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Executive Summary

Introduction to the Conflict Research Programme

The overall goal of the Conflict Research Programme (CRP) is to provide an evidence-based strategic re-orientation of international engagement in places apparently afflicted by the world’s most intractable violent conflicts. Its premise is that in these places, the ability of public authorities to provide even the most basic level of governance is subject to the functioning of the ‘real politics’ of gaining, managing and holding power, which we argue functions as a ‘political marketplace’. This approach helps explain the frustrations of state-building and institutionally-focused engagement; it can also inform the design of improved interventions, which reduce the risk and impact of conflict and violence in developing countries, alleviating poverty and insecurity. A key objective of our research, and a key contribution to the ‘Better Delivery’ agenda within DFID, is to make policies better targeted, more nuanced and rooted in a clear understanding of the social condition that undergirds persistent contemporary conflict.

The locations for research are Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. Our central hypothesis is that governance in these difficult places is dominated by the logic of a political marketplace. These political markets are turbulent, violent and integrated into regional and global networks of power and money. We also hypothesise that moral populism (most visible in identity politics, persecuting ideologies and violent extremism) is a counterpart to the marketisation of politics, and the two flourish in conditions of persistent uncertainty, conflict and trauma. Current policy frameworks and tools can neither capture the everyday realities of politics and governance in these difficult places, nor adjust to the dynamics of contested power relations. External interventions risk being enmeshed in logics of power and may end up inadvertently supporting violence and authoritarianism. At the same time, in all war-torn spaces, there are relatively peaceful zones: what we term ‘pockets of civility’. These might be territorial (local ceasefires, or inclusive local authorities) social (civil society groups helping the vulnerable or countering sectarian narratives, or customary courts solving disputes fairly) or external (interventions that regulate flows of political finance).

The CRP will generate evidence-based, operationally relevant research that can enable real-time analysis of the dynamics of conflict, contestation, ‘civility’ and public authority, enabling better interventions to manage and resolve armed conflict, reduce violence, and create conditions for more accountable and transparent governance. A core component of the CRP is to contribute to a better understanding of “what works” in addressing violent conflict across our research sites. We will develop comparative understanding of how different interventions affect violent conflict and the risk of renewed violent conflict, across our research sites. We will also examine the contextual factors that affect the effectiveness of these interventions. Intervention areas selected for comparative research: Security interventions; civil society and community mediation interventions; resource interventions; and interventions designed to strengthen authority and legitimacy, including at the sub-national level.

We envisage emerging findings from our political economy analysis of conflict drivers to shape our comparative analysis of specific interventions.

Our research methods include (a) comparative political ethnography (b) refined datasets (c) models of violence and political business (d) socio-political mapping of the structural drivers of conflict and the groups involved in political mobilisation and coercion and (e) action research exploring agents of change. We have a unique and robust infrastructure of local researchers and civil society networks across all our sites that will facilitate both fieldwork research and remote research. The CRP team is already closely engaged with key political processes – and regional actors - in the countries concerned, designed to promote peace, humanitarian action, human rights and democracy. This engagement is a key part of our method and will ensure that evidence-based research is effectively communicated to institutions engaged in trying to reduce the risk and impact of violent conflict in our research sites. Our emphasis is upon a mix of research methods and mechanisms for engaging in policy and practice. In line with this flexible approach, we will hold an annual in-country workshop with each DFID country office, and key stakeholders, to work through the implications of our research for them in a practical, flexible and responsive way. This will be supplemented by regular written and face-to-face/virtual communication with country staff.
CRP Research on Somalia

The stakes are very high for not ‘getting Somalia wrong’ another time. Creating a viable polity in Somalia, not prone to violent conflict that generates humanitarian crisis and instability requires a sound understanding of the drivers of armed conflict and governance crisis, and ‘what works’ in addressing these challenges. Policymakers do not have the luxury of a disengaged stance. Somalia poses the particular challenge that is one of a kind: ‘what works’ elsewhere may not work well in Somalia.

The political marketplace is the most appropriate framework for understanding Somali governance, including the drivers of conflict and political coalition management, since the 1980s. The consolidation of public authority in Somalia - including attempts to build state capacity and legitimacy – requires attention to the logic of political marketplace. Political economy analysis alone, however, is not enough. We also require a much better understanding of the powerful ideologies that mobilise violence, as well as the counter-logics that encourage peaceful and economically productive relations between citizens.

In this synthesis paper, we take the Somali Compact of September 2013 as a starting point, and examine the literature relevant to the drivers of conflict and ‘what works’ in interventions to improve stability in Somalia. The Somali Compact, in common with the Busan ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ from which it is drawn, is not a political-economic theory of why states fail and how they can be put back together. Rather, it is a big tent under which national governments, development and security partners, and other stakeholders can come together in a common process in which, despite their differences, they can work towards overcoming state fragility. This allows for diversity and flexibility: the policy-related research agenda outlined in this paper makes use of this flexibility.

The CRP will undertake operationally relevant research in Somalia to explore the political economy drivers of conflict, as well as the ideologies and conditions that encourage popular violence; and those that encourage peace and accountability. This will inform those in HMG who engage directly with Somali officials, such as during political and diplomatic negotiations. It will also be crucial for wider analysis of HMG’s broader interventions in Somalia. The empirical baseline for exploring and understanding the Somali political marketplace, as well as the various forms of public authority which have emerged, is patchy, at best. Our research agenda reflects the opportunity to establish new baseline empirical material, which can inform our current research but also develop new avenues of inquiry.

This means our agenda is also flexible, and able to respond to changes the in the overall context, and to new questions that may arise as a consequence of the initial investigations.

Research will be undertaken using a comparative case study approach, focusing on key areas linked to the political economy of violence and conflict in Somalia (including Puntland and Somaliland, as well as northeast Kenya, south-eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti). Among topics to be addressed are locally and externally driven attempts at state-building and peacebuilding in the Somali context; the functioning of the business sector in the conflict and post-conflict setting; contestation over land, with particular attention to urban real estate; the dynamics of clan, nationalism and political Islam and their interactions with the political marketplace; security arena stabilisation, in light of the lack of a centralist security sector in southern Somalia; and community level mediation and dialogue aimed at peacebuilding and dispute resolution.

CRP research will be informed by a series of workshops that develop the metrics and measurements for political markets, including tools to measure economic power and its interaction with political power. It will also be informed by broader theoretical development of how and why persecuting ideologies emerge and flourish, and how and where this can be countered through alternative, peaceful logics of governance. Our comparative approach and findings will highlight a range of possible solutions to problems that have beleaguered international interventions: helping donors to understand where something has or has not worked and why. As part of the CRP’s objective to encourage the emergence of better networks between Somali researchers, we will leverage the existing links to Marqaadi; Academy for Peace and Development, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies and the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention. We will also collaborate with Peace Direct, who have pioneered the ‘peace exchange’ methodology, as a means of synthesizing and systematising local knowledge and about experiences of peacebuilding, community mediation and reconciliation.
Introduction

The first part of this paper combines a summary of the key debates on Somalia, and a review of relevant literature. This is structured around analysis of the international interventions that the CRP proposes to examine: building state capacity and legitimacy, the ‘security arena’ and security sector reform (SSR), the business sector and natural resource management, community level dialogue and mediation and humanitarian crisis and response. The gender dynamics of conflict and violence are also explored. We elaborate on the analytical framework used by the CRP, namely the political marketplace, moral populism, ‘civicness’ and public authority, as and when appropriate. Regional dimensions and dynamics, as they intersect with the trajectory of Somalia’s conflict, are touched on in passing, and examined in greater detail in the synthesis paper on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The final part develops the key questions for the CRP research agenda.

Any research based on the academic literature on Somalia runs into the enormous obstacle that access for researchers has been extremely limited, primarily for reasons of safety, and therefore the depth and breadth of the primary research has been very limited. Because access has been so uneven, there are important areas—such as the governance practices in areas under the authority of al-Shabaab—that are almost wholly neglected. However, the challenges of studying Somalia are such that only those who are courageous and innovative are ready to undertake research, with the result that the literature is remarkable for its creativity in tackling the challenges posed by the country.

A further challenge is created by the nature of much of the policy or ‘grey literature’ which analyses or informs international intervention in the Somali setting. Such literature is often commissioned by specific donors and never published, or shared beyond a small audience within the commissioning institution. As far as possible, the researchers have tried to access such analysis, but even where this was possible, it is not always permitted to cite such studies, which remain confidential. The analysis which follows takes into consideration what material we had access to, while respecting confidentiality. This, also, is part of the nature of the research and policy environment in the Somali setting.

Methodology

The paper draws upon a literature search conducted according to the following method. Instead of a traditional, comprehensive literature review of all the social science literature on conflict in Somalia, this search focused on identifying empirically grounded social science literature on the drivers and effect of conflict in Somalia. The search process itself consisted of two stages: a database driven search, and a ‘snowball’ search which augmented the database search and also formed the basis of our study of the ‘grey’ literature.¹

Initially, eight social science databases were searched: Taylor and Francis journals, JSTOR, Cambridge journals, Oxford journals, Hein Online, Wiley Online, SAGE journals, and Project MUSE. The search results from these databases were then cross-checked against the search results from Tufts University’s library search engines. One primary search string was used, and for each database a secondary search was carried out to supplement the results of the first search string.²

The following inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied:

- Language: Only studies published in English were selected – this was recognised as an unavoidable limitation, given resource constraints, although in the case of Somalia this will not affect the results significantly.
- Focus on empirical data: From our search results we only selected studies that contained or referenced local level empirical data. For instance, we excluded comparative studies which were not based on empirical data/findings generated by the authors.
- ‘Cut-off’ points: In both searches, after a preliminary scan it became clear that the degree of relevance decreased substantially after the first 120 articles on most databases. Results after the first 120 were not considered.

Such a systematic database misses key academic literature and almost all the policy-related literature. A ‘snowball’ technique was therefore used to supplement the database search, where we (a) examined relevant social science literature known to us through our own research and expertise (including the books and grey literature in the personal collections of the lead researchers), and (b)

² The initial search string used was ("political economy" AND "conflict" AND "Somalia").
examined relevant footnotes and bibliographies of the articles and books the database searches had yielded.

