**‘Opening up’ education policy making in England – space for ordinary citizens’ participation?**

*Sonia Exley*

*Department of Social Policy, LSE*

**Abstract**

This article explores UK attempts to boost ordinary citizens’ participation in government policy formulation through 'open policy making'. Drawing primarily on an analysis of government documents dating from 2012-2018 and focusing on the case of the Department for Education in England, the article highlights elite network control of policy making which works to depress ordinary citizens’ democratic input. Groups who do not fit with depoliticised, ‘top down’ understandings of what counts as valid citizen participation become delegitimised and excluded.

**Key words**

Participatory democracy; policy networks; education policy; open policy making

**Introduction**

The notion of fostering socially inclusive participatory democracy in Western states has been described in much scholarly literature as having the potential to improve public trust in the workings of democratic institutions and also to improve policy outcomes. At the same time, within stratified societies, major power inequalities have long been known to pervade policy making. Elite actors exercise strong influence within ‘policy networks’, espousing dominant discourses and reinforcing narrow understandings of what counts as valid policy knowledge. Their influence can be argued to undermine the participation in policy making of ordinary, particularly more vulnerable, citizens. Such groups become excluded and efforts to boost recognition of their voices become compromised.

The notion of ‘Open Policy Making’ (OPM) is one which has been discussed by organisations such as the OECD since at least 2007[[1]](#endnote-1) and more recently it has become popular in the UK. Influenced by ‘design thinking’, OPM is an approach to formulating policy wherein the views of external experts are given particular importance, as are the views of actors involved in implementing government policies and delivering services. There is however also a related focus on co-production with service users and boosting the participation of ordinary citizens.[[2]](#endnote-2) In 2012, then-Prime Minister David Cameron described growing OPM efforts in the UK Government as being key within a ‘great wave of decentralisation’ of decision making ‘from Whitehall to communities across the country’ (Civil Service, 2012: 2). However, given what has been noted above regarding power inequalities and the operation of elite networks in policy making, how realistic might this be?

In this paper I report on an analysis of UK government documents on OPM dating from 2012-2018, plus some supplementary data from expert interviews. My analysis focuses on the case of the Department for Education (DfE) in England. In what sorts of ways has DfE policy making been ‘opened up’? What actors are being included and via what sorts of practice? Is there evidence that some are being privileged or marginalised as being more or less ‘legitimate’ than others?

**The importance of public participation**

Western liberal states have for decades been plagued by low levels of popular trust and engagement in their democratic institutions. 2018 Eurobarometer data shows that only one third of people in the UK tend to trust the UK government,[[3]](#endnote-3) and Barnes et al (2007) argue that ‘it is now widely accepted that representative democracy is insufficient as a means of reconnecting citizens with those institutions’ (p.27). Representative democracy has furthermore been described as being inadequate on its own for the formulation of ‘good’ social policies (Ansell et al, 2017). Literature has grown focusing on the benefits for citizens that are produced by more participatory democracy (Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970; Bevir, 2013; Dacombe, 2017) and scholars have considered how these might be combined with representative government in mass societies – a ‘democratisation of democracy’ (Pateman, 2012: 15). Young (2000) describes a vision of ‘deep democracy’ (p.5) wherein political inclusion and the day-to-day participation of ordinary citizens in government decision making would become normalised. She argues that such would improve policy makers’ relational understandings of the world, witnessing as they would regular pluralistic discord and the viewpoints of actors situated in a variety of circumstances. More socially just and legitimate policies would, Young argues, follow, with better outcomes for vulnerable groups in particular. Such could arguably help to counter problems of *misrepresentation* where, in present-day societies, skewed rules for decision-making compromise for many the right to take part fully, to contest policies and to pursue goals on an equal footing, creating what Fraser (2008) terms ‘political injustice’.

Critics of participatory democracy highlight practicability problems and also threats to social stability which can emerge where ordinary citizens exercise substantial direct control over government policy making (Dahl, 1956; Schumpeter, 1976). One may also question how far public desire actually exists for extensive participation given even regular voting in elections produces ‘voter fatigue’ (Rallings et al, 2003). Still, while participatory policy making may not always be appropriate, one can argue it nevertheless has potential for checking the power of bureaucratic and political leaders (Fung, 2004).

**Limiting while encouraging citizen involvement**

At the same time, government attempts to date to promote greater citizen participation in policy making have historically been beset with problems. Disadvantaged citizens are far less likely than others to become involved and scholars have long puzzled over the mechanisms underpinning disengagement. One key part of the puzzle here relates to issues one can identify not only from ‘looking down’ at the characteristics of groups not taking part, but also from ‘looking up’ at structures of power both within and beyond government institutions, and considering ways in which citizens might be *systematically excluded* as much as they are *self-excluding*. Political science has for many decades explored power inequalities which are endemic within policy making and in recent years the stratified nature of ‘policy networks’ has been considered in particular. Capitalist states are not neutral entities. They serve disproportionately the interests of social, political and economic elites (Mills, 1956; Lukes, 1974; Miliband, 1969; Crouch, 2011) and this can be considered no less true today in an era of complex polycentric governance (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) – albeit one where national governments still remain powerful (Rhodes, 2011) – than in decades past. In such context, contemporary democratic innovations aiming to boost the voices of ordinary citizens will arguably always be constrained by the interests of network ‘insiders’.

One central means through which less powerful groups’ input is undermined is through dominant discourses which limit what counts as valid, policy-relevant knowledge. ‘Helpful’ evidence comes to be defined as that presented in depoliticised and technocratic terms (Clarke, 2004; Mouffe, 2005; Flinders, 2012) while little space is permitted for that less conventionally articulated (Young, 2000). Prescriptive participatory exercises happen inside ‘invited spaces’ (Cornwall, 2008) but at the same time, discord is discouraged and ‘service users’ become depicted as constituting an undifferentiated ‘universal class’ (Fraser, 1990: 60). As a result, dominant agendas are reinforced and the influence of powerful interest groups is masked. Bevir (2013) terms such contexts ‘system governance’ (p.167) and he argues they constrain space for genuine dialogic policy making. The participation of ‘subaltern counterpublics’ (Fraser, 1990: 67) at the same time becomes misrecognised. Groups critiquing dominant agendas are delegitimised on the basis of counterdiscourses they espouse and their oppositional forms of communication are often deemed inappropriate.

