

Civil and Civic death in the New Authoritarianisms: Punishment of Dissidents through Juridical Destruction, Ethical Ruin, and Necropolitics in Turkey¹

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Abstract

Since the Turkish government's recent turn to authoritarianism, tens of thousands of public dissidents and government critics have been subjected to dismissals and revocation of civic rights via emergency decrees. The victims call this process 'civil death'. We aim to understand the logic behind this form of punishment in Turkey by examining the differential genealogy of civil death in the work of Hannah Arendt, Bertrand Ogilvie, Giorgio Agamben, and Achille Mbembe. We demonstrate that a later form of civil death was used by totalitarian regimes in a process leading to the reduction of targeted individuals as 'superfluous' and as 'living corpses' in concentration camps. In these contexts, death became an instrument of biopolitical and necropolitical powers. We propose that although contemporary punishment of public dissidents in Turkey shares some similarities with these forms of civil death, it may more fittingly be identified as civic death. We argue that while *civil death* is based on the classical political right of the sovereign to 'make die' after first reducing targeted individuals to little more than living corpses, *civic death* is linked to the power of the sovereign to 'let die' through the exclusion of public dissidents from economic, social, and political life.

Keywords

Civil death; civic death; biopolitics; necropolitics; Turkey; authoritarianism.

¹ This work was supported by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant (SG 171613).

Introduction

With the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government's increasing turn towards authoritarianism in the mid-2010s, tens of thousands of dissenting citizens have been punished by being deprived of their economic, social, and political rights, a process they call 'civil death'. Using extraordinary government decrees made possible by the declaration of a state of emergency immediately after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, more than 50,000 people were placed in pre-trial detention; over 130,000 people² 99,64 per cent of whom had never before been investigated,³ were removed and banned from public-sector employment and speech for life; 446,000 people were placed under indictment, initiating more than 100,000 investigations and 48,000 lawsuits which are still ongoing; media outlets, newspapers, journals, television and radio channels, and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations were closed⁴. In effect, the government has used all means at its disposal to facilitate the arrest and punishment of opposition groups, parties, and politicians, journalists, writers, media workers, and academics.

Six months before the coup attempt a public debate on 'civil death' (*medeni ölüm* or *sivil ölüm*) had already begun when a newspaper journalist renowned for his government support used his column to advise government implementation of what he called 'civil death mechanisms prevalent in the West' to punish a group of dissenting academics who had signed a peace petition. By 'civil death', the journalist meant that the academics should be dismissed from their academic posts, never again allowed to work, and barred for life from all media access to the public sphere.⁵

² Onur Erem, 'OHAL sona erdi: İki yıllık sürecin bilançosu', *BBC Türkçe*, July 19, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-44799489> (accessed December 18, 2018).

³ 'İkinci Yılında OHAL'in Toplumsal Maliyetleri', *Mağdurlar için Adalet*, January 2019, <https://magdurlar.myfreesites.net/2-yilinda-ohal-i-%CC%87n-toplumsal-mali-%CC%87yetleri-%CC%87> (accessed January 22, 2019), 945.

⁴ Erem, *ibid.*.

⁵ Cem Küçük, "'Medeni ölüm' mekanizmaları', *Star*, January 16, 2016, <https://www.star.com.tr/yazar/medeni-olum-mekanizmalari-yazi-1082729/> (accessed December 18, 2018).

After the coup attempt, this form of so-called civil death became a template for punishment of government-targeted citizens under the state of emergency, applied en masse to thousands of public- and private sector employees via government decrees. Dismissals in both sectors gives us clues about the increasing power of the state in the private business, universities, institutions, and companies. Affected citizens were dismissed on allegations of being members of the Gülenist community or as the government calls it, Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) or for having undermined the national security of the state. None was afforded procedural rights or presented with evidence to justify the allegations and dismissals, and no official charges were made. Unlike simple layoffs, the decrees barred their targets from public-sector employment for life, from publication in certain journals and media, from access to public speech, and, through passport confiscation, from international travel.⁶ Strikingly, upon cancellation of the state of emergency and instatement of the new presidential system of government in 2017, the decrees were perpetuated, rendering the persecuted as *KHK'li* (*Kanun Hükmünde Kararnameli*), those dismissed by means of an emergency decree and subjected to what is widely termed in Turkish ‘civil death’.⁷ Consigned to a state of outlawry, excluded from benefit and protection of the law, and placed under bans and restrictions, the *KHK'li* suddenly found themselves isolated from the rest of society, excluded from economic opportunity, ineligible for social benefits, and deprived of their political right to visibility in the public realm.

⁶ Kerem Altıparmak, ‘OHAL KHK’ları ‘sivil ölüm mü demek?’, *Bianet*, September 6, 2016, <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/178496-ohal-khk-leri-sivil-olum-mu-demek> (accessed December 17, 2018).

⁷ For application of the term ‘civil death’ to the dismissed (*KHK'li*), see Ali Duran Topuz, ‘Anti-hukuk günlerinde ‘sivil ölüm’ yasası’, *Gazete Duvar*, November 8, 2018, <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yazarlar/2018/11/08/anti-hukuk-gunlerinde-sivil-olum-yasasi/> (accessed December 30, 2018). Serkan Alan, ‘Barış Akademisyenleri’ne reva görülen “sivil ölüm”, *Gazete Duvar*, March 18, 2018, <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2018/03/18/baris-akademisyenlerine-reva-gorulen-sivil-olum/> (accessed December 30, 2018); ‘Etiket: sivil ölüm,” *KHKLI Platformu*, <http://www.khklplatformu.com/etiket/sivil-olum> (accessed December 30, 2018).