**Key Debates on Conflict Drivers and ‘What Works’ in Somalia**

For most of the last 30 years, Somalia has been defined by the problems it has caused for the rest of the world, including its immediate neighbours. Somalia has been identified with warlords whose militiamen shoot down U.S. helicopters, refugees who become social casualties in host countries, pirates, smugglers, terrorists and hosts of terrorists. In designing policies and programmes for Somalia, ‘what works’ for Somalia has commonly been secondary to the urgent priorities of others. Understandably, this has not been a recipe for success.

Somali politics and conflict can be analysed as a four-level system, containing conflict drivers at the global, regional, national and local levels. The factors driving the conflict at each level are independent, but the effects of the political conflicts at any one level influence those at the adjoining levels up and down. The combination of these four interlinked levels generates enormous complexity (de Waal 2017). By way of visualising what this means, consider the simplest four-level system in physics, namely the quadruple pendulum. A single pendulum has such regular and predictable motion that it can be used for timekeeping. A double pendulum is complex: even a minor variation in the initial conditions leads to very different outcomes. A triple pendulum is near-chaotic (in the mathematical sense) and a quadruple pendulum is so complex that it requires a supercomputer to model over even short periods of time. The pendulum model is instructive because it allows us to envision how the linked pendulums transmit kinetic energy from one to another, just as conflict dynamics at one level influence those at the other (as through transmission of energy). Stabilisation (leading to peace-making and state-building) requires each level to be addressed, either simultaneously or in sequence. Most successful efforts at stabilising a country riven by armed conflict begin with bringing the global and regional levels under control so that they are not transmitting conflict energy to the national level. This then allows local conflicts to be addressed. The particular challenge of Somalia is that the regional, national and local levels all independently have high energy inputs.

International policymakers recognise that their first challenge is obtaining sufficient consensus among the key international actors that their respective efforts do not negate or undermine one another. In that respect, the September 2013 Somali Compact is an enormous step forward and the foundation of future engagement. Drawing upon the Busan ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’, the Somali Compact allows diverse international partners, each of which has its own political interests and priorities, and often a distinct doctrine of security cooperation or development partnership, to work together under a common schema that, in principle at least, affords ownership and leadership to Somalis. The Somali Compact has enabled the establishment of the Ministry of Hersi and Somali Security Cooperation (AMISOM), the Somali Security Architecture, and a range of local governance and peacebuilding initiatives including those contained within the Somalia Stability Fund. There are notable gaps in the Somali Compact, for example the position of Somaliland and the role of the business community, but there is no reason in principle why these gaps could not be filled.

The New Deal and Somali Compact do not contain a theory of the political economy of drivers of conflict, but they do have an explicit theory of change, namely that building capable governance institutions is the foundation of stabilisation. This is a variant of the approach in the World Bank’s *2011 World Development Report* (World Bank 2011). The WDR envisaged a spiral of post-conflict governance improvement, with inevitable obstructions and setbacks on an upward trajectory. The principal drawback of this approach (and other similar ones) is that the drivers and dynamics of these setbacks are not sufficiently analysed or theorised: they are seen as secondary factors.

Within the broad tent of the Somali Compact it is possible to accommodate widely divergent approaches to stabilisation and state-building. While reviews of the New Deal have stressed that it focuses on technical capacity at the expense of political dialogue (Hooley et al 2014), in the Somali context it cannot be separated from political negotiations including hard-won compromises. The High-Level Task Force for implementing the New Deal, established within the Presidency, stressed political negotiations. However, the absence of an agreed framework is also evident in the fact that the New Deal partners have not produced a common fragility assessment, and the fact that Middle Eastern partners have separate and parallel modes of engagement. As well as the problem of complexity, there are several political and institutional challenges to conducting such an...
exercise. Paramount among these is that several external actors prioritise different threats, and the involvement of external actors is closely tied up with the conflict dynamics themselves. Indeed, some external actors are engaged in part to neutralise or counteract the presence of other external actors.

Even among the international partners most profoundly committed to a Somali-led state-building process, there are significant differences in priorities and strategies. In a short and illuminating commentary, Ken Menkhaus (2014b) has distinguished between two contrasting philosophies of statebuilding, which he calls the ‘Marshall Plan’ and the ‘Social Contract’.

The ‘Marshall Plan’ school of thought on Somalia—the belief that urgent security imperative requires a massive infusion of financial, technical, and military support to ‘prime the pump’ of the collapsed government and win legitimacy from the Somali people by delivering jobs, security, and basic services. State weakness is at the core of the crisis; therefore the goal of strengthening the central government overrides all other priorities. Gradualist approaches, from this perspective, will doom the current government to failure and perpetuate the conflict trap it has been locked into for 25 years.

The ‘social contract’ school of thought on state-building in Somalia—the belief that successful state-building first requires a legitimate government, which in turn depends upon greater local ownership of processes ... From this view, government legitimacy must be earned and not bought. Donors embracing this view have tended to privilege peacebuilding over state-building, and have looked to support more local-level, inclusive, and organic forms of governance and representation. They have also been more wary of government abuse of power and funding, and more conflict-sensitive to the impact of their aid in the country. In practice, this school of thought has tended to gravitate towards a ‘go slow’ approach to aid to the series of transitional governments from 2000 to 2012, and in some cases has been more inclined to work around rather than through Somali governments with poor track records of accountability.

Social scientists are naturally predisposed towards painstaking, context-sensitive and people-focused ‘social contract’ approaches. But Somali realities have been shaped by dramatic military and political events which mean that the slow pace of these kinds of preferred processes means that they are perennially at risk of being swamped by the urgent priorities of more powerful actors. (Or, we cannot hope that stabilising the lowest, local level pendulum will on its own stabilise the national level.)

The Conflict Research Programme differs in that it places the drivers and dynamics of the setbacks at the centre of its analysis. It sees the process of institutional growth as often being subordinated to the logic of ‘real politics’, and in particular the dynamic of transactional politics in a ‘political marketplace.’ This is highly relevant to Somalia and the New Deal/Somali Compact: progress in building the new Somali state and its governance and security institutions depends upon overcoming these forces. The ‘political marketplace framework’ departs from most existing social and political science frameworks, which focus on the regularities of institutions and slow processes of state formation, to address the more immediate questions of how political power is exercised in conditions of turbulence and unpredictable change. It envisons the politics of a fragile or conflict-affected country as akin to limited competition or oligopolistic rivalry in a market. The ‘energy’ of the conflict is determined by a number of factors, especially the inflow of political funds and the intensity of rivalries. In the Somali case, the high level of financial flows by citizens abroad (remittances) and businesses, quite independent of governmental control in Somalia or anywhere else, means that the local and national levels of conflict have a high level of independent energy. Meanwhile there is also a large number of regional and extra-regional players active in Somalia’s political and security arena, each connected to national and local partners or clients.

The CRP also deals with public authority and the means whereby that can be constituted, sustained, and gained legitimacy. The concept of public authority utilised by the CRP includes state institutions but is not confined to them: any institution at a level higher than the family, which commands legitimacy and compliance, may be considered a form of public authority. In a situation such as Somalia in which state institutions have been absent, remain weak today, and in many cases must contend with other forms of social and political organisation to claim legitimacy, this is clearly a useful starting point.

A political marketplace approach begins top-down, with political finance and the regulation of political bargaining and entry into the political arena. There are two principal sources of political funding in Somalia: (a) the business community and (b) regional players (almost all in the Middle East). The CRP Somalia research focuses on the business community, while the wider Horn of Africa/Red Sea programme engages with the regional players, including their financial dealings and their security engagement.
One of the principal outputs of the CRP is developing a toolkit for the metrics and methods of assessing a political marketplace. This component of the workplan will be pursued through a series of workshops involving relevant academics, and members of the policy/practitioner community including DFID economists and country advisors, from the five CRP countries. The political marketplace toolkit will be developed through an iterative process involving theoretical development and feedback from the countries concerned. This is outlined in a separate paper for the CRP inception report. The toolkit will enable researchers and policymakers to understand how everyday transactional politics functions, under what conditions it is heading towards crisis or towards stability, and how external actions may affect it.

**Political Economy and Political Markets**

The debate between the exponents of a ‘Marshall Plan’ and advocates of a ‘social contract’ is particularly salient because Somalia has been so long without a functional central government, and therefore has developed a political economy in the absence of a state.

Some basic financial parameters of the Somali challenge are contained in the reports of the World Bank Group and FGS Aid Coordination Unit (World Bank Group 2016; 2017). The following graph shows the relative importance of various different financial flows relative to the country’s GDP (World Bank Group 2017, p. 4):

![Graph showing financial flows](image)

This should be elaborated in several ways. First, ODA is split roughly evenly between country-programmable aid (CPA) and humanitarian assistance. (Though the donor profiles for CPA and humanitarian relief are very different: notably, the U.S. plays a major role in humanitarian assistance but not CPA.) Debt relief, another component of ODA, is negligible.

Second, there are substantial security cooperation funds. These include peacekeeping contributions, security and intelligence cooperation, and direct payments for security services. These data are extraordinarily hard to find. The World Bank estimates ‘support for enforcement aspects of peacekeeping’ at approximately $350 million per year during 2015-17 (World Bank Group 2017, p. 25). U.S. total assistance to Somalia has been in excess of $300 million per year, much of which goes to the security sector, plus additional unrecorded payments to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). There is no agreed range of figures for security cooperation financial flows, but they can be conservatively estimated at $400 million per year.

Third, a number of countries do not report their figures to the World Bank and FGS Aid Coordination Unit. Among these are almost all Middle Eastern countries: Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and UAE, though some estimates are obtained from the Somali authorities.

The following graph uses the figures from the World Bank/Aid Coordination Unit reports, plus the security assistance estimate, to give a broader picture of financial flows:

These figures show just how weak the central government is compared to other actors: individuals, businesses, donors, and security actors.

Only about 8% of ODA is delivered ‘on treasury’, directly to the FGS Ministry of Finance. This is well short of the 15% target agreed by donors. This is not the same as ‘on budget’ because it includes substantial contributions that are separate from the budgetary process. Half of the ‘on treasury’ contributions in 2016 were a one-time donation from Saudi Arabia and payments from Turkey (World Bank Group 2017 p. 10).
The political marketplace framework has advantages in a country such as Somalia in that it considers the question of ‘statehood’ as a secondary question to political bargaining. Similarly, the rule-bound functioning of institutions is considered subordinate to the political purposes to which the resources, personnel and symbolic authority of an institution can be used. The leading political marketplace analysis of Somalia is Alex de Waal’s The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa (de Waal 2015). This draws on literature including: Compagnon (2013) on the nature of the Siyad Barre state; Jamal (1988) on the 1980s parallel economy; Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1997) and World Bank (1991) on corruption and the crisis of the 1980s; Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh (2006) and Leeson (2007) on economic resilience following the collapse of the state, as well as Collins on the telecoms sector (2009a, 2009b); and Warah (2012) on corruption in the Transitional Federal Government. The recent analysis by Aisha Ahmad (2017) of the cooperation between businessmen and Islamists in the Somali ‘security bazaar’ is a complementary war economy framework.

