for politics are stumbling blocks to the revolutionary momentum needed to confront imperialism. Take a portion of a speech delivered by Fanon in 1958 at the All-African Peoples’ Conference in the newly independent Ghana:

An African’s anticolonialism, even when already independent, cannot be reduced to staking out a moral position. Each African is an anticolonialist soldier and we well know that, in certain circumstances, we do not have the choice of arms. The African’s anticolonialism is a combatant anticolonialism and not a realm of ethnic awareness – the Belgian, English or French colonialists must get used to seeing each African as an unremitting enemy of their domination in Africa. [Fanon, 2018: 636]

National consciousness, which, Fanon insists ‘is not nationalism’, is the vehicle for entry into a decolonised international (see also Jabri, 2012). National consciousness
is not an expression of the ‘reified’, ‘traditional’ culture of indirect rule, but a new inter-cultural, inter-class identity formed out of empire’s collapse and anti-imperial resistance (Fanon, 1963: 190-199). It is through the process of organised resistance against dominant culture – both imperial and ‘native’ – that new emancipatory identities emerge. Fanon imagines that these processes will or should lead to the ‘break-up of the old strata of culture’ (1963: 197). They must also be driven by the popular will of the masses, and not by elite fiat (1963: 198).

The anti-imperial struggle necessitated an image of the colonised sharing ‘the stage of history’ with the rest of the world, and not sanctifying a local perspective of history (1963: 199). Fanon argued that individual colonies in Africa and the Caribbean should retain their individual sovereignty until they can form ‘a confederation of mature states, determined to help each other and to defend each other’s freedom’ (2018: 589). Thus, the basis of ‘African-Negro’ national consciousness is not race politics, but the result of a geopolitical condition: ‘every independent nation in an Africa where colonialism is still entrenched is an encircled nation, a nation which is fragile and in permanent danger’ (1963: 199). The shared national consciousness of Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, or Angola is not the unity symbolised by race, but the unity created by imperialist threat and anti-imperial resistance (1963: 170-174). This is fundamentally a multi-racial project: ‘the concept of Africa for the Africans does not mean that other races are excluded…. We struggle for the future of humanity and it is a most important struggle’ (Fanon, 2018: 656, italics added).

Thus, Fanon’s anti-imperialism was not a valorisation of a particular universalism, but an assertion of the particular as universal. Fanon called the anticolonial struggle a ‘messy original idea propounded as an absolute’ (Fanon, 1961:
The original idea is the ideological current which emerges from within the movement for the movement, but the movement takes place within a network of other movements all driven by the absolute demand for freedom from imperial rule (Gibson, 2011: xii). Of course, as in the case of a Senghor, freedom from empire was not a universally felt demand. Rather, Fanon’s appeal to the absolute is a political rallying cry, meant to mobilise a transnational cohort of freedom fighters. It is theory meant to inspire political action across the globe, not an academic elaboration of a particular episteme.

Anti-imperial internationalism and cultural revolution continued to form the basis for political projects in Africa and beyond after the deaths of Fanon and Du Bois (e.g. Gibson 2011). Amílcar Cabral’s revolt against the Portuguese colonial state was characterised by a call for African cultural renewal and an appeal to the international community to enshrine and enforce anti-imperial values (Cabral, 2016: 115-120; see Jones, 2010). Addressing the United Nations in 1962 as an ‘anonymous soldier for the United Nations’, Cabral urged ‘the United Nations and the anti-colonialist states and organizations – all forces of peace in the world’ to ‘take concrete action against the Portuguese state’ (cited in Shepard, 2014: 151). The Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, an admirer of Fanon and Cabral, made a similar speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2009. In it, he argued in favour of limited international intervention as long as it was not a front for imperialism (Ngũgĩ, 2009: 1-6). Ngũgĩ was previously incarcerated for his criticism of Jomo Kenyatta’s government in the late 1970s (see Ngũgĩ, 1981). Although Ngũgĩ remains a proponent of African language and culture to this day, his Marxist internationalism was at loggerheads with the post-colonial cultural nationalism which still serves as a camouflage to ongoing imperial relations and designs.
This reading runs contrary to readings which characterise Fanon as ‘strategically ambivalent’ on questions of identity or nationalism (e.g. Bell, 2013b; Rao, 2017). Fanon’s strategy was not ambivalent, but dialectical. Certain conjunctures in the relationship between coloniser/colonised, white/non-white, West/non-West elicited certain representations which appeared strategically necessary. To a reiterate a point made earlier, Fanon never advocated strategic essentialism of non-Western culture as the best of a range of options. Essentialised self-representation emerges as a dialectical response to colonial domination which must be surpassed. The role of the scholar should be to understand and explain these processes of representation, not reproduce particular representations as flattened, transhistorical realities.

