Hannah Baumeister

*Department of Gender Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK*

h.baumeister@lse.ac.uk

**Drawing on Genocide**

**Abstract**

After the Second World War, representatives of the Allied powers developed an international legal definition of genocide. It precisely defines the necessary state of mind, genocidal acts and modes of agency or commission, determining which experiences are recognised and which harms are made visible. However, this abstract and clinical definition and its application do not convey the complexities of genocide. This potentially leads to inadequate responses that call the justice system into question. Artistic representations such as Jean-Philippe Strassen’s graphic novel *Deogratias: A Tale of Rwanda* approach genocide in a more nuanced way. They communicate what cannot be communicated in criminal law and retributive justice processes. This way, they challenge the victim–perpetrator dichotomy, the lack of concern for offenders, the focus on violent acts rather than their consequences, and time limits for investigation and prosecution. In doing so, artistic representations can contribute to more appropriate responses to genocide and post-conflict reconciliation.

Keywords: Deogratias, genocide, graphic novel, Rwanda.

**Introduction**

Following centuries of tension, violence and conflict, genocide broke out in Rwanda in April 1994. In three months, 1 million people are estimated to have been killed and 150,000 - 200,000 women to have been raped. Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutu were the main victims. Hutu politicians, soldiers, paramilitary, members of the police, militiasand ordinary citizens were among the perpetrators.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Many have attempted to represent the atrocities. Lawyers, for example, applied the international legal definition of the crime of genocide to the Rwandan case. Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.[[2]](#footnote-2)

As two of the five modes of agency or commission, Article 3 makes the act of genocide itself as well as direct and public incitement to commit genocide punishable.[[3]](#footnote-3) While the drafters of the Convention developed a precise definition of the crime of genocide, contentious issues remain. They include the range of protected groups, the necessary extent and type of their destruction and who can be held responsible for it.[[4]](#footnote-4) This indicates that law determines which experiences are recognised and which harms are made visible, which particularities are made universal. It also indicates that law focuses on clear cut distinctions and moral binaries that represent a simplified reality of genocide. This potentially leads to inadequate responses that call the justice system into question.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Art and literature[[6]](#footnote-6) offer alternative, more nuanced stories that convey complex experiences that are not always representable in law. Therefore, they challenge the legal discourse. Taken together in the form of graphic novels, they have the potential to communicate the unrepresentable and unspeakable and to offer socio-cultural and moral insights. They can create greater recognition of the dynamics and consequences of atrocity crimes, including the costs of surviving. Consequently, they can inspire more adequate and just outcomes for survivors. Graphic novels confront and challenge the reader to try to understand events and bear witness. They facilitate learning about others to appreciate differences and identify injustice and intolerance. They can motivate a wide range of readers to act for a better world.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Jean-Philippe Strassen’s graphic novel *Deogratias: A Tale of Rwanda*[[8]](#footnote-8) addresses the subject of the Rwandan genocide by describing the life of the teenage Hutu boy Deogratias, who witnessed and perpetrated the rapes and killings of his Tutsi friends Apollinaria and Benina and their mother Venetia. The focus, however, does not lie on the events in April 1994. The storyline before the genocide centres on inter-ethnic relationships. In its aftermath, the Belgian author problematises the victim-perpetrator dichotomy by emphasising Deogratias’ ways of coping. In doing so, he also highlights difficulties regarding reconciliation. Based on months of investigative journalism in Rwanda, Strassen shows how and why genocide is committed, its wider context and enabling environment, to facilitate a deeper understanding of its causes and survivors’ experiences.[[9]](#footnote-9)

This article will explore how the above-mentioned elements of the genocide definition were addressed in *Deogratias*. A humanities-based approach to the rational, legal definition of genocide can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of it. Retributive criminal law searches for, and claims to establish, *the one* factual truth about an event to establish with certainty who the victims and perpetrators were, to punish the latter and to deter future harm to the former as well as others. However, a situation is always seen through a particular lens. Like any law, the definition of genocide is a social construct that was created by particular actors at a particular time. Therefore, it has a particular truth behind it. And just like its creation, its interpretation, application and enforcement are not neutral and objective. *The one* truth does not exist. In the ideal world of law, technical, specialised forms of knowledge and formal, factual testimonies establish the official story of events. In the real world of law, legal knowledge and testimonies are often politicised and used for political ends. Neither fully captures the nuances and complexities of survivors’ experiences of atrocities. Exploring the genocide definition through the medium of graphic novels can bring insights into different ways of knowing that do not solely depend on logic, rationality and politics but also on the authors’ and readers’ subjectivity. Stories can be told more tentatively as one of many accounts of an event and in a way that is more fluid temporally and chronologically, combining facts and fiction. This opens a space for a broader understanding of genocide and makes the invisible visible.[[10]](#footnote-10)

**The Definition of Genocide**

To analyse how the elements of the genocide definition were addressed in *Deogratias*, the article first has to set out the definition itself. A focus will be placed on genocidal intent, the extent and type of destruction necessary, and the identity of protected groups. The article will then comment on the genocidal acts of killing and causing serious mental or bodily harm. Lastly, the act of genocide itself as well as direct and public incitement to commit genocide will be explored as modes of agency or commission. In doing so, the article will draw on the interpretation and application of the genocide definition by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the *Akayesu* case.[[11]](#footnote-11) This case includes the first interpretation, application and enforcement of the Genocide Convention[[12]](#footnote-12) by an international court.[[13]](#footnote-13) While the crime of genocide was also addressed by conventional and Gacaca courts in Rwanda, judges often lacked the legal education, training and experience to interpret and apply the definition of the crime correctly and consistently.[[14]](#footnote-14) Therefore, even though Deogratias’ case as that of a minor génocidaire would not have been heard by the ICTR, this article will focus on the tribunal’s interpretation of the genocide definition.

***Intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected Group***

The ICTR determined that genocide is different from other crimes because it requires a special intent to destroy a protected group.[[15]](#footnote-15) The tribunal acknowledged that ‘intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine’.[[16]](#footnote-16) In the absence of a confession, it can be deduced from the general context in which crimes are perpetrated and from the fact that people are deliberately and systematically targeted because they belong to a particular group. The same group might also have been targeted in other acts that violated the foundation of the group or are perceived that way by the perpetrator. In addition, genocidal intent can be deduced from the scale and scope of the atrocities as well as the frequency with which destructive discriminatory acts occur.[[17]](#footnote-17) This interpretation of how to determine genocidal intent raises the widely debated question whether genocidal acts have to be committed as part of a wider plan or policy backed by an organisation or system aiming to destroy a protected group.[[18]](#footnote-18) In addition, it is debated whether mere knowledge that one’s acts contribute to the destruction of a protected group is sufficient to meet the special intent requirement.[[19]](#footnote-19)

It has to be stressed that perpetrators of genocide do not have to intent to completely destroy a protected group. Following the genocide definition, intending partial destruction would suffice. The ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) determined that the partial destruction of a protected group occurs when a substantial part in relation to the group’s size, a considerable or reasonably substantial number of individuals belonging to it, were targeted.[[20]](#footnote-20) Following the tribunals’ jurisprudence, the partial destruction of a protected group could be geographically limited to members in a particular country or region, or of a single community.[[21]](#footnote-21) It could also include instances where only the group’s leadership or most representative members are targeted if their elimination would destroy the chances of the group’s survival.[[22]](#footnote-22) This indicates a dual qualitative and quantitative interpretation of the requirement.