**Open Policy Making**

OPM has been an increasingly popular notion cross-nationally (OECD, 2009). Initiatives promoting evidence-based policy making and the involvement of external actors in the formulation of government policies have long existed in liberal democracies, particularly as societies have shifted ‘from government to governance’. However, claims have also been made regarding OPM – as a most recent incarnation in these developments – as having the potential to represent an upward gear shift in efforts to ‘open up’ policy making to a greater diversity of voices, ‘improv[ing] policy performance and meet[ing] citizens’ rising expectations’ (OECD, 2009: 21).

In the UK, growing out of earlier ‘Open Government’ and ‘Open Public Services’ initiatives (Cabinet Office, 2011a; 2011b) and also earlier evidence-based policy trends under Labour governments from 1997-2010 (Cabinet Office, 1999; Whitty, 2016), in 2012 OPM was central to a Civil Service Reform Plan published by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (Civil Service, 2012). The Plan described OPM as breaking a ‘Whitehall monopoly’ on UK Government policy making, committing governments to drawing on a ‘wider range of views and expertise’ (p.14). Drawing on ‘design thinking’ which involves considering the diverse perspectives of external stakeholders on whom policies impact (Howlett et al, 2015; Kimbell, 2016), authors writing on OPM have promoted the involvement of external experts and also actors tasked with implementing government policies, (increasingly in the private sector). They have however additionally stressed the importance of co-production with service users[[4]](#endnote-4) and citizens taking part more widely – ‘establish[ing] a new relationship with the citizen who becomes a valued partner’ (House of Commons, 2013: 3).

In 2013, a UK Cabinet Office OPM team was established in order to help promote a mindset across government wherein policy making would become ‘open by default’. From 2013 to 2015, this team ran OPM events, created resources such as an OPM Toolkit and reported on OPM developments across government with a regularly updated blog. This blog continues at the time of writing, though it is today managed by a newer Cabinet Office ‘sister team’ – Policy Lab.

From a participatory democracy perspective, UK OPM might be considered as presenting significant possibilities for greater citizen input into government policy making. Documents describe OPM as being ‘quietly revolutionary’ (OPM blog, 23rd March, 2018) and as sparking ‘innovation and transformational change’ (OPM Toolkit, 2016). At the same time, Young (2000) cautions us always to remember that ‘where[ver] decisions are far reaching or involve the basic interests of the most powerful … the powerful will usually try to make the decisions themselves’ (p.5). Pateman (2012) similarly argues that ‘when actual budgets and policies are at stake, political elites rarely listen to citizens’ (p.15). Talbot and Talbot (2015) highlight a lack of research on UK OPM but they also express scepticism that, in a time of ‘established policy networks’, this will not simply rely on ‘handpicked experts’ (p.187). One Public Administration Select Committee Report states that UK OPM carries ‘great potential … to deliver genuine public engagement’ but also ‘a risk of disappointment and scepticism amongst the public’ where governments listen largely to ‘the usual suspects’ (House of Commons, 2013: 3).

**Research questions and methods**

In a time of OPM – but also elite policy networks – which actors are being invited to take part and in what sorts of ways? In a typical UK Civil Service department, are some privileged as being more/ marginalised as less ‘legitimate’ than others? In this paper I draw on a case study of the Department for Education (DfE) in England – a Ministerial UK Civil Service Department (albeit one whose jurisdiction covers England only) currently responsible for policy in the realms of pre-primary, primary, secondary, further and higher education in England, in addition to wider skills policy, children’s services and equalities. Within UK Government documents on OPM there are a number of specific initiatives which have been identified positively as constituting exemplars of a DfE approach to OPM. Analysing these exemplars can give us insight into how OPM has come to be understood among DfE officials.

A thematic analysis using NVivo was carried out of all publicly available government documents on UK OPM – reports, news articles, press releases, policy briefings, PowerPoint presentations and blog postings – from 2012-2018. A search was then carried out for all documents within the data corpus making reference to DfE policy making. Several initiatives associated with a DfE-specific approach to OPM were identified. A further search for, and analysis of, government documents *exploring these initiatives in particular* was subsequently carried out.

The data corpus for this project comprised 384 documents. Primary documents as described above constituted by far the largest data source; however, in order to dig into greater depth on a small number of specific issues relating to particular DfE/OPM initiatives, five supplementary semi-structured interviews with experts were also carried out (see Appendix 1). Data from documents and interviews were additionally triangulated against secondary academic literature and against media articles reporting on particular DfE initiatives, following academic literature/ newspaper searches focused specifically on those initiatives.

**The DfE in England and its road to OPM**

The DfE is a Westminster civil service department in fact historically long recognised for its taking of an approach to governing education prioritising localism and the participation of ordinary citizens. Often described as a ‘national system, locally administered’ (Chitty, 2014: 21), post-war education in England and Wales[[5]](#endnote-5) was traditionally run by democratically-elected local education authorities (LEAs) with only limited intervention from the central state. LEA ‘maintained’ schools[[6]](#endnote-6) have historically also enjoyed some autonomy from local government, being part-managed by school-level governing bodies including school staff and also parent and other local community participants (Power, 2012).

Since the 1980s, however, concerns have also grown over a perceived nationalcentralisation of English education governance which may have impacted on ordinary citizens’ power to take part. Such centralisation is often argued to have gained initial impetus under 1980s Conservative education secretary Kenneth Baker, driven by preceding Conservative critiques of ‘left wing’ LEAs and also once-powerful teacher unions and university departments of education during the 1960s and 1970s in England (Ball, 1990). Policy remits for the DfE in England have grown considerably over time, and central government has shifted, too, towards particular kinds of externalisation in policy making, including ever-growing engagement with corporate actorsoutside the state (Ball and Exley, 2010). Since the 1980s under Conservative then Labour governments, numbers of ministerially-appointed special advisers (SPADs) with connections to think tanks have grown substantially inside the DfE and they are known to have wielded strong influence (Exley, 2012; Lupton and Hayes, 2018). More recently, powerful actors operating in increasingly global policy networks (Verger et al, 2016) have been documented as contributing to English education policy (Ball and Junemann, 2012; Olmedo, 2017). Network activities have both fuelled and been fuelled-by an increasingly fast-paced, informal and experimental style of policy development, with growing roles for policy entrepreneurs.