To be unable to work for years; unable to work in any kind of a job even if you wanted; unable to think of working in a university abroad because of the passport ban; unable to use your scholarship because you cannot go abroad; unable to enter the door of the institution you worked at for more than thirty years; unable to go to academic meetings; unable to publish your articles; to have every door you knock on be slammed shut in your face; needing in fact to grow skin like the bark of a tree; needing to become insensitive, indifferent, accustomed to being one of the living dead... For an academician this, in short, is civil death.⁸

But more than outlaws, this process produced Turkish citizens as ‘disposable waste.’ In his seminal work *L’Homme jetable, Essai sur l’exterminisme et la violence extrême*, French philosopher Bertrand Ogilvie suggests that the contemporary political order is based on an ‘indirect logic of extermination’⁹ which allows governments to abandon their surplus population to their own fate. Considered as absolute others, such ‘disposable people’ cannot function as part of the economic and public sphere and so are explicitly called in Latin America *población chatarra* (junk populations), Ogilvie’s *l’homme jetable* (disposable man).¹⁰ According to Ogilvie, the contemporary neoliberal market’s logic produces indirectly excluded people and communities, for example via executions of children in the street by police or drug sellers in Brazil in so called operations of ‘social cleansing’¹¹ or organ, sang or child adoption and trafficking¹². The dismissed in Turkey are also viewed as a junk population. Once they have

⁸ Nur Betül Çelik, ‘Medeni ölüm’, *Gazete Duvar*, November 9, 2018,

<https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yazarlar/2018/11/09/medeni-olum/> (accessed December 17, 2018).

⁹ Bertrand Ogilvie, *L’Homme jetable, Essai sur l’exterminisme et la violence extrême* (Éditions Amsterdam, Paris, 2012), 73–74.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹¹ Polly Wilding, ‘‘New Violence’ Silencing Women’s Experiences in the ‘Favelas’ of Brazil’, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 42, no. 4 (2010): 719-747.

¹² Ogilvie, *ibid.*, 73.

been publicly blacklisted and removed from the economic, social, and political spheres via government dismissal decrees, the *KHK'li* are to be thrown away.¹³ In response to public outcries concerning the *KHK'li*'s lack of access to livelihood, a provincial head of the governing party AKP was reported to have said of them, 'Let them eat tree roots'.¹⁴ Echoing the words of the convicted 1980 military coup leader Kenan Evren on the sentencing to death by hanging of a 17-year-old dissident youth activist, Erdal Eren—'Should we feed him rather than hang him?'—President Erdoğan mused rhetorically of the *KHK'li*'s betrayal of the nation, 'Should the state feed them?'¹⁵ Jettisoned outside the national fold, the *KHK'li* were no longer the concern of the state.

To distinguish the recent Turkish dismissals from other examples of civil death in totalitarian regimes, we propose to shift the term ever so slightly but significantly to 'civic death' so as to better capture the systematic diminution of the living to economic, social, and political death and their consideration as disposable persons. Civil death indicates the extinction of citizens' civil rights by their state. Today this status is widely used as a legal instrument in the incarceration systems in the US for the punishment of convicted felons, Guantanamo Bay detention camp being a notable example. While the American deployment of civil death as punishment applicable to US citizens convicted of felony crimes has the look of juridical status, on closer examination, felons are to 'be disenfranchised, lose the right to hold federal or state office, be barred from entering certain professions, be subject to impeachment when testifying

¹³ Ibid., 135.

¹⁴ 'AK Parti İl Başkanı'ndan FETÖ'cülere: Ağaç kökü yesinler', *Hürriyet*, October 7, 2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ak-parti-il-baskanindan-fetoculere-agac-koku-yesinler-40242531> (accessed December 17, 2018).

¹⁵ 'Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Gitsin özel sektörde çalışsınlar', *NTV*, July 14, 2017, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogangitsin-ozel-sektorde-calissinlar-bize-ne,bSJ0ykDJXEyjGU8o2s6Gw> (accessed December 17, 2018).

as a witness, be disqualified from serving as a juror, and may be subject to divorce'.¹⁶ The US example, described in the literature as *neo-civil death* and *new civil death*,¹⁷ differs from the current Turkish case in which public dissidents have been subjected to civic death status via state of emergency decrees.

Following Étienne Balibar's analysis of disobedience which distinguishes *civic disobedience* as the political initiative of a collective citizenry against authority and *civil disobedience* as an individual objection of conscience,¹⁸ we use the term 'civic' because of its utility in indexing the political notion of citizenship, in Latin, *civitas*. The term 'civic death' thus indicates a deprivation of juridical and civic rights whereby the accent is on expulsion outside the political realm. It is with the aim of highlighting the political aspect of this status that we propose the term 'civic death'.

In civic death status, the aim of the sovereign differs from the aim of the sovereign that uses civil death status. Contemporary states often do not need to kill their political opponents and dissidents outright; frequently they need only to ban them from the public sphere, render their deeds and words invisible, diminish them economically, socially, and politically. Significantly, such sovereigns do not view political opponents, public dissidents, and social others as citizens entitled to full civic rights and so force them to live in dire economic and social conditions and in extreme isolation from the rest of the polity. The *KHK'lı* are an example of the use of civic death status in which the Turkish state lets them die in their newly ostracized and deprived conditions.

¹⁶ Gabriel Jackson Chin, 'The New Civic Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction', *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 160, no. 6 (2012): 1800, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2072736> (accessed December 17, 2018).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1789–1833; Calvin John Smiley, 'Existing but Not Living: Neo-Civil Death and the Carceral System', (PhD diss., The City University of New York, 2014): 11–18.

¹⁸ Étienne Balibar, *Droit de cité* (Paris: PUF, 2002): 17.

While civil and civic death statuses are both utilized in a politics of death, the power over death that sovereigns deploying each status claim a right to differs. As a form of juridical dispossession of citizens' rights, civil death status is based primarily on the classical idea of the state according to which the sovereign has the right to kill and to decide who will live and who die. Civic death status, on the other hand, is linked to a modern political strategy based on the idea of the state according to which the sovereign doesn't need to claim the right to commit murder in order to rule, but can merely isolate undesirables from society and all means of sustenance by reducing them to outlaws or disposable people. Whereas in civil death the sovereign *makes die*, in civic death the sovereign *lets die*.