The political marketplace analysis of the crisis and collapse of the Siyad Barre government centres on the inability of the ruler to regulate and dominate the political market. The primary reason for the collapse of the government was not a lack of resources to buy loyalties but a high price of loyalty and a heavy discount on the government’s loyalty payments. However much Siyad Barre spent on trying to buy loyalty, he could not overwhelm the resources available to his rivals, and more particularly, he could not convince his clients or potential clients that he was a reliable patron, so that they regarded corrupt payments not as entailing an obligation to support him, but rather as an entitlement that they could pocket, and still defect to the opposition as opportunity arose. The prediction of government failure became a self-fulfilling prophecy, like a stock market crash or a run on the bank.

The root of Siyad Barre’s failure was his inability to regulate (restrict) entry to the political marketplace (opposition groups could be established at will) and inability to prevent those he paid from abandoning him. The resources his government controlled were dwarfed by remittances and the private sector—the pattern that we see today. Once the political market had been deregulated in this manner, it was extraordinarily hard to re-regulate it. Subsequent efforts to establish a central authority have suffered from exactly the same problem, which is that the purported central ruler is no more than one player among many in a highly competitive political marketplace.

One possible route to stabilisation and the establishment of a functional government is illustrated by the explanation for Somaliland’s success, according to the political marketplace framework (de Waal 2015). This explanation hinges on the role of the business sector and the providers of political finance, who, at the critical period during 1992-94, adopted a coordinated approach towards financing a central authority (with a security sector) and denying finance to rivals. This was possible because of the particular circumstances prevailing at the time, including the readiness of the business leaders to cooperate with one another (in turn a product of their common reliance on livestock exports through a single port, and the absence of zero-sum property disputes in the territory), the lack of alternative sources of political funding and very limited expectations that any such sources would be forthcoming (related to the absence of a recognised government and so lack of official aid, and lack of rents from minerals), and the well-structured process of political negotiations.

The very different circumstances prevailing in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia indicate that there can be no simple replication of the Hargaisa experience. But the successful management of the Somaliland political market suggests that the analysis has lessons, including: coordinating political finance as an intrinsic part of establishing a political settlement; addressing disputes within the business class as part of that settlement; and structuring the political negotiations accordingly. The closest that Mogadishu came to experiencing such a political settlement was under Islamist authority: the Islamists were able to run more efficient and less corrupt administrations (Marchal 2009, 2011; Chonka 2016).

Aisha Ahmad (2017) argues that businessmen in Somalia found Islamists commercially useful in that they were able to lower costs and increase levels of trust. Unlike clan-based political-military organisations that inevitably were confined to certain localities, and established checkpoints on their boundaries that exacted payments from traders, Islamists were able to control larger territories crossing clan or ethnic lines without internal checkpoints, and were able to establish trust and enforce contracts on the basis of common Islamic faith and law. Thus an Islamic ‘proto-state’ emerged in Mogadishu in 2005-06, and has continued in remnant form in Al-Shabaab controlled areas subsequently. Once in a position of power, the UIC was able to act against popular sentiment (e.g. in banning khat consumption and watching televised sports) and against their business sponsors (banning tobacco and increasing taxes). Ahmad sees the business-Islamist alliance as hazardous for a second reason: it invited external military intervention.
Building State Capacity and Legitimacy

Following the Turkish and UK-led engagement in Somalia since 2011, and especially the 2013 Somali Compact, state capacity and legitimacy have been central concerns for external observers and policymakers. The Busan ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ and the Somali Compact are exemplars of a well-established trend in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building pursued by the UK, other OECD governments and the World Bank since the 1990s. These have a mixed record of success. When the New Deal and Somali Compact were adopted, it is fair to say that the consensus among scholars of Somalia’s political economy was that a conventional state-building approach was unlikely to succeed.

Standard accounts of the Somali crisis begin with reference to the collapse of the Siyad Barre government in January 1991 (e.g. Hesse 2010; Pham 2011), implying that the principal challenge facing Somalia is to reconstruct a government, following which the country’s other problems can be addressed (see, for example, ICG 2008). Specialists on Somalia counter that Somali state collapsed for particular reasons which must be understood if there is to be any successful attempt at reconstructing a state. Moreover, the particular form of the Somali state which collapsed over the period 1988-91 has specific legacies for any successful attempt at reconstructing a state. His conclusion is that in instances where functioning institutions emerged at local level, these were only rarely externally supported, and in those cases required very specific contextualisation, rather than a template approach (Menkhaus 2014b). Resources could be more successfully channelled to municipal administrations where these function, and some degree of social contract is in evidence (Menkhaus 2014a). The overall picture that emerges highlights the limits of ‘Marshall Plan’ style, large-scale infusions of assistance, which is likely to fuel the existing dynamics of corruption and insecurity (Hagmann 2016; Menkhaus 2014b).

The Somali Compact framework allows for diverse approaches to building institutions across Somalia. At one level the federal statebuilding process continues the ‘building blocks’ approach mooted two decades ago in the wake of the collapse of the UN intervention (Bryden 1999). At another, it focuses attention and assistance on the central authorities in Mogadishu. Mosley (2015) examines the tension between the dynamics underpinning internationally supported, national level activities (largely in Mogadishu) related to the institutions of the state and the agendas influencing the formation of aspiring federal member state administrations in Kismayo (Jubbaland), Baidoa (Southwest Somalia) and Galkayo/Cadaado (Galmudug). While it is difficult to imagine that these efforts reflect a bottom-up driven process of political organisation, Hoehne (2016) underscores the more locally embedded and informed political processes in Puntland and Somaliland, and (by extension) questions the ability of the Somali Federal Government in Mogadishu to impose an order outside the capital. In practice, the member state formation process, and the ad hoc mechanisms for political dialogue between elites with power bases in Mogadishu or other regions, reflect a degree of pragmatism, which, although dependent on external financial support to survive, have assumed a degree of functionality.

International assistance has become an enduring fact of political life in Somalia, to the extent that it is no longer realistic to envision a political process devoid of external engagement. Hagmann (2016) explored the contradictions inherent in the dependence on external assistance—particularly in terms of the capacity of an extroverted political economy to produce locally legitimate, stable and accountable outcomes. In effect, external financial flows fuel the dynamics the international community seeks to contain—especially in terms of reducing insecurity.

The Somaliland Exception

Another sub-theme of the literature has been the relative success of the Republic of Somaliland in avoiding state failure, or to be precise, quickly re-establishing a functional governing authority following state collapse in 1991-92. Somaliland’s economic and political stability and its democratic record are remarkable, particularly by contrast to the experience of south-central Somalia. Various reasons have been forwarded for the successes of Somaliland, including the common clan-family identity of the majority the population, the wisdom of clan elders, the
relative scarcity of international intervention and the low levels of official development assistance, and the prominent role of business interests in determining a political settlement. The leading book on this topic is Bradbury (2008). Walls (2014) traces the various phases of negotiated and contested development of a constitutional, electoral order in Somaliland, highlighting both its achievements and limitations. The continual renegotiation of the political settlement, and the 'hybrid' nature of some of its institutions – including but not limited to the institutionalisation of the 'Guurti' – underscores that Somaliland’s political evolution continues. Renders (2007) has described how the cooption of traditional leaders into formal legislative positions has changed their character, making them more remote from their erstwhile constituents.

The close business-political links in the establishment of Somaliland has had far-reaching implications for political development. Phillips (2013) stresses linkages between key businesspeople (almost exclusively men) and the development. Phillips (2013) stresses linkages between key businesspeople (almost exclusively men) and the close business-political links in the establishment of Somaliland have had far-reaching implications for political development. Phillips (2013) stresses linkages between key businesspeople (almost exclusively men) and the development of Somaliland, highlighting both its achievements and limitations. The continual renegotiation of the political settlement, and the 'hybrid' nature of some of its institutions – including but not limited to the institutionalisation of the 'Guurti' – underscores that Somaliland’s political evolution continues. Renders (2007) has described how the cooption of traditional leaders into formal legislative positions has changed their character, making them more remote from their erstwhile constituents.

A related issue is the extent to which Puntland can also be said to be an exception in terms of enduring political and economic stability, and the lessons that should be learned from this. The Puntland administration has just passed its nineteenth anniversary. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland’s leaders do not aspire to independence. Rather, Puntland remains part of the Somali political project, and its politicians have circulated between Puntland’s capital Garowe and Mogadishu, attempting to gain access to the national level when the opportunity arises. Puntland’s political project has also been informed by the experience of Somaliland, although it has followed a different trajectory (Crisis Group 2009). Hoehne (2009b) has explored the ways in which military conflict between Somaliland and Puntland over their border area has contributed to the development and consolidation of political identity. This dynamic has only been reinforced as the federal project has progressed since the adoption of a provisional constitution in 2012, and the formation of aspiring ‘federal member states’ during the 2012-17 administration in Mogadishu. Territorial identity is emerging as a salient factor, in a shift from a more flexible role for territoriality in Somali social and political relations historically (Hoehne 2016), with Puntland’s experience a key example.

In our view, these explanations all warrant careful review as the environment changes rapidly. In particular, the period since 2012 has seen an increase in assistance to Somaliland, and most recently, the entry of significant investment and assistance from the Gulf States, as Dubai Ports World takes control of Berbera port, and the UAE establishes a military base nearby. The rents associated with control of major infrastructure (especially the port in Berbera and the airport in Hargeisa) have historically been important points of political contestation – even conflict, although Balthasar (2013) has highlighted how even such conflict was turned into an opportunity to strengthen the capacity of the nascent Somaliland state during the mid-1990s – with a combination of political and national goals in mind, as then-President Egal was able to settle a political dispute with a rival and consolidate his own position and resource base, as well as the state itself. More recent negotiations for the Berbera port and base deals, which will reportedly involve more than US$400 million in investment in the port’s capacity, and unspecified rents for the base, have coincided with repeated delays to presidential and parliamentary elections. This presents a potentially striking contrast to previous experience, and raises interesting points of comparison with Somali politics elsewhere.