Regarding the types of destruction, the father of the Genocide definition, Raphael Lemkin, argued for the definition to include cultural genocide where a group is eliminated as a social entity through the destruction of its language, art, or other ties that bind the group together.[[23]](#footnote-23) The drafters of the Genocide Convention as well as the ICTY and ICTR, however, did not follow his suggestion and focused on physical or biological destruction.[[24]](#footnote-24) Nevertheless, genocidal destruction includes direct violence such as killings as well as indirect acts such as establishing reservation systems that are designed to ‘[inflict] on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction’.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Similarly, demands to include, for example, social and political groups as protected groups under the Genocide definition have not been met. Arguably, this is because social and political groups lack homogeneity and stability and affiliation is freely chosen. Despite the narrow list of protected groups, the ICTY recognised that the groups mentioned overlap and more generally describe a national minority that can be identified by its members themselves or by outsiders.[[26]](#footnote-26) Furthermore, the ICTR stressed that all protected groups are stable and permanent and membership is automatic, continuous and irremediable.[[27]](#footnote-27) However, in addition to establishing this common criteria, the tribunal also delimited and defined the groups mentioned. It defined an ethnic group, for example, as a group that shares a common language or culture.[[28]](#footnote-28)

***Killing and causing serious bodily or mental Harm***

As stated above, Article 2(a) of the Genocide Convention establishes killing members of a protected group as an act of genocide. Rather obviously, the ICTR defined killing as ‘homicide committed with the intent to cause death’.[[29]](#footnote-29)

In addition to killing, Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention lists causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a protected group as another genocidal act.[[30]](#footnote-30) The Rwanda tribunal understood this measure to include acts of physical and mental torture, inhumane or degrading treatment and persecution. The ICTR found that beatings and acts of sexualised violence committed against Tutsi women were a means of inflicting serious bodily or mental harm on them.[[31]](#footnote-31) To pass the threshold of severity, these acts have to cause more than minor or temporary impairment.[[32]](#footnote-32) Rather, ‘a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life’[[33]](#footnote-33) is necessary. However, the harm does not have to be permanent or irreversible.[[34]](#footnote-34)

***Perpetrating Genocide and Incitement to Genocide***

Article 3(a) of the Genocide Convention lists the commission of genocide as one of the modes of responsibility or forms of liability. While the ICTR developed an individualistic approach to commission,[[35]](#footnote-35) the ICTY recognised that, in reality, the commission of genocide is a group action that is more or less coordinated and might be pursuant to a plan.[[36]](#footnote-36)

In addition to the commission of genocide, Article 3(c) of the Genocide Convention recognises direct and public incitement to commit genocide as one of the acts preparing or facilitating the commission of genocide. While it is listed together with the commission of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide as modes of liability, direct and public incitement to commit genocide is also an offence in its own right as the underlying offence of genocide does not need to be completed or proven.[[37]](#footnote-37) The common law interpretation of incitement understands it as encouraging or pressuring another to commit an offence, for example through propaganda.[[38]](#footnote-38) The ICTR qualified this by determining that the incitement does not have to contribute substantially to the commission of genocide.[[39]](#footnote-39) It does, however, have to be direct, ‘specifically [and immediately] provok[ing] another to engage in a criminal act, and […] more than [a] vague or indirect suggestion’.[[40]](#footnote-40) Directness, however, ‘should be viewed in the light of its cultural and linguistic content’ as ‘a particular speech may be perceived as direct in one country, and not so in another, depending on the audience.’[[41]](#footnote-41) In addition, the tribunal noted that incitement may be both direct and implicit at the same time where the perpetrator ‘[plays] skilfully on mob psychology by casting suspicion on certain groups, by insinuating that they were responsible for economic or other difficulties in order to create an atmosphere favourable to the perpetration of the crime.’[[42]](#footnote-42) The perpetrator has to desire ‘to create by his actions a particular state of mind necessary to commit [genocide] in the minds of the person(s)’.[[43]](#footnote-43) This indicates that the perpetrator has a genocidal intent and aims to produce the same in others.[[44]](#footnote-44) While the perpetrator’s genocidal intent does not have to be explicit, it has to be clear under the circumstances.[[45]](#footnote-45) Elaborating on the requirement of publicity, the ICTR stated that it can be established by considering whether the incitement was received by a number of individuals in a public place or by members of the public at large, for example through the mass media.[[46]](#footnote-46)

**Rwandan Genocide Trials**

Significant numbers of Rwandan génocidaires have been brought to justice. As indicated above, the ICTR dealt with those it deemed most responsible for the genocide. Some trials of defendants who lived in Europe or North America were held in their country of residence. Consequently, neither the ICTR nor foreign courts would have heard Deogratias’ case. Instead, like most accused, he would have been tried in domestic courts, close to the victims and survivors of the genocide.[[47]](#footnote-47)

Domestic trials in Rwanda took place in conventional as well as community-based Gacaca courts.[[48]](#footnote-48) While the Rwandan justice system demonstrated determination and made progress in holding those responsible for the genocide and genocidal acts to account and started the process of reconciliation, the scale of the genocide, depleted human resources and the destroyed legal infrastructure overwhelmed both types of courts. Moreover, trials were held in a highly charged, politicised environment that build on and perpetuated the one truth about the genocide defined by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)

The Catholic Church assisted the colonial administration in introducing the divisions among Rwandans that led to the genocide and hence bears responsibility for much of the violence against Tutsi from that time forward. Hutu political leaders organized a genocide of the Tutsi minority and the Hutu population—perhaps all of it—was misled into following their evil plan. Although some RPA soldiers may have killed civilians, these crimes were the unfortunate result of wartime or were occasional acts of revenge and have been punished.[[49]](#footnote-49)

Consequently, genocide trials failed to consider and to create a broader, more nuanced account of this part of Rwandan history. In addition to the one truth, and shaped by it, irregularities and shortcomings in the legal process prevented courts from establishing a comprehensive record of the Rwandan genocide that adequately reflected its realities. For example, arbitrary arrests and trial without solid evidence, witnesses and/or legal assistance for defendants that did not uphold the presumption of innocence, led to wrong convictions with only a limited right to appeal and impunity for actual perpetrators. Bias, pressure, intimidation and corruption by and on parties and participants as well as interference from outside actors led to unfair trials. This also prevented parties and participants from speaking out to reveal the truth. Lack of privacy in rape trails before Gacaca courts had the same effect. The above-mentioned limitations of the Rwandan genocide trials made them appear to be politically driven, organised reprisals that did not advance nuanced understandings of peoples’ roles, positions and realities during and after the genocide. If at all, they focused on the actions of the accused and their direct consequences for the victims and their families. It is unlikely that they considered their impact on the accused or indirect and long-term consequences. The RPF’s truth about the Rwandan genocide and the irregularities and shortcomings of genocide trials also demonstrate that law is not neutral and objective but political. They highlight that law becomes politicised in determining who the victims and perpetrators were and how Rwandans experienced the genocide. This way, they hindered reconciliation.[[50]](#footnote-50)

**The Plot and Art of *Deogratias***

As mentioned in the introduction, graphic novels such as *Deogratias* have the potential to tell a more nuanced, broader and tentative story than retributive justice processes that includes what cannot be represented in law. In a more flexible frame, they can offer socio-cultural and moral insights, for example, into the dynamics and consequences of genocide.

