

**DUAL ALLEGIANCES?
IMMIGRANTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION**

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Abstract

This paper develops a model of immigrant attitudes towards immigration. We focus on two competing motivations to explain these attitudes: while kinship, solidarity, and shared experiences with other immigrants should lead to more favorable attitudes towards immigration, formal integration into a new society may create a new allegiance to the host country that produces more critical views toward immigration. Using the *European Social Survey* (ESS) 1-5 data collected 2002-11 in 18 West European democracies, coarsened exact matching (CEM), and multi-level estimation techniques, our analyses reveal that foreigners support immigration more than natives; however, newcomers who have acquired citizenship in their host countries are significantly more skeptical about the consequences of immigration and admitting new arrivals than non-citizen immigrants. Moreover, the negative relationship between citizenship and support for immigration is particularly pronounced among those who are dissatisfied with their host country's macroeconomy. These findings have important implications for the prospects of immigrant political alliances and the effectiveness of advocacy on their behalf.

*Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen.ⁱ
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust.*

For over two decades, Europe has been struggling with the advent of global migration. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Europe's stock of immigrant-born populations increased by almost fifty percent between 1990 and 2010, representing 47.6 million people spread across the European continent (World Bank 2013).¹ Literally from all over the world, they comprise between less than five percent in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, or Finland, to more than 15 percent of the population in countries such as Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. Notably, a number of European countries currently host immigrant populations whose shares are as high as or higher than those found in traditional immigration countries such as the United States.² In a reversal from earlier centuries, Europe clearly has become a continent of immigration, with net gains in population primarily driven by increasing numbers of new arrivals (e.g. Franchino 2009).

These arrivals have upended many comfortable and well-worn practices and thinking. In particular, the exclusion or insufficient inclusion of large populations of foreign nationals into social, economic, and political spheres have raised questions about the commitment of many receiving countries to uphold core liberal democratic values of equal treatment (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998), and thus have challenged governments to contend with the practicalities of both accepting and absorbing immigrants. How migrants become successfully incorporated into their host societies has long been an important question for social scientists, and one that has taken on increasing relevance with the above-mentioned changes in the real world. In particular, scholars have sought to understand why some countries' populations are more hospitable to foreigners, before and after they arrive, and why others seek to protect their shores from migrants.

Immigrants leave a mark on the societies they join; conversely, host countries shape the lives immigrants lead. While social scientists have paid considerable attention to the former, they have shown less interest in the latter. That is, scholars have sought to understand the impact that migration has on the attitudes and behaviors of native populations (e.g., Sides and Citrin 2007; Fetzer 2000;

ⁱ This has been variously translated as "Two souls alas! are dwelling in my breast; And each is fain to leave its brother" or "In my bosom two spirits are contending, each attempting to separate from the other."

Schneider 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mughan and Paxton 2006; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Citrin et al. 1997; Mayda 2006; McLaren 2001, 2003; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Hjerm 2009; Semyonov et al. 2008) and immigrant admission and incorporation policies in Europe and elsewhere (e.g. Howard 2009; Money 1997, 1999; Brubaker 1992; Hix and Noury 2007; Jones-Correa 2001; Weil 2001).

In contrast, little cross-national research exist on what immigrants themselves think of immigration – for example, whether they oppose immigration less than natives do, and whether some migrants are more accepting of newcomers than others. Moreover, we do not know much about the sources of such differences – if they do in fact exist – in contemporary democracies, and whether they are due to varying individual experiences, formal integration into the host societies, or something else entirely.³ As a consequence, little is known about migrants in other countries with respect to their political attitudes and policy preferences in regulating international migration.

How immigrants view migration has both theoretical and empirical relevance. Politically, immigrants can be effective advocates on their own behalf and others like them, especially as their shares in host countries grow; but the extent to which newcomers can forge stable political alliances and participate in politics as a cohesive block depends on their attitudes towards one another and the issue of immigration more generally (Rogers 2009; Sonenshein 2003; Oliver and Wong 2003). Negative attitudes towards each other among newcomers could not only undermine them as a unified political force but also make it easier for those opposed to immigration to argue that those who benefit from it do not prize it. Thus, understanding what immigrants think of immigration, whether their attitudes differ appreciably from natives and amongst themselves, and why, are important questions for researchers and policy makers alike.

Below, we examine migrants' attitudes towards immigration and argue that they are shaped by two competing motivations: their kinship, solidarity, and shared experiences with other immigrants, but also by allegiances toward their host societies. The former should lead to more favorable attitudes about immigration; the latter may well produce an opposite effect. In particular, we hypothesize that the formal incorporation via the route of citizenship is associated with a more critical stance toward immigration, as it leads to an alignment with the attitudes of native populations.

Moreover, citizenship acquisition increases individuals' sensitivity to the host country's economic situation in evaluating immigration consequences.

We examine these propositions using the *European Social Survey* (ESS) 1-5 data collected between 2002 and 2011 in 18 West European democracies. Using coarsened exact matching (CEM) and multilevel statistical techniques, our analyses reveal that, while foreigners express more positive views about immigration than natives, newcomers who have acquired citizenship in their host countries are significantly less sanguine about immigration than non-citizen immigrants. Moreover, we find that the negative relationship between citizenship and support for immigration is particularly pronounced among those who are dissatisfied with economy.

