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Recycling as bricolage in the Congolese National Police: Lessons from police training in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Michel Thill
INTRODUCTION

In his first major speech after taking over as President following the assassination of his father in January 2001, Joseph Kabila put police reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) firmly on the political agenda. In 2003, along with army reform, it became a key part of the Sun City peace agreement and the following year, police reform started in earnest. While army reform has received much attention in policy and academic literature, police reform has enjoyed comparatively little deliberation.¹

This briefing will examine a specific aspect of police reform, namely training, a central pillar of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and one which—despite its clear limits²—is often credited for its capacity to affect behavioural change amongst security actors. Considering that those who are being reformed are not mere willing subjects, but have their own experiences and interests, the briefing will shed light on the narratives of police officers undergoing training in the DRC by asking about their views, how these may impact training, and how best to take them into account in future reform programming. Everyday experiences of rank-and-file police in and after training can provide clues to donors willing to contribute to a more efficient police service. Such clues, in turn, depend on a better understanding of the political economy surrounding police training and how this impacts the behaviours and actions of police trainees (Baaz and Stern 2017; Davis 2016).
Police training can be seen as a process of bricolage, or the act of deconstructing and recombining past and present parts and pieces to create something new (Lévi Strauss 1962; Cleaver 2002; Johnson 2012). An amalgam of bricoleurs, be this the Congolese government, its international partners or the police themselves, each of whom grapple with the realities of governance in the DRC, draw on a variety of practices and resources to patch together as best they can a new form of training within the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC, Congolese National Police). Out of this process emerges the new police training practice of recyclage (recycling), which itself becomes immersed in a complex political economy of police survival and work logics. Rank-and-file and their superiors try to navigate this economy as best they can, turning recyclage into a new resource to be used, reshaped, or avoided according to their own agendas and priorities.

Two key points emerge from this analysis. First, depending on the perks associated with any given recycling, participation can be a considerable opportunity cost for dismally salaried rank-and-file. Unrewarded training can directly threaten their livelihoods as it keeps them from seeking alternative ways to make a living. At the same time, selecting participants for lucrative recycling can turn into an additional patronage resource used by superiors in return for loyalty. The value of any given recycling is thus carefully calculated by both rank-and-file and superiors. Secondly, regardless of the political economy of recyclage, turning classroom lessons into policing practice remains a major challenge in a context of scarcity, a police culture geared towards survival and extraction, and an institution deeply embedded in a wider societal constellation benefiting those on top at the expense of those at the bottom.

This brief draws on semi-structured interviews and focus groups conducted in Matadi and Bukavu in July and August 2018. In total, the research team talked to 53 people, of which 48 were police officers with the PNC, including 14 policewomen. Focus groups were divided by gender, and two of the five were made up exclusively by policewomen. In addition, the lead researcher observed a police training at Bukavu’s police school for one and a half days to gain a better understanding of daily practices and challenges of police training.

The following section will introduce everyday police work and its challenges, as well the basic objectives, achievements, and failures of the on-going reform. A third section will present the realities of training police faced by the Congolese government, its partners and the PNC itself, and the emergence of recyclage. A fourth section will illustrate the complex political economy of police training through the views and experiences of the rank-and-file, who undergo recycling. Lastly, the conclusion considers how policymakers may still successfully intervene in police training while taking these realities into account.

POLICE WORK AND REFORM

The DRC belongs to states commonly referred to as conflict-affected, weak, or fragile. However, much literature has shown that some public services like the police continue to operate (Hoffmann and Kirk 2013). According to Trefon (2009), there are three reasons for this: Instrumentalization, personal survival, and public demand. This is no different for the case of the Congolese police. Instrumentalization by the political and economic elite has given birth to a practice commonly known as rapportage (reporting). This modus operandi requires police officers to pay a certain amount of money to their superiors, usually on a weekly basis, who in turn pass it up the hierarchy, thus turning the police institution into a rather effective extractive machine (Baaz and Olson 2011; Thill 2019; Sanchez de la Sierra and Titeca, forthcoming).