Nevertheless, in arguable challenge to such narratives, in recent years DfE literature has emphasised a need for greater ‘opening up’ of DfE policy making. In 2012, as part of wider UK Government plans to ‘identify and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy’ (Civil Service, 2012) the DfE underwent a major budget review (DfE, 2012). Plans were outlined for a 50% reduction in administrative spending, forcing the DfE to emerge ‘leaner’.and with new means for producing policies under heightened resource constraints. DfE officials stated that ‘in a time of restricted funding, we need to contemplate innovative, cost-effective methods … us[ing] new open policy techniques to their fullest’ (Barcoe and White, 2013). Officials described cultivating a ‘porous’ policy environment (ibid) and in 2017 the DfE was reported as engaging regularly with OPM practices, tools and activities (OPM blog, 20th March 2017).

From a participatory democracy perspective, clear statements here of DfE commitment to opening up policy making sound hopeful in terms of creating new possibilities for ordinary citizens’ participation. However, what sorts of OPM initiatives have emerged? Which groups are described in literature as taking part and in what ways are they taking part? Are some treated as having greater or lesser legitimacy than others? Below I report on all policy making efforts since 2012 which have been identified in public documents as exemplifying a ‘DfE approach to OPM’.

**Frontline**

In 2013, the UK Cabinet Office published an article entitled ‘co-producing a solution for social work training‘ (OPM blog, 24th July 2013). This article detailed OPM processes leading to the creation of the DfE-funded social work education organisation *Frontline*. In 2012, the DfE Social Work Reform Unit had been seeking ways to ‘raise the quality of social work candidates’, particularly ‘in areas where they were most needed’ (ibid). The social enterprise Absolute Return for Kids (ARK), already known for its role in running Academies,[[7]](#endnote-7) together with Josh McAlister from the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), approached the DfE with a proposal for re-imagining social work training in England. ARK and McAlister had been inspired by Teach First (McAlister was a former Teach First participant) – a social enterprise set up ‘to bring high-flying new graduates into teaching in challenging schools’ (Whitty, 2016: 21), providing initial teacher education lasting two years and focusing primarily on ‘on-the-job’ rather than traditional university-based teacher education (and for relevant background here again see Ball, 1990, on former Conservative critiques of the teaching profession, teacher unions and university-based teacher education in England). ARK and McAlister wanted to create an organisation that would, with public funding and a social work training model that would for the first time be employer-led rather than university-led, ‘attract and train top graduates to become the future leaders of the profession’ (OPM blog, 24th July 2013). McAlister and ARK offered to pilot their proposed model[[8]](#endnote-8) with funding from the Boston Consulting Group, Big Change, the Queens Trust and Credit Suisse EMEA Foundation (Duggan, 2017). The DfE committed additional funding and *Frontline* was founded with McAlister as CEO. A pilot ran in London and Manchester from 2013-2016, the first Frontline cohort comprising 104 trainees. Frontline has since been expanded nationally with government funding. By 2020 over 1600 participants will have completed one of its programmes.[[9]](#endnote-9)

Frontline has been contentious within the social work profession (see e.g. Beresford, 2016). It has been accused of creating an elite tier of social workers with too narrow a scholarly understanding of the problems social workers address.[[10]](#endnote-10) Reports on how Frontline began describe civil servants’ ‘understandable nervousness’ given the organisation represents ‘a radical departure from the established view of social work education’ (Barcoe and White, 2013). However, ARK is described as having worked well with civil servants, moving beyond a ‘typical lobbying relationship’ towards one that was ‘solution-focused’ (OPM blog, 24th July 2013).

Government literature on OPM stresses the importance of ‘breaking down barriers’ with non-state actors and also of ensuring that those involved in *implementing* government services are simultaneously invited to influence policy *formulation* (Civil Service, 2012). In Frontline we see a major implementation actor – ARK – already involved in running government schooling in England being invited to co-produce an experimental venture in a new domain of policy. At the same time, the McAlister/ IPPR example here highlights an entrepreneurial ‘selling’ of ideas by actors inside think tanks which often become ‘do tanks’ (Mulgan, 2006: 151), proposing and raising funding for policy pilots. In line with existing literature on elite policy networks, policy making here appears to be opening up to private sector delivery agents and to new sorts of expert. It is, however, doing little to promote the democratic participation of ordinary or more vulnerable groups.

**DfE Policy Fellows**

A further initiative ‘opening up’ DfE policy making, though largely to actors already part of elite networks, has been the recruitment of DfE ‘Policy Fellows’. These are ‘a unique response to the Civil Service Reform Plan’s goal to make open-policy making the default across Whitehall’ (Berry and Tooher, 2015). ‘High calibre professionals from across the world’ have been seconded with an aim of ‘exposing the whole Department to new ways of thinking’ (ibid). The first Fellows were recruited in 2015 and are listed in Box 1.

**BOX 1 - DfE 2015 Policy Fellows**:

* **Brian Daly:** Investment banker formerly of JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs.
* **Jonathan Clifton:**An IPPR Senior Research Fellow.
* **Marta Pascual Barea:**From edu-business Amplify Education in New York. Formerly worked in the New Jersey DfE Charter Schools Office and co-founded Teach First in Spain.
* **Anton Collyer:**Retired Vice President of IT at GlaxoSmithKline.
* **Stuart Kime:**Former teacher and director of the consultancy Evidence Based Education. Co-author of the *Education Endowment Foundation’s DIY Evaluation Guide*.
* **Bill Holledge:**Former head teacher of Great Yarmouth Primary Academy. Chief Executive of the Paradigm Trust (a London Primary Multi-Academy Trust).
* **Paul Cappon:**Former President and CEO of the non-profit Canadian Council of Learning.

