Brave new world: debt, industrialization and security in China–Africa relations

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China’s ties with the African continent, the economic origins of which lie in the former’s search for resources in the late twentieth century, are evolving into a multifaceted relationship of increasing complexity. After nearly two decades of debt-financed infrastructure development led by Chinese policy banks—institutions set up specifically to implement the government’s economic policies**{1}—**Beijing’s exposure to African debt is reaching disquieting proportions, amounting to an estimated US$143 billion in 2017.[[1]](#footnote-1) Managing this new role as Africa’s creditor poses unprecedented challenges for Beijing, as well as uncomfortable questions for creditor and debtors alike. Concurrently, the quiet surge of Chinese investment in manufacturing and assembly plants in Africa is transforming local economies in ways that, should the trend continue, are on course to fundamentally alter the continent’s position within the international political economy. Finally, the proliferation of over 10,000 Chinese businesses operating across the continent, coupled with the ebb and flow of more than a million Chinese migrants, is raising persistent security concerns for Beijing.[[2]](#footnote-2) In the face of threats ranging from everyday crime to civil unrest and terrorism, Beijing finds itself in the unenviable position of having to protect its far-flung companies and citizens with only limited capacity.

Developments in each of these areas challenge what were in effect core principles or practices that guided interactions between China and Africa in the formative decades of the relationship. For instance, under the banner of offering an alternative to western policies China promoted (and African governments celebrated) the absence of conditionalities attached to its concessional loans and aid grants. Equally, the promotion of industrialization in African economies, and the offshoring to those countries**{2}** of labour-intensive manufacturing, mark a key shift away from China’s hitherto dominant resource-centric engagement with the continent. Also, from a different angle, in the case of security, the Chinese government has been emphatic in stating that its approach to Africa would never involve intervention in domestic affairs, as had been the practice of western powers.**{3}** As such, all the structural changes under way are profound in their impact, will require the concerted application of policy resources from China, and have the potential to recast the character of China–Africa ties in the coming years.

**China as creditor**

China’s status as a global economic power is founded on its role as a manufacturing and services hub, and on its growing prowess in technological innovation, but is fundamentally underwritten by the country’s huge financial reserves. Currently estimated to be over US$3.06 trillion, this financial wellspring gives Chinese economic statecraft the necessary scope to be an extraordinarily effective lender across a range of sectors, countries and risk profiles.[[3]](#footnote-3) This economic statecraft, as scholars like David Lampton and William Norris have pointed out, is an integral part of the regime’s grand strategy, which relies on its use of financial instruments and other economic factors to give target countries, companies and sectors ample incentives to support Beijing’s foreign policy aims.[[4]](#footnote-4) Loans, particularly concessional loans, are in this respect a key instrument for securing access to needed resources and providing credit for infrastructure development built principally by Chinese construction firms.

Between 2000 and 2011, Beijing’s policy banks advanced US$53.4 billion in concessional loans and lines of credit to 43 African countries, much of it to underbanked**{4}** countries in the developing world and the bulk of it destined to be spent in paying Chinese companies to build necessary infrastructure through engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) project contracting in those same places.[[5]](#footnote-5) This trend accelerated after 2012, bringing Africa’s debt to China sharply up to US$143 billion by 2017,[[6]](#footnote-6) as noted above, with loans provided by the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export–Import (EXIM) Bank of China reaching US$35.5 billion and US$55.7 billion respectively.[[7]](#footnote-7) This represents roughly 22.9 per cent of China’s total external loans and a similar percentage (22 per cent or so**{5}**) of Africa’s entire external debts (see figure 1). Considering the volume of Chinese loans to Africa extended in the past decade, as well as the usual grace period of up to seven years (for concessional loans) before capital repayments begin to fall due**{6}**, this means that the coming decade will become a period of concentrated demand on African debtors to start servicing the principal**{7}** to China. Unfortunately, the collapse of commodity prices in 2014 and the slow pace of recovery ever since has put immediate pressure on African governments, with median debt rising from 30 per cent of GDP in 2012 to 50 per cent in 2017, to find ways of addressing payment shortfalls or delays as they struggled to meet their financial obligations.[[8]](#footnote-8)

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Although most Chinese loans have focused on the African infrastructure and power sectors, which are indispensable to Africa’s long-term industrialization and economic growth, the short-term pressure of mounting external debt in some African countries calls for urgent attention to solutions from all the continent’s creditors. China’s management of African debt repayment, against this backdrop, has become an untested component of the mutual relationship. It seems too soon for China to launch large-scale debt restructuring,[[9]](#footnote-9) since, despite the rising risks, African debts have not yet reached an uncontrollable, ‘crisis’ level.[[10]](#footnote-10) That said, China will have to start taking measures to alleviate the debt burden of African countries in general, and those that are heavily indebted to China in particular, in order to avoid a potential crisis on the African side and financial losses to itself. There are a couple of options that China has already taken or considered.

