Towards intersectional democratic innovations

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Towards Intersectional Democratic Innovations

Abstract

While scholarship on intersectionality has emphasised the need to go beyond single categories of identity, like gender or race, intersectionality has not been considered to date within the literature on democratic innovations, even though enhancing inclusion is a key aim of such institutions. This article overcomes this gap. It analyses tools of inclusion within democratic innovations and argues they are not responsive to intersectionality claims. This article shows that current democratic innovations are explicitly exclusionary towards the groups which need the attention of the democratic scholars the most. To address this problem, this article argues for a move away from advocating for single or ‘one-off’ acts of inclusion and towards a more direct focus on facilitating leadership of the disempowered and diversification of the contexts of democratic innovations. Such changes can increase the sensitivity of democratic innovations but can also facilitate a wider social change.
Recent years have seen various calls for increasing diversity within the field of political science (see Fraga et al. 2011). As a result, the discipline has become more alert to the paradigm of intersectionality and the consequences of this paradigm for political research (K. Davis 2008; Hancock 2016; Walby et al. 2010). Proponents of intersectionality argue that single categories of identity are insufficient to analyse and address the oppression faced by members of disempowered groups (see Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Hancock 2007a, 2007b). However, to date, intersectionality has had little impact on democratic scholarship, and the few publications on the topic that do exist (Martínez-Palacios 2017; J. Squires 2010) have not facilitated popular interest within mainstream democratic studies.

Democratic scholarship claims that democratic institutions should be inclusive (e.g. Dahl 1998; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010; M. E. Warren 2017). I take inclusion to mean the ability to incorporate and adapt to specific circumstances of members of disempowered groups, e.g. women, socially excluded representatives of some of the ethnic groups, or people with non-binary gender. Inclusion is of particular value to many deliberative and participatory democrats, and it often constitutes the rationale for creating separate institutions, namely democratic innovations, which complement broader democratic processes (see Fung and Wright 2001; Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Smith 2005). However, as this article argues, democratic innovations usually focus on one, separate identity category at a time. Indeed, some democratic innovations are even identity-blind. As such, participatory and deliberative institutions at present are explicitly exclusionary towards the experiences and oppression of members of many disempowered groups.

This article seeks to show how intersectionality can be a helpful analytical and conceptual tool for deliberative and participatory democrats. In the context of democratic innovations, intersectionality provides a richer and more nuanced basis for the analysis of inclusion practices within democratic innovations. Hence, intersectionality can help to shed light on specific circumstances of members of disempowered groups, e.g. Black women, disabled people, or individuals with a non-binary gender. Members of these groups often experience stark discrimination and injustice (H. F. Davis 2014; Grant et al. 2011). While democratic scholars have been aware of intra-group dynamics and inequality, the

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1 For example, the APSA Presidential Task Force Report Political Science in the 21st Century makes such calls.
2 For an overview of a place of inclusion within current deliberative theory see Erman (2016) and Smith (2009).
application of intersectionality can ground more radical claims to resistance or justice (Spade 2013). By making democratic innovations more sensitive to various dynamics of oppression, democratic scholarship can provide much-needed space for members of the affected groups to conceptualise, formulate, and make such claims. In this light, this article offers a perspective that can contribute towards achieving these ends and can help to make democratic innovations inclusive of those in most need of democratic attention.

The article argues that including an intersectional perspective does not require a transformation, rejection of existing theories or the creation of new inclusion tools. However, it does require a shift in the focus of democratic innovations. While suggesting piecemeal adjustments, this article further argues for a move away from advocating for a single or ‘one-off’ acts of inclusion and towards a more direct focus on facilitating leadership of the disempowered and diversification of the contexts of democratic innovations.

The argument proceeds as follows. First, I consider the concepts of inclusion and intersectionality, and examine why these are important for democratic research. Second, I analyse the most well-established tools of inclusion within democratic innovations. To analyse the practices set out above, the article explores if and how they can fully include members of social groups who experience exclusion on either of the following bases:

1. They find themselves at the intersection of two or more disempowered identity markers (e.g. gender, ethnicity, social class);
2. They identify themselves as part of a dynamic identity spectrum (e.g. non-binary gender), as opposed to a crisp and stable identity category (e.g. binary notion of gender – based on being either male or female).³

This article argues that current democratic innovations are not fully inclusive of those who experience exclusion on either of the above grounds. However, it is possible to adjust and improve such democratic practices. The final section emphasises the role of the disempowered groups’ direct participation in visible leadership positions as an effective tool of intersectional inclusion. While focusing on issues of inclusion within a specialised body of literature, this article contributes to the broader field of political science by arguing how to improve current democratic practices. It suggests relevant adjustments and enhancements, and makes social diversity a central part of this change.
Intersectionality and Democratic Inclusion