The story of *Deogratias* takes place before, during, and after the Rwandan genocide. It follows the protagonist Deogratias, a teenage Hutu boy, covering the present day and Deogratias’ flashbacks in parallel storylines. The story begins after the genocide when Deogratias meets an old friend, a French peacekeeper, in a hotel bar. Their conversation about Tutsi women triggers Deogratias’ memory of his former Tutsi friends and amours Apollinaria and Benina, and their mother Venetia. He also remembers Prior Brother Stanislas, allegedly Venetia’s former client or lover and father to Apollinaria, and the Belgian priest Brother Philip who arrived in Rwanda before the genocide to do missionary work and became a friend to the teenagers. When Deogratias leaves the hotel bar, he walks to the church and remembers his advances towards Apollinaria and Benina. Overwhelmed by this memory, he visits the RPF officer and old acquaintance Bosco in search for alcohol. While they share a drink, Deogratias and Bosco talk about Deogratias’ mental health as well as the genocide and Deogratias’ involvement in it and his possible responsibility for the perpetration of genocidal acts. While they talk, Deogratias remembers a school lesson in which the teacher explained the difference between Rwanda’s ethnic groups – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – to the pupils and the great lengths Venetia had to go to to enable her daughters go to college. Apollinaria, however, would have preferred to work for the church and Benina wanted to enjoy life. Before Deogratias leaves Bosco, he asks for a drink to take home and makes Bosco taste it as a guarantee that it is good, a custom he once explained to Brother Philip when they visited a bar before the genocide. Bosco does not know, however, that Deogratias had laced the bottle with poison. When Deogratias leaves Bosco’s home, he walks down a road he had once driven down with Benina. He remembers the ethnically charged tension they experienced at a roadblock where he first met the French peacekeeper who made advances towards Benina, seemingly unaware that she is the daughter of the woman whose sexual services he used. On his way to the cowshed where he sleeps, Deogratias is stopped at another roadblock. However, the soldiers know him and are aware of his mental health problems and let him pass. At night, Deogratias awakes when he hears dogs barking. His memories of dogs eating the corpses of people killed during the genocide, including his former friends, make him fear dogs. Deogratias sets out to find the only thing that helps him cope: alcohol. Unsuccessful, he returns to the cowshed and, overcome by his trauma, transforms into a dog. In the morning and back in his human form, Deogratias is woken up by the returning cows and, accompanied by the mocking of two boys, leaves for town, passing the place where the French peacekeeper used to live. When Deogratias meets him in the hotel bar again, it becomes clear that the Frenchman is unwell. Being aware of the reason, Deogratias has another flashback. First, he remembers passing Apollinaria translating the peacekeeper’s instructions on cow farming to local farmers and then giving Apollinaria and Benina a lift after the girls had listened to a racist radio broadcast under the watchful eyes of a group of men at a taxi bus station. When the French peacekeeper leaves the hotel bar to rest in his hotel room and Deogratias is forced to leave as well, he visits Bosco who is also unwell. Deogratias’ memories of the day he went to drink with Brother Philip, going to a party with the peacekeeper, Brother Philip and his parents visiting a museum with Apollinaria as their guide, and their conversation with the Twa Augustine who is in love with Venetia, provides information about the relationships between the different groups in Rwanda before the genocide. When Bosco’s condition worsens in the evening, Deogratias leaves. When dogs follow him, he becomes afraid again. In contrast to the previous night, however, he finds alcohol. He drinks it on his way to the cowshed, remembering the day when Benina agreed to sleep with him. Strengthened by the drink and the positive memory, Deogratias finds peace that night. The next morning mirrors the previous one. Only this time, the French peacekeeper is not at the hotel bar and Bosco’s house is locked. Without access to alcohol, Deogratias is overwhelmed by his experiences and transforms into a dog before he is chased away be the younger boys again. In the evening, he visits his former comrade Julius in search for alcohol. As with Bosco, Deogratias asks Julius to taste the drink for him, has some himself, laces the bottle with poison when Julius is not looking, and then hands the bottle back to Julius for him to have a drink. When Julius reminds Deogratias of his alleged duty to his Hutu brothers, Deogratias leaves. Despite having had a drink, he transforms into a dog when he is alone in the cowshed. He remembers the night when he and Benina first made love and where interrupted by Julius and a group of men, calling on Deogratias to pick up arms and join them in their genocidal work. Deogratias remembers Prior Brother Stanislas and Brother Philip unsuccessfully trying to protect a group of Tutsi, including Apollinaria, in their church before fleeing the country together with the French peacekeeper, Venetia, Augustine and his baby daughter Marie. Separately, Augustine and Venetia, however, returned to Rwanda in search for Apollinaria and Benina. Apollinaria survived the attack on the church and found a hiding place in the latrines. Benina left the safety of Deogratias’ house after he had left and by chance found and joined Apollinaria. The next morning, Deogratias still has the form of a dog when he overhears a conversation between to passers-by, saying that Bosco is dead. In tears he is found by Brother Philip and Marie who returned from Belgium to Rwanda. Over a coffee and drink in the hotel, Brother Philip asks Deogratias for news about their friends. In an incoherent way, Deogratias admits that he poisoned the French peacekeeper, Bosco and Julius because of their involvement in the genocide, especially the killings of Apollinaria, Benina, Venetia and Augustine, as well as their knowledge of Deogratias’ role in it. Through a flashback, Deogratias tells Brother Philip about his flight to then Zaire where Augustine found him and his fellow génocidaires in the Turquoise Zone in his search for Apollinaria and Benina. After Julius told Augustine that the girls had been raped by Deogratias and his comrades, Augustine attacked Deogratias and Julius killed him. Upon witnessing Augustine’s death, Deogratias decided to leave the Turquoise Zone and, with the support of the French peacekeeper, returned to the hotel. This had been the place where he and his fellow génocidaires had set up a roadblock and raped and killed Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina. Upon his return, the bodies were still lying on a pile and dogs were eating the corpses. Bosco and his soldiers were shooting the dogs. After confessing to Brother Philip and making him an accessory, Deogratias attempts to poison him as well. However, before his deed is done, he is found and taken away by the police for poisoning the French peacekeeper. Brother Philip and Marie are left alone in the hotel. Outside, the sun sets, making the sky glow as if in flames, and another silent starry night sets over Rwanda.

Deogratias’ story is drawn in cartooned images in square or rectangular panels, working on abstraction rather than realism. They strip down to, and then amplify, an essential meaning.[[51]](#footnote-51) Cartooned images also create a stark contrast to the serious subject matter that causes agitation in the audience.[[52]](#footnote-52) The consistently easy, small, thin, black lettering has the same effect. The lettering of conversations and monologues stands in contrast to that of sounds of knocking, a car starting and dogs barking.[[53]](#footnote-53) In these few instances, Strassen uses capital letters and bold text in grey or red, creating volume, urgency and hostility that disrupts otherwise peaceful scenes. In most instances, conversations and monologues are thickly framed by even, rectangular word balloons that span across the top or bottom of a panel or are placed within it. However, this pattern is broken in three panels where the text is placed outside word balloons and even outside the panels.[[54]](#footnote-54) This creates a tension and highlights a disconnect between larger images and splash panels of pristine night skies and Deogratias’ experiences of the violent nights during the genocide and his struggles in its aftermath. In addition to indirect narration through external dialogue and monologues as well as sounds, Strassen uses signs such as designations on buildings and vehicles,[[55]](#footnote-55) street signs,[[56]](#footnote-56) information in passports,[[57]](#footnote-57) labels on bottles,[[58]](#footnote-58) text on book and magazine covers, TV, posters and clothing[[59]](#footnote-59) to provide additional contextual information. While most panels include words, a number of wordless panels are used to set scenes, offering unfiltered first impressions of situations and characters, and to raise questions.[[60]](#footnote-60) They also highlight emotions,[[61]](#footnote-61) create an atmosphere of secrecy,[[62]](#footnote-62) indicate a tension between spoken and unspoken intentions and create a sense of foreboding.[[63]](#footnote-63) Wordless panels often follow morally questionable acts, leaving a strong and lasting impression on the reader and creating a space to actively engage with, and process, the events.[[64]](#footnote-64) In addition, wordless panels highlight Deogratias’ isolation and exclusion as well as his internal struggles as they are often placed before he has a flashback to the time before or during the genocide.[[65]](#footnote-65) In stark contrast, new days often start with large wordless panels, creating a sense of hope and peacefulness.[[66]](#footnote-66) This is strengthened by Strassen’s use of intense blue tones to colour the sky and intense greens for the vegetation. Along the same lines of meaning, the use of white for Deogratias’, Apollinaria’s and Benina’s clothing before, and to some extent during, the genocide indicates their goodness.[[67]](#footnote-67) In contrast, the few images showing bright red blood emphasise the realities of conflict and genocidal violence.[[68]](#footnote-68) Intense blues, greens, whites, and reds stand out against a background of hazy browns, greens and greys that soften Deogratias’ story. In addition to colours and contrasts, different panel sizes add dramatic weight to, for example, a flight scene.[[69]](#footnote-69) Furthermore, emphasis is created through the use of different perspectives. In most panels, Strassen uses a head on or high angle.[[70]](#footnote-70) A head on angle aims to present a character or scene objectively while drawing the reader in and making them part of the story. A high angle establishes the subject in a diminutive position, as less significant and part of a wider picture. In a few panels, Strassen also uses a low angle which indicates a sense of motion as well as confusion and creates a sense of powerlessness, fear and insecurity in the reader which can mirror the subject’s feelings.[[71]](#footnote-71) Over the shoulder shots, in contrast, are confrontational.[[72]](#footnote-72) In addition to a head on angle, (extreme) close ups can create a sense of intimacy between the subject in the image and the reader. However, they can also create an uncomfortable closeness.[[73]](#footnote-73) While the focus of a close up lies within a subject, Strassen uses medium shots to emphasise a dialogue or detail of an (inter-)action.[[74]](#footnote-74) (Extreme) long shots are used to convey a general impression and are scene setting.[[75]](#footnote-75) While Strassen creates a sense of motion through the use of perspective, gestures and body postures,[[76]](#footnote-76) transitions between panels also create a sense of time and space in graphic novels. Through the primary use of action-to-action transitions, Deogratias’ story unfolds at an even but dynamic pace.[[77]](#footnote-77) A few moment-to-moment transitions slow down the story’s pace[[78]](#footnote-78) while scene-to-scene transitions are used to cross longer timespans.[[79]](#footnote-79) Deogratias’ flashbacks are also shown in subject-to-subject transitions that highlight that an outside reality continues while Deogratias is lost in his memories, emphasising the existence of multiple viewpoints of the same scene.[[80]](#footnote-80)

**Deogratias’ Tale of the Rwandan Genocide**

After setting out parts of the genocide definition and outlining some limitations of the Rwandan genocide trials as well as summarising the story and describing the art of *Deogratias*, the article will now analyse how the definition of genocide has been addressed inthe graphic novel. While a retributive legal approach to the Rwandan genocide would require dealing with each element of the genocide definition separately, a humanities-based approach allows a more fluid and relational analysis. This highlights that Deogratias’ experiences of the genocide, its antecedent and aftermath, are connected. Therefore, while criminal law fragments survivors’ experiences into different legal categories, graphic novels allow for them to be addressed as one whole, interconnected story.