Personal and institutional survival has led to the development of often less violent and more negotiated revenue-generating mechanisms. Police deployed in stations, for example, regularly demand a variety of fees for their services, be this to open a case, to visit a crime scene, or to take a statement—fees which are negotiable and which most civilians have come to reluctantly accept. Another solution to make ends meet is for the police to ask for help from their social network, including colleagues, family and friends, or to set up mutual solidarity funds. Finally, popular demand for police services leads many civilians, who are well aware of the difficult predicament of the police, to encourage their good work by voluntarily offering financial help from time to time. In sum, police work in the Congo consists as much of generating revenue as that of enforcing the law and maintaining order (Baaz and Olsson 2012; Thill 2019).

When the UK government decided to back the ongoing reform of the PNC with its GBP 60 million Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR)
programme, the most ambitious police reform support initiative to date, the objective was to not only address some of these nefarious internal dynamics, but also to overcome its troubled past as the authoritarian state’s tool of violent political oppression. Influenced by democratic policing models from the Global North, and building on community-orientated police reform approaches trialed across conflict-affected and socially divided countries, the SSAPR programme helped transform the PNC into a Police de Proximité (PdP, Proximity Police). The PdP aims to be more accountable to the communities it serves, to listen and respond to the population’s security needs and by doing so, to transition to an apolitical and democratic police service (CSRP 2011; Denney and Jenkins 2013; Marenin 2004). Its three pilot sites were Bukavu, Kananga, and Matadi. The SSAPR took a two-pronged approach, promoting institutional reform and capacity building at the highest level while simultaneously carrying out large popular sensitization campaigns and establishing meeting platforms between police, urban administrations, and communities. From 2010 to its premature end in early 2015 due to Operation Likofi, a campaign of violent repression of youth gangs by Kinshasa’s police force, the SSAPR programme achieved a number of successes. A series of key laws and decrees on the police were passed and over 1,500 police officers were trained in PdP principles across its three pilot cities. In Bukavu and Matadi, despite the difficulties of adhering to them all the time, these principles are still very much in PdP-trained police officers’ minds when going about their work (Thill et al. 2018).

While the impact of some SSAPR initiatives has endured, the effect of others has paled out and vanished. For example, under the programme’s coaching system, trained police coaches provided continued mentoring to low-level commanders and station chiefs. Unfortunately, these coaches stopped receiving support for their activities once SSAPR ended. Today, while the spirit of the reform lives on in parts of Bukavu’s and Matadi’s police, there is no denying that some of the worst survival practices such as arbitrary arrests to extort money or charge detainees for food have returned. Nevertheless, despite this reality of police work, the SSAPR has shown that training can help mitigate some of them and bring about behavioural change. In the words of a police chief, “Like me, I am commander and when I work more with elements who have not been trained, I will have difficulties because they are often busy harassing, but those who are trained cannot do this. So I can make a recommendation—that these people are also proximitized [proximisés, i.e. trained in proximity police principles].”

How then can donors best pick up this police chief’s suggestion and ensure that the reform successes are more firmly anchored in police training across the DRC? To approach this question, it is important to first understand police training as the result of a complex process of bricolage.

TRAINING THE PNC: RECYCLING TO FILL THE VOID

In theory, police recruits take an initial examination after which, if successfully passed, they start basic police training for 12 to 24 months, depending on which entry-level rank the recruit aims to obtain. Those who pass the training receive a certificate (“brevet”) and are deployed. However, as is common in many fragile and conflict-affected states, the Congolese state has a limited budget for police training and reform, and relies on donors to fund much of it. A senior police officer commented that no police training takes place without donor support. Indeed, donors regularly sign agreements with the PNC to fund and support the implementation of police training. Donor support is vital to police reform; without it, one may wonder if much progress would be made. That said, having multiple donors involved creates challenges of coherence and coordination as donor priorities and programmes around SSR and stabilization do not always perfectly align with those of the PNC priorities, nor with each other (Boshoff et al. 2010).

These challenges are compounded by the history and nature of the Congolese police itself. The PNC’s elements have been drawn from former Gendarmerie and Garde Civile, both of which had received military training, and from former soldiers and a myriad of armed group combatants. Many have not undergone any form of police training and reform, and relies on donors to fund much of it. A senior police officer commented that no police training takes place without donor support. Indeed, donors regularly sign agreements with the PNC to fund and support the implementation of police training. Donor support is vital to police reform; without it, one may wonder if much progress would be made. That said, having multiple donors involved creates challenges of coherence and coordination as donor priorities and programmes around SSR and stabilization do not always perfectly align with those of the PNC priorities, nor with each other (Boshoff et al. 2010).
police and its dismal work conditions.  