In deliberative and participatory democratic approaches in particular, inclusion is a central value. More precisely, deliberative and participatory democrats consider the ideal of democratic decision-making to be one in which ‘all of those who are possibly affected by the decisions have equal chances to enter and take part’ (Habermas 1996: 305). If members of the same groups are repeatedly excluded from the process of democratic decision-making, this creates a tension and a potential problem for such theories.\(^4\) By referring to these theories as deliberative and participatory, I refer to two distinct, yet interconnected, normative theories of democracy. While there is a substantive debate within the relevant literature as to whether deliberative and participatory theories are contradictory (e.g. Mutz 2006; Pateman 2012), their application and aims frequently overlap (Curato et al. 2017).\(^5\)

More precisely, the practice of participatory and deliberative democracy most commonly overlap in so-called ‘invited spaces’, which refer to democratic innovations designed by democratic professionals that recruit participants (see Cornwall 2004).\(^6\) This article considers such participatory and deliberative innovations and, more precisely, popular assemblies and mini-publics (Smith 2009). Popular assemblies refer to institutional innovations that provide a space for citizens to meet and engage in decision-making on urgent public policy issues. Examples might include New England town meetings in the US (J. J. Mansbridge 1980), or the Participatory Budgeting process made famous by experiments in Porto Alegre in Brazil (Santos 1998; Sintomer et al. 2008). Mini-publics, in turn, aim to recreate the demographic characteristics of the general public on a scale that is small enough for the group to engage in personal deliberation and decision-making (Goodin and Dryzek 2006). Examples of such mini-publics include Deliberative Polling (Fishkin 1991, 1995), Citizens’ Juries (Crosby and Nethercut 2005), the British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly in Canada (M. Warren and Pearse 2008b), or the 21st Century Town Meetings (AmericaSpeaks 2010).

\(^3\) Here, I am using these groups as a sort of test of democratic innovations. All people are at the intersection of some identity markers. Likewise, many or maybe even all identities are dynamic. However, not all of them are disempowered. My chief focus here is on members of such disempowered groups.

\(^4\) However, some deliberative and participatory democrats see also the important role of non-inclusive and elitist fora (Fung and Wright 2001; Landwehr 2014a).

\(^5\) For example, Curato and her co-authors argue that the study of deliberative micro-publics has the objective of developing more participatory societies, which are the aim of both systemic deliberative and participatory democrats.
In this article, I conceive of political inclusion as the practice of enabling entry into the political forum and providing equal opportunities for relevant agents to influence the decision-making process. This notion relies on the normative principle of all affected, according to which all those who are significantly affected by the decision should have an equal ability to influence it (Dahl 1998: 37-38; Goodin 2007; Young 2000: 23). In what follows, decision-making processes that do not provide such influence are not inclusive and, in this regard, they fail to be democratic. Inclusion, therefore, relies on an additional concept, namely that of equality (on a connection between these two concepts see: Erman 2016; Fung and Wright 2001; Young 2000). As Warren (2017) argues, equality is both a core democratic value and a foundation for the realisation of ideals of inclusion. Young further distinguishes between external and internal inclusion (2000). External inclusion refers to the ability to join the decision-making forum and not being left out nominally. Internal inclusion indicates an effective opportunity to influence others and, consequently, to influence the result. The division between external and internal inclusion is widely applied by democratic scholars, although it is sometimes labelled differently. For example, Abdullah et al. (2016b) refer to this division as equality vs. equity in democratic fora, while Smith discusses equality of presence and equality of voice (2009). This article will investigate both types of inclusion as the aim of democratic innovations.

Democratic innovations can facilitate external inclusion and address internal exclusion (Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Smith 2009: 163-69). Well-designed democratic fora can include members of disempowered social groups, provide them with relevant information, and strengthen their political, participatory, and deliberative skills (e.g. Santos 1998). Deliberative democrats commonly argue that processes of informed debate and engagement in justifications that are acceptable to all affected offer a way to guarantee internal inclusion (Knight and Johnson 1997). Following this argument, a well-designed deliberative process can enable members of disempowered social groups to make their voices heard, and it can also compensate for their lack of knowledge or resources. Similarly, participatory scholars argue that a well-designed forum can both compensate for lack of resources and include members of previously disempowered groups (Smith 2009).6