*Deogratias* illustrates the difficulties of proving genocidal intent in the absence of a confession that were mentioned in the first part of this article. After Deogratias reveals the fate of Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina to Brother Philip, he explicitly states that this was not a confession.[[81]](#footnote-81) Considering that this conversation is between Deogratias and a priest, Deogratias could be referring to a religious or legal confession here. The setting in which the conversation takes place, a dark room where only Deogratias and Brother Philip appear to be present, points towards the former. In this case, while Deogratias’ recollection would be protected by confidentiality, it would engage his moral responsibility for his action. However, his insistence that his account was not a confession indicates that he was using the term in a legal sense, attempting to avoid prosecution. The RPF officer Bosco appears to confirm this interpretation when he mentions in another informal, private conversation in a dark room that Deogratias is considered a suspect of any particular crime.[[82]](#footnote-82) In this scene, the setting of the conversation as well as the conversation itself indicate a tension between public calls to end impunity and private relationships between survivors who participated in the genocide and cope with its aftermath in different ways. Bosco and Deogratias first meet by the roadblock where Bosco and his fellow soldiers shoot dogs that eat the corpses of those killed by the génocidaires, including Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina. Deogratias just returned from the Turquoise Zone and watches them when Bosco discovers him. Already then, Bosco lets Deogratias go without questioning. At the roadblock as well as in the dark room, Bosco indicates that Deogratias’ mental state mitigates his culpability. However, through Deogratias’ flashbacks which are indicated through borderless panels, the story makes clear that he perpetrated, or at least did not prevent, the rape and subsequent murder of Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina.

The graphic novel provides contextual information that demonstrates that hundreds of thousands of Tutsi shared the fate of Deogratias’ friends.[[83]](#footnote-83) In the contrasting, loaded context of a Red Cross party, Deogratias tells the French peacekeeper that Tutsi were deliberately targeted already in the 1970s.[[84]](#footnote-84) This window into history situates the 1994 genocide in a broader, more complete context than a purely legal account would. The scene also looks beyond Rwanda for those responsible, implicating the international community for their failure to prevent the repetition of genocide after the Second World War.[[85]](#footnote-85)

In the antecedent of the 1994 genocide, radio hosts directly and publicly call for the extermination of Tutsi. In a broadcast, they make seemingly joking suggestions to use insecticide to deal with Tutsi to whom the radio hosts refer to as cockroaches.[[86]](#footnote-86) While this broadcast finds a diverse audience outside a kiosk, a second transmission disrupts the public-private dichotomy. It forms the background noise that accompanies Deogratias’ and Benina’s intimacy, indicating that the personal is political. Reporting the death of the Rwandan President, the radio hosts adopt a more serious tone than in the first broadcast. They warn not to trust the cockroaches who are portrayed as responsible for the President’s death. In their speech, the radio hosts pressure the Hutu population to seek revenge by eradicating the cockroaches.[[87]](#footnote-87) Even though the second broadcast does not directly refer to the killing of Tutsi, the message would have been clear to listeners as Tutsi were often referred to as cockroaches in the media and by politicians in the time before the genocide.[[88]](#footnote-88) For those unfamiliar with the terminology of the Rwandan genocide, the first broadcast creates a link between Tutsi and cockroaches whereby a minority population in Rwanda is portrayed as scavenging insects that have to be exterminated so that others can thrive. Their dehumanisation facilitates their killing. It removes the individuality of a person and essentialises them as part of a group. Dehumanisation makes sympathy for the ‘other’ impossible and extermination becomes the natural next step. It motivates and legitimises genocide.[[89]](#footnote-89)

Right after Benina switches off the radio, armed Hutu extremists visit Deogratias and pressure him to join them in their work of setting up a roadblock.[[90]](#footnote-90) The short timespan between the radio broadcast and the men’s visit indicates the effectiveness of the radio hosts messages. The effectiveness of the men’s work is illustrated by an image of a pile of corpses lying near the roadblock on a grey and rainy morning.[[91]](#footnote-91) Towards the end of the genocide, the group of génocidaires flees to what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to escape prosecution. In a borderless picture drawn in dark, doom-like colours with the light of dawn rising at their destination, Julius, the group’s leader, confirms that they killed many Tutsi at the roadblock. He promises his comrades that they will return to Rwanda to complete their mission.[[92]](#footnote-92) It becomes clear here that Hutu extremists partly, but not completely, destroyed the Tutsi ethnic group. While this would be enough to satisfy a charge of genocide, Julius’ intention to return to Rwanda to complete their mission indicates a long-term plan for the total destruction of a protected group.

In addition to the passage described above, another scene shows more work being done in the light of day in Prior Brother Stanislas’ and Brother Philip’s church. After the two priests gave refuge to a group of women and children, including Apollinaria, they block the church door to try and prevent a group of men armed with guns, clubs and machetes from entering. Prior Brother Stanislas does not appeal to the militiamen’s humanity but to their religiosity. He addresses them as his children, positioning himself as a father and/or authority figure who should be obeyed. His concern, however, appears to be for his church, rather than for the wellbeing of the people in it. However, leading with religiosity rather than humanity might have been a strategic decision, knowing that the militiamen will show no compassion for Tutsi but respect religion. However, in the militiamen’s belief, they were carrying out God’s will. A later image showing Apollinaria and others lying in pools of blood on the church floor shows that the churchmen could not protect the people who sought refuge in their church. Pointing to controversies regarding the Church’s (in)actions in the genocide, the priests themselves escaped the massacre.[[93]](#footnote-93)

In addition to accounts of historical acts of violence perpetrated against Tutsi, incitement by radio hosts to destroy the Tutsi group, and the work of Hutu extremists, a TV programme aired in Belgium after Brother Philip’s evacuation and return to his home country provides information about the context in which Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina are killed. The TV presenter disturbs a peaceful evening in Europe by speaking of small-arms fire and lynching. He stresses the gravity of the situation in the distant African country of Rwanda by warning his viewers about the footage he is about to show. However, seemingly out of concern for Marie, Augustine’s daughter who Brother Philip had saved, the priest’s family switches off the TV before the programme continues.[[94]](#footnote-94)

Despite demonstrating that Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina are killed in the context of widespread, systematic and frequent attacks on Tutsi, *Deogratias* does not portray the genocide as following a State policy. However, the graphic novel makes clear that it is a collective effort, not the work of a single individual. Radio hosts aim to incite a group of men and boys listening to the broadcast at a kiosk to commit genocide.[[95]](#footnote-95) Génocidaires such as the above-mentioned Hutu extremists that call on Deogratias and that attack the church as well as militias at roadblocks also appear as diverse groups of men and boys.[[96]](#footnote-96) After the genocide, Julius tells Deogratias without proof that many want to complete their mission. Julius speaks in the plural when he threatens Deogratias, saying that they have not forgotten his betrayal of returning to Rwanda instead of following them to the DRC. He offers Deogratias to make up for his mistake by re-joining them.[[97]](#footnote-97) Considering that the conversation is only between Deogratias and Julius, the use of the plural indicates that Julius speaks as a representative of the Hutu group rather than as an individual. Warm colours and the availability of food and drink make re-joining the Hutu cause appear inviting. This feeling is strengthened by the contrast of the dark and lonely night into which Deogratias leaves after rejecting Julius’ offer.[[98]](#footnote-98) Deogratias seems to prefer isolation over a renewed association with his Hutu comrades that goes beyond his desire to avenge his Tutsi friends and kill those he holds responsible for their deaths.[[99]](#footnote-99)