Source: Berry and Tooher, 2015

Here the importance attached to elite education industry actors (Fellows involved with Amplify Education, Teach First, the Paradigm Trust) emerges again, as does the role of think tank experts and the role of commercial sector actors more broadly. Regarding ‘new ways of thinking’, one former official expressed scepticism:

‘We got one in from Policy Exchange I think, and another couple of places, but it tended – I might be being unfair – again it tended to be from groups that were aligned with what the government was thinking anyway’[[11]](#endnote-11)

Such raises questions about the extent to which true political discord may be occurring in DfE policy making – discord which Young (2000) describes as being crucial in any quest for ‘deep democracy’. Findings here support much previous work in education which has argued that government recruitment of external experts tends very often towards merely lending legitimacy to existing policy agendas, rather than challenging or questioning these (see e.g. Souto-Otero, 2015)

**The Contestable Policy Fund**

In 2012 a Contestable Policy Fund (CPF) was launched in the UK Civil Service. This was intended to prompt, across government, new challenging of existing policy domains, purposefully opening these up to ‘competition from external sources’ and fostering a climate where ‘anybody can initiate policy review/ adaptation/ evolution’(Civil Service, 2012: 15).The CPF matched Departmental spending up to £500,000 where departments applied having commissioned external policy reviews. By 2015, eighteen projects had received CPF funding, two of which were DfE projects:

1. In 2014 the DfE commissioned international strategy consultancy Cairneagle Associates to explore possibilities for increasing the use of massive open online courses (MOOCs) among school-age children in England.[[12]](#endnote-12)
2. In 2015 the Education and Training Foundation received DfE funding to review policies on ‘Making Maths and English Work for All’. The ETF in turn commissioned research consultancy Pye Tait.[[13]](#endnote-13)

In 2014-15, £1.3 billion was spent by the UK Government on specialist private consultants – a figure £400m to £600m higher than in 2011-12 (NAO, 2016: 6). Gunter (2012) refers to ‘consultocracy’ in education and scholars including Ball (2009) have written about a privatisation of education policy making in England and beyond – growing DfE-commissioned roles for actors inside think tanks, the education services industry and firms including PwC, McKinsey and KPMG.[[14]](#endnote-14) At the same time, some step change may also currently be noted regarding levels of government dependency on such actors. The idea that civil servants ought to be *contracting out* policy development – acting not only as ‘partners’ but sometimes even more restrictedly as ‘stewards’ (Civil Service, 2013; Hallsworth, 2011) – is one that has gained traction in UK government literature. Direct Ministerial commissioning of external advisers, bypassing civil servants altogether, has come to be encouraged (Civil Service, 2013a; 2013b; Rutter, 2012). One former longstanding civil servant attributed shifts in part to recent austerity and to civil service redundancy rounds which have caused high turnover and losses in institutional memory.[[15]](#endnote-15) In such contexts, external expertise becomes more necessary, though it also takes only a narrow meaning. Little priority seems to be attached to using funds such as CPF to reach out to e.g. grassroots organisations that may directly involve more vulnerable groups.

**Listening to parents on early years education and care**

Some DfE OPM efforts have gone further in promoting the participation of ordinary citizens. In 2015, DfE civil servants worked together with the Cabinet Office OPM team to ‘engage a broader range of views’ on the future of government-funded early years provision in England (OPM blog, 16th October 2015; 6th May 2016). A structured online questionnaire was designed, garnering 19,300 replies and asking parents about issues including their working patterns, factors affecting childcare choices and the usefulness of proposed changes to government early years funding (DfE, 2015).

A partnership was additionally established between the DfE, Cabinet Office Business Partnerships Team and some employers across England including BT, John Lewis, Deloitte, Accenture, Intel and O2. Employers organised workshops with employees who were parents in order to rather information on ‘the user voice’. Creative OPM techniques were deployed such as asking participants to ‘sketch’ their own perspectives, and civil servants sought, going forward, to ‘build a group of engaged parents’ who could ‘advise on key decisions further down the line’ (OPM blog, 16th October 2015). Such work does indicate some moves towards involving wider constituencies in DfE policy making. Former and current Cabinet Office officials highlighted, too, the importance of ensuring a ‘mixed economy of people’ at workshop events,[[16]](#endnote-16) though detailed demographic data were not available on parents participating in the aforementioned employer-led workshops. A 2015 DfE *Childcare Bill Policy Statement* does show some evidence of policy makers taking citizen views into account. Parents during consultations responded positively to proposals for extending publicly-funded childcare for 3 and 4 year olds in England to 30 hours per week. Such proposals have gone forward, though views expressed during consultations that the government ought also to ensure ongoing quality and sustainable funding (DfE, 2015: 11) have arguably not been addressed, given a current £662 million funding gap (All Party Parliamentary Group for Childcare and Early Education, 2019).

The views of many parents on early years provision have notably also been marginalised by DfE representatives. Following consultative exercises outlined above, in November 2015, then-Minister for Childcare and Education Sam Gyimah summarised the needs of parents as follows:

‘[parents] are looking for convenience and flexibility, quality, and in the longer term, a simpler childcare system’ (Gyimah, 2015)

No mention was made in the 2015 *Childcare Bill Policy Statement* of Sure Start Children’s Centres in England, nor indeed significant political activism which can be noted in recent years over the future of these. The Centres were established in the early 2000s under Labour, funded by central government and delivered by local government, providing integrated early years education and care plus other services, primarily in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Since 2010, cuts in central government grants to local authorities have meant the closure of many Children’s Centres (CASE, 2015; Smith et al, 2018). Parents have campaigned against closures with, for example, High Court challenges in Oxfordshire and Hampshire (Richardson, 2011a; BBC, 2016). Local campaigners from across England delivered to Downing Street on Mother’s Day in 2011 a 50,000-signature petition protesting against closures (Richardson, 2011b). Minister Gyimah did promise in 2015 that a full government consultation would take place over the future of Children’s Centres (Bate and Foster, 2017). However, at the same time the DfE highlighted its interest in ‘innovative and socially led’ early years provision, Gyimah stating in 2015 that ‘the childcare debate has moved on from whether or not Sure Start centres should offer childcare’ (Gyimah, 2015). As of 2018, government plans for a consultation on Children’s Centres have been dropped.[[17]](#endnote-17)