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6 As such, they are opposed to spontaneously created, bottom-up innovations in ‘popular spaces’.  
7 As happened, for example, during the Porto Alegre Participatory Budgeting.  
8 Some argue that a well-designed institution can even favour participation of previously excluded groups over other groups. See Coelho (2007).
In this study, I investigate whether appropriate institutional design can indeed be successful. More specifically, I scrutinise existing practices of inclusion from the perspective of intersectionality. The concept of intersectionality is most commonly assigned to Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989; 1991: 1242), who conceived of it as a response to forms of identity politics which ignore intra-group differences. According to Crenshaw, a focus on race or gender alone does not accurately describe the discrimination and violence experienced by black women (Bassel 2016; Crenshaw 1989, 1991). The scholarship on intersectionality argues that single categories of identity – like gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity – are insufficient when it comes to analysing, and addressing, disempowered group members’ situations (Bassel 2016). Members of the disempowered groups face oppression from multiple sources of disadvantage, which are greater than the sum of their parts (Crenshaw 1989). Well-designed democratic fora, responsive to the intersectionality perspective, should be capable of addressing multiple and intersecting sources of identity-based oppression.

Usually, the application of the intersectional perspective aims to shed light on the situation of members of specifically disempowered groups, and, from this perspective, to critically assess existing policies, positions, and experiences (see Hancock 2007a). Application of this perspective, therefore, requires an ‘insider view’ of experiences that are characteristic of people at the particular intersection of identities in question. Within the democratic scholarship literature, Martínez-Palacios (2016) successfully applies this perspective and analyses the experiences of deaf Basque women with participatory and deliberative institutions. However, intersectional scholars have also argued in favour of applying intersectionality more broadly, as ‘a challenge [that] urges us to grapple with and overcome our entrenched perceptual-cognitive habits of essentialism, categorical purity, and segregation’ (Carastathis 2016: 4). From this perspective, intersectionality is a critical concept and a field of study which aims to challenge understandings of the social world based on stable and neat identities. Intersectionality provides a lens through which we can analyse social and political institutions and their ability to accommodate fluid identities (Cho et al. 2013).

To clarify what this lens can offer to democratic theory, I will make use of three different approaches to studying categories of difference and inclusion, as identified by Hancock (2007b: 64). The unitary approach addresses only one category at a time and treats these categories as stable and uniform. The multiple approach enables analysis of several
identities at once but, similarly, treats them as static. Finally, the *intersectional approach* considers several categories of identity and identifies them as dynamic and diverse. This article investigates the practices of inclusion from the perspective of both the *multiple* and the *intersectional* approaches to studying identities. It assumes that practices that are responsive to the *multiple approach* to identity categories can include people whose exclusion results from being a member of two or more disempowered identity categories. In turn, practices that are responsive to the *intersectional approach* can include those who identify as part of a dynamic identity spectrum. This includes people who do not consider themselves as belonging to *any* particular category and consider this identity category to be fluid and part of a changeable spectrum. Usually, such fluid and dynamic identity categories refer to gender, race or caste, but they could also refer to any category that is not easily categorised by fixed and clear-cut distinctions. For example, it can accommodate people transitioning from one category to another, positioning themselves somewhere in-between established categories, oscillating from one end of a spectrum to another, and those who reject categories altogether (Brubaker 2016).

To date, fluid identity categories have received little attention from democratic scholars and designers of ‘invited spaces’. However, the position and experiences of individuals on the fluid identity spectrum should be of particular concern to democratic scholars, because such individuals face widespread discrimination and oppression. For example, Davis (2014) recalls a survey which shows that two-thirds of people with non-binary gender have experienced discrimination with a severe impact on their life. Moreover, such people are more likely to be victims of physical violence and face unemployment (H. F. Davis 2014). Hence, people with fluid and dynamic identity categories, as well as their claims, interests, and well-being, need to form part of various democratic decision-making processes, and their specific concerns need to be heard.

In the discussion of different tools of inclusion, this article refrains from identifying any actual intersection as the most underprivileged, given that this status is likely to vary in different contexts. Instead, my aim here is to investigate whether or not current policies and tools of inclusion are sensitive to any potentially disempowered members who experience exclusion on account of their being at the intersection of specific identity categories, and those who experience exclusion as a result of being part of a dynamic

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9 Examples of such consequences include losing a job, not receiving required medical attention, or being assaulted.
identity spectrum. To this end, in what follows, the article investigates how current democratic innovations are attempting to address the inclusion of members of disempowered social groups.

