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Why Moral Theorising Needs Real Cases: The Redirection of V-Weapons During WWII*

Susanne Burri
s.burri@lse.ac.uk
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Abstract

In 1944, the German Wehrmacht started terror bombing London with guided missiles called V-weapons. With the help of double agents that the British authorities had recruited among German spies, it would have been possible to deceive the enemy into redirecting his weapons away from Central London. This would likely have greatly reduced civilian casualties in Central London, while leading to a comparably smaller increase of civilian deaths in some areas of South London. While the British deception authorities were in favour of redirection, the War Cabinet's Ministers were opposed.

In this paper, I investigate whether the Ministers had moral reason for their qualms. I argue that they did, as redirecting the V-weapons meant showing unequal concern for the safety of different parts of the population. I suggest that all things considered, redirecting the weapons could nevertheless have formed part of a morally optimal response to the German attack. My discussion draws on insights from the moral philosophical literature that makes extensive use of hypothetical cases. Critics of this literature worry that its method renders its insights practically irrelevant. My paper suggests that this worry is exaggerated, but not without merit. The historical case that I discuss is not easily resolved using ideas from the case-based literature, but such ideas still help illuminate the decision the British authorities faced.

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(1) Introduction

In 1944, the German Wehrmacht started terror bombing London with guided missiles called *V-weapons* or *buzz bombs*. With the help of double agents that the British authorities had recruited among German spies, it would have been possible to deceive the enemy into redirecting his missiles away from Central London. This would likely have reduced civilian casualties in Central London, while increasing casualties in some areas of South London. The expected net effect would have been a significant reduction in the overall number of civilian casualties. While the British deception authorities were unambiguously in favour of deceiving the enemy, the War Cabinet's Ministers were opposed, and issued a puzzlingly vague order to "confuse the enemy" instead. A battle of wills ensued. Eventually, the Ministers authorised a deception strategy aimed at keeping the *mean point of impact* (MPI)¹ of the buzz bombs at its initial location south of Central London.

In this paper, I investigate whether the Ministers had moral reason for their resistance against redirecting the buzz bombs. I argue that they did, as redirecting the bombs would have meant showing unequal concern towards different parts of the population. Unlike the Ministers' proposal to confuse the enemy, the redirection strategy involved knowingly burdening a specific part of the population with the main weight of the German attack. This made redirecting the *V-weapons* morally problematic, as a government owes its duties of protection equally to all of its citizens. Despite this drawback, I conclude that redirecting the *V-weapons* could nevertheless have formed part of a morally optimal response to the German attack. Compared to other options, it promised a significant reduction in civilian casualties, and this fact spoke heavily in its favour. Moreover, if the British government had redirected the buzz bombs while committing itself to eliminating the bomb threat as swiftly and decisively as possible, it could thereby have gone a fair way towards treating all of its civilians with the consideration they were due.

In the philosophical literature to date, the just sketched British conundrum is portrayed in a simplified and overly condensed manner, and important aspects of the historical case have been described incorrectly. A complex setup is thus turned into just another *hypothetical case*, where a morally difficult situation is described in a maximally concise manner. Over the past few decades, the use of such hypothetical cases has become widespread in analytic moral theorising. Hypothetical cases are employed for two main purposes:² first, individual cases are used to test whether moral principles have plausible implications when applied to particular situations. Second, pairs of cases that are equalised in all but one respect are used to investigate the intuitive moral significance of specific considerations. In my view, hypothetical cases play a valuable role within moral theorising when they are thoughtfully employed in one or the other of these two ways. They help us move towards "reflective equilibrium,"³ a state where the moral

¹ The mean point of impact (MPI) is the location which corresponds to the geometrical center of all missile impacts.

² See e.g. McMahan, 2018; Kamm, 1996.

³ Rawls, 1999, p. 43.

principles that we endorse are backed up by plausible justifications and cohere well with our intuitive judgments about particular cases. But while it speaks in favour of a principle if it comes with a plausible justification and is intuitively compelling, this does not suffice to vindicate the principle. Unless the principle is able to inform deliberation and guide action under the messy circumstances of real life, the principle fails the important test of *practical applicability*. We can use detailed case studies to investigate whether a principle passes this test. If a principle helps us shed light on rich case studies whose complexity approaches the complexity of our lived moral experience, then the principle is practically applicable.

Our lived moral experience is complex partly because we tend to be *uncertain about the consequences of our actions*, and because our *alternatives for action tend to be open-ended*. Hypothetical cases do not aspire to reproduce this complexity, presumably because the theorists who use them assume that it would detract from their primary purposes. Yet critics of case-based moral theorising worry about these simplifications. They argue that the moral principles that we arrive at through case-based moral theorising are likely to fail the test of practical applicability precisely because hypothetical cases do not take into account the uncertainty and the open-endedness that characterises actual decision-making.⁴ These worries are worth taking seriously, but little effort has gone into dispelling them.⁵

In this paper, I take it as given that moral theorising aims to establish practically applicable results. Were it to lack this aim, it would seem to miss its ultimate point, which is to further our understanding of the moral universe that we live in. I proceed by first laying out the details of the historical case as it occurred during WWII. I then discuss how we might understand the case from a moral point of view, drawing on principles from the relevant philosophical literature that makes extensive use of hypothetical cases. It is my working hypothesis throughout this paper that we can use insights from the case-based literature to shed light on a complex real-life situation, and that the critics' worries about the literature are thus overblown. This is not to say, however, that the worries are without merit. As my discussion will show, the historical conundrum that I lay out is not easily captured with off-the-shelf principles, and morally important considerations are at risk of being overlooked if one studies the conundrum exclusively through the lens of such principles.

The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 take a close look at the intricacies of the historical case.⁶ Section 4 discusses how the case has been analysed in the philosophical literature. In section 5, I argue that the Ministers' resistance to redirection may have stemmed from a legitimate concern with treating their citizens equally. In section 6, I argue that the illusory appeal of the proposal to fix the MPI at its current location is best understood from a

⁴ See e.g. Fried, 2012; Wood, 2011.

⁵ Cécile Fabre is an important exception to this rule. In *Cosmopolitan War* (2012, p. 15), Fabre explains that in her theorising about the ethics of war, she makes extensive reference to historical situations partly because "war is unfortunately ubiquitous and [...] it would be odd to think about it from a normative point of view without alluding [...] to its historical manifestations." For another exception, see McMahan and McKim (1993).