Our study is designed to contribute to research on political incorporation and public opinion on immigration in several ways. On a theoretical level, we seek to extend the study of anti-immigrant opinion by going beyond the exclusive focus on natives and analyzing how immigrants perceive the consequences of immigration on their adopted homelands. Moreover, we add to extant research on immigrant incorporation by highlighting the complex effect that formal political incorporation – citizenship – has on support for immigration among foreign-born individuals. Finally, our analysis goes beyond existing studies of one or a small number of countries or cities, and puts arguments to a more demanding empirical test against a varied and extensive sample of European nations with diverse immigrant populations. We proceed as follows: the next sections formulate and develop our argument; we then describe our data and measures, present our analyses, discuss our findings, and finally conclude by offering suggestions for further research.

Kinship, Solidarity, and Cognitive Dissonance Avoidance

For a number of reasons, immigrants should be expected to view immigration and other immigrants in a more positive light than should native-born individuals. Though migrants hail from many different nations, they all have gone through the process of moving to another country – an experience that may create a sense of solidarity and kinship with other migrants. Being a migrant means having been born into and having lived in a different political, economic, and social environment; it also means an experience of the physical and psychological uprooting and relocation,

which often require considerable efforts in adjusting to a new environment as well as learning how to cope with the consequences of being an outsider and being different in one's adopted homeland.⁴

In addition to a sense of kinship and solidarity with other newcomers brought on by shared experiences of migration, classic theories of cognitive dissonance avoidance (e.g., Festinger 1957) would predict that individuals who made the choice to migrate themselves would evaluate that same choice made by others positively. These psychological processes along with understanding the difficulties and challenges that migration involves are bound to leave a mark. In particular, we hypothesize that they will make foreign-born individuals more sympathetic toward other immigrants and their decision to relocate to another country, and thus make foreign-born express more positive opinions toward immigration and other immigrants in comparison to native-born individuals.

Citizenship

In addition to differences between natives and immigrants in their support for immigration, we are interested in differences among immigrants themselves. Specifically, we ask whether the formal incorporation of immigrants into the political community via citizenship plays a role in shaping attitudes toward immigration among foreign-born individuals. We argue that citizenship aligns the attitudes of natives and newcomers, making foreign-born citizens less enthusiastic about immigration than foreigners who have not acquired citizenship in their host country.

We base this expectation on several empirical regularities that emerge from the literature about individuals' choice to become naturalized. While the acquisition of citizenship is surely the product of a complex set of conditions and considerations, many qualitative and quantitative studies have uncovered a consistent set of factors that predict citizenship acquisition. Specifically, naturalization has been found to be linked to immigrants' cultural and economic assimilation, but also motivated by instrumental considerations, such as the desire to have access to important benefits and resources bestowed only on citizens (Yang 1994a, 1994b; Bloemraad 2006; Portes and Mozo 1985; Portes and Curtis 1987; DeSipio 1987, 1996; Grebler 1966; Garcia 1981; see also Jones-Correa 1998, 2001; Bueker 2005; Wong and Pantoja 2009).

This means that the acquisition of citizenship is a mark of self-selection into an identity – an expression of kinship with the host country rather than, or in addition to, the sending country – as well as a quest for access to a legal status that provides formal protections and material benefits (political rights, wider employment opportunities, welfare benefits, visa-free travel, protection against deportation, etc.). Both kinds of motivations would lead us to assume that the beliefs of foreigners who choose to become citizens are more similar to those of the majority group (native-born citizens). Thus, there are good reasons to suspect that citizenship is associated with lower levels of enthusiasm for continued immigration and a more concerned outlook about the consequences it may have for host societies.

Contingent Effects of Citizenship: The Role of Economic Evaluations

One key argument in existing research on natives' attitudes toward immigration is that economic threat is a prime mover of anti-immigration attitudes (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Esses et al. 2001; Stephan et al. 2005; Maio, Esses, and Bell 1994). In addition to labor market status and skills, personal economic circumstances – be they employment status, income, and so on – have all been assumed to shape opinion formation on immigration. Thus, anti-immigration sentiment has long been thought to find fertile ground among unemployed, underemployed, and other constituencies that are struggling economically (Fetzer 2000). In addition, Citrin and collaborators (Citrin et al. 1997; Sides and Citrin 2007) have found that concerns about the state of the national economy are major determinants of anti-immigration sentiment. Taken together, these studies suggest that perceptions of economic threat should matter for people's opinions about immigration, and that this threat is likely to manifest itself particularly strongly in socio-tropic ways.

In the same way that natives feel threatened by newcomers, immigrants may oppose the further influx of newcomers whose arrival might intensify labor market competition and directly challenge their employment and wage prospects (see also Fetzer 2000), or might threaten them economically in any number of other ways. We argue, moreover, that such negative effects of economic threat are only enhanced by the acquisition of citizenship, such that immigrants who both

have citizenship and feel that the economy of their host country is threatened well will express some of the most negative attitudes about immigrants and immigration.⁵

Hypotheses

Taken together, then, we expect foreign-born individuals to be motivated by competing considerations. On one hand, we expect them to express more positive views about immigration than natives by virtue of their own experiences, instrumental motivations, as well as a sense of solidarity and kinship with other immigrants. Thus:

Hypothesis1: Foreign-born individuals should hold more positive views about immigration than native-born individuals.