The first is cancellation of select financial liabilities. In response to the debt distress of Mozambique, intensified by its default in early 2017—the first sovereign debt default in Africa since Côte d’Ivoire’s in 2011—China decided to waive four loans, totalling US$36 million, due for repayment by the end of the year;[[11]](#footnote-11) and at the seventh summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in September 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping further declared that all interest-free loans owed by the LDCs, HIPCs, LDDCs and SIDS in Africa due by the end of that year were to be waived.[[12]](#footnote-12) Notably, however, the debt cancellation option offered by the Chinese government has until now only applied to interest-free loans, which comprise a relatively minor percentage of its total loans to Africa.[[13]](#footnote-13)

The second option, which as yet has not materialized, is to provide short-term refinancing arrangements to African countries with payment difficulties. Chinese investors in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, have been discussing the possibility of asking the CDB to exchange its old loans to DRC**{8}** for a new, three- to five-year debt in order to allow Kinshasa more time to recover its economy and repay the funds.[[14]](#footnote-14) Whether this proposed option might work, however, has much to do with the debtors’ economic prospects in the short term—the refinancing arrangement for Mozambique set up by western banks, for instance, did not pull the country from the brink of default. In a broader sense, the new pledges of development finance totalling US$60 billion from China in the autumn of 2018 may also be regarded as a sort of refinancing;[[15]](#footnote-15) but again, while this may bail out those countries that are already on the right track of economic transformation and only in a temporary financial difficulty, it will not change much—and may even worsen debt distress—for those that have not already shown promising signs of economic growth and debt servicing.

In instances of the latter kind, China may choose to withhold additional funds and, in extreme cases, insist on the monitoring of compliance by Chinese officials. Zimbabwe provides an example of both of these policies. President Mugabe’s effort to raise US$27 billion for a recovery programme for the country resulted in a commitment of US$4 billion from Beijing in 2014 that, as of 2018**{9}**, was still to be implemented. Indeed, such was the apparent fear in Beijing of losing finance to local corruption—and the continued inability of Zimbabwe to pay back its existing outstanding US$60 million debt to China—that it insisted on the placement of Chinese officials directly into positions within the Zimbabwean government and parastatal offices to provide oversight and engineer reforms to management procedures, arousing resentment within elements of the Zimbabwean governing party ZANU-PF.[[16]](#footnote-16)

This in turn may also pose a dilemma for China in having to choose between financing the ‘traditional’ infrastructure and power sectors, which despite their fundamental importance cannot yield quick economic returns, and financing productive sectors such as mining and manufacturing, which are more likely to generate money for the host country and repay the debts (we will return to this point below). The Chinese government, therefore, may have to make more cautious decisions this time around in how it disperses the US$60 billion announced for the coming three years in order to protect the interests of both the debtors and itself as creditor.

In more urgent cases, the Chinese government may not be able to avoid the option of rescheduling the debts of those countries that simply cannot afford the payments. Sudan, for instance, during its severe economic crisis in 2012, secured a five-year delay on its debts to China;[[17]](#footnote-17) and Zambia, caught in a critical debt situation since 2018 and owing 30 per cent of its total US$9.3 billion external debt to China, has also been actively engaging with China in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of its debt.[[18]](#footnote-18) At the FOCAC summit in September 2018, Ethiopia became the first among China’s top African debtors to secure a rescheduling deal, allowing it to enjoy a further 20-year extension on some of its debts to China (including loans totalling US$4 billion for the flagship Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway project).[[19]](#footnote-19)

Finally, as a complementary method, the Chinese government has also started to adopt some policies promoting use of the renminbi in Africa. To date, China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with a few African countries such as South Africa (2015) and Egypt (2016), the most recent being with Nigeria, in the form of a US$2.5 billion deal**{10}** for three years signed in April 2018.[[20]](#footnote-20) Although this is not a direct debt reorganizing arrangement, it will help increase the short-term liquidity of Nigeria’s financial markets, avoid risks associated with exchange rate fluctuation, and facilitate bilateral trade and investment. To this end, 14 African countries—including top debtors to China such as Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe—met in Harare in May 2018 to discuss the feasibility of adopting the Chinese renminbi as one of their reserve currencies. Doing so would would open up the opportunity of expanding exports to China and repaying the liabilities directly in Chinese currency.