⁶ I have carried out archival research for the purposes of this paper at the UK National Archives in Kew. The archival research was carried out jointly with Alex Voorhoeve.

rights-based perspective. In section 7, I suggest that redirecting the V-weapons would have been morally permissible if it had been combined with suitable accompanying measures. Section 8 concludes.

(2) The Historical Case

In June of 1944, the German Wehrmacht started terror bombing London with a new kind of weapon.⁷ The so-called *V-weapons* (*Vergeltungswaffen*, i.e. retaliatory weapons) or *buzz bombs* were guided missiles that German engineers had started to develop in the late 1930s. When the terror bombing of London started, the V-weapons were at a stage of development where they performed reasonably well in test runs, but still had some flaws. Most importantly, their guidance system was not yet very accurate, so that the German engineers needed to know where their missiles were falling in order to fine-tune their weaponry. Since the British press was censored, and because reconnaissance flights over London were not feasible, the Germans turned to their London-stationed spies. They asked them to report the timing and location of missile impacts as quickly and accurately as possible. As it happened, many London-based German spies had been turned into British double agents by 1944. These double agents now inquired with their British contacts what information to pass on to the Wehrmacht.

The British thought it likely that the enemy had made Charing Cross (a busy railway station in Central London) the target mean point of impact of his missiles, thus maximising the missiles' expected negative impact on civilian lives, critical infrastructure, and British morale. The British soon realised, however, that the V-weapons were on average falling short of their presumed target. While individual buzz bombs fell scattered all over Greater London (and South East England at large), it became evident that south-east London was suffering the brunt of the attack. About ten days after the German attack had started, the V-weapons' actual MPI lay in Dulwich, some four miles south-east of Charing Cross.⁸

Individual buzz bombs had a limited blast radius and tended not to be very deadly, but many missiles were fired at London each day. When the attack on London stopped on 28 March 1945, just under 4,000 V-weapons had reached the Greater London area, killing almost 9,000 civilians, and injuring about 24,500.⁹

In late June of 1944, when the attack had only just begun, the British authorities had to decide what information their double agents should pass on to the Germans. Sir Samuel Findlater Stewart, chairman of the Home Defence Executive,¹⁰ came up with a deception policy that he sent to the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff for approval. His proposal was to have the double

⁷ Unless indicated otherwise, this section draws on Campbell (2012).

⁸ Jones, 1978, p. 420

⁹ Campbell, 2012, p. 445.

¹⁰ The Home Defence Executive, later renamed to Security Executive, was a committee charged with organising the defence of Britain against enemy forces.

agents selectively report actual incidents so as to "create the impression that the bombs are appearing to overshoot the target (which we assume to be Central London) in the hope that the range and deflection may be moved further to the east and south than it is at present."¹¹ Stewart's idea was thus to redirect the buzz bombs even further away from Central London and towards less built up areas by feeding the Nazis strategically selective information.

Stewart's **redirection strategy** was *prudent*: it promised to protect the excellent reputation that the British double agents were enjoying with their German controllers by allowing them to pass on seemingly useful and in principle verifiable information promptly. For the British authorities, safeguarding their double agents' reputation as reliable German spies was important, as they wanted to ensure that their double agents would be available for further deception projects in case the war should drag on. Stewart's redirection strategy also promised to be *effective* at reducing damage, both with respect to human lives and critical infrastructure. If---as seemed likely---the Germans had no choice but to rely almost exclusively on their spies' reports to establish where their V-weapons were falling, the British were thus presented with a genuine opportunity to limit the expected negative impact of the enemy's missiles.

Findlater Stewart pressed the Chiefs of Staff to quickly reach a decision in the matter. The double agents had been instructed by their German contacts to make reporting missile incidents their top priority, and could therefore not credibly remain silent for long. The Chiefs of Staff instructed the deception authorities to go ahead with Stewart's proposal for the time being.¹² But because civilian lives were involved, they felt that they weren't authorised to decide the matter finally. They thus forwarded Stewart's proposal to the War Cabinet, and asked for the Ministers' backing of the redirection strategy.¹³ On 28 July, the War Cabinet (with Winston Churchill absent that day) discussed Stewart's proposal and argued "that it would be a serious matter to assume any direct degree of responsibility for action which would affect the areas against which flying bombs were aimed."¹⁴ To the Ministers, "it was not for the Government to authorise action which would result in certain areas in South London getting a heavier discharge of ying bombs and sustaining heavier casualties than they do at the present time."¹⁵ The Ministers felt that "if it came out that the Government had authorised such action their position would be indefensible" (*ibid.*). The Ministers concluded that Stewart's proposal "could not be accepted" and instead "invited the deception authorities to arrange that the information conveyed to the enemy [...] was such as would create confusion in his mind and present him with an inaccurate picture."¹⁶ Findlater Stewart's redirection strategy was thus deemed

¹¹CAB 113/35, 5 July 1944 In the filing system of the UK National Archives, "CAB" refers to records of the Cabinet office. The "PREM" and "KV" abbreviations that I introduce later in this section refer to records of the Prime Minister's office and the Security Service, respectively.

¹² CAB 121/214, 7 July 1944.

¹³CAB 121/213, around 10 July 1944.

¹⁴ CAB 121/214, 28 July 1944.

¹⁵PREM 3/111A, 3 August 1944.

¹⁶ CAB 121/214, 28 July 1944.

unacceptable even though neither its prudence nor its effectiveness were called into question.

This exasperated Stewart. In a second report, he argued that the Ministers' **confusion strategy** was not a feasible alternative:

1. "We are forced to give some information in order to maintain our deception machine in being.
2. Information cannot be given haphazardly since the enemy will draw an inference about his aim from whatever is said and we must therefore indicate some mean point of impact which would not be to our detriment.
3. If we tell the enemy or let him infer the truth we present him with valuable information which he can use to improve his aim, and [...] a shift to the north might be very serious."¹⁷

He then proposed a second deception strategy where "material to be passed over should be selected so as to deny useful information to the enemy and to prevent him from moving the mean point of impact of his attack, particularly to the north."¹⁸ As a compromise between redirection and confusion, he thus proposed to deceive the Germans into **keeping the MPI of their missiles at its initial location in Dulwich**.