**Puntland**

In addition to the challenges of competing identities and territorial claims between Somaliland and Puntland, the government in Garowe has also faced a challenge on its southern border, as the aspiring Galmudug State administration has asserted territorial claims on all of the former Mudug province, which has been a fault-line since the 1990s. Galkayo, the key city in Northern Mudug, has been divided since the early 1990s, reflecting long-standing differences in clan identity (which were recognised as far back as the colonial era), with Puntland administering the northern parts of the city, and asserting jurisdiction over northern Mudug (Yusuf and Khalif 2015). More recently, Puntland has also struggled for more than a decade with militancy in the Golis mountain area (Hoehne 2014), initially related to control over natural resources, but having become more entwined with Islamist militant networks. Puntland’s relatively coherent administration allowed it to sign exploration agreements...
with wildcat oil exploration companies, while the transitional government in Mogadishu lacked the capacity to challenge that situation. Moreover, Puntland’s first president, Abdullahi Yusuf, was selected as the first president of the Transitional Federal Government from 2004, limiting the national government’s interest in challenging Puntland’s position. As the transition waned, particularly from 2011, Puntland felt its position being challenged from Mogadishu, directly as the Galmudug administration took shape, but also indirectly as the federal institutions in Mogadishu sought to shape the member state formation process in southern Somalia, in Jubbaland in particular (Mosley 2015).

Jubbaland and Elsewhere

The experience in Jubbaland is particularly important to any assessment of the state-building exercise. It is an area of particular local complexity, with strong representation of militarised clan units that have historically been at odds with one another, and a large presence of minority groups. There has been a strong presence of Al-Shabaab until very recently. Different local elites have differing views on the balance between provincial and central power, and indeed some espouse a strong central state in contradiction to the federalism of the current constitution. Lastly, Jubbaland is also an area in which neighbouring states have powerful interests—primarily Kenya but also in the northern part, Ethiopia. For these reasons, Jubbaland is an important test case for the effectiveness of the various policy measures contained in the New Deal/Somali Compact.

The Jubbaland experience is only recently becoming documented by researchers, most of them either connected to ongoing initiatives in the region, or engaged in the policy assessments (Mosley 2015; Crouch and Chevreux 2016; Allen and Gundel 2017). These provide important insights. They raise a host of questions. For example, is the devolution of power to provincial level a mechanism for engaging at the grassroots, or rather a means of empowering local elites, who may not be serving the interests of their constituents? Who among the local elites most supports this formula, and who is seeking further devolution or indeed centralisation? What is the role of financing (especially through ports)? What is the role of neighbouring countries in determining the viability of subnational governance units?

The experience of other units such as Galmudug and the federal member states with only minimal governance structures, will be a subject of study as their administrations are gradually set up, depending on security circumstances.

Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti

There are substantial and influential Somali populations in neighbouring states. Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti have each taken different political, socio-cultural and economic approaches to the governance of their respective Somali communities. Consequently, the political economy of governance and the functioning of the political marketplace varies substantially. The Ethiopian Somali National Regional State administration has accumulated considerable economic and political power within Ethiopia’s federal system, and also exerts economic and security influence across the Somali and Somaliland border (Hagmann 2014). It offers a key comparison, and potentially a demonstration effect for the emerging federal member state administrations in Somalia. The Kenyan county administrations in Manda, Garissa and Wajir – empowered politically and economically since 2013 by the introduction of devolution following constitutional reform – have also become important loci for political and economic competition, with dynamics that reach across the Somali border, including in security terms. This has echoed and reinforced existing dynamics observed by Menkhaus (2008), whereby locally rooted authority emerged in peacebuilding processes in the absence of a strong state presence.

Such experiences are informative when considering the question of building local legitimacy, although conclusive analysis is lacking.

Ethiopia’s federalisation process remains heavily centralised, but this has not prevented additional political settlements from emerging within regional administrations, including the Somali region. The emergence since 2012 of a consolidated form of authority within the administration of Ethiopian Somali National Regional State President Abdi Mohamoud Omar ‘Iley’ reveals another understudied political economy phenomenon. Abdi Iley’s administration has close links to the national military and the ruling coalition, without being a formal member of that group. The State was largely unaffected by the protest movement which swept neighboring Oromiya State during 2015-16. Nevertheless, there have been clashes between ethnic Somali and ethnic Oromo, including recent violence which has displaced tens of thousands. A paramilitary ‘liyu’ (‘special’) police force – comprised in part of former Ogaden National Liberation Front militants – played a key role in Abdi Iley’s political ascendance, and has reportedly been deployed across the international border into Somalia, as well as into Oromiya State in Ethiopia during unrest.
Kenya’s devolved institutions may have proved more locally legitimate than national elites envisioned (Chome 2015; Cheeseman et al 2016). It is difficult to imagine Kenyans abandoning their new devolved political-administrative system, as evidenced by a strong popular enthusiasm for county-level elections during 2017 (Waddilove 2017).

Devolved government in northeast Kenya is providing some important new data, which has yet to be deeply analysed in the existing literature, and so far has not been examined using the political marketplace as a framework. The development of county authority marks a major development in Kenyan sub-national politics. Although Kenyan elites initially calculated that the political centre of gravity would remain in Nairobi, events since 2013 have shown that the county level has become a key location for political competition, and provides significant access to resources – including the rents which fuel the political marketplace. This was reflected in the intensity of competition for gubernatorial seats during the 2017 elections.

Djibouti’s political economy resembles more the city-state models of the Gulf States and – to some degree – the historical experiences of Mogadishu and Bosaso as maritime garrison markets. Nevertheless, its successful management of an explicitly rentier economy, and its containment of a sizeable non-Somali minority political opposition – to the point where its military has been deployed within Somalia as part of AMISOM – will be seen by some as a potential model for balancing rents from multiple patrons (i.e. Ethiopia trade, Gulf State port investment, U.S. and French military facilities – being joined by Chinese and Saudi counterparts – and resupply arrangements for multiple international anti-piracy missions which use the country as a base. The dominance of a small clique around the ruling family echoes the Gulf States, although the country lacks the same natural resource endowments associated with the development and regional/international influence of those states.

More broadly, the functioning of the political marketplace in these contexts will provide opportunities to analyse how Somalis appealing to moral populism – understood through identity politics in the Somali context: clan, religion – have established more or less sustainable forms of public authority. In the Kenyan and Ethiopian contexts, there will also be the opportunity to examine how in practice Somalis appeal to ‘civics’ in social and political debates, and the degree to which civics thus underpins (or does not) various forms of public authority.

Nationalism, clan and ‘moral populism’

A strong theme in debates on Somalia’s crisis has been ethnicity, predominantly in the form of clan identity and conflict among lineage units. In earlier generations, Somalia was held up as the paradigmatic case of a country consisting of a single ethno-national group. There was a strong literature and thriving discussion on Somali nationality and how this related to the position of Somalis in neighbouring states (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) (Lewis 1983). This discussion has all-but-disappeared. However, pan-Somali nationalism remains an undercurrent in political debates, and occasionally comes to the fore.

Somalia has over the last thirty years been described as riven by armed conflict among rival clans. This characterisation is marked by a generic use of the term ‘clan’ to refer to many different levels of lineage-based organisation, from the level of ‘clan family’ (Darood, Diir, Hawiye, Isaaq) through ‘clan’ (Majerteen, Ogadeen, Habr Gidir, Abgaal etc.) to ‘subclan’ and further subdivisions. Identity in Somalia is commonly presented as a primordial question—‘blood and bone’ (Lewis 1955, 1961, 1994)—and indeed the patrilineal naming system enables Somalis to place themselves within a remarkably unified national family tree. But the facility with which Somalis themselves use clan markers as identifiers conceals several important elements.

First is the instrumental role of clan in military mobilisation, and the associated (and less remarked) flexibility and opportunism with which political-military entrepreneurs choose which clan identifiers to call upon, and which cross-clan alliances to make. It is a matter of circumstance whether a political leader chooses to identify himself as (for example) Hawiye, Habr Gidir, Ayr, or some other level of aggregation. Such a leader may also reach out to build temporary alliances with others. Tracing the military-political alliances of any one individual across the years is likely to plot a highly changeable set of links. But there are very few such biographically-based studies. An illuminating exception is the biography of the erstwhile mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Nur ‘Tarzan’ (Harding 2016).

Also, the salience of identity markers depends on shared narratives and imaginings. Prominent among the latter are the traumas of the 1988-92 period. In Somaliland, the shared experience of massive targeted destruction was crucially important to the Somalilanders’ abandonment of the project of a shared Somali national identity, and the embrace of separatism (Bradbury 2008). In Mogadishu, the ‘clan cleansing’ that accompanied the overthrow of
Siyad Barre involved the wholesale removal of Darood clan members from the city (Kapteijns 2013). They fled en masse, subjected to horrendous violence, and abandoning their houses and property. This episode has defined a collective Darood political memory of the period, while the legacy of land seizes poses a significant material obstacle to the normalisation of political and social relations. On the side of the Hawiye clan family and especially the militia involved in the violations, this is an episode that is too often denied, and sometimes justified with reference to the abuses perpetrated by the Siyad Barre government, which the Hawiye identify with the Darood. In important ways, we can see the period of the civil war and the external peacemaking interventions that followed, as one in which clans were ‘created’ or ‘invented’ as political, military and administrative entities, carving out an arbitrary level of the segmentary lineage system to be the one that holds greatest socio-political significance. This has parallels to the ‘invention’ of tribalism elsewhere in colonial and post-colonial Africa.

A particularly fascinating insight into the role of kinship during the dissolution of the state is provided by Anna Simons (1995), whose study shows the importance of personal networks in providing information, security, and material support as the structures of orderly governance collapsed. Kinship and clan were not only mechanisms for organising violence, but also for organising survival. The logic of clan identity is a useful means for relatively powerless constituents to invoke accountability from their leaders.

Reversing the older literature that emphasised the ethnic uniformity of Somalia, there is also a growing focus on the minority communities in southern Somalia, including the minority clans (Rahanweyn and Digi-Mirifle) and the minority communities (Gabwing, Shebelle, Bantu, Banadir and others). This is tied in to a number of questions over land as well as identity and language (Besteman and Cassanelli 2003).