Despite some initial counter-measures already being taken or considered, as noted above, there are still a few potential challenges for China in dealing this ‘new’ issue in handling debts with its African partners. First of all, as an emerging and relatively inexperienced creditor, China will have to learn, act and adapt quickly in order to handle its debt relations with dozens of countries properly while managing to maintain, if possible, its distinctive approach that differentiates it from traditional western creditors. For now, China does not have a comprehensive external debt management system, including a workable debt sustainability evaluation framework, or a unified debt restructuring mechanism for its external borrowers. There have been no stipulations relating to the circumstances in which loans may be advanced or the qualifications of debtors, nor any specific rules as to when and how to apply debt relief, refinancing, rescheduling or other arrangements. This lack of definition may result in a slow, non-uniform, non-transparent response to debt restructuring needs and put strains on the bilateral/multilateral relations between China and different African states.

To date, China has not been deeply involved in international debt restructuring negotiations led by the Paris Club or multilateral creditors such as the World Bank and IMF. Although China acknowledges and has adopted concepts such as the HIPCs that were proposed by the traditional lenders, it does not apply the rules of the latter in terms of debt restructurings, which often involve additional conditionality, nor has it engaged much in the debt restructuring talks they have held.[[21]](#footnote-21) As the sums advanced in loans to Africa mount, China may need to open up and talk to other lending partners (not least in the interests of the debtors, which may otherwise not be able to get further loans or necessary restructuring deals from their traditional creditors); and it remains a question as to what extent China will be able to maintain some of its long-held positions, given the pressures that may come to bear from multilateral negotiations or concern for financial losses.

Second, the dangers of sovereign default and the resultant seizure of assets (and resources[[22]](#footnote-22)) in lieu of payment would test China–Africa relations. The potential debt-for-equity option, while a typical response to corporate defaults, is more alarming to sovereign debtors. The Hanbamtota Harbour case in Sri Lanka touches a nerve in this respect, giving rise to speculation as to what might happen to African countries in debt distress on a similar scale.[[23]](#footnote-23) In July 2017, an agreement was signed between the Sri Lankan government and CMPort (China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited), a state-owned Chinese company, granting the latter a 99-year lease of the harbour,[[24]](#footnote-24) at a cost of around US$1 billion in rent. Some observers conjectured that the Sri Lankan government, which was in a debt distress situation, ‘sold’ the harbour in order to repay its debts to China.[[25]](#footnote-25) A point lost in the politically charged debate is that Chinese debt represents only 10 per cent of Sri Lanka’s total external debts.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Against this backdrop of growing controversy around the ‘debt-for-equity’ option, it seems less likely to be adopted by the Chinese government in future dealings with its external debtors, particularly those in Africa. That said, although it may not be directly linked to debt servicing, a new trend among Chinese companies that are involved in the infrastructure and power sectors (where the majority of African sovereign debts to China are located) is to change their role from *contractors* on the previously dominant EPC model to *operators*  and *investors* on the BOT/BOOT model.[[27]](#footnote-27) The ‘6+2’ model of the Addis–Djibouti railway and the ‘5+5’ model of the Mombasa–Nairobi railway are cases in point. If equity investment, regarded by China as the future direction for financing in Africa,[[28]](#footnote-28) could gradually overtake traditional loans as one of the main financing methods, especially in the infrastructure and power sectors, this may help alleviate the dilemma posed by the combination of the need for infrastructure development and deepening debt difficulties. Notably, this would entail a partial transfer of risks to the Chinese companies; and it is also not clear whether nationalist sentiments will still come into play when long-term operation concessions are involved, as in the Hanbamtota case.