**Academies and Free Schools**

Since 2010 the DfE has attached strong policy priority to accelerating the ‘Academies’ and ‘Free Schools’ programmes in England (Civil Service, 2012; DfE, 2012). Academies and Free Schools are schools which are primarily publicly funded but which are run by contracted organisations outside the state (Parish et al, 2012). The schools possess freedoms not usually extended to local authority-maintained schools – for example they need not adhere to the full National Curriculum and they are granted substantial autonomy over admissions. Academies originated in England under Labour before 2010,[[18]](#endnote-18) though at this time they were restricted in number and located in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Curtis et al, 2008). Since 2010, all schools in England have been permitted to apply to convert into Academies. The DfE has also encouraged the setting up of entirely new Academies and Free Schools.

DfE literature has emphasised grassroots, bottom-up localism and participatory democratic elements underpinning particularly the Free Schools policy in England. Ordinary parents, teachers and community groups who are ‘ready to play a bigger role in shaping local children’s futures’ are invited to apply to set up Free Schools, boosting consumer choice in education but also citizens’ direct voice and engagement, ‘protecting the ideal of great community education’ (Gove, 2011). At the same time, however, private sector sponsors have also been invited to part-fund and run Academies. Growing numbers of major sponsors in the form of multi-academy trusts (Courtney, 2015) have emerged in recent years, running multiple schools at once.[[19]](#endnote-19)

In January 2018 more than a third of all state schools in England were Academies or Free Schools (NAO, 2018: 4). However, the extent of ordinary citizens’ desire for such a drive to privatise schooling delivery and governance remains unclear. Grassroots campaigns against Academisation have also been noted across England, documented in local and national press and by organisations such as the Anti-Academies Alliance.[[20]](#endnote-20)

Government literature has regularly highlighted the ‘urgency’ of ‘delivering’ on Academisation:

‘When you’re dealing with a service that every child only gets once, every delay means a child in a school never gets that week or that month or that year back again’ (former DfE Permanent Secretary Chris Wormald, in Cameron et al, 2014: 9).[[21]](#endnote-21)

Such discourses have been deployed as justification for some contentious practices in the advancing of Academisation. Until 2016 in England, school governing bodies and prospective sponsors of new Academies in any neighbourhood were required legally to consult with local government and with local communities before plans for Academisation could be taken forward. Local consultations have been critiqued over issues such as:

* their being undertaken by proposed sponsors rather than by independent parties, with only limited dialogue expected and limited information given about plans;
* DfE/ sponsor dismissal of relevant evidence submitted by campaign groups;
* Consultations occurring late in the day, often *after* key decisions have been made, limiting possibilities for opposition (see e.g. Mansell, 2013; Steel, 2014).

Beyond this, however, in 2016 the DfE *Education and Adoption Act* alsoremoved a previous legal obligation for consultations to take place. Education Secretary Nicky Morgan argued that this would ‘sweep away the bureaucratic and legal loopholes previously exploited by those who put ideological objections above the best interests of children’.[[22]](#endnote-22) She added that ‘for too long, campaigners have deployed underhand tactics, spread malicious rumours and intimidated parents in order to deny children the opportunity for success’.[[23]](#endnote-23) ‘Forced Academisation’ has occurred in areas even where majorities in local ballots have rejected plans for new Academies.[[24]](#endnote-24) Schools have become required through DfE Academy Orders to become Academies where they are deemed to be under-performing (Gunter and McGinity, 2014).

Higham (2017) has furthermore shown that Free School proposals accepted by DfE officials have been skewed in the sense that ‘evidence of corporate expertise is crucial to proposers’ chances of success’ (p.217). Higham has shown, too, that DfE-appointed consultants have been simultaneously involved in both *advising on* and *proposing* new Free Schools. Findings here seem to confirm a concern expressed as early as 2012 by Power that Free School governance may become dominated by traditional players despite hopes for a greater politics of representation (Power, 2012).

Local community participation in education governance has simultaneously decreased as a result of the existence of multi-academy trusts (MATs). Where *school-level* governing bodies previously existed in all schools across England, decision making has increasingly shifted to *trust-level*, with school-level bodies being either abolished or reduced to serving mere advisory functions and existing at the discretion of MAT heads. Trust-level governor meetings now regularly take place many miles from where individual schools are located and tens of thousands of local governor positions have been abolished (George, 2018). At both school and MAT level, too, longstanding obligations which previously existed for governing bodies to ensure the presence of parent and other local community representatives now no longer exist (DfE, 2016). Changes are part of shifts towards what Wilkins (2016) terms professionalised ‘skills-based governance’ in education, masking a ‘hidden politics of exclusion’ (p.4).

Developments above would seem to contradict the idea of ‘openness’ in DfE policy making and evidence can be found of distinctions being drawn between citizens who *are* and *are not* considered legitimate and desirable participants. On the one hand, there are ‘engaged parents’, behaving as consumers in an education marketplace (Le Grand, 2003; Clarke et al, 2007) and expressing ‘user voice’ but only in carefully controlled environments such as employer-led workshops. Desirable parents are also those possessing the advanced technocratic and corporate knowledge needed to set up schools/ run MATs. On the other hand, there are Fraser’s (1990) ‘subaltern counterpublics’, expressing counterdiscourses through ballots, petitions and other, more oppositional forms of protest. Such groups are delegitimised as being ‘malicious’ and ‘underhand’ – too bullying and ‘ideological’ to take part in proper policy making. Ball has written that ‘political’ parents opposing Academisation have long been constructed by governments as being ungrateful, unreasonable and ‘getting in the way’ (2005, p.220).