On 15 August, the War Cabinet (with Churchill now present) discussed Stewart's second report. It seems that they were moved by Stewart's arguments against the confusion strategy. They informed Stewart that they had reconsidered their original instructions, and that the deception authorities' new "object should be to ensure that there is no deterioration in the position and that the enemy does not shift the pattern of his bombs towards the North West. With this in view you should continue to convey to the enemy information which will confirm his belief that he has no need to lengthen his range. You are also at liberty, within limits, to take such steps as you may judge safe to intensify this belief."¹⁹

It is not clear what the deception authorities made of these revised orders. They may have read them as a go-ahead for Findlater Stewart's second proposal, so that they tried to keep the MPI in Dulwich. Or they may have interpreted them as consistent with Stewart's initial proposal, so that they kept attempting to shift the MPI further south-east.²⁰ What we know for certain is that they managed to induce the enemy to believe that he was on average on target when in fact he was not. German intelligence appreciation of the fall of the V-weapons shows that the Germans believed that they were hitting Central London with some precision,²¹ when the MPI for all of the V-weapons that fell in 1944-45 actually lay in Beckenham, eight miles

¹⁷CAB 113/35, 31 July 1944.

¹⁸CAB 113/35, 31 July 1944.

¹⁹ PREM 3/111A, 15 August 1944.

²⁰ Howard (1990, p. 177) suggests that a cautious redirection strategy was adopted, as the deception authorities felt they had been authorised "to prevent the enemy from moving his aim towards the north-west and, to a slight extent, to attempt to induce him to move it towards the south-east."

²¹ Howard, 1990, Fig. 1A; Jones, 1978, Ill. 24.

south-east of Charing Cross.²² The fact that the eventual MPI lay several miles south-east of Dulwich supports the hypothesis that the deception authorities went ahead with Findlater Stewart's redirection strategy. Together with military authorities, they were at any rate careful to avoid renewed involvement of the War Cabinet's Ministers in deception issues. As General Ismay wrote to General Hollis on 26 January 1945, the Chiefs of Staff had "got [their] fingers badly burnt by bringing Ministers into this [deception] business", and he, for one, did not "want to risk doing so again."²³

(3) The Feasibility of Confusing the Enemy

Findlater Stewart argued that the confusion strategy was impracticable. This seems too strong. Stewart probably saw no compelling reason in favour of confusing the enemy, and for this reason did not give much thought to how this might be done. But here are possible components of a workable confusion strategy:

- Different double agents could issue reports that cancel each other. A first agent could report rumours of an impact at some given time and place; a second agent could report the same rumour, then saying that he went to check it out, only to find no damage.
- Double agents could be specific about the locations of missile impacts, but give only rough estimates of the times at which the respective missiles had fallen. This would make their reports less valuable for the German engineers, who were interested in finding out where individual missiles had fallen. The agents could argue that it makes them look suspicious if they insist on learning the precise time at which some missile has exploded.²⁴
- Some agents could announce that they were unwilling to stay in London and risk their lives, and would be retreating to the countryside for as long as the attack went on.²⁵

In light of these possibilities, I will assume throughout this paper that "confusing the enemy"--understood as "providing the enemy with largely useless information from which he should be unable to calculate an MPI"---would have been feasible if the British authorities had been

²² Campbell, 2012, p. 346; Howard, 1990, Fig IB. This is true for the first generation of V-weapons, the V-1 guided missiles. Deception also took place with regard to a second generation of V-weapons, the V-2 rockets, whose MPI lay north-east of London (CAB 121/215, 15 October 1944; Campbell, 2012, p. 445).

²³CAB 154/49, 26 January 1945.

²⁴ When the German attack on London started, double agent Garbo used this strategy to play for time. Garbo even staged his own arrest, claiming that he was arrested at an impact site for asking too many questions. His German contacts bought his story and told Garbo to lay low for a while (KV 2/69, 28 June 1944; KV 2/69, 14 July 1944). To honour his valuable work as a double agent during WWII, a blue plaque was recently installed at Garbo's former dwelling place on 35 Crespigny Road in Hendon, North West London.

²⁵Several German contacts tried to issue advance warnings of the attack to their favourite spies; others apologised for not having been able to do so (Delmer, 1971, pp. 202-4 ; Howard, 1990, p. 169).

willing to jeopardise their double agents' reputation as first-rate German spies. I will moreover suppose that if the British had chosen to confuse the enemy, they would not have been able to predict where the MPI of the buzz bombs would subsequently have moved to. This latter assumption is plausible because the British authorities had to reckon that not all German spies had switched sides. If the quality of the double agents' reporting had started to decline, it seems reasonable to assume that the reports of the non-turned spies would have started to look comparatively more useful, and that the enemy would thus have begun to rely more heavily on the reports of his non-turned spies.

(4) How the Historical Case is Discussed in the Philosophical Literature

(4.1) The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA)

The philosophical literature to date relies on a mistaken description of the historical case. Both Jonathan Glover²⁶ and, following Glover, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza²⁷ correctly describe the situation the British authorities faced as one where the Germans relied on British double agents "for information about where the V1 [. . .] rockets were falling,"²⁸ but then go on to assert that the German aim was "broadly accurate, hitting the target of London."²⁹ Given this mistaken understanding of the case, they then discuss whether the British should have had their double agents "send back reports indicating that most of [the V-weapons] had fallen well north of London, so that the rocket ranges would correct their aim a number of miles to the south. The result of this would have been to make most of the rockets fall in Kent, Surrey or Sussex, killing far fewer people than they did in London."³⁰ Based on this description, Glover then argues that the Ministers might have opposed redirection because they believed, together with proponents of the DDA, that *doing harm is worse than merely allowing it to occur*.³¹ Glover subsequently rejects the DDA as unfounded.

Not only does Glover get the details of the case wrong, but his analysis seems sketchy even if we accept his description. That is, even if the British authorities had been faced with a choice between redirecting the missiles and letting them fall where they were already falling, both of these options would have required a *similar degree of activity*. No matter which option

²⁶ Glover, 1977, pp. 102-3.

²⁷Fischer and Ravizza, 1992.

²⁸Glover, 1977, p. 102

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid. The historical case is mentioned also by Michael Moore (2009, pp. 75-6) and David Edmonds (2013, pp. 3-8), but without advancement of the philosophical analysis of the case. Moore's description of the case follows Glover's. Edmonds (2013, pp. 5-6) describes the historical facts more accurately: he points out that the buzz bombs were falling short of their presumed target. He nevertheless misdescribes the choice that the British government faced as one where it could either "do nothing", or where it could alternatively "try to change the trajectory of the [V-weapons]---through a campaign of misinformation---and so save lives" (Edmonds, 2013, p. 8).

