KINSHIP, WORLD RELIGIONS, AND THE NATION STATE

by Fenella Cannell

29.1

Ethnographic introduction: Two visions and an American family

"Let me tell you the story about Eric," said Cathy. "It's a long story. I had Heather and she was a sweet, perfect little girl. Then I had Karen, and Karen was, for the first three or four years of her life...an unhappy child. She cried all the time, on and on [with colic and different transient problems] ... So at that point, I said, I really don't want to have any more children. But I knew that I ought to have another child, because childbirth is actually very easy for me, and I knew that would be the right thing to do. But I don't even *like* babies—I mean, I love to hold them, and then give them back to someone else! Like, 'Here, take it!'—but I don't like *caring* for babies. But then I said; Well, all right. But I made a prayer to God, and I said, OK God, I'll have another baby. But please let it be a boy (because we wanted a boy for Dave) and please, let it be a good one.

"So then I got pregnant, and my mother-in-law called me, and she said, 'I had the strangest dream.' She said she was in a huge place that looked like a planetarium, with the planets each spinning around, and that the roof kept opening and closing, and a voice was saying things like; 'Here's a girl for Steve and Pattie.' And then the roof opened, and it said, 'Here's a boy for Dave and Cathy—and he's a good one.'

"So when I heard that, I thought, Hallellujah! You know—my prayers have really been answered.

"So then I was pregnant, and when I was five months I found out it was Brooke, you know—it was a girl.[i] And for about two months after that I was just incredibly angry, you

1

know, and part of why I was so angry was because I knew there was still this boy to come. I didn't want four children; I wasn't even sure I wanted *three* kids, let alone four.

"But then something happened, and I really started to love Brooke; in fact, of all of them, I think Brooke is the one I really loved even before she was born... I don't know why; I think a lot of it is just to do with Brooke, actually, with who she is… and I really loved her. Then I said to God, 'Ok, I know what you want me to do, but I'm sorry, forget the Celestial Kingdom, I give up on it. I'm just not going to do it, OK, God?' Then I put it off for a number of years. By the time Eric was born, Brooke was five and Heather was ten… I wanted to keep my nice, peaceful life…

"But then one night, I woke up in the middle of the night, and I knew there was someone in the room, standing next to the bed. And not being a very spiritual person, I didn't talk to this angelic presence or anything.[ii] I just stuck my head under the pillow…. like, 'Leave me alone!' But I knew who it was; it was Eric. And I knew that this was one last plea for me to do what was right. And so, then I was, 'Alright.' And I got pregnant. But all the way through my pregnancy, I was really not reconciled to it at all; I was really fighting it. The night before Eric was born, you know, I was out here [makes gestures of very pregnant belly] and I turned to [Dave] and said [crying] 'I just don't want to do this!'

"And it was interesting, because of the way I felt, I sought a lot of priesthood blessings during my pregnancy, and … they were all very accepting and very comforting. Not one of them was like, 'Get a grip!' They all kept telling me, 'Don't worry; when this baby is born, you will love him and everything will be just fine.'

"And when Eric was born, the moment I saw him, you know, I just loved him. He was everything we had been promised. He's such a wonderful little boy; so kind and loving and

obedient… and from that I know that God loves me *personally* and knows what is best for me *personally,* even when it isn't what I want. … It's interesting, you know; it was a step by step process, and we had to go all the way through it… If I had had Eric first, I would *never* have had Brooke. And we had to have Brooke because of who Brooke is; we *needed* Brooke."[iii]

Cathy's story was one of many told to me by American Latter-day Saint women during my fieldwork, which speaks to and from a repertoire of LDS maternal visions (Austin and Axman 2012; Cannell 2005, 2013, n.d., in preparation). I was drawn to work with Latter-day Saints ("Mormons") in part because of the ways in which their attitudes to both kinship and religion are constructed in a very unusual relationship to the modern—in this case the American—nation state. For Latter-day Saints, kinship and religion are coterminous and absolutely implicated in each other. As Mormonism's most thoughtful scholars have long noted (Davies 2001, Shipps, 1987; 148-9) one of the most distinctive features of Mormonism viewed from the perspective of other forms of Christianity, is that it understands salvation, in its highest form, to be collective. For Latter-day Saints, while the individual person can attain the life everlasting, the real joy of heaven and the real purpose of human existence resides in the attempt to get to heaven together with your family—if possible, *all* your family, down to every long-lost fourth cousin, every elderly great aunt who maybe doesn't go to church much anymore, and beyond. Latter-day Saints value the nuclear family but also the extended family, and the whole network of what anthropologists call cognatic kinship, as sacred.

This concept of familial salvation as the highest form of salvation is sometimes referred to by Latter-day Saints as "exaltation" (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 2011, chapter 47). For members of the church, this collective heaven, while it takes the co-

ordinated efforts of church and family, rests ultimately on individual free will, which is centrally important in LDS doctrine. Mormon teenagers are enjoined to "Choose the Right," a phrase which often appears on wristbands, mugs, and other small personal items frequently given as gifts and available on LDS commercial websites. God ("Heavenly Father") intended every human being to live in the right way and so come into his or her true inheritance, life eternal in the highest of Mormon heavens, the Celestial Kingdom, but he requires the co-operation of each one of us. If every person does their part, every kinship relationship on earth can be eternalized and given a life everlasting; kinship, as well as the individual, can be resurrected. Further, kinship in the Celestial Kingdom will not be fixed and finished; Mormon married couples who reach the Celestial Kingdom will undergo a kind of apotheosis, and will become the parents of "spirit children;" new souls who will eventually people worlds to come (Cannell, 2005, Davies 2000, 2003, 2011, Givens 2004, 2010).

Reaching further even than the extended family, LDS missionary work is ultimately dedicated to trying to save every soul, past and present, living and dead, for whom recoverable records are available in the world.[iv] Through rituals of vicarious baptism, the dead as well as the living can be given the opportunity to choose the right beyond the grave, and so to enter the highest heaven. For Latter-day Saints, it is extremely important that no person who has ever lived should be denied this chance and therefore they devote tremendous effort and energy to "temple work" on behalf of unknown as well as known others; every person in every record, they reason, is *somebody's* family.