**An Analysis of Democratic Innovations**

The first place to which deliberative and participatory democrats turn in order to solve the problem of exclusion is the decision-making forum itself. The existing literature provides rich theoretical discussions and empirical illustrations of how democratic fora act as tools of formal and substantive inclusion (i.a. Baiocchi 2001; Beauvais and Bächtiger 2016; Flyvbjerg 1998; Santos 1998; Sintomer et al. 2012). Following Beauvais and Bächtiger (2016), there are three distinct moments when democratic innovations can be inclusive: at the recruitment stage; during the event itself; and finally, when the outcome reflects inclusiveness. Here, different methods of selecting participants enable inclusion during the recruitment stage (what I call ‘inclusion-recruitment’), facilitation and moderation enable inclusion during the event itself, while inclusion reflected in the outcome of the process refers to instances when the preferences and ideas of members of the disempowered group are reflected in the outcome (I call it ‘outcome-inclusion’). However, some participatory and deliberative democrats argue that even when excluded individuals are invited, even when they agree to participate, and even when there is good facilitation, members of such groups may still be unable to present their opinions fully (see Fraser 1990; J. Mansbridge 1996; Young 2000). Such individuals, so the argument goes, should meet in an enclave in which they can conceptualise their claims (C. F. Karpowitz et al. 2009). Finally, a discursive inclusion, as conceptualised by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), focuses on the inclusion of discourses rather than particular people or groups.

Below I argue that most tools of inclusion correspond to the *unitary approach* to the identity categories or, as in the case of discourse representation, ignore identities altogether. These tools of inclusion, if modified, can accommodate *multiple* and *intersectional* categories of identity and act as an instrument of inclusion towards members of previously disempowered groups. I argue that they can do so by facilitating leadership of those disempowered in democratic innovations and by diversifying the contexts of these events.
a. Inclusion at the Recruitment Stage

There are three forms of participant recruitment for democratic innovations: self-selection; random selection; and controlled selection. Self-selection is a mode of recruitment which invites participation in democratic innovation of everyone who wishes to attend (Fung 2006: 67). Self-selection is often a mode of recruitment for the popular assemblies’ type of democratic innovation, e.g. New England town meetings. While self-selection ensures external inclusion, it does not guarantee internal inclusion. As the existing literature shows, when applied in the context of mixed groups, specific characteristics repeatedly become overrepresented as a result of the self-selection process. Such a recruitment process, therefore, fails to include underrepresented groups. The people most likely to volunteer to participate are usually men, white, and of higher socio-economic status (Jacobs et al. 2009; Strolovitch 2006; see also: Urbinati and Warren 2008).

Furthermore, individuals can face structural problems in entering the forum, connected to their family or professional roles, and physical or social abilities. Self-selection does not address these issues. However, self-selection can operate as a tool of inclusion in certain contexts. For example, self-selected innovations in disadvantaged locations can successfully mobilise and empower those previously disempowered. For example, Smith illustrates this point by describing participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, which ‘successfully mobilised large numbers from poor social groups that have traditionally been resistant to political participation’ (2009: 71).

Random selection is a different mode of recruitment, often present in mini-publics. It relies on (almost) randomly choosing participants on the basis of census data or voting lists detailing citizens who are of voting-age (Smith 2009 ch. 3). Random sampling constitutes an attempt to guarantee that the group will represent the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of a given population (Fishkin 2011). This form of selection, while ensuring (almost) the same probability for each citizen to be included, can fail to include members of the most commonly disempowered social groups, and it can produce results from which whole segments of society are missing (O’Flynn and Sood 2014: 44). This is because deliberative fora are usually relatively small in size (Beauvais and

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10 Davies et al. (2005) also describe a fourth way of participant recruitment for deliberative bodies that is not participatory, namely by election.
Furthermore, as Smith notes (2009: 80), participants need to agree to participate. This means that even when members of the disempowered groups are selected, structural constraints or lack of confidence may hinder their full inclusion. Finally, random selection based on census data or voting lists will necessarily exclude unregistered, homeless or informal migrants.

The inclusion of members of disempowered groups is a specific concern for controlled selection. It can take the form of a stratified random sampling whereby the likeliness of participation of members of some groups is increased, or purposive sampling in which democratic practitioners invite only representatives of the particular group(s) (Beauvais and Bächtiger 2016: 5). Citizens’ Juries and Citizens’ Assemblies apply this method of recruitment (Smith 2012: 96). The reasoning behind controlled recruitment is to invite those participants who are less likely to be included in the forum by other means, or to ensure specific proportions of participants from different demographics. However, both methods of controlled selection mean that the group will be representative only in respect of the selected criteria (Parkinson 2006: 76). Hence, if the intersections of the particular characteristics are not explicitly the aim of the selection, people with intersectional identities will not be included in the forum. Furthermore, controlled selection tends to look at different demographics in isolation from each other, that is, without considering or targeting the intersection of the disempowered characteristics. For example, the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly used geographical district, gender, and age, and recruited two Indigenous members, but did not consider the intersection of disempowered identities (Smith 2012: 96; M. Warren and Pearse 2008a: 10).