In the quasi-absence of formal police recruitment and training, an alternative has developed. The PNC, the Congolese government and its partners attempt to bridge the gaps in state funding and capacity, to align diverging priorities, and to meet urgent needs on the ground through recyclage. This kind of police training targets those who are already in the police and aims to retrain them, or strengthen key aspects of police work, be this technical such as the maintenance of public order or more deontological, such as proximity police principles and human rights, or a combination of both. They are thus, to some extent, stopgaps. In the words of a police officer, “Thanks to recycling, we are filling the void.”

Due to budgetary constraints, recyclage is shorter than basic training, often lasting only a few weeks or mere days. They usually involve neither an initial test, nor a certificate at the end, although there are exceptions, but may offer catering and travel compensation to participants. As these are commonly part of the many donor-funded programmes, recyclages occur frequently. Moreover, recycling police officers is also one of MONUSCO UNPOL’s main tasks. In fact, there are so many recyclages that a senior police officer in Bukavu mentioned that he could barely keep track of them.

While the police hierarchy appreciates donor support for police reform, some also have reservations for the nature of recyclage. For example, the same senior police officer regretted the fact that these trainings have come to replace the formal and much more comprehensive training almost altogether: “One cannot recycle those who are not trained,” he said, so “one would need more training than recycling.” He further deplored that, because recycling does not have any impact on police ranks, some trainees see it as a waste of time. A senior colleague in Matadi pointedly observed that the overall impact of filling the void with recyclage is “like a drop in the bucket.” In a focus group, talking about the sustainability of the on-going police reform, a police officer corroborated this feeling of fighting a losing battle:

The police are dynamic. There is regular recruiting. And, as recruitment continues, the number of those who are not proximitized [“proximisé” in original, i.e. reformed according to the principles of the Proximity Police] grows [...] Proximity police has stopped but police numbers go up from day to day.  

Recyclage is thus in many ways a typical case of bricolage. Facing a seemingly unfillable void, the Congolese government, its police, supporting donors and implementers, each with sometimes diverging or conflicting objectives and interests, make do to the best of their abilities. By drawing on, mix and match past, current and new practices of and resources for police training, they become bricoleurs, and in the process, produce a new form of police education, that of recycling. The result is a level of training which varies markedly across the ranks of the PNC, from university degree holders with years of training and recyclage experience, to illiterate officers without any police training and consequently little understanding of their role and work. Perhaps the most important bricoleurs in this process are the rank-and-file police officers themselves; as direct beneficiaries, they too shape how this form of training is used and reproduced. In order to better understand the rank-and-file’s role in this process, it is important to explore their perspectives and experiences of recyclage.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECYCLAGE: NARRATIVES FROM THE RANK-AND-FILE

The majority of rank-and-file police officers live from day to day, or in their words, “au taux du jour” (at the day’s rate). As outlined above, they spend much of their everyday seeking alternative sources of income to make ends meet. Accordingly, their time is highly valuable; spending a day in recyclage entails considerable opportunity costs. A policewoman explained:

We go to the training, we stay there from 8am to 3pm or later. You go home, you find your kids there, they start to tell you: “Mommy, we are hungry!” So how? I followed the training but we did not receive anything. So tomorrow, I won’t go there, I will go find a person who promised me some money and I will buy something to eat for my children.

How costly police training can become comes down to the packages budgeted for each participant in terms of food, transport, and per diems. The packages vary between different recyclages and, as this is well known to police officers, they compare and assess which ones are worth their time and which ones are not. A police officer stressed the seriousness of such calculations: “Someone who makes trainees sit in a classroom from 8am to 6pm
without water, it’s torture what you are doing!” He further explained, “because there is a phrase which says: ‘Don’t do to others what you don’t want to be done to you.’ It is even in the bible.”