At the same time, LDS doctrine and revelation teach that there is a world *before* earthly birth as well as a world after earthly death. All the people who will ever be born on this earth already exist, and are waiting in "spirit" form, as Cathy's son Eric was waiting, for someone to become their earthly mother. Since Mormonism does not regard spirit and matter

as each other's opposites (Givens, 2014), the development from "spirit" form through earthly form to resurrected bodily life is regarded as a progressive development of matter through different stages; the body develops towards its intended glory in parallel with the learning process of each individual. Mormon mothers, when they give birth, are therefore not only labouring to bring an infant into the world; they are labouring to open a gateway between parts of the universe and stages of the human soul, according to the divine plan. It is primarily for this reason that women such as Cathy are attuned to a sense of obligation as to how many children they should carry and birth which exceeds their own personal preference.

As Cathy's story shows—and as I have considered elsewhere in relation to its implications for LDS understandings of adoption (Cannell, 2013)—the idea of a pre-mortal existence also allows Latter-day Saints to think of their earthly familial relationships as reflecting sacred acts of intentionality that lie outside this visible life. People often consider that relationships in this world—including both kin relations and friendships—reflect a commitment people have made to each other pre-mortally, although they also think that, given human failings, not all such commitments are fulfilled as theyght to be, in this life.

That kinship and religion are profoundly mutually constitutive is one of the distinctive qualities of LDS life and the focus of my own research work with LDS interlocutors and friends. Clearly, all these people are modern Americans; Latter-day Saints construct their lives according to distinctive practices,[v] but these are not practices that would mark them out, to the outside observers' eye, as readily identifiable. They do not wear "old-fashioned" clothing on a daily basis; they are not opposed to the use of computers, modern vehicles, or modern medical science. They have a church which is now highly centralised and whose staff, not unlike many modern corporations, include a PR department and legal and financial experts. Some critics of the church indeed claim that contemporary Mormonism has

lost the distinctiveness that characterised its 19th-century origins. Looked at from another viewpoint, however, the ways in which kinship and vision inhere in each other in Latter-day Saint experience and narrative is highly atypical of the ways in which modern Americans expect to live.

It is a central assumption of many classic strands of theoretical writing about modernity and the modern nation, that both what we call "kinship" and what we call "religion" have receded in importance in contemporary life, compared to the determining force of "politics" and "economics" (McKinnon and Cannell 2013). I would argue that this is not the case. Although it is often further assumed that "kinship" and "religion" are clearly separate areas of modern life, and that it is quite obvious what each of these means, I suggest that in fact the opposite is true; kinship and religion are often bound up together in practice, and it is by means always clear where one stops and the other begins. This may be true, from an analytic viewpoint, both for people who say they are "religious" and for people who say they are "not religious," although that distinction as made by an anthropologist's interlocutors is clearly also a very important ethnographic fact, itself reflecting a specific social history in relation to these categories (Cannell, 2011: 475-6). I have followed various ethnographic and theoretical arguments in this terrain in relation to two different modern nation states, the United States, where I have worked with Latter-day Saints, and the United Kingdom where I have worked with amateur genealogists and with users of Anglican cathedral spaces (Cannell, 2010, 2013, n.d.). For present purposes, I will simply note that the formal relationship between the nation state and religion is, of course, quite different in these two countries; while England still has an established church, the Church of England, headed by the monarch (but much modified by modern Parliamentary democracy, multi-culturalism and the decline of regular church attendance), the U.S. constitution provides for the separation of state and religion and the freedom of religion (albeit many commentators have identified an in-practice

"state religion" in the U.S. and more tolerance for some religious traditions than for others.) Nevertheless, notable overlap or ambiguity between kinship practices and religious practices can be observed in both national settings.

The title of this section of the *Handbook*, on which subject I have been asked to write, presents a certain conceptual challenge. By linking together kinship, world religions, and the nation state, it might be taken to imply that we know what each of these terms means, and that there is a clear and readily definable relationship between them. Just the reverse, however, is the case. In the practice of our discipline at present, each of the constituent terms of this title has come to be understood as more and more problematic. Max Weber is the major theorist whose work is above all associated with the idea of 'world religions'— defined as salvationist, often with an ascetic orientation or division of labour between ascetic specialists and lay people, as expansive, as characterised by the development of an internally coherent doctrine (e.g. Weber 1991 [1915]) . Weber's discussions are complex and his exact meaning can be interpreted in different ways. Most people these days are not entirely confident in declaring what a "world religion" might be. The long-running and intense debates that have been held over the existence or non-existence of something called "kinship" are well known, and have been explored elsewhere (Bamford and Leach, 2009; Carsten, 2000; Franklin and McKinnon, 2001; Sahlins, 2011 a, 2011b; Strathern, 1980, 1988, 1992; Schneider, 1984; Yanagisako and Delaney, 1995). "The nation state" might appear at first glance to be the most stable of the set of terms in question, but is in fact also contentious in several different ways. The relationship between "the nation state" and "religion," for example, is precisely at issue in the long-running discussions about "secularisation" and "the secular " (e.g. Casanova, 1995; Taylor, 2007; Asad, 1993, 2003). The question of whether "the state" should be viewed for analytic purposes as a discrete or a homogeneous entity has been raised by a number of anthropologists, as has the issue of

7

whether "political" forces have any kind of causal priority in human life, or whether these can be meaningfully separated from, in particular, economic forces and the dependence of many nation states on different kinds of capitalist production or forms defined by their opposition to capitalist processes.

At the back of all these definitional issues stand even more general questions. Foundational theorists in anthropology have sometimes suggested that it is from the relations between "kinship," "world religions," and "the nation state" that something fundamental can be understood about the nature of the modern world. The legacies of these ideas therefore condition the way that anthropologists view their own discipline's relationship with "modernity." As an anthropologist, what does one understand by modernity? Is it a real state of transformed being or set of definable institutional shifts? Is it finally reducible to capitalism or other forms of economic life? Does its key importance lie in the contrasts various analysts in social science have drawn with "tradition"—perhaps particularly in the realm of kinship (McKinnon 2013)? Or is modernity above all an idea to which we come to subscribe; a myth or an ideology which—like all ideas—comes to have real effects in the world because we believe in it, and act as though it were true and inevitable (Cannell 2010, 2011)? The relative explanatory weight accorded by different writers to the terms "kinship," "world religions," and "the nation state" can be diagnostic of these different approaches.

Given the potential range of this topic I will not pretend to a comprehensive literature review of these terms in this chapter. In even the necessarily selective account given here, I rely on the work of many colleagues writing on kinship, including but not limited to the editor of and contributors to the present volume (see also ed. Bamford and Leach 2009, Feeley-Harnik 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2013), and my co-editor and contributors to the volume *Vital Relations; Modernity and the Persistence of Kinship* (McKinnon and Cannell 2013).