³¹ Glover, 1977, p. 103.

the authorities had settled for, they would have had to instruct their double agents with similarly specific details about what information to pass on to their German controllers. If we were to frame the British choice (as characterised by Glover) as a trolley case, we should thus not describe it as a standard "side track" case where a runaway trolley will kill five people unless an agent decides to redirect it onto a side track where it will kill only one person.³² Instead it resembles an *amended* side track case where an agent has a choice between *pressing a button* so that a lethal runaway trolley continues to run towards five people, and *pressing another button* so that the trolley is redirected onto a side track where it will eventually kill only one person.³³ It is thus not clear why Glover thought of redirecting the missiles as doing harm, and of not redirecting them as merely allowing harm (though see section 6 below).

Against this, someone might argue that Glover may have had in mind the possibility that the British authorities could have merely allowed harm to occur by sacrificing their double agents, i.e. by either *ceasing all communication with their double agents*, or else by *ceasing all communication with the enemy by instructing their double agents to no longer respond to any German inquiries*. Glover may have expected that in his version of the case, such a **keeping silent strategy** would have kept the MPI in place over London. I grant that if this is what Glover had in mind, then the British choice as he perceived it shared important similarities with a standard side track trolley case.³⁴

Once we turn away from Glover's inaccurate description and consider the historical situation as it actually presented itself, the distinction between doing harm and merely allowing it would not initially appear to favour any of the three alternatives that the British authorities actively considered. After all, whichever alternative they would have settled for---redirection, confusion, or keeping the MPI in Dulwich---they would have had to provide their double agents with similarly detailed instructions about what to report to the enemy. Having said that, the option to remain silent would have been available in the historical situation as well, at least if the British had been willing to sacrifice their double agents and, as with the confusion strategy, had been willing to risk a shift of the MPI towards Central London (see sec. 3 above). If the distinction between doing harm and merely allowing it is morally significant, "keeping silent" is thus a fourth salient alternative that the British authorities should at least have considered. Moreover, as I will argue in section 6 below, as confusing the enemy came with the *same expected missile-related effects as keeping silent*, closer inspection reveals that the missile-related harms that would have accompanied the confusion strategy were plausibly morally comparable to harm that the British authorities merely allowed to occur.

³² See Thomson, 1976, p. 207.

³³ This makes the amended side track trolley case structurally similar to Philippa Foot's original case, in which you are the driver of the trolley and face a choice between killing five people and killing one. See Foot, 1967 and Thomson, 1976, p. 206. Foot and Thomson agree that in Foot's original case, it is permissible to redirect the trolley away from the five and towards the one.

³⁴ I thank Jeff McMahan for suggesting this interpretation of what Glover might have had in mind.

While Glover rejects the DDA as unfounded,³⁵ other philosophers view it more favourably.³⁶ In this paper, I follow Philippa Foot³⁷ in assuming that the distinction captured by the DDA is morally significant when it tracks the distinction between victims' *negative rights not to be harmed* and their *positive rights to aid*. I take up a rights-based perspective on the historical case in section 6 below.

(4.2) The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)

Fischer and Ravizza³⁸ accept Glover's flawed description of the case and suggest that the DDE captures some of its morally relevant features. They describe the DDE as follows:

"The Doctrine of Double Effect distinguishes between intended *ends* and necessary *means*, on the one hand, and unintended but foreseen *side-effects* on the other. The doctrine exploits this distinction to claim that whereas it is sometimes permissible to bring about a bad result as a merely foreseen side-effect of what you do, it is in general not permissible to bring about such an effect as an intended end or a necessary means to some intended end."³⁹

Fischer and Ravizza then argue that according to the DDE, "the morally salient feature of the English decision was whether the deaths of the innocent citizens [in the area to which the V-weapons would have been redirected] would have been either a necessary means or intended end of the missile diversion, or whether these deaths would have been merely a side-effect that was foreseen but unintended."⁴⁰ They think that there is reasonable disagreement on this issue,⁴¹ so that the DDE can explain the disagreement between the deception authorities and the Ministers.

Pace Fischer and Ravizza, I do not think that the DDE can explain the Ministers' resistance to redirection in Glover's description of the case. If---as Glover implies---the Germans could simply have been lied to and fake incidents could have been reported to them in a credible way, there does not seem to be a sense in which the deaths of innocent civilians were either a *necessary means* or else an *intended end* of the redirection strategy.⁴² Surely everyone in favour of redirection would have welcomed it if the redirected missiles had happened to consistently

³⁵ Glover, 1977, p. 94.

³⁶ See e.g. Foot, 1967, Kamm, 1996.

³⁷ Foot, 1967.

³⁸ Fischer and Ravizza, 1992, p. 18.

³⁹ Fischer and Ravizza, 1992, p. 6, original emphases.

⁴⁰ Fischer and Ravizza, 1992, p. 18.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² See also Moore, 2009, p. 76.

fall on uninhabited territory. Civilian deaths would thus have been no more than a foreseeable side effect of redirection.⁴³

Once we consider the historical case as it actually occurred, things become more complicated. Remember that Findlater Stewart wanted to safeguard the excellent reputation of the British double agents, and for this reason insisted that only actual buzz bomb incidents should be reported. Now if the enemy ought to be induced to believe that he was at first hitting north-west London on average, and that he was hitting Central London on average after he had adjusted his aim, there had to be actual buzz bomb incidents in north-west London and in Central London. But, arguably, you cannot have repeated incidents in north-west London and in Central London without dead civilians. If this is right, then the deaths of innocent civilians were *inextricably tied up with a necessary means* of the redirection strategy, and in this sense formed a *contingently necessary* part of the redirection strategy.

Similarly for Stewart's second proposal to fix the MPI in Dulwich. To fix the MPI in Dulwich, the enemy had to be induced to believe that he was hitting Central London on average. If only actual incidents were to be reported, then there had to be buzz bomb incidents in Central London. But, it could be argued, you cannot have incidents in Central London without having any dead civilians. Hence dead civilians were contingently necessary for Stewart's second proposal as well.

By contrast, while it is not clear how the confusion strategy would have been implemented, it is certain that the double agents could not simply have reported a number of arbitrarily selected actual buzz bomb incidents. To prevent the enemy from calculating an MPI based on the information provided, the double agents would have had to move away from reporting specific incidents (see section 3). At least with some adjustments, it should thus have been feasible to implement a confusion strategy entirely without reliance on any actual incidents, so that with respect to confusion, such incidents were more like a foreseeable side effect than a necessary means. As for the option to simply keep silent, this would have involved only foreseeable harm in an even clearer sense.