Although overtaken by the push for federalism during the past fifteen years, Somali nationalism remains a potent force. This is a concern for neighbours with sizable Somali populations, especially Ethiopia, which still faces an active (if weak) militant opposition in its eastern region. Kenya’s northeast, where its Somali population is concentrated, has borne the brunt of instability spilling over from Somalia’s conflict, but has since Kenya’s 2011 military intervention in Somalia become a focus for militant activity linked to al-Shabaab political agenda. The continued political salience of Somali nationalism has recently been illustrated by the controversy over the transfer to Ethiopian authorities of Abdikarin Sheikh Muse ‘Qalbi Dhagah’, a deputy leader of the ONLF, by the government of President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’. The handover of a Somali national, who happens to be a veteran of the 1977-78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, has led to calls for Farmajo’s resignation, and highlighted concerns over the influence of Somalia’s neighbours in its domestic affairs. The debate has also been instrumentalised by critics of federalism to attack the entire project as a proxy for the interests of external actors (especially Ethiopia).

Somali nationalism has also played an important role in the political agenda of various militant actors in the context of the civil war during the last decade. This has been reflected, for example, in tensions within al-Shabaab’s leadership over the group’s alignment with nationalist goals versus a global jihadist vision represented by their alignment with Al-Qaida. A nationalist call for the expulsion of foreign troops featured among al-Shabaab’s most potent rallying calls when it launched its insurgency in 2007.

The framework of ‘moral populism’ is a useful lens for understanding why the logic of clan identity is called upon, and for what reason, whether by political leaders or their ostensible followers. The interplay between the political market and identity politics promises to be a useful explanatory lens. This is particularly the case when we also consider the role of political Islam.

**Political Islam**

The role of political Islam and in particular the role of al-Shabaab is a major concern for policymakers. Islamists have been a significant factor in the political economy of Somalia for decades. Somali Islamism has its unique characteristics in which business, social dynamics and political power intersect. Islamist politics also link Somalia to wider regional and global trends – both as a source of social and cultural exchange and as a perceived justification for external security intervention.

Although understanding Islamism in Somalia is clearly a matter of the greatest policy relevance, this is not yet matched by a depth of scholarly analysis. There is a small literature on the early Islamic mobilisation in Somalia in the 1990s (Marchal 2004) and on al-Qaida’s early and unsuccessful attempts to establish a presence in the country (de Waal 2004; Watts, Shapiro and Brown 2007). This is important in that it identifies the plurality of forms of political Islam in the country, and the difficulties that all of them had in gaining a strong foothold or a durable constituency. During the 1990s, Islamist movements – including militant groups such as Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiyya (a Somali movement) and al-Qaida – consistently
underestimated the difficulties of working in a situation of a collapsed state. For Islamist movements, the greatest progress was made in places of relative stability (such as Somaliland) and when they concentrated on social activities such as schools and on controlling mosques. The dominance of the traditional Sufi orders in the country has steadily been eroded by more conservative (often puritanical) Islamist movements, often backed by Gulf funds (Marchal 2013, Marchal and Sheikh 2015). These schools of thought are often referred to as Salafist or Wahhabist, although these terms have become imprecise in use, particularly in Western counter-terrorism or counter-extremism framings. Wahhabist in particular is not a term used by those to whom it is applied.

Amid the convulsions of the early civil war period, provision of services – including local justice – gave such groups an inroad to social and eventually political influence (Anonymous 2010). They also made progress among minority groups with less political clout, such as in the upper Juba valley and among the coastal communities. The Islamists were best able to make political progress when they clearly identified themselves as opposed to discredited warlords (notably in Mogadishu in 2005-06) but avoided direct confrontation with regional powers, against whom they could not stand. Since the late-2000s, conservative Islamist networks – ‘AlaSheikh’, ‘Damul Jadid’ – understood to be offshoots of the Somali Muslim brotherhood movement, Al-Islah, have had significant influence within the federal government, particularly within the presidency under Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009-12) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012-17) (Marchal 2013). As noted in the ACTS report (Life and Peace Institute 2014), nearly every organised political movement in Somalia now defines itself in Islamic terms. This is a significant shift from (and rejection of) the secular, ‘scientific socialism’ of the Barre regime during the 1970s and 1980s.

The particular nexus of politics, business and security that brought about the rapid rise of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, has been studied (Barnes and Hassan 2007; Ahmad 2017) but warrants further analysis. This is an episode that is not only of interest to historians. Although the ICU was militarily defeated and was politically disbanded, it remains an important point of reference for Somalis, including an enduring point of comparison against which the FGS and its record are judged. The ICU’s reputation for probity and fairness is probably not as well founded as the prevailing narrative would indicate, but the very fact that this story is still popularly resonant, is significant. Moreover, Ahmad’s analysis shows that there were some very specific commercial reasons for business support for the ICU, including lower and more predictable protection payments and checkpoint taxes, and reliable dispute resolution mechanisms. Businesses also found that once the ICU had established control over Mogadishu, the balance of power shifted and the Islamist authorities began to act against the commercial interests of their erstwhile sponsors. This experience has implications for current efforts to convince businesses to pay more taxes in exchange for services and security from the federal government (Randa et al 2017).

The growth and agenda of al-Shabaab has been the focus of only a handful of empirically informed scholarly studies, which makes them more significant (Marchal 2009; Hoehne 2014; Hansen 2016; Chonka 2016). Roland Marchal brings to bear a deep understanding of the background and the personalities. He is impressed by the effective organisation and resilience of the organisation, which stands in marked contrast to the externally-backed governance regimes against which it stands. Al-Shabaab’s use of coercion has also proved more effective and disciplined than its adversaries. Stig Hansen provides a detailed history, with attention especially to the military dynamics. His framework of extremism and terrorism is more familiar to the policymaker, but resonates less with the shifting dynamics of Somalia. Markus Hoehne (2014) has examined militant Islamism in the Golis mountain region of Puntland, and sought to situate the militant movement within the clan-related competition for power in Puntland’s government, with Waseengeli militants being cast as Islamist/terrorists by the administration in Garowe. These dynamics are similar to those between al-Shabaab and the federal government. In reality, positions are more fluid, as demonstrated by defections of prominent Islamist figures from al-Shabaab or other groups during the past decade. A pair of studies (Marchal 2011; Chonka 2016) consider the dynamics of governance in areas under al-Shabaab control, considering the group as a political organisation (rather than focusing on terrorist/extremist analytical framing). Chonka’s study looked at al-Shabaab’s discourses of development, while Marchal considered various practical aspects of municipal governance including policing, provision of justice and taxation.

The dynamics of militant Islamism in Somalia are now a regional phenomenon, first in that al-Shabaab’s operations have affected neighbouring countries (most particularly Kenya) and second in that one of the organisation’s rallying cries has been opposition to the military operations of those neighbours inside Somalia. There has been analysis of the repercussions of the Ethiopian and Kenyan military interventions of 2006 and 2010 respectively (Hoehne 2009a; Anderson and McKnight 2014), both of which conclude that the political objective of overcoming al-Shabaab has become secondary to other goals, and may
therefore not be achieved. Some Somalis despaired that they would ever be allowed to solve their problems without destructive external interference (Samatar 2009). The problematic legal dimensions of the intervention have also been analysed (Yihdego 2007).

The way in which Al-Qaida and al-Shabaab function is best explained through the related concepts of the political marketplace and moral populism. The al-Qaida documents analysed by Watts et al. (2007) show that financial considerations—both concerning the efficacy of financial governance and the strategy of buying support from local elites—were dominant in the organisation’s strategy for Somalia in the 1990s, and its failure. The analysis of the governance of al-Shabaab shows a similarly candid approach to calculating how to operate in a monetised political environment. As Aisha Ahmad writes, ‘From outside, these conflicts appear to be driven by ideas and identities; but inside these war zones, everyone is talking about money.’ (2017, p. 187) In parallel, both organisations have utilised moral populist scripts, associated with Islamism and nationalism, as a means of mobilisation. Materials in different languages are used strategically to appeal to different audiences using different, and often-incompatible messages (Hansen 2016).

**The ‘Security Arena’ and SSR in Somalia**

The most demanding area for any form of state-building in Somalia is the security sector. A precondition for success in establishing a unified Somali security sector (however that may be defined) is that diverse external actors should share a common understanding of the task in hand. Unfortunately, this may not be possible when some external actors are involved partly to counteract the influence of other external actors. It is partly because of these sensitivities that reaching agreement on a security pact took several years longer than finalising the Somali Compact.

An interesting example of significant investment in the Somali security sector is the Turkish construction of the new military academy (STRATFOR 2017), which is interpreted in part as a competition between Turkey and the UAE for influence. It is unlikely that Turkey, the UAE, and the African troop contributors to AMISOM, share the same diagnosis of the country’s security challenges. Somalia is heralded as the ‘winner’ in this competition, which is correct insofar as the country benefits from resource flows and a new military academy.

The May 2017 London Conference laid out the basic framework of a Somali national security architecture (UNSOM 2017). The central vision is building a unified Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), which also includes police, coastguard, intelligence, etc. There are enormous technical issues in consolidating the national security architecture (DCAF 2017), which include the proliferation of autonomous security actors, deficient and varying skills, training and equipment, corruption (including ghost soldiers on the payroll and procurement payoffs), transparency (with certain security institutions opaque even to the presidency) and standardising the training curricula among the numerous providers of technical assistance and training. There are also political challenges, notably negotiating the compromises for sharing power and responsibility between federal and state administrations. Lastly, of course, is the financial question: can Somalia afford the expense? (UNSOM and World Bank 2017). The May 2017 Political Agreement on the National Security Architecture specifies timelines for the various milestones including national financing to be achieved. As with the Somali Compact itself, this is more in the way of a foundational political agreement, than a fully-worked out plan.

Fulfilling the promise of the Somali security compact and making the Somali national security architecture a reality on the ground, requires understanding the turbulent realities of the security arena including its multiple actors. All involved have a realistic appreciation of the scale of this challenge. The CRP intends to bring useful analytical tools to bear on this problem, grounded in a political marketplace analysis of the security landscape.