29.2

Nation states and their rivals

We might proceed via some historical background to the Mormon ethnography with which I started. The most widespread misconception about contemporary Latter-day Saints (as many members of the church are only too keenly aware) is that they practice polygamy. In fact, "plural marriage" (LDS polygamy) was held as a religious and virtuous ideal during the mid-19th century, and publically practiced by perhaps 20-30% of church members between about 1850 and 1890, when the practice was permanently suspended by church leaders. Present-day polygamists belong not to the official LDS church, but to smaller independent groups who broke away from the main church at that time. Within the official present-day LDS church, polygamy would be grounds for excommunication.

Religious polygamy remains an object of fascination for observers precisely because it is perceived as a highly anomolous practice for citizens of a modern nation state. Polygamy provokes comment because it unsettles the often unacknowledged norms by which kinship, religion, and the state are defined and co-exist in the American polity. Polygamy is not considered "civilised" or normative as a mode for organising kinship; it does not align itself with state laws on marriage. On the other hand, it describes itself as a form of *marriage*, rather than as a private, sexual choice, or relationship lifestyle (as polyamory is described).[vi] Critics of the LDS church may also tend to assume that polygamy is a culturally "primitive" or "backward" practice, to argue that it inherently demeans women, to make sensational and voyeuristic claims about the sex lives of polygamous persons, and/or—given that Latter-day Saints adamantly identify themselves as true Christians—to feel that it threatens mainstream Christian definitions of marriage as a sacrament intended to join one man with one woman. Although there are relatively few contemporary polygamists in the United States, the practice continues to have a disproportionate capacity to unsettle people, visible most recently in the

ways in which some U.S. activists used polygamy as code or analogue for the campaigns for and against equal (gay) marriage. (Bennion, 2012; http://www.hbo.com/big-love/news/the-couples-behind-hung-in-treatment-and-big-love.html). Even the idea of polygamy (or indeed, polygamy in popular fiction and entertainment) raises the spectre of a challenge to the state's monopoly power to define the status of its citizens.

Anti-polygamy campaigners and critics of Mormonism in the 19th century also claimed that polygamy was backward, primitive,[vii] oppressive to women and children, unsuitable for civilised people in the modern world and un-Christian. Gordon (2002) has shown how LDS polygamy also became a target for the expanding 19th-century American state. Latter-day Saints had hoped to establish the legality of plural marriage under state law in Utah (then a Territory) and under the freedom of religion guaranteed in the Constitution (see also Flake, 2003). Most 19th-century Americans continued to agree in theory with the constitutional principle of religious freedom, and also with the idea that marriage was a sacramental institution; that is, a bond created by divine power through ritual and religious authority, rather than being only a contract in law. However, in practice the developing governmental and legal system increasingly registered the need for the civil control of the institution of marriage. Marriage was understood as "vital to the welfare of all society" in so far as it "connected the authority of fathers and husbands" (the male electorate) with the sexual, fiscal, and moral regulation of households within the nation, with social reproduction and with public order (Gordon 2002: 138). By the 1880s, "[m]arriage and its attendant legal protections were simply too vitally important as a matter of politics to be relinquished back to ecclesiastical control" (Gordon 2002: 140). In addition, the social organisation of Latter-day Saints through kinship was perceived as threatening to the state in other ways; polygamous Utah Mormons were seen as clannish, nepotistic and likely to favour their own at the expense of other citizens. They were also seen as "inherently expansionist" (Gordon 2002: 143)—that

is, as likely to encroach on their neighbours if left unchecked—and seen to run their own affairs so theocratically as to impinge on the legitimate role of the Federal state. The language of the primitive, exclusive kinship-based "clan" co-existed throughout the century in variable ways with the language of the sect or cult, headed by religious "despots," as ways of evoking what was wrong with Mormonism in the minds of non-Mormon American critics.

As historians have demonstrated, "Political power was the essence of the problem," (Gordon 2002: 143). It is notable and important that the 19th-century U.S. state did not simply invoke a secularist agenda in its attack on Mormonism, despite the constitutional separation of church and state. Rather, what occurred was a continued acknowledgment of the higher powers of Christian faith, coupled with the effective narrowing of the definition of what "Christianity" meant. Christianity came to be defined within evolving American law according to implicitly Protestant models, which gradually marginalised and finally excluded alternate claims including those of Mormonism. The ending of polygamy became the condition on which Utah was granted statehood by the Federal government, and the grounds for the admission of LDS senators, with complex consequences for the LDS church as it adjusted its narratives and perspectives to this far-reaching change (Flake, 2003). While the U.S. state relied on increasingly narrower definitions of what counted as Christian," the LDS Church responded by continuing to defend the sacredness of its leadership and iorganisation despite structural change. Latter-day Saints understand that their church is marked out by the gift of present-day revelation; its leaders are both presidents and prophets, and are given revelation for the survival and good of the whole church. The requirement to live in plurality was a revelation given to the founding prophet Joseph Smith; the requirement to end plurality for the survival of the church was a revelation given to the church president and prophet in 1890, Wilford Woodruff.

The situation was therefore quite complex; clearly, the U.S. state was treating the Mormon church as a rival, attacking both its religious/sacramental prerogatives and its kinship practices. As Gordon notes, "there is no escaping the fact that the power deployed was secular, and the power attacked was religious" (Gordon 2002: 140). The LDS church, despite the teaching on continuous revelation, has struggled since that date with ambiguities about the change of direction in its doctrine and religious organisation, as both external critics and members have tried to decide whether or not the end of polygamy represented a loss of sacredness and a fracture in the church's essential fabric. At the same time, neither the attack on nor the defense of the Mormon church could be reduced to a simple advance of secular values; the state sought to identify itself with a majoritarian form of American Protestantism, while the LDS church sought to sustain its own definitions of the continuity of radical revealed authority. Depending on the perspective taken by a commentator, it is possible either to stress the losses of religious charisma that resulted from the end of polygamy, or the continuities and developments in profound experiences of kinship as sacred in the present day which, my own ethnography records, remain foundational for ordinary Latter-day Saints. [viii]