According to the argument just presented, harm to civilians is intended as part of the redirection strategy and the strategy of fixing the MPI in Dulwich, but is merely foreseen with respect to confusion and keeping silent. But the argument just presented is flawed. To see why, note that the DDE means to rule out certain ways of *bringing about* harm.⁴⁴ In essence, it flags as morally problematic cases where an agent involves innocent victims in the agent's plan in a way that causes these victims harm.⁴⁵ But for each missile incident that Stewart's deception proposals would have made use of, this incident would have *already happened* by the time the

⁴³ In the side track trolley case, it is usually thought that the DDE would not rule it impermissible to divert a trolley onto a side track. Insofar as Glover's description of the British decision situation describes that situation as structurally similar to a side track trolley case, it is thus not surprising that the DDE does not speak against redirection.

⁴⁴ Fischer and Ravizza, 1992, p. 6.

⁴⁵ Quinn, 1989.

deception authorities had made use of it. To see this more clearly, suppose the British authorities decided to redirect the missiles. They would then have needed to report an incident somewhere in north-west London. But they would not consequently have aimed at bringing about a first such incident as a means to implement the redirection strategy. Rather, they would either have reported a suitable incident that had already occurred, or they would have waited for such an incident to occur. For each missile incident that the redirection strategy would subsequently have helped bring about, this incident would have been brought about as a foreseeable side effect of the redirection strategy, even if it was *afterwards* used as a means to keep the strategy going. Put differently, Findlater Stewart's proposals were built around the assumption that missile incidents in north-west London and Central London *would* materialise, and they remained feasible only as long as such incidents *kept* materialising. But whatever information was passed on to the Germans was passed on in order to keep the weight of the attacks away from north-west London and Central London, not to cause incidents in these areas. Once we consider the matter carefully, the DDE therefore fails to speak against Stewart's proposals.⁴⁶

In the next section, I argue that a valid reason against Stewart's deception proposals can be found once we turn our attention to considerations of equal concern.

(5) Showing Equal Concern

Each state has a responsibility to protect the lives of its citizens. This responsibility is fundamental: a state that does not meet it lacks legitimacy.⁴⁷ That there exists such a responsibility is uncontroversial. The contested issue is what this responsibility amounts to, or how it is properly fulfilled. In the case at hand, the British authorities knew that they had a duty to protect their citizens; the question they were struggling with was how to live up to it. Given the circumstances, no matter what the authorities decided to do, some civilians were bound to lose their lives. How should a government protect its civilians when it cannot protect them all?

One answer is that it should *minimise losses*. This answer has considerable intuitive appeal. If it is correct, then the Ministers should have endorsed the redirection strategy. In a detailed report, the British authorities estimated that:

1. Moving the MPI from its current position in Dulwich six miles to the south-east would

⁴⁶ The argument just presented resembles one made by Frances Kamm. Kamm (2007, pp. 101- 19) argues that *intending to bring about a bad outcome* is different from acting *only because we foresee that a bad outcome will occur*. When we act only because we foresee a bad outcome, the bad outcome figures as a "condition of [our] action" (Kamm, 2007, p. 118)---we would not act unless we expected the outcome---but we do not thereby intend the outcome. Even if the bad outcome is useful to us, when we act merely because it will occur, we are not thereby committed to doing anything extra to ensure that it will be brought about. For Kamm, this renders acting only on condition that a bad result will occur morally similar to acting while merely foreseeing a bad result.

⁴⁷ See e.g. Hobbes, 1994, ch. 21; Locke, 1990, ch. IX; Mill, 1998, ch. 1 of *On Liberty*.

- decrease average monthly missile-related deaths by 1,600;
2. Moving the MPI from its current position in Dulwich to Charing Cross (several miles to the north-west) would increase average monthly missile-related deaths by 500.⁴⁸

Compared to the redirection strategy, the confusion strategy thus risked an increase of up to 2,100 in the number of average monthly civilian deaths. But there is a second answer to the question of how a government should protect its civilians when their claims to protection compete. According to this second answer, it should strike a balance between *minimising losses* and *showing equal concern for the safety of each person* when these two considerations conflict. The basic idea behind this answer is that a state owes its duty of protection equally to all of its civilians. Only if the protective measures that it implements express a sufficiently balanced concern for the safety of everyone do they properly reflect the fact that in a legitimate state, all citizens enjoy an equal standing.⁴⁹

Had the British authorities chosen to redirect the German V-weapons, they would have knowingly increased the risk of an attack for some parts of their population, while knowingly decreasing that same risk for others. This might lead one to conclude that redirection was a protective measure that did not express equal concern for the safety of everyone. The same cannot be said of the confusion strategy. If the British authorities had chosen to confuse the enemy, they would have tried to keep their double agents in play without knowingly advantaging some of their civilians over others. One might thus suspect that the Ministers had qualms about redirection because they wanted to protect their citizens in a way that expressed equal concern for the safety of everyone.

According to a view that I will refer to as "aggregative", implementing the redirection strategy would not have shown unequal concern. The aggregative view is based on the idea that *minimising losses coincides* with showing equal concern.⁵⁰ An advocate of this view might defend it as follows: "Public decision-makers show an equal concern for the safety of all their civilians if they assign the same positive value to each civilian life in their calculation about the right thing to do. By proceeding in this way, they accept that no one's life counts for more than anyone else's. From a suitably anonymised perspective---e.g. if civilians are deprived of their knowledge of where they live---minimising losses is moreover in everyone's best expected interest. This further supports the idea that *minimising losses coincides* with showing equal concern."

One problem with this aggregative way of showing equal concern is that it does not fit with our considered judgements about particular cases.⁵¹ Suppose that terrorists have captured a group of tourists and are threatening to execute everyone unless a number of demands are

⁴⁸ CAB 113/35, 2 August 1944.

⁴⁹ Rawls, 2001, p. 18; see also Locke, 1990, ch. IX.

⁵⁰ See Mill, 1998, ch. 3 of *Utilitarianism*.