**Industrializing Africa**

As African economies came to demonstrate sustained higher growth rates and two-way trade with China grew proportionally, the debate on the relationship between the two sides came to focus strongly on economic complementarities between them and Africa’s integration into global value chains. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and China’s rise to become the world’s second largest economy, scholars such as Justin Yifu Lin articulated a vision of a new structural development economics based on strategic state-led policy planning, calibrated to infrastructure expansion and mediating the allocation of resources through market forces. Africans, awakening belatedly to the opportunity offered by ‘looking east’, scrambled to attract Chinese financial support and experience for their ambitious industrialization plans. Continental planning scenarios such as Agenda 2063**{11}**, echoed at the regional and national levels, place structural transformation and industrial strategies at the heart of African development aims. As the African industrialization process intensified, so China’s key role in development finance and its experience in key sectors put it in a crucial position to promote this new phase of development on the continent.

By now, African states pursuing an industrialization agenda largely follow two broad lines (or a combination of the two) of development: mining-based structural transformation, adopted by countries such as Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia, which focuses on using the comparative advantage that lies in their energy or mineral resources and developing downstream manufacturing (often heavy) industries; and manufacturing-led structural transformation, adopted by Cameroon, Ethiopia and Senegal, which often starts with light industries that rely less on energy/mineral resources and more on abundant human resources. China, on the other hand, has targeted high-end manufacturing as the new engine of economic growth, and accordingly attaches great importance to so-called ‘industrial capacity cooperation’ (henceforth ‘industrial cooperation’) with other states in the world.[[29]](#footnote-29) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Africa, considered its natural extension, play a significant role within this context as the destination of Chinese overseas contracting and outward investment, motivated by a desire to transfer its surplus industrial capacity, cultivate multinational companies and establish global value chains. As the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has noted, one of the new features of China–Africa cooperation will be a shift from commodity trade to industrial cooperation and processing trade.[[30]](#footnote-30)

In industrial cooperation with Africa, as with other BRI partners, infrastructure, power, mining (including oil and gas) and manufacturing have been targeted as the four main areas of focus.[[31]](#footnote-31) In terms of infrastructure and power, overseas project contracting remains the dominant form of engagement, notwithstanding the recent emergence of other forms. Chinese project contracting in Africa has grown dramatically in the past two decades,[[32]](#footnote-32) to levels against which Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa pales in comparison (see figure 2). While any large-scale project contracting in infrastructure and power is bound to increase the debt burden of African countries, these initiatives clearly pave the way for the continent’s industrialization, in accordance with its declared agenda. Indeed, as many observers have pointed out, the major obstacle facing manufacturing in Africa is the persistent lack, on a huge scale, of infrastructure and power across the continent.[[33]](#footnote-33) The resolution of the infrastructure–debt dilemma will reside in decision-making by African states in conjunction with key external partners—prominent among them, China.[[34]](#footnote-34)

<figure 2 near here>

Chinese investment in mining overseas, furthermore, aligns with the industrialization agenda of the continent, especially for those countries involved in the mining-based approach outlined above. Indeed, despite their rich endowments of mineral resources, several of these states remain underdeveloped owing to shortfalls in capital and technology (as for example in the metals sector in Nigeria), and FDI in mining is still very welcome in many African countries. That said, mining activities, which represented around one-quarter of total Chinese FDI by 2016**{12}**,[[35]](#footnote-35) have seldom developed down the value chain into host countries’ resource-processing and related manufacturing sectors, with a few exceptions such as Sudan and South Sudan.[[36]](#footnote-36) Given the still immature governance structure of mining in many resource-rich countries in Africa, investment in mining activities *per se* may bring considerable economic revenue to host governments but contribute less to manufacturing capability-building and thus structural transformation in those countries, or to other key benefits from development such as job creation. Youth employment, for example, is a priority particularity in middle-income (often resource-rich) African countries with high rates of urban joblessness or underemployment.[[37]](#footnote-37)

It is worth noting that in all the sectors discussed above, infrastructure, power and mining, China has sought to learn and to adapt its recent large-scale projects on the continent, especially at the level of financing institutions (e.g. CDB and EXIM Bank of China) and state-owned companies, partly in response to criticisms of its ignorance in respect of social and environmental impacts at earlier states. In the Mombasa–Nairobi railway project, for instance, while it is impossible to avoid all controversy in such a huge project, compounded by complicated local politics, the China Road and Bridge Corporation has largely accomplished its project aims, in part owing to its skilful minimizing of the potential negative impacts in terms of issues to do with local sourcing, land questions, labour employment and particularly environmental (in this case wild animal) protection.[[38]](#footnote-38)