The group dynamics of genocide also become clear when Deogratias first joins the Hutu extremists despite his initial unwillingness. When Julius first threatens Deogratias to show is loyalty, aiming to create a genocidal mind-set in him, Deogratias refuses to help them set up a roadblock.[[100]](#footnote-100) Considering that this conversation occurs right after Deogratias and Benina were intimate for the first time, it can be argued that Deogratias is led by his feelings for Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina when he asserts his agency against the militiaman. Eventually, however, Deogratias cannot stand up to Julius and joins the génocidaires. Julius’ behaviour as well as Deogratias’ own words, however, suggest that he did not follow them voluntarily. Deogratias says that he was forced to participate in the genocide[[101]](#footnote-101) when he did not hate but love Apollinaria and Benina[[102]](#footnote-102) and wanted to save them.[[103]](#footnote-103) His diminished agency also becomes apparent in scenes where his comrades speak for Deogratias of his genocidal acts.[[104]](#footnote-104) Consequently, he holds his former comrades responsible for Venetia’s, Apollinaria’s and Benina’s death.[[105]](#footnote-105) In addition, he also appears to put some of the blame on his friends themselves, insinuating a death wish,[[106]](#footnote-106) which serves Deogratias as a justification for his actions. Being forced to participate in the genocide, in particular in the killing of his Tutsi friends, demonstrates that the clear-cut legal distinction between victims and perpetrators does not correspond to reality. By being coerced to participate in the genocide, the perpetrator Deogratias is victimised.[[107]](#footnote-107) Together with his above-mentioned mental state and his young age, this would be considered as mitigating circumstances in a trial.[[108]](#footnote-108) Nevertheless, a purely legal analysis would likely find that Deogratias knew that his acts contributed to the partial destruction of a protected group, considering the context in which Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina were killed. Therefore, it would be found that he acted with genocidal intent. A legal analysis would also find that the radio hosts incited others to commit genocide.

As mentioned above, the genocide definition protects national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. The ICTR determined that Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda are two distinct ethnic groups and established differences in language and culture as boundaries between them.[[109]](#footnote-109) In *Deogratias*, however, no such differences are indicated. This reflects the political reality in Rwanda where all share a national territory, language, myths and cultural traditions.[[110]](#footnote-110) While different and at times conflicting groups have existed in Rwanda, dividing the population into ethnic groups was a colonial invention. Western occupiers categorised people based on height and colour, indicating racial rather than ethnic identifiers. Under Belgian rule, however, those categories were included as ethnic groups in identification cards (IDs).[[111]](#footnote-111) While Bosco confirms this in a private conversation with Deogratias, he overlooks the tensions of the past when he says that Rwandans had lived in harmony before white people arrived in the country.[[112]](#footnote-112) More directly, Benina accuses the French peacekeeper at a checkpoint of ruining Rwanda when he impertinently questions Tutsi passengers on the bus she and Deogratias travel on about their destination and purpose of their travels.[[113]](#footnote-113) It has to be stressed here that colonial classifications and the inclusion of ethnicity in ID cards does not automatically prove that different ethnic groups existed in Rwanda at the time. It merely reflects how foreigners divided the population. Inconsistent with the ICTR’s interpretation, in the early 20th century, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was based on lineage rather than language and culture. In the 1950s, the distinction became political, indicating support for, or opposition to, the monarchy. This pattern repeated itself at the end of the 20th century when the groups were distinguished by kinship again which was politicised by Hutu extremists to make a political and socio-economic conflict appear to be fought along ethnic lines.[[114]](#footnote-114)

In addition to challenging the ICTR’s finding that Hutu and Tutsi can be divided along linguistic and cultural lines into different ethnic groups, *Deogratias* shows that the distinction between ethnic groups in Rwanda does not easily pass the test of stability and permanence established by the tribunal. Mobility, interaction and intermarriage existed between groups, blurring the lines.[[115]](#footnote-115) As mentioned above, in the graphic novel, Deogratias and Benina are in a relationship and Deogratias protects Benina when militiamen visit him, inciting him to join the genocide.[[116]](#footnote-116) Additionally, Venetia and Augustine continue their childhood friendship. However, comparing Deogratias’ and Benina’s relationship to that of Augustine and Venetia indicates that inter-ethnic marriages might have been more common between Hutu and Tutsi than between Hutu and Tutsi on one side and Twa on the other. When Augustine shyly proposes to Venetia, she stands up next to him, demonstrating their difference in height, and jokingly asks how they would look as a couple.[[117]](#footnote-117) She and her daughters laugh. Reminding Venetia of their happy childhood together, Augustine indicates that inter-ethnic relationships were untroubled then. A possible explanation for this is that their young age made them oblivious to other people’s opinions about their friendship. This is supported by the background action of Apollinaria and Benina playing with Augustine’s daughter Marie. Augustine’s comment might also point to a time when inter-ethnic tensions generally were lower. This interpretation, however, clashes with the reality of inter-group hostilities, discrimination and violence since Rwanda’s independence.[[118]](#footnote-118) Despite this, the setting of this conversation indicates that certain inter-ethnic relationships are still tolerated even among adults and in the antecedent of the genocide. Augustine proposes to Venetia seemingly spontaneously at the French peacekeeper’s home where Augustine works as a gardener and Venetia has an intimate appointment. However, these forms of interaction are not free from tension either. The French peacekeeper scolds Augustine for not working. However, the true motivation for this rebuke might have been the Frenchman’s perception of Augustine as a sexual rival.[[119]](#footnote-119) Augustine, in turn, is disgruntled working as a groundskeeper for a white man despite being university educated. According to Brother Philip, he chose this employment over being a university professor for the higher salary.[[120]](#footnote-120) Without land for farming, Venetia has to resort to prostitution to raise her daughters.[[121]](#footnote-121) The peacekeeper exploits Venetia by using her services.[[122]](#footnote-122)

While *Deogratias* does not portray Hutu and Tutsi as necessarily stable and permanent, linguistically and culturally distinct groups, it speaks to the ICTR’s pronouncement that membership in protected groups is automatically assigned by birth.[[123]](#footnote-123) *Deogratias* illustrates ethnic origin through lineage. When Deogratias recounts Rwanda’s history for the French peacekeeper at the above-mentioned Red Cross party, he says that Venetia’s mother had been killed in a massacre together with other Tutsi.[[124]](#footnote-124) Venetia’s ethnic identity becomes clear in another conversation between the same characters. Reminiscing about the time before the genocide, the French peacekeeper asks Deogratias if he remembers Venetia. The close-up image accompanying the question shows a cockroach crawling on the table that carries the men’s drinks.[[125]](#footnote-125) Reading this with the above established knowledge that Tutsi were referred to as cockroaches in the context of the Rwandan genocide,[[126]](#footnote-126) this scene shows that, like her mother, Venetia is Tutsi. A school lesson demonstrates that, like their mother Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina are Tutsi.[[127]](#footnote-127) The teacher asks the pupils about their ethnic identity. With his praise, a show of hands demonstrates that the majority of pupils mirrors the majority Hutu population in the country. Apollinaria and Benina hesitate to identify as members of the Tutsi minority. The teacher points out differences between the groups. He explains that Hutu are proud and honest, courageous and caring. They are the real Rwandans who cleared the country for cultivation and subsequently farmed the land that became a marvellous place.[[128]](#footnote-128) In his description, the teacher implies that Hutu brought civilisation to Rwanda and created a safe and fertile place that furthers happiness and community. Tutsis herdsmen and warriors, in contrast, exploited the good nature of the Hutu peasants and subjugated them. As mentioned above, while Hutu and Tutsi might not actually have been distinct ethnic groups, the teacher’s comments demonstrate that Tutsi were established as different from Hutu by outsiders.[[129]](#footnote-129)

In addition to Hutu extremists, foreigners follow colonial conceptions by applying ethnic categories to Rwandans. When the French peacekeeper manhandles Benina at a roadblock, Deogratias steps in. The peacekeeper challenges Deogratias’ protective action based on the ethnic difference between him and Benina, asking why Deogratias as a Hutu cares about a Tutsi. In response, Deogratias questions why their ethnicity matters to the Frenchman. This way, Deogratias suggests that the Frenchman does not understand Rwanda’s population structure. In addition, Deogratias’ words might have been a tool for Strassen to challengingly hint at the French and broader international involvement in the genocide. The peacekeeper’s actions that follow the argument with Benina and Deogratias support this. Despite being rough with Benina and condescending with Deogratias, the peacekeeper takes Deogratias, a Hutu, aside in an attempt to bond over what he perceives as their shared preference for Tutsi sexual partners. However, the derogatory way in which he speaks about Tutsi women angers Deogratias. Similarly, this seeming fraternisation displeases another soldier and Benina who watch the scene from a distance.[[130]](#footnote-130) On another occasion, Deogratias and Brother Philip give Apollinaria and Benina a lift home.[[131]](#footnote-131) Brother Philip remarks that, despite having known the children for some time, he still does not know their ethnicity. Laughing, Deogratias replies that only white people ask this question. For Brother Philip, asking about his friends’ ethnicity is a sign of care and interest. Similar to the French peacekeeper, however, his question indicates an incomplete and possibly naïve understanding of Rwanda’s population. Deogratias’ response makes clear that only foreigners categorise Rwandans into different ethnic groups. In this context, the ICTR as an international tribunal could be understood as yet another foreigner who imposes comfortable but unrealistic interpretations on an unfamiliar society. This demonstrates that law creates its own reductionist reality to fit events into artificial and universal yet narrow legal definitions.