If a police officer decides that the recycling is not—or not anymore—worth his or her time, they stop turning up. According to one police officer: “There is a personal motivation which lacks. He [the police officer] can arrive the first day; the second day, he comes with delay; the third day, he doesn’t show up. Maybe another day, he arrives for an hour, he pretends to go to the bathroom, then he leaves just like that.” Other officers mentioned that it is mostly senior police officers holding lucrative positions within the PNC, who drop out of police training early on: “When they spend a day without gaining anything—and yet, where they work, they gain a lot—they will immediately return to work.” Opportunity cost is thus a very real calculation in participating in training. The more lucrative one’s position within the PNC, the higher the cost of participating in police training regardless of it being remunerated. For rank-and-file with low to no salaries and few revenue-generating opportunities in the job, paid training may indeed become an economic opportunity. If unpaid, however, the opportunity cost for rank-and-file becomes prohibitive as it bars participants from seeking any alternative revenues in their streets and communities; unpaid training for rank-and-file thus equates to a direct threat to their livelihood.

That said, rank-and-file have less say in their participation than their superiors. Only a few recyclages select participants through an open and voluntary test. For the majority, the police hierarchy decides who will participate based on a variety of criteria including being able to read and write French. However, that does not mean everyone will pay attention. As one officer put it: “They [the trainees] are there, a minority which is interested in the subject matter, but the majority is there because they follow the rule which says that obedience is the beginning of wisdom [L’obéissance, c’est le commencement de la sagesse].” Therefore, it is rather pointless for the hierarchy to force their subalterns to participate. One police commander said that: “Even if you force him, he will not listen.” However, not paying attention is as much the result of out-dated pedagogical methods and, most significantly, the fact that rank-and-file may have more urgent concerns to worry about such as how to find dinner when stuck without pay in a classroom.

At the same time, due to the rather low education levels within the PNC, some police officers who do have higher school degrees find themselves selected almost all the time, while others miss out time and again. To some extent this leads the instructors to preach to the converted and not to those who would stand to benefit most. Finally, as some recyclages do come with perks including travelling within the DRC or even abroad, selection can also become a source of patronage: The hierarchy may grant places in a better endowed training in return for loyalty.

That said, a police station commander lamented that selecting participants for a police training that is not well compensated is not always easy because he is very much aware of the difficult working conditions of the rank-and-file. He saw himself as their professional parent with similar responsibilities for their wellbeing. According to him, it would therefore be desirable to have lighter daily course schedules at training so that trainees still have the afternoon to go and find some income elsewhere.

In sum, the political economy of police training turns recyclage into yet another variable that police officers attempt to negotiate in their everyday calculations of making a living. Despite these difficult calculations, most police officers stressed the substantial value of police training for their profession and career. They appreciated being reminded of key policing lessons, which they may otherwise risk to forget. After all, as they said, “repetition is the mother of all science”. One police officer added: “There is always a difference between the person who has done primary school, and the one who has done university. So, all training is very good and very good for us. It helps us work once out there [au terrain].”

And yet, reconciling the value of police training with the bitter realities of police life and work is challenging. A policewoman captured this dilemma as such:

With the conditions that we currently know, we first and foremost aim for the money. One shouldn’t hide that. As long as we are in training, we ask that there is at least some remuneration. We have that idea. Yet, we don’t know that we are losing out on something. Training is really indispensable in our life. We have to go.

One of her male colleagues echoed her point of view, insisting that they had no right to complain: “I think there are not many services, which are good in their payments. Almost all of us, we struggle in the Congo. But
training is good. All those we have had, it strengthens us and it also helps us to change our behaviour towards others.”

What interviewees did complain about, however, was the difficulty to put what has been learned into practice, particularly in the context of the police reform with its community policing principles. One officer said: “Because, across the city [Matadi], they put the logo: ‘Police services are free’. But today, while we are working, we have less than nothing. Even to buy paper, it is you yourself who will take out your money to buy it. How will you work in such conditions?” Another stressed the contrast between what is taught and the realities on the ground: “Me, I think that at the level of training, what we will learn there will be the opposite of what we will encounter at work.” A colleague in Bukavu felt abandoned after training: “But unfortunately at work, it is like a child whose mother gave birth to him and then abandoned him in the hospital bed. That’s us, the proximity police.”

These quotes capture the clear limits of all police training, and pointedly question the applicability of its lessons in practice. The golden rule about free police services remains illusionary in a police system in which superiors expect kickbacks and rank-and-file do not earn enough to make ends meet. Police culture is thus any classroom’s ultimate reality check. As lessons cannot change cultural norms in a work place, they have to attempt to co-opt them as best they can in order to make them work in their favour. And here, existing police practice ought to be the starting point of all training (Marenin 2004, 2005).