The logic of targeted recruitment makes it difficult to treat identities as fluid, as the identity categories are the very foundation for choosing particular members. Hancock (2007b: 72) argues that any researcher using existing data-sets, like censuses or self-identification by a single survey question, does not fulfil the requirements of the intersectional approach. Instead, she argues, a relevant selection should be based on fuzzy sets. However, targeted selection currently does not employ this method. Such practice is explicitly exclusionary towards people on the identity spectrum. Democratic recruiters aiming to include underrepresented genders will most likely focus on women. As a result, they will exclude non-binary people and those with fluid gender identity. Stratified random sampling

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11 Here Hancock analyses political science methods and not democratic innovations per se. However, the analysis is relevant for democratic innovations as well.
that achieves, for example, 50/50 gender equality explicitly excludes those with non-binary gender. In other words, targeted participant selection is currently unable to treat categories of identity as dynamic and diverse, and, as such, it does not possess the strengths of the intersectional approach to identity categories.

Hence, all three methods are prone to omit people who experience exclusion on account of finding themselves at the intersection of two or more disempowered identity markers or on a dynamic identity spectrum. While in self-selection and random sampling these types of individuals are much less likely to agree to participate, controlled selections tend to consider only one specific dimension of identity at a time. From the perspective of underrepresented identities, such tools are therefore likely to be too narrowly focused on one set of identity categories. Indeed, this means that members of the groups whose specific circumstances and experiences of exclusion result from intersections of identity are likely to be omitted by the forum designers.

In principle, it is possible that democratic designers would identify members of a particular social group, who have previously been excluded due to finding themselves at the intersection of two or more disempowered identity markers or on a dynamic identity spectrum, and target them directly. However, such a policy would only realise external norms of inclusion. For full inclusion, this direct targeting would need to be aimed not at simple participation, but rather at leadership positions of organisation, management, and recruitment. Seeing similar people engaged in the process can enhance confidence and enable those disempowered to agree to participate when randomly selected. For example, Smith (2009: 168) reports that reaching a threshold of members of disempowered groups in democratic fora can result in the increased confidence of its members. Chun et al. (2013) report similar boosts in confidence in their case study of Asian Immigrant Women Advocates. Finally, based on their analysis of engagement of LGBTQ activists in the organisation for undocumented youth migrants in the US, Terriquez (2015) argues that visible leadership of members with intersectional identities facilitated activism and commitment among the disempowered groups. These examples show that democratic innovations can use tools of recruitment to take up leadership positions during the events and facilitate wider inclusion of the disempowered groups. Furthermore, intersectional democratic innovations should strive to diversify the context in which such events take place. Democratic innovations in underprivileged contexts, organised by people of disempowered identities, enable the use of self-selection as a tool of inclusion.
b. **Inclusion During the Event**

According to the democratic innovations’ literature, inclusion during the event is possible by facilitation, by choosing the mode of communication that is suitable for the participants, and by helping participants to overcome barriers in using these forms of communication.\(^{12}\) While choosing the relevant form of communication enables active participation of all members, the role of the facilitator is to include those who would not be able to present their opinions otherwise and to empower members of the disadvantaged groups (see Beauvais and Bächtiger 2016; Trénel 2009). Here, the role of a facilitator is to lead a discussion, interact with participants, and include all members in the decision-making process (Moore 2012). The role of an active and visible facilitator is to help the group to reach its self-defined goals, and to ensure internal inclusion and pluralism (Landwehr 2014b).\(^{13}\) Appropriate facilitation can manage tensions associated with power dynamics (e.g. Carolyne Abdullah et al. 2016a; Asenbaum 2016; Moore 2012). Landwehr takes this further and argues that the facilitator can act as a person who includes the interests or opinions of those who are not present at the event (2014b). It is, therefore, a top-down approach, which emphasises the role of the professional staff within the democratic fora.\(^{14}\)

However, in order for the facilitation to act as an effective tool of inclusion, members of disempowered groups would first need to be selected. As I have argued, at present this is problematic. Landwehr (2014b) argues that a skilled facilitator can encourage more passive members of the group and temper overly dominant ones. Here, more passive members are usually those who occupy a disempowered position. However, facilitation can follow the pattern of focusing on single identity categories while disregarding the specific experiences of those who are subjected to multiple sources of discrimination.