Following the genocide definition, *Deogratias* focuses on the physical and biological destruction of a protected group in the form of killings and causing serious bodily or mental harm. Except for three flashback scenes, however, the graphic novel does not directly portray the mass violence perpetrated against Tutsi. On the one hand, this obscures its widespread perpetration.[[132]](#footnote-132) On the other hand, the understatement of acts of killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm serves to avoid desensitisation.[[133]](#footnote-133) The two wordless scenes of a group of women and children lying in pools of blood on the church floor[[134]](#footnote-134) and of a pile of corpses at the roadblock[[135]](#footnote-135) were described above. The third scene makes clear that Venetia is among the dead bodies at the roadblock. Venetia is shown lying dead in her own blood. A bloody bottle lying between her legs and the blood on her thighs, skirt and top indicate that she had been raped before she was beheaded. The speech bubble in the panel indicates that Deogratias raped and killed Venetia, was complicit in her fate or failed to prevent it. When Apollinaria and Benina decide to surrender after weeks in hiding, they approach the same roadblock. Their fate is implicit in that of their mother. When one of the sisters asks what the men did to their mother, Julius replies in a sexually suggestive and derogatory way that Deogratias will show them.[[136]](#footnote-136) In another flashback, Deogratias admits that he was forced to rape Apollinaria.[[137]](#footnote-137) However, Apollinaria’s fate is not told by Deogratias himself but again by Julius. With cruel excitement, Julius speaks about Tutsi women in a derogatory way and reduces them to sex objects. Calling them whores implies that they are used to having coerced rough sex with many strangers which justifies their rape in the perpetrators’ minds. This is consistent with rumours about the sexual availability and seductiveness of Tutsi women which encouraged the perpetration of acts of sexualised violence against them. Tutsi women were targeted because of their mythicised beauty and sexuality which allegedly would help them infiltrate and control the Hutu community.[[138]](#footnote-138) The French peacekeeper appears to have heard and confirms these stories when he speaks to Deogratias in the above described scene at the checkpoint.[[139]](#footnote-139) The rumours also appear to shape his behaviour towards Tutsi women. He calls Benina by intimate nicknames[[140]](#footnote-140) and uses the services of Venetia.[[141]](#footnote-141) After the genocide, the Frenchman reminisces about the beautiful Tutsi women and girls he met in Rwanda and expresses his regret that so many were killed.[[142]](#footnote-142) He makes it very clear that Tutsi women became victims of sexualised violence, beatings, and inhumane and degrading treatment amounting to acts causing serious bodily and mental harm before they were killed. Deogratias makes this even more explicit when he remembers women being raped with sharp objects.[[143]](#footnote-143) Sexualised violence meets the gravity threshold for genocide by inflicting serious bodily or mental harm as it has severe and long-lasting consequences for survivors, their families, communities, and societies as a whole. On an individual level, experiences of sexualised war violence often result in severe physical harm, ranging from bruising and bone fractures to fistulas, vaginal and anal infections, and infertility. Psychologically, survivors may feel a loss of basic trust, including their sense of identity and self-respect, of security and control. Survivors may feel guilty, ashamed, frustrated and angry. They may not be able to cope with their everyday life and suffer from nightmares, flashbacks, depression, neuroses and post-traumatic stress disorder. Socially, survivors may face stigmatisation, humiliation and exclusion and are often held responsible for what happened to them. Exclusion from work may make an overall difficult economic post-conflict situation additionally challenging for survivors. Their family may be faced with excessive demands, separation and violence. On the community level, feelings of mistrust and betrayal may lead to the destruction of social networks and disinhibition. Experiences of sexualised war violence may destroy a group’s social structure by making women unmarriageable. In patrilineal societies, pregnancies resulting from war rape alter the ethnic constitution of a country or region. Acts of sexualised war violence are (purposefully) intimidating and discriminatory.[[144]](#footnote-144) It has to be noted, however, that the consequences of experiences of sexualised war violence are not portrayed in *Deogratias* as victims are killed. This relieves Strassen from commenting on the arguably arbitrary gravity threshold of acts causing serious bodily or mental harm amounting to genocide.

Nevertheless, Strassen complicates the consequences of genocide for survivors by focusing on the impact it has on perpetrators. In the graphic novel, Deogratias deals with his traumatic experiences of committing acts of genocide by drinking. When he cannot get banana beer, he becomes afraid of his memories and connected emotions, of himself as a perpetrator and the consequences for his actions. Losing control, he transforms into a dog and talks about dogs eating bellies.[[145]](#footnote-145) The first time this happens chronologically is when Deogratias sees soldiers shooting dogs that eat the corpses at the roadblock.[[146]](#footnote-146) Deogratias’ first transformation is symbolically connected to the status of dogs during and after the genocide.

Prior to the genocide, dogs were fairly common in Rwanda as pets, watchdogs, and used in hunting […]. When the killing began, Tutsi families fled the génocidaires, abandoning their animals [and] causing the dogs to become scavengers of human remains. […] Like the dogs, Deogratias has feasted on the bodies of his friends in the most shocking and violent way. Yet it is the scavenging dogs, not the killer Deogratias, who are shot by the reinvading RPF soldiers.[[147]](#footnote-147)

Watching dogs feasting on the dead bodies of his friends before they are shot disturbs Deogratias’ attempt to mourn, forcing him to continuously relive the past.[[148]](#footnote-148) Deogratias’ hallucinations start as night time episodes, the time when dogs came to feast on the corpses.[[149]](#footnote-149) However, Deogratias also begins to transform by day after he poisons Bosco and finds his home, and source of banana beer, locked.[[150]](#footnote-150) Problematising the logical and linear legal approach to genocide, Deogratias’ hallucinations become uncontrollable and delusion and reality mix.[[151]](#footnote-151) Plagued by memories, he becomes the victim of his own actions. At the same time, Deogratias’ episodes of hallucination can be interpreted as feelings of guilt as he was involved in the killing of his friends when he should have protected them. His transformations indicate his inability to forgive himself and Deogratias becomes a self-defined perpetrator. His animal form marks him as a beastly criminal while at the same time signifying that he is outside human law. Taking an animal shape indicates a lack of moral and legal responsibility and justifies Deogratias’ inhuman actions. Nevertheless, while he is not shot like the dogs who ate the corpses of his friends, he is punished through his trauma. While the graphic novel illustrates génocidaires’ humanity, it portrays Deogratias as a monster at the same time.[[152]](#footnote-152) This way, it challenges the unrealistic victim/perpetrator dichotomy established by law, acknowledging the complexities of genocide.[[153]](#footnote-153)

**Conclusion**

This article explored how elements of the genocide definition are addressed in Strassen’s graphic novel *Deogratias*. His representation of genocidal intent and coercion, responsibility and punishment, the socio-cultural and political context in which the genocide occurred, and of genocidal acts and their consequences lead to a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the abstract and clinical definition of genocide.

The graphic novel highlights the difficulties of proving genocidal intent in the absence of a confession and in the coercive context of mass violence. While Deogratias shares his experiences of the Rwandan genocide with Brother Philip, he insists that this is not a confession. However, through radio and TV broadcasts and conversations between characters, the graphic novel demonstrates that discriminatory acts of violence have been deliberately and frequently perpetrated against Tutsi on a large scale at least since the 1970s. Deogratias knew, or should have known, that his acts contributed to the partial destruction of a protected group. Therefore, a court might find that he acted with genocidal intent. However, the graphic novel clearly shows that Deogratias was pressured to participate in the genocide. This calls into question the state of mind with which he committed genocidal acts as well as the extent of his responsibility for them. It challenges legal binaries by raising the question whether Deogratias is a perpetrator or a victim, or both. The pressure exerted on the protagonist not by the State but by public opinion in the form of radio broadcasts as well as by his peers also highlights that genocidal acts are not perpetrated by a single individual but by groups of people. This challenges the legal concept of individual criminal responsibility.