Somalia is home to diverse security actors and armed groups. Until 2012, all were formally labeled as ‘non-state armed groups’, but this label concealed a wide diversity. Anthony Vinci (2006) identifies five different types of armed groups: faction, warlord, business, court and Islamic militias. But any kind of categorisation conceals commonalities among the groups, diversities within each category, and shape-shifting. Not only do the groups themselves morph, but individuals pursue career trajectories that move across different groups. The use of the label ‘terrorist’ for al-Shabaab serves as a political instrument (intended to ostracise and exclude the group—just as its leaders’ own decision to affiliate with al-Qaeda was intended to debar political negotiations with others). ‘Terrorist’ serves little analytical purpose. Writing before the designation of al-Shabaab as ‘terrorist’, Roland Marchal (2007) problematises the concepts of ‘warlord’ and ‘terrorist’.

Alice Hills (2014a) prefers to avoid the term ‘security sector’ with reference to Somalia on the grounds that there is no unified sector and little institutionalisation. Rather,
she argues that multiple security actors operate in a dynamic arena, which entails continually negotiating their positions. She bases this on an analysis of three Somali regional police services. In another paper (Hills 2014b) she describes how regional police forces negotiate with external donors. In a third paper (Hills 2014c) she asks, ‘what is policeness?’ as an explicit parallel to the idea (articulated by Lund 2006) of ‘stateness’ as consisting in an amalgam of local institutions of public authority linked to the idea of the state. In doing so, Hills intends to shift the focus from the institution to the context and function of those doing the policing.

Will Reno (2017) explores how the term ‘security assemblage’ can be applied to Somalia. ‘Security assemblage’ implies that there is no fore-ordained or preferred structure to institutions and the linkages between them, but rather that multiple diverse kinds of entities exist and interact in different manners. It also does not presuppose a state-building agenda or trajectory: as Reno avers, it is not even clear that the SFG leadership actually wants to consolidate its authority over the security assemblages in the country—they may prefer the fragmented, rivalrous system that exists. In this regard, he observes that today’s political strategy is not fundamentally dissimilar to that of Siyad Barre’s last decade in power. Reno distinguishes two distinct kinds of private security firm. The first substitutes for the state, and notably includes foreign security companies, supported by business interests or foreign governments including the U.S. The other consists of alternative indigenous network, under the patronage of politicians.

Bryden and Brickhill (2010) address the paradox that statebuilding requires that the state disarm the citizenry, but the citizenry profoundly distrust the state—and with good historical reason. They write, ‘At the core of Somalia’s security dilemma lies a simple question: who is disarming whom?’ (p. 240). They provide an account of the effective DDR programme in Somaliland, which was based on consensus, incremental lesson-learning, and driven by local political demand, alongside an account of the less effective SSR/DDR in Puntland and disastrously ineffective efforts in south-central Somalia. Bryden and Brickhill conclude by observing that while security assistance post-2007 has overshadowed all previous levels, the pattern of engagement is similar to the 1992-93 period, repeating the same mistakes. Though written before the establishment of the FGS, their analysis still resonates. It reminds us that although international state-builders tend to regard Somalia as a tabula rasa, the history of the state is vitally important. Robinson (2016) provides a historical account of the Somali armed forces since 1960. It is a straightforward chronicle without critical depth, but points to the need for more in-depth, reflective studies of this topic.

A prominent issue in the literature since the early 2000s has been maritime piracy and the security of shipping. This is a priority question for international actors because of the high volume and value of international trade that passes near to the Somali peninsular. For our purposes, this issue will be addressed only insofar as it is relevant to the political economics of Somalia itself, which is a concern for only a small component of the literature on this topic (Dua and Menkhaus (2012). Stig Hansen (2012) provides an overview of the resurgence of piracy since the mid-2000s, observing that maritime pirates were entirely separate from, and shunned by political actors, with some exceptions after 2010. Roland Marchal (2011) focuses on the local moral economy of piracy, which has been neglected by analyses that frame the problem as one of state collapse. Weldemichael (2014) describes how the negotiation and payment of ransoms has undermined local communities.

Counter-piracy has served as an entry point for private security companies, funded by shipping corporations or foreign governments, to provide high-end security services to Somali authorities at a sub-national level. Hansen (2009) observes that this has served the purpose of strengthening state-like authority in these areas. Kinsey, Hansen and Franklin (2009) provide an overview of the nature of these companies. Gilmer (2017) details how the process of imprisoning suspected and convicted pirates in East African countries has created a market in prison services and the prisoners themselves.

Peace Operations and the Security Sector

AMISOM plays a central role in Somalia’s security sector. It is a unique peace support operation in that it is principally a counter-insurgency operation undertaken by a regional coalition of the willing, under the flag of the AU and with the kinds of technical and financial support that the UN and EU normally would provide only to a peacekeeping operation (Williams 2013, 2016, 2017). AMISOM is large and expensive. It is politically and financially sustainable only on the assumption that it will draw down over the coming years (AU 2017). Evaluations of AMISOM have mostly focused on technical aspects, on the assumption of continued progress in its military mission (ISS 2016, 2017). The overall assessment of AMISOM’s military operations is that it is gaining ground against Al-Shabaab, but the metrics for assessing progress are problematic and seasoned observers note that driving Al-Shabaab from holding territory does not readily translate into destroying it as an irregular force or a political actor (Bryden 2014;
Menkhaus 2014c; Anderson 2016). Analysts have noted the weakness of AMISOM’s civilian component both in numbers and strategy. Protection of civilians was only inserted into AMISOM’s mandate in 2013, but it is hard to see how an offensive military operation could undertake the kinds of PoC activities that are standard procedure for a UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation under ‘Chapter VI-and-a-half’ (Fitz Gerald 2017). AMISOM units are known to have been involved in violence against civilians including violations of international humanitarian law, and even smuggling (Journalists for Justice 2015).

The military backbone of AMISOM is the deployments by the ‘frontline states’ Ethiopia and Kenya into areas of operation that coincide with those countries’ security perimeters. This is a departure from the standard practice of peace support operations (Berhe and de Waal 2017; Fitz Gerald 2017). It is only such frontline states with substantial national security interests in Somalia that would be prepared to sustain the heavy human cost of the offensive military operations that AMISOM has conducted. This, however, comes at the expense of neutrality. The perceived lack of neutrality of the African troops has legitimised the involvement of other international security providers from the Middle East, including Turkey, the UAE, Egypt and Sudan. Meanwhile private security contractors have been involved in internal security provision (for training the SNSF, protecting embassies and businesses, and for maritime security), supported by external partners, and the U.S. has been mounting its own counter-terrorist special operations and supporting the Somali national intelligence and security service, at times bypassing all the Somali authorities.

The stated intent of AMISOM is to build ‘a well-motivated and truly national army and police whose allegiance is to country and not to any particular clan or region’ (Sidikou 2015). However, as Wondemagegnegnahu and Kebede (2017) point out, ‘Multiple external training providers have failed to coordinate both their efforts and the content of the instruction they provide to the SNSF, which presents further roadblocks to creating viable national security institutions in Somalia. This is noted by one AMISOM official, who states that ‘while everyone talks of coordination in Somalia, nobody wants to be coordinated’ (p. 213). The different troop contributing countries to AMISOM deploy in their own separate theatres of operation (in the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, in the areas close to their own borders which are important to their own national security), and train and equip their counterpart Somali contingents according to their own practices and doctrines. The resulting SNA units are thus unified in name only: there is no inter-operability or unity of command, control, training or doctrine. Other external security actors in Mogadishu (Turkey, the U.S., the UN etc.) have different approaches again. Somalis are well aware of this wide-open field of competition and the ensuing market in the services of ‘violent labour’ (Al-Bulushi 2014).

The approaches to disarmament also differ across AMISOM sectors. While there are some efforts at the reintegration of former al-Shabaab combatants through the UN (Ubink 2017), there are also parallel exercises in redistributing arms and creating new local militia to serve as auxiliaries for AMISOM and the SNA.

Natural Resource Management and the Business Sector

The fact that state collapse did not entail economic collapse has not gone unremarked. The dynamism of Somalia’s telecoms and financial sectors, and—less consistently—its livestock exports, has been the subject of a small but fascinating literature, and one of the narratives of contemporary Somalia, which may be caricatured as ‘better off stateless’ (Leeson 2007). The reality of the difficulty in operating affected by violence and predation – both from informal banditry or extortion at ad hoc check points, and in the form of protection rackets by warlords or other militant movements (and sometimes both) – has been vividly described in Ahmad’s (2017) account of the business sector and its intersection with political Islam, and underscore the trade-offs involved for business (small and large) when the state cannot guarantee security.

Nevertheless, one of the most positive aspects of Somalia in the 1990s and early 2000s was economic dynamism. Freed of the shackles of an interfering and acquisitive state, the Somali business class functioned efficiently. The livestock export trade rebounded rapidly and, also benefiting from open access to the Somali Region in Ethiopia, grew to surpass the levels it had attained before (Little 2003; Mahmoud 2010; Majid 2010; Hagmann and Stepputat 2016).

By 2012, diaspora remittances were estimated to be at least $1.2 billion annually to Somalia and Somaliland, amounting to as much as half of GDP, and making it one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world (Hammond 2013). According to the UK Somali remittances survey, an estimated 40% of Somali households, and more in urban areas, receive money from the diaspora. About 14% of remitted funds are invested, financing 80% of business start-ups (Hassan and Chalmers 2008, p. 13). However, there are some indications that remittances may have passed their peak, as younger Somalis in the diaspora feel less bound by ties to their relatives back home, and less obliged to send
Somalia’s financial sector has emerged in response to the inability of the established banking and financial transfer systems to function in the Somali setting, and the modus operandi of businesses such as Dahabshiil reflects the specific strengths of Somali society, for example the fact that anonymity or disguised identity is impossible (Collins 2009a, 2009b). The largest Somali finance houses, notably Hormuud, have moved into the provision of mobile money and are de facto acting as the country’s banks. The main players in finance are also active in other sectors; most have roots as trading companies following changes in banking regulations meant to tackle money laundering and counter terrorist financing (Lindley and Mosley 2014). On the other hand, there has been a significant increase in appetite for investment in Mogadishu since 2011, with a sense of growing opportunities in the city’s reconstruction on the back of the international intervention to support the SFG and combat al-Shabaab. This in part explains the appeal of pursuing government office for the diaspora, as a preamble to business ventures. Similar dynamics have followed the development of member state projects, especially in Kismayo and Baidoa. In all cases, investment has had important implications for land markets (see below).

However, these positive developments should be seen alongside some equally striking failures. For example, at US$1/KWh, Somalia’s electricity is the most expensive in the world (USAID 2014).