Similarly, the particular experiences of those who are disempowered on account of finding themselves on a dynamic identity spectrum will be most likely alien to the facilitators. While the extent to which facilitators are including intersectional perspective in

\(^{12}\) For example, some note that computer skills can be a barrier for some of users. See Grönlund et al. (2009).

\(^{13}\) Trénel (2009) refers to this type of facilitation as ‘advanced’ facilitation, as opposed to the basic kind, in which the facilitator is only visible when an intervention is required. Basic facilitation is often employed in online deliberations.

\(^{14}\) At the same time, the level of research into types of facilitation and their implications for deliberative innovations remains sparse. See Landwehr (2014b: 82).
their practice remains a matter of ongoing research, the focusing on a singular identity is likely due to an absence of intersectionality within the democratic innovations scholarship. To illustrate this, consider Trénel (2009), who shows that facilitation can increase the substantive inclusion of women, non-white participants, and those with low incomes, and lower levels of education. However, here, the researcher does not investigate whether facilitation is similarly successful in its inclusion of participants at the intersection of those categories. The analysis takes the individual identity categories in isolation and follows the unitary approach. As such, it overlooks the intersectionality paradigm.

In principle, it is possible to train facilitators to include specific concerns and to accommodate particular experiences of oppression and exclusion. However, this solution runs the risk of being essentialising towards the disempowered perspectives. It is because, such training may rely on the assumption that there exist an identity or a set of attributes that all members of the disempowered group share (see J. Mansbridge 1999). As a result, this solution may fail to accommodate the complexity of members of the disempowered groups and their experiences. Furthermore, such solution does not change the relational dynamics through which the disempowered have the more passive role. Instead, it should be the members of the disempowered groups who provide moderation or facilitation. Their own experiences enable the active inclusion of an intersectional perspective, but their active presence also changes the top-down dynamics of the forum.

c. Inclusion as Reflected in the Decision-making Outcome

Ideally, results of democratic decision-making should reflect the ideals of inclusion too. Here, I focus on the direct decision-making result as a tool of inclusion instead of the longer-term outcome. Such a move is justifiable since an inclusive decision-making rule is a functional first step towards the outcome-inclusion. In addition, most democratic innovations act as a consultative forum, whose decisions may or may not be taken into account by the official legislature. As Geissel (2012: 177) notes, the outcomes of consultative fora often do not attract the attention of decision-making bodies.

Not all democratic innovations arrive at a final decision, but those that do are necessarily exclusive towards some participants as a result of decision-making procedures, such as majoritarian or absolute majority voting. In their analysis of gender inclusion, Karpowitz et al. (2012) show that consensual forms of decision-making can be both
inclusive as well as exclusive of members of the disempowered groups, depending on the group composition. Compromise, resulting from democratic decision-making, might be a different solution as, in principle, it provides greater scope for the inclusion of various perspectives and opinions. However, as Young (2001) observes, compromises can also mask inequalities of power and forms of dominance. Members who experience exclusion due to being at the intersection of identity categories can be especially vulnerable to the effects of such inequalities and power imbalances (see also Smith 2012).

There are no straightforward solutions that would guarantee an outcome that is inclusive towards those groups at the intersection of disempowered identity markers or on a dynamic identity spectrum. One way to ensure inclusion is to diversify the context of democratic innovations. Events organised in the disempowered locations with the majoritarian presence of the disempowered groups will necessarily be inclusive towards at least some of them. In other words, to ensure an inclusive result, enclaves appear to offer a good solution. This leads to the next point, namely, inclusion in enclaves.

d. Enclaves and Subaltern Publics

Some participatory and deliberative democrats argue that even when excluded groups are invited, and when they agree to participate, and even when trained facilitations support them, they may still be unable to present their opinions fully. This argument claims that groups repeatedly excluded from the public sphere are less accustomed to articulating their preferences and opinions effectively. Therefore, one-off inclusions in a deliberative forum do not ensure an internal form of inclusion. The deliberation of protected enclaves or subaltern counter-publics can address this issue (Fraser 1990; C. F. Karpowitz et al. 2009; J. Mansbridge 1996). Such fora can promote inclusion in the decision-making processes by creating and promoting a space in which previously excluded groups can discuss their ideas and strengthen their argumentation. Such spaces are essential for unprivileged groups, since within the safe space they should be better able to clarify and discuss their common aims (J. Mansbridge 1996). In turn, these protected spaces can provide room for the development of ideas that would otherwise be overlooked or ignored (C. F. Karpowitz et al. 2009: 582). To recall, here I analyse enclaves and counter-publics designed by democratic professionals that are ‘invited-spaces’ (Cornwall 2004) as opposed to more spontaneous, bottom-up fora.
There are many examples where enclave decision-making has successfully acted as a tool of inclusion. For example, Karpowitz et al. (2012) show that women participate best when in homogeneous groups. Mendelberg et al. (2014: 33) further argue that enclave deliberations for women ‘create a friendly, inclusive discussion tone, and this tone, unlike a hostile or conflictual tone, carries with it the contribution of one speaker to another’s thought’. Kaprowitz, Raphel and Hammond (2009) describe a consensus conference, held in the US, that employed decision-making within several enclaves: low-income people; African-Americans; Hispanics; senior citizens; disabled people; and rural residents. The results of the conference showed that participants increased their knowledge of the issues discussed, and that interpersonal trust was significantly enhanced.