In addition to complicating the legal notion of genocidal intent and who can or should be held responsible for acts of genocide, *Deogratias* challenges the ICTR’s universal conception of ethnic groups in the Rwandan context. It highlights that no clear boundaries existed between Hutu and Tutsi. The interactions between the different characters show that they share a common language and culture and that inter-ethnic relationships existed, albeit not without tensions. While *Deogratias* does not portray Hutu and Tutsi as necessarily stable and permanent, linguistically and culturally distinct groups, the example of Venetia’s family speaks to the ICTR’s pronouncement that membership in protected groups is allocated through lineage. While Deogratias at least initially resists the ethnic rhetoric of the radio hosts, his peers and teacher, Western representatives and the Church follow colonial conceptions by applying ethnic categories to Rwandans. This demonstrates the implication of white people in the racial logic that made the genocide possible. It addresses the failures of the international community and the Church to adequately respond to the events in Rwanda in April 1994 and reveals the cowardice and culpability of white observers that have not been addressed by the ICTR.

*Deogratias* does not focus on the genocidal violence committed in April 1994. Nevertheless, it makes clear that the protagonist perpetrated, was complicit in, or failed to prevent acts causing serious bodily or mental harm followed by the killing of his Tutsi friends. The deaths of Venetia, Apollinaria and Benina is a missed opportunity to address the consequences of the genocide for victim-survivors in a graphic novel format. However, it allows Strassen to explore the generally underrepresented and legally overlooked effect the genocide had on perpetrators. While Deogratias escapes formal punishment for his genocidal crimes, he is punished through his trauma. His transformations into a dog highlight that he is an ordinary human who acted extraordinarily in extreme circumstances. He fell victim to the circumstances which justify his actions and diminish his responsibility. Contrastingly, the transformations also indicate that Deogratias feels guilty beyond forgiveness for his actions. He is a self-identified perpetrator.

Making the invisible visible, *Deogratias* suggests that more adequate responses to genocide that might be more successful for reconciliation have to be inclusive and involve perpetrators. In addition to generally being context-sensitive, they have to be sensitive to the complexities of the circumstances in which specific genocidal acts are perpetrated. They need to follow a flexible approach to legal categories of intent, genocidal acts, modes of agency or commission, and guilt and innocence more generally.

1. United Nations, ‘Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country’ <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml> accessed 11 June 2018; United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, ‘The Genocide’ <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/genocide#timeline> accessed 11 June 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide Convention) © (1996-2018) United Nations. Reprinted with the permission of the United Nations. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Genocide Convention (n 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See for example Robert Cryer, ‘International Criminal Law’ in Malcom D Evans (eds) *International Law* (Oxford University Press 2010) 752-783; Paola Gaeta (ed), *The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press 2009); William A Schabas, *Genocide in International Law* (Cambridge University Press 2009); Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, *International Criminal Law* (Oxford University Press 2012) 155-190. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Karen Crawley and Honni van Rijswijk, ‘Justice in the Gutter: Representing Everyday Trauma in the Graphic Novels of Art Spiegelman’ (2012) 16(1) Law Text Culture 93-118; Courtney Donovan and Ebru Ustundag, ‘Graphic Narratives, Trauma and Social Justice’ (2017) 11(2) Studies in Social Justice 221-237; Thomas Giddens, ‘Comics, Law, and Aesthetics: Towards the Use of Graphic Fiction in Legal Studies’(2012) 6(1) Law and Humanities 85, 87-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See for example Nicholas Mirzoeff, ‘Invisible Again: Rwanda and Representation After Genocide’ (2005) 38(8) African Arts 36; Kate O'Neill, The Decolonizing Potential of Local and Metropolitan Literature of the Rwandan Genocide (2012) PhD Thesis, Faculty of English, University of Calgary <https://prism.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/handle/11023/263/ucalgary\_2012\_o'neill\_kate.pdf;jsessionid=C7E6F08C4F94C7A901D3F53C8FDAEBC1?sequence=2> accessed 13 June 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Donovan and Ustundag (n 5); Giddens, ‘Comics, Law, and Aesthetics’ (n 5); Thomas Giddens, ‘What is Graphic Justice?’ (2006) The Comics Grid: Journal of Comic Scholarship 14; Jérémie Gilbert and David Keane, ‘Graphic Reporting: Human Rights Violations through the Lens of Graphic Novels’ in Thomas Giddens (ed) *Graphic Justice: Intersections of Comics and Law* (Routledge 2015); Gretchen Schwarz, ‘Graphic Novels, New Literacies, and Good Old Social Justice’ (2010) The Alan Review 71; Jessica Silva, ‘“Graphic Content”: Interpretations of the Rwandan Genocide Through the Graphic Novel’ (2009) Master of Arts thesis, Department of History, Concordia University 4-5, 31, 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. (Alexis Siegel tr, First Second 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Gilbert and Keane (n 7); Sara Mortensen, Lars Soderbergh, and Jared Christensen, ‘Deogratias and the Representation of the Rwandan Genocide’ (2012) <http://deogratiasgraphicnovel.blogspot.com/> accessed 18 August 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Rose Brister and Belinda Walzer, ‘Kairos and Comics: Reading Human Rights Intercontextually in Joe Sacco’s Graphic Narratives’ (2013) 40(3) College Literature: A Journal of Critical Literary Studies 138; Donovan and Ustundag (n 5) 221; Giddens, ‘Comics, Law, and Aesthetics’ (n 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (02 September 1998) para 498 <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b8d7bd/> accessed 09 August 2017, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Genocide Convention (n 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. United Nations, ‘First-Ever Judgements on Crime of Genocide Due 2 September’ (31 August 1998) Press Release, AFR/93, L/2894; United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, ‘Historic Judgement Finds Akayesu Guilty of Genocide’ (02 September 1998) <http://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/historic-judgement-finds-akayesu-guilty-genocide> accessed 23 November 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Human Rights Watch, ‘Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts’ (Human Rights Watch 2011) 3; Human Rights Watch, ‘Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda’ (Human Rights Watch 2008) 12, 23, 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 498. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 523. See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Mertis, Judgment, 26 February 2007, para 278-297. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 523. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See for example *Prosecutor v Goran Jelisić* (Trial Judgment) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) para 66-108<https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/b3ece5/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals; Florian Jeßberger, ‘The Definition and the Elements of the Crime of Genocide’ in Paola Gaeta (eds) *The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press 2009) 87-110; William A Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ (2008) 98(3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 93; Zahar and Sluiter (n 4) 173-174. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See for example *Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić* (Appeals Judgment) IT-98-33-A (19 April 2004) para 134 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/86a108/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals; Jeßberger (n 18) 87-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana* (Trial Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para 94 < https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/9ea5f4/> accessed 20 July 2018, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals; *Prosecutor v Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Kolundzija* (Trial Judgment) IT-95-8-T (13 November 2001) para 65 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/682fa0/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić* (Trial Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 545-7, 585-595 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/440d3a/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Prosecutor v Goran Jelisić* (n 18) para 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Alex Alvarez, *Genocidal Crimes* (Routledge 2010) 10-11, 20-21; Schabas, *Genocide in International Law* (n 4) 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See for example *Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić* (Trial Judgment) (n 21) para 580; *Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza* (Trial Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 315 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/7e668a/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Art 2(c) Genocide Convention (n 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana* (n 20) para 98; *Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić* (Trial Judgment) (n 21) para 556-557. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 511. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 513. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para. 500-501. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Genocide Convention (n 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 504, 706, 731; *Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić* (Trial Judgment) (n 21) para 513.