A Genealogy of Civil Death through Juridical Destruction, Ethical Ruin, and Destruction of Human Dignity

The modern-day practices of civil death can be traced from their historical origins in the legal categories of *infamy* in ancient Greece and *sacer* in ancient Rome,¹⁹ where they denoted criminal disenfranchisement and punishment by outlawry or death which 'causes a permanent stain or mark on one's name.'²⁰ In English and American common law, these categories were reflected in the act of *attainder* or *civilliter mortuus* (civil death),²¹ an extinction of the civil rights of a person who 'is disqualified from being witness, can bring no action, nor perform any legal function; he is in short regarded as dead in law'.²² Having lost social and marital status, the right to possession of property and estate, the right to sue, in effect all public rights, those

¹⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1998): 71.

²⁰ Smiley, 'Existing but Not Living: Neo-Civil Death and the Carceral System', 11.

²¹ Jamie Fellner and Marc Mauer, *Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States* (Washington DC: Human Rights Watch and the Sentencing Project, 1998), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/vote/> (accessed December 17, 2018).

²² New York Court of Appeals, cited in Chin, 'The New Civic Death', 1794.

affected are considered legally dead. Such juridical death, whether a precursor to execution or banishment, was referred to as a person's 'destruction'.²³

While these earlier forms of civil death functioned as legal categories applicable to convicted felons, more recent forms of civil death have outgrown the traditional penal institution. The unique feature of recent versions of civil death entails groups of people who are considered as being dead to the law without having been convicted of individual crimes. But in contrast to classical modes of civil death where legal rendition was required in order to punish serious crimes, in its later modes, civil death status may be conferred without there being any need for conviction of a crime. Thus, although the 20th century saw the abolition of civil death as a legal instrument in Euro-America and had prior to World War II been considered to be 'outworn as a mode of punishment',²⁴ it has in fact remained as a political method to suppress opponents, minorities, and the underclasses by extinction of their civil rights. Thus, an extreme version of civil death status was used in the Third Reich's Denaturalization Law of 1933 and the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which deprived Jews and other state targets of citizenship, ultimately leading to the Final Solution, a totalitarian violence that marks the historical shift to biopolitical and necropolitical power. A comparison of the status of the *KHK'li* in Turkey and of Jews under the Nazi regime is useful in that neither have been convicted of individual crimes. In the interwar period, totalitarian regimes disenfranchised millions of their legal rights via recourse to the status of civil death which led to the ultimate transformation of citizens into 'living corpses'²⁵ in concentration and extermination camps through the logic of 'make die'.

Hannah Arendt's granular analysis of autocratic, dictatorial, and totalitarian regimes and their modes of governance demonstrates in minute detail how human dignity was destroyed

²³ Chin, 'New Civil death'.

²⁴ 'Civil death Statutes. Medieval Fiction in a Modern World', *Harvard Law Review* 50, no. 6 (1937): 977.

²⁵ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest Book, 1976): 447, 453.

little by little until people had been transformed into living corpses.²⁶ Her schema allows us to assess which aspects of civil death are replicated in the Turkish case and which not. According to Arendt's explication in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, the liquidation in totalitarianism of human dignity and its spontaneous capacity to act in the public sphere occurred in three phases. The deprivation of rights and the juridical destruction of the individual was the first step in the production of living corpses.

The destruction of a man's rights, the killing of the juridical person in him, is a prerequisite for dominating him entirely. And this applies not only to special categories such as criminals, political opponents, Jews, homosexuals, on whom the early experiments were made, but to every inhabitant of a totalitarian state. Free consent is as much an obstacle to total domination as free opposition. The arbitrary arrest which chooses among innocent people destroys the validity of free consent, just as torture—as distinguished from death—destroys the possibility of opposition.²⁷

Such arbitrary persecution contains within it the potential to target new people or communities outside the normal judicial procedures and convert them to political adversaries. What is striking in this first phase is not only that it signifies a loss of citizenship and its attendant rights, but also an end to the possibility of living as equals together with other citizens; the loss, then, of a polity. In other words, the first phase entails the closing down of the possibility of leading a political life in relation to others. Although Arendt never used the term 'civil death', this first phase may be defined as such in that it is broadly defined by a loss of

²⁶ Arendt, *Origins*, 447, 453.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 451.

civil rights in a process of denaturalization. Uniquely, this first step of civil death cannot be separated from the ultimate goal of totalitarian systems for total domination.

A more detailed analyses of this deprivation of rights is to be seen in Arendt's scepticism concerning human rights more broadly, indissociable from this first phase in the production of living corpses. Despite being notionally universalized to everyone, the modern concept of inalienable human rights has consistently failed to prevent the production of outlawed and stateless peoples, most notably during the two World Wars. The enrolment of human rights as national rights under the control of governments facilitated the targeting of certain citizens and the exclusion of them from the public realm. For this reason, Arendt proposes instead the more fundamental 'right to have rights',²⁸ by which she means the political claim of those exiled from the public realm who must otherwise confront an impossible future without any promises. The loss such stateless outlaws face is 'not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever'.²⁹

This first Arendtian phase of the suspension of rights, banishment outside the community, and the legal destruction of the individual is applicable in the Turkish case of the *KHK'li*. Tens of thousands of dissident citizens have been forbidden from public-sector employment for life by extraordinary government decrees without notice. Meanwhile even the State of Emergency Inquiry Commission (OHAL Commission) was established by the government to inquiry the objections of dismissals on 23 January 2017, Human Rights Joint Platform report says that it is not an effective legal path for purged people and commission's main aim is to delay

²⁸ Hannah Arendt, *Origins*, 296. For an interpretation of Arendt's 'right have to rights', see Claude Lefort, 'Hannah Arendt et la question du politique' in *Essais sur le Politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1986): 64–78; Jacques Rancière, 'Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 103, no. 2/3 (2004): 297–310; Étienne Balibar, *La proposition d'égaliberté* (Paris: PUF, 2010); Ayten Gündoğdu, *Rightless in An Age of Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Justine Lacroix, 'Droits de l'homme et politique, 1980–2012', *La vie des idées*, September 11, 2012, https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/pdf/20110911_lacroixdroitsdelhomme.pdf (accessed December 17, 2018).

²⁹ Arendt, *Origins*, 297.

dismissals' application to ECtHR³⁰ After cancellation of state of emergency, violation of the right to presumption of innocence³¹, considered part of the state of exception, became permanent.