In the meantime, some police officers take the lack of in-job follow-up into their own hands by sharing what they learned with their colleagues who did not participate. Moreover, they try to remain optimistic by arguing that, while work life was difficult, police training still made them better police officers than their non-trained colleagues. Depending on the circumstances, then, police training can be an additional source of income, an added pressure to circumvent, a resource for patronage, an instrument for better education, or a tool to be enhanced. In sum, what government, the PNC and its partners try to fabricate with the limited means at their disposal may not always turn out to be what the supposed beneficiaries seek. The latter therefore bend and fiddle with recyclage to make it fit their own purposes, and by doing so they directly contribute to the process of bricolage within police training.

In sum, police officers have an ambiguous relationship with police training. Participants tend to agree on their value, but identify two major challenges: The opportunity cost of participation, which itself depends on the packages provided by the training; and the difficulty of making the classroom’s lessons count in their everyday work. Where does that leave donors willing to support police reform and fund training?

REFORMING POLICE TRAINING: WHAT CAN WORK

Arguably like the PNC and indeed public services in the DRC as a whole, police training is best seen as bricolage. It consists of a diverse set of old and new practices and resources patched together by an amalgam of bricoleurs, including donors, the Congolese government, and the PNC, to fill what in their eyes is a void. Out of this process emerges the practice of recyclage. Recycling becomes itself immersed in a complex political economy of police survival and work logics, which in turn is embedded in a much larger institutional and societal context. This does not mean that police training wastes donor aid or is a lost cause. Rather, a better understanding of everyday practices of police training can uncover potential avenues for change. This may be change at a small scale, but change nevertheless, with a direct impact on police officers’ and trainees’ professional and private lives.

Moreover, the political economy of police training and the nature of bricolage may allow external actors to have more sway, leverage and, as bricoleurs, potential to reshape than they may otherwise have. “Enduring state weakness in DR Congo offers small—albeit precarious—windows of opportunity for bottom-up and top-down gender mobilisation simultaneously”, writes Lake (2018) regarding women’s rights in the DRC. While we can debate the weakness of the Congolese state, her point of relative influence also applies to police training and reform. With this in mind, this brief concludes with the most salient policy considerations that have emerged out of this research.

How to Improve Police Training: The Big Picture

A less muddled, better coordinated donor approach to police reform in the DRC is necessary. The UK-funded
police reform programme had a real impact on police service delivery, and some of its positive outcomes continue to live on. While donors may not always have the same priorities or means, pooling funds to support a single approach to police reform, inspired by—and built on—“what works” from the SSAPR, should be the ultimate goal. At the same time, donors ought to commit to the fact that police reform can only ever be a long-term and gradual process, which will necessarily include setbacks.

In terms of police training, donors would thus fund police recruitment cycles, which provide basic training according to the Congolese police statute. Such training can be open to both new recruits and existing police officers below a given age. Recruitment campaigns should also encourage more women to take up police work—a potentially important element in shifting norms around the role of women in society at large. Finally, any reform efforts would need to pay close attention to the deployment and transfer of reformed police officers, as constant transfers of reformed police officers to more lucrative units or outside of reform pilot sites is a major obstacle to the reform’s sustainability. One way of doing this may be to decentralize police deployment further so that local police chiefs and civil administrators in decentralized administrative entities—the city and commune levels, as well as the sector and chieftaincy levels in rural areas—have more say over police rotation and can thus keep their police elements within their zones of operation.

In the absence of such a single, coherent approach, however, an alternative is needed. The best option may be to formally integrate recyclage into police careers. With donor support, the PNC’s police school and training authority, the DGEF (Direction Générale des Ecoles et Formations de la Police) could develop a systematized programme for recyclage as continued learning and make recyclage a formal part of a police career. Importantly, this would include the award of formally recognized certificates with an impact on ranks and promotions. After all, as the police officers pointed out themselves, continued in-job training and repetition of lessons learned are important to keep the spirit of the reform alive and to maintain a disciplined and professional police service.

A formal integration of recyclage into the police training curriculum would naturally take time and perseverance. There are, however, smaller tweaks, which could have a more immediate impact and improve the quality of existing recyclage overall.