While solidarity with other immigrants is likely to make foreign-born individuals more open to immigration, citizenship should exert the opposite effect. Put simply,

Hypothesis2: Foreign-born citizens should express more negative views about immigration than foreign-born non-citizens.

Moreover, the consequences of citizenship for immigration attitudes should at least in part be contingent on feelings of economic threat. Thus,

Hypothesis3: The negative relationship between citizenship and support for immigration should be particularly pronounced among foreign-born individuals who are dissatisfied with economic performance of their host country.

Data and Measures

The individual level data analyzed below come from the *European Social Survey* (ESS) five-round cumulative file collected between 2002 and 2011 (Jowell et al., 2007). The ESS project is known for its high standards of methodological rigor in survey design and cross-national data collection (Kittilson 2009).⁶ Moreover, this collaborative project is the only set of cross-national surveys that include questions designed specifically for foreign-born respondents, and ask people

about their citizenship status, attitudes towards immigration, economic evaluations, and socio-demographic characteristics. In addition, it is the only set of surveys that present these questions in identical format across a broad range of countries. The relevant survey items were available for 18 West European democracies: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.⁷

Dependent Variables

Following previous research (Sides and Citrin 2007, Citrin and Sides 2008), we relied on two dependent variables to measure people's attitudes towards immigration: perceived consequences of immigration and beliefs about the appropriate level of immigration in one's country. First, we created an index of perceived consequences of immigration that is based on three ESS items designed to capture respondents' opinions on whether immigration is bad or good for their country's economy, whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life, and whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live. Using answers to these questions, we calculated an average for each respondent; the resulting index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values representing more positive evaluations of immigration.⁸

Our second dependent variable – the preferred level of immigration – is similarly based on three survey items. The ESS asked respondents to what extent their host country should allow people of the *same* race or ethnicity as most people in their country, people of a *different* race or ethnicity, and finally, people from *poorer countries outside Europe* to come and live there. Using the response categories 'allow none', 'allow a few', 'allow some', and 'allow many' for each of these questions, we created an index, which represents an average value for each individual respondent. The variable was recoded so that it ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more support for immigration⁹ (for details on question wording and variable coding, see appendix).

Independent Variables

To identify foreign-born respondents in our sample and to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens among them, we relied on two ESS questions “Were you born in [country]?” and “Are you a citizen of [country]?” Both are dichotomous, with 1 indicating a positive response, and zero – a negative one.¹⁰ Pooling the data across 18 West European countries generated a sample of 12,689 foreign-born respondents (8.30 % of all respondents); of these, 46.04% are citizens and 53.96% are non-citizens of their host country.

In addition to testing the direct effects of citizenship on immigration attitudes among foreign-born individuals, we sought examine whether citizenship interacts with people’s evaluations of the health of macro-economy in their host country. The latter was measured using the following ESS question: “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?” To facilitate the interpretation of our results, the original variable, ranging from 0 to 10, was re-coded so that higher values indicate more dissatisfaction with economy.¹¹

Control Variables

To isolate the direct and contingent effects of citizenship in shaping foreigners’ attitudes towards new arrivals, our estimation models include a number of controls identified as important determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes in previous research. Since individuals who struggle economically are generally more vulnerable to economic competition from new arrivals, we include indicators of people’s income, employment status, and professional skills. In particular, to measure income, we relied on the survey item indicating whether respondents are ‘living comfortably on present income’ (3), ‘coping on present income’ (2) or that it is ‘difficult on present income’ (1), or ‘very difficult on present income’ (0). Further, employment status is a dichotomous measure, with 1 indicating that a respondent is unemployed and actively or passively looking for a job (0-otherwise). Moreover, following Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), we measure skills using the ISCO88 classification and coding it dichotomously, with 1 categorizing respondents with an elementary or manual (1st or 2nd level) skills occupation, and 0 those with highly skilled jobs (3rd, 4th, 5th skill level). In addition, our models account for respondents’ ideological beliefs, as right-wing orientations are generally linked to stronger support for traditional values and practices, perceptions of immigration as

a symbolic threat to a nation, and therefore more skeptical views about new arrivals (e.g. McLaren 2003; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Hainsworth 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Bilodeau and Fadol 2011; Hjerm 2009; Wilkes, Guppy and Farris 2008). We measure ideological beliefs using a standard left-right self-placement item, ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more right-wing orientations.¹²

Further, we employ several survey items to capture immigrants' experiences in receiving countries. Since newcomers' attitudes may be affected by their exposure to, and their personal or group situation in, a receiving country, we control for how recently a foreigner arrived to his or her host country, whether one belongs to a minority ethnic group, and has been discriminated against. In addition, our models take into account whether a foreigner was born in an EU member state to capture the consequences of special rights and privileges enjoyed by EU citizens in comparison to third-country nationals. Finally, we include measures of social connectedness, urban residence, as well as standard demographic variables – education, age, and gender – found to be important determinants of immigration attitudes in previous research (Quillian 1995; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Bilodeau and Fadol 2011; Hjerm 2009; McLaren 2003, 2001) (details on variable coding are listed in the appendix).