Processes of marginalisation here are all the more problematic given the fragility of activism in English education (Hatcher and Jones, 2006). Citizens are sceptical about the efficacy of taking part in a time when it seems unlikely they will be able to make much difference, so sustained collective mobilisation on any issue becomes difficult to achieve (ibid). In defending the importance of subaltern counterpublics for healthy democratic renewal in societies, Fraser (1990) has argued that such groups mustbe granted the democratic space to find and articulate collective dissenting voices if those voices are ever going to become sufficiently powerful to agitate in wider society and to offset the participatory privileges of dominant groups (p.68).

**Discussion and conclusions – towards more open OPM?**

Findings above might reasonably lead us to conclude that so far, in a time of ongoing elite policy networks in education, it is primarily ‘usual suspects’ – most notably consultants plus think tank and other commercial actors – to whom DfE policy making has ‘opened up’. Efforts can be noted to engage ordinary citizens such as parents, though participatory exercises, or at least the ones reported here, appear to have been of a highly controlled variety, with participants having ‘little scope to determine the conditions of their own participation’ (Dean, 2017: 217). Citizens engaging in policy processes through more oppositional critique have furthermore been disregarded as being unhelpful and excessively political. Evidence given in this paper should not be assumed to comprise an entirely exhaustive account of all DfE efforts since 2012 to open up policy making. However, examples given *are*, importantly, the full sum of those about which civil servants have been moved to showcase, suggesting they are considered to exemplify a ‘DfE approach to OPM’.

The idea of network governance is often evoked idealistically in public policy literature as part of a suggestion that *in existing societies* of a sort of policy making is possible where actors from a wide range of ideational standpoints possess power to have their voices heard, joining up as ‘partners’ to solve ‘wicked problems’. Authors such as Frankham (2006) have, however, cautioned against utopian depictions of policy networks which imply that power is somehow well-dispersed. Thinking particularly of English education policy and how one might better include ordinary and more vulnerable citizens, there are many participatory democratic innovations which might work well in this landscape. Bevir (2013) has described the inclusive potential of methods such as participatory budgeting, decentralised development planning, deliberative polling and mapping, town hall meetings, citizens’ panels and juries (though see also critiques from Pateman, 2012) and more broadly community co-production and governance. In all such innovations, critical dissenting viewpoints of differently situated actors might come to be better explored than in the past, with compromises reached and democratic deficits reduced. Perhaps in education such initiatives could be combined with a recent possibility suggested by Ball (2018) that England might revisit late-Nineteenth Century elected local school boards, given their ‘local democratic and radical glimmerings’ (p.218)*.* At the same time, as Fraser (1990) reminds us, issues of ‘status differentials’ (p.62) in policy making must never be sidestepped – and here not only between elite experts and ordinary citizens, but also *among* ordinary citizens. One key problem with liberal ideology, she argues, has always been a tendency to presume that democratic institutions can be ‘insulated’ from ‘pre-political’ inequalities, when in reality policy processes have always been susceptible to elite ‘capture’. If we truly want participatory parity from citizens of all walks of life, then, we must accept that ‘political democracy requires substantive social equality’ (ibid: 65).

**References**

ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR CHILDCARE AND EARLY EDUCATION. 2019. Steps to Sustainability.<https://connectpa.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Steps-to-sustainability-report.pdf>

ANSELL, C., E. Sørensen, J. TORFING. 2017. Improving policy implementation through collaborative policymaking. *Policy and Politics* 45(3): 467-486.

ARNSTEIN, S.R. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners.* 35(4): 216–24.

BALL, S.J. 1990. *Politics and Policy Making in Education*. London: Routledge.

BALL, S.J. 2005. Radical policies, progressive modernisation and deepening democracy: the Academies programme in action. *Forum*. 47(2/3): 215-222.

BALL, S.J. 2009. Privatising education, privatising education policy, privatising educational research, network governance and the ‘competition state’. *Journal of Education Policy*. 24(1): 83-99.

BALL, S.J. 2018. The tragedy of state education in England: reluctance, compromise and muddle – a system in disarray. *Journal of the British Academy*. 6: 207-238.

BALL, S.J., S. EXLEY. 2010. Making policy With ‘good ideas’: policy networks and the ‘intellectuals’ of New Labour. *Journal of Education Policy.* 25(2): 151-169.

BALL, S.J., JUNEMANN, C. 2012. *Networks, New Governance and Education*. Bristol: Policy Press.

BARCOE, N., H. WHITE. 2013. The policy tests: transforming policy in the department for education. *Civil Service Quarterly.*

BARNES, M., J. NEWMAN, H. SULLIVAN. 2007. *Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Case Studies in Public Participation*. Bristol: Policy Press

BATE, A., D. FOSTER. 2017. *Sure Start (England). House of Commons Briefing Paper 7527*. 9th June.

BBC NEWS. 2016. *High Court Backs Oxfordshire Children’s Centre Closures*. 1st August.

BERESFORD, P. 2013. Frontline’s ‘elite route’ into social work will create divisions. *The Guardian*. 29th August.

BERRY, N., B. TOOHER. 2015. Raising the bar. *Civil Service Quarterly*. 27th January.

BEVIR, M. 2013. *A Theory of Governance*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

BEVIR, M., C. NEEDHAM, J. WARING. 2019. Inside co-production: Ruling, resistance and practice. *Social Policy and Administration*. 53(2): 197-202.

CABINET OFFICE. 1999. *Modernising Government – White Paper*. London: TSO.

CABINET OFFICE. 2011a. *Open Government Partnership UK Action Plan 2011-13*. London: TSO

CABINET OFFICE. 2011b. *Open Public Services White Paper*. London: TSO

CAMERON, D. (2009) The Age of Austerity: <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601367>

CAMERON, D. B. DUFFY, A. KHAN, G. SKINNER. 2014. Bursting the Bubble: Open Policy Making and Democratic Renewal. *Understanding Society*. December. London: Ipsos MORI.

CENTRE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION. 2015. *The Coalition’s Record on the Under Fives*. London: CASE.

CHAKRABORTTY, A. 2018. It’s worse than Carillion: our outsourced schools are leaving parents frozen out. *The Guardian*. 30th July.