In addition to permanent discharge from the public sector, the names of those dismissed were published in the newspapers, constituting a government-backed blacklist. Additional security clearances and archival background checks carried out by the Turkish National Intelligence Service and/or the Security General Directorate³² before appointment became a requirement for public-sector hiring, a procedure now being followed in the private sector, in particular at private hospitals and universities.³³ Such security checks have detrimental effects on the family members of the dismissed. A recent report on the impact of the past two years under state of emergency laws suggest that after the coup attempt, 'more than 250,000 citizen have been directly affected and more than 1,500,000 people have been victimized simple for being family members [of the accused]'.³⁴ While not technically stateless, those dismissed have been severed from their economic, social, and political rights and expelled outside society as 'outlaws'.

In the second phase of the liquidation of human dignity, Arendt notes that those targeted are ethically destroyed in that totalitarian regimes interrupt the traditional moral distinction

³⁰ Kerem Altıparmak, 'Is the State Of Emergency Inquiry Commission, Established By Emergency Decree 685, An Effective Remedy?', *Human Rights Joint Platform Report* (February 2017): 5. <http://www.ihop.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IS-THE-STATE-OF-EMERGENCY-INQUIRY-COMMISSION.pdf> (accessed April 2, 2019).

³¹ A report on the state of emergency states that 'the claimant, not the accused or the suspect, must collect and present the legal burden of proof; in this case, the victims have had to prove their own innocence.' 'İkinci Yılında OHAL'in Toplumsal Maliyetleri', 945.

³² 'Güvenlik soruşturması ve arşiv araştırması yönetmeliğinde değişiklik yapılmasına dair yönetmelik', *Resmi Gazete*, October 24, 2018, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/10/20181025-9.pdf> (accessed December 30, 2018).

³³ OHAL'de güvenlik soruşturmasından geçemeyenler: "Kendimi hiçmişim gibi hissediyorum", *BBC Türkçe*, February 28, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-43153876> (accessed December 30, 2018).

between persecutor and persecuted, murderer and victim.³⁵ The destruction of the moral person in this phase represents an attack on human conscience because the decisions made by the persecuted are always equivocal. ‘The alternative is no longer between good and evil, but between murder and murder. Who could solve the moral dilemma of the Greek mother, who was allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her three children should be killed?’³⁶ In totalitarian regimes, the usual valence of death in its individuality is converted to anonymity,³⁷ thereby destroying the ability to accomplish a morally human life.

While this second Arendtian phase as ethical ruin particularly in the gas chambers is applicable neither in kind nor extent to the Turkish case of the *KHK’li*, those targeted do face ethico-political dilemmas of a different order. Since 2008, Turkish law contains an active remorse clause that allows the perpetrator of certain criminal acts to obtain a reduced sentence or release if they show remorse for their wrongdoing, provide new information about their criminal organization, or request nomination as a state ‘secret witness’. In exchange for their own release, many of those persecuted by government decrees have become secret witnesses for the state.³⁸ This has resulted in the arrest and detention of others, most famously the evangelical American pastor, Andrew Craig Brunson, whose imprisonment caused a diplomatic conflict between Turkey and the United States.³⁹ Imprisoned in October 2016 on terror and espionage charges during the post-coup attempt purges, Brunson was released one and a half

³⁵ Arendt, *Origins*, 453.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 452.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Sinan Tartanoğlu, ‘Devletten çağrı: İtirafçı olun kurtulun’, *Cumhuriyet*, October 21, 2016, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/618963/Devletten_cagri__itirafci_olun_kurtulun.html (accessed January 6, 2019); Evrim Kepenek, ‘Adaletin Gizli Tanıklarla Mücadelesi: Hayal mi Gerçek mi?’, *Bianet*, October 17, 2018, <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/hukuk/201772-adaletin-gizli-taniklarla-mucadelesi-hayal-mi-gercek-mi> (accessed January 6, 2019) and Ayça Söylemez, ‘Cizre’de Her Dosyanın Gizli Tanığı: “Vatan”’, *Bianet*, May 10, 2017, <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/186339-cizre-de-her-dosyanin-gizli-tanigi-vatan> (accessed January 6, 2019).

³⁹ For a juridical analysis of the role of the ‘secret witness’ in Turkish law and in the Brunson case, see Fikret İlkiz, ‘Gizli Tanıklar ve Yargı Bağımsızlığı’, *Bianet*, October 15, 2018, <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/hukuk/201667-gizli-taniklar-ve-yargi-bagimsizligi> (accessed January 6, 2019).

years later when several of the secret witnesses for the prosecution retracted their previous statements. Given the choice of imprisonment or submitting to destruction of themselves as ethical humans by turning secret state witness, those dismissed and persecuted are forced to decide between civic death and political collaboration in state processes of civic death in their home country or illegal escape into geographical exile.

The third and final phase of the totalitarian production of living corpses, not applicable in the Turkish case of the *KHK'li*, entails the total destruction of individuality and human dignity. Arendt emphasizes that in this phase, the human being is psychologically annihilated, signifying the ruination of a person's unique identity. 'Actually, the experience of the concentration camps does show that human beings can be transformed into specimens of the human animal'.⁴⁰ Following the destruction of juridical and moral persons through the abnegation of civil rights and ethical norms, totalitarian regimes destroyed the person as an individual, thereby producing living corpses in the concentration camps. These were exemplified most disturbingly in the *Muselmann* prisoners of the Nazi camps, people who had reached the point of starvation, emaciation, and weakness and had resigned themselves to their impending death. In his memoir *If This Is a Man*, Primo Levi describes the 'Muselmann'⁴¹ as persons who were no longer a part of humanity,⁴² not even a part of camp life, forgotten there as living corpses waiting for death in their absolute desolation. Arendt stresses the unprecedented impact on politics made by totalitarianism's production of living corpses:

⁴⁰ Ibid., 455.