The example of American Mormonism provides a very striking instance of a way of life in which kinship and religion are deeply co-determinant for a group of people within a contemporary nation state, and also provide an apparently unavoidable provocation to the state. Mormonism is unusual in part in offering a highly explicit *doctrine* of the mutuality of kinship and religion; it is especially unusual within the repertoire of Christianity. Christianity has been considered above all a religion in which loyalty to kin should be qualified or sometimes superceded by loyalty to religious community and vocation, in which those who love Christ are commanded to be ready to leave father, mother or spouse to enter the discipleship of Jesus (e.g. Luke, 14; 25-27). It has also been one of the world religions in which sexual celibacy has been cultivated as a form of asceticism pleasing to God, at least for

those with a special religious vocation. In anthropology and sociology, this ascetic view of Christianity has been reinforced by readings of Weber, for whom of course "ascetic" action in the world as opposed to "mystical" withdrawal from the world is a development of religious value-making with highly significant historical consequences, especially in Europe (Weber, 1991 [1915]; [1920]) . A long established trend in the literature on modern Europe and the United States, in particular, offered a teleological reading of Weber, in which was embedded an ascetic understanding of what Christianity was and what its effects might be. Christianity was ascetic; ascetic action was key to Western European Protestantism; ascetic Protestantism in combination with mercantile capitalism produced, through an irony of history, the iron carapace of modern capitalism and bureaucracy, and the conversion of the originally religious sense of "vocation" into one of the internalised self-disciplinary practices that helped sustain all these (Weber, 2001 [c.1930]). The teleological emphasis here was misleading in a number of respects (Cannell 2010) but the tendency to identify Christianity as a world religion "against kinship" has only rather recently begun to be qualified in the literature (eds. Thomas, Malik and Wellman 2017).

Outside Christian contexts, the notion that kinship practice might be the terrain of the sacred (or vice versa) within modern nation states is less unfamiliar. Seeman (2017) while warning against a crude contrast between Judaism and Christianity in this regard, sets out some of the parameters of Jewish American kinship identity; Leite (2017) considers the situation of people wishing to reclaim a "lost" Jewish identity as Portuguese marranos, navigating complex paths to belonging through often fragile or challenged claims to marrano ancestry. Liberatore (2016) follows the crossover between ideas of heaven and dreams of an ideal husband for young Muslim women in London.

Recent ethnographies of nation states outside Europe and America have also illuminated the ways in which an overlapping terrain of kinship and religion may exist in

tension with the contemporary state. In this context, ethnographies of India have been particularly illuminating. The post-colonial Indian nation state, like many contemporary Western states, defines itself as "secular." However, Indian constitutional secularity is constituted differently than any form of secular government in the West; drawing originally on a self-definition of the postcolonial independent state as being putatively at an equal distance from any of the sub-continent's religions (rather than, as is often implied in the West, as being the successor to religion regarded as of the past) (Cannell 2010). New ethnography such as that by Poole (2016) suggests that the state is considered, related to and invoked through a "vernacular secular" which is inflected by assumptions drawn from Hindu caste understandings, even for Indian Moslems, who may share some elements of self-understanding with Hindu neighbours while defining themselves contrastively with respect to others. The Indian "secular" state therefore does not constitute itself completely independently of Hindu understandings any more than the American state constitutes itself autonomously from Christian understandings.

The work of Laura Bear (2007, 2013, 2015) on contemporary India explores the inseparability of kinship from religion, economics and politics in various contexts, recently through a consideration of the mainly Hindu workers in the ship-building industry of Kolkotta. Although working within an internationally owned industry attuned to neo-liberalism, the workers of the Hoogli river continue to link the process of ship-building to the processes, including religious pujas, through which their own bodies, kin relations and neighbourhoods are made and sustained (Bear 2013). Bear's first book on Anglo-Indian railway workers (Bear 2007), makes these interdependencies clear in a different way. As citizens, Anglo-Indians inherit a doubly excluded position from the colonial period; claims to recognition of their kinship to or descent from British citizens are precarious and hedged with racialised exclusionary and restrictive practices. Even during the colonial period, the British

14

state required difficult and sometimes impossible forms of bureaucratic proof from Anglo-Indians which were productive of great anxiety given how much depended on them in terms of job security, permission for children to attend school abroad, and other forms of access to the UK that defined life chances as well as confirming identity. Within post-independence India, however, Anglo-Indians are also excluded from full belonging because of the ways in which logics of caste (or exclusion from caste for Moslems, dalits and other groups) are enfolded within categories of citizenship and define modalities of access to state controlled resources. Bear describes the ways in which Anglo-Indians work to articulate a space of habitation in the face of these two exclusions, in part through their adherence to Roman Catholicism, which as in other colonial and post-colonial contexts, offers an alternative form of Christian identification to the dominant Protestantism of the colonial power. Anglo-Indians, Bear tells us, often see benign ghosts who create "connections between generations founded on the idea of a Catholic community of …" connections to the space of the railway colony and "a return to self-being that is impossible to effect in other contexts" (Bear 2007: 271).

Mody's (2008) ethnography of interfaith marriage in contemporary India offers another set of insights into tensions between the modern state, on the one hand, and the grounds of self-making located in kinship and religion combined on the other hand. Marriage in India continues to be freighted with importance not derived from the state. As Mody notes, marriages are still viewed as having profound moral and religious significance; within the Hindu and caste perspective they are: "an instrument for the pursuance of higher goals in life [dharma] rather than…a means for personal gratification" (Mody 2008: 16, quoting Basu, 2001: 24). Marriage, Mody reminds us, makes kin, within relations that are essentially hierarchical because they are caste based. Muslim marriages are conceptually equal as a means of differentiation from caste, but are still endogamous to the religion (Mody 2008: 24-

25). Kin-making through marriage is a collective and soteriological enterprise, a process of alliance, and marriages should therefore be arranged by adult representatives of the group.

Couples who wish to enter into love-marriages do not, Mody finds, want to overturn all these grounds of social being, but simply to renegotiate the boundaries at which they apply. Most couples would like to have their unions accepted and approved by their elders and their extended family, and they often stress the ways in which they are, despite a difference in faith, otherwise highly compatible according to criteria that their parents would also recognise. Such couples however are obliged to resort to the civil marriage act of 1872, which was introduced by secularist reformers under British colonial rule, in an attempt to deal with situations that fell between the delegated jurisdictions of India's faith communities. The act, confusingly compiled and unevenly applied in the courts—where it may often be subject to the preferences of senior members of different faith groups—creates a landscape of contradictions, in which many young couples become lost. Hindu nationalism and contemporary communalism create further hazards for interfaith marriage. But as Mody notes, although these marriages and attempted marriages may become intensely politicised, the intentions of those who enter into them are not directly political; addressing themselves to state law in an attempt to negotiate the restrictions imposed by faith and family, young couples instead come to be subjected to other, often arbitrarily applied, national agendas. The rise of Hindu nationalist politics has only intensified these pressures and entanglements (Mody 2008).