CHITTY, C. 2014. *Education Policy in Britain – Third Edition*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

CIVIL SERVICE. 2012. *The Civil Service Reform Plan*. London: TSO.

CIVIL SERVICE. 2013a. *The Civil Service Reform Plan: One Year On Report*. London: TSO

CIVIL SERVICE. 2013b. *Meeting the Challenge of Change*. London: TSO.

CIVIL SERVICE. 2014. *Civil Service Reform Plan Progress Report*. London: TSO

CLARKE, J. 2004. Dissolving the public realm: the logics and limits of neo-liberalism. *Journal of Social Policy* 33: 27-48

CLARKE, J., J. NEWMAN. N. SMITH, E. VIDLER, L. WESTMARLAND. 2007. *Creating Citizen Consumers: Changing Publics and Changing Public Services.* London: Sage.

COOPER, C. 2013. Hove v Gove: Victory for campaigners over plans to build new free school over playing field. *The Independent*. 4th June.

CORNWALL, A. 2008. New Democratic Spaces? The Politics and Dynamics of Institutionalised Participation. *IDS Bulletin*. 35(2): 1-10.

COURTNEY, S. 2015. Corporatised leadership in English schools, *Journal of Educational Administration and History*. 47(3): 214-231.

CROUCH, C. 2011. *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge: Polity.

CURTIS, A., S. EXLEY, A. SASIA, S. TOUGH, G. WHITTY. 2008. *The Academies Programme: Progress, Problems and Possibilities*. London: The Sutton Trust.

DACOMBE, R. 2017. *Rethinking Civic Participation in Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave MacMillan

DAHL, R. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

DEAN. R.J. 2017. Beyond radicalism and resignation: the competing logics for public participation in policy decisions. *Policy and Politics.* 45(2): 213-230.

DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION. 2012. *The Department for Education Review*. London: TSO

DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION. 2015. *Childcare Bill: Policy Statement*. London: TSO.

DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION. 2016. *Educational Excellence Everywhere.* London: TSO.

DUGGAN, J.R. 2017. Fast-track leadership development programmes: the new micro-philanthropy of future elites. In *Corporate Elites and the Reform of Public Education*, edited by H.M. Gunter, D. Hall and M.W. Apple. Bristol: Policy Press.

EXLEY, S. 2012. The politics of educational policy making under New Labour: an illustration of shifts in public service governance. *Policy and Politics* 40(2): 227-44.

EXLEY, S. 2014. Think tanks and policy networks in English education. In *Studying Public Policy: An International Approach*, edited by M. Hill. Bristol: Policy Press.

EXLEY, S. 2017. Private schools and school choice in England. In *Private Schools and School Choice in Compulsory Education: Global Change and National Challenge*, edited by T. Koinzer, R. Nikolai and F. Waldow. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

FLINDERS, M. 2012. *Defending Politics: Why Democracy Matters in the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

FRANKHAM, J. 2006. Network utopias and alternative entanglements for educational research and practice. *Journal of Education Policy* 21(6): 661-677.

FRASER, N. 1990. Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. *Social Text* 25/26: 56-80.

FRASER, N. 2008. *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Space in a Globalizing World*. Cambridge: Polity.

FUNG, A. 2004. *Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

GEORGE, M. 2018. Are we seeing the slow death of the school governor? *Times Educational Supplement*. 26th January.

GORNITZKA, Å. 2015. ‘All in’? Patterns of Participation in EU Education Policy.In *Evaluating European Education Policy-Making: Privatisation, Networks and the European Commission*, edited by M. Souto-Otero. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

GOVE, M. 2009. *A Comprehensive Programme for State Education*. Speech to the Centre for Policy Studies. 6th November.

GOVE, M. (2011) *Michael Gove’s speech to the Policy Exchange on Free Schools*. London: DfE.

GUNTER, H.M. 2012 *Leadership and the Reform of Education*. Bristol: Policy Press.

GUNTER, H., R. MCGINITY. 2014. The politics of the academies programme: natality and pluralism in education policy-making. *Research Papers in Education* 29(3): 1-15.

GYIMAH, S. 2015. *We are in a Golden Age of Childcare*: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/sam-gyimah-we-are-in-a-golden-age-of-childcare>;

HALLSWORTH, M. 2011. *System Stewardship.* London: Institute for Government.

HATCHER, R., K. JONES. 2006. Researching resistance: campaigns against Academies in England. *British Journal of Educational Studies* 54(3): 329-351.

HIGHAM, R. 2017. The Usual Suspects? Free Schools in England and the Influence of Corporate Elites. In *Corporate Elites and the Reform of Public Education*, edited by H.M. Gunter, D. Hall and M.W. Apple. Bristol: Policy Press.

HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE. 2013. *Public Engagement in Policy-Making:* Second Report of Session 2013-14. London: TSO

HOWLETT, M, I. MUKHERJEE, J.J. WOO. 2015. From tools to toolkits in policy design studies: the new design orientation towards policy formulation research. *Policy and Politics* 43(2): 291-311.

KIMBELL, L. 2016. Design in the time of policy problems. *Design Research Society 50th Anniversary Conference* Brighton. UK, 27–30 June 2016

LE GRAND, J. 2003. *Motivation, Agency and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LUKES, S. 1974. *Power: A Radical View*. London: MacMillan

LUPTON, R., D. HAYES. 2018. Think tanks and the pedagogical dispositions and strategies of socially critical researchers: A case study of inequalities in schooling. *Policy Futures in Education* 16(2): 202-216.

MANSELL, W. 2013. Education in Brief: Is there consultation over academy status? *The Guardian*. 25th February.

MARSH, D., R.A.W. RHODES. 1992. *Policy Networks in British Government.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MILIBAND, R. 1969. *The State in Capitalist Society*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

MILLS, C.W. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.

MOUFFE, C. 2005. *On the Political*. London: Routledge.

MULGAN, G. 2006. Thinking in tanks: the changing ecology of political ideas. *Political Quarterly* 77(2): 147-55.

NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE. 2016. *Use of Consultants and Temporary Staff*. London: NAO.

NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE. 2018. *Converting Maintained Schools to Academies*. London: NAO.