The business sector cannot be analysed outside its political context and its political influence, including the rivalries among businessmen, contests over control over key assets such as land (rural and especially urban) and infrastructure (roads and ports), and associated payments to politicians (Phillips 2013). The ‘better off stateless’ narrative celebrates the dynamism of the private sector without paying due heed to these kinds of rivalries and the associated ruthless business practices.

The business sector is also closely integrated into the security sector, funding both private security companies and clan-based militia (LeSage 2002; Webersik 2006; Hansen 2009; Ahmad 2017; Leeson 2007). The business sector was deeply involved in the setting up of the Islamic Courts Union and its associated courts militia, which briefly governed Mogadishu and much of south-central Somalia in 2006 (Ahmad 2017). Donors, spearheaded by the UN Mission (UNSOM), have advocated for a strengthening of business support for the federal government through taxation. Hagmann and Stepputat (2016, pp. 23-25) provide a useful overview of the literature on the ambivalent posture of businesses towards the state in Somalia (and Somaliland). Although insecurity is bad for small and large businesses, and while businesses have clearly aligned themselves with state-building projects (Phillips 2016; Ahmad 2017) – perhaps most visibly in the Arta process, the rise of the ICU and the elite bargain underpinning the political settlement in Hargeisa – they have been reluctant to empower the state lest its power to regulate and tax be strengthened to their detriment. For example, Dahabshiil is understood to have worked to stymie passage of a commercial banking law in

Somalia also developed first-rate telecommunications as well as private airlines and hotels. Businessmen established their own regulatory systems and law and order mechanisms, beginning in the major market centres such as Berbera in Somaliland and Bokara market in Mogadishu. In 2004, Somali businessmen opened a Coca Cola plant in Mogadishu with investment of $8.3 million. On both income and human development indicators, Somalia has done better since 1991 than before (Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh 2006; Leeson 2007). This is a remarkable testament to the capacity of the Somali business class to use globalisation—the diaspora, trade, and self-regulation—to the benefit of the population. Indeed, Somalia is one of the most extensive instances of contemporary globalisation (Leonard and Ramsey 2013).
Somaliland.⁴ Even amid the 2016-17 food security crisis affecting Somalia and Somaliland, businesses have engaged only cautiously with the idea of a state-led or coordinated relief approach, preferring to focus on their own philanthropic initiatives. Ahmad’s (2017) analysis of the role of businesses in fueling the Islamic Court Union’s rise suggests strongly that cutting operational costs was their prevailing concern, rather than being driven by any ideological position. Nevertheless, once in the ascendant, the Courts were able to dictate the terms of their financial relationship with the business sector, including large businesses (Ahmad 2017, especially Chapter 5).

The business sector is also linked strongly to wider regional dynamics. Many businesses operate across Eastern Africa (Hagmann and Stepputat 2016; Carrier and Lochery 2013), as displacement from the late 1980s reinforced older patterns of population distribution, and Somali businesspeople began taking advantage of opportunities across the region. This included capital investment, import-export and of course the livestock sector. However, even beyond Eastern Africa, Somali businesses have strong links to the Gulf States. Many of the large conglomerates which now operate across the finance, telecommunications and real estate sectors began operations as trading companies with bases in Dubai. These bases facilitated the emergence of the money transfer services which underpinned the development of Somali’s current banking and finance systems. The UAE remains an important hub for Somali business (see Horn of Africa-Red Sea synthesis paper).

Land and Real Estate

In the 1990s, the struggle for land was described as ‘the war behind the war’ (Besteman and Cassanelli 2003). The farming peoples of the Juba and Shebelle valleys, coming mainly from ‘minority’ or indigenous clans or the Gosha (the so-called ‘Somali Bantu’), occupied the most fertile and valuable agricultural land in the country. They were subject to several waves of dispossession: during the colonial era for plantation farming, during the Siyad Barre era by well-connected businessmen, government officials and army officers for land speculation and commercial agriculture (Besteman 1999), and during the wars of 1991-93 by the victorious ‘liberators’ of the anti-Barre forces, as land looting. Land dispossession occurred in multiple forms at different levels.

Urban land was also violently seized, especially during the wars of 1990-92, notably in Mogadishu (Kapteijns 2013). The capital was ‘clan cleansed’ of Darood during this period. Other cities, including Kismayo, were also disrupted and large-scale real estate seizures took place. With subsequent conflicts, and more particularly with economic development that followed political stability, urban real estate has taken on enormous value compared to earlier. However the history of land seizures and the many cases in which land has been inherited, divided, leased or sold, without a sovereign authority to authenticate the transactions, has led to an extraordinarily complex problem of contested land ownership in the cities. Disputes are significant not only to the concerned parties, but also at a broader, political level. As tensions peaked during early 2013 between the federal government in Mogadishu and the emerging Jubbaland regional administration in Kismayo over who should be driving the member state formation process (federal institutions or local politicians), rhetoric referenced the displacement of the 1990s, with Jubbaland politicians demanding land in Mogadishu be restored to the ‘Darood’ if the ‘Hawiiye’ (widely seen to dominate Mogadishu’s economy, and having held the federal presidency since 2009) wanted a say in Kismayo’s politics (Mosley 2015).

In Mogadishu the issues are the most complicated and salient (Rift Valley Institute 2017) and have the greatest potential to cause political dispute, commercial and economic disruption, and even insecurity. Nevertheless, in other regions, particularly port cities that have seen significant investment during the last five years (including Mogadishu, but also Kismayo, Bosaso and especially Berbera), as well as Hargeisa, which has grown significantly in the last decade, competition for land and speculative investment in real estate raises the potential for disputes. This issue has not been adequately researched, with important exceptions such as the Rift Valley Institute study noted above. Still less have processes of dispute resolution, such as the courts, been studied. This is a crucial question for the future stability and development of Somalia.

Business-government relations

Under the New Deal/Somali Compact (2013) framework, the (Western) donor community is investing significantly in expanding the capacity and legitimacy of the federal government and its institutions. Underpinning this intervention is the assumption that the government can boost its legitimacy by delivering services to the population in areas under its authority, and that moreover, this should take place within a framework of downward accountability, reinforced as the government funds its services from domestic taxation and revenue generation (Randa et al

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⁴ Mosley interviews in Hargeisa, January-February 2017.
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As described above, the relationship between business and government in Somalia has largely been antagonistic or predatory. Since 1991, businesses have largely resisted attempts to empower government over them, leading to fairly stable but limited government in Hargeisa, for example (Phillips 2013), or producing unexpected or contradictory outcomes, as in the case of the Transitional National Government produced by the Arta Process or the subsequent emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (Ahmad 2017). The degree to which the business sector has moved on in its approach to relations with central authority (or even local authority) presents an important line of inquiry. Business still provides much of the funding for the political marketplace. Where more durable forms of public authority have emerged, research can illuminate how sustainable relations with the business community have been established, and what prospect there exists for a more assertive role for those authorities in extracting revenues sustainably from business.

Community Level Dialogue and Mediation

There is a remarkable history of peacemaking efforts in Somalia since the late 1980s. The Life and Peace Institute states baldly:

Almost all established peacebuilding and conflict resolution approaches have been attempted in Somalia over the last two decades: a number of military interventions (by the U.S., UN, regional armies, African Union), numerous international and regional mediation efforts, bottom-up peacebuilding based on Somali customary approaches, national clan-based peacebuilding as well as all sorts of mixed approaches applying national, international and local efforts in parallel. All these approaches to peacebuilding and state-building have failed to establish security and peace in Somalia. (Life and Peace Institute 2014, p. 10)

However, other analyses present a more nuanced picture. For example, Mark Bradbury for Interpeace writes:

In a country which has become a by-word for seemingly endless political disorder and humanitarian crises, an analysis of ‘peace dynamics’ rather than ‘conflict dynamics’ reveals a society adapting to state collapse, managing conflict, and establishing systems of governance. The Somali region is not simply a lawless and ungoverned land but one where communities have forged a variety of systems to provide security and law and order and to facilitate economic activity. This study has recorded 90 local peace meetings in south and central Somalia alone since 1991. As such, the study provides an alternative history of the Somali region for the past two decades. (Bradbury 2009, p. 9)

The Interpeace peace mapping study, led by Bradbury, is a comparative study of Somali-managed peace meetings and internationally sponsored and mediated reconciliation conferences concerned with ‘national’ or ‘state-level’ governance and regional and international security. Its main concern is with social and traditional actors rather than those actors that serve as brokers with foreign donors (e.g. NGOs). The study finds that traditional conflict management is generally oriented towards restoring and sustaining social relations, while internationally led processes are focused on restoring state institutions. Local initiatives work in specific contexts, and do not either apply universal templates or seek replicability elsewhere. They are slow, inclusive, work through consensus, and do not claim to address underlying root causes. Bradbury writes:

Traditional Somalia approaches to peacemaking tend to be process rather than product oriented. Somali peace processes are, therefore, invariably long-drawn out, often lasting several months [or even] over a year. All the Somali-led conferences examined in this study were a culmination of several smaller, more localised meetings. The final peace conference and the accord did not themselves produce the peace; such meetings are rarely able to address ‘underlying causes’. It is, therefore, the process leading to the conference at which agreements and consensus are forged - and the implementation of the peace accord - that is important (p. 50)

None of the findings are strictly generalizable, because there are many agreements that fail, or achieve only limited success. Inclusion is respected more in rhetoric and aspiration than in formal participation (especially the participation of women).

A finding of particular note in the review is that local funding of peace initiatives facilitates local buy-in.
Bradbury writes, ‘All the local processes studied were predominantly - but not exclusively - locally financed, with communities raising both cash and goods-in-kind. The investment by people in a process is one measure of their commitment to it, although it can also highlight partial interests in a particular outcome.’ (p. 55)

The distinction between international and local peace efforts is not as clear-cut as might be imagined. Traditional initiatives have often prospered because of a context provided by an international effort, and international peace processes have also become co-opted into local political processes. The government of Djibouti, sponsor of several peace conferences, is itself a culturally Somali political actor, and a broker between local and international processes.