⁵¹ See Nagel, 1979, p. 118.

met. Further suppose that the government of the tourists' home country deploys a special forces unit to free them. After surveying the situation and consulting with the home government, the special forces unit move in and free eighteen of the hostages, leaving behind two more heavily guarded individuals so as not to threaten the entire mission. While a government might approve such a course of action to minimise expected losses, it would unduly stretch the meaning of the term to claim that the government thereby shows an equal concern for the safety of everyone. Intuitively, leaving two hostages behind means sacrificing two people so that eighteen others may live.⁵² In the example just given, a government that leaves two hostages behind increases their risk of death, while decreasing the risk of death for the eighteen individuals who are freed. This suggests that a protective measure---i.e. a governmental intervention that reduces the average risk of harm among the population---expresses an unequal concern for different citizens if it predictably increases the risk of harm to some, while decreasing that risk to others.⁵³ But this is incorrect. Consider the following protective measures that the British authorities implemented in response to the German attack:⁵⁴

1. Sending out fighter aircraft to shoot down V-weapons;
2. Putting up barrage balloons to block and damage V-weapons;
3. Shooting down V-weapons from the ground with anti-aircraft guns.

These measures were implemented in (or over) sparsely inhabited parts of South East England, and they increased the risk of missile-related harms for people living in these areas---V-weapons that were shot down might for example have crushed someone on the ground. Moreover, the measures all aimed to reduce the overall deadliness of the German weapons by keeping them from reaching the Greater London area. All three measures therefore predictably increased the risk of death and injury for some parts of the population, while decreasing it for others.

The measures nevertheless do not express unequal concern. The following reasoning seems to me to explain why this is so: both before and after the introduction of the measures, the brunt of the attacks was borne by Londoners. Each Londoner was at a much higher risk of death and injury than those living elsewhere. Putting up barrage balloons, sending out fighter aircraft, and using anti-aircraft guns all mitigated the relatively high risk that Londoners were exposed to. They therefore protected those civilians to whom the threat to life was most severe. They did this by knowingly increasing the risk of harm to civilians who were at a relatively low

⁵² Cf. Ashford, 2003, p. 301.

⁵³ See Elizabeth Ashford (2003, p. 301) and James Lenman (2008, p. 107) for contractualist arguments along these lines. More generally, there is a large---and still rapidly growing---contractualist literature on morally permissible risk imposition. Many contractualists are sympathetic to the idea that under circumstances of risk, what is of moral relevance is not reducible to the sum total of expected harms and benefits, but includes the distribution of ex ante risks and, depending on the circumstances, ex post benefits and harms as well. See Cohen, Daniels and Eyal (eds.) (2015) for an excellent starting point into this literature.

⁵⁴ CAB 121/213, 1944.

risk to start with, and who remained at a significantly lower risk than those living in Greater London even after the introduction of these countermeasures.⁵⁵

Figuratively speaking, the countermeasures forced British citizens who lived in rural South East England to share in the burden that their fellow citizens in London were shouldered with. The British government was justified in spreading missile-related risks in this manner because we all have *limited duties of assistance* towards individuals who, through no fault of their own, are significantly worse off than we are. More precisely, it is relatively uncontroversial that we are morally required to assist such individuals if we can significantly improve their fate at no more than moderate costs to ourselves.⁵⁶ If a government imposes costs on its citizens that are in line with what their limited duties of assistance demand of them, its actions do not express unequal concern. Quite to the contrary: when we are asked to step up and share in the burden of others, we are asked to recognise them as our equals.

The logic behind the redirection strategy was different from the logic of limited duties of assistance as I have just sketched it. In essence, to redirect the missiles was to single out a part of the population to bear the brunt of the attack in order to reduce the average risk of death and injury among the entire population. To redirect the missiles was therefore not to spread the burden from the most affected areas to a number of less affected areas, but to fix what should henceforth be the most affected area. This suggests that the redirection strategy expressed unequal concern not because it increased the risk to some while decreasing the risk to others, but because it singled out one group of civilians and placed a significant risk of harm on them, thus making them worse off than others. The hostage example further supports this thesis: in the hostage example, the individuals who are left behind suffer a fate much worse, on expectation, than the ones who are freed.

Put in distributive terms, the redirection strategy failed to distribute missile-related risks more equally among the population. Instead it predictably determined a highly unequal distribution of risk. While redirecting the missiles would have shown equal concern in an aggregative sense, it thus would not have shown equal concern in what I will call a *risk-distributive sense*. This provided a--- though not necessarily a decisive---moral reason against redirection.

If the Ministers felt hesitant about implementing the redirection strategy because doing so would have shown unequal concern in a risk-distributive sense, then the confusion strategy offered a way out. To confuse the enemy was to avoid knowingly burdening one part of the population with the brunt of the German attack. This made confusion a risk-distributively less problematic measure than redirection. At the same time, confusing the enemy was not expected

⁵⁵ This is my conjecture; I have not been able to find relevant data. In the literature, there are two main criticisms of countermeasures 1 to 3: that they put soldiers' lives at too great a risk (especially measure 2), and that they were not cost-effective (especially measures 1 and 3). See e.g. Campbell, 2012, pp. 312-4; 446. Based on this, I conjecture that very few---if any--- civilians were killed or injured through countermeasures 1 to 3, and that this is something the British authorities reasonably expected when they implemented these measures.

⁵⁶ See e.g. Barry and Øverland, 2016, pp. 9-76.

to reduce the average risk of harm among the population. Rather, it came with an unpredictable and uncontrollable reshuffling of the burden of the missiles. While this unpredictability made it an intervention that did not express a risk-distributively unequal concern, it also rendered it a potentially very harmful intervention.

Similar but even more pronounced considerations apply to the strategy of keeping silent, an option the British authorities did not actively consider. Just like confusing the enemy, ceasing all communication with him would not have shown unequal concern in a risk-distributive sense, but it would have come with an unpredictable, uncontrollable, and potentially harmful reshuffling of the burden of the missiles. Moreover, unlike the confusion strategy, keeping silent would not have involved any attempt to keep the double agents in play for further deception projects, which made it even more harmful, on expectation, than confusion. This invites the charge that while keeping silent would not have shown *unequal* concern, it would have displayed equal *unconcern*.⁵⁷

Like Stewart's proposal to redirect the missiles, his proposal to fix the MPI in Dulwich would have shown unequal concern in a risk-distributive sense. While implementing it would not have increased the risk of death and injury to the people living in Dulwich, it would have made sure that they continued to be hit the worst. Similarly to redirection, it would therefore predictably have fixed a highly unequal distribution of missile-related risks. Even worse, once we take into account that the terror bombings were expected to happen over a prolonged period of time, fixing the MPI at its current location was arguably worse from a risk-distributive perspective than redirecting the missiles. Redirecting the missiles meant attempting to shift the MPI over time, thus providing some predictable relief to those previously most affected. By contrast, attempting to fix the MPI in Dulwich would have meant attempting to concentrate all missile-related burdens in one specific area.⁵⁸ In addition, keeping the MPI in Dulwich would not have minimised expected losses, and would thus have failed to show equal concern in an aggregative sense. It does not follow, however, that keeping the MPI in Dulwich held zero moral appeal. In the next section, I suggest that its admittedly illusory appeal is best appreciated from a rights-based perspective.