Analysis and Results

A first look at the data reveals that, on average, foreigners have more favorable attitudes towards immigration than native-born respondents: the mean values are 6.26 for foreign-born survey respondents and 5.07 for natives on the 0 to 10 scale measuring how favorably people evaluate the consequences of immigration, and 6.09 vs. 5.15, respectively, on the scale capturing beliefs about the appropriate levels of immigration. Furthermore, the results show that foreign-born citizens express less favorable views toward immigration than foreign-born *non*-citizens: the respective mean values are 5.92 and 6.55 (perceived consequences of immigration), and 5.87 vs. 6.28 (preferred levels of immigration). The results of multivariate estimations (not reported here but available upon request) also show that native-born status and citizenship have negative and statistically significant effects on people's attitudes towards new arrivals. Hence, these initial results provide support for our hypothesis

that foreigners hold more positive views about immigration than natives and for the notion that foreigners who have acquired citizenship are located somewhere in the middle between native-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens.

[Table 1 about here]

To examine the determinants of immigration attitudes among foreigners in greater detail, we turn exclusively to foreign-born respondents. Since we combine information collected at the level of individuals and at the level of countries, our dataset has a multi-level structure. To avoid a number of statistical problems associated with such a data structure (clustering, non-constant variance, incorrect (usually underestimated) standard errors, etc.) (cf. Snijders and Bosker 1999; Steenbergen and Jones 2002), we estimate multi-level mixed-effects models, that is, models with random intercepts (to allow for cross-country heterogeneity in levels of immigration support) and random slopes for our citizenship variable (to allow for cross-country variability in the magnitude of citizenship coefficients).¹³

The results presented in Table 2 (first column for each dependent variable) reveal that citizenship is indeed negatively linked to immigration support among foreign-born respondents, and that this relationship is highly statistically significant with respect to both dependent variables. Specifically, foreigners who have acquired citizenship in their host country report more skeptical views about the consequences of immigration and express less support for allowing more migrants to come to their adopted homelands than foreigners without citizenship. Hence, as hypothesized, granting immigrants formal membership in the political community of their receiving countries is associated with reduced enthusiasm and support for immigration.

[Table 2 about here]

Other variables exhibit some noteworthy patterns as well. Dissatisfaction with the state of macro-economy has a consistent negative effect on immigration support that is statistically significant in the models of both perceived consequences of immigration and beliefs about the appropriate levels of immigration. Interestingly, neither personal income nor unemployment status play a detectable role in shaping foreigners' attitudes about immigration, although individuals with manual skills express more skeptical views about immigration than highly skilled professionals. At the same time,

ideological beliefs matter too, as our results demonstrate a consistent negative relationship between right-wing orientations and immigration support. However, opposition to new arrivals weakens with social connectedness and education that are known to generate more tolerant and multicultural views (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Chandler and Tsai 2001).

Among the socio-demographic variables, age is linked to lower support for immigration, although our data does not allow us to assess to what extent this relationship is due to generational as opposed to life-cycle effects. Moreover, urban residents and men express more positive opinions about the consequences of immigration but these variables have no statistically significant effects on beliefs about the appropriate levels of immigration. Moreover, while discrimination experiences encourage foreigners to be more sympathetic to the issue of immigration and new arrivals, immigrant-specific variables do not have consistent effects. Specifically, immigrants who arrived more recently view immigration consequences for their host country in a more positive light than earlier arrivals, but they are not significantly different from each other in their attitudes towards allowing more immigrants to come in. In contrast, being a foreigner from an EU country (as opposed to being a third-country national) is linked to more positive immigrant admission attitudes, but has no detectable relationship to evaluations of immigration consequences on one's adopted homeland. Taken together, our results reveal that, while attitudes towards immigration among foreign-born in Europe are driven by many traditional predictors of natives' support for immigration, they are also consistently shaped by immigrants' formal incorporation into the host society via citizenship.

Multi-level Results with Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)

One shortcoming of observational data is that, compared to randomized experiments, the data generation process – including the treatment assignment mechanism (in our case citizenship acquisition among foreign-born individuals) – is not controlled by the investigator, and therefore is unknown or ambiguous. The traditional way of handling endogeneity among dependent and independent variables include structural equation or instrumental variable approaches to exogenize the independent variable of interest. Another, more straightforward way to improve causal inferences using observational data is to rely on data pre-processing techniques known as matching – a

nonparametric approach designed to control for the confounding influence of pretreatment variables, and consequently reduce model dependence and statistical bias (Ho et al. 2007).¹⁴ A reduction in model dependence in particular means that pre-processing data via matching leads to different modeling choices having considerably less influence on the estimate of the causal quantity of interest than it would without matching. Matching achieves this by pruning observations from the data so that the remaining observations are left with a better balance in the empirical distributions of the covariates between the treated and control groups.

The “coarsened exact matching” (CEM) method, recently developed by Gary King and his colleagues, has been shown to be a particularly useful technique due to its multiple statistical properties, such as the ability to reduce imbalance, model dependence, statistical bias, estimation error, and variance; it also is highly computationally efficient and easy to use in a variety of statistical programs (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012, 2011; King et al. 2011; Blackwell et al. 2009). The central motivation for CEM is that, while exact matching provides perfect balance by pairing a treated unit to all the control units with the same covariate values, it typically produces few matches because of the so-called curse-of-dimensionality. For example, introducing one continuous variable into a model effectively precludes exact matching because any two observations are unlikely to have identical values on a continuous measure. CEM provides a solution to this problem by enabling scholars to temporarily coarsen the values of their covariates into substantively meaningful categories, exact match observations on these coarsened values, and then employ original (un-coarsened) covariates and statistical estimations they would ordinarily use on the matched data.¹⁵