The complex, diverse, and unpredictable ways in which kinship, religion, and the modern nation state can become engaged with each other are, therefore, clearly evidenced in the ethnographic record. It is also clear that the contemporary nation state is frequently in tension with kinship and religion considered together, as an alternative or partly alternative

space for the making of persons and relations between persons. Michael Lambek (2013) offers an incisive description:

"Kinship is never the sole discourse and practice of person-making in any society. The big shift in modernity [compared to traditional societies] comes less with respect to abandoning kinship for other forms of personhood than with the state's role in legitimating the making of new persons, a role it appropriates largely from what has been called religion but which, from a certain angle and in some societies more than others, could be seen simply as undifferentiated from kinship in the first place… If we take ritual seriously, as an intrinsic part of kinship, then we sharpen our understanding of what is lost—and perhaps gained—when the state steps in and replaces religious ritual with law" (Lambek 2013: 256).

Lambek's account, in an important essay, includes a particularly useful definition of kinship as a distinctively generative, or relation-making activity. Lambek points out that kinship terms, used for instance as terms of address, (say, "Mother!"), are performative both in constituting a kin relation between the speaker and the addressee, and also in implying and enacting further kinds of relationality beyond this dyad (for instance, the existence of a father). As Lambek draws out the implications of this thought:

"In modernity, kinship is found alongside many other disciplines or discourses of person-making (Hacking 1999), but it is perhaps the only one that is intrinsically relational. Kinship does not "make up persons" as monads, but as always already invested in webs of relatedness. It is so thoroughly relational because new kin are related not only to those who produce them but also to those people's relations, in turn. Kin relations are ever-ramifying and auto-productive" (Lambek 2013: 256).

Or, as he also puts it, kinship is "immoderate" and "immodern." Modern states and their bureaucracies prefer to have a monopoly on the definition of persons, and to identify them in ways that are fixed and unambiguous. Kinship, however, "escapes laws that attempt to pin it down" (Lambek 2013: 256). It is felt and defined in ways that are often multiple, overlapping pathways of relatedness, and asserted or denied in ways that seem irrational, otiose, contradictory or ambiguous from the point of view of the modern state. It is also freighted with excessive meanings, perhaps especially in the modern world, and becomes what Lambek, quoting Arendt, calls a "'romanticised object[s]' to which all kinds of excess causality are attributed" (Lambek 2013: 242).

29.3

Theoretical occlusions

It has, however, been difficult until fairly recently to hold all these terms together within a theoretical framing. It has been hard both to see that kinship (and religion) might have properties that are not completely defined and subordinated to modern state processes, and that kinship and religion might often be co-extensive in the modern world.

The reasons for these difficulties are rooted very far back in the theoretical development of the foundational social sciences, and one key factor here has been the one-time dominance, and later persistent half-life of teleological accounts of modernity. Across a wide range of different authors the claim has been made, either explicitly or implicitly, that what we call kinship and religion come to be less important in modernity, compared to what we call politics and economics. Susan McKinnon (2013) has incisively identified and described the ways in which this trope has unfolded through anthropological theories of kinship in the work of Maine, Tönnies, Weber, Lévi-Strauss and beyond. What was originally a 19th-century social evolutionary paradigm concerning the supposed historical advances of

human civilisation travelled sometimes almost invisibly into kinship theories which most often did not intend to reproduce it. For McKinnon, kinship theory has too often rested on a mythologised contrast between traditional and modern societies; traditional societies were assumed to be crucially organised through kinship forms understood implicitly by their analysts as "natural." Modern, complex and industrial societies were portrayed by contrast as transcending these primitive modes of social organisation and replacing them with other, culturally-made ideas and institutions that had freed themselves of their determination by natural kinship (McKinnon 2013: 60). In some formulations of this view, kinship was encapsulated by the modern state, so that kinship—often recast as family or domestic life in relation to a more powerful public or jural domain—becomes subordinated to the workings of the state, which has annexed many of its functions.

Building on the work of many previous anthropologists of kinship including the feminist anthropology of Yanagisako and Collier (1987), Susan McKinnon and I "question[ed] the core presumption in the narratives of modernity; that kinship has been effectively cordoned off in the domestic domain and has become irrelevant to the operations of modern economic and political institutions" (McKinnon and Cannell 2013: 12). Relying on the work of our contributors Bear, Bodenhorn, Carsten and Rutherford (2013), Feeley-Harnik, Lambek, Shever, and Yanagisako, we questioned the language of social domains through which theories of modernity had been developed and expressed, and challenged both the idea of the supercession of kinship as a social force in the modern world, and "the fundamental validity of the narrative structure of modernity altogether" (McKinnon and Cannell 2013: 12). We and our contributors argued that "the nature of kinship… should not be presupposed but should rather be the focus of historical and ethnographic enquiry" (McKinnon and Cannell 2013: 13). In the ethnographic work represented in this volume, our authors in fact traced the interpolation of kinship idioms with modern ship-building,

international textile manufacture, nationalist oil production, migration policies at the US/ Mexico border, laboratory work in Malaysia, climate change debates in the U.S., and many other contexts.

One contribution of the volume was to "contest[s] the idea that kinship is a social formation that can be understood exclusively as either historically prior to or structurally subordinate to the nation-state and that the nation (or state) can be conceptualized apart from its entanglements with kinship… the reigning understanding of a nation-state needs to be questioned" (McKinnon and Cannell 2013: 24). We argued that the relationship between nation and kinship goes well beyond the merely metaphorical; that is, beyond ways in which nations may borrow the language of kinship to generate their own logics and loyalties (Schneider 1969).[ix] Secondly, we questioned the assumption that nation states are based on the unit of the individual citizen, and the corresponding tendency for analysts to be blind to actual kinship processes still at work within modern nation states. Thirdly, we followed Lambek's argument, already referred to above, that kinship is not in fact encapsulated and subordinated within the modern state; "kinship is not separate, because it is embedded in the fundamental actions of the state,"—including all those actions by which the state asserts the right to make and recognise persons and relations between persons—"and it is not subordinate, because it is part and parcel of what the state is and means" (Lambek quoted in McKinnon and Cannell 2013: 26).

We have noted that kinship and religion are treated in teleological modernisation theory, as the two domains that have become subordinated to modern states and economies that claim to transcend them. We have also noted that in fact, kinship and religion are often constituted in the same practices, including performative speech and ritual, and that therefore they overlap considerably, or may even sometimes be virtually co-extensive, in modern states. Nevertheless, there are some contexts in modern practice and in theories of modernity, in

which a strong distinction may be made between the two domains. It is my view (Cannell 2013) that this kind of distinction has left a deep impression in certain kinds of anthropological writing on kinship.