**How to Improve Recyclage: The Small Picture**

**Select carefully:**

Selecting the right participants for recyclage is a crucial aspect of successful police training. While the PNC will ultimately remain responsible for selection, this should not mean that donors and implementers cannot keep an eye on the selection process to reduce the effects of patronage, increase female participation, and maximize multiplier effects by pushing for the participation (and eventual promotion) of those who show great potential.

**Use state of the art pedagogy:**

The pedagogical approach to police training is all too often out-dated, adopting models of knowledge transfer from the expert and the police instructor, to the lay, and the police trainee. Interaction with trainees is limited to questions and answers while group work, real work scenarios and role-play are non-existent. Language difficulties and writing skills naturally compound this style of teaching: Word-for-word dictation of French police manuals is not the way to go. Using up-to-date pedagogical approaches, however, should not be too difficult for donors and implementers to include in classroom syllabi and to prepare and train instructors accordingly (Marenin 2005; Murray 2007).

**Minimize opportunity cost:**

Compensation and material perks play a crucial role in the motivation of the rank-and-file to actively participate in and stay attentive during class. It also makes them feel valued in their work, which further adds to their performance levels. Providing such perks, then, should stop being seen by donors as a risk, a question of ethics or a government responsibility. Rather, it is a condition for successfully reforming a police service in dire needs. Moreover, relatively speaking, these perks come at a small cost for potentially considerable returns. In the case of a one-month long recyclage taking place in Bukavu, for example, police officers received a per diem of USD 2 a day for 30 days, for a total of USD 1,800 for 30 participants. At the same time, close to USD 5,600 was earmarked for public relations and ceremonial activities. It should thus be possible to
recast existing budgets to invest more into the needs of the police training and its trainees without necessarily having to compromise on protocol.

**Follow up in the field:**

A final important element is to provide more support to those police officers, who do their best to put theory into practice despite adverse conditions at work. The SSAPR set up a coaching system, which trained police coaches in providing continued mentoring for lower-level commanders and station chiefs to ensure the programme’s continued success. Reviving this system and training additional coaches across reform pilot sites would be a rewarding and important donor initiative.
ENDNOTES


2 Other important factors affecting behavioural change are rewards and sanctions systems, control and command structures and financial and material resources available. Ultimately police behaviour is shaped by police culture, which police reform and training can merely attempt to coopt and make work for its own purposes (Marenin 2004: 115, 2005: 46–47; 57).

3 Focus Group with policemen, Bukavu, 20 August 2018 (translated from French).

4 This and following two quotes: Interview with policeman, Bukavu, 6 August 2018 (translated from French).


6 Careful parallels can be drawn between the PNC and the Congolese army (FARDC), where demobilization and reintegration processes of former armed group combatants also create “recycling” processes. Yet, in the police, “recycling” refers quite specifically to retraining those who are already in the PNC, and not to those wishing to enter. In addition, it is a recurring training as opposed to a one-off occurrence. Finally, recyclage seems to have entered the formal language of police training in police schools, amongst senior police officers and donors—and become a fundamental and recognized part of police training—to an extent it has not in the FARDC. Cf. Vogel and Musamba (2016).

7 Interview with policeman, Matadi, 24 July 2018 (translated from French).

8 Focus Group with policemen, 20 August 2018, Bukavu (translated from French).

9 Focus Group with policewomen, Bukavu, 13 August 2018 (translated from French).

10 This and following quote: Focus Group 3 with policemen, Bukavu, 11 August 2018 (translated from French).

11 Interview with policeman, Bukavu, 17 August 2018 (translated from French).

12 Focus Group with policemen, Bukavu, 20 August 2018 (translated from French).

13 Interview with policeman, Bukavu, 17 August 2018 (translated from French).

14 Interview with policeman, Bukavu, 15 August 2018 (translated from French).

15 Interview with, policeman, Bukavu, 15 August 2018 (translated from French).

16 Focus Group with policemen, Matadi, 28 July 2018 (translated from French).

17 Focus Group with policewomen, Matadi, 28 July 2018 (translated from French).

18 Focus Group with policemen, Matadi, 28 July 2018 (translated from French).

19 This and following quote: Focus Group with policemen, Matadi, 28 July 2018 (translated from French).

20 Focus Group with policewomen, Bukavu 13 August 2018 (translated from French).

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