To test the robustness of our findings, that is, to see whether citizenship is indeed linked to lower support for immigration, we take advantage of this statistical technique to pre-process our data, and then re-estimate our multi-level models on the matched observations.¹⁶ Using the k2k option on coarsened data generates 996 matched strata, containing 1,105 matched treatment units and the same number of matched control units.¹⁷ This matching procedure reduces the number of cases from 9,518 to 1,950 in the models of perceived consequences of immigration, and from 9,356 to 1,914 in the models of preferred immigration levels.¹⁸

The results of multi-level estimations on the matched data (reported in Table 2, second column for each dependent variable) reveal that our findings remain essentially the same. We still find that citizenship is associated with lower levels of immigration support, and that the coefficient of this variable is consistently negative and highly statistically significant in the models for both dependent variables. In short, these additional analyses confirm that citizenship plays an important role in shaping immigrants' views about immigrations and that these findings are robust to the use of different statistical techniques.

Contingent Effects of Citizenship

In addition to assessing the direct effects of citizenship, we were also interested in the extent to which citizenship status interacts with economic evaluations in shaping immigration support among foreign-born. The results of our interaction models, reported in Table 3, reveal that the impact of citizenship should not be considered in isolation. Specifically, we find that the multiplicative term between citizenship and dissatisfaction with economy is negative and statistically significant in the model of preferred immigration levels. This means that while dissatisfaction with the economy generally erodes immigrants' support for continued immigration, this effect becomes amplified among foreign-born individuals who have acquired citizenship status in their host country. To put it differently, foreigners formally incorporated into the political community of their host country are more inclined to connect their economic evaluations to assessments whether their host country should allow more migrants to come in. Interestingly, the additive term of citizenship is not statistically significant once the interaction between citizenship and economic evaluations is included, indicating that among foreigners fully satisfied with macro-economy, citizenship plays no role in shaping their support for immigration.

[Table 3 about here]

To assess how much citizenship and dissatisfaction with economy matter in substantive terms, we calculated marginal effects using the results from the interaction model for preferred levels of immigration among foreign-born. Following recommendations in recent research with respect to testing conditional hypotheses (Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012), we plot these effects (with 95%

confidence intervals) using two figures: Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of citizenship at various levels of dissatisfaction with economy, and Figure 2 demonstrates the marginal effect of dissatisfaction with economy for citizens and non-citizens.

The results reveal that our key variables of interest indeed have a sizable effect on foreigners' beliefs about the appropriate levels of immigration to their host country. Specifically, Figure 1 shows that the marginal effect of citizenship changes from $-.095$ to $-.602$, as we move from the lowest to the highest value of dissatisfaction with economy, and becomes statistically distinguishable from 0 at the value of 2 (on a scale from 0 to 10) of the dissatisfaction with economy variable. This means that citizenship undermines pro-immigrant views even among foreigners who are fairly satisfied with the functioning of macro-economy, and that this effect becomes considerably stronger at higher levels of dissatisfaction. Figure 2 provides additional support for our conditional hypothesis. Specifically, it demonstrates that, while the marginal effect of dissatisfaction with economy is equal to $-.05$ among foreign-born non-citizens, its magnitude rises to $-.1$ among foreigners who have become citizens. Moreover, the graph shows that the marginal effect is statistically distinguishable from 0 for both citizens and non-citizens among foreign-born. In short, calculations of the marginal effects confirm our expectations that citizenship and dissatisfaction with economy amplify each other's negative effect, and that citizenship in particular plays a sizable role in undermining support for continued immigration among foreign-born individuals.

[Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here]

Discussion

International migration has become a permanent feature of contemporary societies. People move across borders looking for a better life, more fulfilling jobs, and greater opportunities for acquiring new skills and ideas, or a more pleasant retirement. They also migrate to escape war, political persecution, or natural disasters. For better or for worse, migration has been on the rise in recent decades and is unlikely to subside in an increasingly interdependent world marked by economic and political differences, extended civil wars, as well as changing and less predictable climatic patterns. Moreover, some argue that migration will continue in the future because it is

intimately intertwined with the processes of economic development (de Haas 2007), sustained by migrant social networks (Money 1999: 9; Munck 2008), and shielded from public hostility by legal commitments of liberal democracies to protect individual and family unification rights (Joppke 1998; Freeman 1995).

While migration affects both immigrant sending and receiving countries, as well as migrants themselves, previous cross-national research on immigration attitudes focused exclusively on native-born populations. In contrast, little is known about the views of individuals who have personal experiences with migration and are directly affected by migration and immigrant incorporation policies in their host societies. In particular, we still lack a general understanding based on systematic research how immigrant political views and behavior are shaped by experiences unique to immigrants, and the extent to which the effects of these experiences complement, replace, or interact with the consequences of other individual or contextual characteristics.

Our study sought to contribute to this area of research by focusing on what foreigners think about other immigrants and immigration, and what explains these attitudes. Specifically, we asked whether foreigners perceive immigration more favorably than natives, whether these attitudes are affected by similar considerations as among natives, and whether the formal incorporation of immigrants into their host societies interacts with these considerations in shaping their immigration views. Insights into these questions should enable policy makers to better predict and prevent more violent expressions of disaffection among new arrivals, adopt more adequate immigrant admission and incorporation policies, and facilitate the development of more tolerant and cohesive communities in contemporary democracies with large immigrant populations.