(6) The Right to Life

One way of thinking about a state's responsibility to protect the lives of its citizens is in terms of rights. On a rights-based view, each citizen has a *right to life against the state*. This right is taken to have both a negative and a positive component. Negatively, the state must not kill or injure its citizens without due process.⁵⁹ Positively, it must protect its citizens against being

⁵⁷ I owe this formulation to Jeff McMahan.

⁵⁸ I thank Jeff McMahan and an anonymous referee for raising the issue of how missile-related risks would have been distributed over time.

⁵⁹ Griffin, 2008, p. 212.

killed or injured by other agents.⁶⁰ According to the rights-based view, the negative component of the right to life is significantly weightier than its positive component, so that there is a strong presumption against harming one's citizens even if doing so would be necessary to protect more numerous others. The idea behind strong negative rights is that it is appropriate to recognise each citizen as a separate person with "an inviolability [. . .] that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override."⁶¹ The rights-based view stresses that persons are rational beings with aspirations and interests of their own, and from this concludes that it is not straightforwardly admissible to harm one person for the greater benefit of others.

The logic behind stringent negative rights differs from the idea that a government should aspire to show a risk-distributively equal concern for the safety of all of its civilians. Whereas the latter speaks against protective measures that single out one group of civilians and place a significant risk of harm on them, thus making them worse off than others, the former introduces a *general presumption against the redistribution of harm*. If the War Cabinet's Ministers had been worried primarily about infringing their civilians' rights, they might have opposed protective measures such as anti-aircraft guns or barrage balloons on grounds that these infringe the rights of the inhabitants of rural South East England. But if anti-aircraft guns and barrage balloons were reasonably safe, and if it could be expected that using them would significantly reduce the risks that Londoners were exposed to, then considerations of risk-distributive equality spoke in favour of implementing them.

This is not to suggest that stringent negative rights rule out as impermissible most protective measures that considerations of risk-distributive equality speak in favour of. Instead, it is plausible that considerations of risk-distributive equality often provide the grounds for a *principled exception* to the general rule that civilians have a right not to be harmed for the benefit of others. To see why, note that even though I have plans and projects of my own, I can still recognise that a setback to my interests is morally appropriate if the sacrifice required of me is small in prospect, the expected benefit to others is large, and those whom I benefit are my equals. A protective measure might thus frequently *merely permissibly infringe* civilians' rights if it threatens harm while showing a risk-distributively equal concern.

From a rights-based perspective, what response to the German attack would have been most appropriate? To answer this question, we need to keep the negative component of the right to life apart from its positive component. This in turn requires drawing a morally relevant distinction between *doing harm* on the one hand, and *not protecting someone from harm*, or *merely allowing harm*, on the other hand. Yet this is a notoriously difficult task, and there is no generally agreed-upon way of going about it.⁶² In section 4 above, I have suggested that intuitively speaking, "keeping silent" appears closer to merely allowing harm than does "providing the double agents with instructions about what to report back to the enemy." But

⁶⁰ Locke, 1990, ch. IX.

⁶¹ Rawls, 1999, p. 3; see also Kamm, 1996, pp. 259-87.

⁶² See e.g. Kamm, 1996; Barry and Øverland, 2016.

even if this is correct, it is not easy to say what makes it correct, nor is it obvious in what respect "keeping silent" might be morally less problematic than "providing instructions."

One promising way of understanding the distinction as morally relevant is suggested by Frances Kamm. Kamm argues that it is a necessary feature of merely allowing harm that the victim whom an agent fails to protect is made no worse off relative to a counterfactual situation in which the agent is relevantly absent (with everything else held constant).⁶³ To Kamm, this feature---this "definitional property"⁶⁴ of merely allowing harm---mitigates the badness of failing to protect someone, as the agent's presence fails to make a negative difference for the victim. In cases where harm is done to the victim, the victim is usually made worse off than they would otherwise have been. In situations of doing harm where the victim is made no worse off than they would have been, this mitigates the badness of doing harm (just as it always mitigates the badness of failing to protect someone).

Applied to the historical case, Kamm's ideas suggest the following. If there was a response to the German attack that would have *closely mimicked what would have happened to Londoners had the authorities had no influence on the German calculations* via the double agents, then, other things equal, such a response would have been more attractive from a rights-based perspective. Such a "mimicking response" would in a crucial way have been more like a mere failure to protect than an infringement of civilians' rights not to be harmed.

At least on the face of it, one might think that keeping the MPI in Dulwich would have mimicked non-intervention. After all, by the time the Ministers were trying to decide on an appropriate response to the German attack, the MPI was known to lie in Dulwich. It was thus easy to presume that keeping the MPI in place meant reproducing the effects that a hands-off policy would have brought about. But this is mistaken. Somewhat counterintuitively, *confusing the enemy* and *remaining silent* are most likely the two strategies that would have best mimicked what would have happened in the absence of governmental involvement in the bombings. In section 3, I have suggested that if the British authorities had settled for confusion, the Germans would subsequently have started to give more weight to the reports of their non-turned spies, which would have started to look comparatively more informative. A similar argument applies to a situation where the British authorities would have ceased all communication with the enemy. Finally, had the British authorities had no way of influencing the German calculations, it seems just as likely that the Germans would have worked with whatever intelligence they would have received from their non-turned spies. It follows that from a rights-based perspective, confusion and keeping silent would at least in one key respect have been preferable to redirection.