Enclave deliberation and subaltern publics can act as tools of inclusion if the relevant group consists of members who belong to previously disempowered categories of identity. However, enclave deliberation can be prone to forms of intra-group exclusion and domination. For instance, previously organised enclave deliberations and subaltern publics have often focused on one category of identity, from gender to ethnic identity, or specific political viewpoints (e.g. Chistopher. F. Karpowitz et al. 2012). Even when democratic scholars analyse several underprivileged categories of identity at the same time, they evaluate them separately from each other. For example, Karpowitz, Raphel and Hammond (2009) analyse underprivileged participants divided into different sets of enclave deliberation during which all members were in at least one enclave panel, with some being in several. Similarly, Von Lieres and Kahane (2007) describe the enclave of Indigenous citizens in Canada. However, none of the authors above considers how different categories of identity interact with each other, and neither do they consider the creation of separate deliberative groups for those people who experience internal exclusion due to being at the intersection of more than one disempowered category. As Squires (2002) notes, the current counter-publics are often irresponsive to the intra-group variety.15

Still, enclaves, at least in principle, can easily become tools of intersectional inclusion. The latter can be facilitated by the active commitment of the organisers of the enclave to intersectionality and intra-group diversity. For example, Martínez-Palacios (2017) describes the City for All Women Initiative (CAWI) in Ottawa as an example of an innovation that creates the space for women participants at the intersection of various

15 This can be further illustrated by Hughes who describes how The National Council on Disability downplayed participants’ difference and, as such, failed to be an inclusive, pluralistic tool (2016).
disempowered identity categories, thanks to the acceptance of ‘the diversity existing among the women constituting the forum’ (Martínez-Palacios 2017: 585). Such commitment can be the easiest to achieve when the disempowered themselves take up the leadership positions and use their own experiences to facilitate diversity. However, such commitment may also be possible even when members of the empowered groups engage in the organisation of the enclave.

e. Discourse Inclusiveness

Supporters of discourse representation offer a different logic of inclusion (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008, 2010). This perspective proposes addressing inequalities in deliberative fora not by asking the question of whether everybody is included, but instead by investigating whether or not all relevant discourses are included. By this logic, it is not necessary that everyone is included in the deliberative forum so long as the discourse that they support is included. Here, discourse refers to ‘a set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, conventions, dispositions, and capabilities’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010: 31). In other words, discourse is a way of making sense of the world, which is shared by people and revealed by language. According to the proponents of the discursive approach, discourses do not equate to groups based on identity categories (race, gender, age, etc.). At the same time, by drawing on the insights of discursive psychology, Dryzek and Niemeyer argue that individuals engage with, and reflect on, multiple discourses. It is therefore likely that many individuals will find several discourses to be essential for an adequate representation of their perspective, and that individuals will partially endorse more than one discourse at a time (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010: 49, 57-58). Furthermore, some of the discourses to which individuals partially subscribe are likely to be contradictory or at least contain significant tensions.

Projected chambers of discourses accommodate this approach and act as a consulting forum for policymakers (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). The creation of such an institution could start out by exploring all discourses that are relevant to the matter, before going on to identify representatives for the identified discourses. As Dryzek and Niemeyer point out, there may be a need to include discourses that nobody taking part represents, where some person acts as ‘devil’s advocate’. It is possible to apply social-scientific methods, from a Q methodology to historical or ethnographic analysis, to identify all of the
relevant discourses.\textsuperscript{16} Niemeyer and Jennstål (2016) aim to develop a similar form of inclusion, based on the discursive representation of future generations and their interests. Such designed representations of discourses, they argue, may take a formal or an informal character.