⁴¹ While the term 'Muselmann' literally means 'Muslim' in German and Yiddish (like 'Musulman(e)' in French), there is discussion on why this term was used in concentration camps. For various comments on this issue, see Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and The Archive* (Brooklyn and New York: Zone Books, 2002): 45; Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): 119; J. M. Bernstein, 'Intact and Fragmented Bodies: Versions of Ethics "after Auschwitz"', *New German Critique* 33, no. 1 (2006): 33; and Karin Doerr, 'Words of Fear, Fear of Words: Language Memories of Holocaust Survivors', *vis-à-vis: Explorations in Anthropology* 9, no. 1, (2009): 51.

⁴² Primo Levi, *If This Is a Man*, trans. Stuart Woolf (London: Abacus Book, 1987).

‘Apparently nobody wants to know that contemporary history created a new kind of human beings – the kind that are put into concentration camps by their foes and internment camps by their friends’.⁴³ This new kind of human being could no longer be understood in terms of classical political and ethical dilemmas because it had been marked by a ‘banality of evil’.⁴⁴ A precursor to the ultimate reduction of individuals to living corpses in concentration camps, civil death status alone could not produce such extremity.

Civic Death and Biopolitical Power

In *Homo Sacer*, Giorgio Agamben details the impact of totalitarian regimes on our contemporary understanding of politics by reading Arendt’s work against Michel Foucault’s conception of modern biopolitical forms of governmentality.⁴⁵ Foucault argued that in contrast to sovereign power which exercised a right over life and death (let live and make die), modern power exercised a right over the well-being of its population through the logics of biopower (make live and let die). Agamben viewed the totalitarian process as the triumph of an absolute biopolitics wherein life was stripped of all political standing and wholly reduced to what he termed ‘pure’ or ‘bare life’.⁴⁶ In totalitarian regimes, the biological, the legal, and the political became indistinguishable.⁴⁷ Rather than being ‘outside the normal juridical order’, concentration camps were in fact absolute biopolitical spaces in which a permanent ‘state of exception’ was realized.⁴⁸ The law in these regimes systematically fed this biopolitical order and vice versa and as a result, totalitarian systems ruled in a state of exception in which

⁴³ Hannah Arendt, ‘We Refugees’, in *Altogether Elsewhere, Writers on Exile*, ed. Marc Robinson (Boston, London: Faber and Faber, 1994): 110–119.

⁴⁴ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin Classics, 2006).

⁴⁵ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

⁴⁶ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 71–74.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 170.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

‘everything is possible’.⁴⁹ Agamben argues that since the advent of totalitarian states in the mid-20th century, a return to a traditional politics based on the distinction between biological life and the political and juridical realms is impossible and this biopolitical ethos of sovereignty remains relevant today.

In the Turkish case, although public discourse and debate on the recent form of civic death (called ‘civil death’ in Turkey) is new, state governance has a long tradition of a different order of rights violations which may be described in starkly biopolitical terms. Since its foundation, Armenians, Jews, Kurds, Alevis, non-Sunnis, ethnic and religious minorities and leftists have been systematically persecuted and have faced various levels of coercion and biopolitical violence, including arrest, detention, abduction, forced labour, forced displacement, disappearance, torture, assassination, and unsolved murder.⁵⁰ The reduction of dissenting or minority Turkish citizens to civil death status via state use of biopolitical violence and states of exception is not new.

The two most recent states of emergency—the first declared in 1987 in 13 of Turkey’s Kurdish provinces, sustained over one and a half decades until 2002⁵¹ and the second declared from July 2016 to July 2018—were built on society-wide rights violations that were systematized and institutionalized after the 1980 military coup.⁵² In the 1990s, ongoing military operations in Kurdish areas, disappearances, torture, and forced displacement of civilians;⁵³ in 1993, the Sivas Massacre of 35 people in an attack against Alevi intellectuals by Sunni locals⁵⁴;

⁴⁹ Arendt, *Origins*, 440; Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 97.

⁵⁰ Barış Ünlü, *Türklük Sözleşmesi Oluşumu İşleyişi ve Krizi* (Ankara: Dipnot Publisher, 2018).

⁵¹ Banu Bargu, ‘Another Necropolitics’, *Theory & Events*, vol. 19 no. 1 (2016), <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/610222> (accessed December 17, 2018).

⁵² Esra Özyürek, ‘Introduction’, in *Authoritarianism and Resistance in Turkey, Conversations on Democratic and Social Challenges*, eds. Esra Özyürek, Gaye Özpinar, and Emrah Altındış (Cham: Springer, 2018): 1–8.

⁵³ Cengiz Gunes and Welat Zeydanlıoğlu, eds., *The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation and Reconciliation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).

⁵⁴ Nazmi Ağıl, ‘2 July 1993 in Turkish Literature: Representations of the Sivas Massacre’, *Middle Eastern Literatures* 17, no. 1 (2014): 58–70, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1475262X.2014.903049> (accessed January 20, 2019).

in 2000, Operation Return to Life involved the storming of 48 prisons by 10,000 Turkish soldiers to end the hunger strike of hundreds of political prisoners, killing 32 and wounding hundreds;⁵⁵ in 2013, the disproportionate use of police force against peaceful Gezi Park protesters led to eight deaths, over 10,000 injuries and more than 3,000 arrests;⁵⁶ between 2007 and 2015, state security apparatuses and the law were mobilized to carry out several anti-terror operations targeting more than ten thousand dissenting Kurdish and Alevi youth.⁵⁷ These are only a few among many examples of how sovereign power in Turkey utilized biopolitical strategies of civil death under state of emergency rule.

In contrast, the recent dismissals by government decree aim to render those targeted as social outlaws and disposable waste. While the decree targets groups, the decree's effects are individual and therefore multiple: one loses a fellowship abroad, one becomes desperate to find new job, another tries to leave the country via illegal routes, one contemplates suicide, another kills himself. A dismissed academic described his subjection to civic death on his Twitter account and was arrested a few days later.

I am a Doctor of Law dismissed by government decree. I am forbidden from publishing my articles in journals and from participating in scientific conferences. Forbidden from working in the public sector. Forbidden from working at private universities. Forbidden to practice as a lawyer. Forbidden from becoming a graduate student at Ankara

⁵⁵ Hamza Aktan, 'Ölüm Oruçları: 107 Kişi Öldü, 1 Kişi Eylemde', *Bianet*, October 21, 2003, <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/25310-olum-oruclari-107-kisi-oldu-1-kisi-eylemde> (accessed January 20, 2019); and Murat Sevinç, 'Hunger Strikes in Turkey', *Human Rights Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2008): 655–679.