As for those African countries pursuing the manufacturing-led industrialization approach, China’s push to upgrade its domestic manufacturing structures and the concomitant need to transfer surplus manufacturing capacity in industries where it has a comparative advantage,[[39]](#footnote-39) either by value-chain FDI or by equipment exports, offers the potential opportunity to benefit from an influx of Chinese finance, technology and experience. Justin Yifu Lin argues, indeed, that African countries should seize the opportunities offered by the relocation of labour-intensive industries by China now, just as China itself did in the 1980s, thereby successfully kicking off the structural change process.[[40]](#footnote-40) There are also hopes that, by strengthening integration into Chinese-led global value chains, African producers will expand their opportunities to tap into market access in China (and elsewhere).[[41]](#footnote-41)

The fact that a resource-scarce country like Ethiopia stood among the top destinations for Chinese FDI**{13}**, with approximately two-thirds of that investment having gone to the manufacturing sector,[[42]](#footnote-42) confirms the trend of ‘co-transformation’: that is, industrial cooperation that serves both Africa’s industrial development and China’s industrial upgrading. That said, the proportion of manufacturing investment in China’s total FDI in Africa overall is still low, at about 12.8 per cent in 2016.**{14}**[[43]](#footnote-43) While this low level is partially attributable to the industrialization approaches adopted by different African countries**{15}**, the lack of basic infrastructure, power facilities and production support services such as logistics play a significant role in discouraging foreign investors, outweighing the advantage of low-cost labour.[[44]](#footnote-44) A number of other inhibiting factors often cited—the shortage of foreign exchange, fluctuation of exchange rates, inconsistency of tax policies, uncertainty concerning the political situation—further compound the business environment and make investors hesitant about investing in Africa. The newly established China–Africa Fund of Industrial Cooperation (CAFIC), for instance, though endowed with a significant mandate to promote Chinese manufacturing investment in Africa, has confined its activities largely to traditional areas (infrastructure, power and mining), owing to the lack of suitable—for example, economically viable and relatively large-scale—manufacturing projects available.[[45]](#footnote-45)

In this context, Chinese overseas economic and trade cooperation zones (OETCZs), a programme formally launched by Chinese government in 2008,[[46]](#footnote-46) have developed into a comprehensive instrument of China’s industrial cooperation. Over the past decade, China has built around 100 OETCZs (sometimes referred to as SEZs or special economic zones), with a large majority located along the BRI and around 25 in Africa.[[47]](#footnote-47) Although the first of these Chinese ‘industrial parks’ in Africa can be dated back to 2006, they have had a long gestation period owing to slow infrastructure construction and tepid investment interest by Chinese firms, financial constraints, and often complicated (and inefficient) interaction with African local partners, as well as sometimes arcane disputes between Chinese actors.[[48]](#footnote-48) More recently, a number of them are now better developed, and this model is likely to become an increasingly important platform for attracting Chinese firms seeking to move their production lines out to Africa. Offering established infrastructure and facilities, as well as the positive ‘industrial cluster’ effect, among other benefits, these Chinese SEZs in Africa may provide significant facilitation to attract Chinese (and other foreign) manufacturing investors to the continent.[[49]](#footnote-49)

**Seeking security in Africa**

In *Wolf Warrior II*, released in 2017 and the highest-grossing film in Chinese history, the Rambo-like Leng Feng leads a rescue mission to save Chinese and African workers being held hostage by militants and western mercenaries in what appears to be a Chinese industrial park in an unnamed African country.[[50]](#footnote-50) The Chinese navy eventually becomes involved, operating under the auspices of the UN and in support of the beleaguered African leader, moving decisively into the unnamed African country to re-establish order. The note on which the film closes, much remarked upon by western scholars, is the stirring nationalist assertion that the ‘motherland’ will back its citizens, no matter where they reside. *Wolf Warrior II*, which played to rapturous audiences in China and abroad, tells us something about the evolving boundaries of the security relationship between China and Africa. Though obviously fictional, it reflects a perception that Chinese intervention in support of its citizens and economic interests—involving private security personnel and with the clear endorsement of the UN—is no longer taboo.

In fact, it was inevitable that China’s deepening engagement in African economies would thrust security to the forefront of its Africa policy. Hostage-taking by aggrieved separatists in regions as distant from one another as the Sahel, where attacks have been aimed at Chinese by Islamist militants, and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia underscore the vulnerability of Chinese companies and their personnel.[[51]](#footnote-51) Much more pervasive, and equally worrying for Chinese communities across the continent, is the targeting of Chinese residents by criminals who see them as relatively soft targets for blackmail and robbery.[[52]](#footnote-52) Crimes against Chinese nationals and firms—committed by Africans but also by Chinese—have surged in countries including Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, where significant Chinese communities have taken up residence in recent decades.[[53]](#footnote-53) The response has been twofold, with the Chinese government having since 2012 articulated a set of policy initiatives aimed at strengthening multilateral and bilateral security cooperation and, concurrently, Chinese firms and communities embarking on their own private initiatives.