A contrast, rather than a parallel, is made between kinship and religion when kinship is considered in relation to science. From the viewpoint of a modern science defining itself as concerned with the material world, kinship is "real" while religion is "unreal." Kinship, for different kinds of scientists, can be viewed as an expression of the real in the sense of material, physical, and natural forces that may be glossed and elaborated by human culture but are not ultimately controlled by human culture, such as "the selfish gene" in the understanding of Richard Dawkins (1976). It is interesting to note how often ethnographies of kinship—especially kinship concerned with any kinds of modern scientific or medical intervention such as IVF—have tended to treat their subject as though it were obviously nothing to do with religion, or as though any emergence of a religious theme or reference in this context were purely metaphorical, or else anomalous (Cannell 2013: 230-32). A rich vein of ethnographic work on kinship in modern states, concerned with the medical mastery of the body, has therefore tended to be in conversation primarily with other work on similar themes, and not in conversation with any literature that considers religion[x].

Religion is figured as what has been superceded by science in modernity, just as the traditional (kin-based) state is figured as what has been superceded by the nation state in modernity. In discussions of medicalised kinship, however, the body and its materiality become the terrain on which this transcendence is played out; we see modern knowledge apparently mastering nature rather than traditional culture apparently being mastered by it. In this context, the medicalised human body stands as the guarantor of both the reality and the modernity of the processes under consideration.

Schneider (1968) famously described the importance of idioms of the mastery of nature in underpinning American kinship as a cultural construct. His work (and that of Marilyn Strathern and others) has prompted us to be sensitive to the ways in which a specific idea of nature is itself part of our own culture in places that inherit legacies of Western philosophy. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if we allow the anthropological study of "kinship" to be placed in a conceptual enclave that divides it from "religion," we inadvertently reproduce some of those ways of thinking, and we do not take account of the kinds of lived complexities which in fact permeate experience in nation states.

In an earlier essay on Mormon polygamy and its implications for anthropology (Cannell 2013), I argued that Schneider's own account of American kinship is itself blind to aspects of the social salience and historical production of the analytic categories he uses. Schneider's research method for his famous study appears, in particular, to have proceeded in such a way as to flatten the nuance of what his interlocutors had to say about religion in relation to kinship. Readers will recall that Schneider's respondents frequently invoked their own background to citizenship, often describing themselves by reference to both faith and ethnicity, as in "Jewish-American" or "Italian-[Catholic] American." Schneider downplayed these self descriptions because he wanted to draw out the commonalities in all his interlocutors' accounts of, for example, motherhood, and particularly the ways that these commonalities rested on the nature-culture trope with which he was concerned. One does not have to claim that these commonalities did not exist, however, to say that viewed from another perspective the distinctions Schneider's respondents were making could be equally constitutive of the kinship they were living.

As we know from many anthropological accounts, religion also is about the making of persons and the relations between persons, including in some cases relations between the living and the dead, and/or the living and the divine (Orsi, 2005; 2016.) But these

dimensions of lived relationality will be made to disappear if the analyst has in advance decided to make a strong separation between kinship on the one hand and religion on the other. It is my view that Schneider's theoretical apparatus in *American Kinship*, as well as his methodology, has this effect. Schneider's nature/culture distinction is pitched at a level of generality which does not enquire about the particular kinds of work and experience that belong to religion. His categories of "blood" and "the law" viewed as the cultural constructs of which American kinship is made, are strongly de-historicised and are presented as though derived solely from the 1960's survey data on which his study is based. However, a brief consideration of the example of American Mormon doctrine and polygamy with which we began this essay, offers us a corrective to this view. To follow the history of the Federal government's suppression of Mormon religious kinship is to see definitions of the law of God, the law of man and the permissible character of genealogical relatedness ("blood") all in processes of considerable contestation and change over the long 19th century and beyond. The category distinctions which Schneider used were, in effect, the definitions created and imposed by the largely Protestant American majority whose view of the world was victorious in this battle. But although they won at the level of the state and its laws, the majority did not thereby create a perfectly homogeneous American experience, which is what some readings of Schneider's work might tend to suggest. Many other alternate American kinships also existed historically and still exist in part or whole today for some American citizens, as the work of Gillian Feeley-Harnik teaches us.[xi]

This kind of approach to kinship, which divides it from the topic of religion and in effect re-naturalises that distinction by invoking kinship's supposed "materiality," is, I would argue, the correlate of secularisation debates as they have figures in the anthropology of religion. The claim, or assumption, has often been made that modernity would inevitably involve a decline in religious engagement and a withdrawal of religion from the public into

the private sphere. Proceeding by what Charles Taylor calls "subtraction stories" (Taylor 2007: 530-31), secularisation theorists have claimed in many interrelated ways that modernity is the state in which we live when various primitive, mistaken, and irrational elements of human life and thinking are given up. In this view, religion figures centrally as what is to be given up, because it is associated with an infantile or dependent condition of the human person, as well as being associated with a primitive or uncivilised early period of human history, technological inadequacy, superstitious, authoritarian, corrupt or irrational systems and institutions and so on. Both the infantile and the primitive aspects of human life are understood as rather shameful conditions which it is imperative to overcome. Thus the new atheist movement, (drawing however as Taylor points out rather directly but not necessarily consciously on Nietzsche) advocates as the fulfilment of human being a thorough embracing of modern scientific knowledge, especially on human evolution, combined with a heroic determination to face the fact that man is alone in the universe, devoid of any quasi-parental divinities taking an interest in his sufferings or his fate (Taylor 2007: 583).

These orientations give a heroic status to the individual, conceived as the (loosely) Nietzschean superman in unflinching engagement with the real, and also give privileged status to the material world, because the modern person is invited and required to experience of the disaggregation of what is real from what is superstitious or imaginary. This effort of absolute distinction, attempted but never fully achieved, underwrites these myths and narratives of the modern (see also Latour, 1993).