⁵⁶ 'Gezi Parkı eylemleri: Protestolarda gün neler yaşandı?', *BBC Türkçe*, May 31, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-44304326> (accessed January 2, 2019).

⁵⁷ Deniz Yonucu, 'The Absent Present Law: An Ethnographic Study of Legal Violence in Turkey', *Social & Legal Studies* 27, no. 6 (2018): 716–733.

University. Forbidden from having a passport and from leaving the country.⁵⁸

Three months after his dismissal, a PhD candidate studying law was taken into custody for five days, his computer and electronic devices seized and its contents – his PhD research – never returned to him. Because of this, he was unable to complete the final stages of his PhD and was in danger of losing his status as a doctoral student. Given that law practice in Turkey is exclusively in the public sector, he could not subsequently not find a job as a lawyer. His passport was cancelled and he was unable to leave the country.

The fact that the effects of dismissal are not the same for everyone, that they are individual, has important implications for our understanding of the present punishment of dissidents in Turkey. Unlike simple dismissals, layoffs, legal misconducts, rights violations, or ‘misuse of anti-terror legislation’,⁵⁹ such persecution indicates a sovereign strategy designed to exclude those targeted from the public sphere and to restrain their visibility in political spaces. For this reason, this form of punishment may be better called ‘civic’ rather than ‘civil death’: the sovereign’s aim is not to kill them; instead the victims’ sociopolitical existence has been purposefully annihilated in order to demean them and degrade their life condition. Although they retain the right to vote, they are no longer considered ordinary citizens. Indeed, they are not even considered second-class citizens, but rather as ‘the dismissed’, *KHK’li* who do not deserve to live as others and so are left to their own devices to struggle against their degradation.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Cenk Yiğiter (@cenkyigiter), ‘KHK’li bir hukuk doktoruyum,’ Twitter, November 2, 2018, 9:30 a.m., <https://twitter.com/cenkyigiter/status/1058396023251460102> (accessed December 17, 2018).

⁵⁹ ‘Misuse of anti-terror legislation threatens freedom of expression’, *Council of Europe*, December 12, 2018, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/misuse-of-anti-terror-legislation-threatens-freedom-of-expression> (accessed December 17, 2018).

⁶⁰ Dismissed and purged individuals make a great effort to be visible and heard in public realm, to claim their jobs back, to protest the violation of their social, economic and political rights and also to pursue legal struggle despite of the rising authoritarianism which rejects the rule of law. Few dismissed individuals have been elected

In this form of punishment, it is how the sovereign manages its power over life and death that matters. In his analysis of biopolitical power, Ogilvie highlights the Foucauldian shift from a rationality of ‘make die and let live’ to ‘make live and let die’ in the contemporary world.⁶¹ The sovereign, he argues, does not need to exercise his right to kill in order to govern and give shape to society. Reading contemporary society through Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism, Ogilvie argues that in addition to the production of superfluous, outlaw populations, all discourses that draw our attention to them are also rendered superfluous.⁶² In the Turkish case, dismissed academics engaging with critical discourses are rendered doubly disposable because their work is also targeted. The purpose of this operation is to obviate the possibility of involvement in the development and reproduction of the public sphere.

Subjugation of Life by the Power of Death

What is appealing to the sovereign in this civic death/let die genre of punishment of dissidents is its potential to prove both detrimental and fatal.⁶³ Indeed, the institutionalization in Turkey of this mode of governance is designed to be both frightening and deadly. In a country where torture and death have been banalized, those desperate to find a way out must make perilous choices between remaining in Turkey under conditions of civic death and threat of arbitrary detention and torture, dangerous escape into exile, or death by suicide. In an attempt to flee the country, a family of five—two dismissed teachers and their three children aged 7, 10, and 13—drowned in the Aegean Sea.⁶⁴ Dismissed by government decree, indicted for their

as MPs however their presence in the parliament has not yet caused change for the status of other *KHK*lis because of the arbitrary and oppressive exercises of the government. For an analysis of the struggles of oppositional academics inside and outside Turkey and their attempts to create new public spheres in which to act, see Seçkin Sertdemir Özdemir, Nil Mutluer, and Esra Özyürek ‘Exile and Plurality in Neoliberal Times: Turkey’s Academics for Peace’, *Public Culture* 31, no. 2 (2019): 235-259.

⁶¹ Ogilvie, *L’Homme jetable*, 133.

⁶² Ibid., 135; Arendt, *Origins*, 447.

⁶³ Ogilvie, *L’Homme jetable*, 74.

⁶⁴ ‘KHK mağduru aile Ege’de can verdi’, *Arti Gerçek*, November 22, 2017,

<https://www.artigercek.com/haberler/ege-de-bogulan-ailenin-hikayesi> (accessed December 17, 2018).

alleged support of Gülen community, facing property confiscation and a warrant for their arrest, unable to pay for passage by human traffickers, the family decided to risk flight to Greece by renting a boat. The boat sank and the family's corpses were found washed up on Lesbos beach. Detained on charges of terrorism after the 2016 coup attempt, 42-year-old history teacher Gökhan Açikkollu⁶⁵ died while still incarcerated after 13 days in custody. Dr Şebnem Korur Fincancı, forensic expert and head of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, stated in her report that the cause of death was cardiac arrest as a result of torture.⁶⁶ Upon his death, his family was informed that he could only be buried in a hastily dug Traitors' Cemetery created for alleged supporters of Gülen without religious rites. One and half years later, Açikkollu was found posthumously innocent of membership in Gülen community and the Ministry of Education reinstated his office as teacher. After being dismissed from Çukurova University and systematically denied academic positions elsewhere, Academics for Peace signatory Mehmet Fatih Traş chose to end his own life.⁶⁷

Going far beyond the violation of legal rights, these examples of drowning, death by torture, and suicide raise harrowing questions regarding the relationship of life to death in contemporary modes of Turkish governance. In his article 'Necropolitics', Achille Mbembe criticizes Agamben's analysis of biopolitics and its failure to explain the subjugation of life to death in post-colonial contexts.⁶⁸ In place of the notion of biopolitics, he proposes the term 'necropolitics' to denote forms of power in the contemporary world that exert 'maximum

⁶⁵ "Hainler mezarlığına" gömmek istemişlerdi; gözaltında hayatını kaybeden Gökhan Öğretmen aklandı', *T24*, February 28, 2018, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/gozaltinda-hayatini-kaybeden-gokhan-ogretmenin-sucsuz-oldugu-ortaya-cikti,569737> (accessed December 17, 2018).