Multilateral peacekeeping and security cooperation in Africa have featured formally on the Chinese**{16}** agenda since the FOCAC meeting of September 2012. Its**{17}** gradualist approach to peacekeeping, which began in earnest with the deployment of Chinese engineering and medical units to UN missions from 1999, eventually expanded into non-combatant roles in peacekeeping missions in DRC, Liberia and Sudan in 2003.[[54]](#footnote-54) Growing in confidence and experience, by 2013 Chinese peacekeeping troops were for the first time assigned combat-ready roles in UN operations in Mali and in South Sudan. Xi Jinping’s announcement at the UN in September 2015 of a US$1 billion commitment to the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, coupled with a US$10 million commitment to the African Union’s peace and security programmes and a further expansion of the number of Chinese peacekeeping troops, underscores the scale of Beijing’s intensifying involvement in this sphere.[[55]](#footnote-55) The establishment and subsequent expansion of the Chinese military base in Djibouti from 2015, the country’s first permanent overseas presence, is rightly seen as issuing directly from these security concerns.

More localized and immediate security concerns drive the agenda of Chinese enterprises, who look to private security firms for the protection they need. Like their corporate counterparts from the West, leading state-owned enterprises and private businesses alike have made increasing use of such firms, concluding contracts with Chinese, western and even African private security firms. Former soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have themselves set up private security companies such as DeWe which have been providing protection for Chinese companies operating in South Sudan and elsewhere around and beyond the continent since as long ago as 2004.[[56]](#footnote-56) Other firms, among them Shandong Huawei in 2014, have approached South African security firms to handle their concerns.[[57]](#footnote-57) Indeed, according to Chinese officials, as of 2017 there were 3,200 employees**{18}** of Chinese security firms working outside the country, though their legal status at home restricts their use of weapons abroad.[[58]](#footnote-58) The opening of offices in Hong Kong in 2013 by Erik Prince, founder of the private security firm Blackwater, suggests that another form of security cooperation is in the offing. Co-owned by the iconic Chinese conglomerate CITIC, Prince’s Frontier Services Company joins a growing number of western private security firms working with the Chinese in parts of Africa and beyond on the protection of firms and maritime security.[[59]](#footnote-59)

At the other end of the spectrum, Chinese communities unsettled by crime are being driven to make arrangements to protect themselves. In South Africa, where pervasive crime has resulted in the deaths of 20 Chinese nationals every year**{19}**, local representatives have since 2004 made special arrangements to create community policing forums that can liaise between the local police and Chinese residents in the area.[[60]](#footnote-60) So far, 13 Chinese community and police cooperation centres have been established across the country, designed to facilitate improved engagement through language training and outreach programmes.[[61]](#footnote-61) These arrangements are part of a growing international trend that has seen Chinese police on patrol in some European countries, such as Italy and Croatia, with the aim of protecting the rising numbers of Chinese tourists and residents.[[62]](#footnote-62) Donations and financial support for police often feature in efforts to build capacity and goodwill between Chinese communities and local police services in other parts of Africa.[[63]](#footnote-63) In Zambia, efforts to bring Chinese nationals directly into the police force in late 2017, aimed at improving links with the growing community there, were jettisoned after public outcry.[[64]](#footnote-64)

At the same time, the conduct of some members of Africa’s Chinese communities is producing its own headaches for Beijing. For instance, the explosion of the illegal wildlife trade, fuelled in part by Chinese criminal gangs in collusion with corrupt local officials, has compelled Beijing (and Hong Kong) police to launch cooperative initiatives with local law enforcement bodies.[[65]](#footnote-65) China’s public commitment to ending the trade in ivory, enshrined in FOCAC declarations since 2015, has resulted in the seizure and burning of ivory stocks in China as well as cooperation on closing down markets in the country. Chinese criminal gangs involved in other areas of illegal activity are also being targeted by local and Chinese police forces. For instance, in 2012, 37 Chinese criminals reported by Xinhua News to be implicated in ‘kidnapping, robbery, blackmail, human trafficking and forcing women into prostitution’ were arrested and deported from Angola in a joint operation between the Ministry of State Security**{20}** and local police.[[66]](#footnote-66) In Ghana, widely publicized clashes between local communities and Chinese engaged in illegal mining in 2013 resulted in 161 Chinese citizens being deported in collaboration with Chinese police.[[67]](#footnote-67) And in Kenya, 30 Chinese implicated in cybercrimes were deported to China in 2015.[[68]](#footnote-68)