OECD. 2009. *Focus on Citizens: Public Engagement for Better Policy and Services*. Paris: OECD

OLMEDO, A. 2017. Something old, something new, and a lot borrowed: philanthropy, business, and the changing roles of government in global education policy networks. *Oxford Review of Education* 43(1): 69-87.

PARISH, N. A. BAXTER, L. SANDALS. 2012. Action *Research into the Evolving Role of the Local Authority in Education.* London: DfE.

PATEMAN, C. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PATEMAN, C. 2012. Participatory Democracy Revisited, *Perspectives on Politics* 10(1): 7-19.

PERKINS, E. 2018. Parents launch petition for ballot over academisation of seven primary schools in Deal. *Kent Online*. 1st August.

POWER, S. 2012. From redistribution to recognition to representation: social injustice and the changing politics of education, *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 10(4): 473-492.

RALLINGS, C., M. THRASHER, G. BORISYUK. 2003. Seasonal factors, voter fatigue and the costs of voting, *Electoral Studies* 22(1): 65-79.

RHODES, R.A.W. 2011. *Everyday life in British Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

RICHARDSON, H. 2011a. Parent threatens action over Sure Start Closure Plan. *BBC News*. 24th March.

RICHARDSON, H. 2011b. ‘Mothers Take Sure Start Cuts Fight to Downing Street’. *BBC News*. 3rd April.

RUTTER, J. 2012. *Opening Up Policy Making*. London: Institute for Government.

SCHUMPETER, J. 1976. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy – 5th Edition*. London: Routledge.

SMITH, G., K. SYLVA, T. SMITH, P. SAMMONS, A. OMONIGHO. 2018. *Stop Start: Survival, Decline or Closure? Children’s Centres in England*. London: Sutton Trust.

SODHA, S. 2018. The Great Academy Schools Scandal. *The Observer*. 22nd July.

SOUTO-OTERO, M. 2015. European Policy-Making in Education and Training: Between Institutional Legitimization and Policy Privatization. In *Evaluating European Education Policy-Making: Privatisation, Networks and the European Commission*, edited by M. Souto-Otero. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

STEEL, M. 2014 We’ve won the battle to prevent our school becoming an academy. *The Independent*. 25th September.

TALBOT, C., C. TALBOT. 2015. Bridging the academic-policy-making gap: practice and policy issues. *Public Money and Management* 35(3): 187-194

VERGER, A., G. STEINER-KHAMSI, C. LUBIENSKI. (eds). 2016. *World Yearbook of Education: The Global Education Industry*. London: Routledge.

WHITTY, G. 2016. *Research and Policy in Education*. London: UCL IOE Press.

WILKINS, A. 2016. *Modernising School Governance*. Abingdon: Routledge.

YOUNG, I.M. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Appendix 1 – expert interviewees**

**Interviewee 1:** A former civil servant who worked for more than ten years across several policy areas in the DfE. Working for a think tank since 2017.

**Interviewee 2:** A former Cabinet Office official who developed OPM practice and worked extensively with DfE officials. Now senior civil service elsewhere in Whitehall.

**Interviewee 3:** A current Cabinet Office official developing OPM practice across government and collaborating regularly with DfE colleagues.

**Interviewee 4:** A former Cabinet Office official who developed OPM practice and worked with DfE colleagues. Now writing about policy outside of government.

**Interviewee 5:** A former senior civil servant who worked across multiple Whitehall departments. Now writing about policy outside of government.

*Interviews were carried out between October 2018 and March 2019.*

1. See e.g. the OECD Public Governance Committee 2007 project on ‘open and inclusive policy making’ (OECD, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. ‘Ordinary citizens’ is of course a contested and blurry term. Here it is used simply to describe people who would otherwise have little access to/ power to influence government decision-making beyond e.g. voting in elections. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/18/groupKy/89> [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. See e.g. Clarke et al, 2007; Bevir et al, 2019. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Before 1999 the Department’s jurisdiction covered England and Wales. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. In 2016 three-quarters of English primaries and almost a third of secondaries remained local authority maintained (Exley, 2017) [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. See below for more on Academies. ARK presently has 34 Academies in England. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Teach First was itself inspired by Teach for America, set up in 2002 by consultant Brett Wigdortz on sabbatical from McKinsey, with initial funding from Citi and the Canary Wharf Group. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. https://thefrontline.org.uk/the-charity-2/#our-impact [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Rather than undertaking 1200 study hours plus 200 practice days for a Social Work diploma (approximately 18 months) as is the norm for Social Work trainees in England, Frontline trainees attend a five-week course, qualifying after one year. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Interviewee 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\_data/file/315591/DfE\_RR355\_-\_Opportunities\_for\_MOOCs\_in\_schools\_FINAL.pdf [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. http://www.pyetait.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/making-maths-and-english-work-for-all.pdf [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Though Gornitzka (2015) highlights that the extent to which commercial actors dominate education policy making does vary by policy landscape. Gornitzka researches European Commission education policy making, finding little ‘capture’ from industry at the same time as strong influence for NGOs. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Interviewee 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Interviewee 2. Interviewees 3 and 4 also made this point. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. <https://www.daynurseries.co.uk/news/article.cfm/id/1599086/Government-scraps-consultation-on-childrens-centres>;<https://www.nurseryworld.co.uk/nursery-world/news/1165256/childrens-centre-consultation-off-the-table>;<https://www.cypnow.co.uk/cyp/news/2005645/childrens-centre-consultation-ditched-confirms-dfe> [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Drawing inspiration from City Technology Colleges set up under Conservative rule in 1988. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Half of all Academies are run by multi-academy trusts. In 2016 the eight largest trusts ran, between them, 354 schools (Ball, 2018). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Hatcher and Jones, 2006; Cooper, 2013; Perkins, 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Interviewee 1 also highlighted this. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/up-to-1000-failing-schools-to-be-transformed-under-new-measures [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. https://schoolsweek.co.uk/nicky-morgan-accuses-academy-enemies-of-underhand-tactics-and-intimidation/ [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Chakrabortty, 2018; Sodha, 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)