⁶⁶ Leighann Spencer, 'Tortured to Death in Turkey: The Case of Gökhan Açikkollu', *Vocal Europe*, November 21, 2017, <https://www.vocaleurope.eu/tortured-to-death-in-turkey-the-case-of-gokhan-acikkollu/> (accessed December 17, 2018).

⁶⁷ 'Discharged Academic Mehmet Fatih Traş Commits Suicide', *Bianet*, February 27, 2017, <https://bianet.org/english/human-rights/183995-discharged-academic-mehmet-fatih-tras-commits-suicide> (accessed January 16, 2019).

⁶⁸ Achille Mbembe, 'Necropolitics', trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40.

destruction of persons' with heavy weaponry and reduce vast populations to a form of social existence as the 'living dead'.⁶⁹ Classical forms of warfare between two armies has ended. Today's wars are conducted by regular armies alongside 'war machines', polymorphous conglomerations of private armies, urban militias, and mercenaries, all of whom target civilians.⁷⁰ In necropolitics, the sovereign has at his command the right to kill at any time without legal restriction, producing stateless people, mass expulsions, post-colonial African states, and the 'contemporary colonial occupation of Palestine'.⁷¹

Political scientist Banu Bargu's leveraging of Mbembe's notion of necropower in the context of rights violations in the Kurdish regions of Turkey provides us with yet another technique for the reduction of life to death.⁷² Bargu uses the term 'necropolitical violence' to refer to the 'mutilation, dismemberment, denuding, desecration, dragging, and public display'⁷³ of the corpses of those killed in the ongoing armed conflict between the Turkish state and Kurdish guerrillas, the desecration of their cemeteries and graves, interruption or suspension of funerals, dispersion of funeral processions, mass graving, and such. She argues that the aim of this form of necropower is not to produce living dead as Mbembe would have it. The aim of necropolitical violence is to dishonour and punish the living through 'the utilization of the dead as postmortem objects and sites of violence'.⁷⁴ The point of this form of necropower is to subjugate the living by targeting the dead.

Used as a potent symbolic instrument of necropolitical violence, the bodies of Kurdish militants killed in the 'dirty war'⁷⁵ of the 1990s and after often disappeared or were not returned

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 32.

⁷¹ Ibid., 27.

⁷² Bargu, 'Another Necropolitics'.

⁷³ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Bargu, 'Another Necropolitics', 6.

to the families.⁷⁶ Bargu suggests that such persecution goes beyond the usual rendering of the enemy as ‘alien’ as in traditional warfare in which each side may respect the other’s dead bodies, and instead deploys a logic of the ‘absolutization of enmity’.⁷⁷ Such an ‘other’ necropolitics that specifically targets dead corpses is so powerful that coming to terms with it is central to any future reconciliation between Kurds and Turks.⁷⁸

While such practices of necropolitical violence described by Bargu endure in the post-coup attempt era – the Presidency of Religious Affairs quickly issued a directive suspending funeral rites for those behind the failed military coup of 2016, who were to be buried in the Traitors’ Cemetery – the question is whether such practices reflect civil or civic death. In contrast to the many forms of biopolitical and/or necropolitical violence in Turkey based on a strategy of civic death which turn dissidents into the living dead, contemporary forms of dissident suppression are based on a strategy of civic death that systematically subjugates living *KHK'lı* to economic, social, and political death. Governments in Turkey have been using necropolitical political violence for a long time. At the moment the government does not need to rely on necropolitics in order to have a hegemony on the field of knowledge production or other government employees. Instead, they punish dissidents in universities, schools, and jurisdiction with the mechanism of civic death. Thus the sovereign force them to live in dire condition or in exile in their home country and consider them as surplus, waste, or already dead. Rendering targeted dissidents as both the enemy and as little more than disposable waste, we argue that the logic of civic death as a way of punishing dissidents constitutes a distinctive necropolitical mode of the new authoritarianism. Unlike the necropolitical violent use of dead

⁷⁶ Zerrin Özlem Biner. ‘Haunted by Debt: Calculating the Cost of Loss and Violence in Turkey’, *Theory & Event* 19, no. 1 (2016), <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/610224>.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 5, 8.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

bodies to discipline the living, civic death practices aim to destroy the economic, social, and political conditions that sustain the living. As a result, Turkey uses multiple forms of violence in disciplining and punishing its dissidents such as ‘civil’ or civic death according to biopolitical and/or necropolitical mode of government.

Conclusion

Studies of the ongoing social, economic, and political transformations in the post-2002 AKP era have noted that the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey is historically grounded in the paradigm of the exceptional state which has long used bio- and necropower strategies.⁷⁹ The use of civil death status as a strategy of governance is to be seen in Turkey’s long history of execution, persecution, coercion, forced arbitrary detention, and other technologies of extreme violence. In these historical examples, the strategy of sovereign power is based on the logics of *make die*. In contemporary Turkey a very different political strategy, one that we call civic death, is now being deployed based on the logics of *let die*. Fundamental changes occurring in the political and judicial systems make possible dismissals by government decree in order to