**The brave new world of China–Africa relations**

The signs of a shift in China–Africa relations are already evident. The emerging areas of debt, industrialization and security are indicative not only of the deepening of China’s engagement in the continent but also of the accompanying challenges facing Beijing as it seeks to maintain its image as a different kind of development partner, an alternative choice for Africa.[[69]](#footnote-69)

At the seventh FOCAC summit in Beijing in September 2018, President Xi was at pains to point out that Beijing was no longer willing to uncritically finance African ‘vanity projects’.[[70]](#footnote-70) What the Chinese government seems intent on doing, as indicated in the latest series of public announcements, is to limit its further exposure to African sovereign debt. At the same time, the Chinese government may have to start dealing with the existing African debts as well as developing a more established framework for providing, supervising and managing development finance to Africa in the future. Given that creditor conduct is seen to touch directly upon core issues of African sovereignty, Beijing’s management of this issue is being watched closely. Thus the most significant impact of China’s role as creditor is made not so much in the content of negotiations on debt repayments or management of future loans, but rather in the longer-term influence that these arrangements have on China’s image in and relationships with Africa.

Linked to the debt debate is China’s insistence that the ultimate solution to Africa’s debt problems should be sought in the self-propelled and sustainable development of African economies;[[71]](#footnote-71) to this end, industrial capacity cooperation plays an essential role in helping to accelerate the economic transformation of the continent. However, the often immature business environment will continue to test the patience of Chinese firms and financial institutions and their willingness to seriously engage in African productive sectors such as downstream mining and manufacturing, rather than the government-backed infrastructure and power sectors—particularly when opportunities are increasingly opening up for them in the BRI countries. In the absence of structural transformation through industrialization, whether or not induced through Chinese incentives and complemented by African policies, China–Africa economic relations are likely to be stuck in the traditionally dominant mode of resource exchange.

Finally, the deepening of China–Africa relations is significant for the complex and troubling area of peace and security on the continent. Chinese involvement in multilateral peacekeeping, particularly Beijing’s financial support for current and continuing missions, is indeed welcome and laudable. Notwithstanding the preliminary rollout of joint policing centres and other forms of security cooperation, Beijing’s response to an acute crisis in Africa that endangers Chinese economic interests and citizens—and the potential fallout that that might have at home—has yet to be fully tested. The volatile combination of conflict and intervention, undoubtedly played out live through social media, will at the very least give policy-makers and their domestic audiences in both China and Africa pause to reflect upon the depth of their security commitments.

In all three areas examined here, profound changes to the relationship are under way. They are in some respects contradictory, challenging key policy assumptions like the often-declared absence of conditionalities and commitment to non-interference which guided China–Africa relations in their first decades. At the core is a shift away from the heady rhetoric of Chinese engagement framed as an alternative to the traditional western powers towards the stance of a power in the midst of redefining its place within the international system as a global leader. This transformation manifests itself, in African eyes, not so much as a rebalancing of a relationship that continues to hold much promise but more as a shift in a relationship that is now subject to more conventional power constraints—perhaps a ‘new normal’.

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12. LDCs: less developed countries; HIPCs: highly indebted poor countries; LDDCs: least developed developing countries; SIDS: small island developing states. This is the fifth time during the seven FOCAC summits held since 2000 that China has announced debt cancellation to African countries (previous occasions were in 2000, 2006, 2009 and 2015). See https://www.focac.org/eng/. According to the latest data available, the total volume of the forgiven debts was around ¥19 billion by 2009. See the white paper on China’s foreign aid released by the Chinese government in 2011.**{?}** [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Interest-free loans are advanced by the Chinese government mostly to support public facilities and people’s welfare projects in the recipient countries. According to the most recent official data available, interest-free loans represented only 8.1% of the Chinese government’s total external development financing during the years 2010–12 (grants accounted for 36.2% and concessional loans 55.7%). See the white paper on China’s foreign aid, 2011, 2014.**{?}** [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
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