This leaves us with the following interim result: the redirection strategy promised to minimise missile-related civilian casualties, and it did the most to safeguard the excellent reputation of the British double agents with their German contacts. Morally speaking, these

⁶³ Kamm, 1996, p. 31.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

points spoke in its favour. But the confusion strategy and the option to remain silent both showed more of an equal concern for the lives of all civilians, and, following Kamm, they were in one key respect closer to merely allowing harm as opposed to doing it. This rendered confusion and keeping silent comparatively more attractive. As for the choice between confusion and keeping silent, confusion clearly trumped keeping silent, as in addition to the advantages that the two strategies shared, confusion involved a morally valuable attempt to keep the double agents in play. The British authorities were thus justified in setting aside the option to keep silent. But how should they have decided between redirection and confusion, given the two strategies' different advantages? In the next section, I suggest that all things considered, it would have been right to settle for redirection over confusion.

(7) Incorporating the Redirection Strategy Into an Overall Response to the Bombings

An important worry that might have made the Ministers hesitant about redirection relates to class. South London used to be home to the poorer working classes; most politicians and their families would have lived north of the Thames. Moreover, if the Ministers had decided to redirect the buzz bombs, they would thereby have lowered the risk of such bombs falling in Whitehall---their place of work. The Ministers might therefore have feared that if they reached the conclusion to redirect the weapons, they might have been unduly influenced by self-interested motives. At the very least, they might have worried that if their decision ever became public, it would be perceived as unduly self-regarding.

The historical evidence suggests that such worries would have been justified. As the terror bombing of London dragged on, people living in the most affected areas started to become increasingly unnerved. Letters to newspaper editors grew full of complaints such as "if the weight of the attack had been falling on [...] Whitehall and Buckingham Palace, far more vigorous attempts would have been made to stop it", and "if Whitehall were in [Kent], these attacks would cease."⁶⁵ South Londoners thus felt that their government wasn't dealing with the threat because the buzz bombs *happened* to be falling in South London. Had they thought that the authorities were *actively keeping the buzz bombs away from themselves*, the South Londoners' dissatisfaction with their government would doubtlessly have been even more pronounced.

At core, it seems to me that the South Londoners were complaining that their distress was not taken seriously. They were confident that more could have been done to counter the German attack, and that more would have been done if the weight of the attack had fallen on a different part of London. We have no way of knowing whether the South Londoners' discontent with their government was justified. It is conceivable that short of winning the war, there was

⁶⁵ Campbell, 2012, p. 420.

no way of stopping the attacks. But for our purposes, it suffices that the South Londoners' complaints point to an important problem with the redirection strategy that we have not so far considered. The redirection strategy was an extremely effective way of containing the damage the V-weapons wreaked. To implement it was thus to take the edge of the German attack---for everyone except the people living south-east of Dulwich. In this way, there was a real danger that once the redirection strategy was in place, the German attack would no longer be regarded as an urgent issue in need of special attention over and above the attention devoted to ending the war. But this seems problematic. If things would in fact have turned out this way, the people living south-east of Dulwich would have had their interests sacrificed for everyone else's benefit in a way that seems irreconcilable with their standing as equal members of their society.

When we stop to think about it, these considerations suggest that the British authorities would have been able to mitigate the extent to which they would have shown unequal concern if they had settled for redirection.⁶⁶ To see what I mean, note that the general public probably would have---and rightly should have---held its government accountable only for the government's overall response to the attacks, and not for individual aspects of this response considered in isolation. Had the British authorities decided to redirect the buzz bombs while simultaneously committing themselves to eliminating the German missile threat as a matter of utmost priority, I believe they would thereby have diminished the unequal concern that implementing the redirection strategy showed.⁶⁷

While it should thus have been possible to mitigate the extent to which redirection showed unequal concern, redirecting the missiles had a further disadvantage. Compared to the confusion strategy, the harmful effects that it would have helped bring about would have been closer to harm that the British authorities inflicted on their civilians as opposed to merely allowed to occur. At least from a rights-based perspective and if other things are equal, this spoke in favour of confusion over redirection. But, crucially, other things were not equal between the two options. Missile-related casualties were on expectation much lower if the redirection strategy was implemented, and redirection did more to safeguard the reputation of the double agents for further deception projects. Redirection moreover helped protect critical infrastructure in Central London, thus facilitating the British war effort. All of these considerations were morally significant. Compared to confusion, redirecting the missiles while ensuring that the elimination of the overall threat remained a priority would thus likely have been a morally preferable---though necessarily imperfect---response to the German attack.

⁶⁶ As argued in section 5 above, shifting the MPI from Dulwich towards previously less affected areas was plausibly consistent with showing a risk-distributively equal concern, and this made redirection more attractive than keeping the MPI in Dulwich. But had redirection been implemented, and had the bombings continued to go on once the MPI was kept in place south-east of Dulwich, worries of unequal concern would have resurfaced, and would have become more pronounced over time.

⁶⁷ Cf. Lenman, 2008, pp. 109-10.

(8) Conclusion

The redirection strategy was a prudent and effective protective measure. Adopting it promised to save many civilian lives, to prevent thousands of serious injuries, and to reduce the risk of damage to critical infrastructure---all while securing the excellent reputation that the British double agents enjoyed with their German controllers. But for all these advantages, it also showed a risk-distributively unequal concern. To redirect the missiles was to single out a specific part of the population to bear the brunt of the German attack. This made redirection morally problematic, as a government owes its duties of protection equally to all of its citizens.

By contrast, adopting the confusion strategy would not have shown unequal concern. In addition, the harm that confusion would have brought about would have been closer to harm that the British authorities merely allowed to occur as opposed to helped bring about. From a rights-based perspective and if other things are equal, merely allowing harm is easier to justify than bringing it about. But in the case at hand, other things were not equal. Confusion was much riskier and potentially much more harmful than redirection. This makes it plausible to assume that with suitable accompanying measures, redirection could have formed part of a morally optimal response to the German attack, and would as part of such a response have been morally justified.

Many of the moral principles and concepts discussed in this paper are defended within the moral philosophical literature that makes heavy use of hypothetical cases. It is clear that the historical case presented in this paper cannot be subsumed under any one particular such principle or concept. Yet once these principles and concepts are taken together and applied thoughtfully, they can nevertheless help us gain a better understanding of what was morally at stake in the decision that the British authorities faced. Of course, one might worry that my case study does not do enough to show that case-based moral theorising passes the test of practical applicability. After all, the historical case that I discuss is relatively circumscribed and clear-cut; many real-life situations are much more messy and complex than what I describe. This worry seems to me well-founded. As I see it, further work is needed to help us gain an improved understanding of the opportunities and problems that we face when we try to apply insights from case-based moral theorising to real-world issues.

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