⁷⁹ İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, eds. *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony* (London: Pluto, 2014); Pınar Bedirhanoglu, ‘Türkiye’de neoliberal otoriter devletin AKP’li yüzü’, in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, eds. İlhan Uzgöl and Bülent Duru, (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009): 40–64; Seyla Benhabib, ‘Turkey’s Authoritarian Turn’, *The New York Times*, June 3, 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/opinion/turkeys-authoritarian-turn.html> (accessed December 30, 2018); Ali Bilgiç, ‘Reclaiming the National Will: Resilience of Turkish Authoritarian Neoliberalism after Gezi’, *South European Society and Politics* 23, no. 2 (2018): 259–280; Aziz Çelik, ‘Turkey’s New Labour Regime under the Justice and Development Party in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century: Authoritarian Flexibilization’, *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 4, (2015): 618–635; Berk Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü, ‘Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey’, *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 9 (2016): 1581–1606; Aslı Iğsız, ‘Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests: Authoritarianism in Flux, Law and Neoliberalism’, in *The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey #occupygezi*, ed. Umut Özkırımlı, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) (2014): 22–49; Ahmet İnel, *La nouvelle Turquie d’Erdogan, Du rêve démocratique à la dérive autoritaire* (Paris: La Découverte, 2015); Özlem Kaygusuz, ‘Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Regime Security in Turkey: Moving to an ‘Exceptional State’ under AKP’, *South European Society and Politics* 23, no. 2 (2018): 281–302; Ergun Özbudun, ‘Turkey’s judiciary and the drive toward competitive authoritarianism’, *The International Spectator* 50, no. 2 (2015): 42–55; Esra Özyürek, Gaye Özpınar, and Emrah Altındış, eds., *Authoritarianism and Resistance in Turkey: Conversations on Democratic and Social Challenges* (Cham: Springer, 2018); Murat Somer, ‘Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown: Old vs. New and Indigenous vs. Global Authoritarianism’, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16, no. 4 (2016): 1–23; Cemal Burak Tansel, ‘Reproducing Authoritarian Neoliberalism in Turkey: Urban Governance and State Restructuring in the Shadow of Executive Centralization’, *Globalizations*, August 21, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1502494> (accessed December 30, 2018).

punish dissidents by banishing them from the public sphere, consigning them to outlawry, and transforming them into disposable persons.

From periods of ‘total domination’ to today’s ‘war on terror’, modern life has repeatedly been subjugated by the power of death in both its civil and civic forms. The challenging political configurations of post-totalitarianism, postcolonialism, the rise of the far right, nationalist revanchism, populism, the various contemporary crises of neoliberalism, globalization, democracy, human rights, and freedom of movement all deploy these mixed modes of modern bio- and necropower.⁸⁰

As we have seen in the case of the *KHK’li* of Turkey, new authoritarianisms use the ancient power of civil death to extinguish civil rights and then convert it to new instruments of biopolitical and necropolitical power. Theorists of these new authoritarianisms suggest that contemporary political institutions legitimize and open the door to authoritarian forms of rule precisely because they, too, rely on biopolitical and necropolitical modes and mechanisms of power.⁸¹ Further study of the precise and multifarious forms of civil and civic death status into

⁸⁰ John Abromeit et al., eds., *Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015); Christos Boukalas, ‘Counterterrorism Legislation and the US State Form: Authoritarian Statism Phase 3’, *Radical Philosophy* 151, (2008): 31–41; Christos Boukalas, ‘No Exceptions: Authoritarian Statism. Agamben, Poulantzas, and Homeland Security’, *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 7, no. 1 (2014): 112–130; Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2017); Henry A. Giroux, ‘Dirty Democracy and State Terrorism: the Politics of the New Authoritarianism in the United States’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26, no. 2 (2006): 163–177; Douglas Kellner, *American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism* (Rotterdam, Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2016); Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso Books, 2005); Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); Jeremiah Morelock, ed., *Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism* (London: University of Westminster Press, 2018); Pierre Rosanvallon, ‘Penser le populisme’, *La vie des idées*, September 27, 2011, <https://laviedesidees.fr/Penser-le-populisme.html> (accessed December 30, 2018); Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (London: Sage, 2015).

⁸¹ Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy C. Campbell (Chicago: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Esposito, *Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community* (California: Stanford University Press, 2009); Esposito, *Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life* (London: Polity Press, 2011); Francisco Ferrándiz and Antonius C. G. M. Robben, eds., *Necropolitics, Mass Graves, and Exhumations in the Age of Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); and Hardt and Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Thomas Lemke, *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), and Oglivie, *L’Homme jetable*.

which the many excluded, exiled, and stateless peoples of the contemporary world repeatedly fall may shed light on the mutual interaction of multiple contemporary bio- and necropolitical strategies.⁸² The dismissed *KHK'lı* in Turkey reminds us that, as a sovereign strategy for exerting power, the politics of death takes on various forms, including that of civil and civic death. Combining, recombining, and shifting under the weight of historical time and politics, its methods and modes of operation will be both specific and changeable.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to *KHK'lı* academics who took the time to share their experiences with us. Deniz Yonucu, Zafer Yilmaz, and two anonymous referees gave constructive feedback for this article. Theresa Traux-Gischler made it eloquent and pushed us to define our concepts better. The research was funded by British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant (SG 171613).

⁸² Esposito, *Bíos*; Ali Bilgiç, 'Migrant Encounters with Neo-Colonial Masculinity: Producing European Sovereignty Through Emotions', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 20, no. 4 (2018): 542–562; Anthony Burke, 'Humanity After Biopolitics: On the Global Politics of Human Being', *Angelaki, Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 16, no.4 (2011): 101–114; Didier Fassin and Estelle D'Halluin, 'The Truth from the Body: Medical Certificates as Ultimate Evidence for Asylum Seekers', *American Anthropologist* 107, no. 4 (2005): 597–608; Didier Fassin, 'Another Politics of Life is Possible' *Theory, Culture & Society* 26, no. 5 (2009): 44–60; Didier Fassin, 'The Biopolitics of Otherness: Undocumented Foreigners and Racial Discrimination in French Public Debate', *Anthropology Today* 17, no. 1 (2001): 3–7; Miriam Ticktin, 'How Biology Travels: A Humanitarian Trip', *Body & Society* 17, no. 2 & 3 (2011): 139–158; and Peter Redfield, 'Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis' *Cultural Anthropology* 20, no. 3 (2005): 328–361.