As we noted above, all the terms of the title of this article were famously discussed by Max Weber, and together they constituted much of what Weber had to say about modernity, including many of his insights into the ways in which modern persons have to live with profound experiences of loss of meaning, compared to those in traditional societies and in archaic times. I have argued elsewhere (Cannell 2010) that when Weber is read, as he often

has been, as promoting a teleological view of modernity, he is misunderstood. Weber certainly felt that many aspects of modernity were unavoidable, and himself drew on Nietzsche in so far as he required himself as a social scientist to think unflinchingly about reality as he understood it, whatever the personal and emotional cost might be. Weber, however, did not take a triumphalist tone when writing about modern experience, or about changes or apparent declines in religious engagement and practice in the modern world. His writing is therefore to be distinguished from branches of later secularisation literature in which the end of religion in modernity is either deemed to be an inevitable and universal aspect of social change, or else is considered and described as obviously a "good thing" (Boyer, 2001), for instance as a form of liberation from previous intellectual confusion, or from oppressive religious authorities and structures. We do not need to deny that either intellectual confusion or oppressive religious structures have existed in the past and continue to exist today, to wish to take a more nuanced approach to the value of religious life for human beings in society. Weber's own tonality in writing about religion in the modern world is complex and often ambivalent, holding in view the tragic elements of human loss that are entailed, and never simply celebrating scientific, bureaucratic, or economic "progress." Neither does Weber propose that modernity will take the same route in all other parts of the world as it has taken in Western Europe, or result therefore in a homogeneous form of universal modernity. On the contrary, Weber's insistence that historical processes of "rationalisation" (in his meaning; i.e. the gradual acquisition of internal coherence within any system of thought) proceeds through the interaction between value systems particular to different world religions, and developing economic systems, suggests that diverse and multiple forms of modernity are likely to be the outcome. It is true that Weber does appear to consider religious modalities attuned to action (what he calls "asceticism") as more likely to create engagements with economic change than religious modalities attuned to contemplation

(what he calls "mysticism"), which allows for the possibility of a predictive reading, but it is also true that he identified European Calvinist and Lutheran Protestant asceticism as exceptional in their orientation to action in the world ("outworldly asceticism") and that therefore the complex synergy that Weber famously proposes in which a strict Puritanism ironically lent energy and values over time to the development of capitalism (1991 [c.1930]) is best understood as a *unique* historical instance in Weber's thought, and not as predictive of forms or directions that the intersection between world religions and the modernising state and economy might take in other times and places (Weber 1991 [1915]; [c.1920]; [1922]; 2001 [c.1930]).

Despite this, there have been many and very influential readings of Weber which take him to offer a view of modernity as inevitable, and as likely to proceed universally along the lines he traced historically in Western Europe. This kind of reading has not only insisted that modernity will always be or become more secular, but has also had the second effect of reading Protestantism (and sometimes, by analogy, other world religions) "backwards" as a kind of historical staging post on the way to a secular destination that is allegedly known in advance (Cannell 2006: 2010). This view has had a number of effects on anthropological writing, of which I have argued elsewhere one has been the accidental over-privileging of views of Christianity which are too narrowly based on the characteristics of Protestantism (Cannell, 2005, 2006). If, in the history of the suppression of American Mormon polygamy we can see unfolding an insistence on defining "Christian values" in terms of what were actually Protestant norms, so also in anthropological writing and theory, Protestant themes have sometimes tended to become too prominent, excluding our view of other experiences and processes. There are many contexts, including the Dutch Calvinist Protestant missionisation of Sumba described by Webb Keane (2007) in which these are actually the values in question for the actors with whom anthropologists are concerned. However, in

doing as Keane then does and extrapolating from his Sumbanese/ Calvinist encounter to a general theory of "Christian Moderns," we have to exercise caution not to lose sight of other ways of being Christian, and therefore other ways of being modern. It might be argued that the recent—and richly illuminating—anthropological interest in both the "individual" and the definitive lessons to be learnt from the issue of "material religion" takes its cue from Protestant ideas—and ideas about the importance of the Protestant model—which are also bound up in partly submerged claims about the place of Protestantism in processes of secularisation and modernity. It may indeed be partly for this reason that some of the ethnography which is most valuable in thinking about the intersection between religion, kinship, and the nation state actually derives from contexts outside this form of majoritarian Protestantism, whether non-Protestant Christianities such as Roman Catholicism or Mormonism, or non-Christian salvationist religions, including Judaism and Hinduism.

The value of the work of Talal Asad is amply acknowledged by many of the writers referenced above, and particularly by Michael Lambek in the seminal essay here described. Interestingly, though, Asad seems in some respects also to have reproduced a tacit apparent division between kinship and religion, if only because he rarely explicitly names or addresses the topic of kinship when talking about the anthropological category of the religious (Asad, 1993) or about the processes of secularisation and the creation of an ideology of the secular as real, which he considers to be inseparable from the making of the modern Western nation state (Asad, 2003). In fact, kinship in Asad's writing figures most prominently perhaps in the famous discussion of the shift in Egyptian marriage laws in the British colonial period (Asad 2003; 206-246) but even here not as a leading category; it is not a topic that is foregrounded when Asad talks about the historical or the contemporary West. The exception to this is Asad's discussion of the work of Pamela Klassen on contemporary American birthing practices as "Blessed Events" (Asad, 2003; 87-89; Klassen, 2001); Klassen's ethnography

to my eye clearly suggests, like other ethnography cited here, the experiential inseparability of kinship and religion in modern American life, including for people who do not define themselves as "religious." Asad, however, considers the work under the rubric of his category of "passionate agency"—that is, the valuation of forms of human experience, including the positive value of suffering in certain conditions—as these are outlawed by liberal post-enlightenment Western states and by international agreements such as human rights legislation. Asad's main point is that these constraints on the recognition of agency exclude and tacitly coerce actors within other traditions, including religious ascetic traditions, an observation that he rightly connects with the negative stereotyping of Moslems in America and Europe, but which could also be applied to persons of many other backgrounds. The cue to consider what directions "passionate agency" might take within European modern life (despite its negation by the state) is however not fully taken up or explored by Asad himself. Asad also discusses these issues under the term "human life" rather than the term kinship, which again creates a disconnect between the topic of kinship and the context of modern nation states, and which has also prompted Veena Das (2006) to note, in response to Asad's rather dyadic contrast between Western liberal secularism and Islamic tradition,   that there are in fact multiple understandings of human life in the world, including Hindu paradigms which fit neither model proposed in Asad's work.