The representation of discourses, therefore, focuses not on particular categories of identity, but existing discourses. As such, discourse representation concerns what Philips calls the ‘politics of ideas’ (1995). Discursive inclusion, contrary to descriptive inclusion, is not concerned with unitary and stable sociological groups. As Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) emphasise, usually a variety of discourses will represent single individuals. Hence, those individuals who have found themselves thus far excluded on account of the intersecting of disempowered identity markers, or the dynamic identity spectrum, could be included via a representation of all the discourses to which they partially ascribe. However, as intersectionality scholarship argues, people at the intersection of underprivileged identity categories experience a lack of power and voice (Crenshaw 1991). Hence, the inclusion of particular discourses to which members of such disempowered groups ascribe is not sufficiently sensitive to a specific experience of oppression. From an intersectional perspective, the full inclusion of people at the intersection of two or more disempowered identity markers requires the inclusion of their specific discourse. However, it is also likely that the discourse of the disempowered is not fully crystallised and will not be picked up by the relevant social-scientific methodology. For the same reasons, the representation of discourses may not be inclusive towards people on the fluid and dynamic identity spectrum, since their full inclusion requires a crystallisation of their discourse. This weakens the feasibility of discourse representation as a tool of inclusion for members of the affected groups.

In its current form, the representation of discourses does not respond to either of the approaches identified by Hancock (2007b), since it does not focus on identity categories. However, discourse representation and chambers of discourses can act as tools of intersectional inclusion. For example, there can exist a ‘chamber of the disempowered’ centred on the discourse of those on the intersection of disempowered identity categories or those on a fluid and dynamic identity spectrum. The existence of such a chamber can enable members of these groups to crystalise their discourse and to strengthen their claims. However, to be truly inclusive in the intersectional sense, a chamber of the disempowered

\textsuperscript{16} For more about Q methodology, see Niemeyer (2011).
needs to rely on descriptive inclusion. Following intersectionality claims, only the disempowered can do justice to their specific situation and experiences. As such, the direct engagement of the disempowered is still necessary.

**Summary and a Way Forward**

This article has focused on the problem of external and internal inclusion of members of disempowered groups in democratic innovations. For many deliberative and participatory democrats, inclusion is a key rationale underpinning the organising of democratic events (see Smith 2009). Democratic scholars apply specific methods of participant selection, provide relevant facilitation, and seek to create enclave deliberation or subaltern publics so as to ensure inclusion of all the relevant members. Others have called for the representation of discourses rather than people as a way to include all relevant viewpoints. This article has examined these inclusion practices from the perspective of intersectionality. It has investigated these practices to ascertain whether and to what extent they can externally and internally include people who experience exclusion as a result of the intersecting of two or more disempowered identity markers, and people whose disempowered position results from them identifying themselves on a dynamic identity spectrum as opposed to a crisp and stable identity category. While democratic innovations are not currently inclusive on either of these fronts, this article has suggested piecemeal adjustments that could accommodate members of these groups.

These piecemeal adjustments differ depending on the tool of inclusion. For inclusion at the recruitment process, I suggested direct invitation to members of the disempowered groups to take up the leading positions during the democratic events. I also suggested diversifying the context of those innovations that rely on self-selection. For intersectional inclusion during the event, I argued for increasing sensitivity of moderators and facilitators to the specific experiences of participants at the intersection of disempowered identities or on a dynamic identity spectrum. For the outcome-inclusion, I recommended decision-making in disempowered contexts. Consequently, I noted that enclaves can become better inclusion tools if they are created with a clear commitment to intersectionality in mind. Finally, discourse representation can become a tool of intersectional inclusion if it creates space for crystallisation and representation of the
discourse of those at the intersection of disempowered identity categories or on a fluid identity spectrum.

What unites all these recommendations is their commitment to increasing leadership of the disempowered during democratic events and diversifying contexts of these events. Only such events have the potential to facilitate broader mobilisation of the disempowered groups and change the top-down character of democratic innovations. Intersectional change can start by democratic practitioners targeting members of the disempowered groups directly and inviting them to engage in leadership positions within democratic events, such as organisation, management, active facilitation and moderation, mentorship, and research guidance roles. This first step is likely to be successful given that members of traditionally disempowered groups, when asked directly, are more likely to join (Neblo et al. 2010). However, what starts as a top-down initiative of democratic professionals can facilitate wider democratic change. Experiences of the grassroots movements and bottom-up activism show that leadership of those at the intersection of disempowered identities can facilitate broader mobilisation within their groups and can attract the others (e.g. Perry 2016; Terriquez 2015). Such forms of leadership can also increase the group’s sensitivity to various forms of oppression, marginalisation, and injustice (Chun et al. 2013). Intersectional democratic innovations in diverse contexts can create spill-over effects and, as such, contribute to better and more equal societies.
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