**Conclusion**

While not suggesting one path forward, these histories attest to the need to move beyond the Western/non-Western division of the world in our scholarly ontologies. If IR intends to become a ‘global’ discipline – whatever this might mean – it cannot do so at the risk of continuing to reproduce imperial stereotypes about human difference. Of course, the specific disciplinary, institutional, and departmental contexts wherein ontologies are authorised and negotiated are unlikely to submit to an absolute, universal rejection of Western/non-Western. Incentives to diversify curricula and the persistence of imperial hierarchies in contemporary societies are likely to keep these categories around for a long time. This does not mean that scholars cannot run parallel programmes to disrupt essentialist representations of Western and non-Western. Instead of promoting ethnification, globalising the
discipline could suggest a move towards different categories which emphasise the
different ways human groups intersect; for example, internationally-connected
processes, strategic or affective alliances, or the inter-societal co-constitution of
ideologies, practices, and social transformations (e.g. Rosenberg, 2006; Go and
Lawson, 2017; Barkawi and Lawson, 2017). Such a shift would recognise the
porousness of the institutions/society divide in order to keep in frame the political
consequences of our categories. At the same time it would maintain the difference
between academic praxis and political/activist praxis in order to keep analytical
distance from the forms of representation elicited by social and political struggle.

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Notes

1 For aesthetic reasons I have limited the use of scare quotes around Western, non-Western, native, black, white and their variants, but do use them periodically to emphasise the contested character of these terms.

2 For example, Amitav Acharya (2016: 4, n. 1) briefly references the limitations of the binary in a footnote, and then appears to sidestep this concern in favour of a detailed argument for the inclusion of the non-Western. His collaborator, Barry Buzan (2016: 157) makes a related argument that non-Western national schools -- though potentially problematic -- must be embraced in the short term, as they are a necessary step to delivering ‘global IR.’

3 Acharya expresses the need to avoid ‘exceptionalism’ because of its association with authoritarian politics (2014: 651). However, the way that his argument is structured around ethno-cultural contributions, rather than non-ethnic, non-cultural alternatives, necessitates exceptionalist arguments. The binary structure of the discourse forces a question: If the non-Western does not provide exceptions to the Western, than what is its distinctive contribution?

4 The ‘wilful forgetting’ of empire by IR is acknowledged by Schmidt in Long and Schmidt (2005). Similar critiques of this omission are raised by, inter alia, Jones (2006) and Barkawi (2010). The most famous critique of IR as an American social science is, of course, Stanley Hoffmann’s (1977).
Aydin (2007), in particular, demonstrates that the category of ‘the West’ in its current form was largely constructed by Asian intellectuals during imperial legitimacy crises. Of course, there is also a Cold War connotation, amongst others dating back even further (see Williams, 1976: 333-334).


vii For critiques of ‘analytical bifurcations’ in IR, see Hutchings, 2011; Krishna 2015: 139; Go and Lawson, 2017.

viii For a similar critique see Vitalis (2013). Provocatively, Vitalis argues that political and economic entanglements – not race or non-Western identity -- are more robust in explaining the ‘solidarity’ of anti-imperial elites who attended the Bandung conference of 1955 (compare to Pham and Shilliam, 2016).

ix Fanon explicitly made this point in an unfavourable review of Richard Wright’s book *White man, listen!* (in Fanon, 2018).

x This was a view that Du Bois retained even after his turn to communism post-WWII. Compare Du Bois (1970 [1919]) and Du Bois (1945).

xi Claims that Western IR is already theoretically diverse enough without the contributions of the non-Western essentialise as well (e.g. Mearsheimer, 2016), but here I am only addressing anti-Eurocentric arguments.

xii However, Henderson (2017) observes that Du Bois theorised a link between chauvinistic nationalism and racialised imperialism at least ten years earlier.

xiii I do not mean to suggest that Du Bois or Fanon invented internationalism as an anti-imperial sentiment. There are, of course, examples which predate and/or emerge from other contexts. See, for example; Jayawardena, 2016 [1986]; Edwards, 2009; Jones, 2010; Rao, 2010; Sluga, 2013; Makalani, 2011.