29.4

The sense of the state

It is often the case that a particular area of difficulty in anthropological theory yields to a convergence of thinkers who are each moving towards it from slightly different directions. Bearing in mind that the conceptual division between anthropologists of kinship and of religion is itself, I have suggested, part of the problem of myths of modernity, we can note

that the question of the relationship between kinship, religion, and the nation state in modernity seems to be such an instance. The critique of secularist paradigms—and also of buried Protestant normativities in the description of modern experience—has been the angle of approach on this problem taken from the anthropology of religion. Writing on the anthropology of kinship has, however, also recently offered its own approach towards what seem to me to be congruent conclusions, albeit drawing on a different literature. Marshall Sahlins (2011)—building on his earlier critiques of socio-biology and his insightful account of "the native anthropology of Western cosmology" (Sahlins, 1996) offered a highly illuminating and nuanced defense of the possibility of retaining a general definition of the category of kinship, despite the widely acknowledged variability of the terms on which such a category can be based, particularly the category of "nature." For Sahlins, "mutuality of being" is a definition which can permit all this variation without self-contradiction, including, for instance, the notoriously non-Western ontologies of Amazonian life often described as "perspectivism." In making this argument, Sahlins draws persuasively on the work of Vivieros de Castro (2009) who argued that kinship can be understood as like gift giving and (with caveats) magic, in so far as it expresses the creation of relationality through human intentionality (Sahlins 2011: 239).

Sahlins's formulation "mutuality of being" is helpful for anthropologists also interested in religious dimensions of life, since it readily allows for the description and perception of such mutuality between all kinds of persons, across the boundaries of death, the distinction between the human and the divine or indeed (as in the Amazon and, according to Feeley-Harnik, also in a different way in modern America and England) across species. Viveiros de Castro refers to "magic" and therefore brings to mind "traditional" rather than "world religion" or "state" contexts, but we have already argued, following Lambek, that the distinctions between the ways in which societies draw on kinship relations in modern and

traditional contexts can be greatly overstated. Like the amendment of secularisation theory, a more flexible definition of kinship permits us to escape the problem of operating with categories that have already been limited by narratives and myths about modernity and its purifications, and permits anthropologists to speak to each other about the experience of people in modern states across supposedly mutually exclusive domains.

None of this, of course, is new, as nothing ever is. For those unpersuaded by a less "rationalist" view of Max Weber, one might note Daveert Bellah's interesting essay on a lesser-known aspect of Weber's discussions of modernity and its complexities (Bellah, 1997). Weber was considering the displacement of religious affect into alternate areas of modern life, including art and erotic love, without reaching any optimistic conclusions about the capacity of either to sustain human fulfillment without some form of coercion. He also noted the tendency for modern states to ally themselves with highly selective versions of religious and kinship actions, for example by integrating certain definitions of permissible marriage. Perhaps more unexpectedly—or not, considering Weber's own background and his respect for the faith of his wife and cousin Marianne—Weber concluded that one potentiality of world religions as he understood them was the generalisation of "brotherly love" from a care and compassion supposedly extended only to (blood) kin in primitive societies, to a potentially infinite audience of one's fellow humans. Despite his pessimism about what either politics or religion could do in the darkening context of the twentieth century state, it seems that Weber continued to place some hope in the idea of a compassionate human capacity for "world denying love." Although still within a certain social evolutionist framing, therefore, it seems that Weber was himself alert to the possible complex mutual constitution of "kinship" and "religion" in the modern state of his day.

It is my view, then, that Lambek is right in suggesting that kinship is both an "immoderate" and an "immodern" object, and that although it may exist within a context of

state biopolitics, it can never be limited to or by the biopolitical (Lambek 2013: 256). I would add just two concluding notes to this; the first is that in my view "religion" is also both "immoderate" and "immodern" in a similar sense, and the second is that, returning to the point powerfully made by McKinnon, we should try never to assume in advance what the mutual relations might be between what we call kinship, religion, and the nation state. The literature I have drawn suggests how powerful the 'sense of the state' is as lived reality, and yet how complex and variable the inhabitations of reality are in relation to states around the world. These experiences are not reducible to 'modernisation' considered as a homogeneous or unidrectional process. Even in the small sample of examples it has been possible to offer here, we can see both that as Mody says, citizens may act in relation to their understanding of kinship/religion, but be inadvertently drawn into the political, or else, as in my Mormon example but also in contexts beyond this, people may—despite the continuing oppressive potentials of religious institutions and heirarchies—consciously find and pursue alternate ways of being human through kinship and religious life that do not conform to the definitions required by the modern nation state, and continue to make, although unevenly, certain kinds of spaces within it.

Notes

[i] This implies that Cathy, like most American women, had amniocentesis (see Rapp REF).

[ii] Angels, as messengers from the divine, in Mormonism, can be understood as either premortal spirits or resurrected beings; in this case, the spirit of Cathy's son is obviously premortal. There can also be post-mortal (not-yet resurrected) messengers, but it is my impression that these sacred messengers are less often referred to as "angels," perhaps because they tend to be known (deceased) individuals who are referred to by name or relationship, or as ancestors.

[iii] For a full discussion of this ethnography and Mormon motherhood visions see Cannell (in preparation).

[iv] Latter-day Saints are well aware that the records of many lives have been lost or destroyed. They speculate that these records will be recovered during the millennium, with the help of specific early-resurrected persons, for instance, Biblical Abraham.

[v] Including rules of modesty in conduct and dress, and dietary prohibitions among others.

[vi] Polygamy, being evidently a contractual relationship, is also excluded from the forms of social recognition now afforded to identities of personal sexual orientation or gender identity.

[vii] As Gordon (2002) demonstrates, polygamy was also implicated in anxieties about and debates over slavery and its abolition, although the racialised elements of the discourse were usually implicit.

[viii] Here I differ in emphasis from the conclusion reached by Gordon, who stresses loss of religious charisma compared to the 19th century, and regards the continuities as more attenuated (Gordon 2002).

[ix] This article can only gesture towards the ways in which it is artificial also to separate discussions of religion, kinship and politics from discussion of modern economics. The work of Sylvia Yanagisako (2002) offers a lucid critique of Weber's view that kinship did not structure modern capitalism through her ethnography of Italian family textile manufacture; the work of Laura Bear (2015), and Elana Shever (2012) considers kinship in relation to neo-liberalism and state capitalism respectively.

[x] Important partial exceptions may be Marcia Inhorn's discussion of Arab hegemonic masculinity and lineal kinship in relation to assisted reproduction practices in the Arab world (Inhorn, 2012) and Elizabeth Robert's discussion of acceptance of IVF in Andean Ecuador despite the formal opposition of the Catholic church (Roberts, 2012). It is notable that both studies concern contexts in which anthropologists acknowledge that formal religious authority continues to influence states and law-making.

[xi] Feeley-Harnik's profound and nuanced accounts of changes in American and English understandings of kinship between humans and relatedness between species acknowledge many such alternate kinships, and kinship thinking in question, for example in the work of Lewis Henry Morgan and his Iroquois interlocutors.