We argue that the attitudes towards immigration among foreign-born residents are marked by competing motivations. On the one hand, migrants express more positive views about immigration than natives. We posit, but cannot test directly, that this effect is rooted in a variety of considerations; these include kinship and solidarity with other immigrants based on their shared experiences as migrants; a better understanding why people migrate and the physical and psychological difficulties that relocation to a different country involves; instrumental considerations, such as opportunities to bring in their relatives from abroad; as well as cognitive dissonance avoidance that encourages

individuals who made the choice to migrate themselves to evaluate that same choice made by others positively. On the other hand, the formal incorporation via citizenship and perceptions of threat posed to macro-economy by further migration motivates foreigners to be more cautious in expressing support for immigration and lead to a convergence between the attitudes of natives and foreigners who have become better integrated into their host societies.

Our analyses of individual-level survey data from 18 West European democracies using coarsened exact matching and multi-level estimations reveal that individuals born abroad have significantly more positive attitudes towards immigration than natives. This suggests that foreigners may have a shared interest to promote more liberal immigration policies and could be useful allies to business groups lobbying for more flexible labor markets or human rights organizations in favor of more open borders for humanitarian purposes (admitting refugees, asylum seekers, etc.). At the same time, we find a considerable variation in immigrants' attitudes towards immigration: some of it is due to the same factors as support for immigration among natives in established democracies. Specifically, fears about the macro-economy, a lack of professional skills and education, as well as right-wing ideological views are responsible for more skeptical assessments of immigration, while unemployment status or income have limited effect. Most importantly, formal incorporation into the political community of one's host country via the route of citizenships is consistently and powerfully related to more negative views about immigration among foreign-born individuals. Our analyses also show that dissatisfaction with macro-economy amplifies the negative relationship between citizenship and immigration support, but only with respect to preferred levels of immigration, as we find no evidence of this interaction effect in evaluating immigration consequences more generally.

Taken together, our results suggest that, just like natives, foreigners, particularly when they enjoy citizenship status in their host country, assess immigration largely in light of socio-tropic economic considerations about their host society. These findings paint an image of foreigners committed to their adopted country rather than a group of highly individualistic and self-serving residents. Thus, in contrast to fears of immigration skeptics who believe that granting foreigners citizenship rights may create new political tensions and lead to the loss of control enjoyed by the native populations, our results indicate that the formal incorporation of foreigners into the body politic

of their host country is associated with convergent views among foreigners and natives, and that naturalization helps to motivate immigrants to place greater emphasis on collective (national) concerns in forming their opinions about immigration.

While this study examined foreign-born individuals, future research would benefit also from understanding how immigrants' attitudes towards immigration vary across immigrant generations. Existing literature from the United States indicates that foreign-born individuals are generally more positive about immigration and policies that benefit newcomers than second- or third-generation immigrants (e.g. Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1984; Polinard, Miller, and de la Garza 1984; Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Branton 2007; for a more general discussion of differences between immigrant of different generations in the U.S., see, for example, Portes and Rubmout 2001, 2006; Portes and Zhou 1993). A similar pattern may be expected in Europe as well, although a sense of exclusion among some sizable groups of new arrivals, such as Muslim immigrants, and the fact that not all second-generation immigrants receive citizenship by virtue of being born on the soil of their host country, may result in considerably smaller differences between first- and second-generation immigrants in their support for immigration in this part of the world than in the U.S. or other traditional immigration countries. Systematic analyses of how anti-immigrant sentiment varies across immigrant generations along with citizenship status, religion, ethnicity, as well as other markers or identity may add interesting insights to understanding newcomers' attitudes and policy preferences in the context of contemporary democracies.

We conclude that, while the migration experience encourages foreigners to evaluate immigration more positively than do natives and although host governments rarely have any influence on foreigners' socialization experiences in their countries of origin, host societies are not completely powerless when it comes to shaping attitudes among immigrants in their countries. Our study suggests that, by facilitating the formal immigrant incorporation into the body politic via the route of citizenship, governments can encourage foreigners to behave as more responsible members of their societies and pay more attention to national concerns in shaping their attitudes towards issues that are likely to play an important role in the policy-making of many contemporary democracies in the foreseeable future.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Pro-Immigration Attitudes by Citizenship and Nativity Status in 18 European Countries, 2002-2011.

Dependent Variables	<i>Native-born Citizens</i>		<i>Foreign-born Citizens</i>		<i>Foreign-born Non-citizens</i>		<i>Range</i>	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Perceived Consequences of Immigration	5.06	2.07	5.92	2.00	6.55	1.85	0	10
Preferred Levels of Immigration	5.15	2.59	5.87	2.41	6.28	2.38	0	10

Table 2. Pro-Immigration Attitudes Among Foreign-Born Individuals in 18 European Countries, 2002-2011.