art 2(d) Genocide Convention (n 2); *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 508: In *Akayesu*, the ICTR also found that rape can satisfy Article 2(d) of the Genocide Convention and amount to measures intended to prevent births within a protected group if members subsequently refuse to procreate. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić* (Trial Judgment) (n 21) para 513. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana* (n 20) para 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 502; *Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana* (n 20) para 108; *Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić* (Trial Judgment) (n 21) para 513. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. See for example *Prosecutor v Sylvestre Gacumbitsi* (Trial Judgment) ICTR-2001-64-T (17 June 2004) para 285 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/b4e8aa/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. International Criminal Court, ‘Elements of Crimes’, ICC-ASP/1/3, art 6; *Prosecutor v Goran Jelisić* (n 18) para 15, 98, 105, 140; Alexander Zahar, ‘Perpetrators and Co-Perpetrators of Genocide’ in Paola Gaeta (ed), *The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press 2009) 153. See also Alvarez (n 23). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 561. See also *Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze* (Trial Judgment) ICTR-99-52-T (3 December 2003) para 1015 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/45b8b6/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Jens David Ohlin, ‘Incitement and Conspiracy to Genocide’ in Paola Gaeta (ed), *The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press 2009) 208-209. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze* (Appeals Judgment) ICTR-99-52-A (12 January 2007) para 678 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/4ad5eb/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 557-558; *Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze* (Appeals Judgment) (n 39) para 692. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 557. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Zahar and Sluiter (n 4) 169. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 560. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 561. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *Prosecutor v Tharcisse Muvunyi* (Trial Judgment) ICTR-00-55A-T (12 September 2006) para 507-509 <https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/fa02aa/> accessed 01 February 2019, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 556. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: Justice After Genocide – 20 Years On’ (28 March 2014) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-genocide-20-years> accessed 24 November 2018. For further information on genocide trials at international, national and local level see for example Nicholas A Jones, *The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha* (Routledge 2010); Madeline H Morris; ‘Justice in the Wake of Genocide: The Case of Rwanda’ (1997) 3 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 689. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Paul Christoph Bornkamm, *Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation* (Oxford University Press 2012) 100-102; Human Rights Watch, ‘Justice Compromised’ (n14); Human Rights Watch, ‘Law and Reality’ (n 14); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda’ (n 47); Jones (n 47) 68-71: While conventional and Gacaca courts differ in law, procedure and personnel, they were part of the same judicial system and faced similar challenges. Therefore, they are dealt with together in this paragraph. For further information on the Gacaca courts see for example Anne-Marie de Brouwer and Etienne Ruvebana, ‘The Legacy of the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda: Survivors’ Views’ (2013) 13 International Criminal Law Review 937; Phil Clark, *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda* (Cambridge University Press 2010); Allison Corey and Sandra F Joireman, ‘Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda’ (2004) 103 African Affairs 73; Chiseche Mibenge, ‘Enforcing International Humanitarian Law at the National Level: The Gacaca Jurisdictions of Rwanda’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 410; Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Christopher Uggen, and Jean-Damascène Gasanabo, ‘Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts’ (2014) 30(3) Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 333; Max Rettig, ‘Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?’ (2008) 51(3) African Studies Review 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Human Rights Watch, ‘Law and Reality’ (n 14) 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Alison Des Forges, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda’ (Human Rights Watch, 1999) <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm#TopOfPage> accessed 03 July 2018; Human Rights Watch, ‘Justice Compromised’ (n14); Human Rights Watch, ‘Law and Reality’ (n 14); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda’ (n 47). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Crawley and van Rijswijk (n 5) 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Mortensen, Soderbergh, and Christensen (n 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Strassen (n 8) 25-26, 38, 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Strassen (n 8) 27, 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. cf. Strassen (n 8) 1, 2, 7, 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. cf. Strassen (n 8) 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. cf Strassen (n 8) 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. cf Strassen (n 8) 5, 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. cf Strassen (n 8) 8, 9, 13, 37, 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. cf. Strassen (n 8) 1, 14, 31, 51, 67, 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. cf. Strassen (n 8) 8, 15, 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. cf. Strassen (n 8) 3, 10-11, 62, 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. cf. Strassen (n 8) 16-17, 20, 40, 45, 55-56, 61, 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. cf Strassen (n 8) 5, 20-21, 46, 57, 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. cf. Strassen (n 8) 2, 10, 12-13, 15, 22, 24-27, 29, 37-38, 46-49, 51, 53, 54, 57, 67, 73, 75-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. cf. Strassen (n 8) 28, 50, 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. cf. Strassen (n 8) 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. cf. Strassen (n 8) 53, 61-62, 74, 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. cf. Strassen (n 8) 53, 59, 70, 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. cf. Strassen (n 8) 1, 43-44, 52-53, 62, 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. cf. Strassen (n 8) 4, 5, 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. cf. Strassen (n 8) 1, 6, 11-12, 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. cf. Strassen (n 8) 1-6, 43, 67, 70, 75-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. cf. Strassen (n 8) 68-69, 72, 75-76, 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. cf. Strassen (n 8) 9, 10, 23, 25, 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. cf. Strassen (n 8) 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. cf. Strassen (n 8) 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. cf. Strassen (n 8) 57, 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. cf. Strassen (n 8) 7, 8, 9, 10, 64, 65-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. cf. Strassen (n8) 12-15. For further information on the art of comics and graphic novels see for example William Eisner, *Comics and Sequential Art: Principles and Practices from the Legendary Cartoonist* (W. W. Norton & Company 2008); Scott McCloud, *Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art* (HarperPerennial 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Strassen (n 8) 74-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Strassen (n 8) 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Doris E Buss, ‘Rethinking “Rape as a Weapon of War”’ (2009) 17 Feminist Legal Studies 145; Mirzoeff (n 6) 86; Zahar and Sluiter (n 4) 159: Here it has to be noted that génocidaires did not only target Tutsi but also foreigners married to Tutsi, moderate Hutu, the Nilo-Hamitic people of the region, members of the Ugandan army, unemployed people, and criminals in flight. This indicates that the ICTR’s focus on ethnicity obscured various political, economic, regional and class configurations of the conflict. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Strassen (n 8) 40, 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Eleni Coundouriotis, ‘“You Only Have Your Word”: Rape and Testimony’ (2013) 35(2) Human Rights Quarterly 365, 383; Suzanne Keen, ‘Fast Tracks to Narrative Empathy: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization in Graphic Novels’ (2011) 40(1) SubStances 135, 143-144; Silva (n 7) 28-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Strassen (n 8) 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Strassen (n 8) 57-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Des Forges (n 50). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Rowan Savage, ‘Modern Genocidal Dehumanization: A New Model’ (2013) 47 Patterns of Prejudice 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Strassen (n 8) 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Strassen (n 8) 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Strassen (n 8) 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. O'Neill (n 6); Strassen (n 8) 59-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Strassen (n 8) 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Strassen (n 8) 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Strassen (n 8) 58-59, 62-64, 70-74. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Strassen (n 8) 55-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Strassen (n 8) 56-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Strassen (n 8) 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Strassen (n 8) 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Strassen (n 8) 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Strassen (n 8) 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Strassen (n 8) 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Strassen (n 8) 71, 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Strassen (n 8) 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Strassen (n 8) 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Mortensen, Soderbergh, and Christensen (n 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. O'Neill (n 6). [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 513. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. *Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana* (n 20) para 34; Strassen (n 8) foreword. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Buss (n 83) 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Strassen (n 8) 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Strassen (n 8) 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Buss (n 83) 157-158; Strassen (n 8) foreword; Zahar and Sluiter (n 4) 158-162. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Mirzoeff (n 6) 86; Zahar and Sluiter (n 4) 158-162. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Strassen (n 8) 57-59 [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Strassen (n 8) 29-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Strassen (n 8) foreword. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Strassen (n 8) 29-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Strassen (n 8) 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Strassen (n 8) 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Strassen (n 8) 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11) para 511. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Strassen (n 8) 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Strassen (n 8) 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. *Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu* (n 11); Des Forges (n 50). [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Strassen (n 8) 17-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Strassen (n 8) 17-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Zahar and Sluiter (n 4) 158-162. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Strassen (n 8) 23-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Strassen (n 8) 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Silva (n 7) 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Michelle Bumatay and Hannah Warman, ‘Illustrating Genocidaires, Orphans, and Child Soldiers in Central Africa’ (2012) 24(3) Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 332, 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Strassen (n 8) 59-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Strassen (n 8) 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Strassen (n 8) 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Strassen (n 8) 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Silva (n 7) 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Strassen (n 8) 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Strassen (n 8) 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Strassen (n 8) 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Strassen (n 8) 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Strassen (n 8) 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Hannah Baumeister, *Sexualized Crimes, Armed Conflict and the Law: The International Criminal Court and the Definition of Rape and Forced Marriage* (Routledge 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Strassen (n 8) 26, 46-47, 52-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Strassen (n 8) 75-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Jade Munslow Ong, ‘“I’m only a dog!”: The Rwandan genocide, dehumanization, and the graphic novel’ (2016) 51(2) The Journal of Commonwealth Literature 211, 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Munslow Ong (n 146). [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Strassen (n 8) 75-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Strassen (n 8) 51-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Bumatay and Warman (n 132) 334. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (Viking Press 1963); Bumatay and Warman (n 132) 335; Coundouriotis (n 85) 383; Keen (n 85) 152; Mortensen, Soderbergh, and Christensen (n 9); Munslow Ong (n 146); O'Neill (n 6); Silva (n 7) 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Keen (n 85) 140; Mortensen, Soderbergh, and Christensen (n 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-153)