There are several studies that explore the views of Somali political actors, e.g. by the Life and Peace Institute (2014) and Saferworld (Crouch and Chevreux 2016). (The latter is specifically focused on Jubaland.) Having criticised existing approaches for being dominated by exclusion and a counter-terror agenda, these studies ask political actors what they see as the key issues, how those issues should be addressed, and what they would like Somalia to look like. They take pains to include actors that have been marginalised or excluded, including al-Shabaab. However, in the nature of opinion surveys (albeit conducted through semi-structured interviews), these studies are framed around certain questions, which are those of the state-building and power-sharing agendas, and the actors’ hopes and expectations for what a future Somali national state should resemble. As such they do not consider the calculations and processes that would be foregrounded in a political market analysis.

There are excellent, detailed and often critical accounts of the various national peace processes since the 1990s (Interpeace 2009). For an overview of the Djibouti process see Kasaja (2012). However, there are as yet no insider accounts of the negotiations based on documented source material. This is a significant gap.

**Humanitarian Crisis and Humanitarian Action**

Somalia suffered famine in 1991-92 and 2011-12 and, in 2017, suffered a severe humanitarian emergency that analysts warned may have descended into famine without external support. There is a considerable literature on this. The 1991-92 famine is outlined and analysed by de Waal (1997). The predominant concern of the academic and policy literature is the effectiveness and limitations of the early warning system (Lautze et al. 2012; Hobbs et al. 2012; Hillbruner and Moloney 2012; Mosley 2012; Bailey 2013), humanitarian access (Menkhaus 2010; Hammond and Vaughan-Lee 2012), and the challenges of dealing with al-Shabaab (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 2011; Jackson and Aynte 2013). Francesco Checchi (2013) is the leading authority on mortality in the famine. The most comprehensive account of the 2011-12 famine, covering all of these topics and some more as well, is Maxwell and Majid (2016).

Taking the three humanitarian emergencies/famines together we can identify the following causes and contributors, observing that in each case, a coincidence of several factors was needed in order to create a famine.

A striking feature of Somalia’s three famines is that they all struck hardest in the same area, which also happens to be the most fertile part of the country, namely the Jubba and Shebelle river valleys and the lands in between. These are areas inhabited by the minority clans and other riverian peoples of south-central Somalia, who have long been marginalised and subjected to forcible land alienation.

In two of the three cases, environmental decay and exposure to climatic shocks was a factor. In 2011 and 2017, climatic oscillations associated with el Niño/la Niña were major contributors to harvest failure and shortages of grazing for livestock.

In 2011, an important factor in the famine was exposure to an external economic shock, in the form of the second wave of the ‘global food crisis’. As a country heavily dependent on imported food and with its markets well integrated into global food markets, the food price hike of late 2010 and early 2011 hit the country hard. Lacking a government that can design and implement policies such as grain market interventions to mitigate global price movements, Somalis were particularly vulnerable. However, it should also be noted that the first wave of the global food crisis in 2008, did not have this impact.

In the 1992 and 2011 crises, the single greatest contributor to successful coping by the affected populations, was the size and effectiveness of social networks. Those who had large and widely-spread networks, and who were able to migrate purposefully or call upon family members in the diaspora, were far better placed to cope. Those without were much less able to do so. Maxwell and Majid conclude their analysis by noting, ‘Ultimately, the difference between being able to cope in extreme circumstances and not being able to cope came down to the issue of social connectedness.’ (pp. 114-5)

The 1992 famine was very largely caused by armed conflict, looting and the associated destruction of
livelihoods, displacement, and restrictions on commercial activities including the importation of food. These features recurred in 2011 and 2017 but in a more localised manner. Thus, while armed conflict is closely associated with food security crisis, it would be more generally accurate to conclude that it is one factor among several that leads to starvation. A significant factor is the degree to which national and local governance actors are involved in planning for emergencies, if they even have the capacity to do so; this was a key difference between the Kenyan and Ethiopian experiences of the 2011 drought and that in Somalia (Mosley 2012).

In the 2011 and 2017 crises, coercion and corruption in governance systems was also a culprit. Al-Shabaab imposes taxes, penalties and restrictions on the populations under its control. Maxwell and Majid write, ‘The Transitional Federal Government was peripherally involved in the response to the famine but this was more dependent on the goodwill and initiative of certain individuals rather than policy, and some government employees were actively competing to influence the direction of aid or attempting to profit from it.’ (p. 110). They note that about half of food aid went astray because of influence of businessmen, NGO leaders, government officials and militia leaders. Some incidents of diversion were linked to al-Shabaab, contributing to the U.S. decision to cut back on aid.

Turning to the issues relevant to the humanitarian response to the crisis, the lessons of the 1992 famine are less relevant after 25 years, but those from the 2011 crisis are highly pertinent to the current situation. The Maxwell and Majid (2016) study identifies the critical role of local ‘first responders’ and social networks in providing modest but timely assistance. A related factor is the leading role of the business community in providing assistance—a topic that has been hardly studied.

The international humanitarian system forecast the crisis in an accurate and timely manner. The information provided by FEWSNET and the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system was good. The problem lay entirely in the response. A notable constraint upon international humanitarian action was imposed by counter-terrorist legislation, notably the U.S. Patriot Act, which was crucially important in driving the U.S. decision to cut back on food assistance to Somalia as the crisis began to develop. Despite the efforts of both domestic U.S. actors (within the government and in the NGO sector) and international actors, the U.S. decision to find a workaround for the Patriot Act came very late in the day (Hammond and Vaughan-Lee 2012).

Finally, the Somalia famine of 2011 is notable for the role played by new humanitarian actors such as Turkey, the Gulf States and Islamic humanitarian agencies. These new agencies are widely distrusted by the major established donors and international NGOs, which have a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ approach (Maxwell and Majid 2016, p. 178). They have different modes of working, including focusing on providing assistance during Ramadhan and the Eid, giving food items regarded as luxuries by western agencies, but which are in high demand for these festivals. Interestingly, the Islamic agencies have no better record in getting access to al-Shabaab areas.

A particular gap in the study of the humanitarian response has been the role of Somali humanitarian and civil society actors, and how they are able to operate under the very difficult circumstances they face.

**Gender dynamics in Somali settings**

Gender has been an important theme throughout Somali history, and often linked to conflict and contestation. In the mid-1970s, the Barre regime promoted a secular, anti-‘clannist’ developmental agenda, including the legislation of changes to family law affecting women’s rights to own and inherit property, which shifted away from the various versions of Somali customary law or Sharia’a jurisprudence. Education was expanded and literacy improved, for men and women. Since the outbreak of the civil war, analysis of the gendered dimensions of politics, conflict and humanitarian issues in Somalia has tended to focus on the disproportionate impacts on women of conflict and insecurity, both physical and socioeconomic (Abdi 2011). However, given the protracted nature of Somalia’s political crisis, and the geographical variation in conditions of insecurity between the relatively stable Somaliland and Puntland towards the less settled parts of southern and central Somalia, there has also been a chance to analyse the role of women in various Somali peacemaking efforts – particularly in the north (Gardner and El Bushra 2004). Processes of dispute resolution and larger settlements have gendered dimensions, as these involve elders and respected Islamic scholars, both roles traditionally held by men. Women’s roles are often seen as indirect (Walls 2014), through influence over their spouses or children.

During the 2002-04 talks which produced the Transitional Federal Institutions, the ‘sixth clan’ movement sought to secure a structured position for women in governance. Sixth clan is a reference to the 4.5 clan quota system, wherein each of the four major clans (Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Digil-Mirifle) is given an equal share of representation in national institutions, with a half-share allocated to the
‘minority clans’. Although quotas for women have been part of the provisional constitution since 2012, as the seat quotas are distributed, clan elders have consistently proved reluctant to allocate their seats to female candidates (Ingiriis and Hoehne 2013). However, women have been taking more prominent roles in frontline politics, including senior positions in the various federal cabinets (Hammond 2013a).

The Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has framed much international intervention in Somalia over the last two decades, in promotion of gender equality in post-conflict settings – mainly through efforts which target formal institutions. The WPS agenda rests of the assumption that more participation by women and movement towards gender equality will support peace and security in post-conflict reconstruction. Horst (2017) examines the lived experience of Somali women of political participation, and relates this to the normative agenda behind WPS. In resonance with many aspects of international intervention in Somalia, Horst finds that the WPS agenda fails to take local realities into account, particularly local understandings of ‘gender equality’ and ‘inclusion’ (p. 391). This failure leaves the WPS agenda struggling to find purchase within a framework of ‘norm diffusion’, which posits a transfer of norms from the ‘international’ to the ‘local’. Horst’s research also illuminates the range of perspectives held, including by those in Somali settings who have links to or have lived abroad, including in liberal societies, but who might not share the normative assumptions underpinning the WPS agenda.

Other literature also seeks to challenge stereotypes of women as passive victims and/or peacemakers. Indeed, in addition to the ‘sixth clan’ movement, Ingiriis and Hoehne (2013) describe women’s engagement as combatants and in exhorting their clan’s militia fighters to action. Women can also occupy important positions in clan relations, as members of one clan by birth and (often) another by marriage, sometimes allowing them to play a role as interlocutors. In addition, as Gardner and El Bushra (2015) explore in their important study of the impact of war on masculinity, in conditions of displacement women – who are often specifically targeted for humanitarian or development assistance – may often replace men as the main source of household income, by pursuing economic activities (such as petty trading) which are not considered gender appropriate for men. This can result in economic emasculation (loss of raganimo, the Somali concept of masculinity). For men, this can have knock on effects on social mobility, particularly the question of becoming a respected contributor to community debates, and potentially an elder (Gardner and El Bushra 2015).

A final area of interest for our agenda is the question of gendered dimensions of access to justice. Already in customary law, as well as in Islamic jurisprudence, women and men have different recourse to justice. Schlee (2013) notes that while customary institutions have been hailed as providing stability in Somalia, in practice, the experience of justice is uneven. This has clan dimensions as well as gendered dimensions, with larger or more powerful clans more likely to be able to impose a more favourable resolution through such institutions. Allen et al (2016) assess the range of challenges facing Somalia’s formal judicial institutions, in terms of being able to deliver access to justice for most citizens, and at the local level, due to bureaucratic incapacity and, more significantly, rampant corruption. In a case focused on Dhobley town in Awdal district of Lower Juba, from which al-Shabaab was expelled in 2012, Allen et al note the challenges of access to and availability of local, formal justice institutions. Similar to Schlee (2013), they also find that access is affected by factors such as clan and wealth, with wealthier individuals and those from more power clans better positioned to seek justice. Gender will be an important aspect of our inquiry into land-related disputes.
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