Independent Variables	<i>Perceived Consequences of Immigration</i>		<i>Preferred Immigration Levels</i>	
	Multi-level	Multi-level with CEM	Multi-level	Multi-level with CEM
Citizen	-.319*** (.085)	-.281*** (.080)	-.339*** (.066)	-.405*** (.113)
Dissatisfaction with economy	-.134*** (.008)	-.141*** (.018)	-.075*** (.011)	-.070** (.024)
Manual skills	-.210*** (.039)	-.309*** (.094)	-.295*** (.050)	-.329* (.122)
Income	.011 (.023)	.022 (.058)	.051 (.030)	.270*** (.076)
Unemployed	-.141 (.065)	.131 (.261)	.016 (.083)	-.195 (.336)
Left-right self-placement	-.103*** (.009)	-.131*** (.020)	-.137*** (.011)	-.171*** (.026)
Recent immigrant	.053* (.020)	.049 (.046)	.030 (.026)	.006 (.060)
Ethnic minority	.280*** (.044)	.490*** (.128)	.104 (.056)	.171 (.166)
Discriminated against	.269*** (.053)	.272 (.207)	.315*** (.067)	.739* (.268)
Social connectedness	.087*** (.012)	.104*** (.027)	.070*** (.015)	.051 (.035)
Urban residence	.082*** (.016)	.112*** (.034)	.024 (.020)	.088 (.044)
Education	.052*** (.004)	.054*** (.011)	.056*** (.006)	.047*** (.014)
Age	-.007*** (.001)	-.004 (.003)	-.014*** (.002)	-.012** (.004)
Male	.151*** (.036)	.158 (.078)	.056 (.046)	-.047 (.101)
Foreign-born from the EU	.114 (.085)	.398 (.202)	.401*** (.109)	.433 (.266)
ESS1	.184* (.068)	-.012 (.169)	.029 (.087)	-.165 (.222)
ESS2	.010 (.058)	.002 (.120)	.290*** (.074)	.036 (.156)
ESS3	-.033 (.057)	.001 (.127)	.033 (.073)	-.162 (.165)
ESS4	.196*** (.055)	.178 (.115)	.290*** (.070)	.198 (.149)
Constant	6.202*** (.195)	6.020*** (.398)	6.400*** (.258)	6.174*** (.527)
Variance of random slope: citizen	.088 (.041)	.000 (.000)	.022 (.018)	.023 (.063)
Variance of random intercept	.148 (.056)	.105 (.048)	.333 (.125)	.351 (.150)
Variance of residuals	2.978 (.043)	2.819 (.091)	4.757 (.070)	4.662 (.152)
Number of observations	9,518	1,950	9,356	1,914
Wald X ² (df)	1,152.12(19)***	319.30(19)***	805.98(19)***	205.81(19)***


Note: Results are multi-level mixed effects (random slope and random intercept) linear regression estimates (using STATA's xtmixed command). ESS5 is a reference category for survey rounds. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors; *p<.01, **p<.005, ***p<.001 (two-tailed).

Table 3. Interaction Models of Pro-Immigration Attitudes among Foreign-Born Individuals in 18 European Countries, 2002-2011.

Independent Variables	<i>Perceived Consequences of Immigration</i>	<i>Preferred Immigration Levels</i>
Citizen	-.255 (.112)	-.095 (.111)
Dissatisfaction with economy	-.127*** (.011)	-.050*** (.014)
Citizen*Dissatisfaction with economy	-.013 (.015)	-.051* (.019)
Manual skills	-.210*** (.039)	-.295*** (.050)
Income	.011 (.023)	.050 (.030)
Unemployed	-.142 (.065)	.013 (.083)
Left-right self-placement	-.103*** (.009)	-.138*** (.011)
Recent immigrant	.054* (.020)	.034 (.026)
Ethnic minority	.281*** (.044)	.102 (.056)
Discriminated against	.269*** (.053)	.311*** (.067)
Social connectedness	.087*** (.012)	.071*** (.015)
Urban residence	.082*** (.016)	.024 (.020)
Education	.052*** (.004)	.056*** (.006)
Age	-.007*** (.001)	-.014*** (.002)
Male	.150*** (.036)	.055 (.045)
Foreign-born from the EU	.115 (.085)	.403*** (.109)
ESS1	.186* (.068)	.034 (.087)
ESS2	.011 (.058)	.295*** (.074)
ESS3	-.031 (.057)	.039 (.073)
ESS4	.197*** (.055)	.295*** (.070)
Constant	6.167*** (.199)	6.267*** (.263)
Variance of random slope: citizen	.083 (.039)	.017 (.017)
Variance of random intercept	.148 (.056)	.334 (.125)
Variance of residuals	2.978 (.043)	4.755 (.070)
Number of observations	9,518	9,356
Wald X ² (df)	1,155.03 (20)***	820.18 (20)***


Note: Results are multi-level mixed effects (random slope and random intercept) linear regression estimates (using STATA's xtmixed command). ESS5 is a reference category for survey rounds. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors; *p<.01, **p<.005, ***p<.001 (two-tailed).

Figure1. Marginal Effect of Citizenship on Preferred Levels of Immigration Among Foreign-Born Individuals in 18 Western Democracies.



Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Figure2. Marginal Effect of Dissatisfaction with Economy on Preferred Levels of Immigration Among Foreign-Born Individuals in 18 Western democracies.



Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Notes

¹ The total migrant stock in the current 27 EU member states increased from 5.68 percent in 1990 to 9.40 percent in 2010, and to 22.53 percent and 9.93 percent in Switzerland and Norway, respectively (World Bank 2013).

² In 2010, 13.84 percent of the US population was foreign-born.

³ Most existing research in this area focus immigrants (mostly Latinos) in the United States (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Branton 2007; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Polinard, Wrinkle, and de la Garza 1984; Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1984) For studies comparing attitudes of immigrants and natives with respect to policy issues beyond immigration, see Schildkraut (2013), Branton (2007).

⁴ In line with this perspective, several previous studies on Latino immigrants in the United States found that perceptions of linked fate or attachment to their in-group are much stronger among foreign-born individuals than among immigrants of subsequent generations (e.g. Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Barreto and Pedraza 2009).

⁵ Although not focused on the question of immigration, a parallel literature on inter-ethnic competition among minority groups in the U.S. highlights the importance of economic threat perceptions in shaping views of minority group members towards other minority groups. At various times during the course of U.S. history, competition for public jobs and proliferation of ethnically exclusive immigrants' businesses strained the relationships among various groups, particularly between African-Americans on one hand, and Irish, Asians, Latinos, and even blacks from the Caribbean on the other (Diamond 1998; Skerry 1995; Joyce 2003; Morawska 2009, esp. Ch3). As a consequence, cross-ethnic political alliances have often been shaky and short-lived, and efforts to extend policy benefits, political influence, or electoral support to other immigrant groups – limited and conditional (Morawska 2009; Gay 2006; Kim 2000; Kaufmann 2007; Rocha 2007; see also Oliver and Wong 2003; Rogers 2009). This has been surprising, given that minority status and experience of discrimination could be expected to motivate cooperation among various immigrant groups for a common goal of improving their situation in the host society.

⁶ The ESS project relies on hour-long face-to-face interviews using survey questions designed for optimal cross-national comparability and strict random sampling of individuals aged 15 or older regardless of nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status to ensure representativeness of national populations.

⁷ Because our individual-level these analyses are based on samples of foreign-born respondents only, we sought to establish to what extent these samples matched the characteristics of the populations under investigation. We conducted two preliminary analyses. First, we calculated the percentages of foreign-born respondents in the original ESS sample and compared these to data measuring the actual percentages of foreign-born individuals from the 2001 Census data, available from the European Union's statistical agency, Eurostat. The Pearson correlation between the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the surveys and the percentage of foreign-born residents according to Eurostat in the countries included in our study was .98, indicating an extremely close fit between survey and official statistics. Second, using a question indicating respondents' country of origin, we then investigated the extent to which our samples of foreign-born respondents were representative of populations in the countries under investigation by calculating the percentages of individuals from different regions of the world. We differentiated individuals by the following regions of origin: Africa, Asia, the Balkans, East Central Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, Australia and New Zealand, and Western Europe. The Pearson correlation between the percentages of foreign born individuals in our surveys from specific regions and the official percentages of foreign born residents in the countries from these regions was .90, indicating yet again a very close fit between survey and official statistics. For more details about individual countries, please contact the authors. For other studies that relied on ESS samples of foreign-born to study immigrants' attitudes and behavior, see, for example, Wright and Bloemraad (2012), de Rooij (2011), Maxwell (2010), and Just and Anderson (2012).

⁸ The three items scale very well, with a Cronbach's alpha of .80 among foreign-born respondents.

⁹ Cronbach's alpha is .87 among foreign-born respondents.

¹⁰ Foreign-born respondents with both native-born parents were excluded from the analyses.

¹¹ We rely on subjective economic evaluations instead of official indicators of the functioning of the economy because subjective indicators provide more direct measures of what we seek to measure (people's perceptions of the economy), and are causally closer to our dependent variables (people's attitudes towards immigration) than objective indicators, such as official estimates of GDP per capita, inflation, or unemployment.

¹² We recognize that the left-right dimension is a summary measure of people's political orientations that includes people's beliefs with respect to various spheres of society, not just the social one. However, in the absence of a better measure in our data and given that our multivariate analyses account for economic threat in a variety of ways, we believe that left-right continuum offers the best available indicator to capture the effects of symbolic considerations in shaping people's attitudes towards immigration.

¹³ The results of a variance-components model (ANOVA) (available from the authors upon request) confirm that there is statistically significant variability in immigration attitudes at both levels of analysis.

¹⁴ For an overview of matching methods, see Stuart (2010).

¹⁵ For applications of CEM in political science, see, for example, Black and Owens (2013), Broockman (2013), Pierskalla and Hollenbach. (2013), and Washington (2008).

¹⁶ All analyses were conducted in Stata; for guidelines how to implement CEM in Stata, see Blackwell et al. (2009).

¹⁷ To maintain a sufficiently large number of matched cases for efficient estimations and coarsen our covariates into substantively meaningful categories, we proceeded in the following way: dissatisfaction with economy, recent immigrant, education, social connectedness, urban residence were coarsened into two category variables using median values among foreign-born (the median for education corresponds to the substantively meaningful value of 12 years of full-time education completed, or having a high school diploma); age and left-right self-placement were similarly coarsened into three-category variables, while dichotomous variables (unemployment, male, manual skills, ethnic minority, discriminated against, foreign-born from the EU, and dummy variables for

ESS rounds) were used in their original form. Coarsening our covariates in this way results in perfect global balance, as the \mathcal{L}_1 statistic for the full joint distribution of the covariates drops to zero; each individual covariate becomes perfectly balanced as well.

¹⁸ Using the k2k option produces equal numbers of treated and control units within strata, eliminating the need for weights in subsequent statistical estimations.